The EU's asylum policy: A matter of national interests?: - A perspective from the European Parliament
Authors
Rosendahl, Maria Bernhardson ; Povlsen, Jane Slot
Term
4. term
Education
Publication year
2018
Submitted on
2018-04-02
Pages
70
Abstract
I 2015 oplevede EU et uset antal ankomster af flygtninge og migranter siden Anden Verdenskrig. Som svar foreslog EU et akut omfordelingssystem for at lette presset på de mest berørte lande, især Italien og Grækenland. Målet var at omfordele 160.000 asylansøgere, men da ordningen udløb i september 2017, var under 20% blevet flyttet. EU har siden forsøgt uden held at etablere en permanent ordning til brug i krisetider. Dette speciale undersøger, hvorfor EU ikke lykkedes med at oprette en effektiv og varig mekanisme til at dele ansvaret for asylansøgere. Analysen bygger på interviews med seks medlemmer af Europa-Parlamentet fra LIBE-udvalget (udvalget for borgerrettigheder, retlige og indre anliggender) og på teorien om liberal intergovernmentalisme, som ser på, hvordan medlemsstaternes interesser former EU’s beslutninger. Med udgangspunkt i teorien udvikles tre hypoteser—to på nationalt niveau og én på EU-niveau. Casene Tyskland og Ungarn viser en markant splittelse: Angela Merkel åbnede Tysklands grænser og arbejdede for en fælles EU-løsning, mens Viktor Orbán afviste permanente kvoter og nægtede at deltage i den akutte omfordelingsordning, blandt andet af modvilje mod at afgive suverænitet til EU. Interviewene og analysen peger på, at begge landes linjer afspejlede nationale interesser og indenrigspolitik. I Tyskland vurderes regeringen at have langsigtede økonomiske grunde til at modtage asylansøgere. I Ungarn fremstillede regeringen flygtninge som en trussel og prioriterede at holde dem ude. Begge regeringers handlinger synes at have understøttet deres valgpolitiske interesser, i tråd med liberal intergovernmentalisme. Den samme skillelinje ses bredere: Portugal, Tyskland og Sverige har generelt været mere åbne over for indvandring, mens Ungarn og de øvrige Visegrád-lande har afvist omfordeling med henvisning til suverænitet og kontrol. Modstridende nationale præferencer og manglende fælles fodslag har dermed hæmmet etableringen af en effektiv omfordelingsmekanisme.
In 2015, the EU saw an unprecedented number of refugee and migrant arrivals since World War II. In response, it proposed an emergency relocation mechanism to ease pressure on the most affected countries, especially Italy and Greece. The goal was to relocate 160,000 asylum seekers, but by the scheme’s expiry in September 2017, fewer than 20% had been moved. Subsequent attempts to create a permanent mechanism for crises have also failed. This thesis examines why the EU did not succeed in setting up an effective, lasting system to share responsibility for asylum seekers. It combines interviews with six Members of the European Parliament from the LIBE Committee (on civil liberties, justice and home affairs) with the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, which focuses on how national governments’ interests shape EU outcomes. Based on the theory, three hypotheses were developed—two at the national level and one at the EU level. The cases of Germany and Hungary reveal a sharp divide: Angela Merkel opened Germany’s borders and pushed for an EU-wide solution, while Viktor Orbán rejected permanent quotas and refused to take part in the emergency relocation mechanism, citing reluctance to transfer sovereignty to the EU. The interviews and analysis suggest that both positions reflected national interests and domestic politics. In Germany, the government is seen as having long-term economic reasons to accept asylum seekers. In Hungary, the government portrayed refugees as a threat and prioritized keeping them out. In both cases, the actions aligned with electoral incentives, consistent with liberal intergovernmentalism. This split also appears more broadly: Portugal, Germany, and Sweden have been relatively open to immigration, whereas Hungary and the other Visegrád countries opposed relocations due to sovereignty and control concerns. Conflicting national preferences and a lack of convergence made it difficult to agree on an effective relocation mechanism.
[This abstract was generated with the help of AI]
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