

**Table of Contents**

Introduction..... 2

    Problem formulation..... 4

Background..... 5

    TIPNIS National Park and Indigenous Territory..... 5

    Organisations..... 6

    The TIPNIS Conflict ..... 8

        The Consultations..... 10

Theory..... 13

    Post-neoliberalism..... 13

        Post-neoliberalism in Bolivia ..... 16

    Populism in Latin America ..... 17

        Los Partidos Apristas/the APRA Movement..... 18

        Military reformists..... 19

        Social Revolutionary Parties/Bolivian MNR..... 20

        Peronistas ..... 21

Methodology ..... 22

Analysis..... 25

    Economic development of Bolivia..... 25

    Political changes – the Mother Earth Law..... 27

    The relation between Bolivia and Brazil..... 31

    Local democracy..... 35

    Interests of organisations..... 38

Conclusion ..... 43

Bibliography..... 48

Abstract ..... 53

Annex..... 55

## Introduction

The South American country of Bolivia is in a period of rapid changes. Since the election of president Evo Morales, the country has developed fast, economically as well as culturally. With change come challenges. When a country develops and slowly changes status from a developing to a developed country, what follows is the wish to take advantage of the new possibilities. Unfortunately some natural consequences are unavoidable, which is the backside of developing. One consequence is the environmental impact, locally as well as global. Locally because of the damages improved infrastructure and increased industry will have on the country's environment and nature. Globally because the improvement of living standards for the population usually leads to a higher energy-consumption, thus using a higher amount of the earth's resources, as well as increasing the pollution of the atmosphere.

The other negative impact the developing of a country has, is when the changes are forced upon people who does not want these changes, and even worse, when the changes are worsening the living conditions for certain parts of the population and violating their rights. This is a challenge many countries are facing, rich as well as poor. How do you as a leader of a country act, when the actions you take in the best interests of the country have negative impact on parts of the population as well as the environment? And what is most important, modernization on behalf of environment and certain human rights, or preservation on behalf of the development?

This backside of progress in the developing world is a very present issue in South America, especially in the Amazon region. The Amazon rainforest is widely seen internationally as one of the most precious and unique natural areas in the world. Deforesting of the Amazon is widely considered as a huge problem in terms of environment and climate change. Less promoted but not less problematic is the violation of rights of the inhabitants of the Rainforest, who depend on the resources the forest provides.

The Amazon Rainforest though, is for the developing of many South American countries also a limitation. The ground underneath contains natural resources, which could be of great value for the respective countries. This puts the governments into the dilemma of, what is most valuable, the conservation of the nature and environment, or the economic benefits from the

natural resources. A present example of this is in Ecuador where the government wants to leave a massive oil reserve underground to preserve the unique Yasuní National Park, for the benefit of the nature and the indigenous tribes living there. Instead they demand economic compensation from the international society, since they as a poor country can't afford leaving the resources underground, claims the president<sup>1</sup>. Another resource in the Amazon is that the strong streams of the rivers provide opportunities for hydroelectric energy. A country like Brazil covers 60% of their electricity consumption with hydroelectric energy. But with increasing need for more energy production more dams have to be built. Every time a dam is built, a part of the rainforest gets flooded, and thousands of inhabitants are being evacuated. The latest conflict has been about the Belo Monte area, where plans were to build a big new dam, but after massive protests the project has been put on hold for now (*the Guardian* 16/8 2012).

Another challenge for developing the Amazon region and surrounding countries is the weak infrastructure. Transportation inside the region is difficult and slow. It gives problems for import/export among the countries, and it makes it difficult for isolated areas, which are hard to reach, to develop with the same pace as easier accessible areas, keeping the inhabitants in poverty, and keeping them from improving their living standards.

In Bolivia this discussion has been very present during the last two years. The governments struggle to construct a highway directly through the heart of the national park TIPNIS, has evolved into a conflict between the government, the citizens and organisations representing indigenous peoples and environmental organisations. The highway will without doubt make huge damages to one of the most unique natural areas in the countries<sup>2</sup>. Furthermore it will destroy living conditions for the indigenous inhabitants of the area who are self-sufficient and live by the nature. They are depended on having the opportunities for hunting, fishing, collecting food etc.

On the other hand the government claims this highway is essential for the developing of Bolivia. It is necessary to build the highway to give the farmers in the Bolivian lowlands better

---

<sup>1</sup> From the Ecuadorian government's website for the Yasuní Initiative <http://yasuni-itt.gob.ec/quees.aspx>

<sup>2</sup> All claims about the TIPNIS conflict, made in this introduction, will be elaborated in other chapters of this project

access to areas, where they can sell their goods. It is necessary to give better facilities like schools and hospitals to the citizens in the Amazon, and it is important to build the highway since it will improve the infrastructure between Bolivia and their main trading partner Brazil. Furthermore it will shorten the distance between central Brazil and the Chilean Pacific coast, from where a lot of Brazil's goods are shipped out.

This is a core example of the backside of a country's developing towards modernization. This improvement of the infrastructure is essential for the further developing of the country, according to the government. But at the same time it is destructible for the environment and will destroy the living conditions for many inhabitants of Bolivia, according to the organisations.

### ***Problem formulation***

What I find really interesting in this conflict is the government's insistence of the necessity of the highway, yet its lack of ability to let the construction begin. The government seemed from the beginning out of reach, for anyone who wanted to debate the subject. The construction companies were ready to begin the work, the financing was arranged, and the pieces of the highway not affecting the national park, was already being built. This leads to the first question: How come after two years, though everything to begin with seemed to in order, is not yet one centimetre of the highway constructed?

On the other hand, an even more pressuring question is: Why is it that important to build this highway right there? The government is risking a lot. It's accused of breaking human rights. It's getting into confrontations with a lot of the main human right organisations in Bolivia. It's risking its own governing position by working against the peoples it was elected to support. Furthermore it's accused of destroying some of the most valuable parts of the natural richness and diversity the country has to offer. How can this be lucrative or even worth it for the government? No doubt about that improved infrastructure in Bolivia, especially in the isolated regions would be beneficial. But it didn't have to be directly through that relatively small piece of land that forms the TIPNIS national park. There are good opportunities of leading the route around the park instead of directly through the heart of it, and even the local organizations in the area would support this. The government has claimed that this would be too expensive to do. This argument though, was weakened a lot by Brazil being ready to finance it (*NACLA, February 12, 2012*). Brazil was already at first the ones to finance the project with a

very lucrative loan to the Bolivian government. Therefore the government's insistence to construct the highway, right there through the heart of the national park, with the consequences for environment and people, and the decreasing popularity for the government, remains a mystery. This leads to the problem formulation for this project:

*Why is it so important for the government of Bolivia to construct a highway directly through the TIPNIS national park?*

## Background

### ***TIPNIS National Park and Indigenous Territory***

TIPNIS or "Territoria Indigena y Parque Nacional Isiboro-Secure" (Isiboro-Secure National Park and Indigenous Territory) is positioned in Central Bolivia on the border of the Cochabamba and Beni Regions. It has been a National park since 1965 and is valued because of its unique diversity when it comes to plants and wildlife.

The inhabitants can roughly be put into two groups: The indigenous' and the settlers. The indigenous people of TIPNIS have lived there since before the colonial times. They are self-sufficient and live by the nature. They go hunting fishing etc. and only produce what they need for themselves. They are dependent of the nature in the national park. They are less depended of the surrounding society. In the outskirts of TIPNIS various communities of settlers exist, and it is a matter of discussion if they count as official inhabitants of the TIPNIS as well. This is something that plays a role in the conflict, which I will follow up on later.

The settlers are groups of people not originally from the area. It is mainly people from the highlands, for example miners who have been missing the opportunities to find jobs, and therefore have moved to the area, to live as farmers, because of the fertility of the area and because of the space in the little populated region. Many produces coca and others produces different sorts of fruits. It is estimated that as a result of these communities of settlers already 10% of the park has been deforested. These groups are not depended on the national park. They are depended on being able to produce their crops and not less important, being able to export and sell them. Therefore they are very depended of the surrounding society and good transportation lines, which is something the area lacks, since most transportation is on water.

In 1990 the National Park was also declared an indigenous territory after protest from the inhabitants of the park. This means the legal ownership of the park belongs to the indigenous groups of the Yuracaré, Moxeno and Chimán people, who historically have been the inhabitants of the park. The Indigenous territory or the TCO the Indigenous Communal Lands, as it is also called covers the majority of the national park. An area inhabited by settlers in the southern zone called the Polygon 7, is located outside the indigenous territory but are still a part of the national park<sup>3</sup>. Though only having one tenth of the size of the indigenous territory, the Polygon 7 is inhabited by approximately 20000 families. The three indigenous groups of the indigenous territory consist of approximately 12000 persons all together (*Annex I*).

## ***Organisations***

Shortly I will give an introduction to the involved organisations in the conflict. Surely I'm only mentioning a few of all implied organisations, but these are the ones I'm going to mention the most in the rest of the project. The ones I believe having the biggest influence. Also it's worth mentioning that some of them are umbrella organisations, covering various other regional organisations.

I will start by introducing the pro-TIPNIS groups, those opposing the highway.

**CIDOB:** “Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia” (The Confederation of indigenous peoples in Bolivia) is the umbrella organisation representing the part of the indigenous Bolivian population coming from the lowlands. Therefore they are also the overall represents of the inhabitants of the TIPNIS indigenous territory. They were founded in 1982 and their leader is Adolfo Chavez<sup>4</sup>.

**CONAMAQ:** “Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu” (National council of Ayllus and Markas of the Qullasuyu), named after the regions it represents, is the highland

---

<sup>3</sup> All facts about the park is from Parkwatch.org on TIPNIS  
<http://www.parkwatch.org/parkprofile.php?l=eng&country=bol&park=isnp&page=inf>

<sup>4</sup> From CIDOB's official webpage <http://www.cidob-bo.org/>

version of CIDOB representing the indigenous population from the highlands. It was founded in 1997 (*Schilling-Vacaflor, 2008, P. 2*).

**The TIPNIS Subcentral:** They are the represents for the inhabitants of the indigenous territory, the area which is also called the TCO or the Indigenous Communal Lands. This is the part of the park that is not inhabited by settlers. An amount of settlers have also colonized a part of the indigenous territory but are not represented by the Subcentral and are not really accepted as a part of the territory. The Subcentral partly manages the park on a regional level, where the institution SERANAP, a governmental organ looking over national parks, is in charge of the park on a national scale. The Subcentral is not yet satisfied with their level of power in the park. It represents all the inhabitants who depended on the nature, and therefore it's strongly opposed to the highway. Its leader is Fernando Vargas<sup>3</sup>.

In favour of the highway are various smaller pro-MAS<sup>5</sup> organisations, which reason to take side is to support the government. I will not describe every single one of those. The organisation which most continually has been supporting the government in the conflict is:

**CONISUR:** "Consejo Indigena del Sur" (Indigenous council of the south). This organisation represents the other communities in the park than the Subcentral. It represents the communities in the settled areas. It both represents settled communities within the indigenous territory, but also an area called the Polygon 7. It's an area within the national park, but it's not included in the indigenous territory. Since the majority of the members of CONISUR are farmers, they support the construction of the highway, so they will have easier access to trade with their goods (*Carwil without borders, December 29, 2011*).

