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The African Peace and Security Architecture in the African Union

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Abstract
In this thesis project a deductive comparative investigation of why the African Peace and Security Architecture is still not fully functional is carried out. The investigation will be conducted on the basis of the Rational Choice Institutionalism Theory and will focus on the establishment process of the African Standby Force and the Panel of the Wise which both are part of the African Peace and Security Architecture. Moreover, an analysis of the interregional cooperation within the African Union will be carried out with an emphasis on the affect on the establishment of the Peace and Security Architecture. Furthermore, a brief overview of the history and structure of the African Union will be provided as background information for the understanding of the African security framework. By comparing the processes of the establishment of the Panel of the Wise and the African Standby Force it will be possible to derive, which challenges the two conflict resolution instruments have encountered. Moreover, in combination with the analysis of the interregional cooperation within the African Union regarding the Peace and Security Architecture will it be possible to establish why the African Peace and Security Architecture is still not fully functioning. It is concluded that the institutional element behind the African Peace and Security Architecture is weak. Therefore, the rules and structures of the institution are not strong enough to constrain the behaviour of the member states. Furthermore, all countries does not benefit from the common good, as they already live in a peaceful area. Therefore, they have no insensitive to contribute to the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture. Moreover, the African Union does only have limited options to sanction its member states, when necessary, which also make the institutional framework weak. Lastly, the African Union has not established itself yet, as the sole provider of security on the continent. Hence, some member states prefer their own sub-regional security institutions.

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List of Abbreviation

ACIRC	African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises
ASF	African Standby Force
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
EAC	East African Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PKO	Peacekeeping operation
PoW	Panel of the Wise
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSO	Peace Support Operation
RCIT	Rational Choice Institutionalism Theory
RDC	Rapid Deployment Contingent
REC	Regional Economic Community
SADC	Southern African Development Community
UN	United Nation
UNSC	United Nation Security Council

1.0 Introduction

Almost by definition is the African insecurity very complex, as the continent is affected by domestic governance failures, within multi-ethnic societies, which often are extreme poor and many African state borders are porous (Cilliers & Gnanguênon 2016). The genocide in Rwanda and the disastrous United States led United Nation-intervention in Somalia in the beginning of the 1990s demonstrated this complex insecurity situation. Moreover, the fragility of United Nation (UN) peacekeeping missions was highlighted for the African leaders. Therefore, the African countries were forced to create their own peace and security architecture. The countries have since then tried to establish their own standby force that could intervene in conflicts and to improve their peace and security architecture. This was at first developed in the context of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and since 2002 through its successor the African Union (AU). The heart of the African Peace and Security Architecture (ASPA), which is the framework for peacekeeping in Africa, is the Peace and Security Council (PSC). It is supported by four components, which are the African Standby Force (ASF), the Panel of the Wise (PoW), the Peace Fund and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). In, addition to a Military Staff Committee, which is an advisory body comparable to the MSC of the United Nations (Cilliers & Gnanguênon 2016). Thus, the ASF is part of an African holistic approach to participate in peacebuilding, peacekeeping, peacemaking and conflict prevention (de Coning 2014).

CEWS is the preventive component of the ASPA, while the Panel of the Wise both have a preventive role and a more active diplomatic mediation role. Moreover, the ASF is the active component of the ASPA, as its aim is to settle African intra and inter state conflicts through intervention and follow up peacekeeping mission. Lastly, the Peace Fund is the financial component of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

The African narrative of 'African solutions for African problems' is one of the main reasons for the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the context of the AU. This emphasis on solving the continent's own problems fit well in the recurrent trend of promoting regional peacekeeping that has been attempted since the end of the Cold War. Both the Secretary General at the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali[1] and his successor Kofi Annan[2] promoted the idea of regional cooperation through regional organisations regarding peacekeeping operations (PKOs). The aim for the cooperation was to decrease the burden of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and to foster a deeper sense of democratisation and participation in international affairs.

[1] Boutros-Ghali devised the "Agenda for Peace" Report in 1992, which focused on United Nations peacekeeping in the new era after the Collapse of the Soviet Union.

[2] By devising the "Brahimi report", Kofi Annan wanted to evaluate the United Nations peace and security activities at the turn of the millennium.

One of the main components of the APSA is the African Standby Force, which should have been ready for deployment in 2010, but was not declared to be fully operational ready until January 15th 2016. This implied that the ASF was not ready to be deployed, by the time when the outbreak of the Malian conflict required it in the beginning of 2012. Instead, it was the French military that had to intervene in the conflict in order to avoid the capital Bamako being captured by the insurgents. This demonstrated that 18 years after the Rwandan genocide after 10 years in the making ASF and the African Peace and Security Architecture were still not functioning (Roux 2013). Hence, the AU's lack of readiness and capabilities in Mali revealed that the African countries are still depended on assistance from Western countries to ensure peace on the continent. Two of the main components in the ASPA are the African Standby Force and the Panel of the Wise. Therefore, I will compare those two components in order to investigate the following questions:

Why is the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture not fully functioning?

- *Which challenges have the African Standby Force and the Panel of the Wise met during the establishment process?*
- *How does the interregional cooperation within the AU affect the APSA?*

By investigating the challenges the ASF and PoW have met so far and comparing them with each other, it will be possible to extract the main reasons behind why the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture is not fully functioning. Moreover, an investigation on how the interregional cooperation in the AU affected the APSA based on Rational Choice Institutional Theory will provide an additional explanation to the main question.

In this thesis, a description of the methodological approach of the thesis project and the theoretical framework, that will be used to investigate the research question, will be presented first. Thereafter, the history of the African Union and its Peace and Security architecture will be described. Then, the challenges that the ASF and the PoW have met so far will be accounted for in the comparative analysis chapter. Hereafter, a investigation on the interregional cooperation within the AU regarding the African Peace and Security Architecture will be conducted by applying rational choice institutionalism theory. Lastly, in the conclusion the research question will be answered, on the basis of the comparative analysis and the discussion of the interregional cooperation.

2.0 Methodology

This chapter will present the methodological approaches that are used as a tool for the analysis of the previously stated research questions. Moreover, the choice of theory would be introduced and the choice of qualitative data for this master thesis will be explained. Furthermore,

2.1 Choice of Theory

The theory used for the investigation of the research is the Theory of Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCIT), as it focuses on the decision processes within institutions. Hence, based on an individualistic approach, RCIT can explain the decision-making of AU member states within the context of the APSA. Hereby, it can be argued that RCIT consists of a rational approach within an institutional context.

Rational choice institutionalism theorists consider institutions as the centre of most political activity. Therefore, the RCIT emphasises on the role and nature of political institutions in order to offer an extensive account of politics (Peters 2012).

The Theory of Rational Choice Institutionalism will be explained more in detail in the theory chapter.

2.2 Choice of Data

As the aim of the assignment is to explain why the AU's Peace and Security Architecture is not fully functioning yet, qualitative data will be used. Since qualitative research usually emphasis on words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data, it is most adequate to use (Bryman 2016). Moreover, Robson and McCartan point out that situations in qualitative research are described through the perspective of the involved actors and that context is important, as there is a need to understand a phenomenon in its environment (2016). Lastly, both Bryman and Robson & McCartan argue that the social world in the qualitative research is perceived as a creation of the people involved, which is also known as social constructivism. Hence the social reality is constantly shifting depending of actions of the individuals in the world (2016; 2016). Contrary, by only using quantitative data it would not be possible to account for the research question, as quantitative data mainly provides numbers and not explanations and this thesis has the aim to provide an analysis of the reasons behind the challenges met in the establishment process of the African standby force and the Panel of Wise.

Deductive reasoning will be used in order to investigate the research questions.

