The African Peace and Security Architecture in the African Union
Author
Kammersgaard, Nicolai Juul
Term
4. term
Publication year
2018
Submitted on
2018-05-31
Pages
36
Abstract
This thesis examines why the African Union’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is not yet fully functional. Using a deductive, comparative approach grounded in Rational Choice Institutionalism, it analyzes the establishment of two core APSA components—the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Panel of the Wise (PoW)—and assesses how interregional cooperation within the AU affects their development. Drawing on an overview of the AU’s history and APSA’s design (including CEWS, PSC, PoW, ASF, and the Peace Fund), the study compares the obstacles these instruments have faced and highlights the ASF’s delayed readiness, illustrated by the lack of deployment during the 2012 Mali crisis. It concludes that APSA’s institutional framework is weak: rules poorly constrain member state behavior, the AU has limited means to sanction non-compliance, incentives to contribute are uneven because some states feel secure and see fewer benefits, and many members continue to prefer sub-regional security arrangements over continental ones. Together, these factors help explain why APSA has struggled to operate as intended.
Dette speciale undersøger, hvorfor Den Afrikanske Unions Afrikanske Freds- og Sikkerhedsarkitektur (APSA) endnu ikke fungerer fuldt ud. Med en deduktiv, komparativ tilgang forankret i rational choice-institutionalisme analyseres etableringen af to centrale APSA-komponenter—African Standby Force (ASF) og Panel of the Wise (PoW)—samt hvordan interregionalt samarbejde i AU påvirker deres udvikling. Med afsæt i et overblik over AUs historie og APSAs opbygning (herunder CEWS, PSC, PoW, ASF og Peace Fund) sammenlignes de hindringer, instrumenterne har mødt, og ASF’s forsinkede parathed belyses blandt andet af manglende indgriben i Mali i 2012. Analysen konkluderer, at APSAs institutionelle fundament er svagt: reglerne begrænser i ringe grad medlemsstaternes adfærd, AU råder kun over begrænsede sanktionsmuligheder, incitamenterne til at bidrage er ujævnt fordelt, fordi nogle lande allerede oplever stabilitet og ser færre gevinster, og flere medlemsstater foretrækker fortsat subregionale sikkerhedsordninger frem for kontinentale. Samlet set forklarer dette, hvorfor APSA har haft vanskeligt ved at fungere efter hensigten.
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