Maritime security in a time of geopolitical disruption: How global conflicts shape Danish maritime security governance
Author
Falden, Freya Tilsted
Term
4. semester
Education
Publication year
2026
Submitted on
2026-05-28
Abstract
This thesis explores how global conflicts and geopolitical disruption from 2022 to April 2026 have changed Denmark’s approach to maritime security at strategic and institutional levels. The main finding is that the field has widened: it is more risk-aware, focused on preparedness and resilience, and more dependent on international coordination and public-private cooperation. Methodologically, the study is a qualitative case study of Denmark with an abductive approach (moving back and forth between data and theory). It draws mainly on Bueger’s maritime security matrix and on work by Bueger & Edmunds that treats maritime security as a broad, practice-based field where shipping, safety, infrastructure, energy, legal order, trade flows, resilience and national security overlap. The analysis uses two key-informant interviews—with the Head of Security at Danish Shipping and the Danish Ambassador and Special Representative for Maritime Security—combined with public documents, strategies, industry material and official statements for triangulation. Findings show that the risk picture has broadened beyond earlier concerns about piracy. In the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, conflict creates direct disruptions to commercial shipping, leading to rerouting, delays and logistics problems. These raise costs and uncertainty, affecting Denmark’s security of supply, energy security and market predictability. In the Baltic Sea, the picture is more indirect: strategic vulnerabilities in and around Danish waters are exposed by grey-zone activities (below the threshold of open conflict), such as sabotage of maritime infrastructure, shadow-fleet practices (ships hiding ownership or turning off trackers), cyber attacks, and interference with navigation and tracking signals (GNSS and AIS). These do not immediately block shipping or freedom of navigation but reveal weak points, prompting stronger surveillance, monitoring, preparedness and protection of nearby waters and critical infrastructure. Overall, the maritime threat environment has become more interconnected, with disruptions in one region quickly affecting others. In response, Danish maritime governance has become more layered and adaptive, combining strategies, monitoring, information-sharing, cyber tools, diplomatic networks, international cooperation, naval deployments, total defence planning, and closer coordination between authorities and the maritime industry. Governance increasingly works through trade-offs: stronger security must be balanced against escalation risks, capacity limits, legal constraints, ongoing commercial flows, free navigation and Denmark’s interest in a rules-based maritime order. Geopolitics has returned to the sea in the form of conflict and disruption. Denmark has not shifted to a purely state-centric or militarised model; military tools still matter but operate alongside cooperation, multilateralism, legal restraint and public-private dialogue. The Danish case supports strengthening collaborative, cross-sector approaches to meet today’s maritime risks.
Specialet undersøger, hvordan globale konflikter og geopolitisk uro fra 2022 til april 2026 har ændret Danmarks måde at organisere maritim sikkerhed på, både strategisk og institutionelt. Hovedkonklusionen er, at feltet er blevet bredere: mere risikobevidst, mere rettet mod beredskab og robusthed, og mere afhængigt af international koordinering og offentligt-privat samarbejde. Metodisk er studiet et kvalitativt casestudie af Danmark med en abduktiv tilgang (pendler mellem data og teori). Det bygger især på Buegers maritime sikkerhedsmatrix og på Bueger & Edmunds’ forståelse af maritim sikkerhed som et bredt, praksisbaseret felt, hvor skibsfart, sikkerhed, infrastruktur, energi, retsorden, handelsstrømme, robusthed og national sikkerhed overlapper. Analysen bygger på to nøgleinterviews—med sikkerhedschefen i Danske Rederier og Danmarks ambassadør og særlige repræsentant for maritim sikkerhed—suppleret med offentlige dokumenter, strategier, branchemateriale og officielle udtalelser for at sikre triangulering. Resultaterne viser, at trussels- og risikobilledet er blevet langt bredere end tidligere fokus på pirateri. I Det Røde Hav og Hormuzstrædet skaber konflikter direkte forstyrrelser af handelssejlads, hvilket fører til omsejling, forsinkelser og logistiske problemer. Det øger omkostninger og usikkerhed og påvirker Danmarks forsyningssikkerhed, energisikkerhed og forudsigeligheden i markederne. I Østersøen er truslerne mere indirekte: strategiske sårbarheder i og omkring danske farvande udnyttes gennem gråzoneaktiviteter (under tærsklen for åben konflikt) som sabotage af maritim infrastruktur, skyggeflåde-aktivitet (skibe, der skjuler ejerskab eller slukker sporingsudstyr), cyberangreb og forstyrrelse af navigations- og sporingssignaler (GNSS og AIS). Disse trusler blokerer ikke umiddelbart for skibsfart eller fri sejlads, men afslører svage punkter og udløser styrket overvågning, monitorering, beredskab og beskyttelse af nærliggende farvande og kritisk infrastruktur. Samlet set er det maritime trusselsmiljø blevet mere sammenvævet, så forstyrrelser ét sted hurtigt påvirker andre. Som svar er dansk maritim styring blevet mere lagdelt og tilpasningsdygtig med en kombination af strategier, monitorering, informationsdeling, cyberværktøjer, diplomatiske netværk, internationalt samarbejde, flådedeltagelse, totalforsvarsplanlægning og tættere koordinering mellem myndigheder og den maritime industri. Styringen bygger i stigende grad på afvejninger: styrket sikkerhed skal balanceres mod eskalationsrisiko, kapacitetsgrænser, juridiske hensyn, løbende handelsstrømme, fri sejlads og Danmarks interesse i en retsbaseret maritim orden. Geopolitikken er vendt tilbage til havet i form af konflikt og forstyrrelse. Danmark er ikke gået over til en rent statslig eller militariseret model; militære værktøjer er fortsat vigtige, men går hånd i hånd med samarbejde, multilateralisme, juridisk tilbageholdenhed og offentlig-privat dialog. Den danske case peger på at styrke samarbejdende, tværsektorielle styringsformer for at håndtere nutidens maritime risici.
[This abstract has been rewritten with the help of AI based on the project's original abstract]
Keywords