**Chaparé:** The coca-growers federation in Bolivia. It's in favour of the highway since there in the southern TIPNIS and the surrounding areas is a lot of coca growing. The president of Chaparé is the Bolivian president Evo Morales (*NACLA, August 12, 2011*).

---

<sup>5</sup> Movimiento A Socialismo (Movement towards socialism), the government Party of the Bolivian Parliament led by president Evo Morales

## ***The TIPNIS Conflict***

In 2011 The Bolivian government granted the permissions to build a highway through the TIPNIS National Park and Indigenous Territory. There exist a variety of reasons why the government wants the highway to be built. It will connect the isolated northern Bolivia with the big cities in the central and southern Bolivia. It will also even out the balance of the country economically and power wise, since trade will be improved the area, and therefore Bolivia's biggest and richest city Santa Cruz will lose a bit of its status as the trade and finance centre of Bolivia. In that way Bolivia would experience progress in areas which are poor, less developed and mainly inhabited by groups of indigenous people. The majority of the population of Bolivia is of indigenous origin, but still the richest part of the country is in and around Santa Cruz where there is the smallest representation of indigenous people in the country. President Evo Morales, who is of indigenous origin himself, has mainly had the rights of indigenous people as his main priority. With the building of the TIPNIS highway, Evo Morales means he does a favour for the indigenous people in Bolivia, by improving trade and business in the poorer areas. The building of the highway is not being well received by everybody. Two main arguments are used against the building of the highway. One argument is the environmental consequences. TIPNIS is a protected area, it is claimed to be one of the most unique and diverse national parks in Bolivia, home to a number of endangered species. The other argument is the human consequences, because the side effects of building the highway will be that the living conditions for the indigenous inhabitants of TIPNIS are going to be destroyed. Therefore it is seen as a violation of their rights.

What really made this conflict receive attention was the protest march from Trinidad, capital of the Beni Region to the government city of Bolivia, La Paz. This march was organized as a cooperative between the leaders of TIPNIS, the lowlands indigenous organisation CIDOB and the highlands indigenous organisation CONAMAQ, plus an increasing number of sympathizers who joined the march as it progressed (*NACLA, August 12, 2011*).

The 600 km march began on the 15<sup>th</sup> of August 2011, consisting to begin with of 1000 participants (*NACLA, August 19, 2011*). One week into the march, after walking around 100 km, the march arrived to the town of San Ignacio de Moxos, which is the northern port of the beginning of the TIPNIS Highway. Here the march, which at that time had grown to 1500 par-



ticipants, was met by sympathy but also protests from MAS supporters or farmers supporting the highway. Some protesters destroyed a number of vehicles accompanying the march, and the marchers were as well denied access to food, water etc. The government also at this time showed the first signs of interests in dialogue with the marchers, though denying having anything to do with the counter-demonstration in San Ignacio de Moxos (*NACLA, August 26, 2011*). Evo Morales had earlier made himself unpopular among TIPNIS supporters, not only because of the highway, but because of his ridiculing way of talking about them, like saying that the young male farmers in TIPNIS, who supports the highway, should seduce women from the indigenous population of TIPNIS, and by that way increase the support by changing their minds (*Pagina Siete, August 3, 2011*).

As the TIPNIS support was increasing, Evo Morales changed his rhetoric towards being more dialogue oriented. Having said that, the tone between the protesters and the government were still harsh. The protesters accused the government for spreading false rumours about their purpose. They were, as they said, not against improving infrastructure in the area, but against a highway directly through the national park. At the same time the government accused TIPNIS leaders of working together with US officials making the Bolivian government less popular. This was based on telephone calls between TIPNIS leaders and the US Embassy in La Paz. This turned out to be a false accusation, but a matter of security since the embassy wants to have an idea of what is going on around the country (*NACLA, August 26, 2011*). Instead the government tried a new offence by claiming that the TIPNIS leaders were organizing illegal trafficking through the national park, and that this was their reason to oppose the highway construction. At the same time the government claimed that TIPNIS is not a unique ecosystem and that this is also just a part of the propaganda used by TIPNIS-supporters (*Los Tiempos, August 23, 2011*).

A week later into the march, the government once again tried to open up dialogue with the TIPNIS-supporters but highlighted that though being interested in discussing how this highway could be built with as less environmental impact as possible, there was not anyway that the road could go around the park as the TIPNIS leaders had proposed, and also it was not a matter of discussion whether to build the highway or not. The construction was going to be,

and it was going to be constructed directly through the park, was the message (*Pagina Siete, September 11, 2011*).

Where the first weeks of protests and attempts of dialogue has led to nothing, what was about to come changed everything. A little more than a month into the march, the marchers reached the town of Yucumo, which is located on the border between the Beni and La Paz departments. At that time hundreds of MAS supporters had gathered in the town, with the intension of not letting the marchers pass. To avoid further disturbance than necessary, the police were controlling the area, and avoiding the marchers to get into a confrontation with the MAS supporters, who were blocking the road. At September 24, the minister of foreign affairs of Bolivia, David Choquehuanca visited the marchers. The point was to show some goodwill and initiative to dialogue from the government. The outcome was unpredicted. The marchers took Choquehuanca as a hostage and used him to get through a police barrier. Hereafter they released him unharmed. Officially as a consequence of this, the following day a group of 500 police officers attacked the camp of the marchers violently, using rubber bullets and teargas. This resulted in the death of a child and many injured. Officially the government denied having anything to do with this, though TIPNIS supporters were of a different opinion. The police claimed the attack was a reaction of the protesters taking the Bolivian minister of foreign affairs hostage. Since they immediately released him after getting through the blockade, they claimed that the police couldn't use this as an excuse for the attack (*NACLA, September 28, 2011*).

### **The Consultations**

As the marchers reached La Paz in October 2011 the debate climate had definitely changed between the government and the protesters. Two days after they reached the city, Evo Morales signed a new law prohibiting any further actions taken towards the construction of the highway. This law also prohibited new, not approved, settlements in the TIPNIS (*Bolpress, October 21, 2011*). A problem in the national park has been farmers moving into the area without approval, and starting tearing down forest in order to produce crops or make plantations. The TIPNIS supporters was not satisfied with this law, and wanted the government to cancel the contract with the Brazil construction company OAS and cancel the loaning agreement with the Brazilian government.

On the other side there were the pro-highway organisations, who thought the government was running from its responsibility cancelling the highway construction. Especially the coca farmers in the TIPNIS region weren't happy with this, and also indigenous pro-MAS organisations were on the same side as the coca farmers. Therefore a "contra" protest march was arranged, this time in favour of the highway construction. This march was arranged by CONISUR, an organisation representing 21 communities in TIPNIS, where 12 of those are located within the borders of the indigenous area, the rest in the Polygon 7 zone. This organisation is pro-highway because many of the members are farmers. CONISUR has also been a MAS partner in the conflict, as the government needed an ally in the TIPNIS region as a defence for its interactions in the area, and as an argument for claiming it has support for the highway construction (*NACLA, October 28 2011*).

CONISUR claimed that the law prohibiting further construction was not binding since they had not been consulted about it. They claim that Evo Morales was forced to cancel the construction by the anti-highway protesters. The compromise became a new consultation among the affected citizens. The government described this as a prior consultation before taking final decisions about the highway construction. Pro-TIPNIS groups opposed this, claiming it could not be prior consultations, since the government had not yet cancelled the contracts about building the highway. They also opposed that the consultation should include communities located outside the indigenous territory, where the support for the highway is stronger than within the territory (*NACLA, February 10, 2012*).

Yet a new march was arranged by some of the TIPNIS leaders to protest these consultations (*NACLA, March 23, 2012*). A surprising result of this became that the government cancelled the contracts about the construction of the highway with the Brazilian construction company OAS (*Bolpress, 10/4, 2012*). This happened just before the beginning of the new march and also before the beginning of the consultations. Evo Morales though claimed that the course of the cancellations was due to delays on the project. OAS had simply not managed to live up to their contracts about how much of the other segments of the highway, the parts outside TIPNIS, which were to be finished at that specific time. After this the cooperative between Brazil and Bolivia was definitely over, and the TIPNIS project was now solely a Bolivian project.

After cancelling the contract with OAS, the result also became a cancellation of the loan from Brazil that was supposed to finance the majority of the expenses. This led into a smaller con-

flict between Bolivia and Brazil, since it was unclear how much of the loan that was already given to Bolivia, and also had the construction of part 1 and 3 of the highway already begun. The highway consists of three pieces. The centrepiece, part 2, going directly through the national park is the controversial piece, and the reason for the conflict. Also the Brazilian company OAS revealed that they had never had the actual permission to begin constructing the centerpiece of the road. (*Pagina Siete, September 28, 2011*)

While the second pro-TIPNIS march was getting closer to La Paz, with protesters still being against the future consultations, the government began making agreement with the communities represented by CIDOB. Instead of negotiating directly with the organisation the government were attempting to take over the support by the regional organisations in the communities and by that way weaken the legitimacy for CIDOB to participate in the pro-TIPNIS demonstrations. These organisations now supporting the government claimed that CIDOB leader Adolfo Chavez was authoritarian in his way of speaking on behalf of all the representatives without having consulted them (*La Razon, 21/5 2012*).

The marchers didn't have success by their arrival in La Paz. Though a warm welcoming by many citizens, the government refused to dialogue with them, and they were met by teargas and water cannons by the police, when trying to reach Plaza Murillo, where the parliament is located. Basically this became the end of the conflict as it is now. The marchers went back to TIPNIS without any results of their march (*NACLA, July 13, 2012*).

The government continued and finished the consultations by the end of 2012. It claimed that 80% of the 69 consulted communities were in favour of the highway (*La Razon, December 7, 2012*). The TIPNIS leaders claim that there has been manipulation, and that the consultations were not held on fair conditions. For example were some consultations held in locations practically inaccessible for the inhabitants, why they were not able to see what took place at the consultation meetings. The government claimed that after the results of these consultations, everything was ready to finally begin the construction of the highway (*NACLA, December 13, 2012*). A new loan was taken from the international society (*Reuters, October 22, 2012*), but after this nothing new happened and nothing was heard officially until the government in April 2013 declared that the beginning of the constructions was postponed for at least three years. In the meantime it is the plan for the government to eliminate extreme poverty in the

region. Before that had happened, no further actions will be taken to begin the construction (*La Razon, April 11, 2013*). The government have reserved an amount of 14 millions USD to improve living conditions in TIPNIS and to invest in sustainable development projects (*La Razon, April 21, 2013*). So this is the current status of the conflict. But due to the official information the project is not cancelled, only postponed, and the TIPNIS leaders are still being sceptical about the government's intentions (*La Razon, April 11, 2013*).

## **Theory**

I will focus on two theories in this project, one theory to illuminate the economical side of the political situation in Bolivia, in order to understand the motives to construct the highway.

Here I will use the idea of Post-neoliberalism.

I will use another theory to get some ideas of the motives of Evo Morales and the government of Bolivia. Here I will use theories about Populism in Latin America.

It is my impression that I by analyzing the case from these two angles will be able to get an understanding of, both why the construction of this highway might or might not be a good idea for the development of Bolivia, but also to get an understanding of why the government on one hand is so determent to begin the constructions, yet constantly finds new ways to delay the project.

