1. **Introduction**

This Master Thesis examines the stakeholders lobbying of the EU institutions in Brussels and the complexity it involves. In the EU, lobbying is of great importance in order to influence the decision-makers to make policies that are in the stakeholders’ interests. The stakeholders are many and there is severe competition in whose interests will gain most attention. The assumption is that the ones with most resources and with economic interests gain most of the attention of the EU institutions i.e. the European Commission (EC), the European Parliament (EP), the European Council and Council, which makes it harder for stakeholders with fewer resources or who are lobbying soft values to achieve the same attention for their cause. It therefore appears to be an inequality aspect among the stakeholders in regards to access to the EU institutions. It appeared as the animal welfare NGOs faced a specific difficulty to make their issues and expertise heard by the decision-makers and people with influence on these decision-makers. Due to this, the question arose about what it was that made it so difficult and if it was the specific subject that caused obstacles. I did not seem as stakeholders within other subjects were exposed to these obstacles. This created an interest to investigate stakeholders within other areas to achieve knowledge about their experience of lobbying the EU institutions and if that differed from the animal welfare stakeholders’.

On average, the stakeholders interviewed in this thesis have been lobbying the EU institutions for decades and by that influenced the decision-making of the EU under a long period of time. It was not possible to cover such a long period because of the resources it would had involve and has therefore been limited to only include the previous EC under Barosso and the present EC under Juncker i.e. ca. 2006-2016. It should be sufficient enough, since the previous and the present ECs have significantly different agendas, which is discussed in the analyse chapter of the thesis.

A qualitative research was used to investigate the stakeholders’ experiences of lobbying in Brussels with several of animal welfare lobbyists to examine if they all had the same experience of lobbying animal welfare. Interviews with stakeholders lobbying the environment, consumers, the cities and the agriculture sector where made enabling a comparison of their experience to the animal welfare stakeholders’. This was to establish if lobbying different subjects matter in regards to the EU institutions. The purpose behind the interviews was to investigate who they lobby, what approach they used, what obstacles there are, what the main problems are, and if the experiences and views differed within and between the subjects. To achieve an increased understanding of the topic, interviews with decision-makers and people who have influence on these were interviewed as well enabling a view of the aspects from both sides.

The stakeholders’ objective is to influence the decision-makers so the end results of the policies of the EU are in their favour. Some of the policies where these stakeholders have been influential are therefore included in order to create an overview of the policy field and an understanding of the stakeholders’ interests and achievements. It is also to present what the previous EC accomplished and what was prioritized enabling a comparison between the previous and the present ECs’ priorities. The policies included are within the areas of most of the stakeholders interviewed i.e. animal welfare, environment and agriculture. The stakeholders of the big cities of the EU and the cooperatives are interviewed as well, but the policies within these areas are not provided here. Although, consumers is of interest for the cooperatives and is included in the policies presented. The interviews with these stakeholders were foremost to provide insight of stakeholders within subjects that differs from the others to achieve an additional view of the lobbying arena of Brussels.

In regards to theories, pluralism and corporatism has been chosen, since these theories are highly relevant for the topic. The reason for this is due to the EU’s pluralistic environment where all stakeholders should have the same access to the EU institutions and be equally included as external sources in the decision-making. The theories are compared to the reality of the lobbying arena in the analysis. Lobbying the EU institutions are considered to be complex due to the solid competition with a high number of stakeholders, therefore interest representation has been included. Interest presentation also has to be presented to create an overview of the lobbying arena in Brussels and to highlight what the competitiveness constitutes. The theories are also discussed in the context of interest representation in the theory chapter. This is to create transparency of the scenery of the arena in Brussels and what is involved, and what it is that is so specific about lobbying the EU institutions, but also to increase the understanding of the issues in the interviews.

* 1. **Problem formulation**

The animal welfare NGOs are strongly represented in Brussels, but competition with resourceful stakeholders and their specific interests make the lobbying of animal welfare a complicated business, which created the following problem formulation:

Do the stakeholders within animal welfare experience lobbying the EU institutions differently compared to stakeholders that are lobbying other interests, and if so, why?

2.0 **Methodology**

2.1 **Synopsis**

This Master Thesis was initiated by a 6 month internship at Eurogroup for Animals (Eurogroup) in Brussels from September 2015. Eurogroup is a federation of NGOs and is lobbying animal welfare in the EU institutions. The Thesis is also based on my 8th semester project, which lead to lobbying the EU institutions. The project raised an interest for lobbying and at Eurogroup the complexity of it was experienced first-hand and increased the interest to examine it further. The practical experience of the lobbying arena in Brussels should be an advantage in regards to the topic of this thesis where the first-hand knowledge of the topic must be seen as an advantage.

Thanks to the fantastic people at Eurogroup, despite being enormously busy, a qualitative research in form of interviews of stakeholders and people at institutions in Brussels could be reality. It is also thanks to all the fantastic people agreeing to be interviewed and who took time out of their busy schedules to meet with me. I cannot thank all these people enough and especially, Andreas Erler at Eurogroup, who put in a lot of work searching for people to be interviewed.

2.2 **Limitation**

The topic is enormous and therefore exclusion of subjects and collected data was necessary. For example, it became necessary to exclude the success rate (see appendix I) because it was not tangible to measure. It would have taken an extended research to make a proper estimation, which was not possible to perform. An overview of the EU’s policies of the stakeholders’ interests is included instead to demonstrate the influences the stakeholders have achieved. Some data from the stakeholders also had to be excluded due to the extensive volume of it. Therefore, the data that was most relevant to the problem formulation was chosen, but should not affect the result. The period was limited to the ECs of Barosso and Juncker, since the data refers mostly to these ECs.

2.3 **The project design**

2.3.1 **Introduction and problem formulation**

This chapter contains the introduction (1.0) and the problem formulation (1.1). The intention with the introduction is first of all to introduce what the paper contains and its outlines, but also to create an interest for the reader to continue to read. It is to create an understanding for the lobbying in Brussels and also new knowledge about the conditions for lobbying the EU institutions. The problem formulation builds on the observations of the situation experienced in Brussels.

2.3.2 **Theory**

This chapter (3.0) presents the theories where pluralism and corporatism have been chosen, since these are the ones most relevant to the interest representation in Brussels and makes that lobbying arena special. The topic is special and therefore it was necessary with theories which could explain these circumstances to reach an as accurate answer as possible to the problem formulation. No other theories cover the specificity of lobbying the EU institutions as these theories, none of the grand theories either. Pluralism and corporatism are also discussed in regards to the interest representation as a tool to clarify how the lobbying and the EU institutions functions. The competences of the individual EU institutions are also included in this chapter. It appeared most logic to place it there in order to create a flow in the information. The chapter is foremost based on “Interest Representation in the European Union” by Justin Greenwood (1), Professor of European Public Policy at Robert Gordon University in Aberdeen, UK, and visiting Professor at the College of Europe and “The Art of Lobbying the EU: More Machiavelli in Brussels” by Rinus van Schendelen (1), Professor of Political Science at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam, NL, and visiting Professor in North America, China, Middle East and the whole of Europe, and holds seminars (the author of this thesis has attended one thanks to Eurogroup). These professors are specialists in this topic and appeared as most interesting. Additional information from webpages are used as well.

2.3.3 **Introduction of the people interviewed in Brussels**

This chapter (4.0) presents the people interviewed. The stakeholders are 7 from animal welfare associations, 2 from environmental associations, 1 from a cooperative association, 1 from the EU cities association and 1 from the agriculture sector. People from institutions include 1 MEP from SE and 1 from the NL, a policy officer from DG Agri and a Swedish Permanent Representative. It is divided in two sub-chapters where 4.1 present the stakeholders and 4.2 present the people being lobbied. The choice of these people is explained in the qualitative method chapter.

2.3.4 **The EU Policies**

This chapter (5.0) presents some of the policies within animal welfare, environment and agriculture. It is only the most relevant policies of the otherwise extensive area. The purpose is to demonstrate what the previous EC had done and started, and to display the influence the stakeholders have achieved, and to create an understanding for the issues, but also because some the policies are mentioned in the analysis. The policies are presented in their original form in Appendix II and are only describe in the chapter and are divided into subchapters where 5.1 is animal welfare, 5.2 the environment and 5.3 is the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). It ends with a short presentation of the present EC as 5.4. The sources are websites and the “Consolidated Reader-Friendly Edition of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as amended by the Lisbon Treaty (2007)” by Jens-Peter Bonde because of its accessibility.

2.3.5 **Analysis**

This chapter (6.0) contains the analysis, which is based on a qualitative research of collected data from the interviews. The stakeholders’ questions are based on observations and experiences from the internship, while the questions to the people at the institutions are based on the questions to the stakeholders (Appendix I). The data are analysed in regards to the theories of pluralism and corporatism. Additional material from the chapters in this thesis and from websites, and Schendelen’s book are used. The point with the collected data is to base the analysis on the stakeholders and the people at the institutions’ own experience of the lobbying arena in Brussels, since this can vary in regards to the stakeholders’ interest and the lobbied persons’ position and institution. To base the analysis on the interviewed persons own stories was inspired by Bryman’s (2012: 582) narrative analysis. The purpose was also to increase the transparency of the data by avoiding form being taken out of context and with the aim to make the analysis as objective as possible. There are a number of people who have write about this topic, but it is very different to experience it first-hand and the aim of this thesis is to recreate that experience.

An analyse model are used with the purpose to make the collected data more tangible and by that increase the transparency of the subjects in order to find the information to answer the problem formulation. This is done through a model which is based on categories of the subjects of the interview questions. The model is divided into two subchapters where the first is the categories of the stakeholders and the second is the categories of the people at the institutions.

6.1 The categories of the analysis model for the stakeholders are:

* 6.1.1 Who and how the stakeholders lobby
* 6.1.2 What obstacles are there
* 6.1.3 The main difficulties

6.2 The categories of the analysis model for the people at the institutions are:

* 6.2.1 Which stakeholders do they meet
* 6.2.2 The approaches the stakeholders use
* 6.2.3 Are all stakeholders and interests equal
* 6.2.4 What influence do the stakeholders have

2.3.6 **Conclusion**

This chapter (7.0) contains the conclusion, which main purpose is to answer the problem formulation as accurate as possible. The aim is to find information in regards to the problems and issues the other stakeholders eventually experience that the stakeholders within animal welfare may not experience and by that an additional dimension would be achieved. The aim of the conclusion is also to be able to present eventual recommendations (7.1), not only for the stakeholders within animal welfare, but for all the stakeholders.

2.4 **Sources**

The sources used in the chapters have already been introduced in the presentation of the chapters and will therefore not be repeated here. But additionally information is necessary because there are sources which do not have page numbers and is the reason for the absence of these. There are also sources where the date is absent and in these occasions a number has been added instead e.g. the European Commission (1) where the number is added instead of date and year depending on the type of source for clarification in the references.

2.5 **Qualitative** **method**

The qualitative method was in this context used as the research method to find the empirical material here in form of interviews. The qualitative method was chosen over the quantitative because interviews covered the subject more thorough than surveys would have enabled. The purpose with the interviews was to achieve as much information about the persons’ experiences about the subject as possible where a face to face method was thought to increase depth in the information. The description is based on “Social research methods” by Alan Bryman.

The type of interview performed in the research is semi-structured with open ended questions. The purpose of using this type of interview technic is that the same series of general questions have been asked to the stakeholders and the people at the institutions respectively, but enabled additional questions to clarify matters or to achieve further depth of the responses. All the stakeholders have been asked the same questions, but since the questions were open ended there was an opportunity for the person to make interpretations and by that the answers and the length of the answers to the questions varies a lot. The participants at the institutions were asked another series of questions, which was based and correspond to the stakeholders’, but were the same for all and also with an opportunity for interpretation and where additional questions for clarification or to increase depth were asked and by that the answers vary here as well. (Bryman 2012:2012)

The idea with the interviews where to examine the stakeholders experiences of lobbying the EU institutions and if the experiences depended on the subject they lobbied. This was due to difficulties with lobbying animal welfare where some institutions where hard to access and to achieve attention. It was therefore interesting to examine other stakeholders experience with the EU institutions, who were lobbying other subjects than animal welfare to be compared. In order to cover as many angels as possible of the topic, people from the institutions and their experience with the stakeholders and the lobbying in Brussels where also examined, and to give them the opportunity to share their view and experience. It was unfortunately not possible to achieve interviews with all institutions, therefore only the most accessible people are included in this thesis (see chapter 4).

The choice of people to interview was based on the subjects and it was necessary to establish the difficulties of lobbying animal welfare first of all. Most of the stakeholders are therefore within animal welfare i.e. 3 from animal welfare NGOs and 4 from Eurogroup to establish if the experience differed. The reason for interviewing 4 people from Eurogroup is that they all have their specialities and therefore the experiences differ slightly, which increased the information. Data, which are stating the same from all of them, are excluded to avoid repetition. Then to establish the experience of stakeholders lobbying other subjects, there are 1 from an environmental NGO and 1 from an environmental federation, 1from a cooperative association, 1 from an Association of the EU cities and 1 representing the agriculture sector were chosen. Environment and agriculture are related to animal welfare, and cooperatives through consumers and human health. The cities are included to establish the experience of a different area compared to the others to establish if it makes a difference. Moreover, environment and animal welfare are soft values, while agriculture and cooperatives are businesses, although, these also lobbying soft values as well, agriculture is defending the farmers and cooperatives the consumers and cooperatives are consumer owned. The wish was to include more institutions, but could not be achieved. Therefore, the 2 MEPs and the official from the EC agency interviewed are accessible people and cannot be seen as representing the majority of people working in the EU institutions. The reason for the interview with the Swedish Perm Rep was to include the MSs and another important channel to influence.

The qualitative method has been criticized for being too subjective because it relies too much on the researchers view and also because of the personal aspect where the researcher and the interviewed create a relationship to a certain extent by the face to face method. It is also criticized for being difficult to replicate, which according to Bryman can be difficult in any form for social science, since it is unstructured and relies on the researcher’s resourcefulness. The lack of standard procedures also makes it more or less impossible to replicate. This is due the investigator in the qualitative research is the principal instrument in the collection of the data and the data is affected by what the researcher observes and hears, and then the decisions are based on the researcher’s predisposition. It is also due to its small size of the people taking part and who are from certain organisations and within a certain area creates problems with generalization and therefore restricts the data, although, 17 interviews were made here. It can also cause a lack of transparency because the exact method is not known or how the conclusion has been achieved. (Bryman 2012: 405-406)

The qualitative research in this thesis is of course no exception despite the author’s aim to be as objective as possible and to make it as transparent as possible, but selections are hard to avoid. The method to use the people interviewed own experiences and to let them tell the stories themselves was therefore seen as a possibility to increase the objectivity as much as possible. It should therefore be possible to replicate at least up to a point. The questions can always be replicated, but the replies depend on what kind of stakeholders and institutions are approached and the subject has to be the same. It probably also depends a lot on if the same people interviewed for this thesis want to be included again, considering their busy schedule, it is doubtful. The method is otherwise pretty straight forward, as described in this chapter. Additionally, the data was collected first due to the internship in Brussels, which created the possibility for making these interviews and would have been more or less impossible to achieve after the internship had finished. Especially, since interviews where made over one and a half month time and the internship at Eurogroup increased the possibilities to reach people for interviews. This leads to the theory.

3.0 **Theory**

This chapter presents the theories of pluralism, and corporatism, and the interest representation in the EU. Pluralism and corporatism stands for the theoretical part, while interest representation is of importance for the context of the lobbying arena and the competition in it. The competences of the EU institutions are also included here, since it has affect on the lobbying.

First a clarification of the concepts: Lobbying activity is referred to as Public Affairs (PA) and the managing as Public Affairs Management (PAM); lobbyists as PA managers, interest groups and stakeholders.

