Saying "No" Truthfully: What the Murderer at the Door Really Asked
Translated title
At sige "nej" sandfærdigt: Hvad morderen ved døren egentlig spurgte
Author
Nagata, Halgir Winther
Term
4. term
Education
Publication year
2025
Abstract
This thesis examines the classic “axe murderer” scenario and Kant’s strict prohibition on lying, often criticized for moral rigidity. Rather than weakening Kant’s duty of truthfulness, it proposes a reinterpretation of the situation: drawing on philosophy of language—speech act theory (Austin, Searle), Wittgenstein’s language games, and Brandom’s inferentialism—the thesis argues that the murderer’s question, “Is your friend inside?”, is not a neutral request for information but an implicit attempt to enlist complicity in an immoral act. Understood this way, answering “no” can be seen as a truthful and morally required refusal rather than a lie. The argument is situated within Kantian deontology and contrasted with consequentialism and virtue ethics, reviews Kant’s views on truthfulness and contemporary debates (including Cholbi and Mahon), and develops a pragmatic solution that aims to preserve the categorical imperative without sacrificing common moral intuition. Finally, it outlines broader applications where context shifts the moral meaning of speech, including implications for AI alignment and misuse.
Afhandlingen adresserer det klassiske “øksemorder”-scenarie og Kants strenge forbud mod at lyve, som ofte opfattes som moralsk ufleksibelt. I stedet for at svække Kants sandhedspligt foreslår afhandlingen en nyfortolkning af situationen: Med redskaber fra sprogfilosofien – talehandlingsteori (Austin, Searle), Wittgensteins sprogspil og Brandons inferentialisme – argumenteres der for, at morderens spørgsmål “Er din ven inde?” ikke er en neutral anmodning om information, men en implicit forsøg på at indhente medskyld i en umoralsk handling. Forstået således kan svaret “nej” udlægges som en sandfærdig og moralsk påkrævet afvisning frem for en løgn. Afhandlingen placerer argumentet i forhold til Kantianisme, konsekventialisme og dydsetik, gennemgår Kants syn på sandhed og relevante moderne diskussioner (bl.a. Cholbi og Mahon), og udvikler en pragmatisk løsning, der søger at bevare den kategoriske imperativ uden at opgive almindelig moralsk intuition. Endelig skitseres bredere anvendelser, hvor kontekst ændrer den moralske betydning af ytringer, herunder perspektiver for AI‑alignment og håndtering af misbrug.
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