What's the problem represented to be? A policy analysis of Cameroon's National Anti-corruption Strategy 2010-2015 on corruption related to the Local Council public procurement process.
Author
Atungsiri, Que Beltus
Term
4. term
Publication year
2019
Submitted on
2019-05-31
Pages
67
Abstract
This thesis examines how Cameroon’s National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2010–2015 (NACS) represents corruption in Local Council public procurement, a frontline arena where citizens encounter public services and corruption risks are high. Using Carol Bacchi’s “What’s the Problem Represented to be?” (WPR) approach as a qualitative policy analysis framework, and informed by principal–agent and collective action theories, the study explores how the problem is defined, the assumptions underpinning that definition, what is left unaddressed, and the effects of this framing. The analysis identifies five main problem representations in NACS: ineffective accountability systems, cumbersome procurement procedures, vulnerability of Local Council staff, impunity among contracting and supervisory authorities, and limited awareness of procurement rules among actors. The strategy largely reflects a principal–agent orientation and overlooks key anti-corruption techniques such as access to information, public participation, institutional strengthening, and political will. The thesis concludes that strong political commitment and a well-organized civil society are essential to disrupt systemic corruption and make local procurement reforms effective.
Denne afhandling undersøger, hvordan Camerouns Nationale Antikorruptionsstrategi 2010–2015 (NACS) fremstiller korruption i de lokale råds offentlige indkøb, et område hvor borgere møder offentlige ydelser og derfor en særlig risikozone for uregelmæssigheder. Med udgangspunkt i Carol Bacchis WPR-tilgang (What’s the Problem Represented to be?) gennemfører studiet en kvalitativ policyanalyse, suppleret af principal-agent- og kollektiv-handlingsteorierne, for at afdække, hvordan problemet defineres, hvilke antagelser der ligger bag, hvad der udelades, og hvilke effekter repræsentationen kan have. Analysen identificerer fem centrale problemfremstillinger i NACS: ineffektive ansvarlighedssystemer, tunge og komplekse udbudsprocedurer, sårbarhed blandt personale i lokalråd, straffrihed for kontraherende og tilsynsførende myndigheder samt manglende kendskab blandt aktører til reglerne for lokale udbud. Strategien er i høj grad inspireret af et principal-agent-perspektiv og overser vigtige antikorruptionsteknikker som adgang til information, offentlig deltagelse, styrkelse af institutioner og politisk vilje. Afhandlingen konkluderer, at en stærk politisk vilje og et robust, velorganiseret civilsamfund er afgørende for at bryde den systemiske korruption og gøre indkøbsreformer på lokalt niveau virkningsfulde.
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