The deductive approach makes it possible to deduct conclusions from proposition or premises. The main focus of deductive reasoning is to test a hypothesis developed on the basis of an already

known theory. This is carried out by developing the hypothesis, before designing a strategy for the research process and lastly tests the hypothesis (Dudovskiy). Bryman argues that "in deductive theory the researcher draws on what is know about in a particular domain and on relevant theoretical ideas in order to deduce a hypothesis (or hypotheses) that must then be subjected to empirical scrutiny" (21). Therefore, I will use the comprehensive research on the AU and its peace and security architecture, in combination with the Rational Choice Institutional Theory, in order to investigate the hypothesis, which is that *lack of commitment and will are two of the main reasons for why the APSA is not fully functioning*.

Dudovskiy describes the difference between the deductive approach and the inductive approach in the following way. "Deduction begins with an expected pattern that is tested against observations, whereas induction begins with observations and seeks to find a pattern within them"(research-methodology.net).

The empirical data that will be used for the analysis of the comparative study is collected through desktop research with a focus on publications and research papers from analysis institutes, academic institutions and think thanks. Therefore, the data used for this assignment will be secondary. Moreover, diverse media articles have provided additional information in the research process. Combined, these sources have made it possible to produce a comprehensive paper and answer the inquired research question.

2.3 Choice of analysis: Comparative study

The fundamental idea of a comparative study is to improve the understanding of a social phenomenon by comparing a phenomenon in relation to two or several meaningfully contrasting situations or cases (Bryman 2016). Moreover, by bringing unexpected differences or similarities between cases to the researcher's attention, a comparison provides a new perspective to a known environment and put off responses of narrow-mindedness to political issues (Hopkin 2002).

One of the main advantages of comparative study is that it allows for the development, test and refining of theories (Hopkin 2002). Moreover, the comparison of two or more cases brings the researcher in a position to create the conditions to investigate if a theory can defend its hypothesis. Furthermore, the comparison may also lead to a concept, which is applicable to an emerging theory (Bryman 2016). Hopkins points out that, by observing the different ways political problems are dealt with in various contexts, a deduction of possible policy learning's becomes apparent along with an exposure to new points of views and possible solutions (2002).

Regarding the focus of the comparison, comparative research should not be perceived as only focused on comparisons between nations, rather it is applicable to a wide-range of

situations. Comparative design can be used for both quantitative and qualitative research, however when the latter occurs it is the context of a multiple-case study. Moreover, the comparative study based on qualitative research is often a continuation of a case study design (Bryman 2016).

2.4 Limitations

Several components of institutions, peace or security could have been used to investigate the African Peace and Security Architecture. However, to narrow the scope of the thesis only two components have been highlighted. Moreover, this paper will neither concentrate on the peace and security architecture in the specific Regional Economic Community (REC), nor will a specific description of the RECs or other regional cooperations in Africa be provided, instead the focus will be on the APSA on a general plan, as this is more relevant for answering the research question. Furthermore, it has not been possible to gather primary data regarding this topic, as the limited timeframe made exhaustive interviews difficult to conduct.

3.0 Rational Choice Institutionalism Theory

The theory from which the hypothesis will be deducted is the Rational Choice Institutionalism Theory. The underlying thought in RCIT is that people and actors basically are selfish, but these actors do also acknowledge that cooperation sometimes can be necessary. Hence, they establish institutions in order to achieve utility maximisation. However, to avoid any particular actor taking advantage of the institution's decisions, structures and behavioural constraints are part of the institutional framework. Moreover, the theory is useful to understand why intentional change might occur in a world characterised be institutional failures and stable preferences (Peters 2012).

James March and Johan Olsen argued that Functionalism, Reductionism, Contextualism, Instrumentalism and Utilitarism were features of the rational choice and behavioural strands. Moreover, they coined the term new institutionalism, which have at least six different forms (Peters 2012). Elinor Ostrom and Barry Weingast are other major scholars who have conducted research within the field of Rational Choice Institutionalism.

3.1 RCIT philosophy

The rational choice theorists fundamental assumption is that institutions makes a difference and that they explain political decisions better than anything else. According to the theorists all approaches use something related to institutions to explain governmental decisions, as for instance its incentives, rules or values (Peters 2012). Moreover, institutions are conceptualised as positive (inducements) and negative (rules) sets of motivations directed at individuals, while the human

desire for utility maximisation create the dynamic for behaviour necessary for the system to function. Furthermore, RCIT theorists perceive institutions as almost infinitely changeable through selection of structures and rules. Thus, the design of the institutions becomes a more sustainable activity than it is in other perceptions of institutionalism. However, this might also be a liability for the RCIT, if the institutional values are not solid enough to limit the behaviour of individuals. Thereby, it might be necessary to change the rules and structures, so often that the equilibrium of the institution would make little sense for the members (Peters 2012). Moreover, if nobody is benefitting from a common good, collective action problems may occur. Hence the common good must always be maximising utilities for the individuals (Blyth 2002). The rational approach of people or states according to the RCIT is characterised by Ward as "when faced with several courses of action, people usually do what they believe is likely to have the best overall outcome" (65). Hence, it is necessary for the institutions to constrain the behaviour of people or states in order to achieve utility maximisation through cooperation within the institutions for the common good. Utility maximisation is the main argument of RCIT, as the theorists perceive it as the main motivation for individuals.

3.2 Individuals and states are selfish by nature

According to rational approach individuals or states are selfish by nature. However, they may believe that it is more beneficial and effective for them to achieve their goals through the institutional collaboration than on their own. Hence in an environment established by the rules and constraint of the institution, they pursue their own goals and interests.

Moreover, because these selfish individuals might also understand that the institutions shape their behaviour, they realise that it may also be beneficial for them, if the behaviour of other people is constrained as well. Peters summarises the individuals balancing of interest in the following way. "Individuals rationally choose to be, to some extent, constrained by their membership in institutions, whether that membership is voluntary or not" (49). The reason behind is that then everybody is to some extent constraint and will in theory work towards utility maximisation for the common good (Peters 2012).

3.3 The creation of institutions

RCTI theorists argue that institutions are only created when there is a logical need for it or that it will emerge naturally, given that the actors are rational. The best know example of this might be the European Coal and Steel Community, which later transformed into the European Union, that was established after the World War 2. Moreover, it is assumed that institutions are created on an empty

background. Therefore, the previous history of the institution is insignificant. Rather, it is nature of the constraints and incentives incorporated into the institution that affects the outcomes of the design process and the new set of incentive can fairly easy change the behaviour of the institution members (Peters 2012). Peters defines a good institution as one that through rules can constrain individual maximisation in cases where maximisation is collectively destructive and can enforce its own rules(2012). Especially, in the long run is this constraint significant, as political leaders will be more likely to accept constraints on their behaviour, if they trust that future leaders also will be met with this constrain (Peters 2012). Moreover, RCIT theorists perceive institutions as deliberately designed structures selected by individuals in order to ensure stability (Blyth 2002).

3.4 The role of institutions

Peters conceptualises institutions "as collections of rules and incentives that establish the parameters on the behaviour of individuals" (48). By creating the conditions for rationality the rules establish what Peters call a "political space" in which several interdependent political actors can act. The individual politicians must work within these models in order to achieve the maximisation of personal utilities, while they are working within one or more institutions' rule set. Thereby, the politicians are always working, while being inherently constrained at the same time. Hence, contrary to other types of institutional theory, actors rather than just a set of norms and rules are contained in the picture (Peters 2012). While Ostrom defines institutions as:

> […] rules used by individuals for determining who and what are included in decision situations, how information is structured, what actions can be taken and in what sequence, and how individual actions will be aggregated into collective decisions…all of which exist in a language shared by some community of individuals rather than as physical parts of some external environment (Peters 59).

Terry Moe elaborates on Ostrom's definition by arguing that "[…] economic organisations and institutions are explained in the same way: they are structures that emerge and take the specific form they do because they solve collective action problems and thereby facilitate gains from trade" (Peters 61). Hence, the rules within the institutions ensure that collective issues are being addressed and benefit from this. In this way the members of the institutions exchange their freedom of action for achieving the advantages of being members of the institution.

