The Dublin Regulation: Analysis of the Dublin System, Analysis of the Dublin System, perceived to cause a disproportionate burden to the expense of the external border countries of the EU and the reason for its continuous implementation despite persisting criticism
Author
Suy, Laura Helena Rose Mary
Term
4. term
Education
Publication year
2014
Submitted on
2014-09-30
Pages
102
Abstract
På tværs af EU er fælles handling på asylområdet nødvendig for at beskytte mennesker på flugt, værne om national sikkerhed og holde den frie bevægelighed velfungerende. Dublin-forordningen er EU’s hovedregel for at afgøre, hvilket medlemsland der har ansvaret for at behandle en asylansøgning. Dens kerne er første-indrejse-princippet: Det første EU-land, en asylansøger rejser ind i, har som udgangspunkt ansvaret for sagen. Forordningen skal sikre fair adgang til asylproceduren og forhindre, at der søges i flere lande på én gang. Dublin er imidlertid kontroversiel. Den lever ofte ikke op til sine mål og lægger en uforholdsmæssig stor byrde på stater ved EU’s ydre grænser. Lande som Grækenland og Bulgarien har fået deres asylsystemer overbelastet, hvilket øger risikoen for refoulement, altså tilbagesendelse til steder, hvor mennesker kan være i fare. Specialet undersøger, om Dublin skaber en skæv byrdefordeling på grænselandenes bekostning, og forklarer, hvorfor stater, der stilles dårligere af ordningen, alligevel har accepteret den. Analysen bygger på et bredt teoretisk udgangspunkt—neofunktionalisme (integrationens dynamikker), liberal intergovernmentalisme (staters forhandlinger og interesser) og konstruktivisme (idéers og normers betydning)—for at belyse, hvordan Dublin blev forhandlet på plads, hvilken kontekst det skete i, og hvorfor alternativer er blevet fravalgt. Resultaterne peger på, at Dublin-forordningen er grundlæggende mangelfuld, fordi byrdefordeling aldrig blev klart defineret eller gjort til en gennemgående del af EU’s flygtningebeskyttelse. Et fordelingssystem var nødvendigt, men ordningen er fortsat trods sine mangler, formentlig fordi nogle medlemsstater med stærkere forhandlingskraft er mindre negativt påvirket af fordelingseffekterne.
Across the European Union, countries need to act together on asylum to protect people fleeing persecution, safeguard national security, and keep free movement working. The Dublin Regulation is the EU’s main rule for deciding which member state is responsible for examining an asylum claim. Its core feature is the first-entry rule: the first EU country an asylum seeker enters is usually responsible for handling the claim. The regulation aims to ensure fair access to asylum procedures and to prevent people from applying in several countries at once. However, Dublin is controversial. It often fails to meet its goals and places a disproportionate burden on states at the EU’s external borders. Countries such as Greece and Bulgaria have seen their asylum systems overwhelmed, increasing the risk of refoulement, meaning people are sent back to places where they may face harm. This thesis examines whether Dublin creates uneven burden-sharing at the expense of border states and explains why states disadvantaged by the system nevertheless accepted it. It uses a broad theoretical lens—neofunctionalism (how integration dynamics push cooperation), liberal intergovernmentalism (how governments bargain to protect national interests), and constructivism (how ideas and norms shape policy)—to analyze how Dublin was negotiated, the context in which it was adopted, and why alternatives have been set aside. The findings suggest that Dublin is fundamentally flawed because burden-sharing was never clearly defined or embedded as a consistent part of the EU’s refugee protection regime. A distribution mechanism was needed, but the system has persisted despite its shortcomings, likely because some member states with stronger bargaining power are less negatively affected by Dublin’s allocation effects.
[This abstract was generated with the help of AI]
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