Schendelen (2013:60) states, “The public affairs (derived from the Latin *res publica*) of an interest group are the threats and opportunities it perceives in its outside world, in short the external agenda it wants to manage” PA is the threats and opportunities of an interest group and PAM appeared on the lobbying arena in search for techniques to influence the managing of the external agenda more efficiently, to protect and promote one’s own interests strategically (Ibid 2013:60).

3.1 **Pluralism and Corporatism**

*The definitions of lobbying, pluralism and corporatism in this context are referred to as:*

*The definition of Lobbying*: an activity stakeholders use in order to influence decision-makers to make decisions in the stakeholders’ interest. Lobbying is dependent on the people or groups or institutions, which are holding the power and the definition of a lobby group is “a pressure group that in unorthodox ways tries to gather information and support” (Schendelen 2013: 58).

*The definition of Pluralism*: pluralism is the representativeness where all stakeholders despite diversity of interests shall be taken into account in the decision-making of the policy processes. The stakeholders are external actors, who are lobbying to influence the EU institutions from an external position. It is the stakeholders that approach the institutions to build relationships enabling influence from outside.

*The definition of Corporatism*: corporatism is the relation between the decision-makers and stakeholders where some stakeholders are more integrated in the decision process than others e.g. by specific expertise. The process can by that be controlled by key interest groups with prioritised interests. The stakeholders are invited by the institutions to participate in e.g. expert groups or dialogues and thereby achieve influence from inside.

Pluralism is here used to establish an understanding for the democratic principles of lobbying the EU institutions, which are dependent on external interest groups in the decision-making where all interests are to be considered in the decision process. Simultaneously, the stakeholders compete for influence, but it should not lead to unequal representation of interests. Schendelen (2013: 302) states “In this pluralistic setting many stakeholders are eager to develop their own networks, coalitions and cartels, in order to get a grip on the arena and its outcomes,” but “Even the most corporatist arena allows the insiders only limited control, as there are always challengers inside and many more outside.” Although, an example of corporatism in the EU is that Bouwen (2002 in Greenwood 2011:14) “found that large individual firms had a higher degree of access to the Commission than EU-level associations.” Therefore, some stakeholders achieve an advantage over other stakeholders, who cannot compete under the same conditions decreasing the chances of influence. And according to Greenwood (2011:14) if stakeholders are not in line with the EU institutions’ view on the liberal market integration; they can find themselves surplus and by that need to re-evaluate their own values before being reconsidered. This strengthens the corporatist theory that there are interest groups within the market that are prioritised by the EU, while excluding interest groups from the playing field with other values than the EU’s own.

Pluralism and corporatism is here discussed in regards to the interest representation in the EU institutions’ decision-making. Pluralism constitutes the framework of representative democracy and itemizes the role of the interest groups as the participatory democratic supplement in the decision-making. The EU is dependent upon participatory channels due to weaknesses in the representative channel, which is caused by the low number of EU citizens participating in the EP elections and the lack of common identity amongst them. Thereby a link between civil society and the political institutions is missing and civil society is replaced by interest groups acting as agents of accountability. These become substitute in the democratic mechanism by dominating the contribution to the participatory channel. That civil society is not participating weakens the pluralism in the playing field and therefore only the interests of the interest groups are represented. The question to the EU institutions’ high dependents and the interest groups’ institutionalization is to what extent the interest groups can be the connection between civil society and the institutions. This is also in regards to which interest wins and in whose interest, which may not be in the interest of civil society as a whole. (Greenwood 2011:1, 13, 208)

3.2 **Interest Representation**

The EU’s dependents on interest groups are also due to the EU’s own character where it is primarily oriented toward regulations to create legislative harmonization in the MSs. According to Lowi (1964 as quoted in ibid 2011:2) “regulation can concentrate costs and benefits narrowly upon particular stakeholders, often of a highly technical nature, thus making organized interests significant political actors.” This signifies corporatism, since it builds a relation between the decision-makers and key stakeholders, who can use the internal position to their advantage. Greenwood (2011:3) strengthens this argument by stating “Representative democracy has election results as a means to aggregate popular preferences, whereas there is no equivalent in participatory democracy, leading to the danger that well-organized, knowledgeable, and resourced groups might dominate public policy agendas.” This also limits the EU system by creating sensitivity to pressure from external interests in regards to direct accountability, especially, in regards to technical information where the regulation can be captured by stakeholders with specific knowledge. This strengthens the notion of corporatism and creates challenges, since the principle of representative democracy should reflect the variety of participating interest groups, but here it is a risk that only the elite of stakeholders are involved in the policy making. This needs to be addressed where check and balance is to ensure a wider participation, but such pluralistic efforts can be hard to achieve within complicated technical issues. Even though, the check and balance should establish that no specific interests can dominate the political system where other agents can put pressure upon the accountability of these stakeholders. (Ibid 2011:2-4)

According to Greenwood (2011:6) “A complex multi-level system such as the EU intensifies consensual outcomes, and the need for alliances, in the search for solutions of any kind, and information about the potential for solutions.” In regards to the consensual outcomes, the policy outcomes in the EU are consensual in their nature and therefore connected to alliances. This is because in consensual systems there is no “the winner takes it all” and by that alliances are needed to increase influence on the proposals. Since the EU seeks information from interest groups e.g. business PA managers seek dialogue with NGOs, especially within subjects that are popular with the public. This is to be perceived as a part of the solution and not a cause of the problem, but could also be because of mutual interests where an alliance can strengthen the influence gaining both. In regards to the search for solutions, a pluralistic view should be preferable, since acquiring information from several of interest groups would create a wider knowledge in finding potential solutions. The EU institutions are also provided with information from interest groups in regards to the potential for a proposed legislation to have a successful outcome. (Ibid 2011:6)

Since the EU’s decision-making is dependent on external interest groups, transparency is of importance to uphold a democratic pluralistic arena. To ensure this, the EP and the EC have established the European Transparency Register (ETR), which is a publicized database where the stakeholders have to register in order to influence the policy-making. But Greenwood (2011:8) argues that there is not a definitive list of how many stakeholders or what kind of stakeholders that is active, which the system depends upon in order for the stakeholders to uphold democratic functions. According to the ETR (Europa 2) there are 9112 entries on the 16/04/2016 in the register, but Greenwood (2011:8) states, amongst others, that it lacks a governance mechanism and is too open for entries of all kinds. There are even organizations that have not signed up despite being active stakeholders. There are also different categories to register under and the organizations can make the categorization of their choice, which creates a misleading number of organizations. The democratic intentions with the register are thereby weakened. (Ibid 2011:8-9)

Greenwoods critique of the ETR seems to be justified because the EP has called upon the EC to make it mandatory by 2017 for lobbyists to reveal their budget and methods in the register, and to make it difficult to be active if not registered (EuroActive 16/04/2014). The EP in its turn has accreditation for entering its premises and it is only issued to stakeholders that are registered in the ETR (Europa 4). The EP has the exclusive rights to grant requests for access and the applications must be submitted via the ETR (Europa 5), which should increase the transparency.

There are also regulations for the EU institutions’ officials and include the rules of conduct when meeting with stakeholders, and should reflect the pluralistic structure. Article 11 (96) states: “He shall carry out the duties assigned to him objectively, impartially and in keeping with his duty of loyalty to the communities” (Staff Regulation 2004: I-8). The objectivity and impartially should maintain pluralism and avoid the process being controlled by key stakeholders where there are also rules to prevent corruption “An official shall not without permission of the appointing authority accept from any government or from any other source outside the institution to which he belongs any honour, decoration, favour, gift or payment of any kind (….)” (Ibid 2004: I-9).

This leads to the interest representation itself where the solid competition for the decision-makers attention makes a presentation of the stakeholder scene relevant. The stakeholders are many, which create a solid competition due to the pluralistic environment of the EU where the stakeholders have to compete for the attention, but all are not included here. The main stakeholders’ interests include business and professional interests, labour interests, and citizens’ interests such as environment, consumer, animal welfare, human rights, etc. There are also territorial interests and organized civil society and European integration. The cross-sectorial interests are represented by large resourceful groups with economic interests such as Business Europe (national business associations), the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) and the EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce (both based around large corporations), European Association of Craft, Small and Medium sized Enterprises (UEAPME), the Confederation of national associations representing small and medium enterprises (SMEs), the Associations of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry (EUROCHAMBRES), the representation of national associations of Chambers of Commerce, the European Centre of Employers and Enterprises providing public Services (CEEP), the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), and the European Council of the Liberal Professions (CEPLIS). This is a strong representation of economic interests with market expertise, which is of interest for the EU. It therefore risks creating a corporatist relation between these stakeholders and the institutions where these stakeholders become more integrated than others in the policy process. (Greenwood 2011:13-15)

In regards to the representation of citizens’ interests, the representation is by related family networks such as the Green Ten (10 of the largest environmental organisations), but also through two different kinds of organisation where one is based on representation of European membership organisations such as the Platform of European Social NGOs and the other are more based on advocacy representing a specific sector e.g. the European Citizens Action Service (ECAS) for European Citizens rights. The sectorial organisations are of a more federative structure and also include trade unions and some of the business organisations based on national business association. Although, these are large organisations all of them do not have interests based on economic values, but on soft values and in order to maintain the pluralistic structure, the EU supports some of these stakeholders with economic funding. The reason is to prevent more resourceful stakeholder to dominate the political system where fragmentation of power exists to a high degree. The funding should enable these stakeholders to challenge the interests of producers by empowering different kind of interests. This is to establish a pluralistic check and balance where the interests can be challenged by each other. It is also empowered to do so by procedures where the corner stones are transparency regimes and measures for participation such as the funding of citizen interest groups, but also detailed rules in regards to consultation, seen in the officials’ code of conduct. (Greenwood 2011: 15, 22, 32)

Moreover, the experience of working within the EU’s pluralistic environment various amongst the stakeholders and depends on the traditions of the origin where e.g. the Brits are used to working outside the group in a pluralistic tradition, while the Germans are used to work in a more collective way out of a corporatist tradition (Greenwood 2011:17). Furthermore, the interest representation’s practices are also driven by the institutions’ specific procedures e.g. who has the responsibility for the initiation of the policies, or if there are mechanisms in case of defaults that can halt the legislation from passing, etc. (Ibid 2011:7). This leads to the institutions competences.

3.3 **The EU Institutions’ Competences**

The representation’ practices are connected to the competences of the EU institutions and the distribution of their power, which is of essence to know. According to Schendelen (2013:17) the development of the treaties through time has increased the competences of the EU institutions, which has changed the EU playing field. Previous, the EU policy competences where strongest within the markets e.g. “competition, open market, agriculture, industry and environment” (Ibid 2013: 17); the EC had the competence of acting as an agenda setter with proposals for legislations. The Council had the competences within Justice, Home Affairs, Security and Foreign Affairs. The EP had co-decision power equal to the Council on a limited number of areas within the market. But by 2012, the powers of the EU institutions increased and the EC’s regime extended into the areas of e.g. Justice and Home Affairs and the EP’s co-decision powers extended. (Ibid 2013: 17)

The EU Council is the institute of heads of governments of the MSs with its own president. There are several of councils and levels below it, but the ones most relevant here refers to the General Affairs Council (GAC), which is chaired by a MS with a presidency which rotates every six month and the Council of Ministers (Council). The EU Council do not have legislative powers that can bind others. The ordinary Council has that power, and most decisions are in co-decision with the EP and its decisions are mostly based on QMV. The Council “formally controls both the treaties and the legislative acts that follow” (Schendelen 2013: 87) and by that has more power than influence (Ibid 2013: 103). (Ibid 2013: 77-78)

The EC has 28 Commissioners and each has its own Cabinet. It has a president, who is in charge of the internal and external operations e.g. dividing portfolios to the Commissioners, set up the weekly agendas, inter-institutional affairs such as the budget and working programmes. The decisions are made by simple majority. The policies are made by the EC’s Director Generals (DGs), ca 25 plus 10 services. The Commissioners’ portfolios are often not parallel to the policy areas of the DGs and Services, which can cause conflicts of interest, but is solved by internal procedures. Some of the DGs have more power than others e.g. the Secretarial-General (SG), which serves the College and the Legal Service and can block proposals. The EC’s agencies are specialized and decentralized entities that monitors and execute or regulate certain policies. The EC “has (almost) the exclusive privilege to draft legislation, which prohibits the EP and/or the Council to do so formally. It also has become the largest producer of non-legislative acts” (delegated and implementing) (Schendelen 2013: 80). Because of the EC’s relatively small size, it outsources some of the policy work to national authorities, but also by in-sourcing externally e.g. have public consultations and setting up expert groups with people from interest groups (Ibid 2013: 92). (Ibid 2013:78-80)

The EP has 751 MEPs including a president and operates by majority vote. The effectivity is challenged by the many different national parties represented. Almost all of the MEPs are a member of one of the seven political groups where the two largest are the EPP (European People’s Party) and the S&D (the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats), which together have a potential of absolute majority. It works mainly through committees, which get their composition and competences through plenary decision. “The groups inside a committee assign dossiers for plenary decision-making to one or a few members (called rapporteurs and co-rapporteurs), around whom the other groups nominate their ‘shadow rapporteur’” (Schendelen 2013: 82). The EP has legislative powers over secondary legislation, not treaties, where it has codecision with amendment and veto equal to the Council and covers about one-third of the legislation. Its main procedure is still consultation. “The full codecision procedure holds two readings plus, after a ‘conciliation’ with key people of the Council and Commission (trialogue or triangle), a final third reading, and may require from the EP an absolute majority” (Ibid 2013: 82). (Ibid 2013: 82)

In regards to the EU playing field and its complexity, the EU is not typical in its design or how it works, and appears as a labyrinth. It is highly open and informal on its input side where the absorption for various interest and stakeholders are endless, but it is rigorous and formal on its output side when it comes to the enforcement of the laws. In the middle of this the various inputs transforms into common decisions, which are supported by competitive interest groups and approved by officials. A crucial factor is often time because of the tempo of the decision-making in the EU where the EP and the Council’s first reading in the codecision-making are often 12 month and if a second one is needed it is 22 month in general. The EP is known to be the most open and then the EC, while the Council is the most closed. Although, the MEPs are most in favour of receiving stakeholders from their own MS if they are not rapporteurs, while the EC is welcoming all stakeholders within all interests, and where the Council’s backdoor is slightly open. Due to this, the EP appears to be the most pluralistic and the Council lean more at corporatist, while the EC is somewhere in between. Although, according to Schendelen (2013: 113) stakeholders do not only want the institutions to be open, they want them to be “relevant by scope and domain of influence” and “therefore, they preferably contact the Commission that offers both.” For the stakeholders, the key is to be present at all times, since they otherwise risk losing out. (Ibid 2013: 111-113)

Sum up, the EU has a pluralistic character, but with corporatist elements where well-resourced and knowledgeable interest groups can have advantages over the less-resourceful interest groups without knowledge within certain areas. This creates a threat to the pluralistic structure where some interest groups risk to be excluded from the decision-making and by that lose influence on the policy outcomes. Therefore, th EU has created tools in form of check and balances of each other’s activities. How this is working in reality for the stakeholders interviewed in this thesis is to be discussed in the analysis chapter. This leads to the presentation of the interviewed stakeholders and the people at institutions.

4.0 **Introduction of the people interviewed in Brussels**

This chapter presents the people interviewed for this thesis. The stakeholders’ organisation is presented first and then the interviewed. The stakeholders are presented first, 4.1 and then the people from the institutions, 4.2. It starts with the animal welfare organisations.

