Indholdsfortegnelse

[Introduction 3](#_Toc311060794)

[Capabilities of the EU’s CFSP 4](#_Toc311060795)

[Lisbon Treaty and the institutional changes 6](#_Toc311060796)

[Design 8](#_Toc311060797)

[Actors 8](#_Toc311060798)

[Time frame 10](#_Toc311060799)

[Coherence 11](#_Toc311060800)

[Intentions 12](#_Toc311060801)

[Gains 13](#_Toc311060802)

[Delimitation 13](#_Toc311060803)

[Case design 15](#_Toc311060804)

[Method 16](#_Toc311060805)

[Empirical data 16](#_Toc311060806)

[Theory 17](#_Toc311060807)

[Neo-realism vs. Liberal institutionalism 17](#_Toc311060808)

[Liberal institutionalism 19](#_Toc311060809)

[Possible gains via cooperation 21](#_Toc311060810)

[Analysis 24](#_Toc311060811)

[Intentions 24](#_Toc311060812)

[Italy 24](#_Toc311060813)

[Germany 25](#_Toc311060814)

[UK 26](#_Toc311060815)

[Actions taken on Libya 30](#_Toc311060816)

[Military intervention 41](#_Toc311060817)

[No-fly Zone 50](#_Toc311060818)

[Conclusion 57](#_Toc311060819)

[Coherence 57](#_Toc311060820)

[Intentions 58](#_Toc311060821)

[Gains 60](#_Toc311060822)

[Capability 62](#_Toc311060823)

[Table of Contents 64](#_Toc311060824)

A little less conversation a little more action

A case study of the EU’s common foreign policy towards Libya represented by the new HR Catherine Ashton and four of the most powerful member states’ contributions to international cooperation based on an empirical timeline of events.

# Introduction

The European Foreign policy has been put to the test by the so called “Arab Spring”. Now is the time to show that the EU can stand united on one foreign policy by the brand new European External Action Service (EEAS) under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) lead by Lady Catherine Ashton. The European reaction to the Arabic revolution in Northern Africa reflects the EU’s development as an actor in the international political arena. To get an idea of the EU’s position in the case of Libya it would be interesting to have a closer look on the CFSP’s role during the period of time, and furthermore on the reactions from the member states on how to handle the developments in the northern Africa. The fragmented European responses to the Libyan crisis show once again how difficult it is for Europe to merge on a common foreign policy and to respond with one voice to a crisis like this.

Throughout the beginning of 2011 states in the northern part of Africa and in the Middle East has been undergoing some major changes in their political structures. Lead by the civil society huge demonstrations and riots have the primary responsibility for the banishment of president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali from Tunesia (Seeberg, 2011).

The riot in Egypt, the Arab world’s most populated nation and home for the Arab League, was followed very closely by the EU and the rest of the world. The High Representative Catherine Ashton stated in an official announcement that “*Mr. Mubarak has already made it clear that he is not standing again. How they do this transition must be for them to do, and for us to support them in doing. It is really important now that se see calm, we see dialogue, we see things move forward, and for timetable that gives confidence to people, that things are going to change*” (Euronews 2). This statement clearly shows that the EU needed stability and security in the area. But there was no pressure from the EU neither to urge the retraction of Ben Ali nor to contribute to a more democratic process.

When the riot started in Libya the EU has been acting more inconsistent and unclear, mainly because of the contradictions between the member states. Compared to the common foreign EU contribution, some member states have requested for a more active practice such as military intervention and others have only wanted to be a part of the sanctions, others of the humanitarian contribution (Seeberg, 2011). However there was a broader consensus to increase the pressure on the Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi. On this issue Catherine Ashton made this statement, which was considered rather weak, in the relation to the level of violence and loss of lives taken into account: “*The European Union is extremely concerned by the events unfolding in Libya and (…) we condemn the repression against peaceful demonstrators and deplore the violence and the death of civilians. (…)The EU urges the authorities to exercise restraint and calm and to immediately refrain from further use of violence against peaceful demonstrators”* (European Council 1). One could wonder that the critique of Gadhafi’s regime is completely missing from a statement like this, but as long as 27 member states must agree on a common line towards Libya, this statement probably reflects the lowest common denominator.

The relevant question now is why the EU’s foreign policy still has the character of being hesitant and compromising. The intentions with the Lisbon Treaty were to create the fundament for a more coherent and one-faced foreign policy. The new Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and European External Action Service (EEAS) were made for the purpose of handling crisis like the one in Northern Africa.

I will now shortly introduce the EU’s common foreign and security policy to line up under what framework the EU cans maneuverer in situations like this

# Capabilities of the EU’s CFSP

After the end of the cold war the EU’s peace approach aimed at overcoming Europe’s East-West division and also to reduce dependencies on superpowers as the US and to develop Europe’s foreign political identity on its own (Seidelmann, 2002:18). The end of the cold war, German unification and the increasing economic development and global role of Europe meant that political cooperation was becoming increasingly important. The CFSP project was introduced with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the idea was to improve the new EU’s global role as well as to promote integration within the EU. The architecture of the CFSP was designed by the intergovernmental approach known as the second pillar giving the member states’ interests and far-reaching differences in security and foreign policy the say in EU’s CFSP (Seidelmann, 2002:20).

Five years after the EU had signed a treaty announcing the creation of a common foreign and security policy, the perception had begun to emerge that the EU's efforts had failed, and that the United States was more than ever the diplomatic and military leader of the Western world (Gordon 1997). In the aim of changing this perspective the European Council had a meeting in Gologne in 1999 to discuss the future development of the EU’s foreign policy. The EU leaders agreed that "*The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO*" (European Union External Action, 2011). At this point of time, the ambitions for the CFSP were at a high level, and the aim was actually to develop a military counterpart to NATO. To seal the determination of a strategy to develop a common foreign policy, later that year the EU council sat a military goal known as the Helsinki Headline Goal (European Union External Action, 2011).

It called for EU member states to be able to deploy 60,000 troops, within 60 days and sustainable for a year in support of the Petersberg Tasks (European Union External Action, 2011). The Petersberg Tasks presently include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making. EU-led forces assembled in response to a crisis would last only for the duration of the crisis and it would be up to the member states themselves to decide whether, when and how to contribute troops (Lindstrom, 2005:1).

As the Helsinki Headline Goals was confirmed and recognized by the General Affairs and External Relations Council in May 2003 stating that “*the EU now has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls*” (Lindstron, 2005:1), the EU Council decided to set a new Headline goal for 2010. Building on the Headline Goal 2003, it envisages that the member states will "*be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on European Union*" (European Union, External Action, 2011).

Five illustrative scenarios, encompassing a wide range of military operations, were prepared:

* Separation of parties by force
* Stabilisation, reconstruction and military advice to third countries
* Conflict prevention
* Evacuation operation
* Assistance to humanitarian operations.

These Headline Goals show great ambition for the future cooperation between EU member states on foreign policy. The goals are still high, but the relationship with NATO has developed to a more cooperative partnership. The two actors made the EU-NATO Permanent arrangements at Berlin Plus in 2003, stating: *“The EU and NATO have built a genuine strategic partnership that is now well established and deep-rooted. For this partnership to work both organisations ensure effective consultation, cooperation and transparency at all times. This partnership is also about ensuring efficient crisis management and working together in order to identify the best possible response to a crisis*” (European Union External Action, 2).

This partnership also reflects the ambitions of the EU to manage military operations as the Berlin Plus allows the EU to use NATO assets and capabilities in operations, which they did in Marcedonia in 2003 (European Union External Action, 3).

# Lisbon Treaty and the institutional changes

The Lisbon Treaty was supposed to change and improve coher­ence and coordination hence enable the EU to become a global actor not only in the economic sphere but in the political sphere as well. Such a constitution should provide a strong incentive to develop the EU’s foreign policy and offer a stronger coherence between its external relations’ economic and political aspects. Traditionally the old institutional framework has provided several disagreements between some member states, mainly France and the UK because of the strong leadership being taking in military operations (Nicoll, 2011).

After the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 the EU presented a high representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, who also became responsible for drawing up the structure of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Shortly before the treaty came into force Catherine Ashton was announced the High Representative for the CFSP (Koenig, 2001). She was to conduct the Unions common foreign and security policy and contribute to the development of that policy. The EEAS should provide diplomatic support to the common foreign policy (IISS, 2011). Globalization and the increasing interdependence of member states have also motivated the EU to create the CFSP enabling it to act as a unified actor speaking with one voice. The EEAS is only managed by the HR and functions as an autonomous body of the EU separate from the Commission and from the General Secretariat of the Council (Van Elsuwege, 2010). Earlier it was the national presidency who was exercising the role as foreign minister, but that role will from now on permanently lie with Catherine Ashton (European Council 4).

The general role of the CFSP is outlined as the following: “*The basis for the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) remains ‘soft’ power: the use of diplomacy - backed where necessary by trade, aid and peacekeepers - to resolve conflicts and bring about international understanding*” (Europa, 18/11/11)

The EEAS manages the general foreign relation and has the possibility to prepare actions and activities for different crisis areas, but the final decisions are made by the member states via the Council; “*The EU has no standing army. Instead it relies on ad hoc forces contributed by EU countries for peacekeeping, crisis management and humanitarian missions. In order to respond quickly, the EU has established battlegroups of about 1 500 forces each. Two battlegroups are on standby at any given time*” (Europa, 18/11/11).

Almost every decision made in regards to EU foreign policy is made by unanimity which means that the member states have the final say in any actions taken by the CFSP when dealing with military or defence implications (Europa,18/11/11). The Commission is also involved in different implementation and advisory bodies, but only the member states can make the crucial decisions (TEU, article 27, 3.) Article 11(1) of the Treaty on the European Union now stipulates that the “*common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures*.” On defence itself, Article 3a states that the Union “*shall respect member states’ essential state functions, including enshrining the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security”*. It goes on, for good measure, to recapitulate that in “*particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State”* (Lisbon Treaty).

The EEAS was meant to function as a third side-kick in line with the Commission and the European Council (Eurostep, 2008,) but the Treaty did not provide a unified legal basis for the EEAS. The legal basis for the CFSP remains distinct from that of supranational policies with an external dimension. Neither has the intergovernmental decision-making process on the CFSP been changed. It still mostly requires unanimity, which means that member states continue to pull the strings of EU foreign policy (Nicoll, 2011).

This would evidently cause some problems for the CFSP as the member states have different traditions within their national military and foreign strategies. There is simply a lack of coherence between the member states. Furthermore not only the incoherence can explain the slow reaction from the EU.

In the Lisbon Treaty the CFSP is not considered as the main source of military power within the EU. Perhaps most strikingly, Article 42 puts the NATO as the main foundation for security and defence policy in the ‘mutual assistance clause’ (Article 42) is effectively rendered insignificant with the assertion that any obligation of assistance it entails ‘*shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states’*, adding that any such obligations must also be ‘*consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those states which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation’*. Non-NATO members thus need not feel bound to provide assistance, whilst members should use the NATO as the forum for any call for collective defence.

Based on the above introduced concept of the CFSP and the institutional changes with the Lisbon Treaty, it would be interesting to take a look on which role the CFSP has played under the EU’s reactions to the development of the Libya crisis. The Helsinki headline goals have not been completely met, but the frame for cooperation between the member states via the CFSP is funded by the Lisbon Treaty, and even though the headline goals is considered far from established, the EU should be able to manage evacuation operation, prevent further development of the conflict and to stabilise the area. The combination of the to get involved in crisis management and peace keeping on the one side, together with the state centred contribution for national security on the other might seem very hard to manage for the HR Catherine Ashton. Under the circumstances it could be very interesting to elaborate on how the involved actors have prioritised this possibility for cooperation under the relative new framework of the CFSP.

# Design

In the following chapter I will outline, how this paper is organised any which actors and timeframe I will use in my analysis. The consideration on the used data and the selection of variables will also be discussed in the following section.

### Actors

To get an overview of the crisis and the involved actors I will first outdraw some of the main events regarding the Libyan crisis and the responses and reactions of the national leaders, international organizations and the EU. This will be done by creating a time line of the events that actually happened in the critical days where the intervention gained momentum until the UNSC adopted the No Fly-zone (NFZ) over Libya. This will help me bring an understanding of the EU’s role and national leaders’ attitude towards the development of the crisis. Here it will appear what actions were taken by the EU and the member states and to what degree the CFSP played a role. It will also appear which role the HR Catherine Ashton played as the representative for EU’s foreign policy. Here it will become clear what the preferences of the different member states were and I will try to illustrate that four of the most powerful member states had different opinions and intentions in handling the crisis. I have chosen to mainly focus on France, Italy, Germany and the UK because of their different roles within the EU and their attitudes towards the Libyan Crisis. These four countries might also have had different intentions when interacting via international institutions and the national situation in the four member states may play a huge role for their reactions on the Libyan crisis.

The reason why I have chosen the member states’ perspective is because of the unanimity in the decision making process in the Council on CFSP, which gives the member states the power to decide which output the CFSP should have. The decisions on CFSP are taken in the Council (IISS, 2011) hence the member states positions are considered as crucial in formulating a common EU response to the Libyan crisis. I have chosen to focus on four member states in this paper; France, Italy, Germany and the UK. I find France interesting because of their very forward attitude on Libya during the crisis. France has played an active role both in the diplomatic interaction and in the military intervention and France was the first country to recognize the Transitional National Council (TNC) as the only legitimate representative of Libya (Koenig, 2011). I have also chosen Italy because of their national interests in Libya. Italy’s Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi has had a close relationship with Gaddafi and Italy may have some conflicts of interests towards the whole situation mainly because of strong economic ties with Libya. The UK also plays a great role in international politics and the UK has always been cooperating closely with in US in military interventions. The UK is interesting because of David Cameron’s limited time in the role as Prime Minister, and his predecessor, Tony Blair has not been hesitating when going into war together with the US. Furthermore, after the election in the UK Cameron has cut the defence expenses down by 8% (Wall Street Journal, 20/10/2010) which was sending a signal to the British people that more military intervention was not on the priority list. The last country I have chosen is Germany. Because of Germany’s history it has ever since world war two been very hesitant in participating in any foreign military actions. Germany functions as the heaviest player in the council and has shown great ambitions and leadership concerning the euro crisis, but when it comes to the CFSP Germany here functions as the reluctant member state. Thus it would be interesting to see what positions Germany takes during the Libyan crisis.

These four countries have played important yet different role in the history of European integration and because of their very different national situation, these member states might have an important say in the EU’s foreign policy towards Libya. The variation of the four member states national interests would thus have an impact on the EU’s foreign policy on the Libyan crisis. To get an idea of the respective countries interests I will focus on some key actors, who will represent the member states. Here I mainly use the head of states and the foreign minister as representatives of the national position. In this case these actors plays an important role in arguing the specific member states’ interests, and it will become clear what are the intentions, when looking at the quotes and arguments from these central actors.

Furthermore I will also involve some other relevant players such as the UN and the US who also have played a bigger role in the sanctions and military actions against Libya. Involving these other actors will provide for a comparison between the EU and some of the most powerful international organization together with the US as a sole international player in the Libyan Crisis. The UN and the US’s roles in the international society might also have an effect on the EU’s CFSP, because of the possibility for alternative cooperation round the EU. And some member states might have an interest in cooperation via other actors that the EU, due to their national position.

### Time frame

The actual time line will begin on the 15th of February when the riots started in Benghazi and end on the 19th of March where NATO enforced the NFZ. The period in between was a critical period for the whole international society as everybody was somehow reluctant to take the first actions especially the EU even though the Lisbon Treaty had provided the CFSP with a whole new institutional framework. Within this period of time, the statements and quotes from the national leaders will be analysed as a perspective of the member states intentions and willingness for cooperation via the EU’ CFSP.

After this time line I will get an overview of who the key actors are and how they have reacted to the Libyan crisis. Moreover I will get an idea of the importance of the EU’s CFSP and to which extent the CFSP mechanisms were considered and used. I believe that the reactions of the member states are based on the four leaders’ current situation hence, the national situation, history and interest etc. may also play an important role in the actor’s preferences. To account for these intentions, I will just before the timeline of the events outline the current national positions based on the possible interest and history of the specific member states. This helps to bring an understanding of the different preferences, and this helps me understand the main intentions of the member states.

Also the coherence between the member states must be examined in this paper. Coherence is very important if Ashton should form a substantial EU-response to the Libya crisis. As the four member states might be controlled by their intentions, one could imagine that the coherence for a common EU foreign policy is limited. If there is no coherence between the member states on how to deal with the Libyan crisis, the EU’s CFSP would appear very weak in the international society. When examining the actors’ intentions, it would appear how the diverging interests affect the EU’s ability to formulate a common foreign policy towards Libya.

The timeline will thus function as an illustration of what actually had happened during the crisis in Libya and it will appear which preferences the actors have had during the period of time, and I will use the theory to analyse the member states actions. The theory will outdraw the possible gains for the member states, to cooperate via the EU’s CFSP and the intentions of such common response to the crisis in Libya. Based on these actions, it will be possible to see what the motive power behind the member states’ foreign policy was.

Based on the above deliberation and reflections I will draw up the following problem formulation:

**“*Why has it not been possible for the EU member states to coordinate a common response via the CFSP towards the crisis in Libya?*”**

The main subject which I will examine in this paper is the coherence between the member states together with the intentions and interest of the relevant actors in a coordinated contribution to the Libyan crisis. As I have the assumption that these four leaders are driven by rational arguments and cost/benefit approaches I find the intentions very central for the possible outcome of the EU’s CFSP. As mentioned earlier, almost all decisions on the CFSP are taken by unanimity which gives the member states intentions huge importance. In other words if the member states have different interests it is very difficult for Ashton to coordinate the EU’s foreign policy. If there is a coherent interest in how to handle the crisis in Libya at EU level, Ashton would have a great possibility to show that the new CFSP is a reliable source in international relations, but if the member states intentions diverge, the possibility of making an agreement on how to deal with the developments in Libya is almost non-existing.