3.5 Institutional design

RCIT perceive institutions as products of human actions. This is based upon the comprehension that the structure of incentives and rules is a choice of the designers in order to constrain the members of the institutions' behaviour. The aim for the individuals designing the institutional structures is to provide the institution with the capacity to produce stability and collective beneficial outcomes for its members. Moreover, an institution should ideally manage a common pool of resources efficiently and sustainable. Furthermore, the institutional decision-making should be based on the commitment to powerful general norms, such as democracy (Peters 2012).

3.6 Structured and unstructured institutions

RCIT theorists perceive institutions as either structure or unstructured. Structured institutions are characterised by maintaining the same form from year to year and keeping the difference from and similarities to other institutions with a similar agenda. Hereby, it becomes possible to compare the different institutions across settings. Moreover, the structure inserts the logic of optimisation in a strategic connection (Shepsle 2006). Contrary, Shepsle defines unstructured institutions as having more fluid institutional structures (2006). The individual contribution in these institutions is personally costly, as the price of participation is higher and the individuals are often tempted to refrain from contributing to the common good. Moreover, the fear of other institutional members free riding increases the temptation of the individuals to free ride themselves. The uncertainty surrounding the unstructured institutions makes them difficult to analyse, because many more contingencies need to be accounted for and the number of possible outcomes are larger than in structured institutions (Shepsle 2006).

3.7 Under which conditions do institutions change?

According to Rational Choice Institutional Theory theorists, institutions can be modified almost infinitely through selection of structures and rules. Riker perceives changing forms of an institution as natural because "one set of rules that produced equilibrium had no claim of precedence over any other" (Peters 63). Hence, as long as the rules resulted in equilibrium, no rules were better than others.

These changes can happen in cases where the existing institution was unsuccessful in fulfilling the purpose for which it was created (Peters 2012).

3.8 Challenges for institutionalisation

The challenge for the institution and its members, according to rational choice institutional theorists, is that by nature humans or states will always favour others doing the 'hard work' instead of them. However, if everybody follows this sentiment the 'hard work' will not be done and the specific institutional system will break down. Therefore, rules that constrain and provide incentives are necessary for an institution to function (Blyth 2002). Moreover, Shepsle explains the fragility of the institutions in the following way. "Institutions are simply equilibrium ways of doing things. If a decisive player wants to play according to different rules […] then the rules are not in equilibrium and the "institution" is fragile" (26). Hence, an institution is vulnerable if the actors within it do not work for the common good for everybody in order to maximise its own utilities as well.

Furthermore, institutions can encounter the challenge of ensuring that individual bureaucrats and organisations follow the strategy that the political leaders have pinpointed. Therefore, the institution must control the public bureaucracy and the coordination within it. This it can accomplish by developing institutional configurations to secure the compliance to the overall strategy and aims by its members (Peters 2012). Another challenge for the institutions are the 'Arrow Problem', which Peters describes as "how groups of people can make decisions that satisfy the condition of a social welfare function without havingthat decision imposed through hierarchical means" (51). Shepsle argues that institutions can solve this challenge by creating a 'structure induced' equilibrium, which will make some types of outcomes more likely than others, through voting rules (Peters 2012). Thereby, a small group of people or nations cannot obstruct desirable decisions for the common good, however they will still be part of the decision process and preferable feel included in the decision-making.

3.9 Rational Choice institutionalism in relation to other institutional theories

The main institutional theories are historical institutionalism, constructivist institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism. Although there seem to be several important differences between them, they also have a number of aspects in common. Therefore, the different institutional approaches might seem mixed, as none of them stands totally out from the rest. Just as, one approach might align with an approach on some features and with other approaches on other features.

Unlike other institutional theories, RCIT acknowledges the behavioural element of individual maximisation. Hence, the theorists' point out the danger of institutional members shirking and free riding, which will make the institution dysfunctional. Therefore, they argue that it is necessary to design institutions in a way that constrain the individuals' behaviour in order to obtain more desirable results for the institutional members (Peters 2012). Moreover, contrary to historical

institutionalists, RCIT perceives institutions as instruments used by agents to 'structure choices'. This kind of institutions is build by people. Hence, the institutions are 'chosen structures' rather than historical 'structural choices' in the way that historical institutionalists perceive them. Furthermore, constraint on individuals can either be practised through value and norms (intra-institutional) or through rules (inter-institutional). RCIT views formal rules as more crucial than norms and values, while theorist within historical institutionalism perceive norms as the most significant constrain (Peters 2012).

4.0 History of the AU

The failure of the UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia and in Rwanda[3] in the beginning of the 1990s made it clear for the African leaders that Africa could not depend on foreign assistance anymore. Moreover, there was a growing discourse at the continent about providing African solutions to African problems. The South African president Nelson Mandela and the Ghanaian UN secretary general Kofi Annan both expressed this view in speeches, respectively after the Rwandan genocide and in 1997 during a ministerial debate about Africa at the UN Security Council. Mandela stated that OAU member states should establish an African capacity to respond to the security and peace challenges at the continent. While Annan stated, *'There is a new consensus that the primary responsibility of Africa's problems rests with Africans themselves… This new realisation also calls for a re-evaluation of the role of the international community in support of Africa's goal'* (Dersso p. 23). This discourse was continued by the Commissioner for Peace and Security in the AU, Said Djinnit, who in 2004 expressed that '*No more, never again. Africans cannot watch the tragedies developing in the continent and say that it is the UN's responsibility or somebody else's responsibility* (Dersso p. 21). The first chairperson of the AU mission, Alpha Oumar Konaré, supported this stand by arguing in 2007 that, '… *The primary responsibility for ensuring peace in Africa belongs to Africans themselves*' (Dersso p. 24). The concept of African solutions to African problems means that African states and regional organisations should have more self-determination in the resolution to challenges in Africa. This should occur by providing Africa with ownership and leadership in the process of preventing, managing and resolving conflicts on the continent. In order to achieve this goal the members of OAU decided to revitalise the organisation in the context of a new organisation, the African Union. The new organisation was agreed upon in 1999 in Libya and inaugurated in South Africa in 2002. The Constitutive Act of July 2000 set up a number of aims for the AU. These includes, guarantee of territorial integrity, interdependence and sovereignty, in

[3] In a periode of 100 days almost 800.000 Rwandese were massacred in what the OAU's International Panel of Eminent Personalities describes as a preventable genocide (Dersso 2012).

addition to promote security, stability and peace (Schmidt 2016). Moreover, the aim of the AU was that it should play a more active role and continue to be responsive to the demands of the prevailing circumstance, as well as being relevant to the needs of the people. Moreover, the objective of the organisation was to create greater solidarity and unity between the member countries and the African population. Furthermore, the member states appointed the organisation with the objective to improve the synergies of the efforts between the states regarding the security and peace challenges facing Africa, in order to establish a solid peace and security regime. The body that is assigned to carry out this last objective is the African Peace and Security Architecture (Dersso 2012).

When the OAU was established in 1963 two of the most important principles it were founded upon were those of non-intervention and sovereignty. This is clearly stated in the article three of the Organisation of African Unity charter, in which four of the seven main principles are concerned with the territorial integrity and sovereignty of African states. This ideological focal point meant that the OAU operated strictly within the framework of its state-centric principles of non-intervention and of individual states rights to sovereignty. However, with a changed global security order after the end of the Cold War, this framework was an obstacle for achieving the objective about providing African solutions to African problems. Therefore, one of the main differences between the constitution of OAU and the new African Union constitution was that the latter focused on civil sovereignty rather than state sovereignty. This means that state sovereignty in the AU framework is limited and the principle of African Union's right to intervention is a key component of the reason for creating a new organisation to succeed the OAU (Dersso 2012). The necessity of changing the scope of the continental organisation regarding sovereignty and the development of a more active approach is also mentioned by Olonisakan, who states that '*Its stance on sovereignty was perhaps the main weakness of the OAU when it came to conflict management, and one that threatened to render the organisation irrelevant in the new international environment*' (2000 p. 42). Hence, the establishment of AU was necessary for the African states in order to solve the conflicts on the continent in the context of the post-Cold War security situation.

