A little less conversation a little more action: A case study of the EU’s common foreign policy towards Libya represented by the new HR Catherine Ashton and four of the most powerful member states’ contributions to international cooperation based on an empirical timeline of events.
Author
Pedersen, Anne Marie
Term
4. term
Education
Publication year
2011
Submitted on
2011-12-20
Pages
71
Abstract
Dette speciale undersøger, hvorfor EU havde svært ved at tale og handle med én stemme i de tidlige faser af Libyen-krisen. Analysen fokuserer på perioden fra de første protester, indtil FN's Sikkerhedsråd godkendte en flyveforbudszone over Libyen. Dette var en vigtig prøve for EU's fælles udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik (CFSP), som netop havde fået et nyt institutionelt grundlag, og for EU's udenrigschef, Catherine Ashton. Analysen fremhæver fire indflydelsesrige medlemsstater—Tyskland, Frankrig, Storbritannien og Italien—som havde forskellige nationale interesser og politiske hensyn, hvilket gjorde en fælles linje vanskelig. Tre forhold undersøges som forklaring på manglende samarbejde: sammenhæng og koordinering mellem medlemsstaterne, deres intentioner samt de gevinster, de forventede af internationalt samarbejde. To teorier bruges som ramme. Neorealisme peger på magtrelaterede gevinster som et stærkere internationalt omdømme, relative fordele i forhold til andre og øgede kapaciteter. Liberal institutionalisme fremhæver gevinster i form af politisk legitimitet, fælles politikker, normer og værdier samt muligheden for at fremme politisk og økonomisk stabilitet i regionen. Specialet konkluderer, at EU-landene var uenige om både, hvordan krisen skulle håndteres, og hvilken international ramme der skulle føre an. Flere aktører foretrak at handle gennem FN frem for EU, hvilket begrænsede Ashtons muligheder for at samle en fælles EU-indsats under CFSP.
This thesis examines why the European Union struggled to speak and act with one voice during the early stages of the Libyan crisis. It focuses on the period from the first protests until the UN Security Council authorized a no-fly zone over Libya. This was a key test for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which had just been given a new institutional basis, and for the High Representative, Catherine Ashton. The analysis centers on four influential member states—Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy—whose different national interests and political contexts made agreement difficult. Three factors are examined to explain the lack of cooperation: coherence and coordination among member states, their underlying intentions, and the gains they expected from international cooperation. Two theoretical lenses frame the analysis. Neorealism highlights power-related gains, such as a stronger international image, relative advantages over others, and increased capabilities. Liberal institutionalism emphasizes gains in political legitimacy, shared policies, norms and values, and the ability to foster political and economic stability in the region. The study concludes that EU governments disagreed both on how to respond and on which international forum should lead. Several actors preferred to operate through the UN rather than the EU, which limited Ashton’s ability to forge a common EU contribution under the CFSP.
[This abstract was generated with the help of AI]
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