### Coherence

After pointing out the initiatives and the events within the period of time I will get an idea of how the different member states prioritise the CFSP and if there is certain coherence on some areas. This will illustrate how the coherence between the member states has affected the common EU response to this crisis.

A lack of coherence between the member states has by many scholars been identified as the main obstacle to an efficient EU foreign policy (see e.g. Koenig, Gordon and Seeberg). One of the challenges lies in ensuring the coordination with the respective policies and preferences of the member states. During the crisis in Libya the member states have had very different opinions on how the EU should interfere and I will elaborate on this later in this paper. In the aim of explaining the coherence between member states I will take a closer look on some of the key member states, France, Italy, Germany and UK. These four states have had very different policies towards the Libyan crisis and have thus affected the common European response. Based on their national interests the heads of states make decisions, that will possibly benefit their current position and if the national interests are more important than the common European image, the possibility of an incoherent EU answer is very likely.

I will go through the earlier mentioned time table of the events and statement to specify the diverging actions taken towards Libya. Here it will become clear what the preferences of the different actors are and I will try to discuss why the member states have different opinions towards the crisis and what consequences this has had on the EU’s CFSP.

### Intentions

The member states’ intentions will be based on their current national interests and position. The intentions can be based on economic interests, military assets, historical perspective, and domestic policies and so on. The intentions of the member states are possibly based on a certain possible outcome for the member state or a possible gain from interfering in the crisis. This means that the actors have a specific agenda when responding to the developments in Libya, and the goal is to gain the most from a possible cooperation with other actors.

For the EU, the CFSP are based on the member states’ willingness to cooperate, so if the interests of the member states are diverging, the common EU response to the Libyan crisis would be based on the lowest common denominator, which makes the EU’s foreign policy appear weak. The intentions of the member states will be based on the actors current national political situation, and in collaboration with the theory, this can explain why the intentions of the member states are the motive force for more or less international cooperation on different policy fields. The theories can based on the outlined intention suggest some possible gains for the participating member states, if they chose to cooperate with others on a common foreign policy towards Libya.

### Gains

For the member states to cooperate via the EU there could be some possible gains for the involved countries, which would make a common contribution a more desirable solution for some actors. These gains will be defined based on the two theories on international relations, Neo-realism and Liberal institutionalism. The theories will be introduced later, and they will function as the explanatory factor for why it could be more beneficial for the member states to cooperate via international institution.

These gains will be compared to the member states intentions, and these terms will be used in the analysis to explain the reactions and responses of the national leaders. In the end I will get an idea of how the intentions match the possible gains, and if the possible gains can provide any explanation of the member states’ priorities of the CFSP’s role in the international policies toward the Libyan crisis. The gains are defined by the two theories, and they are based on the possibilities for gaining different advantages when cooperation via institutions in international relations.

## Delimitation

Many perspectives have been given on why the EU’s foreign policy has such a weak image in the international society. I can evidently only cover a few hypotheses in this paper which is why some rather important perspectives are left out due to my time schedule and the amount of pages at my disposal.

There are different types of coherence, and I have chosen to look at the cooperation between the member states and how the coherence between the member states affects the outcome of the CFSP. Most likely the coherence between the EU institutions may also play an important role in the outcome of the EU’s CFSP as the new HR after the Lisbon Treaty has become an equal part to the President of the Commission, the President of the European parliament and the President of the European Council. The internal cooperation is important for the perception of the EU as a unified actor and all four institutions must send the same signals or statements or must simply distribute the management of the crisis to the relevant institution for the EU to appear coherent. This analysis is very interesting in terms of the institutional setting and functional spill over within the EU. The president of the European Council, Hermann Van Rompuy, wrote in his invitation to the head of states before the meeting in Brussels on 11th of March: “*In the light of the momentous developments in Libya and our southern neighbourhood, it is important that the EU acts with determination and sends a clear and positive message to the whole region, expressing full support to the transition towards more democracy, pluralism and social inclusion*” (Tribune Business News, march 4). On the same issue the president of the European Commission, Emanuel Barosso stated: “*I want to be very clear. We cannot afford to be passive spectators of events which are historic in many aspects. Ultimately this is about people's deep quest for freedom, justice, dignity, social and economic opportunities, and democracy*.” (European Commission, February 23). Also the European Parliament had an opinion on the developments going on in Libya: “*The demonstrations are so large because they unite Libyans around a common cause: standing up for human dignity. We, the elected representatives of the European people, will defend this dignity wherever we can. It is our responsibility as parliamentarians to stand by the people who, regardless of the price, are fighting for their fundamental freedoms.*” (European Parliament, February 21). These three statements are all backing up the statement which HR Ashton made on behalf of the EU. The consistency between the institutions was clearly there however I will not elaborate further on this issue in this paper as I focus on the coherence between the member states.

Other actors being taken into account in this paper are the US and the UN as the two main counterparts to the EU when dealing with international relations. These two players have also been actively involved in the crisis, and their roles have also defined the EU as an international player. But they will not be analysed together with the four other member states, as they are not involved with the EU’s coordinated foreign policy.

The EU’s CFSP potentially covers a wide range of different things from long-term economic aid to crisis management and possibly military interventions, so it is difficult to make broadly statements on how successful the CFSP is. In this paper the Libyan Crisis is the main focus, hence I will focus on the crisis reaction more than the economic aid and humanitarian aid provided for Libya. Also the evacuation of EU citizens fall under the CFSP, and this will neither be considered in this paper. The CFSP was designed to handle crisis like this and this is why I will focus on the diplomatic and security aspects in the crisis response.

The time frame will run from the break out of the crisis on 15th of February until the 19th of March where military intervention begins. In between this time frame I will try to conduct all relevant information, reactions, answers, statements, sanctions and resolutions which was made or announced by the above mentioned actors. To be more specific I will narrow down the focus to the countries’ head of states and their foreign ministers as these two persons may be in the most obvious position to make statements on behalf of the member states’ interests. This will also include statements from the US. In my focus on the EU I will use the statements made by HR Catherine Ashton since she represents the EU’s CFSP. From here it should appear who played which roles and more important how was the EU’s CFSP used in the response towards the crisis in Libya.

## Case design

The design of this paper will be a case design. A case design is often characterized by a complex phenomenon where one seeks to cover one or few courses of relations (Launsø 2005:94-96). In this paper the case itself will be the EU’s response to the Libyan crisis, and the unit of analysis will as written be the member states and the role of the EU’s CFSP in the international system. The member states reactions are being used as an illustration of the coherence in the EU’s CFSP, as the member states makes decisions based on unanimity. This case can be categorized as a unique case, as something similar has never appeared before, since the Libyan crisis is the first external crisis since the new CFSP has come into force. This means that the aim is not to compare with previous events but to explain a specific case in a specific matter of time and space (Yin, 2003:40-41).

In this case we have the Libyan crisis as the overall context. It is within this context my problem formulation is focused, and it is the Libyan crisis which frames the overall setting. The international organizations and the national countries are the actors in this context. Here I have chosen the EU’s response under the new CFSP as the case, based on the weak outcome of the EU’s foreign policy. To find out which role the EU has played I have chosen the units of analysis as the four member states as mentioned earlier and the two main international actors, the US and the UN. These are the units of analysis. The case is illustrated as below:

The Libyan crisis (context)

The role of EU’s CFSP (Case)

Member states, Us, UN (Unit of analysis)

The case design has its forces in order to answer the problem formulation, because it provides the opportunity to narrow down in this specific field at a specific time in order to find the most plausible cause of relation and thereby analyse the specific initiative of the relevant players and the reason behind their actions (Bryman, 2004:48-53). When all these actions and statements are taken into account we might get an idea of how the CFSP was used during the crisis and where to look for possible explanations for why the EU’s common response was so weak and uncoordinated.

# Method

In the following chapter I will introduce the used empirical data and the used theories. Furthermore I will operationalize the theories into used definitions of the possible gains via international cooperation for the member states. These gains will be used in the analysis as the motivating power behind the national leader’s actions.

## Empirical data

The empirical data on the concrete initiatives and actions of the players will be found in articles and publications, describing the process and contributions in dealing with Libya and the reactions towards the Libyan crisis. Thereby the analysis will have a qualitative base as I am analysing documents and statements of the member states’ leaders and foreign ministers found in official documents as well as newspapers, internet articles and resolutions.

An important consideration to the use of this type of empirical data is the validity. Since the sources to a great extent are based on various newspapers and publications of various scholars, it is essential to take into consideration that these can be influenced by a certain ideological view of the newspaper or publisher. However I will try to eliminate this bias by using the articles to provide me with facts or direct quotes illustrating the actual initiatives of the involved actors. Since I seek to cover the response, initiatives, intentions and interests of the respective actors; articles in various newspapers and publications are the one alternative and the source best capable of covering the sequence of events of the Libyan crisis.

Another implication is that there might be a lot of statements, acts and considerations of the EU member states, international actors, individual key figures etc. that we do not know of. Since the newspapers and academic publications cannot cover all negotiations I must rely on the overall consensus between various articles and draw my conclusions based on these. Most articles and scholars can only cover what is said in public, and since the majority of these negotiations take place behind closed doors, there might be many open questions and biases in the public statements of the member states.

This specific case is also very “new” in the academic terms. This means that various scholars have not yet published their contribution to the explanation of the EU’s role in the Libyan crisis. However smaller articles and essays have been published, but they are not concluding much since the war in Libya just recently ended. I will use some perspectives from such articles, but as mentioned the material is very limited.

## Theory

### Neo-realism vs. Liberal institutionalism

Both Neo-realism and liberal institutionalism are sub-theories stemming from grand theories on international relations namely classic realism and liberalism. In this context I will use the theories and their perspective on international cooperation and especially the institutional corporation to explain why the member states have different intentions when cooperating together. The two theories share some core assumptions about international relations, namely that states function in an anarchistic structure, meaning that there is no higher authority above the state (Jervis, 199:45).

What motivates the member states is relevant for the issue of the Libyan crisis, because of the conflict going on between the EU member states’ perspectives on how to deal with the situation. The outcome is based on cooperation between the member states in the frame of security issues and the interplay between the member states and their leaders is the essential unit of analysis. I will use some core assumptions from realism and liberalism to explain the main views on international cooperation. Neo-realism and neo-liberalism address different sets of issues; in general neo-realism focus on issues of military and security aspects also called high politics whereas –neoliberalism focus on international cooperation, international political economy and environmental issues, referred to as low politics (Jervis, 1999:45) Both theories are based on the anarchy of states and the states are the main actors. The EU’s CFSP are also after the Lisbon treaty based on the intergovernmental cooperation, and the decisions are taken by unanimity, which is why these theories can function with the focus on sole states and the anarchy between them.

As neo-realism has its roots in classical realism I will shortly present some of the main lines from the realist approach in the following.

Realism has in the past century played a big role in the definition of state power. It was formulated in the beginning of the 1930’ies by Hans J. Morgenthau Kenneth Waltz among others (Schmidt &Dunne, 2008:96). For realists the state is the main actor and sovereignty is its distinguishing trait. The state must peruse power and the leaders must act for the better of the states’ interests. More over realists argue that survival requires state leaders to distance themselves from traditional morality and only be loyal to the states’ moral formed by the existence of the state together with the ethical political community. The main assumption is that the international society is anarchistic and states compete with other states for power and security (Schmidt & Dunne, 2008:97). This competition is based on the so called zero-sum game, which in other words means that the more one state gains the less other states get (Schmidt & Dunne, 2008:98).

By anarchy is meant that the international politics takes place in an arena that has no overarching central authority above the individual collection of sovereign states (Schmidt & Dunne, 2008:98). This does not mean that he global politics is ruled by complete chaos and lawlessness, but realists more use the concept of anarchy to emphasize the lack of a central authority above all states.

The Libyan crisis it not based on the struggle for state sovereignty or struggle for more military power in the international society, thus I chose to use the progeny of realism, neo-realism, in order to explain the actions and initiatives taken by the member states during the period of time. I will still use references to neo-realism, where the states interests is the main motivation force during negotiations. In other words, the member states are only making decisions based on their national positions and political situation, and the aim is to stay powerful in the international society (Jervis, 199:54).

Neo-realism diverges from realism on some points. Neo-realists suggest that anarchy defines the system, and all states are functionally similar units, meaning that they all experience the same constrains presented by anarchy and try to maintain their position in the system (Lamy, 2008:128). The difference in the member states policies is explained by divergences in power or capabilities (Lamy, 2008:129). This means that the member states acts differently according to their actual political capacity. In other words; the neo-realist approach does not exclude international cooperation as the classical realists would. If a country does not possess the needed power or capabilities it might seek to optimize their security position via international organizations or joining alliances (Schmidt & Dunne, 2008). In other words according to neo-realists countries will only cooperate via international institutions if and only if they seek the goals that the institution will help them reach (Jervis, 1999:54). However neo-realists find a reason to question the intentions of other member states when cooperating, if one member state acts in a certain way it is always in the aim of optimizing the member state’s power or position in the international society. States acts rationally in the way they pursue their own interests, but for neo-realists the cooperation between states can be ruined by two factors: a) if one state decide to “cheat” to secure their national interests or b) if one or few actor gain more than the other actors from multilateral cooperation (Lamy, 2008:129).

For the theory to describe the actions of the member states during the chosen period of time the term of power has to be redefined. In the context of the CFSP, all initiatives are taken on an intergovernmental basis with unanimity, hence no states risks a decrease in power. On the other hand the member states’ attitude on how to react to the Libyan crisis can indicate how the member states uses their position to possibly gain power in the international society or within the EU. The member states take different positions as their national interests are different, and neo-realism can explain how the national position can define the possible gains for the member states.

The four member states which I deal with in this paper are traditionally four of the most powerful nations in the EU; hence the struggle for power is more important for states like these. In this case neo-realism can explain why a supranational cooperation on EU’s foreign policy is based on the member states national capabilities and power positions. Neo-realism can help explain why some member states are more concerned about certain gains than others. Neo-realism suggests that states are interested in increasing their power and influence, and thus will cooperate with other states or actors in the system to increase their capabilities.

### Liberal institutionalism

Liberal institutionalism originates from liberalism, which by many is considered the historic alternative to realism. Liberals argue that power politics itself is the product of ideas and crucially ideas can change (Dunne, 2008:112). According to Michael W Doyle (“Liberalism and World Politics”, 1997), there are four main concepts that define liberalism; juridical equality, democracy, liberty and the free market. First of all citizens are juridical equal and poses certain rights. Second, the legislative assembly is elected by the population and poses the authority given by the people. The key dimension of liberty is the individual’s right to own property. And finally liberalism sees the free market as the most effective economic system, because of its independence from state control or regulation (Dunne, 2008:110).

There is a much more optimistic approach in liberalism compared to realism regarding the general belief in the possibility of progress and cooperation on the international level (Jervis, 1999:49). The general view on the states behaviour in the international society is that states have different characteristics like individuals. Some are bellicose and war-prone, others are tolerant and peaceful, and the identity of the state determines the outward orientation (Dunne, 2008: 110). This is different from the neo-realists who define the intentions of the state by the capability and the power position. Opposite to neo-realists who see the international society as an anarchic realm the liberalists seek to project values of order, liberty, justice and toleration into international relations. Domestic and international institutions are required to protect and nurture these values (Jervis, 1999:61), which means that not only the states are considered as the central actors. Liberalism also focuses on other elements such as transnational corporations, non-governmental organizations and new patterns of interaction.

The newer definition of liberalism, neo-liberalism differs from the neo-realists in their view of the international cooperation. They share the beliefs in the anarchic structure of the international society and the centrality of states, but neo-liberalists does not agree that anarchy makes patterns of cooperation impossible. The creation of international institutions matters, as they facilitate cooperation by sharing information, the main argument being that actors would enter into cooperative agreements if the gains are equally shared (Jervis, 1999:46).The neo-liberal approach sees institutions trying to respond to the challenge of coordinating the behaviour of states in a decentralized international order. Here the CFSP is a good example of the institutional framework, which tries to coordinate a common response to the crisis in Libya, but the outcome seems rather week due to the nature of sovereignty on the CFSP.

From neo-liberalism originates the concept of liberal institutionalism. The roots of this version of neo-liberalism are found in the functional integration scholarship of the 1940’s and the 1950’s and regional integration studies of the 1960’s (Lamy, 2008:131). These studies suggests that the way towards peace and prosperity is to have independent states pool their resources and even surrender some of their sovereignty to create integrated communities to promote economic growth or respond to regional problems (Lamy, 2008:132). Liberal institutionalism presents arguments that suggest that the world has become more pluralistic in terms of actors involved in international interactions and that these actors have become more dependent on each other. Sates are still the key actors in international relations and they are rational actors; meaning that they try to maximize their interest in all issue areas. Before the neo-liberal approach was more concerned with low politics such ad economic and development issues, but after the end of the cold war and 9/11, neo-liberalism has begun to focus on the cooperation between states on more security related issues (Lamy, 2008:132).

The critique on the neo-realists is based on the claim that neo-realists focus only on conflict and competition and minimize the chances for cooperation (Jervis, 1999:47). Here the liberal institutionalists consider institutions as the mediator and the means to achieve cooperation among actors in the international system. Neo-liberals suggest that successful responses to security threats require the creation of regional and global institutions that promote cooperation among states and the coordination of policy responses to these new security threats. Thus institutions can function also as the promoters of norms and values in regional integration, which may be more appropriate in this case. As the HR Ashton are trying to make a common response on behalf of the CFSP, she must try to coordinate some common values between the member states on their foreign policies, thus the liberal institutionalism sees the institutions as the appropriate framework for sharing and promoting such values.

The states seek to maximize their absolute gains through cooperation and the rational behaviour leads states to see value in cooperation. This cooperation is never without problems, but states will shift loyalty and resources to institutions if these are seen as mutually beneficial and if they provide states with increasing opportunities to secure their national interests (Jervis, 1999:53-54).

The liberal institutionalism is relevant for states that have mutual interests and the CFSP was made for ensuring the coherence in the EU’s security matters, hence the case of the Libyan crisis would be a good example of the managing on security matters within regional integration and common institutions.

