MASTER'S THESIS

Resilience-Building through EU Civilian CSDP Missions:

A Comparative Study of the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo and the EU Mission in Armenia

Vanessa Röber

Supervised by Assoc. Prof. Susi Meret

Aalborg University

M.Sc. International Relations

Department of Politics and Society

Abstract

The term resilience was only recently established in the field of global politics. It is believed that resilience can create a link between short-term emergency efforts and long-term development strategies. To make a country and its citizens resilient, the national institutions need to have effective self-governing capacities. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union (EU) was established to build EU capacities for autonomous operations in reaction to international crises. A unique feature is its Civilian Crisis Management through non-military, civilian missions. The growing instability in the EU's neighbourhood highlights the geopolitical relevance of assessing the impact and effectiveness of the EU's external operations. However, resilience has barely been addressed in current research concerning the civilian CSDP missions. Through a comparative case study of the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA), this thesis aims to analyse the effectiveness of civil CSDP missions in fostering institutional resilience to enable successful self-governance in geopolitically contested environments. The cases differ in almost all but one variable. Both missions aim to stabilise and secure the situation in their respective region, intending to make the countries resilient enough to settle the conflict independently. EULEX was built to assist with the establishment of well-developed rule of law institutions in the country and to ease the conflict with Serbia that leads to ethnic disputes and heavy conflicts in the bordering regions. EUMA was set up to report border incidents to the EU because of severe tensions and territorial disputes with Azerbaijan. The most different system design is applied to examine the cases through a qualitative document analysis of anonymous Expert Interviews, EU laws and policy papers, scholarly literature and newspaper articles. The results of the analysis are explained through a threefold theoretical framework: Liberal Institutionalism and the Securitisation theory together build the foundation for the concept of resilience. This framework highlights the role of the states and international institutions in shaping global policies, along with socially constructed shifts between securitisation, desecuritisation and resilience. The outcome of the analysis proves that EU civilian missions are generally effective in fostering institutional resilience, albeit the effectiveness depends on several factors: the internal, post-conflict stability of the country, the support of international partners and the ability to go into diplomatic dialogue with hostile neighbours. EULEX needs to focus even more on resilience and confidence-building in Kosovo's conflicted society, e.g. by reinforced monitoring of police abuses and the re-establishment of border crossing points. EUMA effectively contributes to securing the border region. Hence, Armenia made major concessions towards Azerbaijan, which might lead to the establishment of peace and the withdrawal of the mission. This proves the effectiveness of EU civilian missions with a realistic, temporary mandate, designed to reinforce and stabilise national governance in response to crises by aligning them with the country's needs.

Disclaimer

Artificial Intelligence has been used through the free ChatGPT version 4. I utilised the program for brainstorming ideas for the thesis topic and theories I could use. Furthermore, I asked the program to search the internet for articles and webpages where I could find more information regarding my cases. The program also helped me to better understand extensive EU judicial cases. ChatGPT was only used for assistance; all reproduced information comes from credible sources cited in the text.

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

AA	Association Agreement
CCP	Common Crossing Point
CEPA	Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJEU	Court of Justice of the European Union
CoS	Copenhagen School
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organisation
EAEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EaP	Eastern Partnership Initiative
ECJ	European Court of Justice
EEAS	European External Action Service
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EU	European Union
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUMA	EU Mission in Armenia
HoM	Head of Mission
H	Hypothesis
IR	International Relations
KFOR	Kosovo Force

KLA   Kosovo Liberation Army

NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NGO   Non-Governmental Organisation

PM   Prime Minister

RoL   Rule of Law

SIENA   Secure Information Exchange Network Application

UK   United Kingdom

UN   United Nations

UNMIK   United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

US   United States (of America)

WEU   Western European Union

List of Figures

List of Tables

1. Introduction

In this master's thesis, I strive to contribute to the field of international security and external governance politics by looking at resilience-building in a geopolitical context, especially in the European Union's foreign policy area as a tool for the EU's peacebuilding initiatives. The aim is to explore how far the EU as an external actor interferes in the internal political affairs of its neighbours and how resilience-building can be best used to create a shift from external governance to effective self-governance of the targeted states, finally resulting in sustainable and lasting peace and security in the region.

Resilience is defined in this thesis as the ability of states and societies to adapt to internal or externally imposed crises by either returning to or improving upon the pre-event state. Therefore, they need to secure their critical infrastructures independently through effective self-governing mechanisms (see Chapter 2.5). The EU seeks to help countries in its wider neighbourhood to reach these goals. Under its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the EU established civilian missions to mitigate the negative effects that come from neighbouring regions' conflicts. The missions aim to prevent conflicts from further escalation and to facilitate a peaceful transition to a stable, self-sustaining environment (Doyle, 2022, p. 7). To effectively reach this goal, I argue, they should be better tailored to a resilientist approach as Bourbeau (2018), Korosteleva (2020), and Joseph and Juncos (2020) describe it (see Chapter 2.1). Resilience-building is broadly applied to the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (see Chapter 2.2), but it is rarely mentioned in the context of the CSDP missions. This thesis aims to shed light on the effectiveness of civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. The central research question guiding the study is:

How effective are EU civilian CSDP missions in fostering institutional resilience to enable successful self-governance in geopolitically contested environments?

A threefold theoretical framework shall provide the necessary lenses through which the issue is analysed. Because of the general complexity of resilience-building in a geopolitical context, I chose to combine a positivistic and a critical theory: Liberal Institutionalism and the Securitisation Theory build the foundation for the concept of resilience, which is the main theoretical approach. This framework, therefore, emphasises the importance of states and international institutions in shaping international policies, as well as socially constructed shifts between securitisation, desecuritisation and resilience.

The analysis is conducted as a comparative case study using the most different system design. Two cases are compared to each other, the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo and the EU Mission in Armenia, by a qualitative document analysis, which was conducted through the NVivo data analysis program. These two cases are generally very different, but they have one significant similarity: Both are civilian CSDP missions aiming at stabilising the security situation in a country that stands a long-lasting ethnic and territorial conflict with one of its neighbouring states. But they differ in their operational frameworks, the international actors involved, their levels of securitisation and desecuritisation, and in the perceptions of the locals in the respective countries (see Chapter 3.4). These differences are the independent variables, and their influence on institutional resilience (the dependent variable) will be analysed and explained in the discussion. I aim to provide a comprehensive assessment of the mission's effectiveness in guiding countries of diverse geopolitical contexts toward self-governance and resilience. The two cases are insofar adequate for the study, as they show how civilian missions of different scope and length can still lead to the same result: The improvement of institutional resilience. However, I presume that the effectiveness depends on the mission's adaptability to the regional geopolitical context and the right deployment of resilience-building strategies. Thus, my hypotheses (H) are as follows:

H₁: The effectiveness of EU resilience-building measures decreases in regions where external geopolitical pressures (e.g., through Azerbaijan, Serbia or Russia) are more intense.

H₂: Civilian CSDP missions that integrate resilience-building strategies promote local ownership and sustainable self-governance more effectively than those that focus predominantly on external governance structures.

This research is of timely geopolitical relevance as an understanding of the effectiveness of EU civilian missions becomes more critical with the growing instability in the EU's neighbourhood. The stability could be reconstructed with effective resilience-building approaches. However, while the concept of resilience is central in the EU Global Strategy, it is rarely addressed in current research of the civilian CSDP missions. The thesis thus contributes to filling this gap. In the following, the literature review will provide an overview of the scholarly debate on resilience in global politics and EU security strategies. Afterwards, the methodology, including the research design, case selection, choice of theory, the methods used, and limitations of this thesis, is presented. This is followed by a comprehensive explanation of the theoretical framework and an in-depth analysis of the two cases. Subsequently, the results will be reflected in the discussion. The conclusion provides the answer to the research question.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Definitions and Implications of Resilience

The word resilience is derived from the Latin term *resilire* ("to jump back") and was first used in anthropology and psychology (Kekovic & Ninkovic, 2020, p. 154). C. S. Holling brought the term back into modern scientific prominence in 1973 when he defined resilience as *"a measure of the persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between populations or state variables"* (Holling, 1973, p. 250). His resilience approach thus highlights the principles of complexity, self-organisation, functional diversity and non-linear dynamics (Kekovic & Ninkovic, 2020, p. 155).

Since then, resilience has sparked many theoretical debates in the scholarly literature. Most definitions come from psychologists, ecologists and social workers (Bourbeau, 2013, p. 3). Resilience is believed to serve as a link between short-term emergency relief efforts and long-term development strategies (Joseph & Juncos, 2020, p. 287). Still, there is a lack of coherence and consensus on the definition of resilience. According to Bourbeau (2018, pp. 9–10), all of the former definitions account for three problematic characteristics when theorising resilience in world politics: (1) they define resilience to be solely about positive adaptation, (2) they see resilience as a binary concept, neglecting the fact that there can be distinct types of resilience, and (3) they tend to reify the conditions prior to resilience, framing it as a return to a fixed, unchanged and stable state that existed before the disruptive event. However, the state of social *"equilibrium"* to which a society can return is difficult to translate to political systems (ibid). Therefore, Bourbeau (2018, pp. 13–14) describes resilience as "*the process of patterned adjustments adopted in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks, to maintain, to marginally modify, or to transform a referent object."*

Through this definition, Bourbeau tries to locate resilience explicitly within world politics by making it applicable to all kinds of communities, societies, ecosystems and economies (ibid). He aims to make resilience processual and give room to adjust differently to various

types of shocks a society might face. Furthermore, he argues that a shock can be both externally or internally imposed, and shocks do not always need to be negative. In some cases, resilience thus might even be an obstacle to change (Bourbeau, 2018, pp. 14–15). However, Bourbeau also acknowledges that his definition gives a lot of leeway as it allows for various forms of resilience. Rather than seeking to maintain a given situation, it also includes the process of transformation or the remodelling of social structures (ibid, pp. 16–17).

Additionally, Korosteleva (2020, p. 687) unified various interpretations of resilience and concluded that the term is tied to the notion of individual self-organisation, meaning that individuals are organising themselves into a sustainable collective, both locally and externally, to explore transformative strategies within the context of external governance. Similar to Bourbeau, Koroseleva (2020, p. 688) explains that resilience-building does not simply happen through returning to the issue and trying to remove the institutional obstacles. It would be crucial *"to understand resilience for what it is—a self-governing project—to allow 'the local' an opportunity to grow their own critical infrastructures and collective agency, in their pursuit of 'good life'"* (Korosteleva, 2020, p. 682). She argues, it is rather about the understanding of the complexities and potential impacts of different dimensions of resilience, namely *"adaptability, conformity and undesirability of change" (ibid, p. 688).*

Further research has made adaptation an important part of the resilientist approach. Adaptability is apparent when a path that has been useful in the past is left behind to find an alternative way which fits better into the new situation (Kekovic & Ninkovic, 2020, p. 155). Resilience through adaptability is necessary to cope with unforeseen events and thus creates the capacity to unfold multiple evolutionary trajectories. This can happen because the connections between social agents are rather flexible, which helps the system respond better to unexpected changes (ibid).

2.2 The Evolution of Resilience in EU Foreign Policy

Resilience as a term in the policy arena of big international organisations, like the UN, OECD and EU, has first been used in combination with development, humanitarian and risk reduction management policies (Juncos, 2017, p. 3). Only within the last decade, resilience has slowly made an impact in the foreign and security policy area. In June 2016, the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) was introduced. This was the outcome of extensive consultations with the EU member states and institutions, as well as various country and civil society representatives, experts and academics (ibid, pp. 2–3).

2.2.1 Strategic Priorities of the EUGS

The EUGS has been created to adopt a normative framework for the long-term direction of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The strategy aims to improve the ability of the EU to resist internal and external threats and is built around the concept of resilience (Bendiek, 2016, p. 1). This represents a great degree of consensus within EU foreign policy cycles and makes it more notable that resilience takes such an important stance in this strategy, with this term being mentioned 41 times in a 60-page document (Juncos, 2017, p. 3). In the EUGS, resilience is defined as *"the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises"* (EEAS 2016, p. 23).

The EUGS established ambitious standards for the resilience of the EU members and their neighbours. It conceptualises resilience as an approach that includes the whole society and all of its individuals (Bendiek, 2016, p. 2). For a society to be resilient, it must be democratic and sustainable, and trusting in its institutions. A resilient EU must be able to spread its stabilising effects to its neighbours and reform global governance structures to secure global common resources (ibid). Furthermore, in security research, resilience is not only the ability to push back attacks and endure and repair the damage, but it can also prevent such attacks in the first place. According to the EUGS, a comprehensive

approach with all stakeholders included is crucial for achieving the desired state of resilience (ibid).

However, Bendiek (2016, p. 1) argues, the EUGS lacks the core features that a strategy should include: a clear objective, a clearly defined and long-term timeframe, and a methodological approach. Moreover, some scholars have criticised this approach for being too broad, and therefore, it is not clear how far it extends and what strategic proposals can be obtained to create a functioning action plan (Bendiek, 2016, p. 2). Nonetheless, there is also potential in the concept to defeat the discrepancy between promoting stability and fostering democracy in fragile countries by withdrawing from the EU's transformation approach. But the question remains how the EU can clearly define its interests and align them, along with all the sub-strategies of external action, with the concept of resilience (ibid).

2.2.2 Self-Governance for Sustainable Resilience

Even if resilience as a concept is not entirely new, it still represents a relatively unexplored terrain. Korosteleva (2020, p. 684) argues that self-governance is an important aspect of resilience that has not received sufficient attention. Self-governance in this context means that people in a community take charge of organising themselves autonomously and be at the centre of their decision-making, rather than relying on top-down control, to achieve their version of *"the good life"* (ibid, p. 698) However, this does not mean that one should reject external governance entirely, but that it should be adapted to support local self-governance to strengthen the communities' identity in their way of life. This approach can make global governance more sustainable, as it is built on self-sufficient foundations when existing capacities are turned into critical infrastructures (ibid, pp. 685, 698).

According to Korosteleva (2020, p. 683), the EU has undergone several reflective shifts to create a more effective and sustainable external governance. But from a methodological point of view, resilience should not only shift responsibilities to individuals and communities but imply the understanding of the locals for what they are. This would

enable them to build sustainable, critical infrastructures with the help of their existing capacities (ibid). Moreover, resilience demands a transformative reconsideration of the self-organising principles behind collective agency, ultimately leading to a rediscovery of self-governance. The EUGS, however, does not suggest such solutions (ibid, p. 685).

2.3 Development of the CSDP and its Civilian Missions

The EUGS aims to reduce the impact and spread of violent conflicts and crises through resilience-building and an integrated approach to EU resources and policies. The Common Security and Defence Policy's (CSDP) international missions and operations are a noteworthy instrument for reaching this goal (Doyle, 2022, pp. 2–3).

2.3.1 Evolution of European Security Policy Post-Cold War

Before the end of the Cold War, European security and defence largely relied on the United States (US) and its commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (Howorth, 2020, p. 685). The initial idea for a common defence policy dates back to the signing of the Treaty of Brussels by the United Kingdom (UK), France and the Benelux countries in 1948. This agreement included a mutual defence clause and was the basis for the establishment of the Western European Union (WEU), which was the principal forum for consultation and dialogue on security and defence matters in Europe, next to NATO (EEAS, 2022). Through the WEU, the member states tried to create a military role within NATO but largely failed to do so. Only after the Berlin Wall fell did the EU gradually become a global player and began to develop an independent foreign and security policy (Howorth, 2020, pp. 685–686).

In 1999, the EU member states met in Helsinki to agree on the European Security and Defence Policy – later renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy – which included credible military forces and decision-making structures. The idea originated one year in advance when the UK and France decided that the EU should have capacities for autonomous action in response to international crises (Doyle, 2022, p. 6). With the CSDP,

the EU aimed to establish a reliable European military capacity independently from NATO. France prompted three major ambitions: First, the EU defines its strategic ambitions autonomously at the political level. Second, the EU develops military and civilian instruments to pursue their strategy and build capacities. Third, at the operational level, the EU must acquire the experience, ability and confidence to conduct operations overseas in pursuit of its interests and its strategy (Howorth, 2020, pp. 691–692). However, this had only limited success, as major crises at the EU's borders, like the conflict in Libya in 2011 and the Annexation of Crimea in 2014, have been taken over by NATO. The reason for failing to follow the three outlined ambitions is that the CSDP project never developed a common agreed strategy. It was, hence, constantly downgraded and became a project that above all offered training, policing, advice and assistance (ibid, pp. 686, 694).

2.3.2 Institutional and Legal Framework of the Civilian CSDP Missions

The CSDP has its legal basis in the Treaty on European Union, specifically in Article 42(1) TEU, and is part of the CFSP, whereby it shall use the member states' capabilities to provide civilian and military capacity for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and international security outside of the EU.

The institutional framework of the CSDP largely replicated the structure of NATO (Howorth, 2020, p. 696). The CSDP has a Political and Security Committee that consists of one ambassador per member country and operates based on unanimity. Furthermore, the CSDP has an EU Military Committee with the Chiefs of Defence Staff of each member state. Both replicate NATO's structure (ibid). However, one very significant innovation of the CSDP is the Committee for Civilian Crisis Management, which oversees the non-military missions. This Committee is unique and distinguishes the CSDP from NATO (ibid).

The civilian CSDP missions became a popular instrument of the policy. Their overall objective is to enhance the EU's capacity to save human lives during crises, uphold fundamental public order, prevent conflicts from escalating further, facilitate the transition

to a peaceful, stable and self-sustaining environment, mitigate negative effects on EU member states and address related challenges of coordination (Doyle, 2022, p. 7). To achieve those objectives, CSDP missions apply training, capacity-building and mentoring programmes to help reduce violent conflicts and support peacebuilding in the region (ibid, pp. 3–4). Elemental features of peacebuilding missions to achieve short-term tension reduction are mediation, negotiation and dialogue capacity at the local level. However, the EU CSDP civilian missions face challenges applying such capacities as it requires knowledgeable staff with the skills and competencies to enter a highly conflict-prone peacebuilding area (ibid).

2.4 EU Peacebuilding and Resilience

Joseph and Juncos (2020, p. 288) argue that the EU interprets resilience in a way that aligns with its interests rather than prioritising an effective peacebuilding approach.[1] Concretely, this suggests that EU peacekeeping resolutions are not fully shaped by the needs of the conflicted regions, but merely reflect the EU's own values and strategic interests. Joseph and Juncos (2020) conclude that the promise of resilience in EU peacebuilding measures remains unaccomplished, mainly because the EU holds on to its past liberal peacebuilding measures (ibid, p. 304–305).