### ***Post-neoliberalism***

Post-neoliberalism is a term used to describe the development of economic politics in the Americas and especially Latin America after neoliberalism really got into the region in the 1980'ies. The beginning of the post-neoliberal era in Latin America is defined as the election of Hugo Chavez as president in Venezuela in 1998. This became a turning point in the political development in Latin America. After the election of Hugo Chavez many countries followed electing left-wing leaders. Though these leaders were very different, they all had in common that they wanted limitations on the influence free market politics had had on the evolution of the region. They believed this politic had influence on the growing poverty in the countries. At the same time the Latin America had during the decades of neoliberalism not experienced a growth in the economy that matched the time before. In fact Latin America benefitted very little from the rise of neoliberalism, and also ended up as the most unequal

region in the world (*Macdonald L, Ruckert A, 2009 P. 4*). For these reasons a vast amount of the citizens of Latin America watch Neoliberalism with extremely critical eyes (*Macdonald L, Ruckert A, 2009 P.5*).

Post-neoliberalism is not the opposition to neoliberalism. It's an alternative, and there are plenty of interpretations of the term. The majority of Latin American countries still acknowledge that some core elements of neoliberalism are still advantageous to follow. For example not to let the inflation rates get too high, and to keep balance on the budgets. There is also a general tolerance of free trade, or at least that some liberalization in the trading sector is beneficial. What distinguishes post-neoliberalism from neoliberalism, is the view on the role of the state. For a post-neoliberal country it's more accepted that the state has a more offensive financial political and influence on the economy. It could be by taking initiatives to influence the market, like manipulating the economy in order to correct market failures that are not beneficial. It can be defined as the continuity versus discontinuity of neoliberalism. This is the easiest way to define whether a country is post-neoliberal or not. If the continuity from neoliberalism is more present than discontinuity caused by political changes, the country is not yet to be classified as post-neoliberal (*Macdonald L, Ruckert A, 2009 P. 7*). The ways the new wave of left-wing leaders in Latin America have led their countries are very differently. Where countries like Brazil and Argentina have shown an openness to the global market, Venezuela and Bolivia have been more closed, and practiced what looks like more old-fashioned socialism, in an attempt to distinguish their countries from the capitalistic market. The majority of the Post-neoliberal governments in Latin America seem to have learned from the mistakes the "pre-neoliberal" governments did. Like the lack of concern for economic deficit that caused deep economic crises in many countries in Latin America. With some exceptions the new generations of leftist leaders seem to be much more conservative in their financial politics, though still trying to maintain more classical left-wing ideals in the formation of their politics (*Macdonald L, Ruckert A, 2009 P.40*).

In the area where post-neoliberalism seems most neoliberal, is in the terms of trade. This is especially where it disconnects from the more old-fashioned way of viewing socialism. Here there is also demonstrated the big difference that still exists among the Latin American countries. Where countries like Venezuela and Bolivia seem much more closed towards negotiations and trade with for example Europe and North America, other countries like Chile, Ar-

gentina and Brazil, seem more open minded, but have also been opposing certain issues, for example the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (*Macdonald L, Ruckert A, 2009 P. 41*). A reason to this has been the countries interest in expanding trade in the region before going intercontinental. The main difference between the countries who are opposing the market in general and those who are just critical towards negotiating with for example North America is that Brazil, Argentina etc. first of all wants to protect the trade in the area of Latin America and domestic trade. It's not that they as such are opposing trade across continents. This is also seen in the way these countries have been frontrunners in the establishment of UNASUR, the association of MERCOSUR and the Andean Pact, the two other main trading associations in South America (*Macdonald L, Ruckert A, 2009 P. 42*). On the other hand countries like Bolivia, Venezuela and Ecuador established after the opposing of FTAA, the alternative association ALBA - the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, together with Cuba, Nicaragua and other countries in Central America (*Macdonald L, Ruckert A, 2009 P. 7*). This was based on anti-capitalist ideas, and was more based on exchange of the respective countries goods, and by that way get around the prices on the market.

At the time of these actions both Brazil and Argentina was in fact led by right wing governments, yet they are seemed as parts of the post-neoliberal turn in Latin America, thus demonstrating the broad definition of the term. It is not a political ideology, but a way to analyze the political and economic development in a period with a lot of changes in the region. Chile on the other hand was the frontrunner in terms of free trade, signing an agreement with the United States in 2003. This was followed by attempts from other South American countries, which could see benefits from entering the protected North American market, to do the same. A few years later Peru managed to get an agreement through as well, and Uruguay was trying as well though having some troubles with this, as their government of the time was in opposition to the trading associations of Latin America, which also limited the ability to make other transcontinental agreements. There is a general understanding, even among left-wing governments in Latin America that openness towards freer trade and more open economies is beneficial for the region. At the same time it is important to protect the interests of the region. Here is really the core of the Post-neoliberalism (*Macdonald L, Ruckert A, 2009 P. 43*). Open economies and free trade to an extent that is beneficial, but it is not based on ideology, rather some sort of pragmatism. If it is helpful we don't move away from it, but use it. The extent of

to where it's beneficial for a country is really up to the respective governments to define. Therefore there can be wide political spans within post-neoliberalism.

### **Post-neoliberalism in Bolivia**

In Bolivia the neoliberal change came late. One of the biggest steps towards neoliberalism was the privatization of the hydrocarbon sector in 1996. Until then it had been nationalized. It was the president of the time Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada that signed the law transferring the industry from the state to the private sector (*Macdonald L, Ruckert A, 2009 P. 106*). In the law was included natural gas. Both existing and new reserves was to be given to private companies (*Macdonald L, Ruckert A, 2009 P. 107*). In 1997 massive new reserves of natural gas were discovered, making Bolivia the second biggest provider in South America after Venezuela (*Macdonald L, Ruckert A, 2009 P. 106*). Lozada did not have success with the privatization. The state revenue from the sector did not match the one from the time when it was nationalized (*Macdonald L, Ruckert A, 2009 P. 109*). At the same time the privatization resulted in mass firings because of effectuations, and it was the only sector not succeeding to create many new jobs. Therefore it was hard for the population to see the benefits. It led to increasing dissatisfaction with president Lozada, and eventually it resulted in the gas wars in 2003, where many protesters demanded a new nationalization. First it was tried to solve the problems by raising the companies' taxes, but the protesters were not satisfied and eventually in 2005 the government lost its power to the MAS party led by actual president Evo Morales.

Recently after the change of government, new laws were passed through regarding the hydrocarbon sector. The government claimed to be re-nationalizing the sector. In fact this wasn't the case. In fact it just made new agreements with the transnational companies that were already in charge of the sector. Or in other words, new requirements were given to the companies. The biggest transnational companies had to pay 82% tax to the state (*Macdonald L, Ruckert A, 2009 P. 110*). Before that, they were hardly paying any taxes. Not until the gas war, where the former government raised the taxes to 50% in an attempt to regain the trust of the population (*Macdonald L, Ruckert A, 2009 P. 108*). The MAS government led smaller companies keep paying only 50% tax of their revenues. In addition to the raised taxes the government was also taken over some of the control with the production, though still keeping the companies in charge (*Macdonald L, Ruckert A, 2009 P.111*).



According to this Bolivia is actually not yet to be classified as a Post-neoliberal country. The changes from the neoliberal era is really not as significant as one might think, based on the rhetoric of Evo Morales. In fact the continuity is more present than discontinuity since the system is fundamentally the same, when it comes to the sector of hydrocarbons (*Macdonald L, Ruckert A, 2009 P. 118*). The only change is that the taxes have been raised and that the government is having a more strict control. It's still the private sector that is in charge.

My reason to use Post-neoliberalism as a theory in this project is because, I see it as the best indicator for the significant changes that has taken place in South America during the past decades. This includes Bolivia. Not only have the country experienced increasing growth and poverty reductions, but also big political changes. These political changes economically as well as ideological is what lies beyond the TIPNIS conflict. The main reason for the government to construct the highway is, according to itself trade. It is trade within Bolivia as well as trade internationally, as it is going to make better infrastructural connections between Bolivia and Brazil. This shows on one hand a country that is accepting these instruments as a way two improve the economy and with that the living standards for the population. But it is also demonstrating a government very determent two take care of their interests in their own way, even if it might cause a lot of resistance towards them. The reason why I see Post-neoliberalism as a good perspective of this, is that we see a strongly leftist government acknowledging that some ideas from neoliberalism can be beneficial, but at the same time an insistence to do the things their own way, which is very much a short summary of the whole definition of the term post-neoliberalism.

### ***Populism in Latin America***

The first era of populism in Latin America was in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, as a result of socioeconomic changes. The industrialization had made the biggest cities grow, which meant changes in living standards for the people moving to the towns. In the beginning moving to the town meant new possibilities and a better life, but with the increasing number of citizens moving to the towns, the backsides also started to show. A lot of people started to settle in slums around the town centres. Crime and rioting was arising, facilities became worse etc. This led to a worsening of living standards for many people through the generations and higher dissatisfaction among the citizens. This was something that made politicians see opportunities. It meant that suddenly they could gain a lot of support by engaging in few

cases which had influence on many people's life. For example could promising better conditions for the poor be an easy way to get a lot of people behind them (*Conniff M L, 2012, P. 8*). Especially during the first half of the century new technologies made it easier for politicians to reach the citizens with simple and effectual messages. Improvements of infrastructure meant that they could get around easier, coming out to a lot of different people. Also the invention of radio and television was crucial in getting the messages out and become a known name (*Conniff M L, 2012, P. 10*).

A characteristic for populist leaders is that they can't rely of the support from only one group. They have to be able to promise something to everyone, or at least the majority. In opposition non-populist leaders have usually been coming from a specific group or social class of the population, representing only those (*Conniff M L, 2012, P. 14*).

The Argentinean sociologist Torcuato Di Tella set up four models of Populism based on the political movements in Latin America and other parts of the developing world. This is known as Torcuato Di Tella's four models (*Conniff M L, 2012, P. 14*). These Models are: Military Reformists, Apristas, Peronistas and the Social Revolutionary parties or the Bolivian MNR as mentioned on the model (*Annex 2*). I will go through these four models one by one. Be aware that as these models are based on the political movements in Latin America in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, also the classes that will be mentioned are from that time.

### **Los Partidos Apristas/the APRA Movement**

Los Partidos Apristas or the APRA Movement refers to the American Popular Alliance, a Peruvian political party. The characteristics for this model, is that it appeals to groups of the working class, which can belong to the lower working class as well as the middle class. But they do not represent higher middle-class, the clergy or the military. There are influences of communism and anarchy within the organizational structure, where a lot of the work is voluntary based. But the leadership is still autocratic and charismatic (*Di Tella, T S, 1965, P. 17*). Though having communistic and Marxist influences on the ideology, the APRA Movement is more to characterize as social democratic. The core ideology is solidarity, but at the same time it represents different classes, and having the majority of the workers on their side is more important than being able to represent the most leftist minorities. Because of that there exist left-wing oppositions to the APRA-movement, but as long as they manage to mobilize the

majority of the working classes, this opposition may not be a thread, since it will remain a minority (*Di Tella, T S, 1965, P. 18*).