4.1 **The stakeholders**

**Eurogroup for Animals** (Eurogroup) is the European Federation of the Animal Welfare NGOs in Europe and has 49 member organisations (MOS) where most of the MSs are presented, except Cyprus, Portugal and Slovenia. It also has MOs in Switzerland and Norway. It mainly represents the MOs’ interests in the EP where it runs the secretariat of the Intergroup for the Welfare and Conservation of Animals, since 1983, which is a cross party group of MEPs interested in animal welfare. Eurogroup was set up in 1980 by an initiative of the RSPCA, who saw that the EU had potential to promote animal welfare European wide. It has a staff of 13. (Erler, Feb 2016)

It is registered in the ETR with activity cost of €100,000-199,999; it lobbies soft values and is committed to how animals are treated and kept in Europe. It has 8 registered lobbyists and with EP accreditation (ETR1). It has a subdivision registered as Eurogroup for Wildlife and Laboratory Animals with 1 lobbyist and 3 with EP accreditation; activity cost of €10,000-24,999 (ETR 2).

*Interviewed participants:*

**Andreas Erler**, Senior Political Officer and runs the secretariat of the Intergroup of the EP

**Lina Christensen**, Senior Program Manager and Deputy Director

**Elena Nalon**, Program Leader for Farm Animals and a veterinarian

**Joe Moran**, Public Affairs Advisor and Program Leader for Companion Animals

**Compassion in World Farming** (CIWF) works for the welfare of farm animals and is a member of Eurogroup. It was founded in 1967 by a British farmer concerned with the growing disconnect between modern agriculture and the well-being of animals and the environment (CIWF 1). CIWF has offices around Europe and in the US. It is present at decision-making forums such as the WTO and the UN and has partners and supporters all over the world. It is an influential NGO. It has an office in Brussels with a staff of one, but otherwise it is the UK that lobbies the EU. (Stevenson, Jan 2016 & CIWF 1)

It is registered in ETR; it lobbies soft values to end cruel factory farming practices with 16 registered lobbyists and 3 with EP accreditation; activity cost of €50,000-99,000;; (ETR 3).

*Interviewed participant:* **Peter Stevenson**, Senior Policy Officer and a lawyer (UK)

**Vier Pfoten** **International** is an animal welfare organisation, which was established in Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Romania, and is member of Eurogroup. It expended and established Four Paws, which has offices in Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Romania, Switzerland, , the UK, the US, South Africa and Sydney (Australia), and active in Hungary and the Netherlands (Four Paws 1). The office in Brussels runs the European Enforcement Network of Animal Welfare Lawyers and Commissioners (1) project. It has a staff of 3. (Sultana, Feb 2016)

It is registered in ETR; it lobbies soft values in all animal related issues and within animal welfare with 3 registered lobbyists and 2 with EP accreditation; activity cost of €100,000-199,999; (ETR 4).

*Interviewed participant:* **Pierre Sultana**, Director of the European Policy Office and a lawyer

**Human Society International/Europe** (HSI) is the international arm of Human Society US (HSUS), which is 60 years old and HSI is 25. HSUS is represented in all the US states and has offices all over the world. HSI Europe has an office in Brussels with focus on the EU institutions, but also the MSs’ activities by collaborating with local NGOs. It works with CITES, CMS, IWC, etc. and also with the EU institutions and MSs for the protection of species. HSI works on international level e.g. with banking institutions, the EU developing bank, global institutions, etc. to influence the EU policy and the international free trade policy. The EU ban on seal fur was the main campaign and made it well known. It has been active in Brussels for 15 years. It has a staff of 4 plus uses people from the HSI. (Swabe, Feb 2016)

It is registered in ETR; it lobbies soft values within animal welfare policy issues in the EU; 4 registered lobbyists and 6 with EP accreditation; activity cost of €200,000-299,999 (ETR 5).

*Interviewed participant:* **Jo Swabe**, EU Executive Director

**World Wildlife Fund** (WWF) is the leading organisation in wildlife conservation and endangered species, founded in 1961in Switzerland. It is global with more than 5 million members (WWF 1)

It is has an office in Brussels, the WWF European Policy Office, with a staff of 40 plus extra staff with various teams such as a Climate Change, Marine team, etc. It works with development of policies within substitute program, use of natural resources, etc. (Gerritsen, Jan 2016)

It is registered in ETR; it lobbies soft values with the ultimate goal to stop the degradation of the planet; 33 registered lobbyists and 11 with EP accreditation; activity cost of €2,000,000-2,249,999; funds: €588,000 (ETR 6).

*Interviewed participant:* **Erik Gerritsen**, Policy Officer within Water and Protected Areas policy

**European Environmental Bureau** (EEB) is the largest federation of the environmental organisation and has 150 members, also from outside the EU. It was created in 1974 as the first NGO in Brussels. It covers a broad area of issues e.g. water, chemicals, air, etc. It was created by the EC because of the intensive lobbying in Brussels where the EC wanted the environmental NGOs to speak with one voice. EEB represents 15 million citizens and has a staff of 30 in Brussels and has lobbied since 1974. (Defossez, Jan 2016)

It is registered in ETR; it lobbies soft values, and follows and engages in a very broad range of EU policy areas within the environment and sustainable development; 17 registered lobbyists and 11 with EP accreditation; activity cost of €3,250,000-3,449,99; funds: €1,114,000 (ETR 7).

*Interviewed participant:* **Faustine Defossez**, Senior Policy Officer of Agriculture and Bioenergy

**European Farmers and European Cooperatives** (Copa-Cogeca) is an umbrella organisation representing the agriculture sector. It is divided between COPA representing farmers, producers and farmers’ organisations, and COGECA representing European cooperatives, but with the same secretariat. It represents 26 MSs with a high number of members. Copa-Cogeca represents the farming community, but also sectors such as the meat, crops, wine, breeding, etc. Its strength to be a representative of a large sector and been in Brussels since the 1950s. It has a staff of about 50 and is divided into teams of 15-16 people working on the policy area. (Azevedo, Feb 2016)

It is registered in ETR as European Farmers, COPA (ETR 8) and European agri-cooperatives as COGECA (ETR 9); it lobbies agriculture and the agriculture market; 18 registered lobbyists respectively and 9 at COPA and10 at Cogeca with EP accreditation; activity costs of €1,000,000-1,249,999 respectively (ETR 8-9).

*Interviewed participant:* **Daniel Azevedo**, Senior Policy Advisor at COPA.

**Euro Coop** is an umbrella organisation for consumer cooperatives and has members in 19 European countries. Its mission is to present the interest of its members in the EU institutions and to have the cooperatives’ specificity recognized where it is hard to compete with private supermarkets. Cooperatives are owned by the consumers, who have the right to vote and Euro Coop therefore functions with the mechanism of its members vote. It was set up in 1957. (Zilli, Feb 2016)

It is registered in ETR; it promotes the economic and social objectives of cooperatives; 5 registered lobbyists and 3 with EP accreditation; cost of activity of €400,000-499,999; funds of €2,500 (ETR 10).

*Interviewed participant:* **Rosita Zilli**, Deputy Secretary-General

**Eurocities** is an umbrella organisation with 153 members of the largest cities in Europe plus 40 smaller ones. It works as a voice for the cities within all areas that the EU influences e.g. cities as the driver of quality jobs and sustainable growth; diverse and creative cities; green, flowing and healthy cities; smarter cities; urban innovation; and governance in cities. It was established by 6 cities and has been in Brussels for 30 years. (Nielsen, Feb 2016)

It is registered in ETR; 30 registered lobbyists and 14 with EP accreditation; activity costs of €4,750,000-4,999,999; funds: €2,575,000 (ETR 11).

*Interviewed participant:* **Dorthe Nielsen**, Policy Director with a large working area

Sum up, 5 of the organisations are umbrella organisations i.e. Eurogroup, EEB, Copa-Cogeca, Euro Coop and Eurocities. CIWF and Vier Pfoten are members of Eurogroup, but also have their own representation in Brussels, while HSI and WWF are independent NGOs. All the organisations are large, although, the number of staff in Brussels various from Vier Pfoten’s 3 to Copa-Cogeca’s 50. The activity costs various as well from CIWF’s €50,000 per year; member fee to Eurogroup not included, to Eurocities €5mil.

4.2 **The people from institutions**

The institutions are not presented here, since there was a presentation in the theory chapter. It is only a short presentation with the most relevant information.

**The European Parliament (EP):**

**Peter Eriksson**, Swedish MEP

Member of the Group of Greens/European Free Alliance at the EP and Miljøpartiet de Gröna in Sweden. Eriksson has now left the EP due to a post as Minister in the Swedish Government.

At the EP:

Member of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), the Delegation to the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee (D-RU), the Delegation to the EU-Moldova Parliamentary Association Committee (D-MD), and the Delegation to the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly (DEPA)

Substitute in the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI)

**Anja Hazekamp**, Dutch MEP, Member of the Confederal of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left at the EP and Partij voor de Dieren (Party for the Animals) in the NL.

AT the EP:

Member of AGRI, and the Delegation for relations with Japan (D-JP)

Substitute on the Committee on Fisheries (PECH), the Committee on Petitions (PETI), the Delegation for the relations with Switzerland and Norway and to the EU-Iceland Joint Parliamentary Committee and the European Economic Area (EEA) Joint Parliamentary Committee.

**The European Commission (EC) departments:**

**Christiane Kirketerp**, Policy Officer at the Director General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG Agri) an agency under the EC

**The Swedish Representation in Brussels:**

**Agneta Norgren**, Swedish Permanent Representative (Perm Rep) and Veterinary Attaché and is a veterinarian

Sum up, the MEPs have co-decision power by the EP and are both very active in different Committees. DG Agri is an EC agency, which makes policies, while the Perm Reps have influence on their respective MSs. By this, all these persons have direct or indirect influence on the EU policy-making and therefore important in the process. This leads to the EU policies.

5.0 **The EU Policies**

This chapter presents the EU’s policies of animal welfare, environment and agriculture. The purposes are foremost to display the stakeholders’ influence and to demonstrate what the previous EC had done and started. The policies are only described and policy analysis has not been performed. The policies are presented in their original form in Appendix II (App II). Primary sources of Law are the Treaties, Secondary Legislations are: Regulations, which are binding and directly applicable, Directives, also are binding, but implementation method can be chosen by the MS, Decisions, are binding to the addressee or specific circumstances and directly applicable (Dosenrode 11/03/2015).

Erler at Eurogroup (Feb 2016) states “I think that the best evidence is that we have the broadest animal welfare related legislation in the world and if there had not been a lobby behind it, we wouldn’t have it.” It is assumed that the stakeholders for the environment and agriculture are behind the development of those policies as well. It starts with animal welfare, then the environment and the CAP and then an introduction of the previous EC.

5.1 **Animal Welfare**

The stakeholders within animal welfare have been active through time, but only some of the most recent policies and the most important from the Treaty are included.

One of the corner stones of the EU’s animal welfare legislation is Article 13 of TFEU (App II:1) “the MSs shall, since animals are sentient beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals” (Bonde 2008:53) by this the animals should be treated with respect. But in the second part it states “while respecting the legislative or administrative provisions and customs of” the MSs and weakens the first part. The European Commission (1) also states “this puts animal welfare on equal footing with other key principles mentioned in the same title i.e. promote gender equality, guarantee social protection, protect human health,” etc. but adds that it is the MSs that have the competences if not stated otherwise in the Treaty (App II:1).

The EU legislation builds on that the animals are sentient beings and the legislation for farm animals includes the five freedoms which should include: “Freedom from hunger or thirst; Freedom from discomfort; Freedom from pain, injury or disease; Freedom to express normal behaviour; Freedom from fear and distress” (European Commission 26/06/2013) (App II:1-2).

The EC put forward an Animal Welfare Strategy for 2012-2015 based on “animals are recognized as sentient beings” where it also interpret that it means “are capable of feeling pleasure and pain” (Directorate General for Health and Consumers 2012:1). This should improve the animal welfare standards in the period of 2012-2015, but also that “the standards are applied and enforced” in all the MSs and that “everyone is responsible” (European Commission 5). (App II:2)

Another important step is that for the first time animal health has been connected to human health, which become a regulation and was published in the Official Journal on 31 March 2016 (European Commission 7) (App: II:2). The regulation includes a number of areas in regards to transmissible diseases, which is of concern to the EU citizens and includes the citizens’ health, food safety and the security aspects of food related to both animal health and cost for outbreaks of diseases, which is related to animal welfare. It should also reflect the priorities of the smart growth objective for the Strategy of Europe 2020. (European Commission 06/05/2013:2) (App II:2-3)

The purpose of the Animal Health Strategy is to give legal support to the Animal Health Law. Its objectives are to ensure a high standard of public health, food safety, prevent and reduce animal diseases by promoting animal health, which is all related to how the animals are treated. It should also ensure economic advantages for the farmers by e.g. increasing competiveness, but the farming practices and the animal welfare should be in accordance with standards that prevent threats to the animals’ health and are connected to the environment where impacts should be minimized in accordance with the EU Sustainable Development Strategy. This connects animal welfare with both environment and agriculture. (European Commission 06/05/2013:3) (App II:3)

Sum up, the EC has had ambitious goals with the animal welfare legislation and has foremost based it on the recognition of animals as sentient beings, but can only act within its competences. These animal welfare policies are connected to farm animals, but their welfare has been connected to several of other areas such as human health, environment and economic growth, and agriculture as business. There is still need for improvements, which is a mutual responsibility. This leads to the environment.

5.2 **Environment**

The EU’s environmental policy area extensive and the stakeholders have been active here as well.

Article 11 of TFEU is an important base for environmental protection and states that policies and activities of the EU must include protection of the environment and should also increase sustainable development (Bonde 2008:53). (App II:3)

Article is 191(1) of TFEU states that policies within the environment “shall contribute to pursuit,” not only protect, but also preserve and improve the environment’s quality (Bonde 2008:130) and thereby taken a step further. Human health and natural resources shall be protected, but also be promoted at international level in regards to environmental problems and to combat climate change, which adds a dimension (Ibid 2008:130). (App II:3-4)

The thought with Decision No 1386/2013/EU was to be “a smart and inclusive economy by 2020” aiming for “low-carbon and resource efficient economy” and when the 6th Environmental Action Programme (EAP) was assessed it was concluded that it had delivered benefits, but also that unstainable trends had continued within the prioritized areas: “climate change, nature and biodiversity, environment and health and quality of life; and natural resources and wastes” (Decision 20/11/2013:171). This appears to have failed considering the areas included. (App II:4)

This leads to Programme 2020, Decision No 1386/2013/EU, which covers a number of areas, but the most relevant here is §11, which states that the EU should transform into a green economy and by that it is required that the environmental issues are integrated into more or less all policies e.g. energy, agriculture, economy and industry, development, etc. to create coherence. In §12 it is stated that it is already set in motion by long-term strategies, which should halt the loss of biodiversity amongst others; it should also promote protection of the ecosystems e.g. water, soil and the species habitats. (Decision 20/11/2013:176) (App II:4)

Programme 2020’s §20 also focus on the CAP and the significance agriculture has for the environment where the aim is to achieve mutual benefits by coherent policies. It is stated that the agriculture and forestry sector represent 78% of the EU, thereby play a “major role in maintaining natural resources” and that the greening of the CAP will promote environmental beneficial agricultural and forestry practices” by e.g. protection of grassland and sustainable agroforestry (Decision 20/11/2013:179). It also has a long-term perspective where the “essential element in sustainable agriculture is farming with a sense of responsibility for future generations, while at the same time remaining resource-efficient and productive” (Ibid 20/11/2013:179). (App II:4-5)

The reference to the future generations is connected to “Living well within the limits of our planet,” which is the title of Decision No 1386/2013/EU on a General Union Environmental Action Programme to 2020, which was made into Regulation by the EP and the Council on the 11th December 2013 (Regulation 11/12/2013).

The agriculture sector is highly connected to the environment and European Commission (4) states “In the EU almost 50% of the territory is covered by farmland (both arable land and permanent grassland). Agriculture therefore plays a key role in the land management and has a huge responsibility in the preservation of natural resources.”