Poopuu (2020, p. 4) argues that the evaluation of CSDP missions was more concentrated on internal EU dynamics, like staff number, logistics and decision-making than on the actual impact of the mission on the conflict society. The local context of the CSDP operation is rarely examined (ibid). Although concepts like complexity, non-linearity, local ownership, and individual local agency are included in official EU policies, they do not seem to be actively implemented (Joseph & Juncos, 2020, p. 288). The EU only embraces a systemic or integrated approach, which functions as their driving force for the resilience

---

[1] Peacebuilding is *"an inherently political process aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, recurrence or continuation of conflict, and further recognizing that peacebuilding encompasses a wide range of political, development, and human rights programmes and mechanisms"* (United Nations General Assembly, 2016, p. 2).

turn of the EUGS, as the systemic approach already understands peacebuilding processes as part of a larger system (ibid, p. 290).

Poopuu (2020) comes to similar observations like some of the scholars who engage with the EU's resilience-building approach, e.g. that the evaluation of the CSDP rarely has anything to do with the local context of the deployed mission (Juncos, 2017; Korosteleva, 2020) and that the EU seems to waver between neoliberal state-building (Korosteleva, 2020) and liberal peacebuilding approaches (Joseph & Juncos, 2020; Juncos, 2017). Opposed to just accepting the core concepts of the CSDP discourse, such as security and the rule of law, PooPuu (2020, p. 8) applies the concept of dialogue to her interrogation of the CSDP missions. In her theoretical approach, dialogue is seen as a process where identity is shaped through the interaction of multiple selves and others (ibid). Thus, dialogue is an important concept to consider when looking at the development of civilian CSDP missions through international cooperation between the EU and the targeted host country with the CSDP mission, as well as the interactions between the host country and their opponents (mostly neighbouring countries).

2.5 State of the Art – Reflection on Resilience in EU Missions

The literature review shows that there is no simple definition of the term resilience. For this master's thesis, I want to contribute to the broader field of peacebuilding studies. Positioning resilience as the core principle of EU peacebuilding initiatives serves as a conceptual bridge between European security, external and self-governance. This approach demonstrates how self-securing measures and externally driven development initiatives can be mutually reinforcing. Together, they contribute to the establishment of societies that are sustainable, peaceful and capable of autonomous governance.

The understanding of resilience in this paper combines the definitions and approaches of the authors referenced in this literature review. Hence, a resilient society should be capable of adjusting and adapting to both external and internal shocks while maintaining effective self-governance (Bourbeau, 2018, pp. 13–14). Such societies have the capacity

to develop and sustain critical infrastructures through self-organisation. Consequently, local ownership and a certain level of trust in the system and the government play an important role in strengthening resilience (Joseph & Juncos, 2020, p. 291; Korosteleva, 2020, p. 682).

The EU has established a very broad concept of resilience through the EUGS. Already in 2016, the EU aimed to make societies and individuals resilient by creating democratic and sustainable structures and generating trust in their institutions (Bendiek, 2016, p. 1). Furthermore, the EUGS seeks to reform global governance structures to secure common resources for everyone. According to this understanding of resilience, the EU should include this concept in their civilian CSDP missions by supporting the establishment of autonomous local agencies that put their perception of well-being at the centre of their modus operandi (Korosteleva, 2020, p. 685). Therefore, the CSDP missions need a common strategy to follow their ambitions, even if other big actors like NATO also set foot in this particular international arena (Howorth, 2020, p. 686). They should work together and use both of their capacities in their attempt to reach peace in the region. Doyle (2022, pp. 4–5) points out that mediation, negotiation and dialogue capacity at the local level are merely successfully used tools in the civilian CSDP missions' toolbox, but they lack skilled staff with the required competencies in trust-building measures between fragile societies and the state. The missions should aim to align the EU's external governance practices with the need for self-governance by equipping the local society with the necessary capacities to create sustainable infrastructures for effective self-regulation (Korosteleva, 2020, p. 698).

3. Methodology

3.1 Research Design

This thesis aims to show how effective EU civilian CSDP missions are in using resilience-building measures to ease conflicts and lead the securitised countries to a point where they do not need external governance measures any more to be resilient against external and internal threats. I presume, firstly, that the EU's ability to foster institutional resilience

declines when external pressures rise. Secondly, I expect missions that promote local ownership and self-governing principles to strengthen institutional resilience more than missions without these implementations:

Research Question: *How effective are EU civilian CSDP missions in fostering institutional resilience to enable successful self-governance in geopolitically contested environments?*

Hypothesis 1: The effectiveness of EU resilience-building measures decreases in regions where external geopolitical pressures (e.g., through Azerbaijan, Serbia or Russia) are more intense.

Hypothesis 2: Civilian CSDP missions that integrate resilience-building strategies promote local ownership and sustainable self-governance more effectively than those that focus predominantly on external governance structures.

I am using the deductive approach by starting with general principles from existing literature and applying them to specific cases through a theoretical framework. I chose to combine the neoliberal theory of Liberal Institutionalism with the Securitisation Theory from the Copenhagen School. Together, they build the foundation for the concept of resilience. This concept functions as the main lens through which I evaluate the results from the analysis. I analyse two civilian CSDP missions, the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo and the EU Mission in Armenia, by applying the most different system design through document analysis. The document analysis allows me to present the variables for each case. In the following discussion, the results from the analysis are evaluated. Therefore, the impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable is demonstrated, which leads to the answer to the research question in the conclusion.

Figure 1: Research Design

3.2 Case Selection

To study resilience-building through civilian CSDP Missions in the EU's neighbourhood, I selected the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo and the EU Mission in Armenia. The choice of those two cases is guided by five criteria that must be met to

conduct a scientifically adequate comparative case study through the most different system design (della Porta, 2008, pp. 212–213): (1) The cases are appropriate to the theoretical framework that combines Liberal Institutionalism and the Securitisation Theory with the help of the concept of resilience. (2) They are relevant to the studied phenomenon of the EU's effectiveness in using resilience-building measures to facilitate the transition from external governance to self-governance in its neighbouring conflicted countries. (3) The cases are empirically invariant concerning their classification as EU neighbourhood countries that receive EU aid through civilian CSDP missions to transition towards resilient, self-governed states. (4) Sufficient data is available to conduct the analysis. (5) The selection and classification of the cases for the analysis must be based on standardised and repeatable procedures. This applies since these cases are both classified as external EU missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy in the EU's neighbourhood, to stabilise the situation through civilian crisis management tools. Furthermore, the research is repeatable due to the operationalisation of the relevant data through systematic coding and categorisation in the document analysis.

3.2.1 EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

Kosovo is a relatively young yet not fully recognised country in the Western Balkans region. Historically, Kosovo has always been under the dominance of Serbia since it declared independence in 2008 (Ray, 2025). Serbia, however, never accepted Kosovo's independence (lpb Baden-Württemberg, 2024). The ethnic conflict between Kosovo-Albanians and (Kosovo-)Serbs is ongoing. Because of the continuing tensions between these two countries, especially in the border region in the north of Kosovo, the EU established the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo. That has become the largest civilian CSDP mission of the European Union and the only mission with executive functions. The areas of responsibility lie in policing, justice and customs (EEAS, 2020). However, despite the scope of the mission, the tensions are increasing significantly, continuously leading to new outbreaks of conflict at the border (lpb Baden-Württemberg, 2024). We can only assume that the scope of the conflict would be significantly higher without the EU mission at the border. Still, Kosovo is a fragile state that is not entirely established yet and needs to build up its system and its way of governing people without

external help (ibid). Therefore, this case has all the necessary criteria to look at external resilience-building measures.

3.2.2 EU Mission in Armenia

Armenia is geopolitically in a very different situation. It is a fully recognised country with one of the oldest histories in the world (Papazian, 2008). Yet, it has ongoing territorial disputes with its eastern neighbour, Azerbaijan. The biggest conflict evolved around the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which was inhabited to a greater part by ethnic Armenians but is geographically located within Azerbaijani territory. After about 100 years of dispute about the region, Azerbaijan forcibly took full control of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023 (Center for Preventive Action, 2024). The EU Mission in Armenia was established that year. It has purely monitoring and advisory functions and is only authorised to stay and operate exclusively within the internationally recognised borders of Armenia (EUMA, 2024). Therefore, the mission was unable to hinder Azerbaijan from taking control over Nagorno-Karabakh. However, it has shown significant success for the local society of Armenia within a very short mandate (Expert Interviews 1 & 2). This case is significant for the comparative research as the mission in Armenia, in contrast to the mission in Kosovo, shows how civilian resilience-building measures can be successfully applied at the border of two very conflicted states.

3.3 Choice of Theory

This thesis aims to uncover how effectively those two civilian CSDP missions in Kosovo and Armenia use resilience-building measures to foster the country's transition towards sustainable self-governance. The concept of resilience, therefore, plays a crucial role in the analysis. However, it becomes clear in the Literature Review that resilience is a relatively new concept that is not yet fully established. Therefore, it should only create a conceptual frame that combines two theories that work well with the cases but have different epistemological and ontological origins: The first one is Liberal Institutionalism, which is a Neoliberal and, therefore, positivistic theory. Secondly, I use the Securitisation

Theory, which is a critical approach and stems from constructivist thoughts. The concept of resilience, in combination with Liberal Institutionalism and the Securitisation Theory, can provide a practical tool to study the institutional ability to create long-term stability in formerly conflicted regions. This also justifies the use of a comparative case study as the methodological approach, as this is the best way to analyse how institutions that face different security threats can use resilience-building measures and (de-)securitisation processes to their advantage.

3.4 Comparative Case Study – Most Different System Design

The research is conducted through a comparative case study covering two cases: the EU civilian CSDP missions in Kosovo and Armenia. The comparative approach, as a scientific method, controls hypotheses by testing two or more variables while all disturbing elements are parametrised or kept constant. To empirically control the hypotheses, there needs to be a distinction between the parameters set and unchangeable and the operative variables that are flexible and allowed to vary. Consequently, despite their lack of a sufficient number of cases, their influence can be measured through logical reasoning by testing empirical relations (della Porta, 2008, pp. 199–201).

The comparative method is the preferred or often considered best strategy in political and social sciences for investigating a small number of institutions or different macropolitical phenomena because it can be used to test hypotheses concerning only a few large units that are insufficient for statistical analysis (della Porta, 2008, p. 202). The case-oriented approach provides in-depth knowledge of a few cases to produce temporarily limited generalisations of the complex social configurations in macro-units such as countries or institutions (ibid, p. 206). In a small-N, case-oriented comparison, **similarities and differences** are explored by a broad description of the cases, considering a high number of characteristics which are often compared on several dimensions and within long-lasting processes (ibid, pp. 204, 207).

The **most different system design (MDSD)** is a category of theory-driven small-N analysis that compares cases that differ to the greatest extent on almost all but one variable (J.Mills et al., 2010). In this research, the similarities are the constant variables, namely the presence of a civilian CSDP mission in both countries, as both are affected by a long-standing ethnic and territorial conflict with one of their neighbouring countries. The variable of interest in this research is **institutional resilience**, operationalised through institutional adaptability and capacity-building mechanisms (see Table 1). According to John Stuart Mill's method of agreement, if two or more cases have only one characteristic in common, that characteristic is likely the cause or effect of a shared phenomenon or, at minimum, an integral part of it. This method, however, only identifies correlation but cannot confirm causal interference (ibid). Furthermore, by analysing *"most different"* countries or other macro-units and their historical periods, researchers try to discover how similar mechanisms and processes can drive changes in differing periods, regimes and places (della Porta, 2008, pp. 215–216).

Table 1: Comparative variables

Variable	Category	EULEX	EUMA
Constant variable *(similarity)*	Long-standing conflict	Both are civilian CSDP missions set up by the European Union aiming to stabilise the security situation of countries that are affected by a long-standing ethnic and territorial conflict with one of their neighbouring states.	
Independent variables *(differences)*	Operational framework (challenges and achievements)	Rule of law mandate with limited executive functions, Successful in strengthening capacities of the judiciary, the customs and the police; But also cases of insufficient	Monitoring and confidence-building with no executive functions, Successful contribution to the stabilisation of the situation at the border for the prize of a strained relationship

		investigation and misuse of executive power	between the EU and Azerbaijan
	International playing field (except EU)	KFOR (NATO-led peacekeeping and military force), Serbia, Russia, Interpol, Europol	Azerbaijan, Russia (peacekeepers), Turkey, Iran, USA
	Level of security	High level of securitisation through different international actors, very little desecuritising actions despite the drawback of a large part of the executive mandate in 2018	Securitisation levels are gradually going down since the agreement of a peace treaty that also includes the withdrawal of EUMA, but tensions with Russia rise
	Local perceptions	Positively by the Kosovo-Albanians, very negatively by the Kosovo-Serbs	Very positively by Armenians, no reliable information for locals in Azerbaijan
Dependent variable of interest	**Institutional resilience**	This is operationalized through institutional adaptability (measured through the level of external and self-governance), and capacity-building mechanisms (by looking at the functioning of monitoring and advising activities, institutional and information capacity)	

The research is conducted qualitatively as an assessment of the performance of the missions on different levels is challenging to measure quantitatively. According to Krasniqi and Abdullai (2022, p. 172), the quantity of activities carried out on the ground must not automatically reflect the success or failure of the mission. Therefore, it is important to note that a quantitative analysis would need quantifiable variables, which may be possible for

the EULEX mission, as there is already a lot of data. The EUMA mission, however, is only two years old, and there is not enough data published to conduct a reliable quantitative comparison between the missions.

A point of critique for this approach could be that variables like institutional resilience are difficult to measure, and every scholar would possibly do it differently. As my research question evolves around the transition from external to self-governance of the countries through the missions, I qualitatively looked for indicators in my data that show how the countries' institutions can adapt to challenges and what capacities were built through the missions. Thereby, the independent variables directly influence the institutional resilience of the countries. I aim to explain these correlations to answer my research question successfully.

3.5 Choice of Data

The analysis is based on qualitative data collection. The validity of the data is ensured through data triangulation, which consists of primary data collection through expert interviews and EU law and policy documents, as well as secondary data, including scholarly literature and newspaper articles. The experts chose to stay anonymous, thus, the interview transcripts remain solely accessible to the examiners of this thesis in the appendices. Three expert interviews were conducted, two of them with EU diplomats who are working in one of the EU institutions. One of them is working in the field of diplomatic relations between the EU and the Eastern European neighbourhood, hereinafter referred to as the *Expert on Eastern Europe* (Expert Interview 1). The other diplomat is working in the policy field concerning the civilian CSDP missions of the EU, hereinafter referred to as the *Expert on civilian CSDP missions* (Expert Interview 2). Lastly, I got a written response via email to my interview questions from the EULEX Press and Public Information Office (EULEX interview). I got the written consent from all the interview partners, allowing the use of the interview information in the analysis of this thesis, although the interview transcripts can only be accessed by the examiners to ensure maximum anonymity to the experts. Further interview requests went out to an EU

diplomat and expert on diplomatic relations between the EU and the Western Balkans, and the Press Office of EUMA. The diplomat rejected the interview out of concerns of revealing their identity, and EUMA did not respond to my requests.

3.6 Document Analysis

I used the software program NVivo to analyse my qualitative data via coding. Therefore, I applied the hybrid coding approach, stating deductively with a set of a priori codes and inductively added or removed codes based on the data. My initial and final code categorisation and theme identification can be found in the appendices. The variables are also the categories in which I structured my codes and subcategories. For the independent variables, the international playing field category mainly reflects liberal institutionalist ideas, codes under the level of security refer to the Securitisation theory, and local perceptions are part of the concept of resilience. The dependent variable of interest, institutional resilience, is operationalised through codes that reflect the concept of resilience: institutional adaptability and capacity-building mechanisms. This way, I want to ensure that my findings are valid and that the output generates the answer to my research question.

3.7 Limitations

Resilience-building by the EU through civilian CSDP missions in the EU's (wider) neighbourhood is a very complex topic. There are 12 civilian CSDP missions in total. The results would have been more generalisable if all the missions could have been analysed. However, for the time and scope of the project, it is not possible to conduct a quantitative in-depth analysis for more than 2 missions. The time frame goes from the establishment of the EULEX mission in 2008 until the end of March 2025, but most of the analysed data has been published in the years 2020 to 2025. The analysed data has been reduced to documents, literature and newspaper articles that are published in English. Hence, the results could have been different if documents in the native languages of the analysed countries were included.

4. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework combines Liberal Institutionalism and the Securitisation Theory through the concept of resilience. Liberal Institutionalism is a positivistic theory that explains cooperation between states and external governance measures by international institutions. The Securitisation theory shows how threats are constructed through powerful actors and their audiences. Thereby, issues are getting securitised, which justifies the creation of exceptional measures to counter the targeted threat. Resilience serves to overcome these epistemological and ontological differences by providing a common analytical lens: It shows how security policies evolve, how institutions adapt to new threats and how (de-)securitisation measures are implemented on state, community and organisational levels. By using this theoretical lens, I want to look at the broader picture of external resilience-building by the EU in its neighbourhood by highlighting the EU's civilian missions as institutions to shape external security governance through resilience-building mechanisms rather than through purely military means. Furthermore, I aim to show that resilience is not only necessary for fragile states like Kosovo but also for societies in conflicted areas across borders, as we can see in Armenia. This framework is particularly relevant for civilian crisis response missions that help communities to adapt after a crisis and to set up preventative mechanisms to stabilise a state or community before another escalation. Hence, this theoretical framework especially targets purely non-military security responses in post-conflict or fragile regions which are not actively at war.

4.1 Liberal Institutionalism

Liberal Institutionalism developed in the 1980s when the debate between the rival theories of neorealism and neoliberalism culminated. Liberal Institutionalism evolved as a theoretical derivative of neoliberalism, emphasising how state behaviour is impacted by institutions that promote interstate cooperation (Krieger, 2014). *Institutions* are defined as the organisational set-up to implement international rules for cooperation. By creating common rules, principles and standards of state behaviour, institutions build common

grounds for collaboration. Hence, they invent and mediate coordination among state actors in the world order (ibid). As rational actors, states prioritise their interests and seek to maximise the benefits of cooperation. Cooperation is to occur in areas where states share mutual interests. Consequently, institutions play a crucial role in shaping state behaviour by providing a framework to reconsider foreign policy decisions and choices (ibid).

The theory of Liberal Institutionalism also indicates that the existing balance of power shapes the framework of international institutions (Keohane & Martin, 1995, p. 47). Consequently, institutions are conceptualised as both dependent and independent variables: They can change because of human actions while also influencing state behaviour through changes in expectations and processes. Therefore, institutions can be significant for state developments and the conditions under which political outcomes are shaped (ibid, pp. 46–47).

