Decisions Investigated
Author
Nielsen, Simon Ubbe
Term
4. term
Publication year
2015
Submitted on
2015-05-29
Pages
66
Abstract
Hvordan træffer politiske ledere beslutninger i udenrigspolitikken? Denne afhandling undersøger Danmarks beslutning om at tilslutte sig den USA-ledede "coalition of the willing" i krigen mod Irak i begyndelsen af 2003 ud fra dette perspektiv. Den anvender to mekanisme-orienterede tilgange fra international politik—Mechanistic Realism og Foreign Policy Framework—for at belyse, hvad der motiverede de centrale beslutningstagere i den danske regering. Tilgangene giver redskaber til at analysere konkrete led i beslutningsprocessen og betydningen af personlige overbevisninger. Hovedpersonen i analysen er statsminister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Studiet peger på, at han i høj grad lagde vægt på sin egen vurdering af de foreliggende efterretninger og reagerede præventivt på den trussel, han mente, at Saddam Hussein udgjorde i begyndelsen af 2003. Teorierne fremhæver, hvordan psykologiske faktorer som frygt, begrænset opmærksomhed (at man ikke får øje på al relevant information) og ønsketænkning (at man tolker i retning af det, man håber på) kan præge lederes valg. Resultaterne viser, at Fogh havde en klar vision for Danmarks fremtidige udenrigspolitik: mere aktiv deltagelse i internationale militære operationer for at sikre Danmarks position og sikkerhed i det internationale samfund. Det bekræfter Mechanistic Realisms grundantagelse om, at statens overlevelse vægtes højest hos beslutningstageren. Sammen med hans nære forhold til USA’s præsident Bush bidrog dette til beslutningen om at gå i krig uden om FN. Foreign Policy Framework peger desuden på, at Fogh filtrerede information gennem etablerede overbevisninger og kendte reaktionsmønstre, herunder hans tro på, at Saddam Hussein besad masseødelæggelsesvåben, og den vægt, han lagde på personlige relationer. Ifølge afhandlingen blev Irak-beslutningen et vendepunkt i dansk politisk tradition og debat. Den understreger, at den enkelte leder spiller en afgørende rolle i udenrigspolitikken.
How do political leaders make foreign policy decisions? This thesis examines Denmark’s choice to join the US-led "coalition of the willing" in the Iraq War in early 2003 from that perspective. It applies two mechanism-focused approaches from international relations—Mechanistic Realism and the Foreign Policy Framework—to shed light on what motivated key decision-makers in the Danish government. These approaches offer tools for analyzing specific steps in the decision process and the role of personal beliefs. The main focus is Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. The study suggests he placed great weight on his own reading of the available intelligence and acted preemptively against what he believed was a threat from Saddam Hussein in early 2003. The theories highlight how psychological factors such as fear, bounded awareness (failing to take in all relevant information), and wishful thinking (seeing what one hopes to see) can shape leaders’ choices. Findings indicate that Fogh had a clear vision for Denmark’s future foreign policy: more active participation in international military operations to secure Denmark’s position and safety in the international community. This supports Mechanistic Realism’s core assumption that leaders prioritize the survival of the state. Together with his close relationship with US President Bush, this outlook contributed to the decision to go to war outside the UN. The Foreign Policy Framework further suggests that Fogh filtered information through established beliefs and familiar response patterns, including his conviction that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and the value he placed on personal ties. According to the thesis, the Iraq decision became a turning point in Danish political tradition and debate. It underscores the importance of examining the role of individual leaders in foreign policy.
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