Ukraine - Battlefield Between EU & Russia

Azadi, Aija Konisevska

4. term

European Studies, Master

2014

2014-11-07

73

Den 21. november 2013, en uge før EU’s Østpartnerskabstopmøde i Vilnius, satte Ukraines regering forberedelserne til at underskrive en associeringsaftale med EU på pause og prioriterede tættere bånd til Rusland. Beslutningen kom bag på mange, fordi Ukraine siden uafhængigheden har fremhævet et europæisk valg som en central udenrigspolitisk målsætning. Specialet placerer beslutningen i konteksten af to konkurrerende regionale projekter: EU’s Europæiske Naboskabspolitik og Østpartnerskab, der skal fremme politiske og økonomiske reformer i nabolande, og Ruslands toldunion, som blev et betydningsfuldt alternativ. Ukraine blev dermed et område, hvor EU’s og Ruslands interesser stødte sammen, og landets foretrukne multivektor-udenrigspolitik – at balancere flere partnere samtidig – var ikke acceptabel for nogen af parterne. Hovedspørgsmålet er, hvorfor Ukraine satte arbejdet med associeringsaftalen i bero. Specialet undersøger to udbredte forklaringer gennem neorealisme, en teori i international politik, der lægger vægt på staters magt og sikkerhed: (1) regeringens henvisning til nationale sikkerhedsinteresser og (2) russisk pres på Ukraine. Analysen bygger på eksisterende litteratur og officielle udtalelser for at vurdere, hvordan hver forklaring kan belyse beslutningens timing og indhold.

On 21 November 2013, a week before the EU’s Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius, Ukraine’s government paused preparations to sign an Association Agreement with the EU and prioritized closer ties with Russia. The decision surprised many because, since independence, Ukraine had presented a European choice as a central foreign policy goal. The thesis situates the decision within two competing regional projects: the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership, designed to encourage political and economic reforms in neighboring countries, and Russia’s Customs Union, which became a significant alternative. Ukraine thus became a site of competing EU–Russia interests, and its preferred multi-vector foreign policy—balancing several partners at once—was unacceptable to either side. The core question is why Ukraine suspended work on the Association Agreement. The thesis examines two widely cited explanations through neorealism, an international relations theory that emphasizes state power and security: (1) the government’s invocation of national security interests and (2) Russian pressure on Ukraine. The analysis draws on existing literature and official statements to assess how each explanation accounts for the timing and substance of the decision.

[This abstract was generated with the help of AI]

Association Agreement ; Ukraine ; Russia ; Customs Union ; ENP ; national security ; EU ; integration ; energy

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