Sino-US Climate Discord and Cooperation under the UNFCCC: A comparison of COP 15 and COP 21

Pedersen, Tina

4. term

Development and International Relations, Master

2016

2016-05-31

48

Klimaforandringer påvirker alle lande og kan gøre områder ubeboelige gennem tørke, oversvømmelser og stigende varme. For at handle oprettede verden FN’s rammekonvention om klimaændringer (UNFCCC) i 1992 og vedtog Kyoto-protokollen i 1997. Fordi Kyoto kun gav juridisk bindende mål til de udviklede lande – og USA og Canada ikke ratificerede – dækkede den omtrent 60 % af de globale drivhusgasudledninger. Forsøget på at blive enige om en efterfølgeraftale i København i 2009 mislykkedes; først i Paris i 2015 kom en aftale på plads. Afhandlingen undersøger, hvorfor UNFCCC-forhandlingerne ikke nåede en aftale på COP15 i København, men lykkedes på COP21 i Paris, og hvilken rolle USA og Kina spillede. Analysen bruger to perspektiver fra international politik. Neo-realisme ser det internationale system som præget af egenhjælp, hvor stater fokuserer på relative gevinster i forhold til andre snarere end absolutte gevinster. Som Kenneth Waltz påpeger, gør “tyranniet af små beslutninger” det svært at træffe store, bindende reduktioner. Neo-liberal institutionalisme forklarer, hvordan institutioner muliggør samarbejde i et egenhjælpssystem ved at øge information og gennemsigtighed, overvåge efterlevelse og dermed styrke aftalers troværdighed. MRV (måling, rapportering og verifikation) er et centralt redskab. København var præget af mistillid og resulterede kun i begrænsede kompromiser i Copenhagen Accord om bl.a. reduktion (mitigation), gennemsigtighed og finansiering, herunder etablering af MRV og to tilsagn om finansiel støtte fra udviklede til udviklingslande. Kina indtog en hård, obstruerende linje og ville ikke give køb på den differentiering af ansvar mellem udviklede og udviklingslande, som Kyoto havde fastlagt. USA havde begrænset at tilbyde, men gav et ekstra finansieringstilsagn betinget af udviklingslandenes reduktionsindsats og MRV. I Paris blev der derimod vedtaget en aftale, der institutionaliserede en bottom-up tilgang med nationale reduktionsløfter kombineret med et top-down review for gradvist at hæve ambitionsniveauet og holde den globale opvarmning under 2 °C. Aftalen byggede også på et kompromis om differentiering, som USA og Kina nåede i 2014. USA søgte fortsat at udvide ansvaret til fremvoksende økonomier som Kina, Indien og Brasilien, også på finansområdet. Kina viste større vilje til at påtage sig ansvar, men dets alliancer (G-77/Kina og BASIC) ønskede stadig at bevare den ældre differentiering. Afhandlingen konkluderer, at Københavns fiasko passer med en neo-realistisk forklaring: Både Kina og USA havde små gevinster ved bindende forpligtelser, så de relative gevinster ved ikke at indgå en aftale vejede tungere. Paris lykkedes, fordi en mere omfattende gennemsigtighedsramme kunne overvåge og sikre efterlevelse for alle parter, hvilket gav aftalen større troværdighed. USA var fortsat begrænset af hjemlige krav om godkendelse i Kongressen/Senatet, mens Kina udviklede større kapacitet og indflydelse i forhandlingerne og i stigende grad fik interesser, der flugtede med at begrænse klimaforandringer.

Climate change affects every country and can make places unlivable through droughts, floods, and rising heat. To respond, the world created the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 and adopted the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. Because Kyoto set binding targets only for developed countries—and the United States and Canada did not ratify—it covered roughly 60% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Efforts to agree on a successor treaty in Copenhagen in 2009 failed; only in Paris in 2015 was an agreement reached. This thesis examines why UNFCCC negotiations failed to produce an agreement at COP15 in Copenhagen but succeeded at COP21 in Paris, and what roles the United States and China played. The analysis uses two international relations perspectives. Neo-realism sees a self-help international system in which states focus on relative gains compared with others rather than absolute gains. As Kenneth Waltz argues, the “tyranny of small decisions” makes large, binding cuts hard to adopt. Neo-liberal institutionalism explains how institutions enable cooperation even in a self-help system by increasing information and transparency, monitoring compliance, and thereby strengthening credibility. Measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) is a key tool. Copenhagen was marked by distrust and yielded only limited compromises in the Copenhagen Accord on mitigation (cutting emissions), transparency, and finance, including establishing MRV and two pledges of financial support from developed to developing countries. China took a hard, obstructive stance, unwilling to relax the Kyoto-era differentiation of responsibilities between developed and developing countries. The United States had little to offer but pledged additional funding contingent on developing countries’ mitigation actions and MRV. Paris, by contrast, produced an agreement that institutionalized a bottom-up approach of national mitigation pledges combined with a top-down review process to ratchet up ambition toward keeping global warming below 2°C. It also reflected a compromise on differentiation reached by China and the United States in 2014. The United States continued to seek expanded responsibilities for emerging economies such as China, India, and Brazil, including on finance. China showed greater willingness to take on responsibilities, though its alliances (G-77/China and BASIC) still favored the older differentiation. The thesis concludes that Copenhagen’s failure fits a neo-realist explanation: both China and the United States had little to gain from binding commitments, so the relative gains from non-agreement prevailed. Paris succeeded because a more comprehensive transparency framework would monitor and help secure compliance by all parties, giving the deal greater credibility. The United States remained constrained by domestic requirements for congressional or senatorial approval, while China developed greater capacity and influence in the talks and increasingly aligned its interests with mitigating climate change.

[This abstract was generated with the help of AI]

US-China relations ; Climate Change ; COP15 ; COP21

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Pedersen, Tina:

• Sino-US Climate Discord and Cooperation under the UNFCCC: A comparison of COP 15 and COP 21 (2016)