The biggest opposition will in this case be the right wing or centre-right parties that represent the higher middle-class and the upper class (*Di Tella, T S, 1965, P. 19*). Again, at that time of APRA, the classes of the workers represented such a vast majority of the population that being able to mobilize the majority of those, meant that none other political parties could really be a thread. In fact, the biggest thread towards such a movement will be other populist parties moving in on the same territory. In the exact case of APRA it was the Odríist National Union, formed of General and former Peruvian president Manuel A. Odría. It also managed to receive support within the higher classes and the military, as well as it was were moving in on the territory of APRA (*Di Tella, T S, 1965, P. 20*). The lack of support within the military and the higher classes is the weak point for a political movement like APRA, since it makes their position in international politics very weak. At the same time they have to keep their politics within their country quite moderate, not to risk getting overruled by armed forces, but at the same time it is not possible for them to create politic that will gain support from the upper classes, because they then will lose the working class, because the economic preferences are so different between the lower and higher classes (*Di Tella, T S, 1965, P. 21*). This is the biggest challenge for parties belonging to the model defined as the APRA Movement.

### **Military reformists**

The Military reformists do not gain power by getting the sympathy of the masses. They take the leadership with force, and when being in charge the challenge is to get the trust of the people, and gain enough support to keep the power without having to protect it with force. For that reason it is essential that they create economic and industrial progress for the country, or else they will remain authoritarian and not populists. Military reformist parties will usually be supported or at least tolerated by the upper classes from the beginning. They have to gain the support from the working classes. Therefore a charismatic leader is essential (*Di Tella, T S, 1965, P. 23*). It is important make it appear that the state is really strong and united. Therefore the leaders would try to make the population critical towards other cultures in an attempt to make their own culture stand stronger. Their foreign policy would as well be aggressive, especially because the international society will usually be critical towards those kinds of leaderships (*Di Tella, T S, 1965, P. 24*).

Military reformists do not represent a form of populism that has been very present in Latin America. It is not to be confused with the military dictatorships which have been present in Latin America, since those have usually been very conservative and not reformists, though some of them have been more positive towards development than others. Usually they have only gained support from the higher classes, which only consists of minorities of the entire population. The example that is closest to this is Rojas Pinilla who became president in Colombia after a military coup in 1953. He tried with different results to imply different directions of the politics in the country. He didn't though manage to gain enough support to stay in charge and lost the presidency four years later. The opposition was too strong (*Di Tella, T S, 1965, P. 25*). The Odría government in Peru, which I mentioned in the APRA-section, also had similarities with this, but they already took the power from a populist government when they took the presidency in a military coup in 1948. Odría ruled very conservatively, but did however try to make some changes in an attempt to win larger parts of the population over to his side, but merely gained the support from some public workers and not the majority of the labour force (*Di Tella, T S, 1965, P. 26*).

### **Social Revolutionary Parties/Bolivian MNR**

This model of populism has been represented in various Latin American countries in the first wave of populism before or around the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. A core example is Fidel Castro in Cuba, so is the Venezuelan left moving revolution. This can also be said about the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement in Bolivia, though this is in between an APRA party and a social revolutionary party (*Di Tella, T S, 1965, P. 27*).

The alliance of social revolutionaries will usually consist of urban workers, which in the countries where this has been taking place, haven't been a big group and very badly organized. It will gain support from the agricultural community, and finally the key persons in the revolution will be from the lower middle class or the intellectual class. The leaders of the revolution from those groups are opposed to their own class. Because they are not in any political or powerful position, they have been developing authoritarian characteristics and they have a very hard emotional attitude in their rhetoric. The existence of this last group to take the leadership is crucial, since it is not possible to train anyone to have these skills. Therefore social revolutions are only seen in countries where the social circumstances make it possible for this group to exist. What distinct this type of revolution from a Marxist revolution is, at

first, the association between the urban workers and the farmers, instead of just being a working class revolution. But the biggest difference is the strategic role the social status of the revolutionaries has to play after the revolution, when the formation of the political parties begins. Here we see the most populist characteristics of this model (*Di Tella, T S, 1965, P. 28*).

After coming to power, the revolutionaries will face social challenges. Because they are out breakers from different social classes in the society, there exists now a distance between those in power and the rest of the society. In contrast to this would be a revolution formed among the organized workers, where the revolutionaries would already have the support from a significant group from the beginning. For this reason the political party of the social revolutionaries will be very hard and uncompromising in their ruling. In that sense they will have similarities with the military reform parties. The right wing or centre-right opposition parties will be criminalized, and the classes that would support those parties are being evicted. The social revolutionaries have a strong international role. Of the time the parties usually were connected to the Soviet Union and gained economic support from there. The government controls all aspects of cooperating with other countries. No other parts of the society will have any access to do so, which also puts the government in a very strong position when dealing with other countries (*Di Tella, T S, 1965, P. 29*).

A social revolutionist government really has the possibility of going in two directions. It depends on the pressure it experiences from other instances of society. If it experiences that the opposition towards the government is very strong, chances are it will turn into a military reformist government, since they will have to use powerful force to remain in charge of the society. But it is also possible that they manage to coexist more peacefully with other instances of the society, and in that case the government is more likely to turn into something that is more similar to the APRA model of populism. This is the case with the Revolutionary Nationalist movement of Bolivia (*Di Tella, T S, 1965, P. 30*).

## **Peronistas**

The Peronist parties got their names after Argentinean president Juan Perón. Unlike the three other models for populism, which describe types of populism in developing countries, this is a model to describe populism in more developed countries. In general populist movements will

have worse conditions in developed country. This is because of the bigger middle class and the larger groups of intellectuals. People will be more educated and more citizens will live in the cities, and the industrialization will as well be on a higher and more developed level. This means also that the workers will be more organized and have stronger unions. A result of this is that it will be harder for a populist movement to gather the masses, since they will be harder to affect with the classic populist emotional methods. They will simply be more immune towards this, than which is the case in less developed countries. In the cases where social conflicts may occur, there is also a predominantly possibility that a large amount of the middle-class will be on the conservative side of such a conflict. The working class will simply not stand as strong in such countries, and the middle class and higher classes do not in general have problems with the social order of the society, as the lower classes have (*Di Tella, T S, 1965, P. 31*).

For these reasons populism is a rare occurrence in developed countries. The Peronism in Argentina is an exception though. Juan Perón gained strong popularity among various aspect of the society. He was supported by the military, parts of the clergy and important industrial groups. These groups provided the economic support and formed the ideologies of the party. At first the Peronist government after the military coup in 1943 had fascistic tendencies with their suppression of the opposition and annihilation of the intellectuals, but they managed little by little to include these groups, among others by introducing social reforms, which is a reason why Peronism, can be characterized as a model of populism (*Di Tella, T S, 1965, P. 32*).

## Methodology

My procedure for this project will be to analyze five areas that I find relevant in relation to my problem formulation. I will here give a short presentation to these areas and an explanation why I find these relevant.

**Economic development of Bolivia:** The founding cause for the whole conflict is the economic development of Bolivia during the past decade. The wish to build the highway is a result of a country going through a rapid modernization progress. As a result of this, as well as a condition for this, is improved infrastructure. Increased production leads to increased need for export, and also the other way around. Increased wealth among the population leads to in-

creased demands and therefore more import. Also the demand for higher living standards will increase. To build for example better hospitals and schools in geographically isolated areas of the country, an improvement of the infrastructure is necessary. Therefore, behind this conflict, before anything else, is the economic development of Bolivia the driving factor. For that reason I find it necessary to analyze this area to fully understand the conflict.

**Political changes:** Since the election of President Evo Morales in 2005, Bolivia has experienced significant political changes on other levels than economics. Evo Morales is the first ever indigenous president in the country. This is worth mentioning in a country where two thirds of the population is of indigenous origin. Better conditions for the indigenous people's that have been experiencing a lot of suppression have been a main priority for Evo Morales. One of the big steps was the changing of Bolivia's status from "republic" to "plurinational state" in 2009, acknowledging the fact that Bolivia consists of 36 different indigenous groups with each their culture and language. Furthermore big steps have been taking to secure better living conditions for the majority of Bolivians who live and work as farmers, and count for the poorest parts of the population.

With the construction of the TIPNS Highway this status of Evo Morales, as a protector of indigenous people's rights, is being questioned. On the one hand Evo Morales claim that the highway construction will result in better living standards for the majority of the population of the specific area, but at the same time living conditions for indigenous groups in the area will be completely destroyed. Does indigenous people's rights even has a thing to say for the construction, and what part does it have to play in the conflict? These are the questions I will try to answer by analyzing this area.

**Relation to Brazil:** The construction of the Highway through TIPNIS was at first a cooperative between Brazil and Bolivia. The construction company OAS is Brazilian, and the Brazilian government was financing the project by providing a lucrative loan to Bolivia. After the cancellation of the project Brazil is no longer a part of the project as such. Having said that Brazil still has a great interest in it, and it is definitely still a project that will mean a lot in the relationship between the two countries. The highway will benefit Brazil as making the access to the Pacific Ocean easier for them, and it will open up another import/export gate between Brazil and Bolivia. So the Brazilian interest in the project is obvious. What is relevant to ana-

lyze is how much impact this relationship has on the government's consideration, and could the indecisiveness end up having a negative impact on this relationship?

**Local Democracy:** The local democracy refers to the actual TIPNIS National Park and Indigenous Territory. The government claims to have the majority of the citizens in the area behind them. Yet the organizations representing the citizens of the indigenous territory claims the majority is against the highway. Also there is an uncertainty of who is to be taken into account. Is it only the citizens of the indigenous territory or everybody in all of TIPNIS? Also I will try to find out how much the local opinion affects the decision makers. In the end, will the locals have anything to say, or is the government most likely in the end to make a decision independent of what reception it will get locally? Also the situation about the consultations in the area will be analyzed in this chapter. Did the government respect fundamental democratic principles when executing them?

**Interests of Organizations:** Many different organisations and NGO's have played a part in this conflict. The organisations that have manifested themselves the most have been in support of the protesters, with the main indigenous organizations CIDOB and CONAMAQ as frontrunners in organizing the first march. But there are also organizations supporting the government. What motives do the organisations have to interfere in this conflict? Do they only take part because they want to show their support for or against the government, the highway or the indigenous groups etc? Or do they get something out of it themselves? Are they benefitting from the conflict, thus having motives less idealistic and more selfish? It is also interesting to provide an estimate of how much influence these organisations have on the decision makers. Some of the organisations are able to mobilize vast amounts of the population. Is it something the government takes into consideration? Will that be crucial in the final decision?

**I will use a hermeneutic approach,** when analyzing these subjects. I do not find it possible to analyze these areas without being biased. I already have my ideas and hypothesis about what is going on. That is the whole reason, why I have chosen these areas to analyze, because I believe the answer to my problem formulation lies within those. This is also my reason to choose the theories I have chosen. I think they are the right tools to illuminate the importance of my chosen analysis areas in relation to my problem formulation. My procedure will be first to describe the parts of the respective areas I find relevant in relation to the TIPNIS conflict,



and then I will analyze it and make my interpretations from the perspective of my theories, I believe it is possible within these areas to find features that to a certain extent defines Bolivia as a post-neoliberal society and Evo Morales as a populist leader. It is my consideration that it is within these observations and interpretations of them I will be able to find the answer to my problem formulation. This is why I call my methods hermeneutic, since I am not able to be 100% objective. In that case I would not be able to specify my research to an extent that makes it possible within the limitations of this project. Therefore I am not phenomenological and keeping all possibilities opens. I have already chosen the subjective approach and limited my area to what I think is sufficient to find the necessary answers.

