The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank - Power, politics and the Economic Institutional Framework
Translated title
: The Rational Design of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
Authors
Christensen, Per Frøslev ; Grau, Esben Knudsen
Term
4. term
Publication year
2016
Submitted on
2016-07-29
Pages
70
Abstract
Afhandlingen undersøger, hvorfor Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) er udformet, som den er, og hvad denne udformning allerede har betydet – og kan komme til at betyde – for Asian Development Bank (ADB). Analysen bygger på Rational Design, en rationalistisk ramme for at forstå institutioners design, og gennemføres som et deduktivt casestudie. Afhandlingen opdeler AIIB og ADB i deres centrale designtræk og sammenholder dem med forklarende faktorer hentet fra samarbejdsteori. Disse faktorer testes systematisk mod Rational Designs antagelser for at belyse, hvorfor bestemte valg er truffet. Den analytiske del fokuserer især på to områder: medlemskredsen (hvem der har valgt at deltage, og hvorfor) og institutionens scope (hvad banken vil og ikke vil gøre). Her inddrages både økonomiske forhold, geopolitik og AIIB’s formelle arbejdsområde. Afhandlingen vurderer også, hvordan AIIB påvirker og påvirkes af Kina og regionens geopolitiske klima, og sammenligner fundene med ADB’s design for at pege på mulige konsekvenser for ADB. Konklusionen er, at AIIB’s designvalg kan forklares med en kombination af regional handel, komparative fordele og Kinas økonomiske profil. Sammenligningen antyder, at AIIB’s udformning især er rettet mod samarbejde og mod at supplere den eksisterende regionale institutionelle ramme, snarere end at erstatte den. Afslutningsvis diskuteres, hvor brugbar Rational Design-tilgangen er i denne sammenhæng: Den korte levetid for AIIB gør analysen vanskeligere, men rammeværket giver alligevel en stringent og dyb forståelse af institutionens design og relationen til en lignende institution.
This thesis examines why the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is designed the way it is, and how that design already has affected—and may affect—the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The study uses a Rational Design framework, a rationalist approach to understanding institutional design, and applies it in a deductive case study. It breaks down AIIB and ADB into key design features and compares them with explanatory factors drawn from cooperation theory. These factors are systematically tested against Rational Design conjectures to analyze the rationale behind AIIB’s design choices. The analysis focuses on two core aspects: membership (who has joined and why) and scope (what the bank chooses to do and not do). This includes considering economic conditions, geopolitics, and AIIB’s formal remit. The thesis also assesses how AIIB both influences and is influenced by China and the region’s geopolitical climate, and it compares the findings to ADB’s design to outline possible implications for ADB. The thesis concludes that AIIB’s design choices can be explained by a mix of regional trade, comparative advantages, and China’s economic profile. From a comparative angle, the evidence suggests AIIB’s design is oriented toward cooperation and toward extending and supplementing the existing regional institutional framework rather than replacing it. Finally, the thesis reflects on the usefulness of the Rational Design approach in this case: although AIIB’s short lifespan limits the depth of analysis, the framework still provides a rigorous and detailed understanding of the institution’s design and its relation to a similar institution.
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