Risk assessment of a gantry's crane operational process: Evaluating whether the risks are according to the risk management principles of Combi Terminal Twente Rotterdam
Author
Oosterom, Patrick
Term
4. term
Education
Publication year
2021
Pages
126
Abstract
This thesis examines whether Combi Terminal Twente Rotterdam (CTTR)’s gantry crane operational process complies with the company’s risk management principles. The study is motivated by evidence that gantry cranes are generally less involved in incidents and by CTTR’s records showing that its two gantry cranes accounted for 12% of reported incidents, accidents, and near misses from 2017 to 2020 with no severe consequences. A structured risk assessment—covering identification, analysis, and evaluation—was conducted using HAZID to identify eight hazardous events (seven at an acceptable risk level and one at a tolerable level), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to trace basic causes, Event Tree Analysis (ETA) to map 72 accident scenarios with probabilities and annual frequencies (61 acceptable and 11 tolerable), and Bow Tie to integrate the overall risk picture with preventive and mitigating barriers, events, and consequences. Based on the results, risk retention is recommended for the many acceptable risks and risk mitigation for the tolerable ones, consistent with the ALARP principle. CTTR’s procedures, documents, checklists, and work instructions are identified as key barriers in the Bow Tie, and further evaluation suggests that improving or expanding these measures could shift tolerable risks to an acceptable level.
Denne afhandling undersøger, om Combi Terminal Twente Rotterdam (CTTR)’s portalkraners driftsproces lever op til virksomhedens egne principper for risikostyring. Baggrunden er, at portalkraner generelt er mindre involveret i hændelser, og at CTTR’s to portalkraner i perioden 2017–2020 stod for 12% af de registrerede hændelser, uheld og nærved-hændelser uden alvorlige konsekvenser. Arbejdet gennemfører en risikovurdering bestående af risikokortlægning, analyse og evaluering ved brug af HAZID til at identificere otte farlige hændelser (syv med acceptabelt risikoniveau og én med tolerabelt niveau), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) til at afdække grundlæggende årsager, Event Tree Analysis (ETA) til at opstille 72 uheldsscenarier med sandsynligheder og årlige frekvenser (61 acceptable og 11 tolerable), samt Bow-tie til at samle det overordnede risikobillede med forebyggende og afbødende barrierer, hændelser og konsekvenser. På baggrund af resultaterne anbefales risikoretention for de mange acceptable risici og risikomitigering for de tolerable i tråd med ALARP-princippet. CTTR’s procedurer, dokumenter, tjeklister og arbejdsinstruktioner identificeres som centrale barrierer i Bow-tie, og en yderligere vurdering peger på, at forbedringer eller udvidelser af disse kan sænke tolerable risici til et acceptabelt niveau.
[This apstract has been generated with the help of AI directly from the project full text]