Governing Economic Security: How Institutional Complementarities Shape FDI Screening in Denmark and Italy
Author
Bazzani, Rachele
Term
4. semester
Education
Publication year
2026
Pages
92
Abstract
This thesis examines why EU Member States have developed different national systems for screening foreign direct investment (FDI) despite sharing the same EU framework (Regulation 2019/452), which sets only minimum procedures. It argues that these differences reflect institutional complementarities within domestic capitalist systems: corporate governance and state–business relations shape both what is viewed as strategically vulnerable and how protection is organized. Combining an Europeanisation lens to explain the common EU stimulus with a Varieties of Capitalism perspective to explain national adaptation, the study conducts a qualitative most‑similar systems comparison of Denmark (coordinated market economy) and Italy (mixed market economy). It traces institutional logics across five legal dimensions—scope, threat definition, activation criteria, competent authority, and the state’s power to block deals. The analysis finds that corporate governance patterns identify the assets that require protection, while state–business relations determine the administrative setup and degree of discretion. As a result, both the object and form of screening flow from the institutional profile rather than isolated legislative choices. Consistent with the hypotheses, Denmark adopts a limited, tightly rule‑bound regime, whereas Italy builds a broad, discretionary one. The thesis extends the concept of institutional complementarities to economic security governance and suggests that stronger EU pressure may change procedures without producing substantive convergence.
Dette speciale undersøger, hvorfor EU‑medlemsstater har udviklet forskellige nationale ordninger for screening af udenlandske direkte investeringer (FDI), selv om de reagerer på den samme EU‑ramme (forordning 2019/452), som kun fastlægger minimumsprocedurer. Specialet argumenterer for, at forskellene afspejler institutionelle komplementariteter i de nationale kapitalistiske systemer: virksomhedsstyring og relationer mellem stat og erhvervsliv former både, hvad der opfattes som strategisk sårbart, og hvordan beskyttelsen organiseres. Med et europæiseringsperspektiv til at forklare det fælles EU‑skub og et Varieties of Capitalism‑perspektiv til at belyse den nationale tilpasning gennemføres et kvalitativt most‑similar systems‑studie af Danmark (koordineret markedsøkonomi) og Italien (blandet markedsøkonomi). De institutionelle logikker spores på tværs af fem lovgivningsdimensioner: anvendelsesområde, trusselsdefinition, aktiveringskriterier, kompetent myndighed og statens mulighed for at blokere handler. Analysen viser, at mønstre i virksomhedsstyring peger på, hvilke aktiver der kræver beskyttelse, mens stat‑erhverv‑relationer bestemmer den administrative opbygning og graden af skøn. Dermed udspringer både genstand og form for screening af den institutionelle profil snarere end af isolerede lovgivningsvalg. I overensstemmelse med hypoteserne vedtager Danmark et tilbageholdent og proceduremæssigt afgrænset regime, mens Italien etablerer et omfattende og skønspræget. Specialet udvider begrebet institutionelle komplementariteter til styringen af økonomisk sikkerhed og antyder, at stærkere EU‑pres kan ændre procedurerne uden at skabe reel konvergens i substansen.
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