Lobbying the EU Institutions in a Pluralistic Environment: An Analysis of the Public Affairs activities in Brussels based on Interviews with Stakeholders, Decision-makers and Officials at the Institutions
Translated title
At Lobbe EU Institutionerne i et Pluralistisk miljø: en analyse af lobbyismen i Bryssel baserat på interviewer med interesse grupper, beslutningstagere og ansatte på institutionerne
Author
Fast, Anna Yvonne
Term
4. term
Education
Publication year
2016
Submitted on
2016-05-31
Pages
68
Abstract
Denne afhandling undersøger, hvordan lobbyisme fungerer i EU, og hvorfor den er central for politikudformningen i Bruxelles. EU sigter mod et pluralistisk system, hvor mange interesser kan deltage, men i praksis dominerer stærke, velorganiserede aktører og korporativistiske elementer ofte dagsordenen. Indflydelse tilfaller oftest dem, hvis mål flugter med de EU-institutioner, der har flest kompetencer. Ressourcer og specialiseret viden betyder meget, fordi EU-institutionerne er afhængige af ekstern ekspertise i politikprocessen. Lobbyisme er derfor kompleks: mange aktører konkurrerer om begrænset opmærksomhed, og den stærke interesserepræsentation øger kompleksiteten. Med udgangspunkt i Schendelens tre arenaer kræver et fuldstændigt sejrsresultat, at man samtidig får succes i EU-institutionerne (som skal tillade det ønskede udfald), blandt interessenterne (som skal levere støtte) og i egen organisation (som skal bakke op). Det er sjældent på grund af hård konkurrence, krydspres på embedsmænd, lav tillid mellem interessenter og hyppige interne splittelser. Selv uden sejr i alle tre arenaer kan interessenter påvirke politikken, hvilket afspejles i de undersøgte policy-udfald. Studiet bygger på kvalitative, semistrukturerede interviews med interessenter inden for dyrevelfærd, miljø, kooperativer, landbrug og byer samt med beslutningstagere i EU og personer, der påvirker dem. Analysen diskuterer pluralisme, korporativisme og interesserepræsentation og inddrager EU-institutionernes kompetencer og procedurer for at vise, hvilke aktører det er mest relevant at påvirke, og hvordan.
This thesis examines how lobbying works in the EU and why it is central to shaping policy in Brussels. The EU aims for a pluralistic system where many interests can participate, but in practice powerful, well-organized actors and corporatist elements often dominate the agenda. Influence tends to go to those whose goals align with the EU institutions holding the most competences. Resources and specialized knowledge matter because EU bodies rely on external expertise during the policy process. Lobbying is therefore complex: many actors compete for limited attention, and strong interest representation adds layers of complexity. Drawing on Schendelen’s three arenas, a complete victory requires simultaneous success in the EU institutions (which must allow the desired outcome), among stakeholders (who must provide support), and within one’s home organization (which must offer backing). This is rare due to intense competition, cross-pressure on officials, low trust among stakeholders, and frequent internal divisions. Even without winning in all three arenas, stakeholders can still shape policy, as reflected in the outcomes examined. The study uses qualitative, semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in animal welfare, environment, cooperatives, agriculture, and cities, as well as EU decision-makers and people who influence them. The analysis discusses pluralism, corporatism, and interest representation, and considers the competences and procedures of EU institutions to show which actors are most worth targeting and how.
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