EU – Turkey Agreement on Refugee Crisis: An insight into negotiations and the final deal as a bargaining process.

Stathopoulos, Georgios

4. term

European Studies, Master

2016

2016-05-31

This thesis examines the 18 March 2016 EU–Turkey agreement on the refugee crisis in the context of the large irregular movements from Turkey to the Greek islands in 2015–2016 and the EU’s challenges with external border and asylum management. It addresses the research question of whether, and how, the agreement can be explained as the outcome of a bargaining process between the parties. Drawing on Thomas Schelling’s bargaining theory, the study traces the players, interests, interdependence, time pressures, rules of progress, power asymmetries, and the use of threats and promises. The analysis combines background on EU–Turkey relations and the EU’s external border policy with a reconstruction of the sequence of meetings and negotiations and a comparison of the EU’s last draft with the final text, based on publicly available documents and transcripts from the European Commission and the European Council. The findings indicate that the agreement can be understood as a bargaining process: key elements such as mutual dependence, time constraints, threats, promises and possibilities for compensation are evident throughout. Turkey sought to leverage its role and burden as a host country to obtain concessions beyond migration, including a revitalization of relations and the accession track, while the EU aimed to curb irregular arrivals by offering incentives and partnering with a third country. The study acknowledges limits to accessing full negotiation details but shows that the agreement is meaningfully explained through a bargaining lens.

Denne afhandling undersøger EU–Tyrkiet-aftalen om flygtningekrisen af 18. marts 2016 i konteksten af de markante irregulære flygtninge- og migrantstrømme via Tyrkiet til de græske øer i 2015–2016 og EU’s udfordringer med eksterne grænser og asylhåndtering. Formålet er at besvare forskningsspørgsmålet: om aftalen kan forklares som resultat af en forhandlingsproces mellem parterne, og hvordan. Metodisk anvendes Thomas Schellings forhandlingsteori til at identificere aktører, interesser, gensidig afhængighed, tidsfaktorer, forhandlingsregler, magtbalancer samt brugen af trusler og løfter. Analysen kombinerer baggrundsviden om EU–Tyrkiet-relationen og EU’s politik for de ydre grænser med en rekonstruktion af forløbet af møder og forhandlinger og en sammenligning af EU’s sidste udkast med den endelige aftaletekst på baggrund af offentligt tilgængelige dokumenter og referater fra EU-Kommissionen og Det Europæiske Råd. Fundene peger på, at aftalen kan forklares som en forhandlingsproces: centrale elementer som gensidig afhængighed, tidsmæssigt pres, trusler, løfter og mulighed for kompensation kan genfindes gennem hele forløbet. Tyrkiet søgte at omsætte sin rolle og byrde som værtsland for flygtninge til indrømmelser ud over selve migrationsområdet, herunder en genoplivning af relationerne og tiltrædelsesprocessen, mens EU søgte at begrænse irregulære ankomster ved at tilbyde incitamenter og samarbejde med en tredjepart. Undersøgelsen anerkender, at adgangen til fulde forhandlingsdetaljer er begrænset, men viser, at aftalen meningsfuldt kan forstås gennem en forhandlingsoptik.

[This apstract has been generated with the help of AI directly from the project full text]

bargaining theory

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Stathopoulos, Georgios:

• EU - Turkey Agreement on Refugee Crisis: An insight into negotiations and the final deal as a bargaining process (2016)