A ‘Marriage of Convenience’? The Emergence of Political Entrepreneurs and the Challenges of Crony Capitalism, Rent-seeking and Economic Growth in Tanzanian Free Market Economy
Author
Londo, Dennis
Term
4. term
Publication year
2008
Pages
92
Abstract
Økonomisk vækst og stigende BNP øger normalt statens indtægter gennem skatter og fx royalties, som kan finansiere offentlige tjenester; ved kriser eller stagnation falder indtægterne. Denne afhandling undersøger Tanzania, hvor landet i de seneste årtier har haft hurtig økonomisk vækst drevet af udvindingsindustri og servicesektor samt store lån og udviklingsbistand – men uden tilsvarende forbedringer for befolkningen. Med udgangspunkt i begrebet embedded autonomy (indlejret autonomi) viser analysen, at liberaliseringen har åbnet for rent-seeking (rentejagt: at indfange offentlige værdier uden at skabe ny værdi) og rovdriftsagtige praksisser, hvilket har svækket styring og embedsværk. Et svagt reguleringssystem gør, at ulovlig rentejagt er udbredt, og gerningsmænd ofte er beskyttet mod retsforfølgelse. Eliteinteressegrupper bruger "money politics" (pengebaseret politisk påvirkning) til at opnå og fastholde magt. Konkurrencen om overførsler undergraver demokratiet og retsvæsenet og truer den sociale sammenhængskraft. Ifølge studiet har vækst baseret på udenlandske direkte investeringer (FDI) og ekstern finansiering ikke styrket offentlige tjenester; omkring 42 % af budgettet finansieres af udenlandske donorer, den udenlandske gæld stiger, og infrastrukturen til uddannelse, sundhed og transport forringes. Samtidig er fattigdommen steget, omfordelingen er meget ulige, og en lille elite bliver rigere, mens mange lever for under én amerikansk dollar om dagen. Afhandlingen konkluderer, at "politiske entreprenører" – aktører der søger privat gevinst gennem politiske kanaler – undergraver god forvaltning og ansvarlighed. Den anbefaler, at Tanzania gentænker sin politik og lader staten spille en mere central, effektiv rolle for at sikre retfærdig fordeling af den nationale velstand.
Economic growth and rising GDP usually increase government revenues through taxes and royalties, enabling public services; downturns reduce them. This thesis examines Tanzania, which has experienced rapid growth in recent decades driven by extractive industries and the service sector, alongside large loans and development aid—but without comparable gains for most citizens. Using the concept of embedded autonomy, the analysis shows that liberalization has enabled rent-seeking (capturing public resources without creating value) and predatory practices, weakening governance and bureaucratic capacity. Weak regulation allows illegal rent-seeking to flourish, and offenders are often shielded from prosecution. Elite interest groups deploy "money politics" to gain and maintain power. Competition over wealth transfers erodes democratic institutions and the justice system, threatening social cohesion. According to the study, growth led by foreign direct investment (FDI) and external finance has not improved public services; about 42 percent of the budget is financed by foreign donors, foreign debt is rising, and infrastructure for education, health care, and transport is deteriorating. Poverty has increased, redistribution is highly unequal, and a small elite benefits while many people live on less than one US dollar a day. The thesis concludes that "political entrepreneurs"—actors seeking private gain through political channels—undermine governance and accountability. It recommends rethinking policy so the state plays a more central, effective role to ensure fair distribution of national wealth.
[This abstract was generated with the help of AI]
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