Reasons for the blockade of climate protection in Brazil and China
Author
Nickel, Sandro
Term
10. term
Publication year
2010
Pages
80
Abstract
This thesis examines why climate protection is blocked in Brazil and China. The core question is which domestic and international factors prevent more ambitious climate action in both countries. The study uses a comparative, theory-driven approach that applies neorealism, Olson’s collective action problem, liberalism, and Putnam’s two-level game to link international dynamics with domestic interest conflicts. Drawing on literature, reports, and statistics (as outlined in the discussion of sources) and a working definition of climate protection, the analysis identifies country-specific patterns. In China, development priorities are placed above climate goals, public pressure for climate action appears limited, and international business interdependencies together with state-centric power politics constrain ambition. In Brazil, profit interests, a government focus on economic growth, a willing but weakly effective public, and international demand alongside neorealist politics combine to block climate protection. Across both cases, the analysis suggests that growth imperatives, conflicting interests, weak domestic pressure, and international structures reinforce collective action problems and two-level game dilemmas in global climate negotiations, making it difficult to accelerate climate protection.
Specialet undersøger, hvorfor klimaindsatsen blokeres i Brasilien og Kina. Problemstillingen er, hvilke indenrigspolitiske og internationale forhold der hindrer mere ambitiøs klimabeskyttelse i de to lande. Tilgangen er en komparativ, teoriinformeret analyse, der anvender neorealisme, Olsons problem om kollektiv handling, liberalisme og Putnams two-level game til at forbinde internationale relationer med indenrigske interessekonflikter. På basis af litteratur, rapporter og statistik (som skitseret i metodens valg af kilder) samt en afgrænsning af begrebet klimabeskyttelse gennemgås landespecifikke mønstre. For Kina fremhæves, at udviklingshensyn prioriteres over klima, at befolkningen udøver begrænset pres for klimahandling, og at internationale forretningsafhængigheder og magtpolitiske hensyn i et stat-centreret system hæmmer ambitiøs klimapolitik. For Brasilien peges der på profitinteresser, en regeringsprioritering af økonomisk vækst, en villig men svagt gennemslagskraftig befolkning og en international efterspørgsel samt neorealistisk politik, der tilsammen blokerer klimaindsatsen. På tværs af casene viser analysen, at vækstimperativer, interessekonflikter, svagt indenrigspres og internationale strukturer forstærker kollektive handlingsproblemer og to-niveau-dilemmaer i globale klimaforhandlinger, hvilket gør klimabeskyttelse vanskelig at fremskynde.
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