### Possible gains via cooperation

For the two theoretical approaches to address the Libyan crisis, we must take a look at the character of such crisis. The theories traditionally cover different issues in international relations. Neo-realists tend to dominate the security study areas and have more focus on state survival. Liberal institutionalism focuses their scholarship on political economy, environmental issues and human right related issues. For liberal institutionalists foreign policy is more about protecting economic interest and the economic well-being for people around the world. Creating, maintaining and further empowering of institutions to deal with these issues are the future foreign policies for liberal institutionalism. Neo-realists see foreign policy as dominated by issues of national security and survival, and all states must, even in this time with globalization look after their own interests (Lamy, 2008:134). Neo-relists accept the existence of institutions and recognize their role as tools or instruments to achieve national goals. They also agree that institutions can shape the content and direction for the foreign policy in certain issue-areas as long as the issue at is not central to the security interests of a given state. However neo-realists emphasise that states’ focus on relative gains will limit the growth of institutions and will always make cooperation difficult, because some states will always gain more than others. Liberal institutionalists have a more positive trust in the existence of institutions; they believe that institutions can promote a foreign policy agenda by providing critical information and expertise to the member states. They also believe that institutions may facilitate policy-making and encourage more cooperation at local, national and international levels.

Based on the above perspectives of the two theories, I will outline the objectives for the possible gains via cooperation in both theories.

Table 1.1

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Possible gains |
| Neo-realism | Power increase |
| Image in international politics |
| Increase in capability |
| Liberal institutionalism | Economic and political stability in regional area |
| Legitimacy |
| Promotion of common norms and values |

In the table 1.1 above, I have tried to highlight the possible gain from cooperation based on both theories. As the theories consider international cooperation possible for very different purposes, it is relevant to elaborate on the possible gains from such cooperation.

Neo-realists consider the possibility of an increase in power as the main argument for international cooperation, and in this specific case an increase in power would be defined as the actors attempt to play a leading role in the actions towards Libya.

The second perspective for neo-realists is the image in international policy. As neo-realists argue that states are competitive, the states struggle to maintain or to improve their image in international relations. States need to survive in the international competitive system, and a strong image wold be beneficial in this competition as neo-realists argue that self-interest rules even in international cooperation. State will seek to maintain their position and placement in the system, which is seen as an important gain.

The third possible gain from cooperation according to the Neo-realist approach is the possibility for increasing the capability. According to neo-realists the military force remains and important and effective tool of statecraft and balance of power and the gain in military capability is obvious when cooperating via international institutions. The possibility for cooperation via the CFSP would increase the member states capability in more aspects than the military division. More resources and intelligence would be shared and this would increase the capabilities for all participating countries.

Looking at the gains from the liberal institutionalism’s view on cooperation, the character of the gains is more soft power based. First of all, a possible gain for the countries who cooperates on a common strategy towards Libya. As liberal institutionalists are not as concerned about the relative gains of others as the neo-realists are, the gains could also possibly benefit other member states.

The gain of economic stability in the neighbourhood is an obvious gain for the EU member states as some of them are involved in trading agreements with Libya. Stability in the area would make the import-prices for the EU countries stabile, and the demand for EU export would remain at the same level. Another important gain from stability in Libya would be the situation on migration. None of the EU member states is interested in an overload of refugees from Libya in this critical period, especially not the neighbouring countries. Cooperation on how to secure stability in Libya would lead to less migration and thus beome a gain for the EU-member states.

Another gain for cooperation via institutions is the gain of legitimacy. Working together via an international institutional framework would provide legitimacy to the common actions taken. As an international institution has broader support from several countries, the legal basis for interfering in Libya would be provided, and no actor stands alone with the sole responsibility of the outcome. The gain of legitimacy is thus very important for some member states in the cooperation on a common foreign policy on Libya.

The last gain I have chosen based on liberal institutionalism is the gain of promoting common norms and values. This is very central for the liberal intuitionalists, because of the capability of international institutions to act as central framework for certain norms and values. Cooperation via the EU and the CFSP would entail a set of constituted values, which in this case could be the promotion human rights and democracy. This is an important common value base for the EU, and the gain in profiling the EU under these values would improve the image of the member states and the EU.

Every theory leaves something out, no theories can claim to offer a picture of the world that is complete, and no theory has exclusive claims to the truth. These two theories offers insight to the perspectives on the Libyan crisis and can argue why some member states act in a certain way based of the possible gains via the international cooperation.

# Analysis

In the following section I will try to unite the theory with the actual sequence of events during the period of time. Here the key actors will be the main focus in the aim of explaining the coherence between the EU member states. The intentions of the four member states and the possible gains for the central actors will be outlined as well, and the latter would give an idea of what motives the main actors might have had during the period of time.

## Intentions

Before the sequence of events, I will very brief sum up the background of the four countries’ relations with the Libyan revolt. Some countries have national interests or values linked with previous international interventions which also may play a role in their reactions towards Libya. These short background notices would basically outline the actors’ intentions for possible international cooperation.

### Italy

Italy has had a history of close cooperation with Libya. In 2008 Italy had signed a reconciliation pact with Gaddafi whereby Rome paid 5 billion dollars in compensation for its colonial occupation and in return Tripoli promised to control cross Mediterranean migration, which has been an increasing problem for the Italian government (IISS; 2011:2). Furthermore Italy is involved with several multi-billion dollar industrial and commercial investments in Libya which also could explain the difficult position for Italy to condemn Libya and Gaddafi. Libya has long been a pillar of Italy's economy, supplying Italians with a quarter of their oil and 10% of their natural gas (Wall Street Journal, March 15) Italian businesses were also granted preferential treatment for taxes and imports as part of a controversial "friendship" pact signed in 2008. Italy suspended the pact in February in the beginning of the riots, under which it had agreed to pay 5 billion euros in reparations to Libya for its 1911-1943 occupation and colonisation of the country and to build Libya a new highway (Tribune Business News, March 15). This puts Italy in a dilemma, because Italy has interest on both sides. Italy must try to maintain a good relationship with the EU and stay reliable in the EU cooperation, and on the other side still do damage control on the connections with Libya. Furthermore Italy has great interests in a stabile development for Libya regarding migration and trade of oil.

Looking at Italy’s geopolitical role, the Mediterranean Sea provides an open boarder for migration to Italy. Evidently Berlusconi is not interested in an increase of migrants from Libya, as this would have high costs and also pose a possible security threat for illegal migration.

### Germany

Due to Germanys history of war, the use of military force has been an issue for German leaders ever since. After the end of world war two West Germany foreswore war as an instrument of its foreign policy. Its military served a single purpose: To help defend the NATO allies in Western Europe and North America from a Soviet attack (DW-World, 28/12/10). Even seventy years after the Second World War, Germans are still scared by their tragic aggression in two world wars and they need convincing evidence of vital national interests to justify any military adventure (Foreign Policy Journal, March 28).

Even the simple term war carries a very different connotation for Germans than for people in other countries. War for Germans means a great upheaval fought on home soil, close to one’s own people with a large number of civilian casualties, military blunders, and military lies (Foreign Policy Journal, March 28). However various authors (see Baumann & Hellmann (2001), Heyman (2011) and Seidelmann) argue that after the period of Schröder and Merkel Germany foreign policy has started to change towards a more EU-oriented strategy, and Germany has been involved in military actions in the Balkans and in Afghanistan (Bundeswehr, 2011), but the second world war dangles over Germany like a horrible reminder of the consequences of war. This means that the chances for Germany backing the CFSP would only be possible as long as it does not involve any military action.

Looking at Germany’s role within the EU, Germany has successfully linked peace and security and opened the way for the EMU, which has reaffirmed Germany’s engagement in the integration in EU (Seidelmann, 2004:21). As Germany has one of the largest financial contributions to the EU’s budget Germany becomes a central player and the political advantages for Germany to cooperate via the EU increases as Germany widens its power image within the EU and in general international relations. But due to Germany’s military capabilities, Merkel would seek to lead a more diplomatic and soft power based foreign policy through the EU.

Merkel is facing federal state election during 2011, and she cannot afford to lose support from the German people. As the peoples opinion on military intervention is outlined very clear to limited support for German participation in a military mission (The Local, March 20).

### UK

Ever since World war two, there has developed a special relationship between the US and the UK. The two countries has shared close relations on economy, diplomacy, culture and military interventions. Their collaboration on defence policy within NATO and bilaterally is more integrated than with any other state, and the integration of their intelligence operations is unprecedented in its scale and its trust (Dunn, 2011:6). The former Prime Minister Tony Blair had a very close relationship with former President of the United Sates; George W Bush and has at the latest been involved in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The latter without legal basis from the UN or NATO and with limited support from the other EU member states (Dunn, 2011:6).

This close relationship with the US might have an effect on the UK’s position within the EU. As UK is cooperating closely with the world’s super power, the EU-agenda could become second priority to Cameron. If Cameron is interested in being in a powerful position, it might be more attractive to stand by the US side, than being the less powerful out of the threesome in the EU (France and Germany). The UK is not one of the funding countries of the EU and at the same time the UK has opt outs on several legislative issues in the EU (Sion, 2004:11-12). This could also imply that the UK is not as integrated in the EU and therefore does not share much interests in an EU-cooperation on a common foreign policy towards the Libyan crisis. If the gain for Cameron is to remain in a powerful position in global politics, he would consider the US as the best alternative, due to the special relationship and the power position of the US. Furthermore, the UK and the US is both permanent member of the UNSC which could make EU less important as the international mediator in Cameron’s view.

### France

The Arab uprisings ought to have given France a chance to show off its diplomatic powers. The former colonial power in Tunisia (and Morocco and Algeria), France has long claimed a special understanding of the Arab world. Nicolas Sarkozy talked early in his presidency of the need for Europe to reach out to countries on the Mediterranean's southern rim. And Sarkozy is presiding over the G20 and G8 clubs, lending him a platform for leadership (The Economist, March 5).

During the crisis in Tunisia Sarkozy has been heavy criticized by his own people for supporting the former President [Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/zine-al-abidine-ben-ali) (The Guardian, 24/01/11). Former French foreign minister Michele Alliot-Marie had made the image of French diplomacy very unpopular. During weeks of protests which were met with violence by Tunisian security forces, French ministers made comments in favour of the authoritarian regime. As human rights groups condemned murders carried out by Tunisian police, the French foreign minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, said France would lend its own police "knowhow" to help Ben Ali's forces maintain order only days before Ben Ali fled (The Guardian, 24/01/11). It furthermore became public that Alliot-Marie when holidaying in Tunisia over New Year had flown twice on a private jet belonging to a local tycoon who had links to the Ben Ali regime. This was unacceptable and Sarkozy must do some damage control by dismissing Alliot-Marie and reorganizing his government by inaugurating Alain Juppe

France was tardy in Tunisia and based on the failed foreign policy, polls finds that 81% of respondents think France's international role has weakened. An anonymous group of diplomats wrote in Le Monde that "*France's voice in the world has disappeared*" and its "*foreign policy is dictated by improvisation*” (The Economist, 05/03/11).

On top of the vague handling of Tunisia, Sarkozy faces national presidential election in the spring of 2012 (The Guardian, 22/03/11). In the beginning of 2011 the exit polls showed that Sarkozy was behind his opponent Marine Le Pen from the far-right party National Front. Sarkozy desperately needed a boost to his image as an international leader, and he needed to show great diplomatic skills in order to win back the respect of the voters. The Libyan crisis could be Sarkozy’s opportunity to make up for his mistaken policy in Tunisia. He knows that he is behind Le Pen and he knows that a strong and decisive appearance on the world stage could transform his fortunes. If Sarkozy shows more willingness to interfere in the situation in Libyan and dare to take leadership of the diplomatic actions against Libya he could possibly boost his image as a powerful western leader and thus gain support from the French voters. The gains for Sarkozy could be defined as the opportunity to re-establish his image after wrong priorities in the Tunisian crisis and also to boost he image as a political leader in the view of the French voters.

### EU

The EU as an actor represented by HR Catherine Ashton may also have some intentions. The four member states’ intentions are based on the possible gains from international cooperation, but as the EU fund the framework for such international cooperation the intentions for Ashton may be based on what the EU can gain as an international organisation. As the theories are based on competition and anarchy between states, I will allow considering the EU’s interest as predominant in line with the member states interests.

As the EU also is an actor in the international society the aim of power increase would also be relevant for the EU. If the member states chose to surrender sovereignty to the EU to manage a common foreign policy, this would be an increase in power for the EU. Also the image in international politics is important to the EU. As the US is considered the sole world superpower both in economic and military terms, the image of the EU is very important in the role of acting the counterpart to the US and to China for that matter. Taking into account the critique of the EU’s CFSP’s ability to speak with one voice in the last decades, the idea of creating a coherent response might also be very important for Ashton’s image.

The capability increase might be of huge interest of Ashton, as the EU’s ambitions on this point as mentioned earlier surpass the current situation regarding the military assets. If the member states were to unite their capabilities, this would be a huge gain for the EU’s CFSO and for Ashton. The strength of a coherent response to the Libyan crisis would improve the capabilities for Ashton and for EU as an institutional player.

Looking at the liberal institutionalists’ view, the EU as an economically integrated institution is very interested in stability with their trading partners let alone when it is in the EU’s neighbourhood. Economic and political stability would ensure future trade agreements for the member states and the migration threat would be less critical.

The question about legitimacy is quite different for the EU as an institution. The member states seek legitimacy to act based on a common ground, but for the EU, the gain is to be the chosen base for legitimacy. For the EU to be the legal basis for international cooperation would provide an increase in power, and it would also boost the image of the EU as an international organisation.

Finally the promotion of norms and values is one of the EU’s most used strategies in foreign policy (Rossi, 2004:1). In particular democracy and human rights have been the core values of the CFSP (see Barcelona Declaration, 1995), and for the EU to promote such values to Libya would be a privilege because of the potential to foster political changes in such region would ensure better cooperation between the regions and possibility to establish trade agreements and control migration floods.

For the EU to gain from international cooperation makes little sense in this context. The EU would benefit from all possible cooperation between the member states because EU as an international institution would increase its importance as an international mediator. The intentions of Ashton can so be described as the attempt to provide an appropriate framework for such cooperation between the member states in the aim of acquire as many gains as possible. Ashton’s intentions are to make the EU’s CFSP a desirable solution for coordinating the EU member states response to the Libyan Crisis.

Based on these national positions, is could be relevant to illustrate what are the main intentions for the member states to act on the Libyan crisis. The possible gains from the two theories are evidently desirable for all actors, but based on their intentions, some gains would be preferred over others. The intentions of the member states could be outlined as the table 2.1 below.

Table 2.1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | UK | France | Germany | Italy | EU |
| Intentions | Cameron to live up to Blair's aggressive foreign policy | Make up for failed policy on Tunisia | Projection of democracy and human rights | Desire stability in the area due to trade agreements and migration threat | Become the countries’ preferred mediator in international cooperation |
| Remain the power position in the global context | Improve Sarkozy’s image before national election | Increase power within EU | Remain loyal towards Gadhafi due to economic interests | Increase image as a determined coherent union |
| Stay loyal to the USA | Prove France as a powerful actor in the international society | Non-military strategy | Remain loyal to the EU i terms of credibility | Coordinate the different intentions into one united contribution |
| Possible gains | Power increase | Power increase | Promotion of norms and values | Economic and political stability in the region | Increase in power and capabilities |
| Increase in capabilities | Image in international politics | Legitimacy | Legitimacy | Legitimacy and promotion of norms and values |
| Image in international politics |  | Image in international policy |  | Image in international politics, stability in the region |

## Actions taken on Libya

In the following I will present the timeline for the actions and reaction on the Libyan crisis from the relevant actors. I will include the theory perspective on the possible gains from cooperation on the CFSP or via international institutions.

During the last three decades Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi has signed friendship treaties and trade agreements with several Westerns leaders. Libya underwent a transformation after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Having seen that Saddam Hussain’s stubbornness had led him and his country to disaster, Gadhafi softened his approach towards the West and the issue of weapons of mass destructions. In December 2003 he officially stated that he would renounce his production of weapons of mass destruction, and in 2004 Libya’s facilities was dismantled (Zafar, 2010:136). Moreover the EU and Libya were negotiating the framework of an agreement aiming at “*the full reintegration of Libya in bilateral and multilateral international relations and Libya’s willingness to strengthen its relations with the European Union*” (European Commission 1). This was negotiated under the same regime which several EU member states were carrying military interventions against a few months ago.

On the 15th of February lawyer and human rights activist Fethi Tarbel was arrested in Benghazi. Protests for his release began in Benghazi and it quickly turned into an anti-Gaddafi demonstration. This triggered the riots in Benghazi, who were inspired by the revolts in Egypt and Tunisia and the riot fasten spread throughout the rest of Libya (Euronews). The following day the Libyan authorities was using force to control the demonstrators, several people were killed (Blanchard, 2011).

#### The first reactions

Oh the 20th of February the High Representative Catherine Ashton issued a declaration on behalf of the EU stating that the EU was “*extremely concerned by the events unfolding in Libya (…) condemning the repression against peaceful demonstrators and deplore the violence and the death of civilians”* (Council of the EU). She also expresses the support for peaceful demonstration and the freedom of expression in the declaration.

The following day there is a struggle between the member states to impose sanctions against Libya. France is one of the states urging for the EU to make sanctions against the Gaddafi family. David Cameron says in an interview on Arab TV that: *“First, we do not want such things to happen, and I believe the Libyan Government should stop dealing with these incidents in a violent manner because what is happening in Libya is completely unacceptable. Just like Egypt, Libya should pay heed to the people's demands and desire for democracy”,* (BBC Monitoring Middle East, February 21). He also confines himself to show his concern, and does not mention any desire for sanctions against Libya at this point.

Italy is also one of the reluctant sates. After the meeting of foreign ministers in Brussels on 21st of February the Italian foreign minister, Franco Frattini, showed his concern for a flood of immigrants from Libya saying that he was following the evolution of the situation with "concern" *"because of the potential fallout for influxes of migrants into the EU*” (BBC, 21.02.2011). Because of Italy’s fear of Libya breaking the cooperation on migration policies no concrete actions were taken, other than the “concern” which Ashton expressed in the declaration on behalf of the member states.