Furthermore, Axelrod and Keohane (1986) show that, despite the former perception that liberalist theories only consider economic cooperation, Liberal Institutionalism can provide a single analytical framework to examine both security and economic matters (Axelrod & Keohane, 1986, p. 227). The effects of globalisation and the complex nature of international security have become increasingly apparent since the 1990s, which has led Liberal Institutionalism to expand its research agenda further. Especially the advancements in the information sector and communications technologies through globalisation have severe effects on international relations (IR) (Krieger, 2014). This can lead to all sorts of transnational problems, ranging from economic or environmental threats to criminal, terrorist or national security matters (Allison, 2000, p. 84). The Liberal Intergovernmentalist Graham Allison states that these problems cannot be solved by national states alone, but they need global mechanisms for cooperation and coordination. Thus, he argues that global integration of technology-driven information, communication, finance, trade, and the use of military power creates a growing demand for supranational governance (ibid).

The securitisation of information is a central point for Liberal Institutionalists, as this explains the necessity of institutions in the security sector. Obtaining information (intelligence) can maximise a policy's utility, which makes the logic of the Liberal Institutionalist theory precisely relevant to security issues, as realists would also define them (Keohane & Martin, 1995, p. 44). An argument of realists against Liberal Institutionalism is, through the relative gains logic, states would not cooperate if they had perfectly contrasting interests and suspect that one partner would gain more from cooperation than the other. Keohane and Martin (1995, p. 44) agree that institutions are not significant when only two states with conflicting interests exist. But, the institution's ability to secure and provide information facilitates the settling of distributional conflicts as gains could be evenly divided among the partners, for instance, by disclosing sensitive information about military capacities and expenditures (ibid, pp. 45–46).

However, Keohane and Martin (1995, p. 50) acknowledge that international institutions also operate within the framework of interests and power and do not always reduce the likelihood of violent conflict and war. The best example might be the NATO bombing campaign of 1999, when the NATO alliance conducted airstrikes on Serbia in former Yugoslavia as a response to Serbia's violent attacks against the resistance movements of ethnic Kosovo-Albanians (see Chapter 5.1.1). Furthermore, the current security reality has changed significantly. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked the end of peace in Europe. Russian President Vladimir Putin justified the invasion, inter alia, by claiming that NATO's eastward expansion threatened Russian security interests (Burdeau, 2022), although this rationale is questioned by experts (Zanchetta, 2022). Moreover, President Donald Trump's second inauguration in January 2025 has introduced uncertainty regarding the future of NATO, as he, at times, threatened to withdraw U.S. support from the alliance. This has raised suspicion around the world about the credibility and stability of NATO as a security institution (Daniels & Mair, 2025).

For these reasons, it would not be sufficient to analyse the issue of my thesis solely with the theory of Liberal Institutionalism. This theory provides a good framework to prove that the EU and the civilian CSDP missions were established out of the states' (security)

interests and that the targeted states, like Kosovo and Armenia, maximise their benefits of cooperation with the EU through these measures. However, to identify resilience-building measures that result in local and sustainable self-governing projects, this issue cannot be looked at only through a positivistic, state-centric lens. A more structuralist point of view is needed to explain this issue in connection to the security threats that Armenia and Kosovo face.

4.2 Securitisation Theory of the Copenhagen School

Similar to Liberal Institutionalism, the Copenhagen School (CoS) and its Securitisation Theory have their roots in the 1990s. It emerged through the scholarly work of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, expanding the concept of security beyond military concerns and broadening the range of referent objects beyond the monopoly of the state as the sole entity that can be threatened (Stępka, 2022, p. 18). The CoS partly interlocks neorealist, liberal and poststructuralist assumptions – it rethinks neorealist ideas on the traditional security debate of conflict and war; liberalist thought of moving beyond the state-centric focus and acknowledging that threats may arise from non-military sources; and poststructuralist assumptions about discourse and discursive structures (Filimon, 2016, p. 51; Sakhri, 2024). Moreover, the CoS's securitisation framework aligns with the constructivist approach by emphasising the role of discourse and language in IR and security studies. Fundamentally, the CoS views security as a construct of human, not state agency. Hence, security is not an objective reality but a construct shaped through inter-subjective social and discursive interactions (Filimon, 2016, p. 49; Stępka, 2022, p. 18). Powerful actors define threats and choose relevant audiences whose recognition of these threats legitimises them. In contrast to Realism, the CoS refrains from the discussion on security materiality, as Securitisation Theory pays no attention to identifying objectively interpreted *"real"* threats (Stępka, 2022, p. 18).

According to Buzan et al. (1998, p. 26), the securitisation process aims to lift existential policy issues above politics to present it as a matter of supreme priority. Powerful actors declare a particular issue as an existential threat through speech acts. However, this does

not produce security itself; it is a securitising move. Only if this is approved by the relevant audience (e.g., the wider society) does the issue become an intersubjectively constructed threat (Stępka, 2022, p. 19).

John L. Austin's and John Searle's theory of speech acts builds the foundation for the translation of the performativity of language to the concept of security. The idea is that not only can the information given through statements be judged, but also their performance (Austin, 1975; Stępka, 2022, p. 20). To be successful, a speech act must define an existential threat and identify a referent object (this must be socially significant, like shared values or identities). These two elements combined can make the issue perceived as a serious threat that justifies exceptional security measures (Stępka, 2022, p. 20). However, while the CoS clearly indicates that successful securitisation is determined by the audience, not the *"securitiser",* it does not provide a clear definition of who or what the audience is (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 31; Stępka, 2022, p. 21). It is hence criticised that the effect of the speech act on the audience does not play such a significant role in the securitisation framework (Stępka, 2022, p. 21). For this thesis, the audience is needed to explain the security dynamics in Kosovo and Armenia concerning the civilian CSDP missions, as the EU has been part of the audience when the security threats originally emerged in those countries. Only by the EU's acceptance of the issue as a security breach has it been politicised and securitised by establishing CSDP missions in the targeted regions. Now, the EU itself is a powerful actor in these regions that defines issues as security concerns through the act of speech.

The Securitisation Theory tries to explain how issues, objects or dynamics that used to be outside of the security framework are getting securitised. This, however, carries the danger of including too many areas in the security issues, making the concept empirically worthless. Consequently, the CoS adapts the Schmittian idea of *"exception"* (Stępka, 2022, p. 22). The state of exception is when a sovereign authority takes on a superior position in the legal system and thereby suspends established norms, fundamental rights and freedoms. This typically occurs when a significant danger threatens a state's existence and is hence justified on the basis of protecting law and order (Ates, 2023, p.

115). The CoS hence argues that security should be seen as something that is outside *"normal politics"* (the everyday standardised political interactions within the limits of normative and casual procedures). Thereby, the process of constructing security is stuck between securitisation and desecuritisation (Stępka, 2022, p. 22). An issue can go through different steps of politicisation before it reaches the level of security, beginning from being non-politicised to becoming politicised and finally securitised (see Figure 2; Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23–24). Nevertheless, the CoS does not explicitly clarify the mechanics and modes of the desecuritisation process (see Chapter 4.3.2).

Non-Politicised Issue	**Politicised Issue**	**Securitised Issue**
No issue of public debate or decision at the state level.	The issue is part of the standard political system.	The issue is seen as an existential threat.

Figure 2: The Securitisation Spectrum, own graphic representation, information source: Does (2013).

4.3 The Concept of Resilience

In IR, and especially security studies, resilience only came up recently through issues of declining sovereignty and social capital, as well as increasing threats of terrorism (Bourbeau, 2013, p. 3). Bourbeau (2013, p. 4) proclaims, *"resiliencism sheds new and significant light on the securitisation process as well as on the instruments, strategies and practices of contesting the securitisation process."* The resilience-building approach helps to bridge Liberal Institutionalism and Securitisation, as resilience incorporates crucial elements from both perspectives, which cannot be sufficiently studied through only one theoretical lens. In the following, I explain how resilience can be integrated into each of these different paradigms.

4.3.1 Resilience at State, Community, and Organisational Levels

In their paper *Towards A Conceptualisation Of Resilience In Security Studies*, Kekovic and Ninkovic (2020) analysed the resilience of three basic systems: the state, the community and the organisational level. While the dimensions (e.g. the fundamental

components of the framework) differ for each system, the capacities stay the same, and there are generally three types for each system: Firstly, the *absorptive capacity* is the degree to which a system can handle disruptions independently and reduce the consequences without too much effort. Secondly, *adaptive capacity* describes the degree to which a system can reorganise itself to recover its system performance levels to the state before disruption. Lastly, *restorative capacity* defines a system's ability to repair itself to its original, pre-event, or a new state that is more adaptive to future system requirements (Kekovic & Ninkovic, 2020, p. 156).

Building on Kekovic and Ninkovic's (2020) findings, we now shortly explore the importance of resilience in the three aforementioned systems. Starting with the state in the context of national security, the concept of resilience states that the global world is defined by dynamic change and interdependence. Thus, a resilient nation can maintain stability, resist negative impacts and recover quickly without major consequences for the citizens' safety. Consequently, resilience focuses on the adaptive capacity of economically stable states' national security strategies to maintain a country's functioning, structure or identity (ibid, p. 158).

On the community level, resilience promises to create robustness and adaptation capacity of social networks to master disaster risk reduction. Building a disaster-resilient community starts with individuals taking responsibility for their actions and extends to entire communities working alongside local, state and federal officials to build a national collective shield of resilience. They must have the capacity to acquire knowledge on how to adapt to changing conditions through learning, planning and reorganisation (Kekovic & Ninkovic, 2020, pp. 159–160).

Finally, on the organisational level, resilience describes the complex adaptive level of socio-technical systems. This involves the adaptation and transformation of systems by developing new structures like specific processes, policies or an organisational culture that allows the organisation to function even amid upcoming challenges. Here, the adaptive capacity arises from the process of organisational learning, which describes how

people's actions can modify a system's resilience and adaptability. If an existing system becomes unsustainable, a new, stable landscape can be established through adaptive governance (Kekovic & Ninkovic, 2020, p. 161). This process requires change while maintaining the system's structure or function and the necessary capacities to learn, adapt and self-organise. Focusing on collaboration and communication between various organisations and stakeholders further enhances organisational crisis response and resilience. However, these cooperations rely on pre-existing system relationships (ibid, p. 162).

The integration of information infrastructure in global governance mechanisms and cooperation is consequently a major intersection of Liberal Institutionalism and the concept of resilience. Critical information infrastructure gains significance as states and communities are getting more dependent on informational-communicational systems because of the increasing threat of cyber terrorism and warfare (Kekovic & Ninkovic, 2020, p. 162). Institutions obtain and provide critical information, which subsequently leads to the adoption of a country's (security) policies. Moreover, the country or institution can use the sensitive information as a bargaining chip for cooperation or the settlement of distributional conflicts.

Another important aspect that connects Liberal Institutionalism and resilience is that institutions can change through human actions and influence state behaviour accordingly. Consequently, the theory of Liberal Institutionalism admits that not only are state actors responsible for shaping political outcomes, but also institutions and the individuals or societies that may influence these institutions. I argue that the EU, as one of the largest institutions in the world, is shaped not only by national interests but also by the broader interests of European society. It has critical information infrastructure from 27 member states and even more international partners. Through its extensive capabilities, the EU has established a resilient society that can cope with both internal and external threats. Even though the EU is at its most critical point since possibly its foundation, it remains a strong and resilient institution in itself.

4.3.2 Resilience in CoS-Security Dynamics

Bourbeau and Vuori (2018) have analysed the relationship between security, resilience and non-security politics. They argue, most scholarly literature assumes that desecuritisation and resilience processes both consistently occur after an issue was securitised (Bourbeau & Vuori, 2018, p. 58). However, Bourbeau and Vuori not only analyse the pattern in which desecuritisation and resilience follow security, but they also look at instances where resilience and desecuritisation arise before the securitisation processes start (ibid, p. 62). Therefore, they developed a triangular model which explains dual relationships between security, resilience and non-security politics (see Figure 3). Bourbeau and Vuori (2018, p. 64) have conceptualised those triangular relationships through the Copenhagen approach to security and politics. The arrows in Figure 3 represent political moves to either transform, repel or keep the status of an issue (ibid).

Figure 3: Triangular relationship of security, resilience and non-security politics, own graphic representation, information source: Bourbeau and Vuori (2018)

Definitions

Security emerges in response to existential threats or if there is a need to act rapidly across several sectors. However, it is not limited to the military sector (Buzan, 1997, p. 5)

but also includes the political, economic, societal, and environmental security sectors (Filimon, 2016, p. 54). Securitising an issue means moving this matter into the sphere of non-political exceptionality (Stępka, 2022, p. 22; Waever, 1995).

Non-security politics refers to political matters that are not considered security issues. They describe non-conflictual relationships between actors who tend to favour trade and diplomacy over mutual threatening. This, however, is not to be confused with insecurity, which represents a threatening situation where there are no certain measures to counter it (Bourbeau & Vuori, 2018, p. 64).

Resilience is the way to adapt to internal or external challenges to maintain, slightly change or completely transform the targeted issue (ibid). Adaptability is a crucial part of resilience, as it creates the capacity to cope with unforeseen events and thus forms a connection between short-term emergency relief efforts and long-term development strategies (Joseph & Juncos, 2020, p. 287; Kekovic & Ninkovic, 2020, p. 155).

Desecuritisation describes the reintroduction of an issue that has been securitised back into the sphere of non-security politics (Stępka, 2022, p. 22; Waever, 1995). It is seen as desirable because it brings the issue back to a situation where no threat occurs and no restrictive measures are needed (Bourbeau & Vuori, 2018, p. 64). However, while literature often biases desecuritisation to be something positive, it is morally not always better than securitisation (ibid, p. 60).

The triangular relationship model

Firstly, in the security-non-security-nexus, the first relation arrow shows the transition from security to non-security politics, meaning that a security issue gets desecuritised through a political move (Bourbeau & Vuori, 2018, p. 65). Hence, the security issue is either resolved, exchanged for a different problem or silenced through marginalisation (Bourbeau & Vuori, 2018, p. 68). Arrow two represents two different aspects: It shows the usual securitisation process when a non-security issue is moved into the realm of security. However, it also suggests that desecuritisation as a political move can originate from a

non-security situation, meaning that authorities might try to keep an issue away from the security status. According to Bourbeau and Vuori (2018, p. 65), this can happen through Hansen's (2012) ideal model of *"change through stabilisation"* and *"pre-emptive desecuritisation as rebuttal"*.

For this thesis, the relationship between resilience and security, as well as resilience and non-security politics, is of primary importance. In the security-resilience nexus, arrow three (3) shows that practices aimed at fostering social and community resilience can be mobilised to react and adapt to a securitised situation (Bourbeau & Vuori, 2018, p. 65). This ankle is favoured in the current scholarly literature about security studies in connection with resilience, as they assume that resilience processes only occur after an issue has already been securitised (ibid, p. 72).

However, resilience can be a preparatory step toward security as well. From the resilience perspective (4), resilience might enact security practices to protect a society's way of life. This is the persistence aspect of resilience, meaning that a society wants to maintain its status quo when confronted with an exogenous shock. Hence, they might protect their current order by enacting security policies (Bourbeau & Vuori, 2018, pp. 65, 75). This specific move can be seen e.g. in the Kosovo resistance moves against Serbian attacks before the NATO bombing (see Chapter 5.1.1) and through the setup of the civilian mission in Armenia to protect their border from Azerbaijan (see Chapter 5.2.2).

Whereas in the resilience-non-security politics nexus (5), we see that resilience can also involve renewal by inducing significant changes in public policy, ultimately leading to desecuritisation (ibid, p. 65). Hence, this might set entirely new directions for the governance of the country or society. Although this remodelling process draws on previous historical experiences and collective memory, it also opens a margin of opportunity for possible new agential powers to take the lead (ibid, p. 80). The civilian CSDP missions aim to reach desecuritisation, which means the withdrawal of the mission when lasting peace has been established in the region. The governance remodelling

process is a particularly important part of the mission in Kosovo, as it is the only mission with limited executive functions in the fields of policing and justice.

Finally, when an issue is desecuritised (6), resilience practices can help maintain the issue in the desecuritisation realm (ibid, p. 66), which can be regarded as the final goal of the civilian CSDP missions. Bourbeau & Vuori (2018, p. 82) explain this through the sociological institutionalist rationale, which suggests that the adjustment of a society or individual to an issue is deeply affected by past experiences and decisions, that the society only becomes truly aware of that issue at critical moments and that the chosen pathway is not easy to adjust, once it is initiated. In this regard, a securitising move is sometimes seen as a disturbance or shock which shall be reversed through resilience mechanisms to maintain the status quo (ibid).

The current world order and the military conflicts in and around Europe do not provide a perception of security or the feeling that countries in Europe can adopt desecuritising measures. These times, it seems as if a military securitisation process like in realist perceptions is urgently necessary to prevent possible attacks from Russia in the East and to counter the threat coming from the United States to withdraw from NATO. However, this thesis aims to look at (de-)securitisation, specifically regarding political and societal sectors, through the EU's civilian CSDP missions. Hence, desecuritisation here is not perceived as something bad but as necessary to end longstanding regional conflicts. But to establish a resilient society, it is also crucial to provide the necessary capacities if a securitisation move (militarily or non-militarily) is needed to protect their way of life.

4.3.3 Resilience: The Missing Link Between Institutions and Threats

Despite their different epistemological and ontological traditions, I argue that Liberal Institutionalism and the Securitisation Theory can be unified through the concept of resilience. Liberal Institutionalism emphasises cooperation, institutions and rules-based governance. The Securitisation theory, on the other hand, focuses on the discursive construction of threats and the securitisation of an issue in order to take exceptional

measures to counter them. Resilience stands at the intersection of these theories as it incorporates institutional mechanisms and the dynamic process of adaptation to upcoming threats. Resilience recognises that security concerns often come from political and societal perceptions. At the same time, the functioning of institutions is also influenced by human and state behaviour and changes in response to security threats. Resilience and (de-) securitisation mechanisms help them to adapt to these new environments without threatening the whole operation of these institutions. Through a comparative case study of the civilian CSDP missions in Kosovo and Armenia, I want to illustrate the adaptability of these institutions, how they concretely engage in (de-)securitisation and resilience building (e.g. by their self-governing ability, information-sharing mechanisms and capacity-building) to reach their goal of promoting stability through non-military means.

Nonetheless, the concept of resilience remains a very normative concept. A critical aspect of resilience in this thesis is that the concept lacks a clear connection to post-conflict resolution mechanisms, as it is found in peacebuilding studies. Especially when it comes to the local perspective, resilience should include more aspects from peacebuilding discussions, like reconciliation and transitional justice, to provide a clear framework on how people from different ethnic backgrounds can overcome their grievances for each other to live together in harmony. Further research in this direction should therefore be conducted in future resilience literature.

5. Analysis

This chapter aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the effectiveness of resilience-building by the two cases, EULEX and EUMA. The analysis was conducted with the help of the software program NVivo. This program allows the collection of all documents in one project. As stated in the methodology, I chose a hybrid coding approach by conducting an initial set of codes and categories that I deemed relevant for my theoretical framework (you can find this in the appendices). During the coding process, I added and removed codes depending on whether new information was found or if initial thoughts had not been covered by the data. The analysis is constructed in three parts. First, I present the findings for the codes and categories of the EULEX-related documents, interviews, literature, and newspaper articles. Secondly, the same approach was taken to analyse the EUMA case. Lastly, the findings of both cases are summarised and compared with each other.

