The Russian Military Intervention in Ukraine: A Theoretical Discussion on the Ukrainian Crisis

Den russiske militære intervention i Ukraine: En Teoretisk Diskussion af den Ukraineske Krise

Jensen, Daniel

4. term

European Studies, Master

2018

43

The 2014 crisis in Ukraine escalated from a domestic political dispute to an international confrontation marked by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and fighting in Donbass, followed by Western sanctions. This thesis examines why Russia chose to intervene militarily in Ukraine by comparing realist and liberal perspectives. It draws on John Mearsheimer’s realist account and Michael McFaul’s liberal account, translating them into two hypotheses tested against historical events, speeches, and trends in Russia–West relations, including NATO enlargements in 1999, 2004, and 2009, Russian objections, the transition from Yeltsin to Putin, the Russo–Georgian war, the “reset” policy, and the 2011 parliamentary election. The analysis indicates that multiple post–Cold War developments set a confrontational course: Western use of international institutions to promote security and democracy was perceived in Moscow as expanding influence; cooperation tended to occur when both sides made concessions, but Russia adopted a zero-sum approach when its strategic objectives or security seemed threatened; and continued EU/NATO expansion despite Russian protests intensified tensions. The thesis concludes that Russia intervened because it deemed it unacceptable for a strategically vital neighbor like Ukraine to move into the Western orbit, and it acted to retain control over Ukraine’s trajectory.

Krisen i Ukraine i 2014 udviklede sig fra en intern politisk konflikt til en international krise med Ruslands annektering af Krim og kamp i Donbass, efterfulgt af vestlige sanktioner. Denne afhandling undersøger, hvorfor Rusland valgte at intervenere militært i Ukraine, ved at sammenligne realistiske og liberale perspektiver. Udgangspunktet er John Mearsheimers realistiske analyse og Michael McFauls liberale analyse, som omsættes til to hypoteser, der testes mod historiske begivenheder, taler og udviklingen i forholdet mellem Rusland og Vesten, herunder NATO-udvidelserne i 1999, 2004 og 2009, russiske indvendinger, overgangen fra Jeltsin til Putin, krigen i Georgien, “reset”-politikken og parlamentsvalget i 2011. Analysen peger på, at en række udviklinger siden den kolde krig har skabt en konfrontationskurs: Vestens brug af internationale institutioner til at fremme sikkerhed og demokrati blev i Moskva opfattet som indflydelsesudvidelse; samarbejdet mellem parterne fungerede primært, når der var vilje til indrømmelser, men Rusland skiftede til en nulsumstilgang, når dets strategiske mål eller sikkerhed syntes truet; og fortsatte EU/NATO-udvidelser trods russiske protester forstærkede spændingerne. Afhandlingen konkluderer, at Rusland intervenerede, fordi det var uacceptabelt for Kreml at se en strategisk vigtig nabo som Ukraine bevæge sig ind i Vestens orbit, og at interventionen skulle sikre, at Rusland bevarede kontrol over udviklingen i Ukraine.

[This apstract has been generated with the help of AI directly from the project full text]

Rusland ; Ukraine ; Krise ; Intervention

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