4.1 The African Peace and Security Architecture

The African Peace and Security Architecture is the operational structure in the AU, which has the assignment to ensure the effective implementation of decisions regarding post-conflict reconstruction, peace-building, conflict prevention, peace support operations, peace-making and interventions (Dersso 2012). It is described as a complex of structure, norms, procedure and capacities to assist the AU in carrying out tasks within the fields of security and peace. Other

describes the African peace and security architecture as a system of institutions, policies and norms (Cilliers & Gnanguênon 2016).

The APSA consists of two components, the policy and normative component and the institutional component in the form of the peace and security council. The normative and policy component have two fundamental frameworks. The first is concerned with the redefinition of the principle of state sovereignty, while the second framework deals with the engagement to an interventionist security and peace regime. Since the Westphalia agreement the principle of the state sovereignty has been one of the cornerstones in the international order. Hence, in accordance with international law, members of the international community are prohibited to interfere in a state's internal affairs through the institutional guarantee of the principle of non-intervention (Dersso 2012). The APSA is, aside from coordination cooperation on security and peace issues with the Regional Economic Communities, dependent on the AU member states and partner countries to provide logistic, financial and human resources for the architecture to be fully functioning.
The main challenges for the African Peace and Security Architecture are according to Coning et al. peacekeeping capacity, early-warning and funding (Cilliers & Gnanguênon 2016).

4.1.1. Peace and Security Council

The PSC consists of 15 members that are elected through the Executive Council of the AU. The members are selected by the different regional organisations, which rotate between the different nations within each regional organisation. Central, South and East Africa each have three seats in the PSC, while West Africa has four seats and North Africa has two seats (Peace And Security Council (PSC) | African Union). The Peace and security council is the motor of the APSA and serves as a standing decision-making authority with the main purpose of facilitating rapid and efficient responses in crisis situations and conflicts on the continent. This happens through a collective early-warning and security arrangement within the African Union (Dersso 2012).

In regard to its focus areas of conflict resolution, prevention and management the PSC has the power to anticipate and prevent disputes, to authorise, gather and deploy peace support missions, as well as to resolve conflicts by undertaking peace-making and peace-building instruments. Moreover, in addition to various other powers, the peace and security council can recommend the AU assembly to intervene in a member state, if grave circumstances occur. These grave circumstances can be crimes against humanity or policies that possibly lead to genocides. Furthermore, the peace and security council is in charge of the cooperation and coordination with other international organisations regarding peace and security in Africa and the development of necessary policies to secure that all external security and peace initiatives within Africa will be

inside the scope of AU's priorities and objectives. These aims will ensure the promotion of a strong partnership between United Nations and AU within peace and security, as well as with other relevant internal organisations about ensuring that the needs and concerns of the African people are part of the decision-making and initiatives (Derssos 2012).

4.1.2. African Standby Force

The ASF is created as a continuation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)-based ECOMOG[4] component to be deployed in immediate crisis situations. The Standby Force is not stationed at one place but is divided among five regional organisations, which are providing, preparing and deploying troops through the member states. However, the capacities and level of readiness of the forces in the different regional organisations are not equal. For instance, the North African Regional Capability is being the least prepared regional capability regarding level of readiness and capacity development.

The aim of ASF is to function as a first response to intervene in crisis situations, such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, if the UN cannot respond. Hence, ASF works under the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which means that the interventions need the permission of the UN Security Council (Darkwa 2017). The process of the establishment of the ASF with a focus on the interregional cooperation and the challenges encountered will be investigated further at a later point in the thesis.

4.1.3. Panel of the Wise

The Panel of the Wise is a recommencement of an old OAU instrument to assist peaceful resolution of conflicts between the member states of the organisation. However, it never became effective and was abandoned after a reconstruction of the Organisation of African Unity in 1993. Nevertheless, just as its predecessor the Panel's main objective is to promote and maintain security, stability and peace in Africa by supporting the Peace and Security Council and the AU Commission and it is an important part of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

The Panel consists of five members, one from each region, that is meeting at least three times a year or on request of the Chairperson of the AU Commission or by the PSC. The chosen members are required to be '*highly respected African personalities of high integrity and independence who have made outstanding contributions to Africa in the areas of peace, security and development*' (Peace

[4] The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was a West African multilateral armed force established by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

And Security Council (PSC) | African Union). Moreover, the members of the panel cannot hold a political position at the same time, as they are serving in the council (Peace And Security Council (PSC) | African Union). The process of the establishment of the PoW centred aboutthe interregional cooperation and the challenges encountered will be investigated further at a later point in the thesis.

4.1.4. Peace Fund

The aim of the Peace Fund is to collect financial resources to finance operational activities in the context of security and peace such as, peace support missions. The AU Heads of State and Government raised the demanded contribution from the member states from six per cent in 2010 to twelve per cent in 2014 to finance the peace and security commitments of the AU. However, by the year 2014 each member state merely contributed with seven per cent to the fund. The contribution to the AU budget from its member states in 2016 was only 41 % of the total budget. Hence, 59 % of the AU budget depended on foreign financial aid (Cilliers & Gnanguênon 2016). All external financial contributions are required to be in accordance with the principles and objectives of the AU. Moreover, the PSC Protocol has envisioned the establishment of a trust fund within the Peace Fund. This can function as a permanent reserve to be used in case of emergencies and other unforeseen events for specific project (Peace And Security Council (PSC) | African Union)

4.1.5. AU Commission

The commission is a continuation of the OAU General secretariat and its main function is to support and represents the interests of the Executive Council and AU Assembly. The commission works closely with the AU by drafting common positions of the organisation, managing the resources and budget of the AU, in addition to implement decisions of the AU organs and initiate proposals to be submitted in the different organs. Moreover, the commission cooperate with the member states by assisting them with the implementation of AU programmes. Furthermore, it coordinates and harmonises the AU policies and programmes with the Regional Economic Communities' programmes and policies.

The AU Assembly elects the Chairperson and deputy chairperson, while the Executive Council elects eight commissioners, which complete the decision makers in the commission. All members are elected for a period of four years and can only be renewable once (African Union Handbook 2018).

4.1.6. Continental Early Warning system (CEWS)

CEWS is a recommencement of some early warning functions that was part of the OAU's Centre

for Conflict Management, which was initiated in 1994. The aim of the component is to anticipate and prevent conflicts in Africa. Moreover, CEWS focus on providing information about evolving violent conflicts. These information's are obtained through monitoring and observation centers in the RECs and through the Situation Room, which is situated in the department of Peace and Security in the AU. Furthermore, the Situation Room facilitates informed decision-making for the Peace and Security Council through monitoring information and by collecting data on potential, simmering, actual and post-conflict activities and initiatives in Africa (African Union Handbook 2018).

5.0 Challenges encountered in the creation of the Panel of the Wise

5.1 The Panel of the Wise and APSA

The Panel of the Wise is considered a key component of the African Peace and Security Architecture. Therefore, it is a focal point in the performance of conflict resolution, early warning, mitigation and conflict prevention through its institutionalising. The idea and practice of eminent elders solving conflicts originates from old traditional African practices, which placed the elders as the key figures in charge of reconciliation (Khadiagala 2016).

The Panel consists of a group of respected African personalities. At first, the AU and the different Regional Economic Communities admitted only former heads of states for the Panel of the Wise. However, this was changed later, so also prominent African personages that significantly contributed in different public policy positions could be admitted to the Panel. This enlargement of the possible candidates, combined with an increased political pluralism in Africa, which led to an increased number of retired presidents, resulted in an important increase in the pool of leaders available for the Panel. Hence, the Panel of the Wise could carry out missions with more expertise and institutional memory. In addition, to increase the number of missions the Panel participated in (Khadiagala 2016). Khadiagala emphasises that the elder statesmen is a valuable asset, because they contribute to the conflict resolution with their "wisdom, imprimatur and stature, but more critically, for their wide-ranging experiences in previous leadership positions" (202).