The way I will use the theories are to back up the part-conclusions I get out of my analysis chapters. I will not specifically look for things that back up my theories; it's the other way around. Especially when it comes to populism, my plan is to analyse the motives and actions of the government and then see how those match with the models of populism, are there any similarities? With the post-neoliberalism I will look at the directions Bolivia has been taking during the past years, and then see if some of this can be described as post-neoliberal directions, and what influence this could have on my problem area, so here I will be a little more direct in my search for characteristics. But this is not a theoretical project. The theory is not the frame of my analysis, but more of a common thread to back up the results of my research.

## **Analysis**

### ***Economic development of Bolivia***

Bolivia has experienced a relatively stable economic growth during the last decade<sup>6</sup>, though not remarkably high, still higher than for example Europe<sup>7</sup>. That said it is important to mention that the poverty in Bolivia is vast. One fourth of the population lives in extreme poverty. In other words, economic growth is not necessarily beneficial for the poorest parts of the population. It depends how the money is used. Bolivia is as well among the 10 most economically unequal countries in the world. Annually Bolivia has exports for about 10 billion USD,

---

<sup>6</sup> Index Mundi, [http://www.indexmundi.com/bolivia/gdp\\_real\\_growth\\_rate.html](http://www.indexmundi.com/bolivia/gdp_real_growth_rate.html)

<sup>7</sup> EU-oplysningen, Folketinget, [http://www.euo.dk/fakta/tal/BNP\\_vaekst/](http://www.euo.dk/fakta/tal/BNP_vaekst/)

with Brazil as being their main export destination receiving 40% of the goods. The export consists of natural gas, soy products, a variety of metals from the mining industries etc. Bolivia imports for about 8 billion USD annually. Again Brazil is an important partner, though Chile is of the same importance, together they are exporters of half of the goods to Bolivia<sup>8</sup>.

Bolivia has been going through some significant changes in the economic politics during the past few decades. First the change towards neoliberalism in the 90'Th as described in the theory chapter, then the direction towards post-neoliberalism after the election of Evo Morales. First of all I will suggest why I think Bolivia is to consider as a post-neoliberal country. As mentioned in the theory-chapter the so called "nationalization" of the hydrocarbon is not enough to categorize the country as such, since what took place was basically just a raise of the taxes the companies had to pay to the state. But there have been other changes in the politics of Evo Morales that definitely are steps away from neo-liberalism. Worth mentioning is the inclusion in the "Bolivarian Alliance" or "ALBA" in 2006<sup>9</sup>. This association that started as a cooperative between Cuba and Venezuela in 2004 is an alternative to the free market, and the consequences it has had for Latin America. This association is clearly to define as post-neoliberal because the discontinuity overruns the continuity of neoliberal principles. The mechanisms of the free market are put aside in this corporative, yet it is based on trade. But instead of letting the market value define the price for the goods, the included countries contribute with their own goods. For example have Venezuela been providing Cuba with oil, and as a part of the payment Cuba sent doctors to Venezuela to improve their health sector, as well as giving the opportunity for Venezuelans to study in Cuba. That way the cooperative is building a wall around itself, isolating it from the market powers. I will not go into a deeper analyze of the Bolivarian Alliance since it in itself is not relevant for this project. But I mentioned it to show it as an example of Bolivia's economic direction away from neoliberalism.

So how does this direction for Bolivia relate to the TIPNIS Conflict? In the post-neoliberal idea exists the fact that a country doesn't have to reject all features of neoliberalism. If neoliberal principles can be beneficial for the country, there is no reason why they can't rely on

---

<sup>8</sup> The CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bl.html>

<sup>9</sup> Alianza Bolivariana's (the Bolivian Alliance) webpage, portal ALBA, [http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/que\\_es\\_el\\_alba.php](http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/que_es_el_alba.php)

those to a certain extent, and still be categorized as post-neoliberal. Bolivia has been taking steps away from neoliberalism by “nationalizing” the energy-sector as well as entering the Bolivarian Alliance. At the same time they are depended on economic growth to reduce the still vast amount of the population living in moderate as well as extreme poverty. The country has become richer. The production has increased. But to really get the benefits out of this, the possibilities for trade have to be improved. And to make sure the majority of the population benefits from this increased wealth, more areas of this very impassable country have to be made accessible. So to really improve the living conditions for the majority of the Bolivian population and minimize the extent of poverty, the country have to give in to neoliberal ideas, seems to be the thought behind this. This is a reasonable explanation why a highway through TIPNIS is beneficial, if not necessary for Bolivia. This though, far from answers my problem formulation. Because it does not answer why this highway absolutely has to go through the heart of the national park, with the environmental consequences it will have, instead of going around the park. The government has used the argument that it is too expensive, but with the Brazilian government’s willingness to finance these increased expenses in the first place (*NACLA, February 12, 2012*), the argument seems a bit hollowed. There seems to lie something else beneath, which cannot be explained from an economic point of view.

To sum this chapter up., the economic situation of Bolivia definitely explains a wish and a need to build a highway like this one. It seems that the government accepts that the challenges for the country can’t be solved alone by turning against neoliberalism, though some of the steps away from it have been beneficial for the population and the country’s economy. Therefore the post-neoliberal theory very well describes the situation, but it doesn’t give the full answer to my problem-formulation.

### ***Political changes – the Mother Earth Law***

Bolivia changed in 2005 direction by getting a socialist government instead of a neoliberal. This obviously had significant impact on the economic politics of Bolivia. But not less important, Evo Morales was the first president of indigenous origin ever in Bolivia. This is of great importance in a country where two thirds of the population is of indigenous origin and the majority of the last third is mestizos, which means a mix of indigenous and European origin. The rights of indigenous peoples have been a key issue for Evo Morales. According to the TIPNIS conflict though it can be questioned if his concern for indigenous peoples is limited to

highland indigenous', among whom he belongs, as being of Aymara origin. The Aymara people are together with the Quechua people the two main indigenous groups in Bolivia, and they are from the highland. But all together Bolivia consists of 36 different indigenous groups.

An area where Evo Morales is acclaimed of failing on his promises is according to the "Mother Earth Law". This is a law comparing the nature with individuals and giving a set of rights to the nature. I choose to focus on this law because it has relevance for the TIPNIS conflict, which is much about the environment, and this law is also protecting indigenous people's rights since many are depended on the nature, especially in the lowlands. At the same time this is also a law based on indigenous cultures where Mother Earth is seen as a kind of god that needs to be respected. Within the law lies the concept of living well which means the indigenous cultures should have the possibility of living in harmony with the nature (*Anteproyecto de Ley de la Madre Tierra, 2010, P. 4*).

According to TIPNIS Subcentral leader Fernando Vargas, Evo Morales is violating this law by constructing the highway. This was a part of the reason for the second march in protest of the highway, together with the lack of respect for human rights. The latter reason was supported by the UN (*NACLA, April 27, 2012*). Human rights are as well a part of the "Mother Earth" law.

As I see it, there are two perspectives to the breaking of the mother earth law. There is the very concrete issue about the violation of human as well as nature's rights in TIPNIS. By destroying the environment, they go directly against the part of the law, which is about the indigenous people's right to live in harmony with the nature.

The other perspective is on a more national scale. The negative impact of nature is confirmed in the law to be of capitalist origin. According to the formulations in the law, the complexity of the nature, the life cycles, biodiversity and such things importance for people's lives, should be understood and respected over exploitation and expropriation of the nature. Furthermore the understanding of natural resources is a misunderstanding made by capitalism, since what are called natural resources are not resources before being moved away from the nature and is therefore just material parts *Anteproyecto de Ley de la Madre Tierra, 2010, P. 2*).

This last perspective is interesting to analyze, because it can relate to my chosen theory of post-neoliberalism. It's a part of the formulation of the law that it's a struggle against capitalism and a movement towards an alternative (*Anteproyecto de Ley de la Madre Tierra, 2010, P. 3*). So in fact this law is not only a law to protect the rights of nature as it is presented. But it also presents the aim for a new political direction for Bolivia, also in the economical sense. It is definitely a step away from neoliberalism, therefore another step towards post-neoliberalism. Within this lie some contradictions in relation to the TIPNIS conflict. If the construction of the highway should somehow live up to the Mother Earth law, it should for one contribute to protection of the natural areas, and second it should be helpful towards constructing an alternative to capitalism. Of course the highway doesn't directly have to do this, but at least the results of the highway should be doing that, so that it at least indirectly lives up to the law.

So what would the results or consequences be? Locally the easiest measurable consequences will be environmental. These consequences will be from side effects of the road mainly, like hydrocarbon companies entering the area in search for petrol (*Pagina Siete, August 11, 2011*). A study from 2011 suggests that 64 % of the national park will be destroyed within the first 18 years after the construction of the highway. This will mean that the living conditions for the original population of the park will be destroyed, since they rely on being able to fish, hunt and collect food in other ways from the nature (*NACLA, August 12, 2011*). It is hard to see how the highway in anyway can be beneficial in relation to this.

What is really worth mentioning is that in the centre of the park, where the highway is meant to be constructed, not many people lives. This may sound contradictory to what I said before, but because the consequences is side effects from the highway more than the highway itself, it doesn't matter where within the borders of the park the people live contra where the highway is. The consequences will be the same because most of the park will be destroyed. But this matters if the highway should be able to have positive side effects for the citizens of these communities. In that case it would be preferable if the highway was located close to where they live. Because they are so isolated it is hard to bring out goods to them. It is not so important because they are self sufficient, but with easier access it would be possible to improve their living conditions, like building better hospitals, schools etc. The majority of the TIPNIS' indigenous population lives around the rivers bordering the park, since the river is the main

transportation way in there<sup>10</sup>. A highway parallel to the river around the park would have less damaging impact on the environment and will be more beneficial for the local communities. At the same time it would still live up to the other purposes it is supposed to have. It would still be a short cut through the jungle, and therefore the improvement of the Brazilian gateway to the Pacific Ocean. It would till improve local farmer's possibilities to export goods.

So out from this it's possible to conclude that the purpose for building the highway can't be the benefits of the local population inside the indigenous territory. Even though a compromise could be found, the government is determined that it must go through the centre of the park. From the perspective of the "Mother Earth" law, and therefore also from a post-neoliberal perspective, it is hard to tell why. The government doesn't seem to be in touch with the "rights" of Mother Earth on this matter. If it were, it would put the environment first and also the indigenous' right to live in harmony with the nature, as the law says. So my problem formulation is hard to answer from this perspective.