Regarding Italy’s reaction it is safe to say that the fear of migration overload was the main concern for the Italian statement. On top of this, Prime Minister Berlusconi told the press that “*I haven't been in contact with him (Gadhafi). The situation is still in flux and so I will not allow myself to disturb anyone*” (Reuters, 2011). Both Frattini’s and Berlusconi’s statements indicate that Italy’s position both geopolitical and relationship wise is very fragile in the current situation. If the riots develop this would cause a massive migration flood towards Italy, and this would have major domestic and economic consequences for Italy.

The first reactions from some of the member states reflect different national positions. Ashton and Cameron are taking the same position on the promotion of democratic values and they both show concern on the developments in Libya. Italy on the other hand, does only show concern for their national interest in the possibility of migration, and Berlusconi actually does not want to make any serious statement about the situation.

#### Cooperation on sanctions

HR Catherine Ashton makes another statement after the UNSC had made a press release in which they called for the Libyan authorities to respect the human rights and end all violence and stressed that the responsible would be held to account (Security Council Press Statement on Libya, February 22). In the statements Ashton calls an immediate end to the violence and use of force, and she offers EU humanitarian aid where needed. She also underlines that :”*The EU has decided to suspend negotiations with Libya on the EU-Libya Framework Agreement and is ready to take further measures*.” (PR Newswire, February23). In this quote she actually hints to the impose of sanctions when she says that the EU is ready to take further measures, but she is not being concrete about the sanctions as the member states has not agreed on anything yet. This clearly shows the limits for the HR, as she can only make vague statements on behalf on the EU.

On the 23rd of February French President Nicholas Sarkozy called for common EU sanctions on the ones responsible for the violence in Libya (Wall Street Journal, February 23). Those sanctions could be to prohibit the responsible persons’ entry into the EU and the tracking of financial transactions. Germany agreed to support such actions, after the speech held by Gadhafi on the 22nd of February The German Chancellor Angela Merkel said she may support the use of sanctions against Libya after the leader had "*basically declared war on his own people*" (Financial Times, February 23). Sarkozy urged Libya’s leaders to start a dialogue and to stop the violence; “*The international community cannot remain a spectator facing those massive violations of human rights*” (Wall street Journal, February 23) Sarkozy stated. He considered that the right channel to impose these sanction would be the EU as he elaborated that he would; “*propose to our European Union partners the quick adoption of concrete sanctions so that all those who are implicated in the current violence know that they have to assume the consequences of their acts*” (Tribune Business News, February 23).

Until this point of time France and Germany can agree on making sanctions against Gadhafi. Sarkozy actually suggested that the EU member states should agree on a common underlying basis for these sanctions, hence he considers the EU the proper arena for making these sanctions. Italy does not want to interfere, but does show concern for the possibility of migration overload. Berlusconi was more aware of the unsettling situation in Libya, but he did not consider any sanctions against the regime: “*I am alarmed by the increasing severity of the clashes and the unacceptable use of violence against the civilian population*” he said in a note (African Press Organization, February 22).

#### UK reluctance for EU cooperation

At the same time David Cameron was on a trip with the delegation of arms and defence industries to the middle east, and he was very cautious in backing the French proposal for sanctions in a speech held in Qatar, he said that the situation in Libya was a wake-up call for the EU and that: "*We have been very clear with respect to Libya that what is happening there is unacceptable. The use of violence against their own people, the appalling scenes we have seen on our television screens - this is unacceptable and cannot be allowed to stand," he said. "In Libya, the situation remains gravely concerning.*” (BBC Monitoring Middle East, February, 24).

Unlike his French counterpart Cameron did not consider the EU as the right forum for a common action against the Libyan regime. He expressed his desire for the UN to lead the line towards Libya. He added that he would like to see a UN Security Council resolution to send a very clear warning to Colonel Gaddafi and the Libyan armed forces that what they were doing was wrong and against the law (MENA report, February 24).

According to the theory, neo-realism can explain why France and Germany have interests in imposing sanctions. As the two of the most powerful EU member states, they are taking the leading role in the aim of remaining the most powerful member states within the EU. But as France suggest a common EU base for imposing sanctions; liberal insitutionalists would say that Sarkozy tries to exercise statecraft through the EU and thus promote a common EU foreign policy. Liberal institutionalism would claim that Sarkozy seeks a stronger legitimate base for the sanctions, and the CFSP would be the proper arena for such sanctions. This is consistent with the intention of appearing as a powerful leader, and if he can lead the EU on his initiative he would, according to neo-realists gain a better image in the international society. Cameron on the other hand, is more fund of the UN as the mediator for imposing sanctions.

What is rather interesting is that Cameron would like the UN to take the lead and not the EU. Cameron seems to have more faith in the UN as a common base for making sanctions against Libya. Liberal institutionalism would see that the UK tries to cooperate via international institutions, here the UN, which is considered by liberal intuitionalism to be the mediator for achieving cooperation on eventual sanctions against Libya. The gain for Cameron when cooperating via the UN would be a legal basis to impose the sanctions. Another explanation for the UK to prefer the UN over the EU as the arena for making sanctions is the UK close relation to the US regarding foreign policy. This could indicate that the UK was interested in getting the US to join in such sanctions. Also for the UK to remain in the favourable position as the US’ closest collaborator Cameron would prefer the UN over the EU.

#### Italy’s dilemma

Meanwhile in Italy the foreign minister Franco Frattini announced the developments in Libya as a civil war between different groups and that there were deaths among civil groups, but he did not say whether the deaths and attacks were backed by Gadhafi’s regime (Wall Street Journal, February 23). Later the same day Gadhafi in a long speech on TV accused Italy of supplying the opposition groups with rockets. Afterwards Berlusconi called Gadhafi immediately to deny all participation in the distribution of arms, and he also invited him to end all the violence. (Wall Street Journal, February 23). Italy is still being hesitant, and obvious Berlusconi is concerned about his close ties with Libya. He is in a dilemma, on the one hand if he plays along with Germany and France it will have huge economic consequences, but if he remains loyal to Gadhafi it might cost him his power position within the international society and in the EU.

Italy is mainly concerned about the situation, which could threaten the current migration aspect. Also the economic interests in Libya are of great concern for Italy. The gain for Italy at this point, is to achieve economic and politic, stability in Libya. Berlusconi and Frattini stand between the choice of remaining neutral or backing the European partners’ suggestions for sanctions. Another gain for Italy is legitimacy, because of the close relationship between Italy and Libyan Berlusconi would need a legal base to take any actions against Libya, otherwise it could be understood as a progressive move against Libya. The gains for Italy in this situation, is thus to stabilise the situation, and to find a legal base for decision making.

#### Germanys firm line

At this point of time the freezing of assets and the travel restrictions were the sanctions discussed at EU level and Germany was taking a role as one of the leading countries pushing for sanctions on Libya. German foreign minter said that sanctions were unavoidable if the bloodshed continued (Wall Street Journal, February 23). And Angela Merkel said the day after; "*If the use of violence doesn't stop, Germany will call for us to use all avenues of pressure and influence on Libya*” (EIU Viewswire, February 24).

Germany is still taking the lead in the European rhetoric and plays an aggressive role wen pushing for sanctions. Based on the neo-realistic approach the gain for Germany is at this point of time is the improvement of the image in international politics. Germany being a central player in European politics must take a firm line on the crisis to remain its image as one of the most powerful member states in the EU. The use of sanctions would be a suitable instrument for Germany’s foreign policy, as it does not involve any military power which gives Merkel the possibility to take a lead in the international cooperation. This would also prove a possible gain for improve the image of Germany in international politics, as a soft power based international actor.

#### Obama on the phone

The US was more consequent in the statements and on February the 23rd President Obama called the bloodshed in Libya “outrageous” and “unacceptable” and said that his administration was looking at

The: “*full range of options we have to respond to this crisis*” (The white house blog, 2001). On the February the 24th US President Barak Obama makes three separate phone calls to his partners in Europe; one to Sarkozy, one to David Cameron, one to Berlusconi in an attempt to coordinate their responses to the crisis. A spokesperson from the white house uttered that the US was considering imposing economic sanctions on the Gadhafi family including an assets freeze. From the calls made it became clear that the US was not interested in interfering with Libya as a sole actor, Obama was very determined to involve his European partners. A spokesperson from the white house said that “*all options were still on the table, but the administration prefers concerted broad-based international action that could compel the Libyan government to cease and desis*t” (White House Briefing, February 24).

Here it is noteworthy that Obama did not call Angela Merkel or HR Catherine Ashton in his attempt to coordinate responses towards Libya. Germany has been very straight forward with their request for sanctions against Libya and the EU would be a strong partner to negotiate sanctions with as it represents 27 countries. This could be a signal that Obama already new, that the chances for the EU to agree on any proposals would be very slim yet it would take much longer time if the 27 states would eventually agree on a common proposal. Moreover he also know Germany’s attitude towards the use of hard power, which could be why he did not call Merkel. At this point of time, none of the four member states or the EU has discussed the use of military force, but this call from Obama could very well have involved discussions about a military intervention because he knew that France and the UK might have the military power and the political will to get involved in a possible NFZ. Italy on the other hand has showed more reluctance to get involved, but taken Italy’s relationship with Libya into account it makes good sense for Obama to call Berlusconi on his plans.

After this phone call Cameron was clearer in his wording. He showed goodwill to impose sanctions where he before has been more reluctant to back Sarkozy and Merkel' wishes for sanctions against Libya. But he did still not consider the EU as a possible channel for common action. David Cameron was more positive towards the UN Security Council as the main arena for sanctioning Libya. On February 24th he stated that; *"We should send a very clear warning to Col Gaddafi and to the Libyan armed forces that what they are doing is wrong and against the law," it would be better if the world could move ahead as one, and this could be done through the UN Security Council”* (Financial Times, February 24). Also Sarkozy was fast to ask for quick concrete sanctions after the phone call from Obama, he clearly said that: *”he favoured suspending all economic, commercial and financial ties with Libya until further notice. Sanctions would make clear that all those implicated in the violence know that they will have to assume the consequences of their actions.*” (Financial Times, February 24).

Theoretically this is leaning towards the liberal institutionalist’s ideas as the most power full nation in the world is trying to coordinate sanctions against Libya. Liberal institutionalism suggests that cooperation between states is the best way to secure their international interests and as long as the mutual interests are taken care of it is easier to cooperate on an international level. The aim for Obama is to coordinate these sanctions with his European partners and since he has convinced Cameron that the sanctioning of Libya is of their common interest the theory would claim that cooperation between these actors would secure the relative gains of all. Since we in this case are not talking about actual gains, but more the purpose of improving the international image as a powerful actor, the actual gain for Cameron in this cooperation is to team up with the US and call for the UNSC to impose sanctions to remain his powerful partnership with the US and thus gain influence in the UNSC, where the UK has a permanent seat.

#### Sanctions against Libya

The US is the first actor to impose sanctions against Libya. On the 25th of February Obama impose financial sanctions on Gaddafi and other Libyan officials, blocks certain Libyan funds under U.S. jurisdiction, and restricts U.S. persons’ financial transaction with certain Libyan individuals and entities (Blanchard, 2011). The US also announces that they are shutting down their embassy in Libya on this date (Tribune Business News, 26.02.2011).

The German foreign minister, Westerwelle shows his concern on the developments in Libya and he would like for the UN to take the initiative to impose sanctions on Libya: “*I have decided to move again for the UN Security Council to meet in an emergency session. In view of the extent of human rights violations and the use of violence there, I think that sanctions are unavoidable, and that would include entry bans for the ruling family, but also the freezing of assets*” (Westerwelle, BBC, 25.02.11). Westerwelle does not take the EU into consideration when discussing the sanctions. Only as the interviewer asks him about the a common EU response he replies: *“I found the European Union too reticent, which is why I decided together with other EU colleagues to take the lead on the issue of sanctions. However, we have meanwhile found increasing realization within the EU that the current situation is entirely unacceptable. The UN Security Council dealt with the issue earlier this week and was much more substantial and much clearer in its language, by the way”* (Westerwelle, BBC, 25.02.11). These quotes are a fine example of the German ambitions for the new CFSP. Germany only wanted to impose sanctions against Gaddafi and his family via the UNSC. Westerwelle said loud and clear that the EU is acting too slowly and the lowest common denominator were to agree that the situation in Libya is unacceptable. But for one of the most powerful member states of the EU not to have faith in the CFSP, it is evident, that the institutional framework has not convinced Germany.

Liberal Institutionalism suggest that countries would be willing to hand over sovereignty to institutions if they believe that they can integrate a common response to regional problems, but Westerwelle obviously does not consider the EU to represent such common base in this case. He prefers the UN to take measures towards Libya, and this shows that the gain for Germany also is legitimacy for imposing these sanctions. As Westerwelle and Cameron would like for the UN to be the legal basis, Sarkozy is left the only actor wishing for the EU to make common sanctions. This indicates a lack of incoherence between the member states in this early but critical point of time. It also indicates that the EU’s CFSP is not considered as an important channel for the member states’ common foreign policy.

Catherine Ashton has become more determined that the EU should be more strict in a coherent answer to the bloodshed in Libya, on February 25th she stated: “*For the European Union, it is time to consider what we call restrictive measures, to think about what we can do to ensure that we are putting as much pressure as possible to try and stop the violence in Libya and see the country move forward*” (Radio Free Europe, February, 25). She is still not mentioning the use of sanctions, but she is definitely referring to the sanctions which the US already had imposed and which Germany, France and the UK have urged for during the last days.

The first EU member state to act independent is France. On 26th of February France’s foreign minister announces that “*that it has closed its embassy in Libya and ceased all diplomatic activities in the unrest-beset North African country until further notice*” (Tribune Business news, 26.02.2011).

On the 26th of February the UN follows the US and makes a unanimous decision in Resolution 1970 to freeze Gaddafi’s financial resources and also to make a worldwide stop for export of weapons to Libya. The EU followed this decision the day after and choosed to remove Gaddafi’s entry permit and also to freeze his accounts (Wind, 2011:2). Regards to the EU agreement on freezing the Gadhafi-family’s assets HR Catherine Ashton said: “*The EU fully endorses this resolution and will implement the restrictive measures as a matter of urgency. The EU had already started to work on restrictive measures (...) and preparations are already well underway*” (Tribune Business News, February 27). Ashton praised the recent pro-democracy protests in Libya and said the international community should offer support. But she rejected accusations that the EU is trying to export European values; "*The right to free speech, freedom of assembly, justice and equality are not European rights, they are universal rights*” (African Press Organization, 28.02.2011). Even though Ashton is mention rights as universal rights, the liberal institutionalism theory would consider this as a possible gain for Ashton, as these norms and values could be linked to EU’s fundamental base, hence the perception of the EU’s image could be improved.

This is a fine example of the problems within the EU to make an accurate response to an important event like this after some member states already has been pressuring for sanctions for over a week. On the other hand, Sarkozy is the only actor who suggested that the EU could be a common base for sanctioning Libya, and if the other member states show reluctance (Italy) or turn to other alternatives it seems difficult for Ashton to coordinate any answers.

#### Further cooperation

After the resolution in the UNSC David Cameron was urging Gadhafi to step down, he stated; “*The next part is real pressure on this regime, the travel ban, the asset freeze. The measures were taken against the regime to show just how isolated they are a very clear message tonight, that it’s time for Col Qadhafi to go. He should go now and Libya’s future has no future with him at the helm, absolutely none*” (Interview with Cameron, February 27).

The UK and France urges for the EU leaders to meet. British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy proposed convening an unscheduled EU summit on Monday [28 February] to discuss further steps against the regime of the Libyan leader. Cameron's office stated that he and Sarkozy agreed during a phone discussion that the international response to the crisis in Libya was prompt and appropriate (BBC, March 1). They settled that important changes in EU's approach the Libyan Crisis should be discussed at a meeting of the Council of the European Union so that it can argue the future steps of the EU’s role in Libya. Sarkozy's office also confirmed that leaders of the EU member states have to meet as soon as possible and informed that Cameron and Sarkozy were planning to address EU President Herman Van Rompuy regarding this matter (BBC, 2 March).

Regarding the sanction, all four member states acknowledge the need for actions. Italy was trying to play an anonymous role, but realised eventually that measures must be taken. Italy had no choice than to support the UN and the EU to maintain their image in the international society. For Italy to make this decision, the gain was to get legitimacy for backing the sanctions against Libya. France was the first to acknowledge the EU as an appropriate actor for making these common statements, Germany was leaning towards the UN to make the sanctions, because of EU’s slow process of agreement, and Cameron was reacting to the call from his transatlantic partner and was afterwards fund of the UNSC to initiative the sanctions. It was indeed the UN who made the sanctions ahead of the EU, and only two days after the UN resolution the EU could agree on more or less the same initiatives. It seems as if the actors are willing to cooperate on a higher institutional level, but the EU was not the obvious choice for all actors. The coherence between the member states for imposing sanctions actually existed, but there was simply no coherence in supporting the CFSP’s role as the main institutional frame for cooperation.

Eventually Sarkozy and Cameron addressed the EU regarding further cooperation. What is noteworthy is that they address the president of the European council, and not HR Ashton. This show that even though Sarkozy and Cameron are interested in a coordinated EU effort, they do not want the cooperation taking place on the supranational level, it must be in the European council on the intergovernmental level. For both Sarkozy and Cameron to address the European Council, show desire to maintain their power position within the EU and to play an active role in the decision making in the council. According to neo-realist this is an example on how countries will try to increase their power profile via international cooperation, and the pressure for sanctions would improve the image of both as dynamic leaders. Neo-realists consider foreign policy a national matter mainly dominated by national interest and security. This could explain why none of the member states have any interest what so ever in handling over power to the CFSP. Their national interest are simply too important in this case.

Italy eventually chose to back the sanctions against Libya. Berlusconi and Franttini both showed their concern for the migration situation, and since Italy’s intentions are to stabilize the area, they must realise that the way to pursue this gain, is via cooperation with the European partners. So far, Italy has got the institutional legitimacy to impose sanctions, and the confidence between the other member states is still intact.

