AAU Student Projects is unavailable between June 15th 1.30pm and 17th 1.30pm due to planned system maintenance. The projects cannot be downloaded during this period.
AAU Student Projects - visit Aalborg University's student projects portal
A master's thesis from Aalborg University
Book cover


Game-Theoretic USV Patrolling for Subsea Cable Protection: A Bayesian Stackelberg Approach

Authors

;

Term

4. term

Publication year

2026

Submitted on

Abstract

This thesis presents a practical modeling framework to plan patrols for a single Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) that protects subsea infrastructure in the Bornholm Basin. It uses a Bayesian Stackelberg Security Game—a leader–follower game where the defender commits to a strategy and uncertain attacker types respond. We apply the DOBSS algorithm to a map divided into 400 cells with real geospatial data on cable routes, seabed conditions, and vessel traffic, modeling both accidental and state-sponsored threats. The model computes an optimal coverage plan and converts it into a kinematically feasible route via maximum-entropy Markov routing—a method that turns coverage probabilities into a realistic path that respects vehicle motion limits. The main contribution is a tractable decision-support tool that carries a Stackelberg optimality guarantee under the model’s assumptions. A seven-parameter sensitivity analysis yields a reliability hierarchy aligned with underlying Strength-of-Knowledge ratings: the choice of patrol target is unconditionally robust, while the specific allocation depends on two uncalibrated parameters. In this case study, the equilibrium (game-theoretic) strategy improves expected defender utility by 8–9% over baselines; the gain is driven by a single dominant asset and is smaller than the spread due to parameter uncertainty. The framework is a proof of concept and is not field-validated.

Denne afhandling præsenterer en praktisk modelleringsramme til at planlægge patruljer for et enkelt ubemandet overfladefartøj (USV), der beskytter subsea-infrastruktur i Bornholm-bassinet. Metoden bygger på et Bayesiansk Stackelberg-sikkerhedsspil—a en leder-følgerspil-model, hvor forsvareren forpligter sig til en strategi, og forskellige typer angribere (med usikkerhed om deres typer) reagerer. Vi anvender DOBSS-algoritmen på et kort opdelt i 400 felter med virkelige geodata om kabelruter, bundforhold og skibstrafik, og modellerer både utilsigtede og statsstøttede trusler. Modellen beregner en optimal dækningsplan og omsætter den til en kinematisk gennemførlig rute med maksimal-entropi Markov-rutning—en metode, der omdanner dæknings-sandsynligheder til en realistisk rute, som respekterer fartøjets bevægelsesbegrænsninger. Hovedbidraget er et beslutningsstøtteværktøj, der er beregningsmæssigt håndterbart og giver en Stackelberg-optimalitetsgaranti inden for modellens antagelser. En følsomhedsanalyse over syv parametre giver et pålidelighedshierarki i tråd med de underliggende “Strength-of-Knowledge”-vurderinger: valg af patruljemål er ubetinget robust, mens den konkrete fordeling afhænger af to ukalibrerede parametre. I denne case forbedrer ligevægtsstrategien den forventede værdi for forsvareren med 8–9 % i forhold til baselineløsninger; gevinsten drives af ét dominerende aktiv og er mindre end spredningen fra parameterusikkerhed. Rammeværket er et proof-of-concept og er ikke feltvalideret.

[This abstract has been rewritten with the help of AI based on the project's original abstract]