EU - Turkey Agreement on Refugee Crisis: An insight into negotiations and the final deal as a bargaining process

Stathopoulos, Georgios

4. term

European Studies, Master

2016

2016-05-31

50

Amid the 2015–2016 refugee crisis, the EU and Turkey concluded a deal on 18 March 2016 aimed at stemming irregular arrivals from Turkey to Greece in exchange for revitalized EU–Turkey cooperation, including the accession process. This thesis asks whether, and how, that agreement can be explained as the outcome of a bargaining process between the two parties. Using Thomas Schelling’s bargaining theory as the analytical framework, it examines the players, interests, interdependence, time pressures, bargaining power, and the mechanics and characteristics of the negotiations. The study combines a review of EU–Turkey relations and EU external border and asylum policy with document analysis of European Commission and European Council materials, and a comparison of the final agreement with the EU’s last draft. Within the limits of publicly available sources, the analysis shows that core features of bargaining—threats, promises, agenda setting, compensation, and iterative drafting—help account for the negotiations and the final deal: Turkey leveraged the talks to raise issues beyond migration, while the EU offered incentives to secure cooperation in reducing flows. The thesis concludes that the EU–Turkey agreement can be interpreted as a bargaining outcome consistent with Schelling’s theory.

Midt i flygtningekrisen 2015–2016 indgik EU og Tyrkiet den 18. marts 2016 en aftale, der skulle dæmpe irregulære ankomster fra Tyrkiet til Grækenland mod en genoplivning af EU‑Tyrkiet‑samarbejdet, herunder tiltrædelsesprocessen. Specialet spørger, om – og hvordan – aftalen kan forklares som resultat af en forhandlingsproces (bargaining) mellem parterne. Med Thomas Schellings forhandlingsteori som analytisk ramme undersøges aktører, interesser, gensidig afhængighed, tidspres, forhandlingsmagt og forhandlingens karakteristika. Studiet kombinerer en gennemgang af EU‑Tyrkiet‑relationer og EU’s politik for de ydre grænser og asyl med dokumentanalyse af materialer fra Europa-Kommissionen og Det Europæiske Råd samt en sammenligning af den endelige aftale med EU’s seneste udkast. Inden for rammerne af offentligt tilgængelige kilder viser analysen, at centrale træk ved bargaining – trusler, løfter, dagsordenfastsættelse, kompensation og iterative udkast – er tydelige i forløbet og det endelige kompromis: Tyrkiet søgte at koble spørgsmål ud over migration til forhandlingerne, mens EU tilbød incitamenter for at sikre samarbejde om at reducere strømmen. Specialet konkluderer, at EU‑Tyrkiet‑aftalen kan forstås som et bargaining‑resultat i overensstemmelse med Schellings teori.

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Bargaining theory

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Stathopoulos, Georgios:

• EU – Turkey Agreement on Refugee Crisis: An insight into negotiations and the final deal as a bargaining process. (2016)