After the imposition of sanctions, the actual gains for the member states are outlined in the table 2.1 below. The intentions are still the same, as the Libyan crisis is not over, and there is more to gain or to lose from further cooperation.

Table 2.2

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | UK | France | Germany | Italy | EU |
| Intentions | Cameron to live up to Blair's aggressive foreign policy | Make up for failed policy on Tunisia | Projection of democracy and human rights | Desire stability in the area due to trade agreements and migration threat | Become the countries’ preferred mediator for international cooperation |
| Remain the power position in the global context | Improve Sarkozy’s image before national election | Increase power within EU | Remain loyal towards Gadhafi due to economic interests | Increase image as a determined coherent union |
| Stay loyal to the USA | Prove France as a powerful actor in the international society | Non-military strategy | Remain loyal to the EU in terms of credibility | Coordinate the different intentions into one united contribution |
| Actual gains after sanctions | Image in international politics | Image in international politics | Promotion of norms and values | Legitimacy | Legitimacy |
|  |  | Legitimacy |  | Promotion of norms and values |
|  |  |  |  |  |

All of the member states have got a legal basis for the sanctions. This show willingness to cooperate on an international level, but the incoherence occurs when to choose which institution. Here the UN was the preferred framework for the UK and Germany for different reasons. The EU also imposed sanctions, which made the intentions for being able to coordinate a common EU strategy under the CFSP an actual gain for the EU. However the UN was the preferred institutional actor for most member states.

The UK remained its close relationship with the US, and after showing willingness to cooperate with Obama, Cameron secured the UK’s image and international position. The image of Sarkozy was also very important for his current stand in the French exit polls. He was very aggressive in his approach and he took initiative to close the French embassy and he addressed the other member states on the issue of sanctioning. Compared to his efforts in Tunisia, Sarkozy definitely improved his image as a powerful leader so far.

Italy on the other hand, was in a difficult position, because they faced a dilemma. Eventual the cooperation with the European partners was the most valuable to Berlusconi, and Italy gained legitimacy for backing the sanctions.

## Military intervention

After imposing the sanctions, the situation in Libya remained unchanged. Riots were still fighting Gadhafi’s forces, and lots of civilians were killed. The next section deals with the developments after the sanctions until the enforcement of a No-fly zone.

#### UK plans for military intervention

David Cameron had become more and more determined to play a leading role against the Libyan regime. He had ordered British officials to work with their counterparts in Paris to come up with proposals for common EU-strategies towards Libya ahead of the summit in Brussels on March 11th (Financial Times, March1). After resolution 1970 was adopted in the UNSC David Cameron announces that his ministry of defence will engage in planning a No Fly Zone (NFZ) over Libya on the 28th of February: “*We do not in any way rule out the use of military assets," Mr Cameron said. "We must not tolerate this regime using military force against its own people*”, (Wall Street Journal, February 28). The UK has already used military forces to evacuate British people from Libya, and together with France the UK is probably the only member state with the military capability to use force in Libya. This actually was a mixed signal to send to the US because of Obama’s reluctance to become embroiled in a third military campaign in a Muslim country. Furthermore NATO is considered by the rest of the world as a US-dominated alliance, and from the US’ view they could have hoped that the CFSP was powerful enough to deal with the crisis without the involvement of NATO (IISS, 2011).

#### France turns to the UN

France was also more hesitating to involve NATO right away. Only a few months before the outbreak of the riots in Libya France has signed a bilateral defence treaty with the UK in November 2010, and thus considered the operation in Libya as an opportunity for the two leading military power of the EU to engage in a joint operation in Libya, but the UK rejected (UK ministry of defence). On March 1st French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said that there will be no NFZ over Libya without the legal basis from the UNSC. This is a shift in the French attitude, since they ask for a legal base, but as the UK already is cooperating with the US there is only room for French involvement via the UN. Sarkozy is familiar with Germany’s attitude towards the use of military force hence the EU is not a possibility for cooperation on a NFZ.

#### Neutral Italy

Italy was still trying to be neutral and was only interested in a NFZ if the rest of the international society was to agree on one. Berlusconi said on March 5th: “*A military option is not unilaterally countenanced by the Italian government, and any decision will nevertheless be taken together with all the international bodies. As for the No Fly Zone we will abide by what the international community decides to do*” (BBC Monitoring European, March 6). This shows that Berlusconi is not interested in taking a lead at all, but he does admit that the UN should be the legal basis for a NFZ: “*Basically, Italy is not opposed in absolute terms, but is well aware that a UN, and consequently a NATO, resolution is necessary*” (BBC Monitoring European, March 6).

Italy again took the quiet road with no desire to get involved in a NFZ. However Berlusconi realised that the pressure from France and UK might lead to a military intervention, so he went with the flow and said that the UN would be a proper base to enforce a NFZ. This indicates that Italy is still trying to save his image towards Gadhafi. Italy does not have any interest in increasing the migration and Berlusconi must on the other hand still remain entitled to support from the other member states if such a migration flood were to occur. The gain for Italy in this situation is still legitimacy to get involved on a NFZ, which is why Berlusconi express his wish for NATO or UN involvement.

Also Germany was agreeing that only the UN could be managing a NFZ, foreign minister Westerwelle said that: “*any measure that went beyond sanctions - such as the enforcement of a no-fly zone over Libya - would have to be authorized by the UN Security Council and approved by partners in the region*” (Tribune Business news, March 7).

#### A little hope from Ashton

No one has suggested that the EU’s CFSP could be an important channel in a military intervention, but the HR was not so sceptical towards her own institutional role. In a speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg HR Catherine Ashton mentioned that it might be necessary to establish a mission within the CFSP to help evacuate and to address the humanitarian crisis (Tribune Business news, 09.03.2011). She also said that “*work on planning the mission -- which would need careful analysis and proper answers on questions of mandate, resources and objectives" -- was "on-going this week*". This shows that the ambitions of making a common EU response and mission via the CFSP was actually there a few days before the meeting of the head of states, at least in Ashton’s head. Ashton said that the bloc was considering sending a military mission in Libya to help the evacuation and address the humanitarian crisis. This was only one day before the meeting of European foreign ministers and two days before the Libya summit with the EU’s head of states. This shows that Ashton’s intentions was that the CFSP could play a military active role in Libya, and she was the only one who had expressed her belief in a common EU military mission (Radio Free Europe, March 9). Regarding the NFZ she was more reluctant to express ambitions, she stated: "*We have to define what we mean, because a no-fly zone by definition, means different things to different people*” (Tribune Business news, 09.03.2011) and she added that contacts were on-going with the UN and NATO. This also showed, that despite of her possibilities, she cannot do anything without the support from the member states. And as they have asked for the UN to be the main mediator of a NFZ, Ashton’s possible gains decreases significant.

#### UK and Germany addresses the EU

The UK was not hesitating to take a stand regarding the NFZ; the, British Foreign Secretary William Hague confirmed that Britain is working with France and other nations on "elements of a resolution on a no-fly zone. Hague said: "*It is a realistic and practical possibility, but it must have a clear legal base and broad support in the region and from the international community*." (Tribune Business News, March 8). Cameron was again leaning towards his transatlantic partners and has in a phone call with Obama discussed the possibilities of NATO being involved in humanitarian assistance, enforcement of the arms embargo, and the NFZ (Tribune Business News, March 8).

Germany was still reluctant towards a NFZ, especially one authorized by the EU, if a military intervention should be the solution Germany wanted the UN to be the legal basis, foreign minister Westerwelle stated: “*One can only decide it together with the United Nations, joined with the Arab League, otherwise "the dictator" could easily claim that the rebellion in Libya was inspired by foreign interests. I would not like Germany to get stuck on a slippery slope where we end up as a party in a civil war*” (Tribune Business News, March 9). But when it came to more soft policies such as political cooperation with Gadhafi, both Germany and the UK found the EU’s CFSP the right way to communicate. In a common letter to HR Catherine Ashton the British Foreign Secretary William Hague and Westerwelle urged the EU to agree on a declaration that “*EU and its member states will not work or cooperate with Gaddafi and that he has to step aside to allow for a true democratic transformation of the country*”. It further called for a series of EU responses, which should be tailor-made for the circumstances of each country currently experiencing popular upheavals; "*Our vision is a comprehensive partnership of equals between the peoples of Europe and its neighbourhood, underpinned by deeper and wider economic integration (…)"We can achieve this by a custom-made cooperation of the European Union with those that want this partnership and see in it an opportunity to support the changes they want themselves”* (Tribune Business News, March 10). This could indicate that some member states especially Germany considered the EU’s CFSP as a more soft power based policy maker to promote values such as democracy, because neither Germany nor the UK sees the EU as a military actor in this specific crisis.

#### EU as a soft power

This desire for a soft power based EU cooperation shows that the UK’s and Germany’s intentions for cooperation via the EU, is to promote common norms and values and to support economic integration in the neighbourhood. According to Liberal institutionalism this is the proper approach for institutional cooperation, and for the EU to manage such policies all the member states would achieve gains from this cooperation. Based on this preference from the member states, the leaders have showed which role, they want the CFSP to play in the Libyan crisis. The institutional role is based on the gains from Liberal institutionalism meaning that if the participating countries have an overall frame for exercising common policies, the EU would be the proper institutions for such policies. In this specific case, the EU has just turned out to play a less important role for the member states foreign policy, since none of the actors suggests further cooperation via the CFSP

As the rhetoric has changed and more actors are discussing a NFZ the focus has shifted towards the UN. No one in interested in getting involved in a military action in Libya without any legal basis provided by the international society. All four member states and the US is clearly stating that if a NFZ were to be planned, it should happen on the base of cooperation between nations, here via the UN. Cameron is clearly interested in an alliance with the US, based on the UK’s military history and partnership with is US. Cameron does not consider his fellow European member states as strong a supporter as the US, hence Cameron is preparing for a NFZ. He also makes a clear sign on what role the EU should play. In the letter to Ashton he obviously urges for her to take measures based of more soft power issues when asking for a declaration on democratic values and transformation and not a more hard power approach.

Sarkozy on the other hand has been counting on the EU as the mediator for cooperation. France’s position within the EU is more power full than in the UN, and if France together with the UK could have lead a NFZ, this would most likely have proved that Sarkozy is a strong and influential leader who does not always stand in the background of the UK/US partnership.

Germany on the other hand made a clear distinction on what they would support. Due to their military history they would not get involved in any kind of military action, but Westerwelle acknowledges that the UN is the only way for other countries to enforce a NFZ. But on the more soft power oriented actions Germany is still very forward by addressing Ashton in a letter together with Hauge. This shows that Germany has faith in the CFSP as an active institution promoting soft power. The neo-realists would explain this by the national interest being the highest priority. As Germany after two wars not has been considered as a military threat in the international society, it is not through military which Germany should seek power. The possible gain according to the theory would be to remain or improve the image in international policies, and Germans image is not related to the use of military force in the post war period. Hence the gain here would be to remain a soft power based nation.

#### No EU-led military intervention.

After the meeting of EU’s foreign ministers on the 10th of March German foreign minister Westerwelle said that a NFZ would be misinterpreted as a:”*Christian crusade against people of the Muslim faith*” (Tribune Business news, March 12). He furthermore stated that “*I don't think it's healthy when Europe talks about other countries, instead of with those countries*”. His French counterpart was less hesitant with the will to use military force, after the meeting Sarkozy stated “*It is not about installing a government in Libya, it is simply about having the means to protect the population if a massacre were to happen, imagine if (the rebel capital) Benghazi were to be bombed, for example*” (Tribune Business News, March 12). The Italian defence minister La Russa also made it clear that Italy was not interested in any military operation in Libya. At the meeting in Brussels La Russa said “*Any ground operation has been ruled out, it has not even been taken in to consideration and I don't consider it likely. The same applies to a bombing campaign*”, (Tribune Business News, March 10).

The conclusion taken by the European Council on how to deal with Libya was not within the remit of the High Representative anymore. Because of the highly important nature of the issue, the arena for decision-making became the European Council with the Heads of States, who took the centre stage and they did this because of heavy pressure from France. However the compromise was agreed on by the Heads of State and government and therefore can hardly be attributed to a leading role of Ashton. In the end the European Council conclusion reflected that the EU was internally blocked. For the further actions against Libya the EU (and consequently Ashton) was thus left on the side line, while France and UK allied with the US was aiming for a NFZ.

#### Aggressive French move

The National Transitional Council (NTC) is formed by the anti-governmental forces to act as the “political face of the revolution” on the 27th of February. It holds its first meeting on March 5 in Benghazi, which functions as headquarter and the capital of the newly formed opposition government. The NTC declares itself to be the sole representative of all Libya and of the Libyan people (Euronews).

The day before the important meeting with head of states in Brussels, Sarkozy met with leaders of the Libyan opposition in the evening, in what was the first high-level meeting between a foreign head of government and the TNC. The Libyan opposition was frustrated that NATO is still debating the imposition of a NFZ and that the leaders of Europe could not agree on an intervention (Tribune Business News, March 11).

As mentioned earlier Sarkozy and Cameron said in a letter to the President of the European Council on 10th of March, Hermann van Rompuy that they wanted action to be taken against Gaddafi's government, including an arms embargo, an expansion of the sanctions already in place: "*Colonel Gaddafi must go, his regime is illegitimate, what he is doing to his people is completely unacceptable*," Cameron told Al Jazeera ahead of the EU meeting. In the letter Sarkozy and Cameron expressed their concern for the Libyan people: *“We support the Libyan people’s desire to choose their own leadership and to decide their own political system (…)When the Libyan people win their fundamental rights, we should be ready to support them with the necessary assistance and cooperation, in order to promote stability and development in Libya, for the benefit of all Libyans*” (The Guardian, March 10).They also expressed their willingness to make military interventions, possibly through the UNSR: “*We support continued planning to be ready to provide support for all possible contingencies as the situation evolves on the basis of demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and firm regional support. This could include a no-fly zone or other options against air attacks, working with Allies and partners, especially those in the region. We are working together on elements of an appropriate UNSC resolution.*” (The Guardian, March 10).

Whilst Sarkozy has said that he would be willing to start the air strikes against Gadhafi’s forces, Cameron is more hesitant before the meeting and he is carefully mentioning the NFZ. Cameron and Sarkozy had ruled out the EU as a possible conciliator for the military intervention, but they are not considering the EU as an opportunity for the humanitarian aid either: “*We call upon the UN to evaluate and closely monitor the humanitarian situation in Libya, and to make proposals to ensure full access for humanitarian organisations and assistance to displaced people*” (The Guardian, March 10). Ashton has in a speech to the European Parliament two days earlier said that she was considering a humanitarian intervention through the CFSP, but evidently it is difficult when the member states do not have faith in the CFSP’s capabilities. Actually, Cameron and Sarkozy do not suggest that the EU takes any lead in the crisis, based on their letter to the Council’s President. This is also a weak signal to send to the other member states the day before the official meeting, and it seriously undertone the role of the CFSP.

This is another sign that the EU was only considered an important institution regarding sanctions. As Cameron and Sarkozy addresses Van Rompuy in this manner there is no room left to manoeuvre for the European Council. The distinction between EU’s role in military intervention and legal sanctions is now very clear; the CFSP is only functional in soft power.

Neo-realists would consider this letter and the statements as a clear power demonstration. Cameron and Sarkozy address Van Rompuy before the meeting which shows that their intentions are to show how powerful they are as leaders. They clearly want to set the mood before the meeting, and hence gain a powerful position within the EU. Also the gain of the image in the international society is important for the two leaders, they are making these statements before any other member states and they have both been very active in the respective policies towards Libya. The letter shows great motivation on the two gains formulated by neo-realists.

France is the first nation to recognize the TNC as the lawful government of Libya on the 10th of March. French President Sarkozy’s office makes the announcement, one day before the extraordinary meeting in the European Council (Tribune Business News, 10.03.2011). Some of the other member states found this announcement very inappropriate because they meant that it would prevent a possibility for a common EU strategy towards the TNC. Diplomats said that it was the intention for France to push the other member states in the same direction. However the European Council does not follow France and does not recognize the TNC as the sole representative of Libya, but they “*welcomes and encourages the interim transitional national council based in Benghazi, which it considers a political interlocutor*” (European Council 2).

Sarkozy did not succeed in convincing other member states to recognize the TNC as the sole legitimate representative of Libya. Their allied foreign secretary from UK Hague stated after the meeting; “*The TNC was legitimate people to talk to*", but added that "*we recognize states rather than groups within states*” (Financial Times, March 11)

This move by Sarkozy would be characterized by neo-realists as intention of power increase. Sarkozy does not try to provide legitimacy for the TNC via the EU, he does this solely. This could again be explained by his own intention of appearing as a strong leader, due to his failed foreign policy under the Tunisian crisis. This is a very aggressive move in the French foreign policy and neo-realists would argue that when it comes to foreign policy, the main goal is to stay in power, and to ensure the absolute gains. Here Sarkozy stands out as an energetic leader, and compared to the other EU heads of states he stand out as the action-oriented and dynamic leader. The gain fir Sarkozy can be seen in comparison with the joint effort between the US and the UK with whom he competes for power and ownership on the Libyan crisis.

#### No support from Germany

While Sarkozy is talking to Cameron about air strikes Mrs Merkel restricted herself to agree with the other member states that it was time for Gadhafi to step down. Germany was furthermore reluctant to recognize the NTC as the sole representative of Libya. The German foreign minister stated that; “*I would first like to know how the countries in the region and the Arab League see it before we in Europe once more form our own definitive opinion before everyone else”* This shows that Germany is not in a rush to show how powerful it can be in international relations. Germany acts more hesitant and is prepared for others to make these first steps towards the changes in Libya (Tribune Business News, March 11).

The theory would argue that the only gain for Germany I this situation is the image. Even though Germany is one of the most powerful member states in the EU, Merkel is hesitating and is not interested in making any statements. She is leaving it up to others, as the subjects concern military force, she is leaving Germany out of the centre, and aims at staying out of hard power based solutions.