Sum up, the ambitions with the environmental policies is high where the environment is to be integrated into all areas, although, there still needs improvement on several of issues. The environment is highly connected to the agriculture sector where the cost and benefits of agriculture and forestry stands on one side and preservation and protection of the environment on the other, which needs to be balanced to achieve success. It is also connected to animal welfare in regards to the ecosystem, loss of species habitat. This leads to agriculture.

5.3 **Agriculture**

Agriculture fills a lot in the EU where the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) is the main policy and is extensive and complex. Only the most relevant is included, but first articles from the Treaty.

Two articles from the TFEU have been chosen, Article 39(1) focus on the economic side of agriculture with the objective to create “a fair standard of living for the agricultural community” and should be ensured by increased productivity with technical progress, rational development and optimization of the utilities to increase earnings and stabilize the market, and to ensure consumer supply at reasonable prices (Bonde 2008:62). While Article 39(2) focuses on “the particular nature of agricultural activity” and that agriculture is not the same in all regions and that it is “closely linked with the economy as a whole” in the MSs (Ibid 2008:62). (App II:5)

The entire CAP was reviewed and the EP was the co-legislator with the Council for the first time (European Commission No5/2013:1). It has been reformed successively through the years where the agricultural market orientation has increased, and has provided income and a safety net for the producers and the rural development in the EU with environmental improvements. The new reform moved the support from the production over to the producer to be more land-based because of the challenges to the sector, identified as economic, environmental and territorial. (Ibid No5/2013:2) (App II:6)

According to European Commission (No5/2013:3) “In short, EU agriculture needs to attain higher levels of production of safe and quality food, while preserving the natural resources that agricultural productivity depends upon.” The intention is to create a more sustainable agriculture in the EU due to the pressure on the natural resources with more sustainable methods in order to improve environmental performances. This is also in regards to the effects of climate change. (Ibid No5/2013:6) (App II:6)

The intention with the reform was to simplify the CAP where environmental requirements are included, but also obligations, which has to be met in order to receive full funding and therefore Green Direct payments are introduced. It rewards farmers that respect the obligatory practices e.g. with ecological focus. The payments account for 30% and are mandatory, and introduce “practices that are beneficial for the environment and climate” (European Commission No5/2013:7). (Ibid No5/2013:6-7) (App II:6)

For the farmers, the most important with the CAP the direct payments, which provide stable income and ensure that farming maintains in the EU and can increase in case of severe crisis. Its intention is to reward the farmers’ work not considered by the market, but that is beneficial to the EU as a whole. It is also rewarded to comply with practices that are efficient and protect and preserve the environment and its biodiversity in general. There are conditions where the farmers have to maintain strict standards in regards to e.g. environment, food safety, animal health and welfare, and to hold the land in good condition; otherwise, they risk to lose the payments and fines can be imposed (European Commission 26/06/2013). (Ibid 26/06/2013) (App II:7)

Sum up, the CAP is a major policy in the EU and the reform intend to combine its priorities within areas such as protection of the farmers’ income, the environment, the consumers and sustainability. It has also produced direct payments, which should protect the environment including wildlife, food safety and the welfare of animals, which can be suspended if the rules are not complied. The agricultural stakeholders have achieved a lot, but there are areas where they may not be contempt because of its demands. This leads to the present EC.

5.4 **The present EC**

The present EC has made policies as well, which are included in the Commission Working Programme for 2016 (European Commission 27/10/2015), out of 69, there are 3 in regards to the environment where 2 are amendments and 2 in regards to agriculture and rural development, while there are 35 in regards to finance and the internal market. There are none for animal welfare, but Eurogroup has succeeded, together with the EP’s Intergroup, to call upon the EC to listen to the citizens of the EU. And the EC created a citizens’ survey where people were asked about animal welfare, the Eurobarometer (European Commission Mar 2016). According to Eurogroup (15/03/2016) it reveals that an overwhelming majority of citizens want the EU “to act to better protect animals.” Four out of five people want higher welfare for farm animals, three out of four want better welfare for companion animals and nine out of ten want that imported products should have the same animal welfare standards as the EU (Ibid 15/03/2016). This leads to the present EC’s priorities.

According to Gotev (14/11/2014) the EC President Juncker had 10 priorities in the working program 2015 with better coordination between the EU institutions. The priority points are:

1. A new boost for jobs, growth and investment
2. A connected digital single market
3. A resilient Energy Union with a forward looking climate change policy
4. A deeper and fairer internal market with a strengthened industrial base
5. A deeper and fairer Economic and Monetary Union
6. A reasonable and balanced Free trade agreement with the USA
7. An area of justice and fundamental rights based on mutual trust
8. Towards a new policy on migration
9. A strong global actor
10. A Union of democratic change (Ibid 14/11/2014)

Only the titles of the points are included here, but there is no mention of animal welfare, environment or agriculture in these priorities, but human rights are mentioned (Ibid 14/11/2014). It appears as if the previous and present ECs have different focuses and priorities, the previous had a fairly large focus on animal welfare and a large focus on the environment and agriculture, although, there were areas that could be improved. Additionally, the EU’s value of a human life is estimated to be worth €2.4 million while animals and environment has no value (European Commission 08/02/2016). If this has effect on the priorities of the EU in regards to its agenda and the perception of stakeholders’ interests is not known, but is probably of interest for the stakeholders in those areas.

Sum up, the new EC’s has an extensive economic interest, which appears to be its only interest except for migration and the inclusion of climate change. Most of its new legislation is in regards to the internal market with a few in regards to the environment, which are mainly amendments, while non for animals. The EU citizens are apparently interested in the welfare of the animals and should as stakeholders in the EU’s pluralistic environment have a voice to be heard. The stakeholders’ view and experience of this is discussed in the analysis, which is next.

6.0 **Analysis**

The main point of the analysis is to establish if lobbying animal welfare is experienced differently compared to lobbying other interests and how the collected data stands in accordance with the point of views in the theory chapter. The subjects are divided into categories to increase transparency. References are made to the other chapters, and is referenced by chapter and page no (Ch.X:X) if only page no is stated, it is referred to this chapter (p.X).

The key is that the interest representation in the EU should function under pluralistic democratic principles where all interests are equally heard in the decision-making process. Especially, since the EU institutions are dependent on external interest groups’ information in the policy-making. The stakeholders in their turn have an obligation to be accountable due to their position. The institutions have an obligation to ensure coherence and transparency in the processes and consider all views by being open with broad consultations and regular dialogues. This can be contradicted if not all stakeholders have the opportunity to provide information. (Ch.3:10)

Although, there are critiques, Professor Svendsen and Associate Professor Brandt (05/04/2016) argues that regulation is needed because business interests are favoured on the behalf of consumer interests. The problem appears when information from only some of the stakeholders is heard and not the others. An example is that the result of the CAP was achieved by successful lobbying, but affects the tax payers and consumers hard because of the high subsidies and artificially high prices. The problem is lack of transparency and code of conduct with clear rules. Some advises are that whistle-blowers should be awarded and corruption should be combated, and both sides should automatically be considered in the decision-process. (Ibid 05/04/2016)

Who the EC meets is therefore of interest and Transparency International (EU Office 1) states that, since December 2014, the EC has met 70% with corporations, while less than 20% with NGOs. There are a ten top list where Business Europe stands as no 1 with more than 100 meetings, while only environmental NGOs are included with WWF as no 7 and Greenpeace as no 9, but with half or less as many meetings as Business Europe. The Green Ten is not mentioned, neither is any of the animal welfare NGOs. NGOs are mentioned as an unspecified group with 2000 contacts, but not meetings (EU Office 1). It therefore appears as businesses have corporatist relationship with the EC, which does not agree with the pluralistic structure. The business and industry sector are also strongly represented in the EU with resourceful corporations (Ch.3:13). If the critique is justified are discussed here, but first what it takes to win.

Lobbying is a complex activity in the EU’s playing field and the strong representation of interests adds to the complexity (Ch.3:13). Schendelen (2013: 119) states that to achieve a complete victory requires that one wins in all the three arenas i.e. “the EU, which has to allow the desired outcome; the stakeholders, which has to deliver support; and the organization at home, which must provide backing.” But the chances for achieving all three are not high due to the exceptionally solid and powerful competition. The foremost reasons for the competition are the cross-pressure on the officials have to work under and that there is a lack of trust amongst the stakeholders, at the same time as the own organisation is often divided. A partial win is therefore a great achievement and to be able to keep one’s position in the arena, while still having support from the own organisation. It all comes down to “*compromise, respect and backing*”, which may be seen as a weak gain, but is often “valued as the highest attainable and thus satisfying achievements” (Ibid 2013: 119). The partial win is also connected to the consensual outcomes, which is intensified due to the EU’s multi-level system, where there is no “the winner take it all” and alliances is therefore necessary in order to increase influence on the decision-making (Ch.3:11). (Ibid 2013: 119)

6.1 **The categories of the analysis model for the stakeholders**

Who and how the stakeholders are lobbying are important to establish; since this is how the influence is achieved. The activity is complex mainly due to the EU’s system and connected to the individual institutions power. The EC has the privilege to draft legislation, while the EP and the Council have co-decision and veto powers (Ch. 3:14-15). It is also important to establish if there are differences between the stakeholders lobbying technics and if that has effect, starting with the animal welfare stakeholders and then in the same order as in chapter 4.

6.1.1 **Who and how the stakeholders lobby**

Eurogroup: Christensen (Feb 2016) states *“Eurogroup lobby all the main institutions also the EC and the Council. The Council is lobbied through the Perm Reps and the national ministries; the latter is usually through the members of Eurogroup*.” And Erler (Feb 2016) adds “*It is through help by the EP that we can put pressure on the EC to come forward with new proposals. We lobby the MEPs within all the political groups because it is important to have support within all the political directions from the left to the right. The focus is on MEPs, who support animal welfare and are currently 110, but not all are active; they support initiatives if they are good for them. There are only about 15-20, who are really supportive and those are the MEPs that we usually are relying on when we are campaigning in the EP.”* Eurogroup lobbies broadly and approach all the EU institutions. It also makes use of the EP, Perm Reps and its MOs to increase its opportunity to influence and is done already on proposals. To run the secretariat of the Intergroup can be seen as an advantage, unfortunately, not so many MEPs are active within it, but therefore seek support from a broad coalition of political parties to gain the majority vote. (Ch3:15)

Moran (Feb 2016) elaborates “*any decision-maker that are of relevance, the EP, the EC and the Council and individuals within those, civil servants, politicians including MEPs, political advisors, attaché diplomats of the MSs and the staff. They are not necessarily advisors, but staff that work with the politicians, particularly the MEP officers assistance, who are often the ones when you want to decide things that get it done outside the box. To a lesser degree outside the institutions, but related to them, national governments where possible and experts within those e.g. CVOs, also regional levels wherever we can, the CoR, also other external stakeholders who have an impact or who also lobbying e.g. the FVE, and that we can try to co-opt into seeking the same objectives that we are after.*” Eurogroup is active and uses all channels available in regards to decision-makers and staff on all levels is approached both inside and outside the institutions, and emphasizes that also officials on lower levels are important to use, since these have influence as well. The main focus seems to be on the EP where it has a strong position.

Christensen (Feb 2016) adds “*it is important to remember that the EC has the initiative, the right of initiative in terms of new legislation. So in fact the Commission is probably the most important, but also amongst the most difficult to lobby.*” This experience goes against that the EC is welcoming to all stakeholders and open for all interests, but was written under the previous EC (Ch.3:16), while is here connected to the new EC and supports that there are a difference between this and the former. “*Very often in animal welfare, we have this system where the EP is like a rabbit running very fast wanting to do a lot and then you have the Commission being the turtle coming after them because they cannot really follow. So we find ourselves trying to make the gap smaller.* It could be due to the EC’s relatively small size (Ch.3:15), but also that it has other interests. *The political landscape has changed a lot, before there were more initiatives being taken relevant to animal welfare. We could follow that process and fit in to it, and being heard. This process, especially, since the new EC with Juncker is a completely new playing field.* *The Brussels scene has become much more political because he wants simplification; he wants better regulation, which means less regulation. So they do a lot to cut back on legislative proposals and processes, and that means that to fight for the small spaces that are still left in an agenda, you have to make a lot of noise.*”This confirms that there has been a change since the present EC took over and has other priorities (Ch.5:27) than the previous EC and therefore prioritize other stakeholders, which leans toward increased corporatism.“*Eurogroup has to invest more in receiving the same results as before because if we just do what we did before, we will not manage to get animal welfare on the agenda [and] to be smart, since there are not more people or funds, on the contrary. Therefore, it is agreed to have one flexible campaign per year with a public facing element, so speaking on behalf of the citizens are clearly achieved and “Protect our Pets” was an example of that. The purpose of that campaign was to ban illegal trade of pets and that show very well that with the more than 430.000 emails to MEPs, we can do this at a European level.*” There have been consequences with the new EC where more resources are needed to achieve the same result as before and that animal welfare has become harder to lobby, which supports that the new EC is different. It also is highlighted that the playing field has changed and become more political because of the new EC. This is again connected to priority of interests and strengthens the notion of corporatist elements in the EU. Eurogroup has used the citizens to call on the decision-makers and by that Eurogroup has acted as a link between the institutions and the civil society, which was otherwise missing (Ch.3:10), now the approach.

Erler (Feb 2016) states “*We set up meetings with the MEPs, but before we start approaching the Committees, we start with mapping those that will be of major interest to us. The choice of the MEPs is usually made according to who could be the best person to play a key role to the promotion of the campaign. Therefore, our main focus is on MEPs within the environment and agriculture committees, even more in the agriculture because it has the main responsibility for animal welfare concerns. The environment committee is usually more supportive to our concerns than the agriculture because within that you also have a strong lobby from the farmers and the industry.*” Here it seems as the various Committees in the EP have the same conflict of interests as the DGs in the EC (Ch.3:15). It also confirms the solid and powerful competition from counterparts, who are strong opponents in some of the Committees and therefore other Committees, has to be chosen. Thereby, it leans toward corporatism where only some strong and resourceful interest groups are heard excluding others. It decreases the chances to win when there is a lack of support in one of the arenas (p.30).

Nalon (Feb 2016) states “*They are approached formally and informally, so we take the opportunity to participate in expert groups and advisory groups when we are invited, and try to be recognized as experts.*” The opportunity to use the EC’s dependence on external interest groups is taken (Ch.3:15), to influence and to achieve recognition, but is only by invitation as in corporatism.

Moran (Feb 2016) states *“I think it depends on the objective, but many of the contacts that I have are contacts that I have built up over a long period of time. Often you will rely on the same networks, the same people; the same contacts you already got over and over again. So a lot of it comes down to what information you can provide them and in return what they can do for you. First it is about identifying the right people to begin relationships with and you can then often “use” them and their leverage. If they are in the right position they can affect their colleagues. You don’t need to know the 751 MEPs. You probably need to know 10 or 20 very very well on the right committee and when you got those ones and their offices you can then affect automatically all of the other groups. Similarly with the Council, you don’t need to go and speak to all 28 MSs, the fact that they are far fewer helps. You’re better off building up networks with the big MSs and those there are often then followed by the small ones. So it is working strategically and try to get the maximum effect and the maximum output with the minimum amount of effort.”* Eurogroup makes use of the EU’s pluralistic structure by networking and building important relationships, but it takes time, which is then used in order to influence. It is about finding the right persons, but also the right MSs to influence, which craves research. It emphasizes the importance to have information of interest to share to keep relations, while also get something back, and to optimize the resources to keep up with time consuming work. This leads to the other animal welfare stakeholders.

