A Quest for the Explanation of the recurrence of civil war: why does negotiated settlements fail to secure peace
Author
Pedersen, Lea Skov
Term
4. term
Publication year
2013
Submitted on
2013-05-29
Pages
80
Abstract
Hvorfor bryder fredsaftaler efter borgerkrige så ofte sammen, så kampene blusser op igen? Siden midten af 1990’erne har tilbagefald været hyppigere end helt nye konflikter, og mange borgerkrige afsluttes på slagmarken frem for gennem forhandlinger. Denne afhandling undersøger, hvorfor konflikter vender tilbage, og hvorfor forhandlede aftaler ofte svigter, med henblik på at give mere forståelse og praktisk viden til dem, der arbejder med fredsprocesser. Studiet tager en deduktiv tilgang: det starter i teori og tester den i konkrete sager. To teoretiske spor er centrale. For det første North, Wallis og Weingasts New Conceptual Framework, som giver en nutidig ramme for at forstå, hvordan institutioner og organisationer påvirker orden og vold. For det andet Barbara F. Walters forklaringer på, hvorfor aftaler i borgerkrige bryder sammen, særligt problemerne med troværdige garantier for, at parterne vil holde deres løfter. Tre case-studier – Somalia, Sierra Leone og Guatemala – bruges til at afprøve disse idéer. Med udgangspunkt i Walters teori er forskningsspørgsmålene: Havde landet troværdige politiske eller juridiske institutioner til at garantere en aftale? Var der tredjepartsinddragelse, og i givet fald håndhævede de aftalen? Begyndte afvæbning, demobilisering og reintegration (DDR) for tidligt? Metodisk bygger analysen på dokumentstudier af sekundære kilder som forskningsrapporter, bøger og artikler. Resultaterne peger på en blandet støtte til forklaringerne. I Sierra Leone og Guatemala understøtter materialet, at troværdige institutioner er vigtige for at fastholde en aftale, mens Somalia peger i modsat retning. Når det gælder tredjepartsinddragelse og håndhævelse, finder studiet støtte i Guatemala og Sierra Leone til, at fravær eller svag håndhævelse kan undergrave aftaler, mens Somalia ikke bekræfter dette mønster. Timingen af DDR ser ud til at have haft betydning i alle tre sager, med indikationer på problemer når processen blev sat i gang for tidligt. Derudover viser North, Wallis og Weingasts ramme sig nyttig til at forstå institutioner og organisationer i konfliktramte lande og til at forklare, hvorfor nogle lande oftere oplever tilbagevendende vold end andre.
Why do peace agreements after civil wars so often fall apart, allowing violence to resume? Since the mid-1990s, relapses have outnumbered brand-new conflicts, and many civil wars end on the battlefield rather than at the negotiating table. This thesis examines why conflicts restart and why negotiated settlements fail, aiming to provide clearer understanding and practical insights for those working on peace processes. The study takes a deductive approach: it starts from theory and tests it in real-world cases. Two theoretical strands are central. First, North, Wallis and Weingast’s New Conceptual Framework, a contemporary way to think about how institutions and organizations shape order and violence. Second, Barbara F. Walter’s explanations for why civil war settlements break down, especially the problem of creating credible guarantees that parties will keep their commitments. Three case studies—Somalia, Sierra Leone and Guatemala—are used to assess these ideas. Guided by Walter’s theory, the research asks: Did the country have credible political or judicial institutions to guarantee a settlement? Was there third-party involvement, and if so, did it enforce the agreement? Did Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) begin too quickly? Methodologically, the analysis relies on documentary research using secondary sources such as scholarly reports, books and articles. Findings provide mixed support. In Sierra Leone and Guatemala, the evidence supports the claim that credible institutions are important for sustaining a settlement, while Somalia points in the opposite direction. Regarding third-party involvement and enforcement, the cases of Guatemala and Sierra Leone support the idea that weak or absent external enforcement can undermine a deal, whereas Somalia does not fit this pattern. The timing of DDR appears to matter across all three cases, with indications of problems when the process started too soon. In addition, North, Wallis and Weingast’s framework proves useful for understanding institutions and organizations in conflict-affected countries and for explaining why some countries experience more frequent recurrences of violence than others.
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