AAU Student Projects - visit Aalborg University's student projects portal
A master's thesis from Aalborg University
Book cover


The security analysis of the Lightning Network protocol

Translated title

Sikkerhedsanalysen af Lightning Network-protokollen

Author

Term

4. term

Publication year

2019

Submitted on

Pages

107

Abstract

Lightning-netværket er en andetlagsprotokol, der kører oven på kryptovalutaen Bitcoin. Det er et decentraliseret netværk af betalingskanaler—direkte forbindelser, hvor brugere kan udveksle betalinger uden en central myndighed. Konceptet blev foreslået i 2014, og den første implementering kom i 2017. Fordi teknologien er forholdsvis ny, kan der være ukendte sikkerhedsrisici. Dette speciale analyserer Lightning-netværket for at undersøge dets sikkerhedsegenskaber med fokus på to spørgsmål: Holdes fortrolige data hemmelige, og sikrer protokollen brugerautenticitet (at brugere er dem, de udgiver sig for)? Vi bruger procesalgebra, et formelt matematisk sprog, til at beskrive de kryptografiske protokoller, der udgør Lightning-netværket, og anvender ProVerif, et automatisk analyseværktøj til kryptografiske protokoller, til at vurdere disse egenskaber.

The Lightning Network is a second-layer protocol that runs on top of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency. It is a decentralized network of payment channels—direct connections that let users exchange payments without a central authority. The idea was first proposed in 2014, and its first implementation appeared in 2017. Because it is a relatively new technology, there may be security issues we do not yet know about. This thesis analyzes the Lightning Network to examine its security properties, focusing on two questions: Are confidential data kept secret, and does the protocol ensure user authenticity (that users are who they claim to be)? We use process algebra, a formal mathematical language, to describe the cryptographic protocols that make up the Lightning Network, and we apply ProVerif, an automatic cryptographic protocol analyzer, to assess these properties.

[This abstract was generated with the help of AI]