CIWF: Stevenson (Jan 2016) states “*We use equal weight to the EP, the EC and the MSs. They are all important. The approach is by emails and letters, and to request meetings. We right reports with a scientific approach where we quote others e.g. EFSA. We look at economic figures e.g. points out that bad ways are not so much cheaper e.g. battery cages. We point out cases. We look at positive numbers where animal welfare and the environment can be of benefit. We argue for alternatives and point out realistic alternatives*.” CIWF also lobbies all the institutions and makes use of science to influence where it even uses one of the EC’s own agencies to strengthen the arguments to increase influence, which can be said to be unorthodox (Ch.3:9).

Vier Pfoten: Sultana (Feb 2016) states “*The EC, the EP and the MSs, especially, the German speaking countries, countries that Vier Pfoten has offices in. We often work through partnerships e.g. Italian issues with Italian NGOs, in France with French NGOs, etc. We asking for meetings or write letters or emails, but for special projects we use meetings, since it is better with personal contact.*” Vier Pfoten lobbies all the institutions as well and use languages and partnerships to increase its influence. It points out the importance of personal contacts to make a higher impact.

HSI Europe: Swabe (Feb 2016) states “*We lobby the three institutions. Political advisors of the political groups, they can influence the group, and their assistants. We lobby as many as possible, but also MSs, depending on the subject. Especially, the MSs with the biggest influence such as France, UK, Italy, Poland and Germany are important. The ones with the most votes, but small MSs can help too, especially the perm reps, because the Council is not transparent.*” The Council is stated to be the most closed (Ch.3:16) and other channels have been necessary to use here the MSs.“*We attend meetings in the EP, being present in the building is important and having access to agendas. It helps to come from the same country with the same views and languages. It is about giving information and at the same time receiving, and to see if something from the NGO is acceptable or not. The Presidency is important, both present and future and is important to make friends with, since they are chairing events.*”The rotating presidency is a part of the Council, but appears as more open to approach, but could depend on the MS in charge of it (Ch.3:14). “*The EC; we talk to on different levels e.g. Head of Units, DGs and the political level with Cabinets and Commissioners. It can take time to approach them, but I have not had an issue with getting hold of people at high levels.*” HSI appears to have success at all levels including at the EC, but takes time. This is strengthening the pluralism where all interests are to be heard.“*Who we approach depends on what we are working on, the EP with the committees, the rapporteur or the shadow rapporteur to influence.*  *It’s about to have inside people and to have contact from more than one source. People who trust you share. Timing is essential. It’s first when it goes to plenary, then you work with all the politicians. People do not go against their own political group, but at plenary level it is all open, more national interests are at stake and politicians know that voters are about animal welfare. At plenary the balance can be changed if you know your counter lobby and play smart. We request for meetings, sometimes informally, I do a lot inside the EP, run into people or arrange meetings, or give them a call or sometimes twitter or on social media. Assistants are gate-keepers and some people do not realise the importance of the assistants. Political advisors are a good start and they are around longer. We attend as many committee meetings as possible. You have to be visible and to establish yourself as reliable .We work on a shoestring. If we had more resources and personnel, we could do even more. But we do well and have had success, but there are always challenges and no new legislation is coming up.* No new legislation seems to be connected to the new political landscape mentioned by Christensen. HSI is very active and influence as many as possible within all the institutions. It takes advantage of language skills and own origin. HSI has found a lot of important channels and that timing and trust building are of essence. The EP is used a lot and rapporteurs and shadows have great influence on their assigned dossiers (Ch.3:15). The processes within the EP and the party groups are also used to advantage (Ch. 3: 15). HSI maximizing the networking activity and are present at all times, which is a must (Ch. 3:16) and also works at being recognized as reliable, but have to optimize due to lack of staff. HSI and Eurogroup have similar lobbying activities. This leads to the environmental organisations.

WWF: Gerritsen (Jan 2016) states *“The EP, the EC, the Council and Ministers, which institute depends on the policy. It is important to affect the EC because of their power to write proposals and is the guardian of the Treaty, a gatekeeper. It is the stage of the proposal and the cycle that decides who to approach. An important part is to assess the interplay and understand the timing of the procedure to maximize influence. You have to know the file or dossier and know who the obstacle or obstacles are.*”It takes the procedures and the division of the institutions powers in to account and uses it to an advantage where the EC is especially important at the beginning (Ch.3:15), which is similar to the animal welfare stakeholders approach. “*The approach depends, personal contacts work best, trust building is important. At the EC, it is the desk officers that are important. The Commissioners want to meet with the Head of the Organisation. Cabinet staff is approached and can be done directly. There are few people within environment to speak to and there are different layers in between who might block. DG Envi is usually the first to approach for environmental NGOs, but it depends on the file. One has to work in interweaving ways. Also, DG Agri, DG Sante, etc., but they are harder to work with as they usually speak different languages and defend different interests.*”The different DGs conflict of interests are highlighted (Ch.3:15), which make it even more complex. “*The challenges for the EC and the EU as a whole are to work in integrated ways and find coherence.* This is probably the key point of the EU’s complex multi-level to find solutions (Ch.3:11). “*In the EP there are many people to talk to. The whole EP has to vote and it is impossible to talk to everybody. They vote mostly with the EP parties. MEPs are harder to approach than the EC. They do not have time and need to divide their attention. The assistants are a bit more approachable. You have to be strategic, know what is on the table and to be time efficient. It is important to reach the decision-making people e.g. the rapporteur, since they can change the move. Other approaches are events such as breakfast meetings, etc. to reach more people at once.*” It lobbies all institutions, but which depends on the policy it wants to influence. Knowledge and timing appears to be the key in regards to both the EC and the EP. WWF also network to build up personal relations and the importance of trust building. The Commissioners are reached by the CEO, but otherwise do not have a problem to reach high level officials at the EC, it is also no. 7 on the EC’s top ten list (p.29). An issue is the lack of people to approach within the environmental area, which is strange considering that it is a large area within the EU, but also that others block due to conflict of interests. An interesting aspect is that WWF believes that the EC is easier to approach than the EP, which goes against that the EP is more open (Ch. 3:16) and is opposite to the experience within animal welfare.

EEB: Defossez (Jan 2016) states “*EEB uses various ways, the official with consultation to the EC, it is the only institution for initiatives, and we consult with the public.*  *We also work with advisory groups including other stakeholders, if they are registered in the transparency register. The access with seats in advisory groups, make us officially recognised as stakeholders for the environment.* *The problem is that the opposition have many more people working on the same issue, even if the opposition is less effective*. *There are still stakeholders that are lobbying the dirty way and are not registered in the transparency register*.”Here the corporatism is used to an advantage enabling influence from inside (Ch.3:10) and the importance of being recognised is highlighted, just as with the animal welfare. It also influences other stakeholders, which agree with that other stakeholders have to deliver support to win (p.24). It has counterparts, but here it is not so efficient. The dirty lobbying strengthens Greenwood’s critique of the ETR (Ch. 3:13). “*We also use non-official meetings with the EC, but it is registered somewhere in the system. The EC is not supposed to represent the MSs, but they do and it is the MSs that decides.*”Here a new issue is highlighted and may be connected to the Council’s power with formal control of treaties and legislative acts (Ch.3:14). *“We approach all the institutions, the EC, the EP and the MSs. The EC fund EEB, but it has no influence, but the EC listens to it. Although, the EC listen more in the past, Juncker’s Commission has no environmental focus and packages the various issues into one area e.g. under sustainability and frame it as green, but it is worse now for the CAP then it was before the greening* (see Ch.5:26)*. EEB is part of the Green Ten and it is so big so the EC cannot refuse to meet, but has refused though. The EC meet 70% with the industry and the rest with all the others. We use emails, phone and have built up a network. Sometimes we hold dinners, breakfasts, etc. to build up relationships, but it is expensive.*” Green Ten is not on the EC’s top ten list (p.29), which is remarkable considering its size. EEB lobbies all the institutions as well, formally and informally, especially; the EC because of its initiative power (Ch. 3:15). That it has become harder with the new EC, confirms the priority for the economic issues (Ch.5:27) and agrees with the animal welfare stakeholders’ experience. The purpose of the funding to prevent resourceful stakeholders from dominating does not function here (Ch.3:13). It also makes use of the public for support and builds relationships by networking, but lack of resources is an issue as for many of the NGOs. All in all, there is an element of increased corporatism due to the new EC’s priorities. The environmental stakeholders’ lobbying is similar to the animal welfare’s and leads to agriculture.

Copa-Cogeca: Azevedo (Feb 2016) states “*Everybody, but of course, the core of our operation is basically to lobby the EU institutions; we represent the united voice of farmers, the families and the cooperatives. So we have no credit card where I can buy a gift or dinners. We have to work disparate. The main targets are the institutions, before it was very much the EC, but now also the EP and the Council is also very important, but the Council is more the MSs and that is through our MOs.* *It helps that people know us. We have been there for a long time and we are so united, so people listen to us, but of course what we do is what any registered lobby will do. It is very transparent.*” Here it appears as Cop-Cogeca has broadened its approach, since it started, which could be caused by increased competition and that the EU has become more pluralistic with time. It is one of the big players and has a long history where it is well known, which is an advantage. It is here believed that it is transparent, which goes against EEB’s experience and the critique (Ch.3:12). “*We send letters. Our contacts are important. We also participate in meetings and have a dialog where e.g. the EC organise a meeting twice a year where important subjects on the market are discussed, we are about the market, so they invite farmers, cooperatives, the food process industry, traders, animal welfare, EEB for environmental issues, but we are also in expert groups.* Copa-Cogeca has access to a lot of activities i.e. meetings, dialogues and expert groups to influence the right people (Ch. 3:15), which points to corporatism again where key stakeholders have advantage by being well integrated. “*I think that there is respect because people have to work together because in the end we all have objectives, but we need to make things happen and we need more and more to develop partnerships, etc. So e.g. the way we work with NGOs, even though we do not share the same opinions, we need to talk to understand what they are thinking and what we are thinking. We need to explain to what the reality is for the farmers, how they suffer.*” Copa-Cogeca lobbies broadly as well where everyone is included, also the other stakeholders to develop partnerships, which is important to increase influence (p.29), but seems to be difficult at times. It is experienced that there are respect amongst the stakeholders, which is highlighted as a key (p.29). Networking is a priority, but the importance of contacts are also emphasised and is one of the key players with access to the EC. In regards to the CAP (Ch.3:26), it does not seem as the farmers are satisfied either considering that despite the direct payment still have it hard, now the cooperatives.

Euro Coop: Zilli (Feb 2016) states “*We lobby the primarily the EC and the EP and we have strong links with the EESC, so I would say these three institutions primarily. Most of our encounters are formalized e.g. we participate in stakeholders platforms and we are members of the Retail Environmental Action Plan, [etc.] Then we are part of the Civil Dialogue Groups run by DG Agri. So we are recognized by stakeholders in a variety of formalized forum. This is one of the chances we have to make our voice heard.*”This shows the importance of achieving influence from inside and again an element of the corporatism in the EU. “*The second chance is through alliances with other likeminded organisations. We have mapped stakeholders very carefully that have similar positions with a number of issues e.g. Eurogroup for Animals. So we come up with joint positions and then set up meetings with officials from institutions and MEPs with a position on a given subject. This is through alliances depending on the subject because we retailers deal with a lot of different items. Then we have internal meetings, we are organised on technical level in 3 working groups and from time to time we invite people from the institutions to give us feedback on a given dossier*.” Euro Coop prioritizes three institutions where it has built good connections with one of the EC’s agencies and thereby differs slightly from the others. It is active in a number of forums where it can influence by being recognized. It is also emphasized here the importance to find the right people and who are chosen depends on the subject. Euro Coop also builds alliances to increase the possibilities to influence (Ch.3:11), but also to achieve support from others to win (p.29). It works slightly different from the others due to being another type of stakeholder and also uses internal mechanism where they invite key persons themselves.

Eurocities: Nielsen (Feb 2016) states “*We work with upstream policy work with the EC to see what is coming and with the EP; we work with different MEPs depending on the area. There is an Intergroup for the cities in the EP, which has 80 members. Otherwise, we work with the CoR and the Mayors in the MSs. We also work with the Presidency, which right now is the NL, where we meet with various ministers to know what they want with the Presidency. The EC is the largest contact group and we work with many DGs, but also with politics, legislation and finance.*” Eurocities also lobbies broadly with many institutions and monitors the situation. It has the advantage of having an Intergroup in the EP with a high number of MEPs and being well connected in the EC, but experience that it is not so open on higher levels. It also uses the rotating Presidency actively to be ahead and by that increase influence (Ch. 3:14). *“We approach with e-mails if we do not know them, otherwise, on different events. Our Secretary General has worked here for 20 years and knows everyone. The networking is friendly and the EC is open on official level, but higher up e.g. at the Cabinet and the Commissioners it is harder.*”[[1]](#footnote-1) Since Eurocities experiences the networking as friendly, it does not seem to be subjected to the hard competition at the same extent as the others. It uses events to network giving the advantage to meet many people at the same time and also has a well-known CEO, which is of advantage in order to reach the right persons.

Sum up, all the stakeholders are active and use similar lobbying styles, but the experiences with the access to the different institutions varies and appears to be due to the interest they represent. All are registered as lobbyist and should therefore have access in the pluralist environment, but Euro Coop stands weaker than Copa-Cogeca despite also being within the market, but lobbies softer values. Copa-Cogeca has an upper hand by being well established through its long history and its interests. It weakens the pluralistic structure when all interests are not involved at the same degree and strong corporatist elements are evident. To be recognized a stakeholder, is stated to be important for many.

* + 1. **What obstacles are there**

Some obstacles are already stated, but here other issues are addressed and who the opponents are, which is related to the hard competition (Ch.3:13). The order is the same as before.

Eurogroup: Erler (Feb 2016) states “*Two thirds of our requests for EC proposals that we are programming in the EP usually get through. But currently there are not so many animal welfare related initiatives and therefore we have to be creative ourselves and initiate things or propose new initiatives. So we are working on different motions that should be the start of new initiatives on EU level e.g. the call for a new Animal Welfare Strategy* (see Ch.5:23) *where we have lobbied hard the last month to get a motion for a resolution in the EP. Because in principle, the EC is not very much in favour to add a new strategy, but you need this kind of document to refer to*.” Eurogroup has been successful in its use of the EP, which has created great advantages, but new strategies have been necessary and again the EP is used. But creativity has been necessary caused by problems linked to the new EC’s attitude where Christensen (Feb 2016) adds “*I would say that our biggest obstacle is the mantra that Juncker likes to say “EU doing less and doing better” because animal welfare is usually seen as a “nice to have and not a need to have.” We continuously try to reframe our discourse into environment, consumer protection, and internal market level playing field. Because when we do that we have much more success than if we just come and speak about animal welfare*.” The new EC’s change of the playing field has had negative effects and again linked to its priorities of interests where animal welfare is not seen as a necessity. The creativity and rethinking have been necessary to move forward where other subjects are linked to the own interest to increase influence and support from other stakeholders (p.29), which is a most in order to win. This also indicates that it is very much because of the new EC that the corporatism increases in the EU, making it harder.

Moran (Feb 2016) states “*internal obstacles, lack of money particularly, animal welfare is not something that traditionally has a lot of money. If you are an umbrella organisation your capacity to move quickly is severely hampered by the fact you have to bring with you or you are often beholden positions of your members. E.g. HSI can take very principal coherent stands on issues because they are a single organisation whereas with Eurogroup and similar organisations at EU level, it is always an obstacle not to end up with the lowest common denominator in terms of your position because inevitable you have to first reach a compromise within your organisation before you even got out and sought compromise between the institutions, which is obviously the name of the game in European politics. So you can end up with, if you are not careful, something that is quite weak.*” Backing from the own organisation is important, but here the composition of the own organisation is an issue due to division within it (p.29). This weakens the prospect of winning in all the three arenas and hurt one’s own cause, and the lack of finance does not make it easier.