#### Coherence about the UN

There was certain coherence between the member states that a military intervention would need a clear legal basis such as the UN-mandate. French foreign minister said that he would work on making progress in the protection of civilians: “*France will accelerate its efforts (to protect Libyan civilians), in the coming hours, in conversation with its partners in the EU, Arab League, United Nations Security Council and the Libyan transitional national council*” (Tribune Business News, march 13). Juppe does not get specific about the NFZ or a military intervention, but as the Arab League backed the French/British call for a NFZ he sees an opening for an agreement in the UNSC.

Also NATO general secretary Anders Fogh Rasmussen said after the meeting that NATO would not impose a NFZ with a strong legal basis (Financial Times, March 10), meaning that the NFZ should be approved by the UNSC. After Hillary Clinton said that the NFZ should be under the authority of the UN and not the US, there was no doubt left that the UNSC must make the sole decision on whether to impose the NFZ in Libya (Tribune Business News, March 11).

All actors agree that the UNSC would be the right mediator for a NFZ. Liberal institutionalism would argue that this is an illustration of sovereign states seeking to cooperation via institutions to reach a common goal. None of the actors has ever expressed a desire to enforce a NFZ on their own which shows that the states were willing to cooperate together. Not all states had the intentions of the enforcement of a NFZ, Germany and Italy was hesitating, but the UK, France and the US who were determined that a NFZ was the only option to stop the situation in Libya was leaning towards international institutions for a solution. This is a fine example of the liberal institutionalists approach as these originally powerful states were not considering military interference without supranational cooperation. As these three states has the same goal and intentions for Libya, Liberal institutionalism suggests that a possible gain from cooperation is legitimacy and all the involved actors need a legal base for imposing a NFZ, hence the UN has been the preferred choice.

Neo-realists on the other side would say that cooperation does only happen if the involved actors were to gain from the cooperation. Since the US was already involved in highly expensive wars, and Obama has made huge cuts in the military budget, the gain for the US is not that obvious. The US has a leading role in the NATO and in the UN, but is a military intervention in Libya worth the image of power for the US? The UK has also cut their military budgets after Cameron became prime minister, and the UK is also involved in Afghanistan and Iraq which has been highly unpopular among the citizens. So for Cameron the intention could be to show how powerful he can be working closely with the US and thus gain more respect from the other member states. Sarkozy was under more pressure from his own people. He was highly criticized for his lack of response towards the Tunisian crisis, that he might have been forced to show a more firm and aggressive foreign policy in the Libyan case, furthermore Sarkozy has an upcoming election in the spring of 2012.This gives Sarkozy a possible gain via the international cooperation on the NFZ, which gives him the chance to make up for the “mistake” on Tunisia and also give him an image of a dynamic leader short before the national presidential election. Neo-realism can thus explain why France to some point may be driven by the possible gains via international cooperation because of Sarkozy’s aggressive line in the recognition of the TNC, and the letter to Van Rompuy and Sarkozy was the first EU member state to close their embassy.

## No-fly Zone

The following days after the meeting between the EU head of states the situation in Libya changed to an overweight of momentum in favour of Gaddafi and pro Gaddafi forces began an assault on the main opposition base in Benghazi (Blanchard, 2011). This was “convenient” for British Prime Minister David Cameron as he together with Nicholas Sarkozy has been planning for military intervention and a NFZ. In a speech to the Parliament he said: "*Every day, Gadhafi is brutalizing his own people. Time is of the essence. There should be no let-up on the pressure we put on this regime, it is in our interest to see the growth of open societies and the building blocks of democracy in North Africa and the Middle East. A crushing of the Libyan uprising would send a "dreadful signal" to the legitimate aspirations of those involved and to "others striving for democracy across that region*” (Business Tribune News, March 14). By statements like this Cameron is trying to put pressure on the other member states to agree on the imposing of the NFZ. He also urged the UN to take leadership on the military intervention to make sure to get rid of the Libyan regime (Financial Times, March 16).

On March the 15th Alain Juppe invited the foreign ministers of the G8 to a crisis summit in Paris. But he did not succeed in convincing them to impose a NFZ over Libya. They agreed to immediately resume the discussions in the UN on increasing the pressure on Gadhafi through economic measures (Tribune Business News, March 15).

#### Italy supports No-fly zone

After the G8 meeting in Paris Italian foreign minister Frattini said that he was willing to support a common decision as long as it would provide a ceasefire: “*The only thing we would not want is a unilateral action outside the context of the Security Council and outside the regional context. The Arab League is an indispensable interlocutor; the African Union has proposed a mission of African Presidents to be sent to Libya to negotiate with Gaddafi; the council of Libyan tribes has made an appeal for internal reconciliation. Everything that might lead to a ceasefire will have our support, as long as it takes place in a multilateral framework*” (African Press Organization, March 16). Here Italy has finally chosen a more oncoming side and decided to back a military intervention, as long as there is an international institution to coordinate the NFZ. Italy has hesitating to act on their own, and has now realized that the most powerful states are heavily leaning towards a NFZ. For Italy not to lose their position within the international society, Frattini must show willingness to cooperate with the other states. Liberal insitutionalists would argue that the reason for Italy to hand over the decision to the UNSC is that an international authority would provide a better solution based on common decision making for the NFZ. The gain for Italy is economic and political stability in the area. The developments towards Gadhafi’s’ advantage could become a problem for Italy, as they had backed the sanctions and a NFZ is approaching, and Frattini must support his European partners in the aim of gaining legitimacy. Furthermore if Gadhafi were to succeed to eliminate the riots, Italy would have some explaining to do to Gadhafi.

#### Sarkozy’s initiative consolidate the NFZ

After the failed agreement on a NFZ at the G8 meeting in Paris, Sarkozy invited 22 head of states to Paris in the context of the UN. The participants were members of the EU, members of the Arab League, members of the African Union and members of the UN. Both the UK and France start to realise that the possibility for an airstrike over Libya is urgent. France and the UK being the two military powers willing to impose a NFZ has very limited options in terms of making an effort in holding Gadhafi’s forces back. The situation in Libya has turned and Gadhafi has gained momentum in huge areas in the riots districts. There is no doubt that French foreign minister Juppe would have liked to intervene in the developments in Libya, to a French radio station he said: *”If we had used military force last week to neutralise a number of air strips and a few dozen of their planes, perhaps the opposition's reversal of fortune wouldn't have happened”* (Financial Times, March 16).

During the meeting in Paris the French President and the British Prime minister succeeded in convincing the other participants to “take all necessary measures to protect civilians” which is another wording for military intervention. Mainly the Arab League was very forthcoming to the suggestion for a NFZ, and after the meeting Sarkozy wrote a letter sent to the head of state and government of the UN security council saying that: “*It is high time for the international community, through the Security Council, to come together to take the appropriate action in response to this situation and to respond to the Arab League's urgent call without delay*” (BBC Monitoring Europe, March 17).

On March 17 the UN Security Council gave permission to impose a “no-fly zone” over Libyan airspace. It also authorized military action to be taken for the protection of civilians from Gadhafi’s army in the UNSC Resolution 1973. The UN authorized member states to “*take all necessary measures to protect civilians (…) and tightened sanctions on the Gadhafi regime and its supporters*” (UNSC, 2011). Germany broke ranks with the EU and abstained in the vote to the UNSC resolution 1973. Germanys foreign minister said: *"We understand those who have decided out of honourable motives in favour of an international military intervention in Libya (…)However, after considering the risks, we reached the conclusion that we do not want to participate with German soldiers in a war, a military intervention, in Libya*” Tribune Business News, 18.03.2011). The resolution authorizing military intervention obtained 10 votes in favour. China, Brazil, India and Russia also abstained (Tribune Business News, 18.03.2011). Even though Germany abstained the resolution and Chancellor Merkel maintained that this was not a sign of neutrality: "*We share the goals of the U.N. resolution unreservedly (…) our abstention should not be confused with neutrality*" (Global Information Network, 19.03.2011). For Germany to make this decision it is very clear that the German military identity is still marked by its history. Through the whole period of time, Germany has diplomatically tried to put pressure under Libya via intergovernmental negotiations and sanctions. The intentions of Germany have thus never been of military character, and for the most powerful member state in the EU, is would seem impossible for the CFSP to coordinate an EU-based contribution.

Right after the UNSC resolution was a fact, Sarkozy held a meeting with his foreign minister and his defence minister and a spokesperson announced that France will of course be consistent with military intervention and that the strikes would take place soon (National Journal, March18). In terms of planning the strikes, David Cameron met with Sarkozy in Paris, but there were some disagreements between the two, as Cameron wanted NATO to play a leading role in the military intervention. Sarkozy on the other hand wanted an independent coalition to lead the operation, and none of them suggested a common force through the EU (Tribune Business News, March 19). The disagreements could be based on the assumption in the Arab world that the NATO was an American dominated organization and this might take focus more on the US’ role in several wars in other Muslim countries. But as Cameron has played along with Obama, it would be in Cameron interest to lead the operation through NATO, as the US and the UK historically form a strong partnership within the framework of NATO. This could in Sarkozy’s view demote France to a secondary role in the intervention. Sarkozy was of cause interested in playing a leading role, ads he had so far, which could be why he asked for an independent coalition to manage the NFZ. This is in accordance with the neo-realists thoughts that countries only cooperate in the aim of optimising their own power position. Neo-realists thus explain why Cameron and Sarkozy have different opinions on who should lead the mission, as this might affect their power position in the international society. The gains from cooperation are according to neo-realists to increase one’s power position, and this is exactly what the two leaders are trying to in this situation.

#### Final statements

A statement from the French president said that Gaddafi must stop all violence against his people or face military intervention. Later that day (March 18), Al Jazeera reported that Gaddafi’s forces was advancing quickly towards Benghazi

Italy's foreign minister, Franco Frattini, said the country will offer its military bases to those operating the no-fly zone over Libya and that Italy will take "an active role" in any operations against Gadhafi, according to the BBC. Italy will also close its embassy in Tripoli. After Frattini's remarks, Italy's defence minister, Ignazio La Russa, said Italy will only take part in a military coalition against Libya if the national parliament votes in favour (National Journal, March 18).

Also the EU backed the decision in the UNSC, in a statement HR Ashton and Van Rompuy said: “*We fully endorse the UN demand for a complete end to the violence and all attacks against, and abuses of civilians (…)The European Union is ready to implement this Resolution within its mandate and competences*” (PR Newswire, march 17).

The day after President Obama outlined demands to Gadhafi to end the violence and indicated that the US was prepared to interfere military as a part of a coalition to protect the lives of civilians and to enforce Resolution 1973 (Blanchard, 2011). On the 19th of March the military operation began lead by the US and a coalition of France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Greece, Denmark, Norway, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, and Canada.

After the UN meeting in Paris HR Ashton expressed: "*I think that if you've been at the meeting I was at in Paris on Saturday, what you have from that meeting is a communique signed up to by all countries present, including Germany*," she said. "*Different member states contribute in different ways. Today, with the EU, our role is to look at humanitarian, economic, political aspects and that is what we will be doing. There is unanimity about this*” (Radio Free Europe, March 21). This statement by Ashton is very interesting in terms of defining the EU’s role in Libya. There was no support from the member states to an EU-lead intervention, but the member states gave their full support for the humanitarian missions. The EU’s could have played several roles during this period of time, but as sole member states took initiatives round the EU it would have been difficult for Ashton to manage the CFSP.

After the enforcement of a NFZ, the cooperation between the actors has been based on their intentions in the policy process. Based on the above events, the actual gains of the actors from the cooperation on the NFZ are placed in the table 2.2 below.

Table 2.2

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | UK | France | Germany | Italy | EU |
| Intentions | Cameron to live up to Blair's aggressive foreign policy | Make up for failed policy on Tunisia | Projection of democracy and human rights | Desire stability in the area due to trade agreements and migration threat | Become the countries’ preferred mediator for international cooperation |
| Remain the power position in the global context | Improve Sarkozy’s image before national election | Increase power within EU | Remain loyal towards Gadhafi due to economic interests | Increase image as a determined coherent union |
| Stay loyal to the USA | Prove France as a powerful actor in the international society | Non-military strategy | Remain loyal to the EU in terms of credibility | Coordinate the different intentions into one united contribution |
| Actual gains | Image in international politics | Image in international politics | Image in international politics | Legitimacy |  |
| Power increase | Power increase | Legitimacy |  |  |
| Increase in capability | increase in capabilities |  |  |  |
| Legitimacy | Legitimacy |  |  |  |

In terms of military intervention all actors was expressing their desire for a legal base to manage the NFZ. And if we compare the preferences, all of the member states wanted the UN to be the legal base for cooperation on the military mission. France was at one point interested in leading the NFZ via an independent coalition, but because of Cameron insisting on using NATO’s capabilities, NATO became I charge of the NFZ on the mandate from the UNSC. This meant that all actors gain legitimacy from cooperation on the NFZ, and as this was wanted from every member states Liberal institutionalists would argue that cooperation on a common goal would secure relative gains for all participating countries; hence all actors gained legitimacy to enforce a NFZ.

Cameron’s intention for a close cooperation with the US was motivated by the possible gain of power and the image of the UK as Obama’s partner. Cameron improved his image, by showing willingness to enforce a NFZ, and he did prefer to cooperate with the US dominated bodies such as the UNSC and the NATO instead of his European partners. Furthermore he also tried to live up to Tony Blair’s very active foreign policy, even though Cameron has made cuts in the UK’s defence budget. Cameron also increased his power position within the EU. Together with Sarkozy he addressed the president of the European Council to coordinate future initiatives on the Libyan crisis and he was one of the first to announce that he was looking at options for military intervention in Libya. These reactions reflect the intention of taking the lead in the coordination and the possible gain of an increase in power was very attractive to Cameron as a relative new prime minister. The increase in capabilities was also a gain from an international cooperation on the NFZ. As Cameron already has made budgetary cuts he need military capable partners, hence he was leaning towards the US and NATO. Via a coordinated contribution, the capabilities is shared and enhanced for all the participating countries.

France was also aiming for a more powerful position in international politics and Sarkozy also took the lead in the coordination of a NFZ. At the same time as Cameron, Sarkozy was calling for a NFZ. Initially France was not leaving out the possibility for a French/UK led military coalition in Libya, but after Cameron’s desire to involve the UN and NATO, France also asked for a legal basis via the UNSC. As Sarkozy was the first actor to recognize the TNC and he tried to convince his European partners to do the same, he was taking the aggressive line as a leader, in the aim of increase his power position within the EU. He also addressed Van Rompuy in a letter together with Cameron, which shows great leadership and the intentions of increasing his power position. Neo-realists would argue that this offensive role is due to the gains of improving his image in the French voters view.

To improve his image as a powerful leader in the light of his failed foreign policy towards Tunisia, Sarkozy was being more offensive, and he was determined to be involved in every part of the military progress, and he tried to maximize his position with the suggestion of a coalition force, because this would give him the possibility to be in a leading position. Based on Sarkozy’s reactions he has showed much more determination and leadership compared to the reactions in Tunisia, which might have improved his image as a powerful leader.

Germany has shifted gear in the cooperation on a NFZ: Germany was interested in getting involved in a military action in Libya, and was after the imposition of sanctions playing a much more reserved role. The gain for Germany was to remain in the role of a soft power and has then no actual gains in getting involved in a military intervention. However Westerwelle did recognize that the other actors were leaning towards the solution and an enforcement of a NFZ was impending. Therefore he stated that should be a legal basis for such operation, and he was suggesting the UNSC. Germany abstained, which would by neo-realists be considered as a clear sign that there were no gains for Germany to join this international cooperation because of their image as a non-military actor.

Finally Italy was more consequent and backed the proposal for a NFZ. However Italy was only willing to cooperate if there was a broad consensus for a military intervention. This clearly shows Italy’s intention of remaining as loyal as possible to all involved parts due to economic and geopolitical interests. The gain for Italy in the situation of the NFZ was to find a legal basis to manage to coordination. In this manner Italy gained legitimacy for such foreign policy towards Libya and Italy managed to remain loyal to the other EU member states, but there was no pressure from Italy to coordinate such military operation.

Finally the EU’s role in the cooperation on a NFZ can be summed very briefly. There was no support for a EU-based mission in Libya even though Ashton suggested that the CFSP could lead a military evacuation mission. The member states was firmly determined to lead the cooperation via the UN, which shows that the faith in the EU’s CFSP was very little. Only when it came to further sanctioning and the more soft power based contributions the EU was considered by some of the member states. The enforcement of a NFZ did not involve the EU what so ever, and even though EU could have contributed with an eventual evacuation mission, there was no support from the member states.

Even though the member states clearly wanted a legal basis for the military mission, the UN seemed more attractive for the involved actors, which gives the EU no gains at all from the cooperation on a NFZ. Based on the neo-realistic theory the actor will only cooperate if there is a possible gain from the cooperation and in this case, the gains was more obtainable if the UNSC was functioning as the institutional framework. Liberal institutionalism would suggest that the cooperation via international institutions would lead to a better outcome, than if states were acting alone, and the actors in this case are more than willing to cooperate. The belief in the authority of the UNSC overshadowed the role of the EU in the view of the member states, hence liberal institutionalism finds a relative gain in cooperation via the UN.

# Conclusion

### Coherence

Due to very different national positions the four EU member states had different opinions on what role the EU should play in the course of events. Regarding the sanctions, both France and Germany was suggesting that the EU should play the mediator for common EU-based sanctions. Italy and the UK were more hesitant to impose sanctions, which slowed the process for the EU. It took one phone call from Obama for Cameron to actually suggest sanctions against Libya, but he wanted the UN to lead the way for imposing sanctions. Italy was still concerned with the migration situation, and did not take any initiative. The UN imposed sanctions on Libya on the 26th of February, after the US and before the EU.

