Putin the Predictable?: An Examination of the Foreign Policy Strategy of Putin’s Russia
Author
Pedersen, Jacob Dalsgaard
Term
4. term
Publication year
2018
Submitted on
2018-05-31
Pages
80
Abstract
Dette speciale undersøger, hvordan og hvorfor Rusland under Vladimir Putin har brugt militære interventioner som et udenrigspolitisk redskab. Siden Putin blev præsident, har Rusland grebet ind i tre større konflikter uden for egne grænser: i Georgien, Ukraine og Syrien. Set fra et vestligt perspektiv betegnes Rusland ofte som aggressoren, men specialet spørger, hvad der drev Rusland til at intervenere, og om handlingerne bedst kan forstås som defensive eller offensive. Undersøgelsen bygger på to hypoteser fra den neorealistiske teori om internationale relationer: defensiv realisme (stater søger først og fremmest at beskytte deres sikkerhed) og offensiv realisme (stater søger at udvide deres magt og handlemuligheder). Hypoteserne testes op mod den empiriske udvikling for at vurdere, om Ruslands kurs overvejende er defensiv eller offensiv. Resultatet er, at ingen af hypoteserne entydigt forklarer alle tre interventioner. Ruslands beslutninger må ses i lyset af andre aktørers handlinger i det internationale system. I forbindelse med krigen mod Georgien handlede Rusland efter årtiers NATO-udvidelser, som Rusland gentagne gange havde betegnet som en trussel mod sin sikkerhed. Da NATO tilkendegav, at Georgien sigtede mod medlemskab, vurderede Rusland, at det måtte handle. Da Ukraine efter Euromajdan i 2014 valgte en mere vestvendt kurs, frygtede Rusland, at voksende vestlig indflydelse kunne true den strategisk vigtige flådebase i Sevastopol på Krim. Det medvirkede til annekteringen af halvøen. Den efterfølgende destabilisering af det østlige Ukraine peger dog på et mere offensivt motiv: at signalere til Ukraine og Vesten, at Rusland fortsat har betydelig indflydelse i sit nære udland, og at vestlig indflydelse her ikke accepteres. Da Rusland året efter indledte sin intervention i Syrien, var målet primært at beskytte egne interesser snarere end umiddelbar statslig sikkerhed. Gennem en omfattende indsats har Rusland placeret sig som en central magtmægler i konflikten og markeret sig igen som en stormagt i international politik. Specialet peger således på et skifte i Ruslands udenrigspolitiske strategi. I Georgien brugte Rusland offensive kapaciteter som middel til at forsvare sig mod en oplevet NATO-trussel. I takt med at Rusland er blevet stærkere, har det i stigende grad brugt militær magt til at beskytte interesser i udlandet frem for primært statens sikkerhed. Samtidig med stigende amerikansk fravær i det internationale system har Rusland ført en mere interventionistisk linje og søgt at udfylde magttomrum, blandt andet i Mellemøsten, for at genindtræde som stormagt og svække en USA-ledet unipolær verdensorden.
This thesis examines how and why Russia under Vladimir Putin has used military intervention as a foreign policy tool. Since Putin first became president, Russia has intervened in three major conflicts beyond its borders: in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria. From a Western point of view, Russia is often labeled the aggressor, but the study asks what drove Russia to intervene and whether its actions are best understood as defensive or offensive. Two hypotheses drawn from neorealist international relations theory guide the analysis: defensive realism (states primarily seek to ensure their security) and offensive realism (states seek to expand power and opportunities). These hypotheses are tested against the empirical record to assess whether Russia’s approach is chiefly defensive or offensive. The findings show that neither hypothesis explains all three interventions on its own. Russia’s decisions need to be understood in the context of other actors’ behavior in the international system. In the war with Georgia, Russia acted after decades of NATO enlargement, which it had repeatedly criticized as a threat to its security. When NATO signaled that Georgia was moving toward membership, Russia judged it was prone to act. In Ukraine, after the Euromaidan in 2014 set the country on a more Western course, Russia feared that growing Western influence could jeopardize its strategically important naval base in Sevastopol, Crimea, contributing to the annexation of the peninsula. The subsequent destabilization of eastern Ukraine, however, suggests a more offensive motive: to signal to Ukraine and the West that Russia retains significant influence in its neighborhood and that Western influence there will not be accepted. In Syria the following year, Russia intervened mainly to protect its interests rather than immediate state security. Through a comprehensive effort, Russia positioned itself as a power broker in the conflict and reasserted itself as a great power in international politics. Overall, the research indicates a shift in Russia’s foreign policy strategy. In Georgia, Russia used offensive capabilities to defend itself against a perceived NATO threat. As Russia has grown stronger, it has increasingly used military power to protect interests abroad rather than primarily the security of the state. Alongside increasing U.S. absence from the international system, Russia has pursued a more interventionist course, seeking to fill power vacuums, for example in the Middle East, to re-emerge as a major power and diminish a U.S.-led unipolar world order.
[This abstract was generated with the help of AI]
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