5.1.1 Purpose of the Panel of the Wise

The aim of the PoW is to support and contribute to peace, development and security. The Panel has worked towards accomplishing this aim since it was inaugurated in 2007 by focusing on three main activities. These are firstly, to advice the AU Commission on security and peace challenges. Secondly, it has advised the Commissioner of the Peace and Security Department within the AU.

Thirdly, the Panel has carried out fact-finding missions in countries in conflict and performed shuttle diplomacy. Additionally, the Panel has contributed to share best practices and experiences through an annual forum for African mediators and envoys (Khadiagala 2016).

5.1.2 Capabilities of the Panel of the Wise

The eminent personalities in the PoW have the advantage, compared to serving head of states, that they can dedicate sufficient time to conflict resolution. This is important, as these negotiations often requires perseverance, persistence and often a lot of time to reach an agreement (Khadiagala 2016).

Moreover, the elder statesmen can contribute with support from international, regional and national institutions, which can provide the elder statesmen with leverage to ensure an effective intervention. Moreover, they can use this support for gaining access to international, regional and national resources, as for instance economic sanctions. Furthermore, the national and international support increases the respect for and moral suasion capabilities of the elder statesmen. Moreover, the PoW brings in much needed resources and capacities, which supplement and complement regional and national peace-making institutions. Additionally, Khadiagala points out that the elder statsmen by "operating in the institutions lends them more local leverage and may contribute to the accumulation of knowledge and experiences that these institutions could draw from in the future" (214). Thus, the Panel of the Wise assists the different peace-keeping institutions in the capacity building process. The elder statesmen can also benefit from expert advices from knowledgeable people within their national and international network in the conflict resolution process. However, the implication of receiving support from regional and international institutions and partners are that these outside actors can be a source of constraint for the elder statesmen, in for instance discussions about the capacity of the intervention (Khadiagala 2016). By including outside actors in the conflict resolution process, the elder statesman might risk losing control of the process to the outside actors. Thereby, reducing their manoeuvrability, when attempting to solve the conflict.

In regard to the rational choice institutionalism theory, the Panel of the Wise contributes in various aspects. First, it supports the aim of the African Union to create stability for its member states by either support in fragile situations, as for instance elections, or through mediation in conflicts. Second, it is more cost-efficient, as conflict prevention is less expensive than conflict intervention. Thereby, the institution fulfils the RCIT requirement of managing resources efficient and sustainable. Third, the Panel of the Wise to some extent also solve the issue of states and humans by nature preferring other people or countries to do the hard work. Because, the PoW requires less financial and human resources, those that free ride will not affect the work of the Panel of the Wise in the same way as they would affect the work of the ASF.

5.1.3 Panel of the Wise at the REC level

The Panel of the Wise does also exist on the sub-regional level, where the different Regional Economic Communities have copied the continental version of the PoW, as part of their own institutions (Khadiagala 2016). To improve the coordination and cooperation with the different RECs Panel of the Wise the continental PoW has created a PanWise forum. Moreover, former members of the PoW support the Panel with their expertise when requested through the 'Friends of the Panel' forum (Khadiagala 2016).

5.1.4 Challenges

The lack of established peacekeeping policies, regarding authorities and mandates in many African regional and national institutions, make it challenging for the eminent peacemakers to navigate their position in an environment with faltering institutionalised conflict resolution structures (Khadiagala 2016). Moreover, the proliferation of peace-making actors and institutions as a consequence of African institution's focus on the subject that raised concerns regarding convergence, coordination and rationalisation of resources. Furthermore, the proliferation of peace-making actors also increases the risk of contestations and competitions among the actors. Additionally, the abilities of the intervention can be decreased if too many external voices issue mix messages (Khadiagala 2016). However, Khadiagala states that the different actors are aware of this challenge and gradually negotiate the different roles on the background of the roles and capacities of the different peace-making actors and institutions (2016). Another challenge is that the effect of eminent persons in conflict resolution, in cases where the parties are far apart, is limited, because diplomatic tools, such as mediation, require the parties to be 'riped for resolution' in order to reach a peaceful settlement (Khadiagala 2016). Moreover, Aall & Crocker critically notes that the PoW has some challenges concerning competition between senior figures involved in the same conflict, lack of resources and insufficient debriefing of senior leaders after mediation meetings (2016). Furthermore, they point out that some of the eminent statesmen lack mediation competencies, as they argue that leading a country is not comparable to carry out peace-making negotiations. Lastly, Aall & Crocker agree with Khadiagala that the Panel of the Wise is arguably successful in cases where the conflicting parties demonstrate commitment to the process. However, it has been incapable of solving conflicts where the parties prefer fighting instead of negotiation (2016).

5.1.5 Sub-conclusion

The establishment process, in the context of the RCIT, of the Panel of the Wise can on the one hand be perceived as positive because the PoW is providing stability and subsequent derived positive

outcomes. Moreover, conflict prevention or conflict mediation are less expensive, when is carried out by the Panel of the Wise, that if it should have been carried out military. Therefore, PoW resources are as usually managed sustainable and efficiently. Lastly, the Panel of the Wise is not as vulnerable towards free-riding by states that prefer other states to do the hard work, as for instance the African Standby Force. On the other hand, the PoW is inefficient if the conflicting parties will rather fight than negotiate. Hence, the Panel is not utility maximising in that case. Moreover, if a major power has different interests than the institutional strategy the latter can fail and subsequently the PoW would lose prestige. Lastly, the African Peace and Security Architecture can have difficulties to ensure that the PoW follows the overall institutional strategy.

5.2 Challenges encountered in the creation of the African Standby Force

Since the failed UN-interventions in Somalia and Rwanda in the beginning of the 1990s, the African political leaders have had a desire to be able to provide 'African Solutions for African problems'. The establishment of the African standby force together with the Peace and Security Council in 2002 was the fulfilment of a long-term desire and vision by the different African Head of States (de Coning 2014). The agreement about creating the ASF was the completion of this vision.

The expert recommendation for the design of the African Standby Force was a single standby brigade under AU control; however the member states did not follow this advice (Cilliers & Gnanguênon 2016). Instead the African standby force was established consisting of five brigade-sized multidisciplinary contingents that are composed of military, police and civilian components, which are based in their home countries.

After the ASF missed its deadline for operationalizing twice, the African Union decided to establish the African capacity for immediate response to crises', which will be explained further later in this chapter. Moreover, which is under the auspices of the African Union (Cilliers & Gnanguênon 2016). Thereby, the AU followed the principle of the rational choice institutionalism theory, which states that institutions are almost infinitely changeable. Hence, when the operationalization of the African Standby Force failed a new body within the AU institution was created in the form of the 'African capacity for immediate response to crises'.

5.2.1 Structure and purpose of the ASF

The AU has divided Africa into five regions: West, East, North, South and Central Africa (de Coning 2014). These will briefly be described later in this assignment. Each region is required to establish its own continental standby capacity with a brigade-sized, which equals 5000 personnel (Heitman & Leijenaar 2014). Every Rapid Deployment Contingent (RDC) is required to have

verified, prepared and pre-identified units ready to be deployed within 14 days (de Coning 2014). This follows the overall purpose of the African Standby Force, which states that the RDC must be ready to deploy within 14 days, after the PSC has required its assistance in cases of crimes against humanity or policies that possibly can lead to genocides. Six scenarios for deployment are envisaged in the African Union policy framework for the ASF. These are rated according to complexity and intensity. Scenario five requires a complex peace operation, while scenario six requires "a rapid (14-day) peace enforcement response to mass atrocity crimes" (de Coning 2014). Theoretically, the RCIT concerning achieving utility maximising of the common good through institutional cooperation, fits well on the AU African Standby Force. The reason for that is that the individual country, by cooperating within the institutional framework, benefits from an enlarged army and extensive capacities necessary for ensuring peace and stability within the African Peace and Security Architecture framework. However, in practise the ASF has not been fully operational yet and therefore the countries have not achieved the desired utility maximisation. The reason for that will be explained later in this chapter.