I used the same codes and categories for both cases, therefore, the analyses are constructed in the same way to make them easier to compare. Both cases start with a historical background and a brief explanation of the establishment of the missions to provide the reader with the necessary background information. Afterwards, the independent variables (the differences) and the dependent variable (institutional resilience) with their respective codes are presented. Some of the codes are divided once more into several 'sub-codes'. The sub-codes for the dependent variable are again the same for each case. However, for the independent variables, these were not coded extra in NVivo, but I chose to create them afterwards to give the chapters more structure and clarity (e.g. for the challenges and achievements, and crisis and conflict dynamics for each case, see Figure 4).

Construction of the Analysis

	Sub-codes Case 1 EULEX Kosovo	Sub-codes Case 2 EUMA Armenia

Historical Background & Establishment of the Mission

Independent Variables

Operational Framework
- Achievements
  - 1. Development of the Kosovan judiciary and customs institutions
  - 2. Strengthening of the Police
  - 3. EULEX's evolving role and European Integration

  Case 2:
  - 1. Stabilisation of the situation at the border with Azerbaijan
  - 2. Peace negotiations with Azerbaijan
  - 3. Confidence-building with the Armenian population

- Challenges
  - 1. Conflicts with the Serbian Minority
  - 2. Centralised political system
  - 3. Cases of insufficient investigation and misuse or failure of the use of executive power by EULEX
  - 4. Elite-level corruption
  - 5. Internal challenges

  Case 2:
  - 1. Political risks for the EU
  - 2. Azerbaijan's profound hostility and the EU's partiality towards Armenia
  - 3. Armenia's balancing act

International Playing Field
- International Actors

  Case 2:
  - 1. Russia
  - 2. Turkey
  - 3. Iran
  - 4. Other international cooperations

- Crisis and Conflict Dynamics
  - 1. Fragility and inter-communal tensions
  - 2. Breakdown of Dialogue and Cooperation Mechanisms
  - 3. External Influences and Commitment Challenges

  Case 2:
  - 1. Regional Opposition to EU Involvement
  - 2. Russian warnings against EU alignment

Security Situation
- Securitisation
- Desecuritisation

Local Perceptions and Social Structures
- Cooperation with Locals and Civil Society
  - 1. Civil Society Participation and Consultation Gaps
  - 2. Public Outreach and Strategic Partnerships
  - 3. Rebuilding Trust Through Engagement
- Local Perceptions

Dependent Variable

Institutional Resilience
- Institutional Adabtability
  - 1. External governance
  - 2. Self-governance
- Capacity-building Mechanisms
  - 1. Capacity-building through mentoring, monitoring and advising
  - 2. Institutional capacity
 - 3. Information capacity

Figure 4: Construction of the Analysis with Sub-codes

5.1 EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

5.1.1 Kosovo: A History of Conflict and Change

Kosovo is a country in the Western Balkans, bordered by Serbia, Montenegro, Albania and North Macedonia. Just before World War I, Serbia took control of Kosovo from the Ottoman Empire. Thus, it later became part of the former country of Yugoslavia, where the Serbian-led central government dominated power (Stokes, 2008). The Serbian authorities attempted to recreate their ethnic character in Kosovo through cultural and administrative policies. Under socialist Yugoslavia, Kosovo was granted autonomous status within the Republic of Serbia but remained under Serbian dominance until 1966, when the Serbian chief of the secret police was removed from power (ibid). Through the decentralising constitution of 1974, Kosovo was raised to almost equal status with the other Yugoslav republics until Slobodan Milošević, then president of Serbia, garnered strong support within Serbian society for his repression of the region in 1987 (ibid).

The ethnic majority of Kosovo-Albanians first engaged in passive resistance movements. But by 1998, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had launched guerrilla operations, escalating into armed conflict (Ray, 2025). Serbian special police and Yugoslav armed forces attempted to regain control over the region. Thereby, they committed many atrocities and caused a stream of refugees to flee the area (ibid). An unofficial alliance of the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Russia called for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serbian troops from Kosovo, the return of displaced people and unrestricted access to international observers. Those demands have not been implemented by the Yugoslav President Milošević (ibid). During the ceasefire, the KLA took advantage of the pause to reorganise, rearm, and intensify their attacks. In response, Yugoslav and Serbian forces launched a large-scale counteroffensive, leading to systematic ethnic cleansing (ibid).

After another attempt at diplomatic negotiations had failed, NATO began air strikes against the Serbian military in March 1999. Serbian and Yugoslav forces responded with massive attacks against Kosovo-Albanians, causing the displacement of thousands of

people to Albania, (North) Macedonia and Montenegro (Ray, 2025). The NATO bombing lasted 11 weeks in total and expanded up to Belgrade, significantly damaging the Serbian infrastructure. In June 1999, a peace treaty was signed between NATO and Yugoslavia, defining the withdrawal of all troops and the return of about 1,5 million displaced persons (ibid). Furthermore, an international protectorate directed by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established (Stokes, 2008), but the tensions continued. Yugoslavia ceased to exist in 2003, but Kosovo remained a part of Serbia. Numerous anti-Serb riots broke out in 2004, leading to the death and displacement of thousands of Serbs and other minorities from the Kosovo region. In February 2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia (Ray, 2025). This has been recognised by 117 countries, including the US and nearly all EU member states (BMZ, 2022; Ray, 2025). However, aside from Serbia, several influential countries have not recognised Kosovo as an independent state, including Russia, China and five EU countries: Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus, Romania and Greece (AJLabs, 2023).

5.1.2 Establishment of EULEX

Following Kosovo's declaration of independence, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) was established in 2008. Thereby, all responsibilities in the areas of policing, justice and customs were transferred from the UNMIK to EULEX (EEAS, 2020). Until today, EULEX is the most unique of the EU's CSDP missions as it remains the only mission with executive functions. For nearly a decade, international judges, prosecutors and police officers were appointed by the mission to actively examine, litigate, and rule on legal matters within Kosovo's judiciary (ibid). In June 2018, the responsibilities were shifted back to the Kosovo authorities to handle their cases at all levels. However, the mandate of EULEX still includes monitoring and advising activities and limited executive functions. The mission's headquarters are in Pristina. It is still the largest civilian CSDP mission with up to 396 staff members and remains the second security responder after the national Kosovo police (EULEX, n.d.). The UN Security Council Resolution 1244 builds the framework for the mission (UNMIK, 2016).

The current mandate covers the period from June 2023 to 2025 (Council Decision 2023/1095, 2023). It is carried out through the pillars of monitoring and operations support. The monitoring pillar consists of a case monitoring unit that oversees the entire criminal justice system, as well as civil justice cases related to property and privatisation matters. Additionally, the correctional unit assists the Kosovo Correctional Service by establishing a professional management team and enhancing the capacity for the rehabilitation of Kosovo's prisoners (EULEX, n.d.).

5.1.3 Operational Framework: Challenges and Achievements

The EULEX mission has faced numerous challenges since its beginning. The mission operates within a highly complex political environment marked by ongoing issues related to the Serbian minority, elite-level corruption, and a fragmented political landscape. Despite this, EULEX plays a significant role in contributing to the modernisation and strengthening of the Kosovan rule of law (RoL) institutions. The challenges that EULEX faces can subsequently be lessons learned to improve the mission itself, but also other ongoing or future civilian deployments:

5.1.3.1 Achievements

Development of the Kosovan judiciary and customs institutions
The EULEX interview reveals that the mission's key achievements are the strengthening and development of the RoL institutions of the judiciary, the customs, and the police. Until 2018, when the mission still had broader executive functions, EULEX judges adjudicated more than 64,261 cases, including war crimes, corruption, organised crime and money laundering as well as constitutional and civil justice cases (EULEX Interview). The EULEX judges and prosecutors, therefore, supported the development of an independent judiciary aligned with EU standards (ibid). Furthermore, EULEX strengthened the Kosovo Judicial Council and the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council and gave legislative assistance to Kosovo authorities in over 150 laws; assisted with the integration of Kosovo Serb judges, prosecutors and their staff into the judicial system of Kosovo; supported Kosovo, together with the EU Office and the European Commission, to establish a reliable civil registry of

over 12,000 books and established the interim Common Crossing Points (CCPs) between Kosovo and Serbia, among others (ibid). Lastly, EULEX structurally mentored, monitored and advised Kosovo customs so they have become a well-established and reliable institution. Today, they can conduct a better-quality risk analysis and efficiently collect customs revenues of well over 50 per cent of Kosovo's annual budget (ibid).

Strengthening of the Police

The Expert on the EU civilian CSDP missions has outlined that the Kosovo police is now capable of conducting police work independently and at all levels. The police force has the competence to operate by the RoL and human rights standards, which is a top priority for the EU (Expert Interview 2). It is therefore already a great achievement of EULEX that the Kosovo police can carry out its work according to the EU's criteria and maxims. Moreover, it represents a big success for the EU that EULEX's vision of engaging the Kosovo police in community policing and similar instruments has been achieved (ibid). Furthermore, EULEX highlighted its assistance in the integration of close to 300 Kosovo Serb police officers into the Kosovo police in 2013 and the establishment, investment in and training of the Kosovo Police North Quick Force Response Team (EULEX Interview).

EULEX's evolving role and European Integration

Since its creation in 2008, EULEX has faced many challenges regarding its efficiency and public image. But these challenges are valuable lessons learned that help to strengthen not only EULEX but also other civilian CSDP missions further (Krasniqi & Abdullai, 2022, p. 171). EULEX actively engages, albeit with limited success, in facilitating the integration of parallel Serbian structures in the north of Kosovo (ibid, p. 178). What is more, EULEX played an important role in offering expertise in drafting legislation sponsored by the Kosovan Ministry of Justice and simultaneously supporting Kosovo's progress in its European agenda regarding justice and the RoL (ibid). Consequently, EULEX effectively prosecuted anti-corruption cases against civil servants and bureaucrats with public institutions and enforced new anti-corruption legislation and regulations. In the private sector, EULEX achieved successful outcomes in organised crime cases targeting gangs engaged in human and drug trafficking (Jackson, 2020, p. 963). These positive

developments might be a reason why Kosovo's parliament has become more reliable in recent years. The last Kosovan parliament has been the first to conclude a full mandate of four years, from 2021-2025, since Kosovo's independence in 2008 (Euronews, 2025). According to Aivo Orav, the EU's ambassador to Kosovo, the new government also makes the impression that it will meet the expectations of the citizens and continues to pursue the European path (ibid).

5.1.3.2 Challenges

Conflicts with the Serbian Minority

Long after Kosovo declared its independence in 2008, major tensions between the Kosovo Albanians and the Kosovo Serbs remain. In November 2022, Kosovo Serb judges, prosecutors, administrative staff, police officers and mayors resigned from their state institutions in the north of Kosovo, as EU-mediated agreements between Kosovo and Serbia have allegedly been breached (European Commission, 2024, p. 29; Stojanovic & Bami, 2022). Since this mass resignation, the Kosovo Police has endured serious challenges and multiple violent attacks. However, the Police also negatively impacted the Kosovo Serb community by the closure of Serbian-administered institutions. Furthermore, some prominent Serbian people from the civil society in the north have been arrested on seemingly insufficient grounds (Jones, 2024). On April 21, 2024, Kosovo organised a mayoral recall vote to open the way for new local elections in all four municipalities of the north. But the Belgrade-backed party Srpska Lista (*"Serb List"*), representing the Kosovo Serbs, withdrew from the election and left the most polling stations without any Kosovo Serb candidates. Consequently, the elections failed due to an extremely low voter turnout, making inclusive local elections in the northern municipalities close to impossible (European Commission, 2024, pp. 4, 21; Stojanovic & Bami, 2022).

Centralised political system

The Srpska Lista not only boycotted institutions in the north but also the work of the national Kosovan Assembly to diminish its capacity to adopt constitutional amendments and pass legislation (European Commission, 2024, p. 22). The level of political centralisation is high. Kosovo shows a strong commitment to the European path, but the

implementation of Kosovo's EU agenda is restricted by its fragmented political landscape. The lack of expert-level permanent interministerial coordination bodies limits the political ownership of the ministries and delays coordination and decision-making. Furthermore, Kosovo's institutions still show very weak administrative capacities (ibid).

Cases of insufficient investigation and misuse or failure of the use of executive power by EULEX

The Kosovo Report 2024 by the European Commission states that Kosovo has only made limited progress in improving the functioning of the judiciary and strengthening the protection of fundamental rights (European Commission, 2024, p. 5). A critical point for the mission is a case before the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), where the plaintiffs accused EULEX of a deficient investigation of the disappearance and murder of members of their families, as well as the misuse or failure to use their executive power by removing their executive mandate in 2018 (*KS and KD v Council of the European Union and Others*, 2024, p. 8). Furthermore, they contested the proclamation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Council that EULEX did their best to thoroughly investigate the crimes in question (ibid, p. 28). The CJEU, however, found that these situations are not directly related to the political or strategic choices of the CFSP and are therefore referred back to the General Court (ibid, pp. 28, 33). This ruling raised critical voices from international law experts, as the Lisbon Treaty integrated the CFSP into the EU's legal system and should therefore be in the CJEU's jurisdiction (Verellen, 2024). However, the ill-defined boundaries of the CJEU's jurisdiction within the CFSP remain a challenge that requires a reform of the Treaties to be resolved (ibid). For now, the final rulings of the cases and the consequences for EULEX are still uncertain.

Elite-level corruption

Kosovo has made only limited progress in strengthening the fight against corruption (European Commission, 2024, p. 5). While many lower-tier corruption cases related to civil service and bureaucratic matters are pursued, EULEX has not successfully managed cases involving centralised corruption among economic, party, or government elites (Jackson, 2020, p. 967). EULEX struggles to separate anti-corruption cases from the

necessary dialogue with Serbia because the elites facing prosecution can disrupt the dialogue and increase pressure on the EU to limit EULEX's actions. As organised crime and corruption become gradually tolerated, the EU's incentives diminish in a trade-off between institutional reform in Kosovo and dialogue with Serbia (ibid). This creates challenges for EULEX in pursuing cases against Kosovo Serbs, as their access to the Serb-majority areas in northern Kosovo is restricted. Furthermore, contrary to the assumptions of this thesis, Jackson (2020, p. 957) highlights the *critical 'local turn'*. He argues that focusing on strengthening local institutions primarily benefits elites who profit from patronage, instability, and conflict-driven markets, thus failing to address the underlying causes of violence instead (ibid).

Internal challenges

Alongside all the external influences that pose a challenge to the functioning of EULEX, the mission also has some internal issues. Next to the accusations of KS and KD in the Joint Case stated above, other actors like Serb NGOs have stated that EULEX does not fulfil its monitoring responsibilities sufficiently (Jones, 2024). The Expert on civilian CSDP missions, as well as the Head of Mission (HoM) Giovanni Barbano (in an online interview), admit that EULEX has insufficient budgetary resources and, therefore, the mission needs to allocate its funds according to the existing needs (Expert Interview 2, Jones, 2024). However, this further challenges the mission's efficiency (Krasniqi & Abdullai, 2022, p. 171). Furthermore, EULEX must maintain a neutral status towards Kosovo, as five EU member states do not recognise Kosovo's independence (ibid, p. 175). However, this does not affect the work of EULEX or the EU support towards the mission (EULEX & Expert Interview).

5.1.4 International Playing Field

5.1.4.1 International Actors

This section provides Liberal Institutionalist connections about EULEX's multilateral cooperation with different international actors and shows how rule-based cooperation can strengthen Kosovo's rule of law. Apart from the EU and EULEX, there are several

international actors involved in the conflict. Firstly, Kosovo and the mission have several cooperating partners, namely Europol, Interpol, Frontex and NATO. EULEX facilitates the exchange of information between the Kosovo Police (which is the first security responder) and Interpol, Europol and the Serbian Ministry of Interior (EULEX Interview). Furthermore, Kosovo is advancing its cooperation with Europol by participating in joint operations and the deployment of a liaison officer in Europol (European Commission, 2024, p. 8). Based on mutually agreed operational plans with Kosovo, Frontex deploys officers at several border-crossing points. Moreover, the NATO-led KFOR is still the most significant international partner as it provides military security. In June 2024, KFOR had up to 4490 personnel from 28 contributing countries (ibid, p. 89). This high level of international cooperation, however, does not prevent Kosovo from punishment: In 2023, Washington and the EU suspended funding for several projects after a US-led dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia collapsed, followed by another outbreak of violence at the shared border (Euronews, 2025). Moreover, the Expert on civilian CSDP missions mentioned the Russian influence on the Serbian government in Belgrade. According to the Expert, Serbia will continue to act on the ground with Russia's support, creating large tensions and an unstable political situation locally (Expert Interview 2).

5.1.4.2 Crisis and conflict dynamics

Fragility and inter-communal tensions

In December 2024, the head of the EULEX mission, Giovanni Barbano, talked in an interview about a deteriorating situation in the north with increasing street harassment and a canal bombing (Jones, 2024). This situation has calmed down, as in the interviews with EULEX and the Expert on the civilian CSDP missions (both conducted in March 2025), the Experts stated that there have been fewer tensions and the situation is relatively calm, as the Kosovan government has taken measures to shut down parallel structures in the country. However, the situation remains fragile, with strained inter-communal relations (EULEX & Expert Interview 2).

Breakdown of Dialogue and Cooperation Mechanisms

Apart from the aforementioned US-led dialogue that broke down in 2023, there has also been no continuation of the Belgrade-Pristina Working Group on Missing Persons (led by the International Committee of the Red Cross). The Kosovo delegation insists that Serbia change its Head of Delegation. For this reason, the Deputy heads of delegation held an ad hoc meeting in Geneva in January 2024. This seemingly positive development could not lead to any result as both parties continuously hampered the dialogue through unconstructive behaviour (European Commission, 2024, p. 58). Furthermore, Serbia has violated its dialogue obligations through the withdrawal of Kosovo-Serbs from Kosovan institutions in 2022 and the boycott of local elections in 2023 (ibid, p. 60). In 2014, 2017 and 2018, Serb politicians of the Srpska Lista party organised protests against the removal of roadblocks to secure the border with Serbia and boycotted the Kosovan government (Jackson, 2020, p. 965). This might also be a reason why only two of six permanent Common Crossing-Points (CCPs) between Kosovo and Serbia are operational. Serbia has not established any CCPs on its side, which led to a suspension of EU funds for the project since 2018 (European Commission, 2024, p. 61). The EU urges Serbia to resume the EU-facilitated joint meetings on Integrated Border Management at central, regional and local levels (ibid).

