An International Game of Chess: State Motives Behind Participation in the CEDAW: An analysis of france, india, china, and the USA
Authors
Pedersen, Katrine Houkjær ; Pedersen, Kim Sønderriis Holm
Term
10. term
Publication year
2013
Submitted on
2013-05-31
Abstract
This thesis examines why highly diverse states have chosen to join the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979, and whether the convention delivers on its aims. Drawing on liberalism, realism, and constructivism, it compares four cases—France, India, China, and the United States—across domestic violence, human trafficking, and family-related issues, with state-specific topics such as China’s one-child policy. The study asks whether ratification reflects a genuine commitment to women’s rights or other motives, including the pursuit of power, national interests, and reputational benefits within the international community. It finds that states frequently ratify when the costs and sacrifices are limited and use the convention instrumentally to advance national interests, often with little intention to implement or enforce the rights CEDAW stipulates. On this basis, the thesis concludes that CEDAW’s effectiveness is limited in practice because states prioritize sovereignty and self-interest over full compliance.
Denne afhandling undersøger, hvorfor meget forskellige stater har valgt at tiltræde FN’s konvention om afskaffelse af alle former for diskrimination mod kvinder (CEDAW) fra 1979, og om konventionen virker efter hensigten. Med udgangspunkt i teorierne liberalisme, realisme og konstruktivisme sammenlignes fire cases – Frankrig, Indien, Kina og USA – på områderne vold i hjemmet, menneskehandel og familieretlige forhold, suppleret af stats-specifikke temaer som Kinas et-barns-politik. Formålet er at belyse, om ratifikation udspringer af et reelt engagement i kvinders rettigheder eller af andre motiver, såsom at opnå magt, nationale interesser eller omdømmemæssige gevinster i det internationale samfund. Afhandlingen finder, at stater ofte ratificerer, når omkostningerne og ofrene er begrænsede, og bruger konventionen som et instrument til at forfølge egne interesser, ofte uden tilsvarende ambitioner om at implementere eller håndhæve de forpligtelser, CEDAW indebærer. På den baggrund konkluderes, at CEDAW i praksis har begrænset effektivitet, fordi stater prioriterer suverænitet og nationale interesser højere end fuld efterlevelse af konventionens rettigheder.
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