5.2.2 Implementation phase and process

The implementation of the ASF was scheduled in two phases. The aim of the first phase was to obtain the capacity to provide military counselling in political African Union missions or as an observer nation under United Nation banner. This also included the establishment of a contingent with the size of a brigade, which has the ability to be rapidly deployed for peacekeeping operations. The second phase aimed at developing the capacities of the force, for them to be able to lead complex peacekeeping operations. This included increasing the rapid deployment capabilities of the forces in the regional organisations, which were already prepared to establish the brigades. While the regional organisations there were behind schedule, should complete the establishment of the brigades. However, by the end of 2010 the African Union realised that these goals could not be fulfilled. Hence, the organisation created a third road map with the aim of the ASF to be fully operational by 2015 (Darkwa 2017).

The delay of the operationalisation of the ASF can be perceived as one of the challenging outcomes, which can occur in institutional programs that are described by the Rational Choice Institutionalism Theory. These challenging outcomes take place in cases where the coordination within the organisation is not functioning or the public bureaucracy of the institution is not following the strategy pinpointed by the institutional leader. In order to overcome these challenging outcomes the institution might develop institutional configurations to ensure that everybody comply with the strategy and to limit coordination problems within the institution.

5.2.3 Specific challenges in the establishment process

In the wake of the inability to intervene in Mali, the African Union conducted a comprehensive investigation of the progress of the ASF, in December 2013. This report brought to attention the issue of financing of the peace support operations (PSOs). According to the report, the lack of funding for AU's peace support operations is the largest constraint for the African Union in its ability to respond rapidly, when crisis occurs on the continent. The AU member states' inability to fund Peace Support Operaions means that the AU is not controlling the scope, duration, size and mandate of the peace operations. The reason for that is the dependency of the institution on external partners to finance the cost of the missions (de Coning 2014). Currently, almost all African PSOs are entirely funded by external partners, such as the European Union (EU) and the UN. However, there are no easy solutions to the issue of self-funding for African Union, as up to 50 % of the continents one billion inhabitants' lives in poverty (Heitman & Leijenaar 2014).

The lack of funding from the member states for African Union peace support operations can be conducted from the RCIT, which states that collective action problems occur if no one is benefitting from the common good. Moreover, the theory also argues that by nature people prefer others to do the hard work if this possibility is given. Therefore, by deriving these arguments from the theory it is possible to provide two explanations for why the member states are not contributing to the ASF financially. Firstly, some countries expect more wealthy African states to contribute their share. Moreover, they know that the African Union will also receive external funding from its partner countries and organisations partners. Hence, the country does not have any incentive to contribute financially. Secondly, if the country is situated in a relative peaceful part of the continent it might not benefit from the common good, in cases where conflicts are the collective action problem. Therefore, the country might not contribute financially, because it knows that spill over effects from a potential conflict would not affect it.

De Coning argues that the idea behind having a generic standby capacity is not favourable for several reasons (2014). First, each PSO will be different. Therefore, the solutions and design of missions should be flexible and adapted to the required needs of the mission, rather than as with the ASF being an inflexible mechanism. However, there is the possibility that they will not be able to contribute with the needs required for the specific mission. These needs can both be in regard to the operational capabilities or the political coalition. Moreover, it can be beneficially for the resolution of conflicts that the countries, which participate in the intervention, have a political interest in the resolution or have an interest in participating in the specific mission (de Coning 2014). The analysis of the establishment process of the ASF demonstrated that, the original idea of

utility maximising the member states security resources through a military RDC might be good to ensure peace on the continent. However, as the rules and constraints within the APSA were not strict enough, some countries 'sat on the fence', while others contributed to the establishment of the ASF.

5.2.4 Assessment of the ASF

The December 2013 African Union report on the ASF stated that progress was taking place towards operationalisation, but several gaps, shortcomings and obstacles still had to be solved. Therefore, the AU panel encouraged the member states to increase the pace of the establishment of the regional ASF entities. Moreover, the African Union presented an action plan to ensure that the ASF would reach full operational capability by the end of 2015. Lastly, the panel warned that if these recommendations for making the ASF operational were not addressed, it would not meet the deadline for the African Standby Force's full operational capability (de Coning 2014).

As was the case with the lack of financial contribution to the ASF, the lack of political will and military engagement concerning contributing to fully operationalize the African Standby Force can be conducted from the RCIT, which argues that by nature people prefer others to do the hard work if possible. Moreover, the theory states that collective action problems occur if no one is benefitting from the common good. Once again especially the minor and weaker states will expect the economic and political stronger countries to contribute more to the operationalization of the ASF and the states are also aware, that foreign countries or the United Nations might assist in interventions by request. Therefore, some countries try to escape lightly, in order to spend the money on internal matters. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, if the country is situated in a relative peaceful part of the continent its incentive to support the operationalization of the ASF is smaller, as it might not benefit from the common good, in cases where conflicts are the collective action problem. Hence, the country might not demonstrate political will or provide military components, because it knows that spill over effects from a potential conflict would not affect it. Moreover, it might also be part of another security organisation, such as ECOWAS, Southern African Development Community (SADC) or the East African Community (EAC). Because of that the country might be more inclined to support this sub-regional architecture instead of African Peace and Security Architecture and the ASF.

In general, the African standby force has been criticised for being ineffective, because the standing readiness model, which was one of the key features of the ASF, has not yet been utilised as planned. However, the December 2013 AU report about the African standby forces stated "the 75000 African peacekeepers deployed in 2013 come from the same member states that

have pledged contributions to the ASF" (de Coning 2014). Hence the report argued that the member states have the numerical capability to deploy the troops needed, if necessary (de Coning 2014).

5.2.5 ASF successes

Even tough the ASF has not achieved full operational capacity yet, the AU has by means of external funding participated in missions in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Burundi, Darfur and Somalia on its own with the African Standby Forces. Thereby, the ASF has achieved an increased experience with planning and managing PSOs, which often also has involved outside actors. Moreover, the African Union and its troop contributing countries and partners deployed forces to the conflicts in the CAR and Somalia more rapidly than the United Nations or the EU. However, all these missions were supported by the European Union, the UN or other bilateral partners, mainly regarding financial support of the missions (de Coning 2014). Dallaire shares this view and points out that AU's successful Peace Support Operation in Darfur was remarkable, as the APSA including the African Standby Force was still in its infancy (2010). Furthermore, according to Heitman and Leijenaar the ASF reached the aim of establishing five regional RDCs with a brigade-size already in 2013 (2014). Thereby, it is possible to argue that the structures and rules that, according to Rational Choice Institutionalism Theory, are significant for an institution in order to function do the intended work to some extent.

5.2.6 African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis

Because the African Union and ECOWAS were incapable of creating an intervention force to intervene in the Mali crisis fast enough, in 2012, a number of African countries agreed on establishing a preliminary military force that could be deployed until the ASF was ready for operationalisation. The force is named African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis **(**ACIRC) and was created in January 2013. It will consist of a 1500 integrated combat squad with several specialist capabilities. This has been selected from a pool of around 5000 specially equipped, highly trained combat-ready troops that can be rapidly mobilised with 14 days after the mandate has been authorised. Moreover, ACIRC has access to large airborne forces prepared to intervene by parachute or air-landed[5] (Roux 2013).

The ACIRC is supposed to be a temporary measure to cover the 'gap' until the African Standby Force has reached full operational capability (de Coning 2014). Hence, its main focus is to perform PSOs under the 'scenario six' of the African Unions policy framework for the ASF. This scenario includes in addition to, stopping or preventing emerging genocides, war crimes

[5] This military term means that the soldiers can roll of the aircraft and start fighting immediately (Roux 2013).

by armed rebel forces, atrocities and combat intervention in order to save lives. However, ACIRC does not have any civilian, police or specialised non-military capabilities to assist in conflict beyond the immediate intervention and subsequent battle (Roux 2013). The ACIRC needs the African Unions approval in order to operate under the organisations auspices. Moreover, to intervene in crisis it is dependent on a coalition-of-the-willing under a lead-nation model, which provides the capabilities needed for the intervention and the participating countries will cover their own costs in the beginning (de Coning 2014).