*“External challenges, again the lack of resources, not just money, but in terms of human resources. You can compare the number of staff that Eurogroup has, which are 13 with Copa-Cogeca, they got over 50. It is a completely different ball game for them; they can through resources at things where we really cannot. We have to prioritize and that means to constrain some activities we would love to pursue. Also, the competition from these with more resources, more money in particularly and also the political priorities in which we have to work.*” Lack of staff is here seen as a major issue, especially, since the counterparts do not appear to have the same issue. This gives the counterparts an advantage and makes it difficult to prevent others from working retaliatory. This leads to the opponents.

Erler (Feb 2016) states “*the counter lobby of other stakeholders and the farmers’ stakeholders are usually against further initiatives to promote higher animal welfare standards because that also involves cost and new investments, and they usually hesitate to have these. But sometimes we also have alliances in the industry e.g. on chemicals where the industry had an interest to work with us. You cannot generalize, it depends very much on the different campaigns we have and sometimes it can be, or very often, different interests in the MSs. So the Council doesn’t really give support for it. The EC very often listened more to the Council than the EP. There we face, very often, a strong opposition.*” This highlights the conflict of interest with strong counterparts, but also the possibility to use them as alliances to an advantage for both (Ch.3:11) where mutual support increases the chances to win (p.29). The MSs different interests are a problem and that the EC support the MSs more than the EP becomes a problem when depending on the EP.

Nalon (Feb 2016) states “*Our opponents are several. We of course, defend animal welfare per see. We also defend it as a way to improve productivity to have a more sustainable livestock production of course. We truly believe that the sentient of the animals should be respected as a value in itself. I read this morning that the economic output of livestock farming in the EU is in excess of 150 billion euros per year. So it can easily be understood how implementing stricter animal welfare rules, is imposing costs and hindering commercial exchanges, production volumes and trade agreements. So we go against the whole big chunk of economic interests, which are not only the economic interests of the stakeholders, but finally they are the economic interests of the EU because livestock farming is a big source of income for the EU.*” Nalon highlights the concept in Article 13 (Ch.5:22) where the animals should be treated with respect due to being sentient. Again strong economic interests prevail over soft values and here it is not just strong counterparts, but EU as a whole. The importance of agriculture to the economy for the MSs is also highlighted in the TFEU (Ch.5:25).

Moran (Feb 2016) add “*I don’t like to say that we got opponents and friends. Often, again, it depends on what is going on and what issue is on the table. E.g. if we try to revise the rules in live transport, so take the UECVB, the meat industry, they are holy opposed to it and it is not going to happen as far as they are concerned. They will use all their weight, all their influence they possible can to stop any revision because for them the market is functioning, it is very beneficial for them and ultimately that is all they care about. Then take the position on equine transport, equines end up in the food chain, but there is an acceptance that equines are transported too much and too long journeys can cause real problems to the quality of the meat of the end product. So we ended up working with UECVB to come up with voluntarily good guidelines on the transportation of equidae in Europe. So in the overall big picture, we call them our opponent, but on some projects we find that it is more beneficial to work with them and they find it more beneficial to work with us.*” This highlights the importance of finding alliances (Ch.3:11) and to find common ground for support with the counterparts (p.29). In this case it was a solid and powerful player that can work retaliatory and block due to its importance for the market.“*You should like to think that we are all on the same page here, but we’re really not we have some organisations within the European PA arena, who have such similar priorities as Eurogroup, who will refuse to work within the framework as us and who are therefore overly competitive with Eurogroup to the point of being predatory, quite aggressive in their nature. So it really depends on the situation.*” That likeminded stakeholders are becoming opponents instead of alliances, adds a dimension and the efficiency to influence decreases drastically and an arena is thereby lost (p.29).

CIWF: Stevenson (Jan 2016) states “*Foremost, the huge power from businesses with interest in status quo e.g. fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, etc. It is a huge faller to enforce legislation by the EC and the MSs. The MSs ignore e.g. the law with enrichment for pigs. In Article 13 the MSs “should pay full regard to animal welfare,” but they ignore the formulating or the implementation of it. The Treaty is being ignored and we are not doing enough about it.”* CIWF strengthens the view about that strong business interests are a major obstacle. The lack of enforcement of the laws weakens the statement of the EC being rigorous when it comes to the enforcement (Ch.3:15) and that together with that Article 13 is not respected are related to priorities again. Opponents: *“The businesses supplying the intensive farmers, and the policy-makers defending the businesses and the intensive farmers. We are not against farmers. We support good farming. We are not vegetarians and do not tell people to be, but agriculture has become so damaging. The obstacles are also free trade rules. It needs improvement, but it is hard to get through. It is undermined e.g. if the EU bans something, by the free trade, but the WTO has changed so it is more balance now*.” There are strong opponents both from the industry, which are supported by the decision-makers adding a dimension. At the same time as the EU is restricted by its membership in the WTO.

Vier Pfoten: Sultana (Feb 2016) states “*Animal welfare is hold against economy in people’s minds and in the policy-makers’ mind where the ethics of animal welfare has to be translated into the real world and that world is economy. They think that there already is a high animal welfare. Although, people know more and more that massive farming is not good for the health and environment, but politicians only listen to talk about economy e.g. the cost of public health of heavy meat consumption where the farmers make money, but we have to pay twice because of health issues.”* The economic priority becomes evident again and the issues have to be translated into economic issues in order to be heard, even though, the public health is threaten, which becomes a cost. *The opponents depend on the file e.g. the farmers when it comes to animal welfare. The EC depends on the DGs where some are more open than others. They fight internally about the cost for the farmers vs. the animal welfare and biodiversity. In DG Sante it is animal health vs. animal welfare where they set it up against each other. They try to oppose it instead of finding the truth*.” There is an issue in regards to agreements amongst the DGs within the EC, which confirms the fact that the DGs are not parallel to the EC’s portfolios and that it is the DGs’ powers as policy-makers with conflicting interest and can block each other becomes a major problem (Ch.3:15).

HSI: Swabe (Feb 2016) states “*Various, it depends on the political group if there is a lack of interest in the issue. Some don’t want to talk to NGOs and some have other agendas. You need to meet people when it is relevant to them and to engage with them to have them sending a written question or to make resolutions. The process is important even if it is not going anywhere, it is important to engage in coalition e.g. animal testing where the industry is interested because they can get more funding for non-animal testing. We try to talk as broadly as possible.”* The political diversity in the EP with its 7 political groups (Ch. 3:15) becomes an issue where the openness for particular stakeholders varies, which decreases the pluralism in the EP. Again the importance of alliances is highlighted. Opponents, *“It depends on what issue e.g. fur with the fur industry. It can also be with MSs e.g. seal fur with Denmark, Sweden and Finland or e.g. sharks with the Spanish fishing industry or with other NGOs e.g. Polar Bears with WWF, where WWF had another position and wanted to approach it in another way*.” There are strong opponents within the industry and also the MSs because of economic interests. But likeminded becomes opponents again, this time due to disagreements to the approach, which decreases the efficiency to influence. Thereby, HSI appears to have similar obstacles to the ones of Eurogroup.

WWF: Gerritsen (Jan 2016) states “*Ignorance by the policy-makers. Organisational vested interests, corporations, politicians, who lobby the same persons. The politics is an obstacle at the moment with extreme right sides, who are less interested in the environment in general. Personal ideas and ideologies that the people to be approached have can be a large obstacle.*”The lack of knowledge amongst the policy-makers should not appear if information from all interest groups is considered, but is also because of a strong political ideology’s lack of interest. “*The opponents depend on the topic and what is at stake. Farmers, it is a love/hate relationship. We all know what we talk about, but we want to use the land for different things, other big landowners in regards to land. Corporations such as Business Europe, they sent a letter to Junker with a list of wishes before he started. Business Europe is a strong lobbyist with economic arguments e.g. in water issues the opponents are farmers and hydro-companies, it depends on the issues who the opponents are*.” The farmers seem to be an opponent to many. The strong economic interests are an obstacle for the environment too where stakeholders with economic interests have an increased access to the EC (Ch. 3:9) and by that corporatism prevails again by not letting all interests be heard. Competition is also a part of pluralism, but should not prevent stakeholders with other interests from participation.

EEB: Defossez (Jan 2016) states “*The obstacle is to reach the right people e.g. in the EP. Conservatives do not want to meet and it got worse when the EP got co-decision because of the various Committees in the EP works against the Committee of the Environment. Some MEPs are also farmers and they have self-interest. There were MEPs who “killed” everything the EC proposed in the Committee of Agriculture.*”EEB also highlights ideologies as an obstacle and conflict of interests with decision-makers as obstacles, but also the necessity to achieve access to the right people in regards to whom has the power in the processes. “*The opponent is openly-Copa-Cogeca, but behind the scene – who is pulling the strings? Is it working for the farmers or for the industry? So the industry is the strongest opponent, but they are not seen. Copa-Cogeca also defends the farmers who wants to do better, but has to stand united. The industry decides what the farmers should use. They decide over trade. The situation is complex with a lot of interests. Copa-Cogeca says that the environmentalists are the problem and that the environmentalists want the farmers’ money. The farmers are deceived.*” The real opponent is one of the strongest stakeholders, the industry, and appears to be working through Copa-Cogeca with use of accusations and blocks developments. This highlights the solid and powerful competition that exists within the EU.

Copa-Cogeca: Azevedo (Feb 2016) states “*The obstacles I would say is getting your message through, sometimes because we do not always know exactly what will win and that is an obstacle. Sometimes people are not very aware of the issues, they don’t realise what it is going to affect. There are also a lot of regulations and all those things are not an obstacle, but people have different opinions. It is a challenge to communicate to that people. Sometimes you have to think about the fact that you are actually on the same side, but people have difficulties when you talk different languages and coming from different countries*.” Copa-Cogeca’s main obstacle is apparently communication where it is a problem to get the message through to reduce the conflict of interests, but also language barriers, but seems to accept that people have different opinions.“*We don’t see opponents; we don’t want to work with opponents. Everyone here have different interests, sometimes they are the same. We work with the orientation to accomplish the same objectives and the same issues and then we change sector and they have a different ones. We can’t treat them as opponents that would be suicide. We try to have communication with everyone. We work within animal welfare orientation, we work within environmental orientation, we don’t agree, but we talk because that is all a part of the business. Many times our biggest opponent is time*.” Copa-Cogeca’s only opponents seem to be time and that the objectives change depending on the sector where also the competition changes due to different interests. It aims to achieve support from other, otherwise opponent, stakeholder in order to achieve victory where it is not enough with its access to the institutions and the backing from the own organisation (p.29).

Euro Coop: Zilli (Feb 2016) states “*The main obstacle for us is that we are a small organisation; we clearly feel that who has more powers to lobby get more results. This is also why we have to continuously look for alliances to bring forward our point of view. To be a small organisation doesn’t help in Brussels, especially, within a sector as ours, which is highly competitive. There are associations, which are much bigger than ours and potent to be the privileged counterpart for the EU institutions when it comes to giving them advice. Besides that, the concept of cooperative is not very well known.*”This strengthens that large organisations have better access to the EC (Ch.3:10) in the highly competitive area and that being a stakeholder with an outstanding speciality makes it harder. Again stating the corporatist notion in the EU where key stakeholders have advantage. “*The opponent is to have a consumer soul but representing at the same time a retail business, we are in a so-called “golden middle”, meaning that we get along well both with NGOs and with the industry. How, when and in which case, really depends on the subject. I wouldn’t say that we have formal opponents or at least less than when you are a pure retailer or when you are a pure NGO.*” It appears to have a neutral role in regards to opponents and depends on allies to achieve influence.

Eurocities: Nielsen (Feb 2016) states “*The Commissioners are very pressed for time and not so interested; they have other issues and the politicians do not come to Brussels that often. There are challenges on both sides.”* Opponents, *“Not really, we try to not come in conflict with anybody. But when the budget is going to be negotiated, one looks at the competitors*.”[[2]](#footnote-2) The main obstacle is the EC’s lack of time, which can be due to the relatively small staff (Ch. 3:11), but that does not explain the lack of interest. The opponents are only in regards to the division of the economical means, otherwise it has neutral position.

Sum up, the main obstacle is the economic interests for most of the stakeholders due to the EU’s priorities. Copa-Cogeca, who is a strong player with market interests, does not appear to have the same obstacles; neither does Eurocities due to being in another area. Although, Eurocities appears to have similar obstacles in regards to the EC as the others. Most can work in alliances also with counterparts due to common interests at times, but conflict of interests is a strong competitor. The notion of weaknesses in the pluralistic structure continues to be present where all stakeholders do not have the same conditions caused by strong economic priorities, leading to main difficutlies.

* + 1. **The main difficulties**

Eurogroup, Erler (Feb 2016) states “*The most difficult is to get things moving because the EU institutions are sometimes rather slow to move on and so until you achieve something takes time*.” Christensen (Feb 2016) adds “*That must definitely be the competition for the agenda and many of the things I said before*.” These statements can be connected, since the competition for agenda indicates that there are many issues and interests to consider in the decision-making, but is also connected to the pluralistic structure where the stakeholders are many and compete for attention.

Nalon (Feb 2016) states “*It is really maintaining credibility, while also pushing for an improvement in an area where it is not popular. Because we are seen as people, who are disturbing, who are never happy, never satisfied, who always want more while there is a crisis, while our farmers are really encountering a lot of difficulties.*”This is connected to that the subject is not prioritized, while economic interests are at stake and the stakeholders therefore become inconvenient instead. “*But it is not because they are implying animal welfare that they are encountering these difficulties because now there is a raise to the bottom with the devise to prices and it is a raise to the bottom to pay farmers for their products even less. It is driving people out of business and livelihoods, and it is ruin entire sectors of society, especially in rural areas. So this is really what happening that is detrimental for entire sectors of society, but it is certainly not the fault of having higher animal welfare standards. It is perverse market strategy and market mechanisms where we have spoiled consumers into thinking that food should be cheap and especially animal products. Because if you compare what a kilo of peers cost to a kilo of pig meat then you realise that a pig is a living being and it requires a lot of more resources to be raised than the peers. We have lost the sense of what it costs to raise an animal for meat or dairy. The industry is in a crisis, but they have created this crisis for themselves because they are competing exclusively on prices and this is not possible when you have animals to raise because an animal requires water and feed and feed costs, it is the biggest component. These external costs cannot be controlled at all by the farmer. So the farmer is basically in the hands of the market and competing continuously for lower prices and this is drives people out of the market. I really think that the industry is destroying itself*.” This is an interesting issue, since here Copa-Cogeca and Eurogroup’s interests become common interests instead of opponent, which could be of great gain for both. Nalon actually defends the farmers by pointing out that the market as the problem, but where animal welfare is blamed and seen as a cost and not benefit. The EC’s dependents on information and its economic priorities should increase interest for all stakeholders, but here a stakeholder with key information is not heard due to its otherwise opposing interests. If the pluralistic structure had functioned properly this information should have been considered as valued economic information, but it could be that the interests for the market are valued higher than both the farmers and the welfare of the animals.

Moran (Feb 2016) states *“it is successfully managing the process to reach your ultimate objective. Essentially, nothing is guaranteed until it is either produced in the EC or ends up in the Official Journal. Meetings that happen between institutions trial docs, legislative files develop, things change and every single step of the way you have to be on top of the process. Then it comes to vote in the Committee and you have not followed that up with the members of that Committee and they won’t read it very well or got the correct information, etc. or the way the tabling deadline works. It is a matter of staying on top of it and really trying to manage the process from start to finish and that is quite pretty tricky in itself because you have to somehow remain very good relations with the people involved doing things for you.”* This indicates the key of being present at all times (Ch.3:16), but is resource consuming due to the EU processes. At the same time as the relationships with key people have to be balanced. It emphasizes how hard it is to win in the EU arena and if support and backing are not found in the other areas, the chances are reduced further (p.29).