As Sarkozy was the actor who suggested that the EU should cooperate on sanctions one could say that the coherence between the member states is rather small. The paradox is that Germany and the UK finds the UNSC a better arena for making these sanctions, even though they agree with France to make the sanctions. The problem is not the disagreement between the member states; it is that the member states have different views on the EU’s role. As German foreign minister Westerwelle clearly expressed: “*I found the European Union too reticent (…) The UN Security Council dealt with the issue earlier this week and was much more substantial and much clearer in its language, by the way”.* So does the incoherence explain why the EU CFSP was not taking into account when the sanctions should be imposed? Not in this case, the EU imposed sanctions the day after, but the interesting point is that the EU was not the obvious choice for two of the most powerful member states. It should be mentioned that the UK and France is permanent member of the UNSC and Germany is a current member, which could also explain why the UN would be a desirable mediator.

Looking at the enforcement on a NFZ, the incoherence of the four EU-member states was more obvious. Westerwelle was from the beginning making a clear statement that Germany was not interested in getting involved in any military action in Libya. Sarkozy was from the beginning urging the EU to take further measures and to discuss possible future options. After Cameron’s close cooperation with the US, he was officially planning on the enforcement of a NFZ, and he considered the UN as a legal basis for such initiative. Also France and Italy agreed that the UN would be the proper negotiator for such a resolution. Actually Ashton was the only one hoping for an EU-based mission, namely humanitarian as she expressed to the European Parliament. The incoherence between the member states was clearer in the question of military intervention and Germany would not back an EU-managed military mission, which evidently would affect the CFSP options on the use of military assets. But regarding the enforcement of a NFZ, the most willing countries were also leaning towards the UN as the mediator for such operation.

It is kind of misplaced to talk about incoherence within the EU on this issue, as member states were clearly stating that the UNSC should be the legal basis for a NFZ, and thus they all agreed that the EU should play no role in the military intervention, especially as Germany would never get involved. But yet again the member states and the US turned to an alternative international organisation to coordinate the NFZ. This can indicate that Liberal institutionalism plays a role in the cooperation between states even when it comes to security issues. If countries have the same goals they seek to create an institutional framework to pursue these goals which in this case has been the UNSC. All actors has at all points tried to cooperate both on the sanctions, and on the NFZ, which gives liberal institutionalism relevance in this case, as the actors believes that international cooperation via institutions would provide a better and stronger result. But some of the gains from cooperation could also be based on the neo-realistic approach for cooperation. The willingness to cooperate is based on the actors’ intentions and the possibility of gains via the cooperation.

### Intentions

As mentioned earlier, the member states make rational decisions based on the current situation. The different circumstances for the member states have obviously influenced the different point of views between the member states. The incoherence of the member states could be explained by the diverging intentions of the member states. Germany was very eager to impose sanctions on Libya as fast as possible. It became clear that the intentions behind the German strategy were to use soft power in a diplomatic manner to stop the violence in Libya. The intentions was never to interfere military because of Germans history, there has been a clear line not to get involved in any war because it is conflicting with the post-war German attitude.

The Intentions for the UK was in the beginning a little bit unclear as Cameron was hesitating to express his view on the sanctions. But after the phone call with Obama, he all of a sudden was very fund of imposing sanctions. What is not evident from the empirical data is whether Obama put forward the idea of a military intervention if the development in Libya continued. This could be an option, as Obama did not call Angela Merkel, because his was aware of the German attitude towards military actions, but also because of Cameron’s early announcement of the possibility of a military solution for Libya. This could very well mean the Cameron’s intention has been to take the lead together with Obama round the EU and through the UNSC, where he was a permanent member. He might have seen a better opportunity for a successful enforce of the NFZ via the UN compared to his European partners. Taken into account Tony Blair’s very close cooperation with the US in military actions, neo-realists would say the Cameron must remain in this powerful position, and then to partner up with the US gives Cameron the best chances to demonstrate that he also is a dynamic leader.

The intentions of Cameron can provide an answer to why the EU’s CFSP did not matter in this situation. The chances for the member states to agree on anything were slim, and then Cameron could risk looking less determined as a leader in a crisis situation.

French President Sarkozy had the same dilemma. He had to prove to his own people that he could take serious measures against Libya, which he completely failed to do with Tunisia. Furthermore he has an upcoming election; hence he must prove his worth as a leader in the international context. For Sarkozy to propose the EU as the mediator for common actions actually reflects his determination to act as a leader. By turning to his European partners he sends a signal that he does not want the US/UK alliance to be the dominant actors in the cooperation on sanctions. He is very offensive in his proposals, and he urges both the EU and the G8 and the UN to take measures.

On top of that he is the first to recognize the TNC as the sole representative for Libya, which could be considered a very firm attitude towards the changes in Libya and by this very forward move, he could have hoped that the other EU leaders would follow his strategy. For Sarkozy there was also a possibility to turn the power structure around, so that he possibly could lead the military intervention. He saw Obama’s hesitation about leading another operation in the Arab world, and turned this to his advantage by putting France in the leading position alongside with the British. Germany’s reluctance to enforce a NFZ at first irritated Sarkozy, but also handed him an opportunity to take the lead within the EU. This opportunity was very consistent with France's vision of its role in the international politics, where everyone does not always have to follow the US. This vision was also made clear when Cameron suggested that the NATO should lead the military operation. As mentioned earlier, NATO is considered by the rest of the world as a US lead organization which again would enhance the American contribution. This might be the reason for Sarkozy to propose an independent coalition to lead the NFZ as this would blur the operation as an UK/US alliance.

It has been more difficult to argue the intentions of Italy. Based on their actions during the period of time it seems like Italy had taken the role of a neutral player. Initially as the discussion on imposing sanction began Frattini and Berlusconi were most concerned about the migration flood and showed no willingness to either condemn the actions in Libya or to impose sanctions. Looking at the close ties between Berlusconi and Gadhafi appeared as Italy’s intention was leaning towards some degree of damage control. Italy had economic interest in Libya which easily could be dismissed if Italy took the same position in sanctioning as France and Germany. But as the pressure on Gadhafi increased there was no other choice for Italy than to back its European partners, so that Berlusconi would not lose face within the EU. He would probably have hoped for a more silent transition in the aim of remaining good friends with Gadhafi, but eventually he realised the way to remain reliable was to back the his European partners and their foreign policy.

### Gains

If we look at the actors’ intentions and the possible gains from cooperation on the Libyan crisis, France and the UK stand out as those who have gained the most based on the theories. Cameron was very hesitant in the beginning, but after his talk with Obama, he realised that there were opportunities to increase his power position in the EU, and furthermore boost his image as the relative new leader of the UK. Neo-realists see these two gains as important when considering working with other countries on the international level. For the UK to make the decisions on sanctioning Libya and later to get involved in the military intervention, the gains was relative central in Cameron’s preferences as he chose to cooperate very close with the US and give lower priority to the EU. Furthermore the gain of an increase in capability was also important in the decision to work with the US via the UN and NATO. These partners have more comprehensive means at their disposal, which make cooperation with these actors a gain in capabilities for Cameron. Based on the theory the gains for the UK are related to the neo-realistic approach, and the gains for the UK very well match the intentions for international cooperation in Cameron’s view.

Sarkozy was also prepared to gain more power and to improve his image as a leader. Neo-realists would argue that Sarkozy had a clear gain from an international cooperation, because he needed a strong boost of his image as a leader. Sarkozy has acted very offensive in his way towards military intervention, and neo-relists would say that his main goal was to prove how powerful he can be compared to the other actors. However the theoretical assumption about the international anarchy and the competition between states could be used in this case, as Sarkozy might consider the US/US alliance as competitors for power in international relations. It comes clear from the proposal on working via the EU on the sanctions and the suggestion for a united coalition on the military intervention that Sarkozy is aiming at increasing his power in the coordination within the EU. This way Sarkozy could possess a more powerful role than through a US/UK lead NATO operation. The actual gains for Sarkozy are an improved image for his role in leading the sanctions and his offensive attempt to pull the other member states in his direction.

The gains for Germany were initially based on the same desire for playing a leading role in the sanctions together with France. Germany was very determined to play the leading role which indicates that an obvious gain would be an increase of the power image within the EU. Germany has always played an important role in the European integration, and neo-realists would say that the gain for Germany was to remain in the powerful position. But when it came to the enforcement of the NFZ, Germany had no intention to continue the international cooperation. The gains for Germany were now limited and through the negotiation process Germany encouraged the involved actors to find a legal basis for the NFZ. Germany hence remained the image of a soft power, and had no intentions to get involved in a military operation.

The gains for Italy to cooperate were mainly based on Berlusconi’s relationship with Gadhafi and Italy’s economic interests in Libya. A gain on the one hand was to secure further cooperation with Libya hence Italy tried to ensure economic and political stability in Libya. But On the other hand, Italy could not ignore the other member states call for sanctions, so Italy turned to the second gain, legitimacy, to show loyalty to the European partners.

The common goal for the EU-member states was officially to secure human rights and democratic development in their neighbourhood, but some of the unsaid goals might also be economical stability and liberal structures, so the future oil-trade and export to Libya would be secured. As mentioned earlier trade with Libya plays an important role for the EU, which gives a good motive for securing stability in the area. As these questions are important for the European neighbourhood, why are the UN and NATO the most obvious institutions to address? Taking France’s and the UK’s position into account their intentions are mainly based on the neo-realistic approach for international cooperation. As these countries were playing the most distinguished role in the coordinated reaction to Libya, their intentions might have been the decisive factor. If we look at the EU’s role in the crisis, the intentions of the EU have been more dominated by liberal institutionalists’ thoughts of legitimacy, promotion of norms and values and political diplomacy. The EU could impose sanctions against Libya based on these intentions, bus as the intentions on military intervention takes character of a more neo-realistic approach, and the EU cannot match the possible gains. This could be a reason for choosing the UN as the appropriate mediator. Another factor which I have not included in my analysis could be the EU’s capabilities under CFSP.

As the member states are acting and forming their foreign policy based on their intentions and the possible gains, the coordinating of one common foreign policy becomes very difficult. The incoherence of the member states expectations and perception of the EU’s role in international relation has had big influence on the limited action taken by the HR on behalf of the EU. As the national politics plays an important role in the member states foreign policy it is very difficult to coordinate a common answer, as the possible gains from international cooperation vary from country to country.

Even though the ambitions for the common CFSP was to respond to international crises, conflicts prevention and evacuation operations which would have been useable for the Libyan crisis, the support from the member states was simply not there. The actors was driven by their intentions, and preferred to cooperate via the UNSC on the international response to Libya. Why the UN would seem more desirable for some of the actors has not been clarified in this paper. I will shortly suggest a possible variable for explaining why the EU was not the obvious choice for international cooperation namely capability.

### Capability

The capability of the EU compared to the UN and the NATO reveals huge differences. First of all the decisions making process in the UNSC is much more efficient than the one in the European Council when dealing with the CFSP. Both Ashton and Westerwelle have expressed the inefficacy of the EU’s foreign policy. Westerwelle preferred to make sanctions via the UN as the described the EU as “*too reticent”.* If the EU member states were to agree on any actions, the decisions must be made with unanimity. In the Security Council nine of the 15 member must vote for, and none of the five permanent members may veto (BBC, November 8). This makes the decisions making much smoother, and the international base is much broader. Regarding the sanctions, France tried to compromise with his EU allies in the aim of imposing sanctions against Libya on an EU-basis. The EU also agreed on making sanctions on Libya after the UNSC resolution 1970. Furthermore as Westerwelle in a letter with Hauge asked Ashton for further enforcement of the sanctions shows that Germany and the UK acknowledges the EU as a proper channel for such instruments. The EU’s CFSP has proved its capabilities of housing these soft power issues, and as long as the member states are willing to use the CFSP as a mediator for cooperation on soft power, the CFSP can manage the task. Ashton expressed it herself: “*Different member states contribute in different ways. Today, with the EU, our role is to look at humanitarian, economic, political aspects and that is what we will be doing. There is unanimity about this”.* This means that for the CFSP to create a coordinated answer to crisis such as the one in Libya there must be certain coherence between the member states.

The military capacity of the CFSP’s EEAS is another issue. There is no doubt that the EU does not possess the desired capability to manage a NFZ alone. But that being said the EU has lead military missions in Somalia, DR Congo and Kosovo, with success. But the capacity of EU’s crisis management has had shortfalls, and does not cover the proportions of a NFZ. But the EU was never meant to lead an autonomous military mission in Libya. Article 42 in the Lisbon Treaty stated that NATO should be the main base for its member states security and defence issue. The CFSP has not lived up to the Headline Goals 2010, and even though the NFZ never was an issue for the CFSP, the member states all agreed that the UNSC was the right institution for enforcing a NFZ. The eventual decision to led NATO lead the military action might also be based on the capability of NATO’s assets. France suggested that an allied coalition could lead the air strikes, but maybe for other reasons as mentioned above.

The capabilities for the CFSP actually fulfil the aim of providing soft power via diplomatic measures and the member states support the CFSP in this matter. The incoherence between the member states is not based on the EU’s capability but more driven by their original intentions and possible gains in international cooperation.

# Table of Contents

African Press Organization, February 22: ya **/ Tripoli must listen to Europe's appeal and stop the violence against civilians, says** Frattini**. The Minister is visiting Cairo today.**

[African Press Organisation. Database of Press Releases Related to Africa](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=130928&TS=1320076269&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Lausanne: [Feb 22, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=130928&pcid=58463251&SrchMode=3).

African Press Organization, March 16: **ocus-**Libya **/ G8 foreign ministers' appeal to the UN. "Ceasefire urgent", says** Frattini

[African Press Organisation. Database of Press Releases Related to Africa](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=130928&TS=1319561304&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Lausanne: [Mar 16, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=130928&pcid=59244531&SrchMode=3).

African Press Organization (2011): “Catherine Ashton**, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to address UN Human Rights Council, discuss** Libya **with international partners “**

[Database of Press Releases Related to Africa](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=130928&TS=1318612440&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Lausanne: [Feb 28, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=130928&pcid=58668051&SrchMode=3).

African Press Organization (2011): “**German Federal Minister** Westerwelle **welcomes naming of UN Special Envoy to** Libya”[, Database of Press Releases Related to Africa](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=130928&TS=1318604264&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Lausanne: [Mar 8, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=130928&pcid=58951581&SrchMode=3).

Barcelona declaration (1995), adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference - 27-28/11/95

BBC News, November 8: ”Security Council – Profile” November 2010 Last updated at 15:43 GMT viewed at 17/11 2011 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-11712448

BBC (2011): “**Plans for Islamist state behind** Libya **revolt - Italian Foreign Ministry "source"”** Anonymous. [BBC Monitoring European](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=58345&TS=1318611112&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). London: [Feb 21, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=58345&pcid=58441261&SrchMode=3).

BBC, March 2: Slovak premier calls for "unscheduled" EU summit on Libya, [BBC Monitoring European](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=58345&TS=1319470547&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). London: [Mar 2, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=58345&pcid=58739521&SrchMode=3).

**BBC Monitoring Europe, March 17: “French minister warns against overstating Libyan terror risk**”, [BBC Monitoring European](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=58345&TS=1319570258&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). London: [Mar 17, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=58345&pcid=59290831&SrchMode=3)

BBC Monitoring European, March 6: “Italy **hinges enforcement of** no fly zone **over** Libya **on international consensus”**, [BBC Monitoring European](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=58345&TS=1320157530&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). London: [Mar 6, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=58345&pcid=58902351&SrchMode=3).

Belmann, Reiner & Bellmann, Gunther (2001): “Germany and the use of military force: 'Total war', The culture of restraint', And the quest for normality, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt

Blanchard, Christopher M. (2011): “Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy”, Congressional Research Service March 29th

Brock, Stuart & Mares, Edwin (2007): “Realism and Anti-realism” Acumen, Durham, GBR, 03/2007

Bundeswehr, 2011: viewed at 18/11/11 http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/04\_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pPKUVL3UzLzixNSSqlS93MziYqCK1Dz9gmxHRQCQ45Pn/

Coppens, Dominic & Wouters, Jan (2005):”A Global Actor in the Making? Reforming the EU’s External

Relations Machinery with or without the Constitution” Working paper, K.U. Leuven faculty of Law

DW- World, December 28, 2010 “The Balkan Dilemma: Germany returns to military action”, viewed at <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,6309598,00.html>

Dunn, David Hastings (2011): UK–US Relations After the Three Bs – Blair, Brown and Bush,

Defense & Security Analysis, 27:1, 5-18

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/

Dunne, 2008: “Liberalism” in Baylis, John, Smith, Steve & Owens, Patricia “The Globalizatioin of world politics, Oxford University press, 2008.

EIU Viewswire, February 24 Europe/Libya politics: EU prepares sanctions against Qadhafi regime. [EIU ViewsWire](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=325&npc=6&pmid=65888&TS=1319469705&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). New York: [Feb 24, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=325&npc=6&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=65888&pcid=58566501&SrchMode=3).

Europa, November 18: viewed at http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index\_en.htm

European Commission, February 23: Statement by President Barroso following his meeting with Navi Pillay, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Speech/11/212), Brussels February 23 2011

European Council 1, 20 February 2011, “Declaration by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the European Union on events in Libya” (6795/1/11Presse 33)

European Council 2, 11 March 2011, “Declaration of the Extraordinary European Council”, EUCO 7/1/11 REV 1, Brussels 2 April 2011

European Council 3, March 23 2011, Council decision 2011/137/DFSP

European Council 4, November2009 “EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”

European Parliament, February 21: viewed at 31/10/2011 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/president/en/press/press_release/2011/2011-February/press_release-2011-February-28.html>

European Union External Action: Common Foreign and Security Policy, “Development of European Military Capabilities”, viewed at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1222506/110106%20updated%20factsheet%20capacites%20militaires%20-%20version%208_en.pdf>

European Union External Action, 2: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/references?lang=en

European Union External Action 3: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/completed-eu-operations/concordia.aspx?lang=en

Euronews viewed at 14.09.2011 <http://www.euronews.net/2011/08/29/libya-timeline-of-the-conflict/>

Euronews 2 viwed at 26.09.2011 <http://www.euronews.net/2011/02/04/eu-for-made-in-egypt-political-solution/>

Euronews 3 viewed at 07.10.2011 http://www.euronews.net/2011/03/18/how-international-reaction-to-libya-evolved/

European Commission 1 (2009), Concept Note Libya – Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme 2011-2013

Eurostep (2008): “The European External Action Service”, Briefing paper no. 41

Financial Times, february 23; “Sarkozy urges sanctions against Libya”

[Heba Saleh](javascript:void(0);). [FT.com](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=46708&TS=1319468525&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). London: [Feb 23, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=46708&pcid=58549481&SrchMode=3).