The establishment of ACIRC demonstrates the Rational Choice Institutionalism theory's point that an institution is almost infinitely changeable, that an institution emerges or is created if there is a need for it and that modification of an institution occurs when the existing institution is unsuccessful. As the Mali conflict showed, the ASF was not ready for deployment at that time, the African Union's member states in line with the theory saw a need to establish a temporary institution that could fill the gap that the not deployable ASF had left.

The fact that ACIRC is voluntary based, self-funded and in theory with a lead nation makes the mechanism more rapid. However, since it is based on the model of a coalition-of-the-willing it does not fulfil the African Unions requirement of functioning as a predictable RDC (de Coning 2014).

5.2.7 Sub-conclusion

The fundamental idea of establishing African Standby Force is according to the RCIT a good initiative. Because it provides the member states with the opportunity to utility maximise their resources and gain stability and other positive outcomes from the institutional arrangement. However, as not everybody necessarily benefitted from the establishment of the ASF collective action problems occurred. This issue combined with difficulties ensuring that the overall strategy from the AU regarding ASF was followed and weak behavioral constrains within the institutions resulted in three problems. First, some countries did not contribute enough to the establishment of the ASF, as the AU could not sanction them. Second, due to the lacking financial, military and human resources to the African Standby Force it did achieve to be fully operational before the deadline. Hence, the member states modified this institutional component and established the ACIRC instead. Lastly, rules and structures are essential for an institution to function. However, as this was not the case the APSA and AU lost reputation.

6.0 The effect of the AUs interregional cooperation on the APSA

This chapter will investigate the cooperation aspect and actors within the APSA. First a brief presentation of the AU structure and the federal model in relation to cooperation will be conducted. Then, the main cooperation issues will be highlighted, before the role of the RECs; regional participation in PSOs and the role of ACIRC will be dealt with. Lastly, the challenges for APSA cooperation will be analysed.

6.1 AU structure

A Freedom of Information report stated that the AU so far only has a skeleton structure, which requires more time to develop the capacity necessary to bridge the gap between the actual capacity and the ambitions (Cilliers & Gnanguênon 2016). The rational choice institutionalism theory underlines that structures and rules are essential for an institution to work. Hence, when these structures are portrayed as weak it can explain how the interregional cooperation affected the African peace and security architecture. According to RCIT, institutions need to constrain the behaviour of the states, as these are selfish by nature. The institutions can constrain the behaviour of states through rules and structures in order to maximise utilities for the common good. However, if these structures are weak, as suggested by the Freedom of Information report, free riding might occur or a major power might capture the agenda of the institution and not want to follow the strategy from the institutional leadership. In the latter case, the institution would be fragile and would have to modify in order to regain the equilibrium.

6.2. The federal model as a mean to connect the African states

As the African continent is both immense and diversified, a federal model is well suited to include the different African people and states within an institution. Moreover, from the point of view of the African Heads, a federal model ensures that the countries can control the extent of the institutional cooperation. This is an advantage for them, as nobody wants to hand over or pool sovereignty to increase the institutional integration. Although, the Constitutive Act of the AU and several protocols, which creates the different institutions have paved the way for a greater integration the process is dependent on the African leaders (Dallaire 2010).

6.3 Main issues in the APSA cooperation

The AU December 2013 ASF report highlighted the issue of political will and lack of coordination. It is fairly easy for the countries to commit to participate in a standby arrangement. However, when the countries need to either provide troops for or finance a specific PSO, they are more reluctant. Moreover, the generic design of the ASF generally does not fit with context-specific needs in a

particular Peace Support Operation (de Coning 2014). These two issues combined with the lack of financing of PSOs and a undesirable political decision-making process are, according to de Coning, the reason why the African Standby Force and thereby the APSA is not fully functional yet (2014). De Corning argues that the rapid deployment standby model is feasible at the national level, as long at the deploying country has the capabilities (2014). However, this is not the case on the multinational level. Because at that level the main issue is not readiness or capabilities, but rather the financial means, political will and the capacity to deploy, manage and plan a PSO (de Coning 2014). At the African Union summit in Johannesburg in 2015, the AU member states decided to solve the disparity between the internal and external funding to the African Union budget. This should occur with the member states financing 100% of the operational budget 75 % of the budget for the AU programs and 25 % of the peace and security budget. The main contributors to the new budget would be the five largest African economies that should fund 60 % of the total AU budget equally. While the remaining 40 % should be financed by second and third tier member states, dependent of the scale of their economy (Cilliers & Gnanguênon 2016). Heitman and Leijenaar claim that not all major African powers are contributing enough to the PSOs both in respect to financial and to military contributions. For instance, neither Angola that has a reasonable airlift capacity and a large army, nor Egypt that has a large airlift capability offer its assistance to Peace Support Operations on a large scale (2014). The same counts for South Africa, whose contributions do not stand in comparison with its economic strength. The scholars argue that the African countries have the capacities to transport troops and vehicles, except for heavy vehicles by air, if the coordination and cooperation between them improves. Hence, the AU could become less dependent on European and US assistance for PSOs in this area (Heitman & Leijenaar 2014). However, according to the RCIT, the lack of political will, coordination, slow decision-making processes and a lack of financing of Peace Support Operations paint a picture of an institution that is not fully established. Reason for that are especially the insufficient coordination and the lack of political will, which includes the reluctance among the member states to finance PSOs. This demonstrates that the institution is not strong enough, as the African states accomplished to get other actors to finance the PSOs and most of the African Union's total budget. The weak institutions open up for, free-riding even that the original thought was to provide 'African solutions to African problems'. Moreover, it shows that the rules and structures in the APSA are not tight enough. Therefore, the necessary constraining of behaviour does not take place. One of the reasons behind that is a lack of sanctions possibilities, as the only punishment in the AU rules is to suspend the membership of a state.

6.4 The role of the Regional Economic Communities

From the beginning it was an operational and political challenge to create a clear framework for cooperation between the RECs and African Union in order to implement the ASF. When the African Union was inaugurated in 2002 ECOWAS, SADC, Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) had already established their own diplomatic, political and security structures. Thereby, they had an autonomous financial and political framework established next to the AU's new African peace and security architecture. Hence, at first little interest was in merging these structures into African Peace and Security Architecture. Three of the five APSA regions followed the Regional Economic Communities geographical division, ECOWAS, Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and SADC. The two remaining regions had to create an additional regional institution in order to establish suitable decision-making structures, which would allow for a deployment of regional forces as part of the ASF (Cilliers & Gnanguênon 2016). However, similar institutions are not necessarily an issue, if the cooperation among the different regional decision-making institutions and the APSA is functioning (2016). Cilliers & Gnanguênon characterise the cooperation between the RECs and the African Union in the following way "[It] is predicated on the principle of primary responsibility of the African Union in maintaining and promoting peace, security and stability in Africa, while simultaneously recognising the principles of comparative advantage" (144). This means in practice that the REC takes the lead in the specific region where the conflict occurs first. Only then the AU will support or intervene if necessary, and only if the conflict escalates and the UN Security Council approves, a United Nation's intervention will take place. This way each actor can play its appropriate part and thereby, the APSA will achieve the benefits of the comparative advantage, as the institutional architecture generates. Even though this practice in theory should ensure a clear division of tasks between the RECs, African Union and United Nations, this is not always the case. Particularly, the cooperation between the regional economic communities and the AU revealed some degree of competition between the African states. The explanation for this competition is that the African states do not have the same priorities and hence, differ in their interpretation or understanding of specific crisis. Therefore, they sometimes offer competing or differing solutions. Furthermore, the conflict actors take advantage of this incoherent cooperation and different regional or national approaches to the crisis by playing initiatives and countries off against one another. This is exercised by stimulating new initiatives or interlocutors. Another example on the gaps in the regional cooperation is that countries such as Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda prefer national, rather than regional responses to threats. This is based upon their regional strategy, national security concerns and economic and political ambitions.

