Does Size Matter?: A case study of the Piran Bay conflict
Translated title
Hvad betyder størrelse?: Et casestudie af Piran Bugt konflikten
Authors
Thrysøe, Jonas Nicolai Kronow ; Bakar, Sidney Tawfik Nor Eldin Paulick
Term
4. term
Education
Publication year
2014
Submitted on
2014-04-01
Pages
74
Abstract
Denne afhandling undersøger, om et lille EU-land kan opnå øget forhandlingskraft ved at bruge sin vetoret under en nabos optagelsesforhandlinger. Med udgangspunkt i grænsestriden om Piran-bugten mellem Slovenien og Kroatien viser casen, hvordan Sloveniens EU-medlemskab fra 2004 og Kroatiens optagelsesproces fra 2005 bragte en uafklaret søgrænse i centrum. I 2008 blokerede Slovenien åbningen af nye acquis-kapitler, hvilket trak Rådsformandskabet og Europa-Kommissionen ind i en ellers bilateral konflikt og øgede presset på parterne. Studiet anvender en caseanalyse, der kombinerer congruence testing og proces-tracing inden for rammerne af liberal intergovernmentalisme, småstatsteori og magtteori, for at vurdere om vetoretten gav Slovenien reel løftestang, samt hvilken rolle Kommissionen spillede. Forløbet mundede ud i en bindende voldgiftsaftale, der løftede striden ud af optagelsesforløbet og henlagde den til et særligt tribunal efter Kroatiens optagelse. Analysen peger på, at vetotruslen var et tveægget sværd: Den skabte synlighed og kortvarigt pres, men manglede opbakning fra andre medlemsstater og en Kommission, der prioriterede tekniske kriterier og institutionel neutralitet, hvilket efterlod Sloveniens udbytte som begrænset.
This thesis examines whether a small EU member state can gain leverage by invoking its veto during a neighbor’s accession negotiations. Using the Piran Bay border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia as a case, it shows how Slovenia’s EU membership from 2004 and Croatia’s accession process from 2005 brought an unresolved maritime boundary to the fore. In 2008 Slovenia blocked the opening of new acquis chapters, drawing the Council Presidency and the European Commission into an otherwise bilateral conflict and increasing pressure on both sides. The study employs a case study design combining congruence testing and process tracing within the frameworks of liberal intergovernmentalism, small state theory, and power theory to assess whether the veto delivered leverage and to analyze the Commission’s role. The episode culminated in a binding arbitration agreement that removed the dispute from the accession track and assigned a special tribunal to rule after Croatia’s accession. Findings suggest the veto was a double-edged instrument: it created visibility and short-term pressure but lacked support from other member states and a Commission focused on technical criteria and institutional neutrality, leaving Slovenia with limited gains.
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