STUDYING WESTERN EUROPE TRADE UNIONS' CRISIS: THE CASE OF SPAIN
Author
Rey Garcia, Marta
Term
4. term
Education
Publication year
2017
Pages
76
Abstract
Er Spaniens store fagforeninger i krise? Dette speciale undersøger CCOO og UGT i lyset af faldende medlemskab, svækket mobiliseringskraft, ændringer i produktionsmodellen og større jobusikkerhed. Det ser på to roller: fagforeninger som politiske aktører, der forhandler med regeringen, og fagforeninger som store, bureaukratiske organisationer, der risikerer at fjerne sig fra de almindelige medlemmer. Studiet anvender Alessandro Pizzornos teori om politisk udveksling (1978) og Robert Michels’ Jernlov om oligarki (1911). For den politiske udveksling gennemgås treparts-aftaler mellem fagforeninger, arbejdsgiverorganisationer (CEOE og CEPYME) og den spanske regering fra den demokratiske overgang i 1977 over finanskrisen i 2008 og frem til i dag. For Jernloven analyseres kløften mellem ledere og medlemmer, interne organisatoriske ændringer og åbenhedsinitiativer, der skal mindske kløften, med brug af officielle dokumenter, presseartikler, fagforeningernes hjemmesider og et spørgeskema fra et tidligere CCOO-medlem. Resultaterne viser, at teorien om politisk udveksling forklarer fagforeningernes institutionelle rolle, men at udvekslingen brød sammen under krisen i 2008: under tiltag fra Troikaen (Europa-Kommissionen, Den Europæiske Centralbank og Den Internationale Valutafond) blev regeringsdrevne arbejdsmarkedsreformer ikke længere forhandlet med fagforeningerne. Michels’ teori synes delvist at passe: voksende utilfredshed blandt offentligheden og arbejdstagere hænger sammen med fagforeningernes bureaukratiske, oligarkiske strukturer og begrænset ledelsesansvar over for medlemmerne. Specialet konkluderer, at spanske fagforeninger i stigende grad baserer deres legitimitet på evnen til at påvirke regeringens politik og lægger mindre vægt på direkte bånd til græsrødderne.
Are Spain’s major trade unions in crisis? This thesis examines CCOO and UGT against declining membership, weaker mobilization, changing production, and growing job insecurity. It analyzes two roles: unions as political actors that negotiate with government, and unions as large bureaucratic organizations that risk drifting away from ordinary members. The study uses Alessandro Pizzorno’s Political Exchange theory (1978) and Robert Michels’s Iron Law of Oligarchy (1911). For Political Exchange, it reviews tripartite agreements among unions, employer federations (CEOE and CEPYME), and the Spanish government from the democratic transition in 1977 through the 2008 financial crisis and into the present. For the Iron Law, it examines the widening gap between leaders and members, internal organizational changes, and transparency measures meant to narrow that gap, using official documents, press coverage, union websites, and a questionnaire from a former CCOO member. Findings indicate that Political Exchange explains the unions’ institutional role, but the exchange broke during the 2008 crisis: under measures set by the Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund), government-led labor reforms were no longer negotiated with unions. Michels’s theory appears partly applicable: growing public and worker disaffection is linked to unions’ bureaucratic, oligarchic structures and limited leadership accountability. The thesis concludes that Spanish unions increasingly base their legitimacy on their capacity to influence government policy, while placing less emphasis on direct ties to their rank and file.
[This abstract was generated with the help of AI]
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