Stevenson (Jan 2016) states *“The refusal to take account for science. If the science does not tell them what they want to hear, they want status quo. There is a tendency by policy-makers that only smaller changes are needed, but we need to rethink farming totally. We have undermined future generations from feeding themselves.* *The argument is not just about the animals, but also the environment and the consumers. It is about lobbying broadly because more politicians listen to broader arguments.”* This is in line with what the previous EC’s “responsibility should be taken for future generations” (Ch.5:25).It indicates the difficulty to achieve change within the political arena and the importance of connecting issues, since not even science is heard and increasing the importance of alliances within other areas to be heard. *“It is difficult to lobby animal welfare and environment because various businesses, which are strong, do not want change and a strong sustainable agriculture would eliminate these companies’ products and the economic reasons are stronger. The politicians are aware of that change is needed, but do not want to, but change will come by evidence and public concern.”* Here the experience is again that economic interests are dominating and an obstacle to create change. The civil society could be the link to the politicians and institutions, which is missing in the participating channel (Ch.3:10), because opinion is important in politics and connected to elections and to aggregate popular preferences (Ch.3:11).

Vier Pfoten, Sultana (Feb 2016) states *“The bureaucracy, on one hand there are people with good will, but it has to go through various instances. The EC are together when they sit in the college, but all have to agree and if somebody suggests something it may not be agreed on. Check and balances, there are powers but even more counter-powers to control. It has not been an active year for animal welfare. We are not enough staff, we need to be methodical to apply and more monitoring.”* The bureaucracy is connected to the EU’s system and can be hard to change, although, it should be in everybody’s interest. The same goes for the EC’s decision-making. The check and balance do not seem to function as intended, which should prevent dominance (Ch.3:13) and is a problem to the pluralistic structure, since it was a tool to maintain it. Here lack of resources is also a hinder to achieve success.

HSI, Swabe (Feb 2016) states *“Wading through mud very slowly. Things move very slowly. There is a lack of transparency in the processes at times, especially with the Council. Personally I feel I need to be cloned, to be more than in one place at the time, to delegate stuff.”* This can be connected to Erler’s statement that the institutions move slowly and things take time, experienced here as well, but also the transparency factor, which seem to be an issue in the EU. Lack of resources to be able to keep up is again a factor.

WWF, Gerritsen (Jan 2016) states *“Despite all the arguments in the world you are still working with people. It would be better to put part of the resources together in order to achieve more together. It is the pact between people. People are complex creatures and have to be worked with.”* Here the human factor is highlighted as the main problem and the gain that could be achieved if alliances could be formed.

EEB, Defossez (Jan 2016) states *“Before it was easier to lobby the EP than it is now, but the Council is the most difficult. We also need to fundraise and that take a lot of the time. It would be good if we did not need to do that. We are very far from our goal, it is only damage control, but people start to react. The politicians look for straws to defend status quo. It is the people who need to make the pressure.”* Here the EP is experienced to have changed despite being seen as the most open (Ch.3:16). Lack of resources is again stated as a major obstacle. Defossez agrees with Stevenson about the urge to keep status quo and in regards to civil society’s opinion, which is seen as being an important stakeholder that need to participate if change is going to be achieved.

Copa-Cogeca, Azevedo (Feb 2016) states *“It is a massive bureaucracy, but maybe it is because there are different DGs within the EC with different subjects some of them having different objectives. Usually within the environment, they have a different agenda than agriculture and then you have to be able to talk.”* Again the bureaucracy is stated to be a factor, but here it is due to the DGs’ conflict of interests, but also that it hinders communication. “*Then it is the EP with co-decision powers. You have to disperse your efforts. You do with the EC on proposals and you have to work with the EP because they have their opinion and changes, and then the Council. So it is this trilogies, they have to meet. Sometimes the system is very complex and to pass a message you really have to manage to reach the decision-makers to explain them what the real situation is. Sometimes there are different languages and not everyone speak the same.”* The procedures are seen as complex where all the institutions have to be approached at different stages, which are made even more difficult due to language barriers. This indicates that Copa-Cogeca has similar difficulties as the NGOs despite being one of the major players.

Euro Coop (Feb 2016) states *“It is the bureaucratic state of mind because if you don’t enter the lines which have been predefined and pre-decided by a long chain of bureaucratic decisions, there is little margin for manoeuvre. If you don’t have a cooperative unit with the EC, basically you are scattered around “2000” services which are not always coordinated. This EC is much more geared on economy in the classical terms. So e.g. there are much less concern for society and the environment. With Juncker e.g. there is a specific agenda with growth as the priority. So it is a major change and one of our priorities is to advocate is actually that you can have growth, but we encourage to think about growth in a different term. To think about growth and the creation of value in a different way, in a way which is sustainable, more respectful because otherwise growth is growth by the sake of growth, but for which the impact on the society and the environment will really outpace the economic benefit. One of the peculiar things with the new term of the EC is that it gives much less work to the EP. So actually the EP is more silent. Some MEPs are showing that they are more accessible and more active than others and others are more difficult to get in touch with.”* Here several of problems are highlighted where bureaucracy is seen as mental obstacle which blocks opportunities and Euro Coop has a similar problem as the environmental where WWF stated that they did not have a particular person to talk to either. The new EC appears to be a problem for most because of its economic priority where growth is only seen out of one perspective. Here pluralism could also be of benefit in regards to include different stakeholders to increase information. The EC seems to be behind a change in the EP, but here it goes against EEB’s experience and experienced that several of the MEPs are easier to access due to having more time.

Eurocities, Nielsen (Feb 2016) states *“The EC makes the proposals and that we can work with, but when it comes to the Council it becomes difficult, the members need to work with them. The agenda in the Council is heavy, since everyone comes with their own national agenda. The work and the result become watered down in the Council. It is better to work with the Presidency. There is a huge difference between the old and the new EC. There are new structures and different priorities. Earlier, there was a strong Commissioner for the cities, who could come back to the College with ideas. That is not the case anymore and everything has to go through Timmerman and he blocks.”*[[3]](#footnote-3)Eurocities appears to have more problems with the Council than the EC. It is noted that there is a difference between the present and previous EC, which creates problems for Eurocities as well, especially, because of Juncker’s new structures.

Sum up, all stakeholders experience difficulties with the institution, but which institutions depends foremost on the subject. The Council appears as most difficult for all, while the EP and the EC differs a lot in how the accessibility is experienced. Most agrees to that the new EC is very different to the previous. It is mainly due to the new EC’s priorities of the economy and growth, but also the restructure of the EC itself. This has added complexity in regards to be heard. It seems as many of the stakeholders have problems with getting their message through. The lack of resources is a problem where man-power stands out as a major issue. This leads to the people at the institutions.

* 1. **The categories for the people at the institutions**

As mentioned earlier, the person interviewed here are open to approaches and by that a generalisation about people at institutions cannot be drawn. It starts with what kind of stakeholders approach them.

6.2.1 **Who the stakeholders are**

Eriksson, MEP (Feb 2016) states “*Today for example, we had the British government and they have been here a few times before. Then there are some authorities, institutions and private companies. There are different groups, NGOs as well of course.*”[[4]](#footnote-4) Eriksson receives all kinds of stakeholders, even governments, which is interesting in regards to how various nationalities work where the Brits are known to have a pluralistic tradition, which is here confirmed (Ch.3:14).

Hazekamp, MEP (Jan 2016) states *“The Dutch Agricultural organisation and people from various parties, who wanted me to be involved in events. Otherwise, it is Dutch NGOs and HSI, but also various subjects such as pesticides, etc. Then companies as Monsanto gets involved and they were taught some things they did not know about. Businesses come to the events to speak, but I do not want to help businesses as Monsanto. The NGOs are always welcome though and they do not need to be registered as lobbyists. Some are so small so they are not registered.”* Hazekamp is mostly open for soft values and has a dislike for a corporation that works against it, but is one from the US. The theory that MEPs often receives stakeholders from their own MS (Ch.3:16) appears to be accurate at least to a point. Hazekamp is also open for giving less resourceful stakeholders a chance.

Kirketerp, Policy Officer (Feb 2016) states *“The stakeholders are organized. There is a civil dialogue and a lot of different interests. The stakeholders are farmer-, forestry- and food organisations, organic farmers, etc. It is a broad mix. We use dialogues. I work for Rural Development and for us it is important with what happens on the ground. We work with programmes, which have to be developed by the MSs and within the EC’s framework. The MSs have to work closely with the stakeholders after the Partnership principle, it is important.”* Here the DGs function has influence to what stakeholders are involved, which mostly are within agriculture. Dialogue is used with both stakeholders and the MSs, leaning towards corporatism, but has to cooperate under a specific principle and different interests are involved, leaning toward pluralism.

Norgren, Perm Rep (Jan 2016) states *“NGOs and business representatives, the business representatives are for e.g. antibiotics to change or influence legislation or veterinary medical products for pharmaceutical companies. They lobby mostly through lobbyists, but it is the politicians in Stockholm who decides. Perm Reps also scan colleagues in other MSs and explain their position and then Stockholm is contacted. This gives the Perm Rep an understanding of the other MSs’ situation and why they are for or against a proposal. E.g. the Pharmacies in Sweden earn money on prescriptions, while in the UK and other countries it is the veterinarians that earns on the prescriptions. The pharmacies in those countries can lobby to follow the Swedish model*.”[[5]](#footnote-5) The stakeholders here are within animal welfare and businesses related to animals or animal medicine due to the speciality Norgren represents as a veterinarian. Norgren does not have decision-making power, but can influent the decision-makers in Sweden and is therefore of interest to lobby.

Sum up, all appears to follow the pluralistic structure, but receive stakeholders within the interests of their concern. Although, Hazekamp has a restriction in regards to a specific US corporation. DG Agri involves stakeholders in dialogue, which is a channel to influence from inside, but many interests are represented. This leads to how they are approached.

* + 1. **The approach used**

Eriksson (Feb 2016) states “*Usually they call first or send an email that they like to see you. So they ask for meetings and say which days they are here or that a special week could suit them and then we try to set up the meeting. Somebody from my staff makes the appointment.*”[[6]](#footnote-6) Eriksson appears as especially flexible in regards to arranging appointments with stakeholders and that stakeholders are not situated in Brussels is taken into consideration.

Hazekamp (Jan 2016) states *“They send me brochures about their businesses or NGO. Some of them sponsor the “MEP of the Year Award.” It is not always transparent what they do or who the company are, but there are also e.g. semi-governmental organisations within my own interests.”* Here it appears to be an alternative approach method where brochures and sponsorships are used. The issue with the lack of transparency is taken up again and confirms that there are stakeholders who are not open about their intentions decreasing the transparency.

Kirketerp (Feb 2016) states *“We talk and meet a lot with the stakeholders. We host events and conferences with stakeholders, and participate. We look at the arguments and interact with lobbyists and build personal and professional relationships, which you surround yourself with. It is about being aware of their situation e.g. the economic situation, the environmental situation, etc. All angles are to be seen. Many of us have a link to what we do, but we cannot make a policy for just one stakeholder; it has to be for all.”* Dg Agri appears as being active where various methods are used in order to meet stakeholders and emphasizes the importance of being aware of situations, which is achieved by interaction. The importance of making policies for all is emphasized and stresses that DG Agri does not work for key stakeholders as in corporatism, although, it is stakeholders within the specific subject of the institution.

Norgren (Jan 2016) states “*They call or mail. The contact is through a representative, but anyone can contact us.*”[[7]](#footnote-7) This emphasizes that the Swedish representation has a pluralistic structure.

Sum up, the approach by the stakeholders are mainly through direct contact, although, alternative approaches are used and Dg Agri is active to create channels through events etc. that the stakeholders can use. Transparency is an issue, but otherwise the pluralistic structure is maintained. This leads to the interests.

* + 1. **Are all stakeholders and interests equal**

Eriksson (Feb 2016) states “*I think it is interesting when it is a government that is coming and lobby a MEP. It gives another dimension because they already have their channel through the Council and then they try to influence here as well. And in that way, it also becomes interesting for me to ask them about the Council. It becomes an interaction and a process, which goes a bit further and has significance, and that at times gives me a bit more*. *But, I also do that with NGOs and private companies, but it becomes a bit special when it is governments”* Is it to get your vote? “*Yes, they pursuit some questions and will try to influence in a matter as the one today about the emissions trading scheme, which are on the table at the moment where I am a shadow*. *Often the most lobbying is where one has a personal responsibility where you shadow or is a rapporteur. I was rapporteur in the linking of the European electricity grid and there of course it was a lot of lobbyists from both authorities and companies*.”[[8]](#footnote-8) Here governments use their tradition to work in a pluralistic structure and by that also use all channels available to influence (Ch.3:14). It also creates an opportunity for increased political exchange of information, although, all stakeholders appears to be treated equally. It is indicated how important the role as rapporteur or shadow (Ch.3:15) is for a stakeholder to increase influence on the specific area to its advantage and also increases the activity.

Are some interests more important? Erikson states “*Yes, it is where I have a direct responsibility and that happens when it is me who has to do the work and have the responsibility for the Green groups’ work*.” Who are most influential? “*It is very hard to judge. I think that the EC gets most of the lobbying. It is there the most extensive lobbying is and then we are number two. I think it may be a bit different with different issues, but it is clear that in general it is the private sector that is very well represented and has the resources and the money to lobby*.” What stands out? *“It is issues that affect the private sector’s economy*.” Is it mostly economic? “*Yes, indirectly it becomes like that, but also environmental issues e.g. the Emission Trading System, which is a kind of environmental issue, but the reason for the businesses lobbying is that it affects their economy*. *I give priority to energy issues, which I have done lately, more than others, but it is above all about that*.”[[9]](#footnote-9) The importance of the subject is connected to the area of responsibility and explains why all stakeholders are not involved in all of the processes. It is signified that the private sector is dominant due to its resourcefulness, which indicates that resources matter in the competition for influence. Also, that the economic interests are dominating, but here environmental interests can compete.

Hazekamp (Jan 2016) states “*The most important are NGOs, people with interest for the planet and the animals. Everybody approach everybody. They stop when they realize that their subject is not of interest. I invite organisations for achieving information. Sometimes it is not clear that stakeholders are lobbying, which happens often with companies like Monsanto. Some are open about their sponsoring, while some companies are lobbying with events that are not in their actual interest, but they turn it into PR. If one is not sure about the consequences, preventable precautions should be used instead. There are large commercial interests, which is not transparent despite the ETR. Lobby event for agriculture has the chance to talk to me, but it is mostly NGOs that are invited these days*.” The stakeholders here mostly reflects the own interest and are also invited indicating a corporatist approach. Again, it is indicated that the lobbying is not transparent and it appears to be the resourceful stakeholders in particularly where precautions are taken. It also confirms that there are stakeholders who use popular subjects to increase influence and by that be a part of solution instead of being the cause to the problem (Ch.3:11).

Hazekamp continues “*There is a discussion about how to lobby the government. The NGOs do not agree, but the key is to hold the arguments indoor and to find common ground. The key is to work together without losing one’s identity with the right to express oneself without fighting and to joy forces when needed*.” Who are the opponents?“*It is the EC and the governments. Animal welfare increased since 2002-2010 due to lobbying e.g. Party for Animals and other parties started to support. The problem is that there are always big crisis, mostly economic, which takes the attention and makes it hard to get through with animal welfare issues. E.g. there were plenty of people, who signed petitions against the treatment of the dogs in Romania to the MEPs, but it did not get attention for long before some economic crisis or refugee crisis or other took over again. One has to find majorities, also, within one’s own group e.g. an amendment was up for a vote against production made by children or other human rights violations to be forbidden in the EU, but it was voted down.*” Here the NGOs get critique for not being efficient in their approach and therefore weaken the opportunities to influence, which was also mentioned by stakeholders. The economic priorities are again emphasized, which sets all other subjects aside and increases therefore these stakeholders dominance. These stakeholders also have support by both the EC and the MSs, which adds a dimension and increases these institutions corporatism by supporting specific interest.