Financial Times, February 24: “EU gives nod to sanctions on Tripoli”, [Daniel Dombey](javascript:void(0);), [Stanley Pignal](javascript:void(0);), [Peter Spiegel](javascript:void(0);). [Financial Times](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=32326&TS=1319469322&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). London (UK): [Feb 24, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=32326&pcid=58565731&SrchMode=3). pg. 2

Financial Times, march 10: “Sarkozy takes risk on Libya”, [Peggy Hollinger](javascript:void(0);). [FT.com](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=46708&TS=1319471857&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). London: [Mar 10, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=46708&pcid=59084141&SrchMode=3).

Financial Times, march 16: 'Moment passed' for Libya intervention”, [James Blitz](javascript:void(0);), [Tobias Buck](javascript:void(0);), [Peggy Hollinger](javascript:void(0);). [Financial Times](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=32326&TS=1319458830&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). London (UK): [Mar 16, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=32326&pcid=59275311&SrchMode=3). pg. 1

Financial Times, March 1: Cameron **tones down** Libya **rhetoric** [George Parker](javascript:void(0);). [FT.com](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=46708&TS=1319720999&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). London: [Mar 1, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=46708&pcid=58748601&SrchMode=3).

Financial Times, March 16: Cameron **calls for 'leadership' on** Libya, [James Blitz](javascript:void(0);), [Alex Barker](javascript:void(0);). [FT.com](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=46708&TS=1319730300&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). London: [Mar 16, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=46708&pcid=59333991&SrchMode=3).

Foreign Policy Journal, March 28: “Semantics and the German “Nein” in Libya” by Franz-Stefan Gady,March 28, 2011, viewed at 18/11/11 http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/03/28/semantics-and-the-german-nein-in-libya/

Global Information Network (2011), “LIBYA**: BROAD GERMAN CONSENSUS AGAINST A 'RISKY WAR'**, [Julio Godoy](javascript:void(0);). New York: [Mar 19, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=52834&pcid=59468721&SrchMode=3).

Gordon, Philip H (1997):”Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy”, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter, 1997-1998)

Heyman, Sven (2011): “Germany’s new military doctrine of “national self-assertion””, viewed at 18/11/11 http://www.wsws.org/articles/2011/may2011/germ-m30.shtml

IISS (2011): “War in Libya: Europe’s confused response”, IISS Strategic comments, Volume 17 comment 18

Interview with Cameron, February 27: Prime Minister David Cameron a gave an interview on the situation in Libya on Sunday 27 February 2011, viwed at 27/10/2011 http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/transcript-of-the-pm%E2%80%99s-interview-on-libya/

Jervis, Robert (1999):”Realism, Neo-realism and Cooperation – Understanding the debate”, International Security 24:1, 1999

Joffé, George (2002), “European Multilateralism and Soft Power Projection in the Mediterranean”. Centr de Estudos Internacionais, Universidada de Cambridge

Koenig, Nicole (2001):” The EU and the Libyan Crisis: In Quest of Coherence?” Istituto Affari Internazionali, working paper 11

Lamy, Steven L (2008) “Comtemporary mainstream approaches: neo-realism and neo-liberalism” in Baylis, John, Smith, Steve & Owens, Patricia (2008): “The Globalization of World Politics”, Oxford University Press

Lindstrom, Gustav (2005): “The headline Goals”, Institutute for Security Studies, 2005. Viewed at http://catalogo.casd.difesa.it/GEIDEFile/05-gl.PDF?Archive=191967991914&File=05-gl\_PDF

Lisbon Treaty – The Treaty of the European Union

MENA report, February 24: **QATAR,UNITED KINGDOM :” Prime Minister welcomes Qatari gas deal”**, [MENA Report](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=50839&TS=1319709674&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). London: [Feb 24, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=50839&pcid=58570791&SrchMode=3).

Morgenthau, H.J. (1984): “Politics among Nations: The struggle for Power and Peace, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, “A foundational text for the discipline of International Relations.

**National Journal, March 18: LIVEBLOG: Obama Says Terms Of UN Resolution Not Negotiable, Qaddafi's Attacks Must Stop,** [Katy O'Donnell](javascript:void(0);), [Sara Sorcher](javascript:void(0);). [National Journal](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=17099&TS=1319553311&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Washington: [Mar 18, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=17099&pcid=59378021&SrchMode=3).

Nicoll, Alexander (2011): “War in Libya: Europe's confused response Receive Strategic”. IISS Strategic Comments - The International Institute For Strategic Studies

PR Newswire, February 23: **Declaration by High Representative Catherine** Ashton **on Behalf of the European Union on** Libya, [PR Newswire](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=11947&TS=1320151425&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). New York: [Feb 23, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=11947&pcid=58502601&SrchMode=3).

PR Newswire, March 17: “**Joint statement by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy and EU High Representative Catherine** Ashton **on UN Security Council resolution on** Libya”,[PR Newswire](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=11947&TS=1320161771&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). New York: [Mar 17, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=11947&pcid=59280131&SrchMode=3).

Radio Free Europe, February 25: “**International Community Seeks Response To** Libya”, [Radio Free Europe Documents and Publications](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=130128&TS=1320152836&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Lanham: [Feb 25, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=130128&pcid=58594961&SrchMode=3).

Radio Free Europe, March 9: “**Qaddafi Dismisses** Libya's **'Traitors' As EU Mulls Military Humanitarian Mission”,** [Radio Free Europe Documents and Publications](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=130128&TS=1320155334&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Lanham: [Mar 9, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=130128&pcid=59022831&SrchMode=3).

Radio Free Europe, March 21: viewed at 27/10/2011 <http://www.rferl.org/content/eu_libya_germany_dissent_nato/2345500.html>

Reuters, 2011: ” Berlusconi under fire for not "disturbing" Gaddafi”, viewed at 07/10 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/20/us-italy-libya-berlusconi-idUSTRE71J1LH20110220>

Rossi, Rosa & PANEBIANCO, Stefania, (2004): ” EU attempts to export norms of good governance to the Mediterranean and Western Balkan countries”. Jean Monnet Centre EuroMed Department of Political Studies - University of Catania, October 2004

Schmidt, Brian C & Dunne, Tim “Realism” in Baylis, John, Steve, Smith & Owens, Patricia ”The Globalization of World Politics”, Oxford university press, fourth edition 2008.

Seeberg, Per (2011): “Det arabiske oprør og den Europæiske Pragmatik” analyse for Center for Mellemøststudier

Seidelmann, Reimund (2002): ”Problems and Prospects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP): A German View” European Studies, Vol.1, 2002

Sion, Maya (2004): ” The Politics of Opt-Out in the European Union: Voluntary or Involuntary Defection?” In Thinking Together, Proceedings of the IWM Junior Fellows’ Conference, Winter 2003, ed. A. Cashin

and J. Jirsa, Vienna: IWM Junior Visiting Fellows’ Conferences, Vol. 16.

The Economist March 5: France's foreign-policy woes: “ Nicolas Sarkozy's diplomatic troubles” France dumps its foreign minister, Germany its defence minister—and all of Europe frets over its place in the world

Mar 3rd 2011 | PARIS |

The Economist, March 5: **Europe: “Nicolas** Sarkozy's **diplomatic troubles; France's foreign-policy woes**” [The Economist](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=28390&TS=1321541924&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). London: [Mar 5, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=28390&pcid=58936541&SrchMode=3). Vol. 398, Iss. 8723; pg. 57

The Economist, March 20: “**The welcome return of French diplomacy; France's role in Libya”,** [The Economist (Online)](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=138428&TS=1319559616&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). London: [Mar 20, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=138428&pcid=59449251&SrchMode=3).

TEU – Treaty of European Union, Lisbon (2008)

The Guardian, 24. January 2011: Sarkozy admits France made mistakes over Tunisia, [Angelique Chrisafis](http://www.guardian.co.uk/profile/angeliquechrisafis) in Paris [guardian.co.uk](http://www.guardian.co.uk), Monday 24 January 2011 16.18 GMT, viewed at 18/11/2011 on

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/24/nicolas-sarkozy-tunisia-protests

The Guardian, March 10: Letter from David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy to Herman Van Rompuy

Thursday 10 March 2011 21.06 GMT

The Guardian March 22: “Is Nicolas Sarkozy's re-election campaign setting pace of Libyan action?” [Nicholas Watt](http://www.guardian.co.uk/profile/nicholaswatt) Tuesday 22 March 2011 13.02 [guardian.co.uk](http://www.guardian.co.uk/) , [Article history](http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/wintour-and-watt/2011/mar/22/nicolas-sarkozy-davidcameron#history-link-box)

The Guardian, March 24: Germans voice disquiet over absence from Libya military action [Helen Pidd](http://www.guardian.co.uk/profile/helenpidd) in Berlin, [guardian.co.uk](http://www.guardian.co.uk), Thursday 24 March 2011 17.22 GMT

The Local, March 20: “Majority supports military action in Libya”, viewed at 18/11/11 http://www.thelocal.de/national/20110320-33839.html

The White House Blog (2011): “President Obama Speaks on the Turmoil in Libya: "This Violence Must Stop"”, viewd at 7/10: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/02/23/president-obama-speaksturmoil-

libya-violence-must-stop.

Tribune Business News, February 23: **ROUNDUP:** Cameron **promises "everything" to evacuate Britons in** Liby, Anonymous. [McClatchy - Tribune Business News](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=42957&TS=1319708872&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Washington: [Feb 23, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=42957&pcid=58488211&SrchMode=3).

Tribute Business news (2011): “**ROUNDUP: France puts diplomatic relations with Libya on ice”** [Ralf Krueger](javascript:void(0);). [McClatchy - Tribune Business News](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=42957&TS=1318593906&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Washington: [Feb 26, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=42957&pcid=58603671&SrchMode=3).

Tribune Business News, February 27: Ashton**: EU to impose** Libya **sanctions "as a matter of urgency"**, [Ben Nimmo](javascript:void(0);). [McClatchy - Tribune Business News](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=42957&TS=1320154046&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Washington: [Feb 27, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=42957&pcid=58611791&SrchMode=3).

Tribune Business News, march 4: **EU summit to discuss "overcoming"** Libya **conflict, long-term aid Eds: EU emergency summit on** Libya **to be held on March 11**, [Ben Nimmo](javascript:void(0);). [McClatchy - Tribune Business News](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=42957&TS=1320062968&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Washington: [Mar 4, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=42957&pcid=58798521&SrchMode=3).

Tribune Business News, march 7: **BRIEF:** Germany **welcomes nomination of UN special envoy to** Libya, [Helen Maguire](javascript:void(0);). [McClatchy - Tribune Business News](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=42957&TS=1320158381&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Washington: [Mar 7, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=42957&pcid=58915361&SrchMode=3).

Tribune Business News, March 8: **Heavy violence in** Libya **as calls grow for a no-fly zone Eds: Adds Obama's call with** Cameron, [Yasmin El-Rifae](javascript:void(0);). [McClatchy - Tribune Business News](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=42957&TS=1319724281&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Washington: [Mar 8, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=42957&pcid=58943821&SrchMode=3).

Tribune Business News (2011): “**EU mulling humanitarian military mission to** Libya **Eds: Adds Ashton quotes, news of trip to Cairo in graf 10, corrects EU acronym in grafs 2 and 6: CSDP sted of CFSP”**, [Alvise Armellini](javascript:void(0);). [McClatchy - Tribune Business News](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=42957&TS=1318613312&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Washington: [Mar 9, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=42957&pcid=58982921&SrchMode=3).

Tribune Business News, March 9: **German officials sceptical on** Libya **no-fly zone**, [Michael Fischer](javascript:void(0);), [Carsten Hoefer](javascript:void(0);). [McClatchy - Tribune Business News](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=42957&TS=1319732071&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Washington: [Mar 9, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=42957&pcid=58982921&SrchMode=3).

Tribune Business News, March 10: **Britain and** Germany **urge united EU response to** Libya **crisis**, [Anna Tomforde](javascript:void(0);). [McClatchy - Tribune Business News](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=42957&TS=1319732459&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Washington: [Mar 10, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=42957&pcid=59000181&SrchMode=3).

Tribune Business News, February 23; France calls for EU sanctions on Libya, [Ulrike Koltermann](javascript:void(0);), [Clare Byrne](javascript:void(0);). [McClatchy - Tribune Business News](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=42957&TS=1319468238&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Washington: [Feb 23, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=42957&pcid=58488211&SrchMode=3).

Tribune Business News, March 10: Libya: Italy denies it has plans to intervene militarily, Anonymous. [McClatchy - Tribune Business News](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=42957&TS=1319471159&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Washington: [Mar 10, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=42957&pcid=59000181&SrchMode=3).

Tribune Business News, March 11: “EU nations split over Libya action”, Anonymous. [McClatchy - Tribune Business News](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=42957&TS=1319473201&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Washington: [Mar 11, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=42957&pcid=59040291&SrchMode=3).

Tribune Business News, March 13 : France to "accelerate" on Libya crisis after Arabs back no-fly zone, [Clare Byrne](javascript:void(0);). [McClatchy - Tribune Business News](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=42957&TS=1319456155&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Washington: [Mar 13, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=42957&pcid=59140891&SrchMode=3).

Tribune Business News, March 15: France: G8 ministers "not yet convinced" on Libya intervention, [Clare Byrne](javascript:void(0);). [McClatchy - Tribune Business News](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=42957&TS=1319457827&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Washington: [Mar 15, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=42957&pcid=59195581&SrchMode=3).

Tribute Business News (2011): “**Britain and Germany urge united EU response to Libya crisis”**, [Anna Tomforde](javascript:void(0);). [McClatchy - Tribune Business News](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=42957&TS=1318608309&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Washington: [Mar 10, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=42957&pcid=59000181&SrchMode=3)

Tribune Business News, March 11: **EU nations split over** Libya **action**, Anonymous. [McClatchy - Tribune Business News](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=42957&TS=1319539134&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Washington: [Mar 11, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=42957&pcid=59040291&SrchMode=3).

Tribune Business News, March 15: Libya**: Gaddafi says he is 'shocked' by Europe, especially** Berlusconi, Anonymous. [McClatchy - Tribune Business News](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=42957&TS=1319560690&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Washington: [Mar 15, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=42957&pcid=59195581&SrchMode=3).

Tribune Business News, march 19: **BRIEF: EXTRA: Sarkozy, Cameron meet ahead of Libya summit**, [Ulrike Koltermann](javascript:void(0);). [McClatchy - Tribune Business News](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=42957&TS=1319558366&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Washington: [Mar 19, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=42957&pcid=59343351&SrchMode=3).

Tribute Business News (2011): “**Germany does not want to go to war in** Libya**, minister says”** [Marc-Oliver von Riegen](javascript:void(0);). [McClatchy - Tribune Business News](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=42957&TS=1318600923&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Washington: [Mar 18, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=42957&pcid=59306791&SrchMode=3).

Van Suwege, Peter (2010): “EU EXTERNAL ACTION AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE PILLAR

STRUCTURE: IN SEARCH OF A NEW BALANCE BETWEEN DELIMITATION AND CONSISTENCY”, Eoxmtemronn aMla arkcetti Loanw Review 47: 987–1019, 2010. Kluwer Law International. Printed in the United Kingdom.

Vogel, Toby (2011): “EU opens office in Bengahzi”, Europe Vioce, May 23

Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2010: “Cameron's Defense Cuts Reveal a U.K. Preparing to Do Less With Less”, Wall Street Journal (Online). New York Oct 20,2010

Wall Street Journal, February 28: **Cameron Doesn't Rule Out Military Force for Libya**

[Wall Street Journal (Online)](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=117310&TS=1319717175&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). New York, N.Y.: [Feb 28, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=117310&pcid=58660481&SrchMode=3)

Wall Street Journal, March 15: **Gadhafi Urges Rebels to Surrender**, [Wall Street Journal (Online)](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=117310&TS=1319550179&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). New York, N.Y.: [Mar 15, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=117310&pcid=59208031&SrchMode=3).

Wall Street Journal, March 19: **World News: Europe Pressure, Arab Support Helped Turn U.S.**, [Adam Entous](javascript:void(0);), [Jay Solomon](javascript:void(0);), [Alistair MacDonald](javascript:void(0);). [Wall Street Journal](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=7510&TS=1319556090&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). (Eastern edition). New York, N.Y.: [Mar 19, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=7510&pcid=59364401&SrchMode=3). pg. A.5

Wall Street Journal, February 23: France, Germany Call for Libya Sanctions, [Wall Street Journal (Online)](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=117310&TS=1319463359&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). New York, N.Y.: [Feb 23, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=117310&pcid=58499151&SrchMode=3)

White House Briefing: Obama Will Discuss Libya with Cameron, Sarkozy,[Rebecca Kaplan](javascript:void(0);). [National Journal](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=17099&TS=1319469038&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). Washington: [Feb 24, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=17099&pcid=58603321&SrchMode=3).

Westerwelle (2011): “**German FM finds EU "too reticent" to take action over** Libya”, Anonymous. [BBC Monitoring European](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=58345&TS=1318602054&clientId=11561&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD). London: [Feb 25, 2011](http://proquest.umi.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=58345&pcid=58574161&SrchMode=3).

Wind, Marlene (2011): “Debat: HASTETOPMØDE: Urolighederne i Libyen er lakmusprøven for EU's udenrigspolitik”, Published in Politiken on the 11th of march 2011

UK Ministry of Defence, viewed at 07/10: http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/UkfranceDefenceCooperationTreatyAnnounced.htm

UNSC, Resolution 1973, 17th march 2011. Security Council Press Statement on Libya, February 22: viewed at 01/11/02011 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10180.doc.htm

Zafar, Shaista Shaheen (2010): “EU-Libya Relations”, Journal of European Studies 2010