Governing Economic Security: How Institutional Complementarities Shape FDI Screening in Denmark and Italy
Author
Bazzani, Rachele
Term
4. semester
Education
Publication year
2026
Abstract
The European Union has shifted from broad openness to foreign capital toward a focus on economic security, making screening of foreign direct investment (FDI) a key policy tool. Regulation 2019/452 set minimum procedures but left implementation to Member States, producing clear national divergence. This thesis examines why and how countries responding to the same EU stimulus design different screening regimes, and what this reveals about the limits of harmonisation. The argument combines Europeanisation (a common stimulus and securitised framing) with the Varieties of Capitalism perspective (institutional complementarities) to explain both what is defined as strategically vulnerable and how economic security is organised. Empirically, it employs a qualitative most-similar-systems comparison of Denmark (a coordinated market economy) and Italy (a mixed market economy), operationalised through two spheres—corporate governance and state–business relations—and assessed across five legislative dimensions: scope, definition of threat, activation criteria, competent authority, and the state’s discretionary power to block. The analysis shows that institutional configurations map onto legislation: corporate governance shapes the object of protection, while state–business relations shape the administrative infrastructure and degree of discretion. Consistent with the hypotheses, Denmark develops a residual, procedurally bounded regime, whereas Italy builds an encompassing, discretionary one. The findings extend the concept of institutional complementarities to economic security governance and suggest that stronger EU pressure may alter the form of national regimes without producing convergence in substance, sustaining divergence over time.
Den Europæiske Union er gået fra bred åbenhed over for udenlandsk kapital til at prioritere økonomisk sikkerhed, hvor screening af udenlandske direkte investeringer (FDI) er blevet et centralt redskab. Med Forordning 2019/452 indførte EU et fælles minimum af procedurer, men lod medlemsstaterne udforme egne ordninger, hvilket har skabt markant national variation. Denne afhandling undersøger, hvorfor og hvordan lande, der reagerer på samme EU-tilskyndelse, udvikler forskellige screeningsregimer, og hvad det betyder for mulighederne for harmonisering. Teoretisk kombineres europæisering (det fælles stimulus og den sikkerhedspolitiske ramme) med Varieties of Capitalism (institutionelle komplementariteter), som forventes at styre både, hvad der anses for strategisk sårbart, og hvordan styringen organiseres. Empirisk anvendes et kvalitativt most-similar-systems-studie af Danmark (koordineret markedsøkonomi) og Italien (blandet markedsøkonomi), operationaliseret gennem to sfærer—virksomhedsledelse/ejerskab og relationer mellem stat og erhvervsliv—og analyseret på fem lovgivningsdimensioner: rækkevidde, trusselsdefinition, aktiveringskriterier, kompetent myndighed og statens skønsbeføjelse til at blokere. Analysen viser, at institutionelle profiler afspejles direkte i lovgivningen: corporate governance bestemmer, hvad der skal beskyttes, mens stat-erhvervsrelationer former den administrative infrastruktur og graden af skøn. Danmark udvikler et residualt, procedurebundet regime, mens Italien etablerer et mere omfattende og skønsmæssigt. Resultaterne udvider anvendelsen af institutionelle komplementariteter til økonomisk sikkerhed og antyder, at øget EU-pres kan ændre form, men ikke substans, så varig divergens består.
[This abstract has been generated with the help of AI directly from the project full text]
Keywords