But within my problem formulation lies another question. Why has the government not yet managed to begin the construction, when being so determined about it? Maybe this question is easier answered by this. The government wants to begin the construction, and it doesn't want to look weak in the eyes of their supporters and probably also not in the eyes of Brazil, with whom they want to maintain a good relation. At least their actions in this whole conflict give that impression. But they are aware that by beginning the construction they also know they are going against their own values on certain issues. The "Mother Earth" law is not older than this conflict, and the government would seem very unreliable going against it. These are speculations, but let's define Evo Morales as a populist from the models of Torcuato Di Tella. In that case he would be somewhere in between a social revolutionist and APRA. Though he is democratically elected I still see social revolutionary symptoms in the way he got the power. It was founded on the gas war, a massive protest consisting of lower classes. As the theory says a social revolutionist needs support from both urban workers and the agricultural sector. In Bolivia that is the groups that brought Morales to power. The poor indigenous groups are his primary supporters. But besides that I see more similarities with the APRA-movement. The reason is for one the socialist aspect, but especially because of the

---

<sup>10</sup> From parkwatch.org on TIPNIS

<http://www.parkswatch.org/parkprofile.php?l=eng&country=bol&park=isnp&page=hum>

lower/working classes in Bolivia that are very diverse groups. Because of the plurinational society, Evo Morales can't survive only by having one group from this sector behind him. To maintain support from the majority of the population, he has to be able to mobilize a various amount of groups within the same classes. This explains why it is so difficult for Morales and the Bolivian government to go on with this project. No matter what he chooses to do he will split his usual supporters into two groups: Those who are behind him in the TIPNIS conflict and those who are not. If he can't mobilize all these groups he is risking his own position. Therefore, if he has to go on with the construction of the highway, he will have to convince the part of the population that is against it that it is a good idea, or at least the part of the protesters that would normally vote for him. The part of the population that wouldn't vote for him anyway is less important as long as he keeps them to be a minority, but he can only do so by having all his people behind him. As he has not yet managed to get sufficient groups behind him on this matter, he can't yet begin the construction. From the populist perspective it is that simple. On the other hand he can't just cancel the project completely, because this would lead to a loss of support from the other part of his voters, the ones supporting the highway. Therefore he is stuck in this limbo, where he can't take a decision for or against the highway without risking his power.

### ***The relation between Bolivia and Brazil***

The Construction of the TIPNS highway started as a cooperative between Brazil and Bolivia. Brazil was financing the majority of the project through a favourable loan to Bolivia (*Bolpress, October 28, 2011*), as well as the Brazilian entrepreneur-company OAS were in charge of the construction. Why did Brazil have interest in the Highway? Bolivia is with its location between Brazil and Chile, the gate to the Pacific Ocean for Brazil. Access to the Pacific Ocean is crucial for all Latin American countries in terms of exporting goods the seaway. The Beni region of Bolivia, which is one of the regions that borders up with Brazil, is a deserted region with poor infrastructure. Therefore the transportation of goods from Brazil to Chile, and as well to major towns in Bolivia like La Paz and Cochabamba, is long and challenging. The TIPNIS National Park and Indigenous Territory is located in the southernmost part of the Beni Region on the border of the Cochabamba region. For vehicles to get to Cochabamba and further on to the border of Chile they have to go a long way around TIPNIS. It is a long distance, but the construction of the highway will not only shorten the route, but also improve

the road conditions, since the quality of other roads in the region is of poor quality. In fact the road will make a route that now takes 16 hours to drive, doable in 4 hours (*NACLA, September 2, 2012*). Clearly this is in the interest of Brazil. Brazil is also an important import/export partner for Bolivia. 40% of Bolivia's export and 23% of the import is to/from Brazil. Therefore having efficient transport lines between those two countries is important.

During the TIPNIS conflict the relationship between Bolivia and Brazil has been set to a test. The problem is the uncertainty from the Bolivian government whether to begin constructing the highway or not. Brazil was ready to finance the project. They were even ready to finance a more expensive construction going around TIPNIS instead of right through it. That clearly shows the Brazilian will and necessity to getting the highway. But with the constant delays and finally cancellations of the contract, the relationship between the countries has been put on stake.

When Bolivia cancelled the contracts with the OAS they also in a way put Brazil out of the game, and finally also the loaning agreement with Brazil was cancelled. Something that could be a worsening factor in their relationship is also that Evo Morales blamed the OAS, and therefore indirectly Brazil for being the reason of the cancellation, by claiming they didn't live up to the contracts. According to a Brazilian newspaper this would cause troubles between the Brazilian president Dilma Roussef and Evo Morales (*Pagina Siete, April 11, 2012*). But the possibility was also suggested that the initiative to cancel the project was actually from Brazil. The Brazilian government might not have been aware of the controversy that the highway project would cause in Bolivia. So it is possible that Brazil wanted to get out of the agreement because of the fear for worse violent confrontations in the area when the actual construction of the controversial part of the highway began (*Los Tiempos, April 11, 2012*). Something that back this claim up is that Brazil already when the conflict escalated in late half of 2011, decided to freeze the funding to Bolivia, until the Bolivian government had sorted out the disagreements with the indigenous groups. Therefore Brazil definitely has a stake in the delays of the project. At that time to solve the problem, Bolivia launched the controversial first round of consultations, which were boycotted by the indigenous communities of TIPNIS arranging the first march, and therefore they claimed the consultations were invalid.



A topic that can't be ignored when discussing the relation between Bolivia and Brazil is the Gasbol gas pipe line. This is the longest gas pipe line in South America and is used by Bolivia export natural gas to Brazil (*Project Closing Report, 2005, P. 5*). This is very important for both countries. When it was created, Brazil was having big problems with pollution and deforestation because of the energy sector. Therefore there was a pressure on the government of Brazil to find cleaner sources of energy (*Mares, D R, 2004, P. 17*). They had the opportunity to import natural gas from either Argentina or Bolivia. They chose Bolivia, and a reason was to support the economic development in the country, which was also a wish from the World Bank. Therefore Gasbol is an important factor in the relation between the two countries (*Mares, D R, 2004, P. 16*). This also shows that it is of no interest for these countries to have a bad relation to each other. It would have consequences for both countries if the supplies from Gasbol are cut off.

My reason to mention this is to draw a picture of what's at stake for the two countries. The TIPNIS highway is just another step in connecting these two countries. The construction of Gasbol was also a part of a Brazilian strategy about investing in sustainable development projects in Bolivia. They had the opportunity to import natural gas from Argentina, but the two countries had troubles agreeing on the price (*Mares, D R, 2004, P. 17*). But Bolivia on the other hand also had the opportunity to export elsewhere, and was already exporting to Argentina though relatively small amounts (*Mares, D R, 2004, P. 1*). So the agreement between Brazil and Bolivia were beneficial for both sides. At the moment Bolivia export more than half of their natural gas supplies to Brazil, and less than one third to Argentina (*NACLA, May 23, 2013*). The TIPNIS highway was a new chapter in this economically and trade wise close relationship between the Bolivia and Brazil. Overall it's reasonable to say that Bolivia is the part depending mostly of the relationship. Brazil is a big economy and they are able to supply themselves with many necessities, and the ones they can't produce they can import from elsewhere. They import from Bolivia because it's beneficial, not because it's crucial, and at the same time it's with the purpose of helping Bolivia. Therefore it is also very inconvenient for Bolivia if the TIPNIS highway fails. They need to show goodwill towards Brazil to not lose the good relation they have to the country. But they got caught between that and their commitment to their own population. When circumstances got out of hand for the government, they took a choice of letting their popularity among the population come before their

relation to Brazil, by not only cancelling/postponing the construction, but also blaming Brazil for it, by saying they didn't live up to the contracts.

The first and easiest conclusion would be that this would have negative impact on the relationship between Bolivia and Brazil, but it might not be the case. There is nothing that shows that Brazil was particularly interested in having the highway going directly through TIPNIS. They were interested in a shortcut through Bolivia to be able to access the Pacific Coast faster. It could be around the park as well, they even agreed to finance the extra costs. So the TIPNIS conflict is as such only a Bolivian matter. But with Brazil financing and constructing the highway it can't be avoided that it would also be a Brazilian matter. There is no reason to think Brazil is interested in that, which they also showed by freezing the funds in the early days of the conflict. There is also the more direct consequence for Brazil ending being a part of the conflict. There is the possibility that constructing the highway could have physical consequences for the workers. It was acts of violence that in the first place made the Bolivian government cancel the project. There would be a risk for other acts of violence if the constructions continued after this, and it could mean a lack of safety for the OAS workers, or in general Brazil might not like to be associated with an escalation of the conflict. This is also the reasons why it was suggested that the cancellation was actually a Brazilian initiative, with the purpose of avoid an escalation in the conflict and eventually more acts of violence. If it was really Brazil that wanted the project cancelled it would put Evo Morales in an even worse situation. In the eyes of his supporter he would seem weak accepting the Brazilian demands. At the same time he would not gain any more sympathy among his opponents since the cancellation wouldn't be his will.

By blaming the cancellation on Brazil, Evo Morales managed to do the cancellation in a way that both showed him as a strong and determined leader, but also he got the possibility to regain some support from the TIPNIS supporters, by cancelling the project on his own will. It is hard to say whether he really got anything out of this, because the protests continued, now also by his own supporters who still wanted the highway, but eventually he made a compromise by launching the new consultations. That way the cancellation ended out as a small victory for Evo Morales, and Brazil took the blame. Yet from a Brazilian point of view, this was a small price to pay, if it was really a Brazilian wish to postpone the project. There is no evidence to support that point of view, but with these perspectives taken into considerations it

seems likely. At the same time it's easy to see why the conditions from the Bolivian government to cancel the project, would have been that they could blame OAS for it.

### ***Local democracy***

With local democracy I'm referring to democratic processes in the National Park and Indigenous Reserve of TIPNIS. The dilemma here is that it is hard to define democratic rules in the area because of the composition of people living here, and it is also not clear where the geographic lines should be drawn. The government claims after the consultations that they have a majority of the population behind them. Even though the government are being accused for manipulating the results, I will try to watch it from a position where the consultations were held on fair conditions. It's not unlikely that the vast majority of the National Park's inhabitants would support the highway. Included in the National Park is the Polygon 7 area, inhabited mainly by settlers from the highlands. As already mentioned the majority of the inhabitants in TIPNIS live in this part of the park. It is also in this part of the park the support for the highway mainly exists. Therefore Evo Morales is not wrong when claiming that he has support from the majority of the inhabitants of TIPNIS. The dilemma is whether it is fair to count the results from the polygon 7. The reason is that the indigenous territory is where the indigenous population of TIPNIS lives, and they are, though being outnumbered by the settlers, those who have been there for longest, and those who will suffer most from the consequences.

So the government faces two dilemmas. Should they consult the whole national park or only the indigenous territory? Second, does all inhabitants opinions count equally. Whether the decision to construct the highway was democratically fair, really depends on perceptions. But the argument for counting all inhabitants of the park is that the highway will affect everyone, in good or bad ways. Usually in all democratic processes, there will be advantages for some and disadvantages for others, no matter what decision is finally taken, and people are not excluded from a democratic process, on the basis of what they are expected to vote. From this perspective it would not be fair to exclude the inhabitants of the Polygon 7. They also live in the area, will be affected of the result, no matter what the result might be, and therefore have an opinion about it. So it is fair to conclude that from this point of view, the actions of the government have not been directly undemocratic.

Where the undemocratic aspect comes into the picture is, when the government on purpose have tried to avoid hearing the ones who are against them, for example when the first round of consultations were held. They were held when the first TIPNIS march was being planned. That way a lot of TIPNIS supporters were unable to attend and telling their opinion on an official meeting. Also the earlier mentioned example, of the government arranging the consultation meetings on locations practically unreachable for the inhabitants of the communities, is rather undemocratic. That way the government only meet with very few representatives for the communities, who they might try to convince to vote in favour of the government.