External Influences and Commitment Challenges

In 2008, EULEX and UN officials agreed with the Serbian government on several technical provisions to incorporate Kosovo-Serbs into the Kosovan RoL institutions, but the Kosovo Serbs and the government of Kosovo both formally rejected the agreement (Jackson, 2020, p. 963). Additionally, Kosovo-Serb leaders do not acknowledge EULEX's authority, which is why they often violently deny access to the Serb communities in the north (Jackson, 2020, p. 963). Kosovo's Prime Minister (PM) Albin Kurti and his cabinet, however, took several steps to raise tensions with Serbia and the Kosovo-Serb community, like the ban on the use of the Serbian currency (the dinar). Consequently, Kosovo-Serbs cannot do or receive transfers of dinar, which heavily affects the ethnic Serb minority, as they depend on Belgrade's social services and payments (Euronews, 2025). This still happens despite Kosovo's commitment to abide by international law

related to human and fundamental rights and the protection of persons belonging to minorities without discrimination on any ground, which is enshrined in Article 4 of Kosovo's Association Agreement (AA) (European Commission, 2015).

5.1.5 Security Situation

5.1.5.1 Securitisation

Northern Kosovo's security situation is relatively stable and calm, but remains fragile because of the ongoing tense inter-communal relations. Therefore, EULEX continues to monitor the conflict environment and the well-being of all communities in Kosovo (EULEX Interview). The daily management of all security aspects within EULEX's mandate is ensured through Area Security Officers in the regional and local EULEX locations. These are appointed by the HoM and stand under the authority of the Senior Mission Security Officer (Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP, article 14(4)). Despite being a RoL mission with merely monitoring and advisory functions, the uniformed EULEX staff carries weapons for self-defence and in line with the mission's mandate as second security responder (Jones, 2024). Kosovo has a three-tiered security mechanism, where the Kosovo Police is the first responder, EULEX the second, and KFOR the third. They work in close coordination with each other to be prepared in cases of civil disturbances. To ensure readiness, they carried out the second joint exercise to test their capacity to apply crisis management procedures in crowd and riot control situations in November 2024 (ibid). HoM Giovanni Barbano emphasises that uncoordinated and unilateral activities could carry certain political consequences. EULEX, however, is a technical mission that is mandated to assess security situations and does not engage in political judgments (ibid). Through their AA, Kosovo ensured compliance with the execution of the CSDP mission, as well as convergence with the EU's general CFSP measures, especially in regard to restrictive measures against third countries, persons or non-state agencies (European Commission, 2015, p. 7). Furthermore, the EU expects Kosovo to combat and prevent all forms of criminal activities, organised crime and serious violations of the law with a cross-border dimension, and to promote regional cooperation in that matter (ibid, p. 28).

5.1.5.2 Desecuritisation

The literature has not revealed many desecuritisation measures of the EULEX mission or the conflict situation in Kosovo generally. The only code that has therefore been found is the transition from an executive mandate to a role that focuses more closely on monitoring and advising tasks (EULEX Interview). This does not seem much at first, but it was a big step as EULEX managed to foster resilience, independence, and transparency in Kosovo's justice institutions (ibid), inasmuch that responsibilities could be referred to the Kosovo authorities. In this case, desecuritisation does not mean the issue is no longer securitised. But it is a small step that will eventually take the issue from being securitised to politicised and maybe non-politicised if the conflict is completely resolved at one point (see Figure 2).

5.1.6 Local Perceptions and Social Structures

5.1.6.1 Cooperation with Locals and Civil Society

Civil Society Participation and Consultation Gaps

EULEX aims to actively strengthen societal resilience in Kosovo through establishing inclusive governance mechanisms by giving Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) an active role in the implementation of reforms. CSOs play an active and diverse role in a largely enabling environment in Kosovo. They are involved in the design, implementation and supervision of EU-related reforms (European Commission, 2024, p. 23). Most draft laws, strategies and concept documents were accessible on an online platform for public consultations. However, these consultations remain insufficiently regulated by the government, which is required to adhere to consultation timelines, ensure transparency through complete information sharing, provide feedback and publish all of the updated draft proposals and final reports (ibid). The regulation on public funding for CSOs is being implemented, but it also still lacks accurate, timely reports on public funding and the evaluation of the effectiveness of allocated funds (ibid).

Public Outreach and Strategic Partnerships

The EULEX mission is responsible for implementing a transparent and timely public information policy. Especially at the end of the largest part of the executive mandate in 2018, EULEX provided a broad public information campaign informing the on the changes and the future of Kosovo's RoL in English, Albanian and Serbian languages (Jones, 2024). Additionally, EULEX regularly consults with CSO representatives and members of the Kosovo public. A large part of the mission is countering disinformation from different sources, whereby the local media plays an important role in fact-checking and news debunking (ibid). The local population is hence encouraged to check all of the information regarding the mission's posture or engagement on EULEX's official channels (ibid). Furthermore, EULEX specifically partners with civil society on topics like violence against women and gender equality. The civil society engages with Kosovo's youth community and advocates for the creation of effective assistance services to victims at the government level, including reintegration programmes (EULEX Interview).

Rebuilding Trust Through Engagement

Critics say that the bridge between civil society and EULEX is broken, as EULEX would not proactively engage with NGOs but would wait for them to ask for cooperation. The HoM Giovanni Barbano counters this argument by saying that EULEX stands in a constant dialogue with civil society at all levels, and is steadfastly engaged in a continuous exchange of views with numerous NGOs (Jones, 2024). This way, EULEX would listen in formal and informal meetings to citizens' grievances, complaints and honest feedback for the mission's work on the ground (ibid). Barbano reassures that all those inputs are seriously considered, as the upholding of human rights by everyone in Kosovo is EULEX's priority. Consequently, dedicated dialogue between the civil society and Kosovo would not only be the interest of the population of Kosovo-Serbs, but of all communities in the country (ibid).

5.1.6.2 Local Perceptions

According to HoM Barbano, EULEX staff wearing uniforms helps signal their presence and makes them more easily approachable to the local population, encouraging them to

present their claims, and reinforcing the mission's commitment to benefit everyone on the ground (Jones, 2024). The Expert on civilian CSDP missions similarly says that parts of the local population respond and react very positively to EULEX staff as they do their patrols (Expert Interview 2). Nonetheless, Barbano acknowledges that the presence of special units is still negatively perceived by the Kosovo-Serb population. EULEX conveyed this information to the leadership of the Kosovo Police, so they could address this issue comprehensively (Jones, 2024). Moreover, a critical analysis of EULEX from 2022 has noted great discontent of Kosovo's population about the mission, as EULEX was not able to fulfil its high expectations that it raised from the very beginning. The public expected the prosecution of high-profile cases against organised crime and corruption in Kosovo, but the local perception of the corruption level in the public sector is still too high (Krasniqi & Abdullai, 2022, p. 177). This sense of disappointment and frustration lets the local population see international missions like EULEX as ineffective. The Kosovo Centre for Security Studies conducted a study about the public approval of law enforcement agencies in Kosovo. EULEX ranked last with 22 per cent of public approval, followed by the Kosovo Police with 42 per cent and KFOR with 60 per cent (ibid).

5.1.7 Institutional Resilience

EULEX helps Kosovo's RoL institutions respond to crises by introducing external governance structures with the aim of a full transition to self-governance and local ownership. Some scholars are criticising that EULEX imports the models of EU institutions, as the local structures might not fit into the foreign system. On the other side, EULEX builds capacities within Kosovo's RoL institutions mainly through monitoring and advising activities, which strengthen Kosovo's resilience by allowing it to build its own adaptive mechanisms. What is more, information capacity, as it is explained by Liberal Institutionalism, plays a significant role in the security relations between the cooperating partners.

5.1.7.1 Institutional adaptability

External governance

The EULEX mission represents a form of external governance, as the EU seeks to establish a RoL structure in Kosovo from the outside. According to Jackson (2020, p. 957), the EU's external governance largely involves importing foreign institutions while overlooking local structures, resulting in dysfunction. Kosovo, however, signed an Association Agreement with the EU as it aims to join the Union as soon as the necessary reforms are in place. Through the AA, Kosovo is bound to *"ensure that its existing law and future legislation will gradually be made compatible with the EU acquis"* (European Commission, 2015, p. 22). Furthermore, Kosovo agreed to the supervision over its application and implementation of the Agreement through a Stabilisation and Association Council (ibid, p. 35). But the EU and EULEX mission are not the only external actors in Kosovo. The Expert on civilian CSDP missions stated that the power of KFOR should not be undermined (Expert Interview 2). The EU and NATO aimed to provide a mentor to almost every police officer in the country. Therefore, a large number of personnel are still on the ground, and according to the Expert, they need to remain there as the situation would escalate again otherwise. These external influences are therefore necessary to stabilise the situation on the ground (ibid).

Self-governance

Since 2018, the Kosovo local justice system has had no international judges and prosecutors for the first time in its post-conflict history. EULEX gave up its executive functions in the judiciary, and Kosovo authorities overtook the full responsibility for investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating cases at all levels (EULEX Interview). Today, EULEX remains largely present but focuses on its monitoring and advising mandate. The Expert on civilian CSDP missions highlights the good work that the Kosovo police is doing with the help of EULEX after 17 years of cooperation. Generally, Kosovo's RoL institutions have made significant progress in fulfilling their duties (EULEX Interview). EULEX thereby remains a steadfast partner to foster local ownership, which is *"the bedrock of long-lasting reform"* (ibid) and is implemented in all projects whenever it is possible (Expert Interview 2). However, EULEX highlights that the true responsibility for reform lies within Kosovo's

leadership. To build a sustainable justice system, Kosovo needs to close the gap between its legislation and implementation. This is only possible through political will, judicial independence and active civic engagement (EULEX Interview). The findings of the latest Kosovo Report show that the relationship between the central government and the municipalities (which are mostly led by opposition mayors) is still strained and has not improved (European Commission, 2024, p. 22). Initiatives to change certain ministerial responsibilities lacked public consultations and disregarded potential risks (ibid, p. 4). However, the municipalities have made substantial progress in strengthening their operations and service delivery, and an increased overall budget growth of 12 per cent compared with 2023 (ibid, p. 22). Moreover, clear improvements were made with gender equality at local and central levels (ibid, p. 4).

5.1.7.2 Capacity-building mechanisms

Capacity-building through mentoring, monitoring and advising

The largest part of EULEX's mandate is the monitoring and advising activities that need to be physically carried out in the Kosovo institutions along the entire justice chain (EULEX Interview). EULEX thereby needs to remain an impartial party to assess the Kosovo institutions' adherence to the RoL and human rights obligations, while fully respecting the judicial independence and the principle of non-interference (ibid). When serious shortcomings are identified, EULEX addresses the responsible authorities with advice and recommendations that are recorded in monitoring reports to effectively tackle those problems (EULEX Interview, Jones, 2024). The Kosovo Report still identified some shortcomings of judges in conducting trials professionally and impartially. Hence, further training by EULEX is needed in this field (European Commission, 2024, p. 27). A positive example of capacity-building in Kosovo's institutions is the recent initiative by the Ministry of Internal Affairs to consult with partners and institutions on creating regulations on the responsible use of social media by Kosovo Police officers. This initiative aims to uphold ethical standards and ensure integrity, impartiality, human rights, and respect for the RoL of Kosovo's Police Officers, both professionally and privately (Jones, 2024).

Institutional capacity

According to the critical analysis of EULEX by Krasniqi and Abdullai (2022, p. 178), the mission has significantly contributed to the institutional capacity and the development of performance of Kosovo's institutions. EULEX has also been active in facilitating the integration of parallel Serbian structures in the north, although only with limited success. Furthermore, the mission helped Kosovo to advance its European agenda by providing important expertise in the process of drafting legislation sponsored by the Ministry of Justice (ibid). Moreover, the participation of Serbia in a joint inspection at the Institute of Forensic Medicine in Pristina has been a significant development and a very positive step by Kosovo and Serbia towards each other (European Commission, 2024, p. 58). EULEX provided expertise and advice to the Kosovo Institute of Forensic Medicine, established a witness protection program and strengthened the capacity of the Kosovo Police through community-oriented policing (EULEX Interview). EULEX's close engagement generally fostered resilience, independence and transparency in Kosovo's justice institutions and contributes to the goal of a sustainable justice reform that is obligated to its people and resilient amid challenges (ibid). On the downside, a critical view that has already been mentioned before comes from Jackson (2020, p. 957), who argues that the 'local turn' in Kosovo's institutions creates dangerous markets of violence and empowers wartime elites who benefit from patronage, instability and the conflict in general.

Information capacity

The information capacity between the EU and Kosovo is especially written down in legislative acts like the AA and in the Joint Legislation that builds the foundation for the EULEX mission. The AA alone includes the word *"information"* 67 times, signalling that the exchange of information is a very important part of the EU-Kosovo cooperation. This includes, but is not limited to, information exchange to implement restrictive measures by the EU against third countries, persons or state entities, to jointly analyse economic issues of mutual interest, to ensure the interoperability of networks and services, to provide the general public with basic information about the functioning of the EU and to provide professional circles in Kosovo with more specialised information (European Commission, 2015). The findings of the Kosovo Report state that the amount of

exchanged information via the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) [2] significantly increased (European Commission, 2024, p. 8). The Council Decision 2023/1095 (p. 22) states that EULEX should assist the Kosovo law enforcement authorities in capacity development for the exchange of information in legal and criminal matters with their regional and international counterparts. EULEX confirmed this by stating that it supports the Kosovo Police by facilitating the exchange of information between them with Interpol, Europol and the Serbian Ministry of Interior (EULEX Interview). Furthermore, EULEX acknowledges that international police cooperation provides credible data promptly, which helps the law enforcement authorities to combat all serious forms of crime (ibid).

---

[2] SIENA is a state-of-the-art platform by EUROPOL that enables the exchange of operational and strategic crime-related information among EU member states and third parties with cooperation agreements (Europol, 2025).

5.2 EU Mission in Armenia

5.2.1 Armenia: A Historical Overview

Armenia has a very rich and old culture; their ancestry can be traced back three thousand years or more. Christianity was adopted as their state religion between 302 and 314 C.E. (Papazian, 2008). Around 1750, historic Armenia lost its independence to Persia and Ottoman Turkey. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the South Caucasus region was marked by numerous conflicts and fights over the area, finally resulting in the massacre of two to three hundred thousand Armenians in 1894-96 after they, together with their Turkish-Muslim compatriots, tried to overthrow the sultan (ibid).

In 1908, a nationalist movement known as the Young Turks overthrew the Ottoman sultan's government, initially promising reform (Papazian, 2008). However, during World War I, they sought to replace the empire's multicultural structure with a purely Turkish state. As a result, Armenian Christians were once again targeted as enemies to be eliminated (ibid). They had been arrested and murdered, sent to labour battalions and killed or sent to the Syrian desert. By 1923, the Armenian genocide had cost the lives of about 1.5 million ethnic Armenians. Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Armenians surrendered to the Communists, fearing a possible annihilation by the Turks (ibid).

A Transcaucasian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic consisting of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia had been established by the Bolsheviks. In 1922, the Russian Communist and PM Joseph Stalin placed the Armenian-inhabited regions Nakhchivan and Nagorno-Karabakh under Azerbaijani administration (Papazian, 2008). In 1936, the three republics were split, and Azerbaijan gradually depopulated Nakhchivan of its Armenian inhabitants and started a cultural genocide in Nagorno-Karabakh by suppressing the Armenian culture and language in the region (ibid). In 1991, when the Soviet Union imploded, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh voted for independence and reunion with Armenia. Another war broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1992, which ended in a truce in 1994 and the Armenian control of Nagorno-Karabakh (ibid).

In the early 21st century, Armenia emerged as the most stable of the three Transcaucasian republics. However, it faced blockades from Azerbaijan in the east, where the main supply route from Russia originates, and from Turkey in the west, which supports Azerbaijan's policies (Papazian, 2008). Armenia relied primarily on Russia and Iran for supplies while also receiving financial support from the United States and its large diaspora in Russia and America. In 2005, Armenia amended its constitution to align with European Union standards (ibid).

The bilateral acceptance of a ceasefire in the Nagorno-Karabakh region from 1994 formally remained in force until September 2020 (Center for Preventive Action, 2024). Despite pressure from the US, Russia and the UN, and notwithstanding more than seven thousand casualties, both countries initially rejected a truce. It was Russia who, fortified by Russian peacekeepers, successfully negotiated a deal on November 9, 2020, to end the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war after 6 weeks. Azerbaijan regained most of the region while Armenia was left with only a small piece of Karabakh. Furthermore, the Lachin corridor was established as a transit route to connect Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh and monitored by Russian peacekeepers (ibid).

On September 13, 2022, repeated ceasefire violations led to another two-day conflict. Azerbaijan launched several attacks on Armenian territory, leading to a death toll of up to three hundred and the evacuation of more than 2,700 Armenian civilians. Both countries, however, have exchanged accusations for initiating the attacks (Center for Preventive Action, 2024). About one year later, on September 19, 2023, Azerbaijan launched another offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh (despite just reaching an agreement to reopen the Lachin Corridor for aid deliveries) and regained full control over the region in just two days (ibid).

In mid-March 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan announced the finalisation of a peace treaty to put an end to the dispute (Vartanyan, 2025). The draft of the peace treaty concentrates only on diplomatic relations, like the renouncing of territorial claims, settling of legal disputes, and the withdrawal of foreign peacekeeping missions like EUMA. However,

Azerbaijan has already announced subsequent demands that put the peace treaty's actual signing into question (ibid).

5.2.2 The Establishment of EUMA

Following an official request by the Armenian authorities, the EU Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) was deployed on the Armenian side of the border with Azerbaijan between October and December 2022. The mission was recognised as a successful test operation. Consequently, on the 20th of February 2023, the EU Foreign Affairs Council established the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) to support peace and stability in the region (EUMA, 2024).

EUMA's mandate is to observe and report the situation along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, and to promote human security, peace- and confidence-building. The mission operates under a two-year mandate and remains exclusively deployed on the Armenian side of the border (EUMA, 2024). Its headquarters are in Yeghegnadzor, and six additional Forward Operating Bases. Furthermore, EUMA maintains a liaison office in Yerevan (ibid). Up to 165 international and 44 local staff members from 23 EU Member States and Canada, as the third contributing state, are involved. All activities are coordinated with the Armenian authorities, while Azerbaijani authorities are informed of relevant developments when necessary (ibid).

5.2.3 Operational Framework: Challenges and Achievements

Different from EULEX, EUMA's mandate solely revolves around monitoring the situation at the border and confidence-building in the Armenian population. Because of those relatively few objectives compared to EULEX, as well as its significantly shorter duration of only 2 years, the mission seems to have fewer achievements. There is generally less literature on the EU mission in Armenia. Furthermore, peace negotiations had just been successfully achieved at the time of writing, but the challenges are still not completely resolved. Moreover, there is not much information about the peace talks except for the Expert interviews.

