Paradoxes of Programme Aid and Increasing Corruption in Developing Countries: A case of Tanzania and Danida
Author
Masinde, Gloria
Term
4. term
Publication year
2015
Submitted on
2015-05-29
Pages
65
Abstract
Specialet undersøger, hvordan international bistand, korruption og fattigdomsbekæmpelse spiller sammen i Tanzania, med særligt fokus på Danmarks rolle. En udtalelse fra udenrigsminister Jens Otto Krag i 1962 bruges som ramme for spændingen mellem bistandens idealer og donorers egne interesser. Tanzania har oplevet markant økonomisk fremgang det seneste årti, med en stigning i den økonomiske vækstrate fra 0,4% i 1994 til 8,8% i 2013. Denne udvikling har gjort landet attraktivt for investorer og udviklingspartnere. Donorer har i høj grad anvendt generel budgetstøtte (GBS), altså midler der overføres direkte til statens budget, for at styrke effektivitet, ejerskab og brugen af landets egne strategier for vækst og fattigdomsreduktion. Resultaterne har dog været begrænsede: Tanzania hører fortsat til blandt verdens fattigste, og mange lever i alvorlig indkomstfattigdom. Specialet peger på korruption som en central årsag til de svage resultater. Svigtende Ujamaa-udviklingspolitikker og vedvarende økonomiske udfordringer har bidraget til udbredelsen af både småskala- og storkorruption, ofte knyttet til personlige netværk og gensidig favorisering (economy of affection). Donorer, der fremmer god forvaltning og støtter store dele af økonomien gennem GBS og andre overførsler, har også et medansvar, fordi misbrug af offentlige ressourcer berører deres bidrag. Danmark har arbejdet med en rettighedsbaseret tilgang: at engagere borgere i at kræve ansvarlighed af myndighederne for at sikre bedre ressourcefordeling og mere gennemsigtig service. Danmark vurderer, at især storkorruption hæmmer udviklingen i Tanzania, men er samtidig optimistisk, fordi institutioner som PCCB (Prevention and Control of Corruption Bureau) og relevante love findes – om end håndhævelsen er svag. Specialet konkluderer, at kampen mod korruption må forankres dybt i samfundet, helt ned på familieniveau. Overser donorer dette, bliver inklusiv, fattigdomsorienteret vækst svær at opnå, og fortsat støtte uden tilstrækkelig opmærksomhed på korruption kan delvist placere ansvar hos donorene.
This thesis explores how international aid, corruption, and poverty reduction interact in Tanzania, with a particular focus on Denmark’s role. A 1962 statement by Denmark’s Foreign Minister Jens Otto Krag frames the tension between the ideals of aid and donors’ own interests. Tanzania has seen notable economic progress over the past decade, with the growth rate rising from 0.4% in 1994 to 8.8% in 2013. This has made the country attractive to investors and development partners. Donors have widely used General Budget Support (GBS), meaning funds transferred directly to the government’s budget, to promote aid effectiveness, national ownership, and the use of the country’s own growth and poverty-reduction strategy. However, outcomes have been limited: Tanzania remains among the world’s poorest countries, with widespread income poverty. The thesis identifies corruption as a key reason for these mixed results. The failure of Ujamaa development policies and ongoing economic pressures have contributed to both petty and grand corruption, often linked to personal networks and mutual favoritism (economy of affection). Donors who advocate good governance and finance major parts of the economy through GBS and other transfers share responsibility, since the misuse of public resources also affects their contributions. Denmark has pursued a rights-based approach: engaging citizens to demand accountability from government to improve resource allocation and deliver services transparently. Denmark views grand corruption as a major obstacle to development but remains cautiously optimistic because institutions such as the PCCB (Prevention and Control of Corruption Bureau) and relevant laws exist, even if enforcement is weak. The thesis concludes that the fight against corruption must reach deep into society, down to the family level. If donors overlook this, pro-poor growth will be hard to achieve, and continuing support without tackling corruption risks leaving donors partly responsible.
[This abstract was generated with the help of AI]
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