More Power, Less Radicalism?: A study of the interaction between the European Parliament and interest groups in environmental policy-making in the European Union

Christensen, Mikkel Hyldig Mosebo

4. term

European Studies, Master

2014

2014-04-01

Europa-Parlamentet bliver ofte set som EU’s mest miljøvenlige institution. I begyndelsen havde Parlamentet primært en rådgivende rolle, mens Europa-Kommissionen, der fremsætter lovforslag, var det mest attraktive mål for lobbyarbejde. Over de sidste 40 år har Parlamentet dog fået mere lovgivningsmagt gennem traktatændringer, og miljøpolitik er blevet en integreret del af EU-traktaterne. Det har gjort Parlamentet til en vigtig arena for både miljø- og industrigrupper, som søger indflydelse på miljølovgivning. Dette studie undersøger, om billedet af Parlamentet som miljøets “forkæmper” stadig passer i dag. Med udgangspunkt i to nyere miljøsager bygger analysen på kvalitative interviews med centrale medlemmer af Europa-Parlamentet (MEP’er) eller deres assistenter samt repræsentanter for relevante industri- og miljøorganisationer. For at udvikle forklaringer anvendes en teoretisk ramme baseret på Pieter Bouwens Logic of Access samt ressourceafhængighedsperspektiverne hos Jeffrey Pfeffer & Gerald R. Salancik og Rainer Eising, som fokuserer på, hvordan adgang og indflydelse afhænger af de ressourcer, aktører kan tilbyde, og de afhængigheder beslutningstagere har. Analysen viser, at Europa-Parlamentet ikke bør betragtes som en miljømæssig “forkæmper” i dag. Tværtimod blev de vedtagne tekster svækket i forhold til Kommissionens oprindelige forslag. De vigtigste forklaringer er: (1) MEP’er gav oftere adgang til industriinteresser, fordi de leverede de ressourcer, der efterspurgtes i lovarbejdet; (2) nationale positioner havde stor indflydelse på MEP’ernes stemmeadfærd; (3) siden valget i 1999 er sammensætningen skiftet fra centrum-venstre til centrum-højre, domineret af traditionelt mindre miljøvenlige grupper; og (4) to næsten lige indflydelsesrige udvalg – Miljøudvalget (ENVI) og Udvalget om Industri, Forskning og Energi (ITRE) – førte til kompromisser mellem modstående interesser frem for klare miljøsejre. På trods af øget lovgivningsmagt optræder Parlamentet derfor ikke som en miljømæssig “forkæmper” i dag.

The European Parliament is often seen as the EU’s “greenest” institution. Early on, it mainly had a consultative role, while the European Commission, which proposes legislation, was the most attractive target for lobbying. Over the past 40 years, however, the Parliament has gained more legislative power through treaty changes, and environmental policy has been written into the EU treaties. This has turned the Parliament into an important arena where both environmental and industry groups seek access and influence over environmental lawmaking. This study examines whether the Parliament still lives up to its image as an environmental “champion.” Focusing on two recent environmental files, it draws on qualitative interviews with key Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) or their assistants and with representatives from relevant industry and environmental groups. To explain patterns of behavior, it uses a theoretical framework based on Pieter Bouwen’s Logic of Access and on Resource Dependency perspectives by Jeffrey Pfeffer & Gerald R. Salancik and Rainer Eising, which highlight how access and influence depend on the resources actors can provide and the dependencies decision-makers face. The analysis finds that the European Parliament should not be considered an environmental “champion” today. Instead, the final texts were weakened compared with the Commission’s original proposals. The main reasons are: (1) MEPs more often granted access to industry interests because they provided the resources needed in the legislative process; (2) national positions strongly shaped MEP voting; (3) since the 1999 election, the balance has shifted from center-left to center-right, with groups traditionally less supportive of ambitious environmental policy; and (4) two nearly equally influential committees—the Environment Committee (ENVI) and the Industry, Research and Energy Committee (ITRE)—produced compromises between opposing interests rather than clear environmental wins. Thus, despite increased legislative power, the Parliament does not act as an environmental “champion” today.

[This abstract was generated with the help of AI]

EU ; European Parliament ; Environmental policy ; Lobbyism ; Resource Dependency ; Logic of Access ; Environmental champion

Download
View record in AAU Student Projects