5.2.3.1 Achievements

Stabilisation of the situation at the border with Azerbaijan

The Expert on Eastern Europe stated that the situation at the Armenian-Azerbaijani border remained fairly calm thanks to EUMA. Compared to the time before EUMA was established, there have been significantly fewer incidents, which led to a stabilisation of the situation between the two countries (Expert Interview 1). The Expert on the civilian CSDP missions confirmed this statement and emphasised the difference EUMA has made on the ground as it chose exactly the right strategic approach and has therefore contributed to the political stability that the recent peace negotiations have brought (Expert Interview 2).

Peace negotiations with Azerbaijan

In March 2025, Armenia made major compromises and concessions to Azerbaijan, therefore, the negotiations for a peace agreement have been successful. This, however, could finally lead to the withdrawal of the mission (Expert Interviews 1 & 2). The Expert on the civilian CSDP missions said, this is a great success story for the EU, as the mission did its job so well that it would have contributed to the successful negotiations. According to the Expert, the mission shows that only a realistic mandate and a valuable impact on the security structures of the region can lead to the success of the civilian CSDP missions (Expert Interview 2).

Confidence-building with the Armenian population

Although EUMA displays only limited success in confidence-building measures between the Armenian and the Azerbaijani population, the mission is seen very positively among the Armenian locals. The Expert on the civilian CSDP missions has been on the ground and confirmed that the monitors seem to give the locals a feeling of confidence that the situation at the border remains calm when they are around (Expert Interview 2).

5.2.3.2 Challenges

Political risks for the EU

The EU Expert on Eastern Europe explained that, despite the mission's success on the Armenian side, it simultaneously strains the EU's relationship with Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is not interested in political relations but wants to keep it to economic contacts with the EU, without extra conditions (Expert Interview 1). The political interference through the mission, the EU's insistence on the return of the Armenian population to Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as Europe's attempt to help with the progress of the peace treaty, is viewed very negatively by Azerbaijan (ibid). Furthermore, there is the general risk that the EU gets highly involved in the conflict and strongly commits to Armenia, but then another war breaks out or the Armenian government becomes a Putin-friendly regime again. In this case, the EU could lose its political standing, and all the reforms that the EU has undertaken in the last decade would be reversed, which might also lead to a deeper-reaching reputational damage for the EU (ibid). Moreover, it is questionable what the EU could do in the case of another outbreak of the conflict, as anything that would go above the EU's statements of condemnation, solidarity and support for Armenia, like the establishment of sanctions, would most likely be blocked by Hungary and possibly other member states (ibid).

Azerbaijan's profound hostility and the EU's partiality towards Armenia

The tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia are deeply rooted in their history. Azerbaijani officials and media are attacking Armenia and the EU regularly. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan stated that the EU mission was placed directly on the borders without Azerbaijan's consent, and that this directly impacts the conflictual situation between them and Armenia (Enveroglu, 2024). According to an article by Azernews, Azerbaijan is reasonably concerned about the activities of EUMA, as it supports Armenia's provocative actions and has undermined the peace talks between the two countries (ibid). The article repeatedly refers to Armenia as *"the occupying state"* and claims that EUMA would make biased accusations against Azerbaijan. This also heightens the personal risk for the EUMA troops at the border. The Expert on Eastern Europe admitted that it cannot be fully ruled out that a staff member gets caught up in a

fight (Expert Interview 1). According to the independent news platform OC Media, the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated in January 2025: *"I don't want to show them how quickly [the monitors] might run if someone even accidentally sneezes on Azerbaijani territory, but we're tempted. This is why we told them to stop these binocular theatrics"* (Barseghyan, 2025b). Baku demanded a complete withdrawal of EUMA, but Armenia offered to remove EUMA monitors from the demarcated parts of the shared border. Baku, however, has not formally responded to this offer but continuedly warns that EUMA might disrupt the demarcation process (Krikorian, 2025).

Armenia's balancing act

Khvorostiankina (2024, p. 1175) assessed the policy resilience of the EU-Armenia cooperation on Armenia's RoL and judicial reform. She states that the implementation of these reforms and the fight against corruption remain among the gravest challenges ahead for their partnership (ibid). For a long time, Armenia has been caught between the EU's and Russia's influence. After the launch of the EU's Eastern Partnership Initiative (EaP) in 2009, Armenia started to negotiate an AA with the EU but terminated the negotiations in 2013 to integrate into the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Yet, Armenia favoured keeping the cooperation with the EU and suggested negotiating a lighter version of the AA. But there has been no alternative until the launch of negotiations on the EU-Armenian Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2015 (ibid, pp. 1183). Since then, Armenia has been the only country that is legally bound to the law of the EAEU and CEPA simultaneously. According to Khvorostiankina (2024, p. 1183), the *"U-Turn"* in Armenia's policy in 2013 revealed a rather low degree of resilience of the EaP policy at the time, leading to a radical change in the policy. Nevertheless, in light of the current geopolitical challenges and regional security issues, Khvorostiankina concludes that the EU's foreign policy towards the Caucasus region still shows a low degree of resilience, which can harm the EU as an actor in the region (ibid, p. 1186).

5.2.4 International Playing Field

5.2.4.1 International Actors

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan involves a lot of powerful state actors who are either for or against Armenia's deeper cooperation with the EU. Through a Liberal Institutionalist lens, Armenia tries to ease the conflict by cooperating with several partners who normally do not work closely together: the EU and the US on the one side, and Russia on the other side, through various economic and security agreements. Thus, from the Securitisation Theory's lens, both the EU members and Russia (next to Turkey and Iran) raise this conflict into the securitisation sphere as it is considered a direct threat and an international security issue.

Russia

Russia is an actor with considerable influence in the region and has long been considered a close partner of Armenia. Armenia's aforementioned membership in the Russian-led EAEU and CSTO confirms this. However, the Expert on Eastern Europe questions whether Russia is interested in a truce between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Indeed, Russia repeatedly offered to mediate the peace talks, but in the end, the ceasefire agreement that should have been implemented through Russian peacekeepers has been broken, which was a great disappointment for the Armenian society. Hence, the Expert considers Russia merely an ambivalent actor (Expert Interview 1).

Turkey

There are differing views and considerations about the role of Turkey in the conflict. In a Parliament Resolution from March 2024, the European Parliament regards Turkey as a disruptive actor who is not interested in a peace agreement (European Parliament, 2024, p. 5). The Expert on Eastern Europe, on the other hand, argues that Turkey has an interest in a peace treaty as this is also linked to a normalisation of the Turkish-Armenian relations. Peace would make it possible to open the borders to Armenia, which would lead to greater economic benefits on both sides and a stabilisation of the whole region (Expert Interview 1). According to the Expert, Turkey shared these thoughts with Azerbaijan, but did not exert pressure to conclude a peace agreement, as this would also be a disruptive

factor in their bilateral relations (ibid). According to the independent newspaper OC Media, the Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan emphasised that normalising the Armenian-Azerbaijani relations would enable the South Caucasus to become a region of peace, integration and cooperation (Barseghyan, 2025a). Despite these positive developments, Armenia remains wary of Turkey's intentions as Ankara's increasing involvement in the CSDP raised scepticism that Turkey might join EUMA. EUMA, however, ensured no neighbouring country would ever participate in a CSDP mission that is right at their doorstep (Krikorian, 2025).

Iran

Iran is a closer ally to Armenia, but the relationship with Azerbaijan is very difficult. Nevertheless, Iran does not play a very active or constructive role in the conflict (Expert Interview 1). There have been rumours that the demand for a transport corridor from the Azerbaijani mainland to its enclave, Nakhchivan, could be realised through Iran. But until now, Iran has not shown any concrete progress or willingness to pursue this demand (ibid). According to OC Media and Armenpress, Iran's Ambassador to Armenia, Mehdi Sobhani, expressed Iran's willingness to support efforts in maintaining peace by preventing a breach of the ceasefire and assisting Armenia and Azerbaijan in reaching a final peace agreement (Barseghyan, 2025a).

Other international cooperations

Apart from Russia, Armenia has maintained its partnership with the EU over many years. This can now be considered an asset for Armenia since the relationship with Russia is strained. In February 2024, Armenia froze its membership of the CSTO because the security agreement had not been implemented, according to the PM of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan (TASS, 2024). Therefore, Armenia included new actors to its securitisation, like France, Greece and other EU members (European Parliament, 2024, p. 2). Especially France has been criticised by Azerbaijan for selling weapons to Armenia. But India remains the largest supplier since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Krikorian, 2025). The US has generally supported the peace process. But according to the Expert

on Eastern Europe, there does not seem to be a clear line or much interest in the region under the new Trump administration (Expert Interview 1).

5.2.4.2 Crisis and conflict dynamics

Regional Opposition to EU Involvement

Armenia stands out among the EU's other Eastern European partner countries. Despite its extremely difficult geopolitical context, it has managed a process of political transformation through a transition of power in 2018, which resulted from peaceful protests against the former oligarchic, semi-authoritarian regime (Khvorostiankina, 2024, p. 1177). However, the long-lasting armed conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno–Karabakh, the trade blockade with Turkey and several economic and security dependencies on Russia frame the crisis and conflict dynamics in the region around Armenia (ibid, p. 1176). The EU's stronger presence and support for Armenia have led to Azerbaijani disinformation campaigns, particularly against EUMA (Expert Interview 1). Azerbaijan sets the removal of the mission as a condition for establishing a peace agreement, a demand that Armenia has finally agreed upon (ibid). Apart from this, Azerbaijan also demands a revision of the Constitution of Armenia. The French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot criticised this precondition sharply, calling it *"unacceptable"* and saying it would delay the signing (Barseghyan, 2025a). Opposition to the EU and EUMA, however, is not limited to Azerbaijan. Similarly, Russia and Iran also perceive EUMA as unnecessary interference in the region (Krikorian, 2025). They accuse the mission of being a paramilitary deployment and of collecting intelligence against them. Furthermore, they claim EUMA is being co-opted by NATO (Barseghyan, 2025b). An article by Azernews accuses EUMA of spreading disinformation and provoking Armenia to initiate hostilities and fire at positions of the Azerbaijani army (Enveroglu, 2024).

Russian warnings against EU alignment

Armenia's membership in the EAEU and its influence on the country create potential conflicts between Armenia's Europeanisation efforts and its Eurasian integration (Khvorostiankina, 2018, p. 48). Through their economic integration, Russia can exert pressure on Armenia, for instance, to participate in possible sanctions circumvention.

Furthermore, Russia punishes Armenia for its strategic and political choices (European Parliament, 2024, p. 4). According to Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu, Armenia would lose 30-40 per cent of its GDP if it decides to withdraw from the EAEU and joins the European Union (Russian News Agency, 2025). At the same time, Shoigu claims, there would be no generous subsidies to be expected from the EU. Armenia would need to restructure all its system standards and certifications to meet EU requirements, which would ruin Armenia's existing metal, food and light industries. Furthermore, he asserts that Armenian products are not wanted in Europe, as the Western standards would not be reachable for Armenia's industry. Meanwhile, Russia's losses from Armenia's withdrawal would not be significant (ibid).

5.2.5 Security Situation

5.2.5.1 Securitisation

The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict has been observed by international actors for a long time, but the last escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict also significantly lifted the issue within the securitisation sphere of the EU and resulted in the establishment of the EUMA mission at the border region. EUMA is legally based on the *Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/162 of 23 January 2023*. According to Article 1(2), EUMA supports the establishment of a safe and stable environment in Armenia's conflict-affected areas as an impartial and credible actor. Article 2(2)(b) ensures EUMA's contribution to human security by ad hoc patrolling, reporting and gathering information of situations where life or basic human rights are endangered. The Expert on Eastern Europe added that the presence of non-Armenian nationals carries diplomatic significance, as any incident resulting in injuries to EUMA staff could lead to further political consequences. Thus, both parties must exercise restraint and are more likely to uphold the ceasefire agreement (Expert Interview 1). The clear violation of the ban on violence in Nagorno-Karabakh has made the EU realise that this remains a recurring source of conflict, which would impact not only the South Caucasus region but also the EU, given that it is located in their direct neighbourhood (ibid). Armenian PM Pashinyan also repeatedly stated that he would like to see EUMA remain as it proves useful in giving the local communities a sense of security

(Krikorian, 2025), but this will probably not be possible if the peace agreement comes into force. The EU-Armenian CEPA, however, remains in effect (based on current information). The agreement reaffirms Armenia's commitment to continued political dialogues with the EU and other international organisations, aiming to strengthen cooperation on foreign and security policy through effective multilateralism, conflict prevention and crisis management, based on mutual interests and common values (European Union, 2017, pp. 8–9). Moreover, the EU Parliament believes that the EU should strengthen its security and defence partnership with Armenia even further. Since Armenia's membership with the CSTO is frozen, Russia might try to threaten or punish Armenia for its strategic choices. Therefore, the EU should be ready to provide rapid assistance if the threats become a reality (European Parliament, 2024, p. 4).

5.2.5.2 Desecuritisation

For the finalisation of the peace agreement, Armenia has agreed to the clause that EUMA needs to be withdrawn. The Expert on Eastern Europe says it is likely that this clause will be implemented when the peace treaty is signed. This will take time, and EUMA may remain until this happens (Expert Interview 1). However, this would mark a big step towards desecuritising the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. Similarly, Russia's Federal Security Service border guards have left one checkpoint at Armenia's border with Iran in December 2024 (Krikorian, 2025). This not only represents further diversification away from Moscow (ibid), but can also be considered as a desecuritising move. Furthermore, the EU-Armenian CEPA supports further desecuritisation by emphasising the need for regional cooperation, cross-border movement, good neighbourly relations and peaceful resolution of conflicts to achieve regional stability and security (European Union, 2017, p. 9).

5.2.6 Local Perceptions and Social Structures

5.2.6.1 Cooperation with Locals and Civil Society

The EU-Armenian CEPA states that promoting dialogue and cooperation between civil society stakeholders is an integral part of the relations between Armenia and the EU

(European Union, 2017, p. 32). These dialogues aim to actively involve civil society in EU-Armenia relations by supporting institution-building, strengthening CSOs in various ways and enhancing their role in public decision-making processes through transparent and regular consultations with public institutions. Thus, civil society can be further integrated into the policy-making process of Armenia (ibid). The important role of civil society in implementing reforms in Armenia was also emphasised by the European Parliament in the resolution from March 2024 (European Parliament, 2024, p. 4). The Expert on Eastern Europe states that the EU supports the Armenian government financially and through capacity-building initiatives to work and consult with its civil society. Moreover, Armenia's citizens' initiative for EU accession was developed by the society to a certain extent (Expert Interview 1). According to the 2024 annual survey by EU Neighbours East, a quantitative survey targeting the general population in Armenia, 65 per cent of the population strongly agreed and 23 per cent somewhat agreed that the government should cooperate with CSOs, especially for countering disinformation (EU Neighbours East, 2024).

5.2.6.2 Local Perceptions

EUMA is still a very young mission, therefore, there is currently no public data available to make valid statements about the local perceptions of EUMA except for the information from the Expert interviews. Nevertheless, there has been research about the general perceptions of the Armenian population towards the EU, which possibly also reflects on the civilian EU mission. According to the Expert on civilian CSDP missions, the local Armenians often stop and wave at the monitors during their field visits, initiating a very positive response to the EUMA mission (Expert Interview 2). The Expert on Eastern Europe confirms that the EU in general is perceived very positively by the Armenians, especially since the lack of support from Russia when Azerbaijan overtook Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia was considered a close partner to Armenia. Hence, the Armenian society was greatly disappointed after this incident (Expert Interview 1). This is also validated through the survey by EU Neighbours East, which shows how positive perceptions towards the EU increased again after 2022. In 2024, 17 per cent of the population had a very positive image of the EU, 39 per cent were fairly positive, while 30

per cent remained neutral (EU Neighbours East, 2024). Strikingly, the report also reveals the Armenians' low levels of trust in nearly all national institutions, including CSOs (ibid). About Azerbaijani perceptions regarding the influence of the EU in the region, the Expert believes that a free civil society in Azerbaijan could see a lifeline in the EU, and perhaps the US, because of the support to improve the human rights situation in the country. But the actual perception of the civil society in Azerbaijan cannot be generalised, because they are heavily oppressed and marginalised. Moreover, the information space is determined by the government's narrative, which is mostly not positive towards the West (ibid).

5.2.7 Institutional Resilience

Similar to the previous chapter, there is no literature specifically targeting the external governance procedures of EUMA, as the mission is still too young and has not been scientifically examined in this regard. Furthermore, EUMA does not have any executive functions like EULEX, but only a monitoring, observing and reporting mandate. Nevertheless, I argue that the mission also functions as a tool for the EU to broaden its external influence in Armenia and the South Caucasus region through the Europeanisation approach.

5.2.7.1 Institutional adaptability

External governance

Khvorostiankina (2024, p. 23) explains that the EU uses the concept of Europeanisation to influence a country's political culture, legal mentality, judicial reasoning and to empower the civil society. This transformative influence can be directly initiated by the EU or result from voluntary change on the domestic level (ibid). Khvorostiankina's analysis of the EU-Armenian CEPA reveals that the EU promotes its values through external action in three ways in Armenia: (1) by considering EU values as *"essential elements"* of legally binding agreements with partner countries and including a non-compliance clause in case of violations, (2) by animating third countries to ratify and implement legally binding multilateral agreements grounded on universal values, and (3) to set the adherence of

the EU's values and a condition for receiving financial assistance. This way, the EU educates domestic actors about the rules and principles of European governance (ibid, pp. 31–32). The legislative approximation instruments used in CEPA are similar to those of the AAs, but less advanced, as CEPA has a more limited scope and objectives (ibid, p. 41). However, the results of the Armenian political, legal and social developments after the change of power in 2018 already revealed the internalisation of fundamental EU values, even though the authoritarian Soviet past is not completely overcome (ibid, p. 35).

Self-governance

Since the change of government, Armenia has voluntarily chosen to conduct essential legal and political reforms after the European example, *"with or without the participation of the EU"* (Khvorostiankina, 2018, p. 35). The new government under PM Pashinyan, who is still in charge, immediately implemented anti-corruption measures and reforms to establish RoL and good governance procedures (ibid, p. 30). In a more recent study, Khvorostiankina (2024) assessed the policy resilience of EU-Armenia cooperation on the RoL and judicial reform. Thereby, she reveals that Armenia's first withdrawal from the original idea to negotiate an AA was a significant backdrop to the EU and displayed the EU's low EaP policy resilience (Khvorostiankina, 2024, p. 1183). This low level of resilience came from the absence of alternatives to the AA, a lack of strategic foresight to the changing geopolitical situation in the region, and the highly consensus-based decision-making procedures as required under EU law. Nevertheless, this shock led to a radical change in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and a significantly higher level of resilience since the revision resulted in the Review of 2015 (ibid). Consequently, I argue that Armenia showed a high level of self-governance by deciding to withdraw from the AA and later come back to negotiate a CEPA that includes both of their economic and strategic interests by simultaneously keeping its membership with the EAEU and, until recently, with the CSTO. Despite this controversy, this finally helped the EU as well to strengthen the resilience of its external policies.