This can also be applied to the member states of ECOWAS and SADC, which prefer solving issues through their sub-regional institutions instead of through the AU (Cilliers & Gnanguênon 2016).

6.5 Participation in Peace Support Operations

Until now, most of the AU missions have been peace enforcement operations, with a stabilisation mandate. These missions are more dangerous than peacekeeping missions and require a higher degree of robustness. In the peace enforcement operations the aspect of national interest from the major military contributing countries turned out to be of uttermost importance. The reason for this importance, of the national interest from the troop-contributing countries, is that the African PSOs in the CAR and Somalia have had a large amount of casualties. Hence, countries with little interest in a particular crisis will have little incentive to deploy forces to a high-risk and high-intensity operation only due to a commitment to regional standby arrangement (de Coning 2014).

In the Executive Council and the Assembly a two-thirds majority can make decisions. This also includes security related decisions. Thus, the decision-making process should be more efficient than for instance in the EU, where the search for consensus prolongs the decision-making process. However, the African consensus oriented culture with a high degree of personalisation of politics makes it difficult to publicly outvote member states, as the Head of States or states might lose face. The AU is short of sanction possibilities if the member states do not comply with the institutional decisions. The only sanction is the suspension of membership, which the military junta in Mali was threatened by. Moreover, even that a two-third majority in the AU is sufficient to take decisions concerning interventions. The decision would be worthless if the majority cannot contribute with the required funds and capacities (Dallaire 2010).

6.6 The role of ACIRC

Roux argues that the creation of ACIRC moved the focus away from preparing the African Standby Force and enhance its RDC capabilities towards making the ACIRC ready for deployment. Just as, regarding medium and heavy airlift capacities for rapid deployment, African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis will encounter the same challenge as ASF (2013).

The narrow scope of the lead-nation, coalition-of-the-willing approach of ACIRC diluted the regional consensus focus of the ASF by undermining the urgency for the RECs to have the regional brigades fully operational by 2015. Moreover, it would remove power away from AUs political authorisation processes with checks and balances incorporated. Instead, the power would be in the hands of the African Union's PSC the AU secretariat and the small of group of countries willing and capable of intervening in crisis (Roux 2013). Furthermore, these ACIRC missions

might just work as a band-aid on an open wound, as deployments are expensive and difficult to maintain for a small group of countries. Moreover, the ACIRC group might poach the influence of Africa's security agenda from the African Union (Roux 2013), thereby, risking a further continental fragmentation regarding peace and security issues. In relation to the RCIT, the establishment of ACIRC demonstrated, that institutions can change almost indefinitely and that the change occurs when the existing institutions is unsuccessful in achieving its aim.

6.7 Challenges for the cooperation within ASPA

One of the challenges of the inclusive approach of the AU is that it has brought together states with different political systems, cultural backgrounds and levels of development. Thereby, created a very diverse composition of the institution, which for instance means that the common consensus on norms and values is much weaker compared with the European Union (Dallaire 2010).
Another challenge is that an intergovernmental logic is common for the AU-institutions, contrary to the EU structures, which are a mix of intergovernmental and supranational institutions (Dallaire 2010).

In order to redesign the ASF to make it more effective and cost-efficient, Heitman and Leijenaar suggest that an audit of the availability of military assets and the technical capabilities among the African countries should be conducted (2014). Moreover, the AU Peace Support Operations Division should be extended with additional police, civilian and military staff to improve its capacity. Furthermore, Heitman and Leijenaar argue that PSC and African Standby Force should not be a replica of the UN peacekeeping architecture and approach. Instead the planning of the ASF should be shaped to solve the evolving nature of conflicts in Africa and be based on the existing African capacities. Lastly, standards for procedures, equipment, rosters and personnel to ensure the right resources at the right place and time should be emphasised in the process of redesigning the ASF (Heitman & Leijenaar 2014). De Coning suggests that the African Standby Force should be restructured, so it becomes a just-in-time capacity instead of a rapid deployment capacity. However, the scholar emphasise that AU member states should still have some units prepared on standby to engage in international or national conflicts (2014).

This just-in-time model should include the development of common procedures and standards, as well as a common implementation through joint exercises and training. Moreover, command, mission management and mission support capabilities should increasingly be developed combined with national, regional and AU planning. The just-in-time model is less cost-intensive than the current ASF model. Furthermore, three main elements should be part of the model. First, the member states must have the ability to provide civilian, military and police capabilities. Second,

the AU and regional organisations must have the ability to support, manage, plan and deploy PSOs. Thirdly, the conditions necessary for establishing context specific coalitions for Peace Support Operations should be provided. Moreover, should these PSOs include contributions from member states, the AU, regions and partners (de Coning 2014).

Peacemaking, prevention and peacebuilding should also have a larger role in the APSA, according to de Coning (2014).

Dallaire suggests that a new strong cooperation among the major African powers concerning the AU is necessary to improve the institutional integration and coordination (2010). This was the case in the beginning of the establishment of AU, where Nigeria governed by President Olusegun Obasanjo and South Africa lead by President Thabo Mbeki had a close cooperation and was the engine in the development of the AU. This occurred through coordination meetings between the two presidents and their diplomatic services, where common positions were decided upon in order to increase the African integration. However, this close relationship ended when new Head of States were appointed in the two countries (Dallaire 2010).

6.8 Sub-conclusion

The development of the African Union and APSA has so far not been successful and a lot of the AU institutions are still under construction. The AU institutions suffer from capacity, structural and resource problems, which are the main, cause for the slow development the AU institutions. With a very diverse mix of member states the AU lacks a common vision and common values to support the inherent promises and strong rhetoric from the AU leaders (Dallaire 33). One solution to the APSAs lack of logistical, financial and human capacities is for example an increased cooperation with partner countries (Cilliers & Gnanguênon 2016).

7. Conclusion

The investigation of the establishment processes of the Panel of the Wise and the African Standby Force, combined with an analysis of the interregional coordination within the African Union indicated, several contributory causes to why the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture is not fully functioning yet. These causes were lack of will from the different member states, weak coordination among the member states and lack of financial means. The investigation of the African Standby Force's establishment process showed that, despite the AFS not being fully functioning yet, has the AU still been able to conduct PSOs in African countries with a military troop contribution corresponding to the size of the RDCs.

Deducting these causes by means of the Rational Choice Institutional Theory provided a possible explanation to the research question. First and foremost, the AU is lacking restriction and sanction

possibilities beyond exclusion of member states, because according to the theory it is necessary to constrain the human behaviour through rules and structures. The reason for that is that the human by nature is selfish. Therefore, it is also necessary that everyone benefit from the common good, otherwise collective action problems will occur. Moreover, in order to avoid countries to not contributing to the institutions, it is important to provide an incentive to participate in the form of utility maximisation. Furthermore, it is necessary that the AU ensure that its strategies are carried out by the member states and that major powers or sub-regional institutions not poach the institutional agenda. The process of establishing the Panel of the Wise was fairly simple due to two reasons. First, the extent of the institution is reasonable and the member states do not have to contribute with a lot compared to their contribution to the ASF. Second, the AU extended the amount of people, who can be part of the PoW. Hence, the establishment and recruitment have been fairly simple. Contrary, the process of establishing the African Standby Force has been more complicated as not just sufficient troops contributions are required, but also funding for the Peace Support Operations has been difficult. The cause of this is, on the one hand, that the AU has limited means to sanction and require the member countries to contribute to the ASF. On the other hand, many countries prefer to either establish their own strong military capacity or support the sub-regional military cooperation, in which they have more influence. Moreover, some countries might also benefit more from the sub-regional cooperation, than from the African Peace and Security Infrastructure. The analysis of the interregional cooperation within the AU demonstrated that the uncommitted engagement from some of the member states affected the APSA. Because, the African Peace and Security Architecture currently do not receive enough funding from its member states, it is dependent on external financing. This makes the more than 20 year old African dream about providing ‘African solutions to African problems’ implausible at the moment.

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