Finally there is the question: Is it enough to consult the ones affected by the highway and is it democratically fair? With that I mean: Do the rest of the population not have a word to say on this? As the organisation CONAMAQ claims: “The National Parks of Bolivia belongs to the Bolivians” The government is about to change something that belongs to the entire Bolivian population and therefore their opinion should be heard in that case. This is also a reason why the big nationwide organisations participate in the protests. They think the government violates the rights of the Bolivian, not only the inhabitants of TIPNIS, nor only the indigenous population, but the entire Bolivian population (*Annex 3, Q1*).

Before the government began the second round of consultations in 2012 a poll was made, showing the opinions of the citizens of the four largest cities in Bolivia. This poll showed that only 15 % of the citizens thought the government should go through with the plans to build the highway, no matter the results of the consultations. To compare 38 % of the citizens was on the same side as the TIPNIS supporters, and were of the opinion that no matter the results of the consultations, the government should not construct the highway through the national park, and finally 43% was of the opinion that the government should continue with the consultations and respect the results of those (*Pagina Siete, July 11, 2012*).

This does not unambiguously shows that the majority of the population opposes the highway, but it clearly shows that there is not a general trend among the citizens to support the highway, since only 15% do that, and it's worth mentioning that the 38%, who opposes the highway, are citizens that are not directly affected by it. So there are definitely more people against the highway than for it, and the fact that 43% thinks the results of the consultations should be respected, showing that the majority of the citizens definitely don't think that the highway should be built against the wish of the inhabitants of TIPNIS.

These polls also show something else. They show that the government actually have the opportunity to get the majority of the population behind them. By assuming that these polls are representative for the entire population, they show that if the results of the consultations are that the inhabitants of TIPNIS want the highway, then the majority of the population also supports the highway. This is because the 43%, who thinks the results of the consultations should be respected, can be put together with the 15% already being in favour of the highway. Suddenly the result is that 58% of the population supports the highway opposite to only 38% who opposes it. Clearly for the Bolivian government being in this situation, it would be crucial to get support from the inhabitants of TIPNIS, but it also demonstrate the pressure it was under before starting the consultations. It was the last chance for the government. If the results of the consultations showed that the majority of the inhabitants of TIPNIS opposed the highway, the government would have very little incentive to ever begin the constructions.

Also this is the government showing its populist side again. If the government at least could make it look like the inhabitants of TIPNIS support the highway, it would finally have done what it hadn't been able to do yet: To mobilize the masses. From this theoretical perspective it seems reasonable to suggest that the government would do whatever to get support from TIPNIS. Therefore it also seems likely that the government would manipulate with the results, or use undemocratic methods in its attempt to get the support, because the whole reason to launch the consultations was to get the incentive to begin constructing. What took place in TIPNIS during the consultations, and the accusations the government got, support these claims.

In the northern part of the park 20 communities denied to participate in the consultations, since they did not see them as being fair. They barricaded the area so the government's officials could not reach them (*Pagina Siete, August 30, 2012*). Without being able to make consultations in these communities, it wouldn't be possible for the government to get valid results, and it also showed that a strong opposition towards the government exist in the area. The government as a result decided to put the consultations on hold to find a solution to this problem (*La Razon, August 30, 2012*). It can be claimed that it's not the government's fault that these communities refused to participate in the consultations, but it didn't make it less problematic for the government, who were in need of results from the entire area. The government also seemed to use undemocratic methods, since four communities who were not

possible to reach for the government still, by the government, were counted as being consulted (*La Razon, August 21, 2012*). Other accusations were that coca growers unions had been visiting some communities and managed to take them over to their side, making these communities divide from the indigenous territory and therefore the results of the consultations from these communities, could not be accepted as valid (*Pagina Siete, August 15, 2012*).

These and other similar examples demonstrate the desperation of the government to get a positive result of the consultations. Even though the government claimed that the results would not be legally binding, but only used as guidance, the necessity of a positive result is unquestionable, since it would be the only way the government could get the majority of the population behind itself in the conflict. If the results were not of this importance, there is no reason why the government could not carry out the consultations on fair and democratic manners.

As mentioned, the official results from the government were that 80% of the communities were in favour of the highway. According to this, the government should now have the majority of the population behind them. Whether it was because of the controversy about the unjust methods used during the consultations remains unclear, but it did not seem to be the case for the government. At least President Evo Morales did not dare taking any further steps in the TIPNIS conflict before next presidential election has been held (*NACLA, April 25, 2013*). According to him because he wants to eliminate extreme poverty in the region, but by sticking to the populist theory, it would appear that he does not yet trust his own popularity enough to begin constructing the highway. It seems reasonable since poverty in TIPNIS is not something new. If that is in the way for beginning the constructions then it's late in the process to bring it up. So it has been with all other excuses for postponing. They really had it all in place, but suddenly Evo Morales had his people against him, which is the only thing that must not happen to a populist leader.

### ***Interests of organisations***

A number of different organisations in Bolivia have interests for and against the construction of the Highway. Except for the TIPNIS Subcentral itself, which represents the indigenous people originally living in the Park, the main organizations in the protesting of the highway is the organisation CIDOB representing indigenous communities in the lowlands of Bolivia, and

CONAMAQ, which represents the indigenous communities of the highlands. CIDOB though is the only one of those two being officially against the highway, with their leader being one of the main voices in the protests.

The reason for CONAMAQ to support TIPNIS, and why they was a part of the initiative behind the march is according to themselves that they, before being a political organisation, are an organisation for the indigenous population of Bolivia, and their main priority is their rights (*Annex 3, Q2*). Also according to CONAMAQ, the National parks of Bolivia belong to the people of Bolivia, the whole population, not only those living in the area of the parks. Therefore when the government decides to destroy one of those parks, it is also a violation of the entire population of Bolivia (*Annex 3, Q1*). For that reason decided CONAMAQ to enter the protest against the highway together with CIDOB and the TIPNIS Sub Central. According to CONAMAQ the government has been secretive about its motives for building the highway which is another reason for them to oppose the government. The government's motives are not really clear (*Annex 3, Q3*).

On the other side there are the parts that have interest in the construction of the highway. Firstly there is the Governing party MAS led by president Evo Morales. The MAS party has as a single government party obviously a many voters and supporters. A lot of them will be in favour of the highway, only because they support the government. In TIPNIS the main organisation to be in favour of the road is CONISUR and Chaparé, the federation of Coca growers in Bolivia, and like the MAS party led by Bolivian president Evo Morales. They have a big representation in the southernmost part of the park and outside the park. They are interested in better infrastructure to export their goods. Evo Morales is interested in maintaining support from the coca growers since they are an important group of voters. CONISUR is an organization of communities in TIPNIS that are in favour of the highway. These communities are for the most not consisting of original inhabitants of TIPNIS. They are immigrants, who came to the area to seek luck in farming. Often it's miners from the highlands missing job opportunities. In general the supporters of the highway in TIPNIS, are the ones who produces something, let it be coca, fruits etc. that they need to export.

Outside supporters of TIPNIS, are in general people and organizations who are worried about the environment and/or the rights of indigenous people. Outside supporters of the highway, will mainly be supporters of the government, who will support them in everything and someone that like the government sees the highway as a necessity for Bolivia to develop the way they want it to.

When talking about interests of organisations, it is firstly important to have in mind that these organisations are not political parties. It is not solely the point for these organisations to be as powerful as possible and to have as much support as possible. The organisations have a purpose, so their main priority will be to live up to that purpose. Therefore when organisations choose a side in a conflict like this one, they might not have a personal interest in it, but might just be interested in showing their support with affected parties of the conflict.

But first I will try to analyse on which areas the organisations actually have an interest. It's most obvious to start with the organisations actually directly affected by the highway. These are CONISUR, Chaparé and the TIPNIS sub-central. The two first are in favour of the highway. They want to improve their ability to transport goods. That's one side of it. Another perspective is their relation to the government. Chaparé have the most direct relation, since their president is Evo Morales. The coca growers are his strongest supporters. Therefore the bond is strong between them and Evo Morales. CONISUR also consist of settlers from the highlands. So they will also be supportive of Evo Morales, and again of the highway. But in this case the one with the interests is Evo Morales more than the organisations, because he is so dependent of having support inside of TIPNIS.

When it comes to the organisations opposing the highway, the motives can seem a little more ambiguous. CIDOB is representing the indigenous people of the lowland. For that reason it can be said that they both represent groups being for and against the highway. According to CIDOB though, their mission is defending the rights of the indigenous peoples of the lowlands. The communities in TIPNIS favouring the highway do not consist of inhabitants of lowland indigenous origin. Therefore CIDOB do not participate in the conflict for the sake of the highway as such. They participate in the conflict to defend the rights of the inhabitants of the indigenous reserve of TIPNIS, because their rights are violated for example according to



the Mother Earth law. But CIDOB is a diverse organisation. They are an umbrella organisation consisting of various regional organisations in the Bolivian lowlands, many which are in no way related to the TIPNIS. Therefore the government did to some extent succeed in getting the support of CIDOB from the inside by making agreements with the regional organisations under CIDOB and getting them onto their side. That way suddenly a significant part of CIDOB was suddenly on the government's side in the conflict. This was a good tactic move for all highway supporters because it questioned the legitimacy of Adolfo Chavez as leader of CIDOB. It was claimed that he was not actually speaking for the case of CIDOB and not representing the member's points of view. The official opinion of CIDOB has not changed a bit during the whole conflict though; they are still supporting the indigenous inhabitants of TIPNIS unconditionally.

My reason to mention this is that it proves that CIDOB have a main mission that goes beyond popularity. They want to protect the rights of the indigenous citizens before anything else. It might mean that they lose support. It might mean that people, they were supposed to represent, doesn't feel represented by them anymore. But this is less important, because their mission goes beyond that. For that matter they are also a threat to the government. The government have to worry about its popularity, at the same time as it is trying to achieve their political goals. That's why it's so difficult for the government to be determined. It's determined of words. It has not at one point faltered on the fact that they want to build the highway. But in their actions it has been going slow and hasn't yet achieved anything. This is mainly because of the organisations persistence. They have not been giving up, not even when it costs them support and popularity. Their achievement is: They are winning the battles.

CONAMAQ might be proving this even stronger. As representing the indigenous peoples of the highlands, they are not even affiliated with the conflict. If anything, the settlers in TIPNIS who support the highway come from areas represented by CONAMAQ. Yet they have decided to be on the side of the TIPNIS supporters. As representing the highland indigenous peoples they also cover groups where the support for MAS and Evo Morales is very strong. It would seem more natural that they were on the side of the government on this cause. But they stick to the policy that they are there for the people of Bolivia. According to them the government is acting against their people and therefore the organisation is going against the government. CONAMAQ do not belong to any political wings. They do not mind if their "mem-

bers” are MAS supporters or not. What matters is the cause. For them it’s about the manifestation that the national parks belong to every Bolivian. No matter if they are indigenous or not, no matter if they live in the highlands or lowlands, no matter which president they support. So where CIDOB’s motives were much about the rights of the inhabitants of TIPNIS, CONAMAQ is even more principled, about the government not having the right to destroy national parks.

This can really become a problem for the government. The government needs to be able to mobilize all these different groups of indigenous inhabitants, as mentioned when discussing populism. But at the same time these organisations are mobilizing the same groups. This would not be a problem for the government, if it was not because these groups are mobilized against it. Not only do the government lose support and popularity by their actions in the conflict. But they are losing further power, because of the actions of the big organisations. So it gives a two-sided effect where both sides fall out to the disadvantage of the government.