5.2.7.2 Capacity-building mechanisms

Capacity-building through mentoring, monitoring and advising

According to the legally agreed mandate of EUMA, the mission is part of the EU's contribution to the establishment of a safe and stable environment in conflicted areas of Armenia and aims to decrease the number of incidents in the conflict-affected parts of the border. As an impartial and credible actor, EUMA shall improve human security and promote the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the progress towards the peace agreement (Article 1 & 2, Council Decision 2023/1095, 2023). The Experts on the civilian CSDP missions and Eastern Europe both confirmed the very strong contribution to the security stabilisation in those areas through EUMA's monitoring and reporting function (Expert Interviews 1 & 2). It remains to be seen what the situation is like at the border when this stabilising factor falls away (Expert Interview 1).

Institutional capacity

The Council Decision 2023/1095 on EUMA determines that the HoM must ensure the consistency of the EU's action in Armenia. Therefore, the HoM shall closely cooperate with the EU's Delegation to Armenia and the EU Special Representative to receive political guidance regarding the relations between the Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities (Article 15(2)). In a more general view of the institutional capacity development between the EU and Armenia, Khvorostiankina (2024, p. 1179) explains that if a critical challenge needs extra decision-making, it depends on the type of EU competences in the specific sectors and the relevant institutional arrangements to see how flexible and adaptable the policy can be. The institutional arrangements are set in the EU-Armenian CEPA and include, among others, commitments to strengthen political, socio-economic and institutional development in Armenia through anti-corruption efforts, civil service reform and good governance practices (European Union, 2017). Furthermore, the CEPA promotes cooperation in the areas of security and crisis management, justice, regional development and Armenia's participation in EU-led missions (ibid). Lastly, the agreement wants to ensure Armenia's alignment with the EU's economic policies and multi-level governance to reinforce institutional stability and capacity (ibid). Unfortunately, no country

report showcases the recent developments of Armenia's institutions, similar to the one for Kosovo, as Armenia is not an EU candidate country.

Information capacity

According to its mandate, EUMA's unarmed civilian observers exclusively conduct their patrols on the Armenian side of the border with Azerbaijan. It contributes to the citizens' security by gathering information from ad hoc patrolling in conflict situations when basic human rights are endangered. Afterwards, EUMA sends classified reports back to the EU. But, as previously mentioned, Russia and Azerbaijan criticise and accuse the mission of collecting intelligence against them and Iran (Barseghyan, 2025b; Council Decision 2023/1095, 2023). The general collection of information, be it solely within Armenia or throughout the whole region, has a very broad standing in the CEPA as well. The term *"information"* is mentioned 287 times in the whole document, which implies that it is one of the key preferences for all policy cooperations in the agreement. Some relevant examples are the cooperation in the exchange of information on security matters, macroeconomic trends and policies, economic development, structural reforms, and national information society strategies (European Union, 2017). Furthermore, the parties agree on information sharing on regional development policies, civil scientific research, innovation strategies, and the exchange of experience on the work of the civil society between the EU and Armenia, among many other points (ibid).

5.3 Summary and Comparison of the Cases

The Analysis reveals the differences between the two missions with mainly monitoring and advising functions in very different geopolitical contexts. EULEX was already established in 2008, while EUMA only exists since 2023. Furthermore, EULEX has a much broader scope than EUMA, with about double the number of staff members. This is because EULEX's monitoring mandate is not limited to the border situation, like in EUMA's case, but largely focuses on the RoL institutions in Kosovo. Good achievements have been made during the last 18 years, like the strengthening of the judiciary, customs, police and Kosovo's European integration through capacity-building measures.

But despite its role as one of the key EU civilian missions, EULEX's financial resources are limited, forcing the mission to set priorities, which leads to shortcomings elsewhere. The situation in northern Kosovo remains fragile, and tensions escalate regularly. Even if it has been a bit calmer at the time of writing, inter-communal relations have not improved. Criticism has arisen regarding inadequate monitoring due to budgetary constraints. Therefore, there is a need to better align the mandate with monetary resources. Additionally, political centralisation and elite-level corruption are still high and strain Kosovo's and EULEX's image. Similarly, the recent case of the individuals KS and KD, who accuse EULEX of insufficiently investigating the torture, disappearance, and killing of persons. This case remains open but has already raised questions, not only regarding the implementation of EULEX's mandate but especially about the legal application of the CFSP in general. Thus, this case might also significantly impact other civilian CSDP missions in the future.

EUMA is regarded as a success story in the European sphere in Brussels. In just two years, the mission achieved stabilisation at the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan solely through its monitoring mandate. The local Armenians have a very positive perception of the mission, as far as the Experts can evaluate the situation. This aligns with the survey that shows the Armenian population's favourable view of the EU. However, the impartiality of EUMA cannot be entirely assured, as the mission only operates on the Armenian side of the border, since Azerbaijan refused to accept a European mission on its territory. Similar to the Kosovo-Serbs, Azerbaijan wants the end of the EU civilian mission at its border. The crucial difference here is that the Kosovo-Serbs also live within Kosovan territory, and their disapproval directly impacts the functioning of the mission and the safety of the monitors. While the Armenian citizens support EUMA, Azerbaijan lacks the authority to remove the mission. Consequently, Azerbaijan has set the withdrawal of EUMA as a requirement for the peace agreement, which Armenia recently accepted.

Generally, the external influences in Armenia are significantly higher than in Kosovo. The South Caucasus region is geopolitically highly contested. The EU and the US, as well as

Russia, Turkey, and partly Iran, are interested in gaining more influence in the region. This has enabled Armenia to create its balancing act, particularly between the EU and Russia. But since Azerbaijan forcefully overtook Nagorno-Karabakh and Russian peacekeepers did not do anything to stop the attack, Armenia's perception of Russia sank significantly and gave room for closer cooperation with the Union. How this cooperation develops if Armenia signs the peace treaty and makes more concessions towards Azerbaijan remains to be seen.

Kosovo's main partners, next to EULEX, are the international institutions Europol, Interpol, Frontex, and NATO-backed KFOR. On the other side, Kosovo's only true nemesis is Serbia, out of their profound hostility towards each other, as Serbia does not recognise Kosovo as a separate country but wants to retain control over it. Furthermore, deep grievances remain between Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs because of their grave history. Russia's role on Serbia's side, as well as Serbia's perception towards EULEX, have not been covered by the data and remain subject to further research.

EULEX's resilience-building measures are overall well established, this is especially reflected in the contributions to the forensic institute, witness protection measures, community policing and legislation support. Furthermore, the mission managed to build enough capacities across the entire justice chain to refer the full responsibility back to the Kosovo judges, prosecutors and police. Simultaneously, EULEX still monitors and advises these instances, while ensuring the principle of non-interference. An interesting observation is the allegation that the *"local turn"* might be counterproductive to resilience-building measures because it fuels instability due to criminal activities by corrupt elites. This is an issue that EULEX must monitor more rigidly, and the EU needs to adopt harder consequences.

EUMA was able to strengthen the resilience of the Armenian locals at the borders with Azerbaijan. Despite Azerbaijan's threatening attitude against the EU, it would most likely not let the situation at the border escalate if third-state monitors are in between by gathering data from their monitoring trips and reporting it to the EU. Hence, EUMA has a

strong stabilising effect, but it is unclear what happens if the mission gets withdrawn. Apart from EUMA, Armenia has strengthened its resilience from within by partnering with the EU and undertaking reforms aligned with EU standards, despite its simultaneous membership with the Russian-led EAEU and CSTO (until its withdrawal for security reasons in February 2024). Moreover, Armenia (unwillingly) strengthened the EU's ENP policy-resilience by their termination of the negotiations for the AA in 2013.

6. Discussion

In the following, I discuss the outcomes of the analysis by focusing especially on the influence of the independent variables on my dependent variable, institutional resilience (see Table 2 for an overview of the results). The discussion is separated into two main parts and a final reflection. First, I explain the impact of the independent variables on institutional adaptability, the first sub-category of the dependent variable, which is measured through the level of external and self-governance of the cases. Secondly, I discuss the influence of the independent variables on the capacity-building mechanisms. That is my second sub-category of institutional resilience and consists of mentoring, monitoring and advising capacities, institutional capacities and the capacity to exchange critical information. For a better overview, the **independent variables** are in **bold**.

Simultaneously, the theoretical framework is applied to the findings of both cases. Through the lens of Liberal Institutionalism, the EU is an international institution that significantly influences the behaviour of its member states and third countries that want to cooperate with it. Civilian CSDP missions are a tool to maximise the Union's security at the border and to build up a long-term relationship. The cooperation regarding the missions maximises the shared security benefits for both parties, as supranational governance helps to counter transnational threats. The CoS recognises security as socially constructed through inter-subjective and social interactions. According to the Securitisation theory, the missions have been established because the EU has accepted the conflict dynamics in Kosovo and Armenia as threats and legitimised the issues as a security concern. Both theories are linked to the concept of resilience, which embraces institutional mechanisms and the process of adaptation to threats. I especially conclude the connection of my findings to the resilience types (absorptive, adaptive and restorative capacities) and their applications on different levels (see Chapter 4.3.1, Kekovic & Ninkovic, 2020) and the triangular relationship between security, resilience and non-security politics (see Chapter 4.3.2). The research question will subsequently be answered in the Conclusion.

Table 2: Influence of the Independent Variables on Institutional Resilience

Institutional Resilience

Institutional Adaptability → External governance, Self-governance

Capacity-building mechanisms → Mentoring, Monitoring and advising capacity, Institutional capacity, Information capacity

Influence of the Independent variables:

	External governance	Self-governance	Mentoring, Monitoring and advising capacity	Institutional capacity	Information capacity
Kosovo	International actors, Securitisation	Challenges and Achievements, Cooperation with locals and civil society, Desecuritisation	Challenges and Achievements, Crisis and conflict dynamics	Challenges and Achievements, Crisis and conflict dynamics	International actors, Achievements
	Largely influenced by the EU through EULEX for securitisation and the AA for the establishment of European governance structures	Strong improvement through EULEX's capacity building measures in Kosovo institutions; but for successful self-governace, political will, judicial independence and active civic engagement are needed and still need to improve	EULEX scored a lot of achievements through its monitoring and advising mandate, especially the improvement of the functioning of Kosovo's rule of law institutions, but shortcomings in judges' impartiality and professionalism	Overall increase in performance of Kosovo's institutions, but local turn could empower the conflict further	important for international cooperation, needed for capacity development in legal and criminal matters with regional and international counterparts
Armenia	International actors, Securitisation	International actors, Challenges, Securitisation	Achievements, Securitisation, Local perceptions, Crisis and conflict dynamics	Achievements, Desecuritisation, Local perceptions	International Actors, Securitisation
	influenced by the EU through the Europeanisation approach, but also still influenced by Russia	By simultaneously integrating into both the EU's and Russia's international policies, Armenia managed to strengthen its self-governance and showed a high level of adaptive and restorative capacity	EUMA has already reached the goal of its mandate by stabilising the border region, local perceptions have increased, Azerbaijan likely fears an outbreak of diplomatic conflict with the EU	Armenia is on a strong European path and committed to the CEPA, successful securitisation efforts through EUMA give Armenia the room to focus on its governance, citizens and the finalisation of the peace talks with Azerbaijan; However, the Armenian population still has an overall low level of trust towards its national institutions	EUMA gathers information from ad hoc patrolling in conflict situations, the international actors Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran are threatened by the collection of intelligence; further information exchange for economic development and society strategies is written down in the CEPA

6.1 Independent Variables' Impact on Institutional Adaptability

When looking at the triangular relationship model of resilience in CoS-security dynamics (see Chapter 4.3.2), the conflict in Kosovo is largely dealt with in the security-resilience nexus, as the issue has been securitised from the beginning, and the resilience process only occurred afterwards through EULEX (see Figure 3 (3)). The EU has highly securitised the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia since the beginning of the wars in former Yugoslavia. The conflict has been identified as an existential threat to the EU, since the relevant audience, namely the EU and NATO, has turned this into a securitised matter. The security situation is socially constructed by actors of different ethnicities (mainly the Kosovo-Serbs against the Kosovo-Albanians) who threaten each other verbally but also attack physically. In both cases, EUMA and EULEX, the EU plays the dual role of being both the audience and the securitising actor.

The level of external governance in Kosovo was specifically high when EULEX had large executive functions in Kosovo's RoL institutions. But external governance features are still given through the mission and the AA that binds the Kosovan government to establishing European laws and regulations. Hence, the **international actors** and the **securitisation process** are the independent variables that mostly influence Kosovo's institutional adaptability through external governance measures. When EULEX changed its mandate in 2018, it gave up a large part of its executive functions and returned the responsibility to the Kosovan government. This was the result of EULEX's **achievements** in capacity-building of the RoL institutions, which are connected to **desecuritisation** and the **cooperation with locals and civil society**. However, Kosovo's authorities must have the political will, judicial independence and active civic engagement for effective self-governance. Missing trust between the central government and local institutions, as well as the lack of public consultations, are still challenges that need to be tackled. But overall, the external governance measures led to the beginning of self-governance and show Kosovo's adaptive capacity (its ability to reorganise or recover after disruption) at the state and organisational level.

In Armenia, external governance is merely adopted through the Europeanisation approach, as the EU educates Armenia on the rules and principles of European governance through CEPA. Looking through the lens of the Securitisation Theory, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan was politicised before the forceful annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh, but it was only **securitised** when Armenia actively asked the EU to set up a monitoring mission at the border (speech act), shortly before the conflict culminated. The EU was the audience that accepted the securitisation of this matter. But Armenia still tries to find the perfect balance in cooperating economically with both the EU through CEPA and Russia through the EAEU. The security interests are now covered through the establishment of EUMA, especially since Armenia lost trust in the Russian peacekeepers. This shows a good level of Armenia's adaptive and absorptive capacity, as it was able to handle the disruptions independently by choosing a new securitising actor. EUMA further strengthens Armenia's self-governance, as the setup of the mission protects Armenia's border. Resilience is thus a preparatory step towards security (see Figure 3 (4)). Armenia's self-governance largely depends on the **international actors** involved and the **challenges** that might occur due to the EU's low foreign policy resilience towards the South Caucasus region.

6.2 Independent Variables' Impact on Capacity-building

Both missions successfully **achieved** many of their goals by building capacities through mentoring, advising and reporting activities. Particularly in Kosovo, the mission strengthened the adaptive capacity and is still establishing the absorptive capacity on the organisational level by mentoring the RoL institutions to handle **challenges** independently. But the **conflict dynamics** are elevated as cross-border crime is still high, especially in the north at the border with Serbia. When looking through the lens of Liberal Institutionalism, the EU is interested in close cooperation with the Western Balkans and in including them in the Union once they are ready. It lies in the EU's interest, economically and security-wise, to resolve the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo for the long term. The external governance measures by **international actors** largely contributed to the institutional capacity building. EULEX's engagement fostered resilience,

independence and transparency in institutions and the advancement of Kosovo's European agenda. Thereby, EULEX must respect the self-governing regulations of judicial independence and the principle of non-interference, but shortcomings in judges' impartiality and professionalism persist. Hence, further training and capacity building through EULEX are needed to strengthen Kosovo's institutional capacity further. Moreover, the critical local turn might empower the conflict through elite-level corruption. This problem specifically shows the missing link between the concept of resilience and peacebuilding, reconciliation, and transitional justice measures that should be analysed and adapted further within civilian missions like EULEX.

Armenia is geographically not bordering the EU, which at first does not seem to pose a direct threat to European security. However, the EU seeks influence in the South Caucasus region to earn economic gains and to counter Russia's power in the post-Soviet Union. According to the Liberal Intergovernmentalist view, both are mutually interested in the safety of the region, which is why the civilian CSDP mission has been set up. EUMA significantly contributes to the stabilisation of the border through its monitoring and reporting capacities. This **securitisation** aspect is probably one of the main reasons why the **local perceptions** towards the EU increase. However, the **conflict dynamics** between Armenia and Azerbaijan were transferred onto the EU as well, as Azerbaijan perceived the EU as a threat because it is partnering with Armenia. But despite warnings from Azerbaijan towards the EU and Armenia, it might fear the outbreak of political and diplomatic conflicts with the EU when EUMA staff get hurt.

Regarding Armenia's institutional capacity, I could not find specific information on how the Armenian institutions have changed and improved through EUMA or CEPA, because the EU only publishes country reports for EU candidate countries with an AA, like Kosovo. However, Armenia is currently on a strong European path, the chance is high that it commits to the agreement of strengthening political, socio-economic and institutional development through anti-corruption efforts, civil service reform and good governance practices, as stated in the CEPA. Successful securitisation efforts from EUMA led to the **desecuritisation** of the conflict through the establishment of a peace treaty (see Figure

3 (1)). The next step would be the insurance that the issue stays desecuritised through the adaptive capacities of resilience (Figure 3 (6)). If this **achievement** of desecuritisation remains in place, Armenia would not have to worry about another outbreak of a major conflict and could focus on its citizens and governance structure, further strengthening their absorptive and restorative capacity (the ability of a system to return to or improve upon the pre-event state). This would be urgently necessary as the Armenian **local population** still has a very low level of trust towards their national institutions.

The critical information infrastructure is very important and well developed between the EU and its partners. For the EU-Kosovo cooperation, the build-up of critical information infrastructure is a big **achievement**. It is needed for capacity development in legal and criminal matters with regional and international counterparts, and the exchange of information between the Kosovo police and **international actors** like Interpol, Europol, and the Serbian Ministry of Interior with the help of EULEX (out of securitising aspects it is, however, questionable how much and what kind of information are exchanged between Kosovo and Serbia). The information capacity in Kosovo shows the movement from security to resilience (Figure 3 (3)), as, according to Liberal Institutionalism, the sharing of information through institutions aids conflict resolution and policy efficiency.

In Armenia, information is gathered by EUMA from ad hoc patrolling in conflict situations for **securitisation** purposes, as the **international actors** Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran are threatened by the collection of intelligence. Consequently, Armenia and the EU use resilience in the form of cooperation through intelligence-sharing as a protection mechanism (Figure 3 (4)). But the critical information infrastructure also has a very high standing in the CEPA, as information exchange for economic development and society strategies is very important for the EU-Armenia cooperation.