Kirketerp (Feb 2016) states “*For us, the farmers are important. We also have groups such as the food industry, traders, the agri-industry, machinery; fertilize- and pesticide industry, etc. It stands in the Treaty what we need to do and the environmental angle is also in the Treaty. The farmers and the environment are to interact with each other.*” Here the stakeholders are mostly within interests of concern for this agency and it is highlighted that the rules of Treaties are followed and includes the environment and that these have to work together.“*Some lobbyists are so extreme, so it is hard to find common ground and we stand really far from each other. It is important to find common ground. For me it is a difference between stakeholder and lobbyist. There are representative organisations or people, or there are lobbyist bureaus. I have never had anything to do with the latter. We have rules how to deal with lobbyists and how to interact with them. It is about transparency. We make minutes about the meeting and what have been said, which is registered. We have to see if the person is registered in the ETR. The whole design is built on interaction with various stakeholders and with other EU institutions. I can see that we are described wrongly in the media; it would not pay off to be bought, we can e.g. only accept gifts up to €50 and there are rules for how to conduct when invited to restaurants, etc*.” It is made a difference between stakeholders, but that is in regards to how they behave where precautions are taken to prevent unserious interest groups from achieving dishonest actions and to maintain transparency. The code of conduct is also followed (Ch.3:12) to prevent corruption.

Norgren (Jan 2016) states “*The size matter to a certain point. It has to be realistic, not private persons, etc., but views can be heard from all, but I have never examined it. Most goes to the EP directly.”* Who is most influential? “*It is difficult to say. I do not see it that way. They go to likeminded people. I do not have so large groups*.” What stands out? “*Animal protection issues are most difficult. They are “stone dead” within a foreseeable future, then the enforcement of laws are stronger. The EC is working in favour of that, not in new legislation, but the enforcement of the law that already exists. The EC wants to start the economy. It is a lot about the economy. They do not believe it is that bad and have a blind eye for the problems. They think that the legislation is good.*”[[10]](#footnote-10) The pluralistic structure is followed up to the point that it has to include interest groups, but does not to let certain interests dominate. The economic priorities of the EC is here confirmed and also the view from, especially Eurogroup’s, about the new EC’s views on legislation and that animal welfare is not a priority at all with the attitude that it already functions.

Norgren continues *“If one should choose between organisations, then it is the organisations reputation that is of importance and how it behaves, but you want to hear everything. But if they want to be partner it has to be built on facts, the right facts is alfa omega. It provides better negotiation and partnerships. The approach and appearance is important. The NGOs have to have credibility and come with facts, not with propaganda access to the subject. Perm Reps do not have gatekeepers and it all depends on the legislation and the issue. The MEPs are contacted more and have gatekeepers. The EC is not interested, they only want economic growth. For us, the general utility of the subject is important*.”[[11]](#footnote-11) This indicates that it is very much up to the stakeholder itself to how it is perceived and can by behaving professionally and providing useful information increases the opportunities to achieve access. The differences between institutions are also apparent where the Swedes look at the utility, while the EC look at the economic impact.

Sum up, the interests represented depends on the interests these people work within and is the reason for that some interests stand out. The pluralistic structure is again apparent, but also depends on the stakeholders themselves and how they work. That the EC has economic priorities are evident and by that the EC does not work out of a pluralistic structure, which goes against its own rules (Ch.3:10). Although, its agency here working after these rules and towards upholding transparency. But it is not only the EC where the economic interests are dominant; it is amongst the MEPs in the EP as well. Therefore, the EU’s pluralistic structure does not seem to function within any of the institutions and are only uphold by individual persons within the institutions.

* + 1. **What influence do the stakeholders have**

Eriksson, (Feb 2016) states “*They can influence a lot, absolutely, especially against the EC; it is seen as that they have a great influence, but it is always about having good arguments.*” How do they influence? “*Now with the Brits, they got their own proposals to change the system to whom should get the free allocation of emission trading rights and they are arguing for it. It is direct how the legislation should be made. It can be anything that they may influence of course. If you lobbying an issue hard and have strong arguments then you have influence, it is above all about important arguments that bite the best*.” Is it mostly economic? “*No, it can also mean that there are more rational things where you have a proposal that is simpler and better and more efficient, but it is often because we regulate the market. The players in the market have their perspective and they know the market in a way that we MEPs or the EC do not know, or cannot out of that perspective. They have other perspectives and the knowledge, and I think it is very good. But the problem with the lobbying is more about that there are some that may not have those resources. Not that some businesses can afford and have the possibilities to express their views, but that there are others who do not have that. That is the problem, because the weak groups should be able to express their views, but may not have the channels and resources for it.*”[[12]](#footnote-12) This highlights the importance of knowledge, which can be provided by key stakeholders and therefore raise their influence, which indicates corporatism. But it is not the resourceful stakeholders that are blamed, it is the system and strong arguments are up to all stakeholders to provide. It confirms the issue with the inequality between stakeholders due to resources, which the pluralistic structure of the EU should prevent and the EC seems to have been aware of it by providing funds, but it does not seem to have had the desired affect (Ch.3:13). The dominance of economic interests seems to increasingly be the cause.

Is there a reason for why some succeed? Eriksson, “*Yes, but it is also to work smart and efficient with the lobbying. If you e.g. compare the Swedish government, they are rarely here and try to influence their point of view and positions in the EP, while the British government does it with a number of issues.*” Why not the Swedes? “*I do not know. They may not believe that they can. They do not have the experience and the habit that this is the way it works, but you can gain alliances in this way*.”[[13]](#footnote-13) This confirms the influence of traditions where the Brits are working out of pluralism, while the Swedes miss opportunities to increase influence because of their corporatist tradition.

In regards to influence, Hazekamp (Jan 2016) states “*I am not sure. Personally, I am looking at animal welfare NGOs. They had more influence before than now. The system is changing and people are changing, they are not true to their political parties. Politicians try to follow the flow and there is no clear goal anymore. Most petitions from citizens are about animal welfare, but MEPs are not very interested. Petitions therefore have no major effect. They are soon forgotten again because other problems fill more*.” This confirms the dominance of specific interests again, which seems to have increased. Here it is also indicated that the political system have changed and has had a negative impact within interest that are not economic despite being interests of the public.

Kirketerp (Feb 2016) states “*They influence quit a lot. We have to make policies in the interests of the stakeholders and look at their needs when we make proposals, but it is decided by the EP and the Council. We must balance the proposals with the reality. The economy is important. The farmers have to stay in business. It is also in the Treaty, but the sustainability increases*.” The stakeholders within the agriculture have great influence on the proposals from the EC where the economic aspects are taken into account in accordance with the Treaty, but the EC does not have decision power on the outcome. It is also indicated that change are on the way though.

Sum up, the stakeholders have great influence on the decision-making, especially, if they lobby interests that are of priority to the EC. It is important to be able to provide useful and specific knowledge, which give stakeholders advantages, but strong arguments are influential as well. There is inequality between the stakeholders’ interests in the EU institutions where economic interests are dominant in all of them. It is up to the stakeholders to use the right method where stakeholders working out of pluralistic tradition can achieve higher influence than the ones from corporatist. This leads to the conclusion.

7.0 **Conclusion**

To the question if the stakeholders within animal welfare experience lobbying the EU institutions differently compared to stakeholders that are lobbying other interests, the answer has to be yes, but only up to a point, since there were other stakeholders that have similar experiences. It first had to be established how and who the stakeholders lobbied in order to establish if this made a difference. In conclusion, there were no major differences in the stakeholders lobbying, but all expressed to have negative experiences with the lobbying. Even though, the experiences varied to a certain degree due to the differences of subjects. The animal welfare stakeholders appeared to be especially active, but could be due to more detailed answers. The EP was most approached by these stakeholders of all the institutions and also appeared to be the most accessible to animal welfare interests. The environmental stakeholders on the other hand lobbied the EC more and experienced that the EP was harder to approach than the EC, which went against that the EP was the most open institution. WWF appeared to have a higher access to the present EC than EEB despite EEB being a part of the Green Ten, which should give access due to its size. Eurocities and Euro Coop lobbied slightly differently due to their specific interests, but was did not make a major difference in the experience to the lobbying arena. It was experienced by most of the stakeholders that the EC has changed, since the previous EC, and that it is due to the new EC’s priorities, which made it more difficult to achieve access. The exception was Copa-Cogeca, who did not express that this was an issue and it appeared to have the same access to the EC as it had with the previous, but had an issue to get it message through despite the access. The EU has a pluralistic structure to maintain democracy in the lobbying, but this does not appear to be experienced by most of the stakeholders.

The people at the institutions represented here all appeared to following the pluralistic structure. The eventual corporatist tendencies only appeared because of individual expertise and therefore only stakeholders with direct interest to the persons’ area make approaches. There was a demand that stakeholders had to be professional and behave correctly to be considered, but everyone has a chance to be heard, which follows the principles of pluralism. It was emphasized that when governments lobby it added a dimension due to the possibility to share political information, but other stakeholders had the same opportunity to exchange their information and influence.

In regards to why the animal welfare stakeholders’ experience the lobbying differently, is mostly due to the total lack of interest for animal welfare, primarily by the new EC, but also by some MEPs and the MSs. Another issue for animal welfare stakeholders is that they go against the economic interests and therefore are seen as inconvenient with unreasonable demands, which could have been avoided if their information had been heard. Although, they are not alone in experiencing a decreased interest for their cause, since it is shared by the environment, the cooperatives and the cities as well. There are also people within institutions that do not want to talk to NGOs and by that information from a large number of stakeholders never become considered in the policy-making process, which weakens the outcome and affect the interests of the civil society as well. This is not only in regards to the animal welfare stakeholders, since the other stakeholders experience similar difficulties. Again, with the exception of Copa-Cogeca to a certain extent, since it had difficulties to get messages through to make people understand the farmers’ situation. Copa-Cogeca represents economic interest, which gives it higher access to the institutions, especially to the EC, but experienced that it has become more difficult, since the EP has achieved co-decision. This it shared with the environmental stakeholders, especially EEB. The EU is pluralistic where many stakeholders compete for the attention, but strong corporatist elements are evident depending on the subject where economic interests are prioritised over soft values affecting consumers, animals and the environment. The EC has also met mostly with stakeholders with economic interests and by that has not maintained the pluralistic structure. The most common factors for all the stakeholders were also the importance of participating in expert groups, advisory groups, etc. to achieve influence from inside and to be recognized as stakeholders and experts, which is a corporatist structure.

There were obstacles, which added to the problems where the animal welfare stakeholders highlights the lack of animal welfare initiatives and that it has to be hold against the economic interests, especially caused by the new EC and Juncker’s attitude toward the subject. The ideologies were especially a problem in regards to the conservatives, who lack an interest in the environment. The animal welfare did not express this, but emphasized the importance for a broad coalition. The cooperatives had problems with being small and having a concept that was not known, while agriculture though it was that the opinions differed. The cities and the cooperatives did not have any formal opponents, and Copa-Cogeca did not see anyone as an opponent. The animal welfare and environment had the same experience where the counterparts depended on the objectives, which created both strong counterparts, but who could also be strong alliances at times to mutual gain. Most of the opponents where connected to economic interests, but likeminded could also become opponents due to conflict of interests where there were disagreements in regards to the framework it should be worked within. EEB and HSI experienced that there was a lack of transparency, while Copa-Cogeca experienced it to be transparent. EEB also emphasized that there were dirty lobbying, which the ETR should had prevented, but thereby does not work as intended. Conflict of interest was also experienced as by several both in regards to the EP Committees and the DGs in the EC. For many of the stakeholders, the lack of resources is a severe issue in the competition with resourceful stakeholders and causes inequality, which should be prevented by the system, but again does not work as intended. Another interesting subject where the problems the own organisation created by being an umbrella organisation where internal issues had to be solved first, which influenced the external work negatively and decreases the chances to win in all three arenas further.

The main difficulties appeared to be that the solid competition for the institutions’ attention including the agenda and that the economic interests are superior to others, and that the bureaucracy adds to the problems. The institutions are also experienced as moving slowly and that there is a wish to maintain status quo, also amongst the MSs, which makes it hard to move forward. Many of the subjects are set up against the economic interests, which has a major dominance despite mechanism to prevent that anybody from dominating the system. Most also experienced that there is a difference between the previous and present EC where the problems have increased with the new EC and its economic priorities, but also due to its reconstruction. Thereby, the pluralistic structure that the EU institutions should maintain in order to maintain democracy has decreased and the corporatist elements increased creating an inequality amongst the stakeholders, which could have been avoided if all interests had been respected equally. This highlights how hard it is to win in all the three arenas where it is so hard to achieve attention in the EU institutions, while strong counterparts can be supportive alliances, but only temporary and otherwise work retaliatory and if the own organisation are not giving the vital backing then it becomes impossible. All in all, none of the stakeholders appears to be satisfied, which could have been avoided if the pluralistic structure had functioned properly, but the tools that are put in place do not work as intended.

The stakeholders are backed by the people at the institutions, who confirm many of the stakeholders’ issues where the economic priorities are highlighted as being an issue. That the stakeholders have strong influences on the policy-making was also confirmed and increases the inequality when resourceful and powerful interest groups prevail. This is also emphasized here to be because of the present EC, who turns a blind eye to certain issues due to its economic priorities. It is also highlighted that the main problem with the lobbying is that the resourceful stakeholders have advantage over less resourceful, but is caused by the system that do not treat all stakeholders equally, which also includes the civil society. The lack of transparency is also confirmed and the critique by Svendsen and Brandt is thereby justified and change is needed. It seems as if the whole scenery needs to be restructured in order to work in everybody’s interests, civil society’s included.

In regards to the theories, it appeared to be the right choice, since these highlighted the issues of the institutions structures and increased the understanding for how the lobbying arena in Brussels functions, but also its dysfunctions. Interest representation was necessary to include though, since the theories had to be set in a context and without explaining the scenery the theories would have been severely weakened and hard to use to its full potential. It highlighted the difference between the pluralistic and corporatist approach where it was emphasized the advantage of pluralism to achieve both influence e.g. the Brits vs. the Swedes, but also to maintain democracy amongst the various stakeholders and interests. Corporatism also helped to highlight the strong corporatist elements within the institutions and the weaknesses it brought with it. Especially, the information that is lost and therefore threatens democracy in itself, since it affects whose interest wins in whose interest. The majority of interests for the civil society as a whole may therefore not be protected as it should in a democracy.

7.1 **Recommendations**

In regards to recommendations, the only recommendation that can be given, since these are professionals, is that the all stakeholders within soft values such as NGOs and consumer stakeholders find common ground so a more permanent alliance can be formed. They are many and if they joined forces, they would be an interest group to count with, even against the economic interests. It should be possible to achieve due to common interests and common problems, but trust need to be achieved first, which unfortunately can be an issue where everyone wants to work within their own framework. But it can only be recommended that the barriers are overcome in gain for all.

Peter Stevenson is here given the last word:

“We need change in how we regard the world and the animals in it. We need real respect and reverence to change the whole attitude towards animals. We will only get real change when the attitude changes.” – Peter Stevenson

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1. Translated from Danish [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Translated from Danish [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Translated from Danish [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Translated from Swedish [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Translated from Swedish [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Translated from Swedish [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Translated from Swedish [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Translated from Swedish [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Translated from Swedish [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Translated from Swedish [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Translated from Swedish [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Translated from Swedish [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Translated from Swedish [↑](#footnote-ref-13)