The Competition and Cooperation of China, the US and the EU in the Realm of Global Climate Governance
Author
Tang, Sangyuan
Term
2. Term (Master)
Education
Publication year
2017
Submitted on
2017-05-15
Pages
59
Abstract
Denne afhandling undersøger, hvordan Kina, USA og EU påvirker global klimastyring gennem deres nationale og regionale politikker og deres positioner i internationale klimaforhandlinger. Den bruger idéer fra international politik og spilteori til at forklare, hvorfor de både samarbejder og konkurrerer. Det neorealistiske begreb “relative gevinster” beskriver, hvordan hver aktør forsøger at klare sig bedre end de andre, hvilket kan skabe spændinger. To enkle spilmodeller—Fangernes Dilemma og Hjortejagten—illustrerer incitamenter til enten at snylte eller at samarbejde. International politisk økonomi og neoliberal institutionalisme giver redskaber til at vurdere, hvornår samarbejde gennem institutioner er muligt. Analysen viser, at Kina, USA og EU befinder sig på forskellige udviklingsstadier, har forskellige politiske systemer og kulturelle syn, og har særskilte økonomiske og politiske interesser. Disse forskelle driver konkurrence, samtidig med at de samarbejder om afbødning (at reducere udledningen af drivhusgasser) og tilpasning (at forberede sig på klimaændringers konsekvenser). Deres relation inden for klimastyring er derfor både samarbejdende, konkurrerende og dynamisk. Denne blanding påvirker effektiviteten af implementeringen af mekanismer under FN’s rammekonvention om klimaændringer (UNFCCC) og i sidste ende de globale resultater for reduktion af drivhusgasser. Afhandlingen konkluderer, at en voksende fælles forståelse og erkendelse af menneskehedens fælles interesser gør samarbejde under internationale regimer muligt, men at det på det nuværende tidspunkt er tæt forbundet med konkurrence.
This thesis examines how China, the United States, and the European Union shape global climate governance through their domestic and regional policies and their positions in international climate negotiations. It uses ideas from international relations and game theory to explain why they both cooperate and compete. The neo-realist concept of “relative gains” describes how each actor seeks to do better than the others, which can create tensions. Two simple game models—the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Stag Hunt—illustrate the incentives to either free-ride or work together. International political economy and neoliberal institutionalism provide tools to assess when cooperation through institutions is feasible. The analysis finds that China, the US, and the EU are at different stages of development, have different political systems and cultural outlooks, and have distinct economic and political interests. These differences drive competition even as they collaborate on mitigation (reducing greenhouse gas emissions) and adaptation (preparing for climate impacts). Their relationship in climate governance is therefore cooperative, competitive, and dynamic. This mix affects how effectively UNFCCC mechanisms are implemented and, ultimately, global greenhouse gas reduction outcomes. The thesis concludes that growing shared understanding and recognition of common human interests make cooperation under international regimes possible, but it remains intertwined with competition at the current stage.
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