6.3 Reflections on Institutional Resilience Gains

In conclusion, both missions have contributed to the improvement of institutional resilience in Kosovo and Armenia. Unsurprisingly, the most transitions happen in the security-resilience nexus, where either resilience is used to adapt the system to securitised issues (Figure 3 (3)) or security practices are used to stay resilient and keep the status quo (Figure 3 (4)). Only when analysing Armenia's institutional capacity, I could find that EUMA's securitisation effort could lead to successful desecuritisation soon if the peace agreement is signed ((1) on the security-non-security nexus). To keep this situation in the non-security politics sphere, the actors must keep up their adaptive capacity to remain resilient (resilience-non-security nexus, (6)).

Finally, both Kosovo and Armenia especially strengthened their adaptive and absorptive capacities at the state and organisational levels through the institutional resilience-building mechanisms of the missions. An increase in restorative capacity could soon happen in Armenia if the peace agreement comes into effect. Kosovo made major improvements in its institutional resilience, but it still needs to improve its self-governance to be resilient on all levels. The community level was not present in this discussion, as it focuses more on social cohesion and individual self-organisation. This could be reviewed in future research, in combination with the missing connection between resilience and post-conflict resolution mechanisms like reconciliation and transitional justice.

7. Conclusion

This Master's Thesis aims to show how effective EU civilian CSDP missions are in fostering institutional resilience to enable effective self-governance of the cooperating countries in geopolitically contested environments. The analysis of the two CSDP missions EULEX in Kosovo and EUMA in Armenia, conducted through the most different system design, shows that the civilian missions are merely effective in fostering institutional resilience. However, the effectiveness depends on the internal, post-conflict stability of the country and its population, as well as international cooperation and the ability to go into diplomatic dialogue with hostile neighbours.

Kosovo shows a rising level of institutional resilience, but it will take time until Kosovo can govern itself effectively without external help. EULEX fosters resilience through capacity-building mechanisms in the local and national institutions. The Kosovo authorities show adaptive capacity in implementing European standards, although with room for improvement. The security situation at the border remains tense as the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia has been frozen since 2023, and EULEX has not managed to earn the trust of the Kosovo-Serbian minorities. EULEX should have a stronger focus on reuniting dialogues between the different ethnic groups in Kosovo, and it should be perceived as impartial by the (Kosovo-)Serbian population, who accuse EULEX of not fulfilling its monitoring responsibilities toward them. Accordingly, it might be worth rethinking EULEX's role as the second security responder and passing this executive policing function on to KFOR, which is already the third security responder in Kosovo. This way, EULEX could focus more on resilience and confidence-building in Kosovo's institutions and within the conflicted society, e.g. by increasingly monitoring issues like police abuses against minorities and by opening more border crossing points.

Armenia shows a high level of institutional resilience and self-governance. Since the change of power in 2018, the Armenian government has chosen to conduct legal and political reforms after the European model. This proves Armenia's adaptive capacity as it was able to reorganise itself and recover from former authoritarian tendencies. EUMA is

a mission that Armenia actively requested to secure the border with Azerbaijan. Especially since the Azerbaijani attack on Nagorno-Karabakh, the mission is still contributing to establishing Armenia's ability to be more adaptive to future system requirements. Despite the highly geopolitically contested environment that Armenia is in, it still made major concessions towards Azerbaijan to establish lasting peace. Although the conflict may appear resolved, significant steps must be taken before all conditions for the signing of the formal peace agreement are fulfilled. It is hence not clear if and when the mission will be withdrawn.

Consequently, H_1: *"The effectiveness of EU resilience-building measures decreases in regions where external geopolitical pressures are more intense"* is not correct for Armenia, but it applies to Kosovo because the country is more fragile, as there are internal ethnic conflicts between Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs that need to be resolved for establishing peace with Serbia. H_2: *"Civilian CSDP missions that integrate resilience-building strategies promote local ownership and sustainable self-governance more effectively than those that focus predominantly on external governance structures"*, applies to EUMA, as it only has monitoring and reporting functions. Therefore, the mission does not touch upon Armenia's institutional integrity but helps to build confidence and promotes human security and peace. The hypothesis also partly applies to Kosovo because the rule of law institutions can operate almost without the executive functions of EULEX. However, it is still unclear whether the local ownership of national institutions currently empowers the conflict further through elite-level corruption.

In conclusion, the analysis of two distinct EU civilian CSDP missions shows the significance of external resilience-building in promoting peace, security and self-governance in geopolitically contested regions. Thereby, the missions should remain temporary, aimed at strengthening and stabilising national governance against internal and external pressures by adapting to the country's needs. In a world increasingly turning to military solutions, leaders would be wise to reflect on their own internal challenges and prioritise resilience and peace before resorting to armed conflict. The establishment of civilian missions significantly impacts regional stability, peace and security.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Council Decision 2023/1095. (2023, June 5). *COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2023/1095.*

Official Journal of the European Union. https://eur-

lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/1095/oj/eng

Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/162 of 23 January 2023 on a European Union Mission in

Armenia (EUMA), 022 OJ L (2023). http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/162/oj/eng

Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1095 of 5 June 2023 Amending Joint

Action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo,

EULEX KOSOVO, 146 OJ L (2023). http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/1095/oj/eng

Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the European Union Rule of

Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO, CONSIL, 042 OJ L (2008).

http://data.europa.eu/eli/joint_action/2008/124/oj/eng

EU Neighbours East. (2024, November 1). *Armenia annual survey 2024 – country*

report. https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/publications/country-report-armenia-

annual-survey-2024/

European Commission. (2015, October 27). *Stabilisation and Association Agreement*

between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the

one part, and Kosovo *, of the other part.

http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2016/342/oj/eng

European Commission. (2024, October 30). *Kosovo Report 2024.* European

Commission. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/kosovo-report-2024_en

European Parliament. (2024, March 13). *Closer ties between the EU and Armenia and the need for a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia – European Parliament resolution of 13 March 2024 on closer ties between the EU and Armenia and the need for a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia*. http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6555/oj/eng

European Union. (2017, November 24). *Comprehensive and enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part*. http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2018/104/oj/eng

KS and KD v Council of the European Union and Others, No. Case C-29/22 P (ECJ 10 September 2024). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:62022CJ0029

REUNIR. (2025, February 10). *D5.1 POLITICAL THREAT ASSESSMENT IN EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD & WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES*. REUNIR. https://reunir-horizon.eu/d5-1-political-threat-assessment-in-eastern-neighbourhood-western-balkan-countries/

Additional Sources

AJLabs. (2023, February 17). *Which countries recognise Kosovo's statehood?* Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/17/mapping-the-countries-that-recognise-kosovo-as-a-state-2

Allison, G. (2000). The Impact of Globalization on National and International Security. In J. S. Nye & J. D. Donahue (Eds.), *Governance in a Globalizing World* (pp. 72–85).

Brookings Institution Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aalborguniv-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3004325#

Ates, D. (2023). The State of exception: An insight into its theoretical background. *Global Campus Human Rights Journal*, *7*(1), 114–124. https://doi.org/10.25330/2652

Austin, J. L. (1975). Lecture I. In J. L. Austin (Ed.), *How To Do Things With Words: The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955* (pp. 1–11). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245537.003.0001

Axelrod, R., & Keohane, R. O. (1986). Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. *The Johns Hopkins University Press*, *38*(1), 226–254. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv39x84c

Barseghyan, A. (2025a, January 30). *Armenia's Justice Minister claims Azerbaijani demands for signing the peace treaty are not 'preconditions'*. OC Media. https://oc-media.org/armenias-justice-minister-claims-azerbaijani-demands-for-signing-the-peace-treaty-are-not-preconditions/

Barseghyan, A. (2025b, January 30). *EU approves extension of Armenia monitoring mission until 2027*. OC Media. https://oc-media.org/eu-approves-extension-of-armenia-monitoring-mission-until-2027/

Bendiek, A. (2016). The Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy. *Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik (SWP)*, *(English version of SWP-Aktuell 44/2016)*, 1–4.

BMZ. (2022, November 3). *Kosovo*. Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. https://www.bmz.de/en/countries/kosovo

Bourbeau, P. (2013). Resiliencism: Premises and promises in securitisation research. *Resilience*, *1*(1), 3–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/21693293.2013.765738

Bourbeau, P. (2018). *On Resilience: Genealogy, Logics, and World Politics* (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press. DOI: 10.1017/9781108349017

Bourbeau, P., & Vuori, J. (2018). Resilience and Security. In *On Resilience: Genealogy, Logics, and World Politics* (1st ed., pp. 58–84). Cambridge University Press. DOI: 10.1017/9781108349017

Burdeau, C. (2022, May 9). *Putin blames NATO for pushing Russia into invasion*. Courthouse News Service. https://www.courthousenews.com/putin-blames-nato-for-pushing-russia-into-invasion/

Burley, A.-M., & Mattli, W. (1993). Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration. *International Organization*, *47*(1), 41–76. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706882

Buzan, B. (1997). Rethinking Security after the Cold War. *Cooperation and Conflict*, *32*(1), 5–28. https://www.jstor.org/stable/45084375

Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & Wilde, J. de. (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Center for Preventive Action. (2024, March 20). *Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict*. Global Conflict Tracker. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict

Chandler, D. (2015). Rethinking the Conflict-Poverty Nexus: From Securitising Intervention to Resilience. *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, *4*(1), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.fb

Côté, A. (2016). Agents without agency: Assessing the role of the audience in
securitization theory. *Security Dialogue*, *47*(6), 541–558.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010616672150

Daniels, L., & Mair, S. (Eds.). (2025). Trumps Rückkehr und Europas außenpolitische
Herausforderungen. *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)*, *SWP-Studie*(03/2025).
https://doi.org/10.18449/2025S03

della Porta, D. (2008). Comparative analysis: Case-oriented versus variable-oriented
research. In D. della Porta & M. Keating (Eds.), *Approaches and Methodologies in
the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective* (pp. 198–222). Cambridge University
Press.

Does, A. (2013). 3. Securitization theory. In *The Construction of the Maras: Between
Politicization and Securitization*. Graduate Institute Publications.
https://doi.org/10.4000/books.iheid.719

Doyle, K. (2022). Context for Common Security and Defence Civilian Missions. In K.
Doyle, *EU Peacebuilding Missions* (pp. 1–31). Springer International Publishing.
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-18769-8_1

Duffield, J. S. (1994). Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The Contributions of
Regional Security Regimes. *Review of International Studies*, *20*(4), 369–388.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097386

Emmers, R. (2016). Securitization. In A. Collins (Ed.), *Contemporary Security Studies*
(4th ed., pp. 173–188). Oxford University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1093/hepl/9780198804109.003.0012

Enveroglu, E. (2024, September 29). *EUMA emerges as architect of game more dangerous than weapons*. Azernews.Az. https://www.azernews.az/analysis/231915.html

EUMA. (2024, April 11). *About European Union Mission in Armenia*. EU Mission in Armenia. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/euma/about-european-union-mission-armenia_en?s=410283

Euronews. (2025, February 10). *New government in Kosovo faces multiple challenges*. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/10/new-government-in-kosovo-faces-multiple-challenges

European External Action Service (EEAS). (2016, June). *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy*. https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf

European External Action Service (EEAS). (2020, November 30). *EULEX Kosovo: European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo - Civilian Mission*. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eulex-kosovo/eulex-kosovo-european-union-rule-law-mission-kosovo-civilian-mission_und?s=333

European External Action Service (EEAS). (2022a, March 28). *Civilian Compact*. EEAS. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/civilian-compact_en

European External Action Service (EEAS). (2022b, March 28). *The shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy*. EEAS. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/shaping-common-security-and-defence-policy_en

European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). (n.d.). *What is EULEX? -
EULEX - European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo*. Retrieved 13 February
2025, from https://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,16

Europol. (2025, June 3). *Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA)*.
Europol. https://www.europol.europa.eu/operations-services-and-
innovation/services-support/information-exchange/secure-information-exchange-
network-application-siena

Filimon, L.-M. (2016). An Overview Of The Copenhagen School's Approach To Security
Studies: Constructing (In)Security Through Performative Power. *The Romanian
Journal for Baltic and Nordic Studies*, *8*(2), 47–72.
https://doi.org/10.53604/rjbns.v8i2_4

Floyd, R. (2016). Extraordinary or ordinary emergency measures: What, and who,
defines the 'success' of securitization? *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*,
29(2), 677–694. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2015.1077651

Garrett, G., & Weingast, B. R. (1993). 7. Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing
the European Community's Internal Market. In J. Goldstein & R. O. Keohane (Eds.),
Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (pp. 173–206).
Cornell University Press. https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501724992-009

Hansen, L. (2012). Reconstructing desecuritisation: The normative-political in the
Copenhagen School and directions for how to apply it. *Review of International
Studies*, *38*(3), 525–546. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210511000581

Holling, C. S. (1973). Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems. In L. Robin, S.
Sörlin, & P. Warde (Eds.), *The Future of Nature: Documents of Global Change* (pp.

245–256). Yale University Press. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aalborguniv-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3421303

Howorth, J. (2020). The CSDP in Transition: Towards 'Strategic Autonomy'? In R. Coman, A. Crespy, & V. A. Schmidt (Eds.), *Governance and Politics in the Post-Crisis European Union* (pp. 684–720). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108612609.019

Jackson, C. M. (2020). The EU and rule of law development in Kosovo: EULEX, domestic spoilers, and a two-level commitment problem. *Journal of European Integration*, *42*(7), 955–973. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2019.1703967

J.Mills, A., Durepos, G., & Wiebe, E. (2010). Most Different Systems Design. In *Encyclopedia of Case Study Research* (pp. 571–572). SAGE Publications, Inc. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412957397

Jones, B. (2024, December 31). *Barbano: The police are not above the law, they are accountable to it*. Alternativa. https://alternativna.com/28024-2/

Joseph, J., & Juncos, A. E. (2020). A promise not fulfilled: The (non) implementation of the resilience turn in EU peacebuilding. *Contemporary Security Policy*, *41*(2), 287–310. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1703082

Juncos, A. E. (2017). Resilience as the new EU foreign policy paradigm: A pragmatist turn? *European Security*, *26*(1), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2016.1247809

Kekovic, Z., & Ninkovic, V. (2020). Towards A Conceptualisation Of Resilience In Security Studies. *Srpska Politička Misao*, *67*(1/2020), 153–175. https://doi.org/10.22182/spm.6712020.7

Keohane, R. O., & Martin, L. L. (1995). The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. *International Security*, *20*(1), 39–51. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539214

Khvorostiankina, A. (2018). Europeanization Through EU External Agreements and the Issue of "Constitutional Identity": The Case of the EU-Armenia CEPA. *Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal*, *4*, Article 4. https://doi.org/10.18523/kmlpj153250.2018-4.15-52

Khvorostiankina, A. (2024). Assessing performance of the EU-Armenia cooperation on the rule of law and judicial reform: Policy resilience and relevance perspectives. *International Politics*, *61*(6), 1174–1198. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-023-00476-2

Korosteleva, E. A. (2020). Paradigmatic or critical? Resilience as a new turn in EU governance for the neighbourhood. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, *23*(3), 682–700. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-018-0155-z

Krasniqi, L., & Abdullai, J. (2022). Common Security and Defense Policy and Kosovo: A critical analysis of the EULEX Mission. *Revista de Stiinte Politice*, *75*, 171–180. https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/common-security-defense-policy-kosovo-critical/docview/2715838629/se-2

Krieger, J. (2014). Liberal Institutionalism. In *The Oxford Companion to International Relations*. Oxford University Press. https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199738878.001.0001/acref-9780199738878-e-208

Krikorian, O. J. (2025, January 16). *Azerbaijan Seeks End to EU Mission in Armenia as Pashinyan Offers Border Compromise*. The Jamestown Foundation.

https://jamestown.org/program/azerbaijan-seeks-end-to-eu-mission-in-armenia-as-pashinyan-offers-border-compromise/

lpb Baden-Württemberg. (2024). *Geschichte des Kosovo im Spannungsfeld des Serbien-Kosovo-Konflikts*. Landeszentrale Für Politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg. https://osteuropa.lpb-bw.de/kosovo-geschichte#c77211

Mammadli, N. (2024, August 29). *Azerbaijan's FM Highlights Armenia's Constitution as Barrier to Peace Talks*. Caspian News. https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/azerbaijans-fm-highlights-armenias-constitution-as-barrier-to-peace-talks-2024-8-29-0/

Papazian, D. R. (2008). Armenia. In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern World*. Oxford University Press. https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780195176322.001.0001/acref-9780195176322-e-98

Poopuu, B. (with Poopuu, B.). (2020). *The European Union's Brand of Peacebuilding*. Springer International Publishing. https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-19890-9_1

Ray, M. (2025, January 24). *Kosovo conflict | Summary & Facts*. Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/event/Kosovo-conflict

Russian News Agency. (2025, March 25). *Russia/Armenia: Armenia to lose many privileges if it joins EU - Russia's top security official*. ProQuest. https://www.proquest.com/docview/3180178496?accountid=8144&parentSessionId=rFTPsIdkyTgIm%2B9ncNOlO0b%2BLU6JaXdZ%2BSUNPvIRV3E%3D&pq-origsite=primo&sourcetype=Newspapers

Sakhri, M. (2024, September 20). *Liberal Theory in the Interpretation of Security Studies*. World Policy Hub. https://worldpolicyhub.com/liberal-theory-in-the-interpretation-of-security-studies/

Stępka, M. (2022). The Copenhagen School and Beyond. A Closer Look at Securitisation Theory. In M. Stępka (Ed.), *Identifying Security Logics in the EU Policy Discourse: The "Migration Crisis" and the EU* (pp. 17–31). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93035-6_2

Stojanovic, M., & Bami, X. (2022, November 15). Belgrade-Backed Kosovo Serb Party to Boycott Local Elections. *Balkan Insight*. https://balkaninsight.com/2022/11/15/belgrade-backed-kosovo-serb-party-to-boycott-local-elections/

Stokes, G. (2008). Kosovo. In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern World*. Oxford University Press. https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780195176322.001.0001/acref-9780195176322-e-863

TASS. (2024, February 23). *Armenia suspends participation in CSTO — Prime Minister*. TASS. https://tass.com/world/1750695

United Nations General Assembly. (2016, April 27). *A/RES/70/262: Review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture*. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_262.pdf

UNMIK. (2016, January 18). *United Nations Resolution 1244*. UNMIK. http://unmik.unmissions.org/united-nations-resolution-1244

Vartanyan, O. (2025, March 26). *The Window for an Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Deal Is Closing.* Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/03/azerbaijan-armenia-peace-talks?lang=en

Verellen, T. (2024). A Political Question Doctrine for the CFSP. *Verfassungsblog.* https://doi.org/10.59704/86e905fddea7e26c

Waever, O. (1995). Securitization and Desecuritization. In R. D. Lipschutz (Ed.), *On Security* (pp. 46–86). Columbia University Press.

Zanchetta, B. (2022, March 18). *Did Putin invade Ukraine because of NATOs 'broken promise'?* King's College London. https://www.kcl.ac.uk/did-putin-invade-ukraine-because-of-natos-broken-promise