What has happened is that because of national organisations interfering in the conflict, it is no longer a regional conflict belonging only to the TIPNIS area. The whole conflict has turned national. Everyone who is somewhat affiliated with one of these two major organisations is also a part of the conflict, directly or indirectly, and everybody supporting one of these organisation are suddenly against the government, no matter of their political leanings on any other issue. This is probably the biggest thread for the government.

Had the government been able to keep the conflict on a regional level in TIPNIS, it might have been able to get the highway through, because for the majority of the population this would not have any real affection on their daily routines. But the organisations have managed to do what the government couldn’t: Mobilize the masses. Therefore we see the government’s attempt to “buy” the support from the lowlands indigenous groups by seeking out to the regional organisations, and by that way dissolving the mobilizations and getting the support from the inside of the big organisations. But they didn’t succeed, because CIDOB and CONAMAQ all the way through have been sticking to their causes. For the government this is about building a highway, for the organisations it’s about something bigger. It’s about the Bolivian self-esteem, the indigenous’ rights and the nature’s rights. These are subjects the government earlier has been very focused on and now people feel that these values are being neglected.

The government's supporters in the conflict are limited to the settlers in TIPNIS, who will benefit from the road and then the dedicated MAS supporters as well as Chaparé, the coca-growers federation. But the problem for the government is that these groups were already supporting it before the conflict. Many of those stick to the government but might not have any real interest in the highway. We have also seen these supporters' methods being very aggressive, like in Yucumo where the police attack took place. In fact it is possible to say here that the supporters of the government made the situation worse for the government, because they made the government seem brutal and authoritarian, even though denying having been a part of it, it looked like it was the government striking down on the protesters. Also the government took the consequence and postponed and later cancelled the highway project.

To sum this chapter up, what really has been the problem for the government is the national organisations participating in the conflict in opposition to the government, and thereby mobilizing significant parts of the population against it. This has made the government step back on its actions, and made it impossible for it to begin the constructions, without losing its power as the result. At the same time these organisations have made the government's rhetoric more aggressive. The government denies letting the organisations be the ones to tell them what to do, when they know what is best for the future of Bolivia. This gives also an answer to my problem formulation. The government is so determined to build the road through the TIPNIS, because the organisations say it can't. It doesn't want to make it look like the protesters are in charge of the conflict. Therefore they keep claiming that this highway is going to be built. Yet it has to postpone it, but blaming other circumstances for it, like OAS being slow. For the first time also, I have a possible answer to why the government insists that the highway has to go right through the park and not around. It is because it wasn't the government taking the initiative, and it wants to show everybody, and especially its supporters, that they still are the ones in charge. There might be other factors as well, but this is the conclusion I get from analysing the role of the organisations in the conflict.

## **Conclusion**

The government of Bolivia is facing many challenges in its attempt to construct the TIPNIS highway. They have to face organisations of indigenous people turning their own voters against them. They are facing accusations of being undemocratic, accusations of violating

indigenous people's rights, accusations of violating the nature's rights. They are facing their important business partner and ally Brazil on the one hand expecting the highway to be build, on the other hand expecting the Bolivian government to sort out the conflict with its opponents first.

At the same time they are being accused of running from their promises and being irresponsible when they try to give in to some of the demands from their opponents. No matter which directions the government choose to take it can't be without getting very unpopular among significant groups of the population. This is something all political leaders have to face from time to time, but the case of the Bolivian government, and especially president Evo Morales, is that it is their own supporters that turns towards them, no matter how they try to get out of the conflict. This is the worst possible situation for a government.

Therefore I find it very unlikely that the government from the beginning predicted this outcome. To me it seems impossible that a government, so depended on their supporters would on purpose put themselves in such an unfortunate position. Evo Morales was elected on principles that he is now being accused of failing. It can't be his wish. From this perspective it is also my impression that, however unlikely it might seem, that the TIPNIS highway was planned with good intentions. Evo Morales wanted and still wants to improve living conditions for the indigenous people of Bolivia and to do that, steps have to be taken to modernize the country, to keep having economic growth and to make sure everybody gets benefits out of it. Improved infrastructure is essential in that case.

The TIPNIS highway would be the easiest and cheapest way of connecting the northern Bolivia with the central and southern parts of the country and that way getting a more united society and better possibilities, to make sure as much of the population as possible gets benefits from the economic development the country is going through. The consequences of building the highway have been seen as unavoidable. No matter where a highway is being built it will have environmental impact and somebody is going to oppose it. The human consequences are manageable. The 12000 inhabitants of the indigenous reserve is a relatively small amount in a country with 10 million inhabitants, especially when it's about creating something that would benefit the entire population. It should be possible for the government to find a solution for these negatively affected groups. It can't be a surprise for the government that

these 12000 persons were going to oppose the highway; therefore I assume that it was already a part of the government's plan.

So why did the government not just lead the highway around TIPNIS? There is no clear answer to this, except for what the government claimed: That it would be too expensive. Again, if they at the time of the planning had been aware of the consequences the conflict would have for them, it's reasonable to assume they would have been more open to that possibility. But since they probably thought constructing the highway would cause less trouble than it did, there was no reasons why they should consider any other options than the cheapest and easiest. This is my answer to why I think the government in the first place wanted to construct the highway through TIPNIS.

The next question is: How did the conflict evolve to the extend it did? The turning point in the conflict, as I see it, is the involvement by CIDOB and CONMAMAQ. These organisations made the conflict nationwide. Suddenly the majority of the population was in one way or another part of the conflict, with their own reasons for being for or against the highway and for being for or against the government. It was also after their involvement the Brazilian government at the first time started to pull back a bit. They were worried about the directions the conflict was taking. The peak of the conflict was the episode with the police attack in Yucumo. After that, the government couldn't defend going on with the project. This escalation of the conflict happened really fast and I don't think the government was prepared for it. This also explains why the government's actions have been so vitiating, where they at one point have seemed to be on the TIPNIS supporter's side and the next moment being determined that they were going to go through with their plans of constructing the highway no matter what. I don't think they even had an emergency plan, should the situation evolve the way it did. This answers also my question of why the government have seemed so faltering during the process.

My final question though, which is also really the core of my problem formulation: Why have the government not just changed its plans and started constructing the highway around TIPNIS? Since it seems like the plan to build it right through is going to be impossible to carry out. Why have they kept on being determined that this is the right thing to do? I see two sides to that question. The one side is the type of leader Evo Morales is. He is a populist leader, which means two things. He needs to have the majority of the population behind him, but he

also needs to prove that he is a strong leader not taking orders from anyone. The idea of building a highway around TIPNIS was not his idea. It was suggested by his opponent organisations and the Brazilian government. If he that easy gave in to the demands of others he would show himself as a leader that is easy to manipulate, and thereby weaken his position. At the same time he would also weaken his position by carrying out the plans. Therefore he has to keep on postponing the plans using various excuses to make it look like it isn't his or the government's fault. But he has to keep on saying that it's still the plan to begin the constructions, or he will lose supports from the groups of the population wanting the highway. The increasing desperation from the government resulted in the undemocratic methods being used during the consultations.

That he is still in that dilemma is shown in the latest turn in the conflict, where the project is postponed until extreme poverty in TIPNIS has been eliminated. This shows an acceptance of something they should have done from the beginning, finding a way to get the indigenous inhabitants of TIPNIS behind them, before taking the steps towards letting the construction begin. It also shows that Evo Morales is aware of his risky position. He knows that both cancelling and carrying out the plan would probably mean that the MAS will have a very hard time winning the next election, therefore the only possibility is to postpone once again. They still seem determined though that they in the future will have the luck to carry out the plan. They are still not using the possibility of constructing an alternative highway around TIPNIS.

Another reason to this could also be economic. When the Brazilian government were financing the project it would have been easier for the government to start building the highway around TIPNIS, since they could get it financed, but with the cancellation of the agreement with Brazil, the possibility of constructing around the park seems less realistic, since Bolivia now have to take care of it themselves. When Brazil was still a part of the project Bolivia refused the alternative routes out of stubbornness and as a result of this they are now in a situation where they can't choose between the possibilities anymore that easily.

To sum this up: **Why is it so important for the government of Bolivia to construct a highway directly through the TIPNIS national park?**

At first the government wanted to build the highway with good intentions, because they thought it to be beneficial for the further developing of Bolivia and the relation to Brazil.

They were not prepared for the way the conflict ended up evolving, why they first postponed then temporary cancelled the project. Because many of their supporters wanted the highway they didn't give up the project, but still they couldn't carry it out because so many were against it as well. This put the government in the situation it is in still. They can't build the highway and they can't avoid building the highway, thus keeping on postponing it. The reason why they do not consider the alternative routes started as being because it didn't seem to be necessary, then it turned in to principles for the government who wouldn't let others decide what they should do and finally now they simply don't have the same possibilities, as they had when Brazil was financing the project, thus having to stick to the first plan, but having to wait until they can carry it out without getting the nation against themselves.

## Bibliography

- **Alianza Bolivariana's (the Bolivian Alliance) webpage, portal ALBA:**

[http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/que es el alba.php](http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/que_es_el_alba.php)

- **Anteproyecto de Ley de la Madre Tierra, Por las Organizaciones Sociales del Pacto de Unidad, November 2010:**

[http://www.redunitas.org/NINA\\_Anteproyectode%20ley%20madre%20tierra.pdf](http://www.redunitas.org/NINA_Anteproyectode%20ley%20madre%20tierra.pdf)

- **Bolpress, October 21, 2011:** <http://www.bolpress.com/art.php?Cod=2011102108>

- **Bolpress, October 28, 2011:** <http://www.bolpress.com/art.php?Cod=2011102803>

- **Bolpress, April 10, 2012:** <http://www.bolpress.com/art.php?Cod=2012041008>

- **Carwil without Borders, December 29, 2001:**

<http://woborders.wordpress.com/2011/12/29/about-conisur/>

- **CIDOB's official webpage:** <http://www.cidob-bo.org/>

- **Conniff, Michael L, 2012, Populism in Latin America, the University of Alabama Press.**

- **Di Tella, Torcuato S, 1965, Populismos y Reforma en América Latina, Desarrollo Economico Vol. 4 N. 16:**

<http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/23010528/1319897937/name/Populismos.pdf>

- **EU-Oplysningen, Folketinget – Vækst i BNP:** [http://www.euo.dk/fakta/tal/BNP\\_vaekst/](http://www.euo.dk/fakta/tal/BNP_vaekst/)

- **Index Mundi – Bolivian GDP – Real growth rate:**

[http://www.indexmundi.com/bolivia/gdp\\_real\\_growth\\_rate.html](http://www.indexmundi.com/bolivia/gdp_real_growth_rate.html)

- **La Razon, December 11, 2011:** [http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/Tipnis-comunidades-Gobierno-construir-carretera\\_0\\_1738026274.html](http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/Tipnis-comunidades-Gobierno-construir-carretera_0_1738026274.html)



- **La Razon, May 23, 2012:** [http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/regionales-Cidob-ultimatum-Adolfo-Chavez\\_0\\_1618038201.html](http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/regionales-Cidob-ultimatum-Adolfo-Chavez_0_1618038201.html)
- **La Razon, August 21, 2012:** [http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/Brigadas-pudieron-hacer-consulta-comunidades\\_0\\_1673232688.html](http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/Brigadas-pudieron-hacer-consulta-comunidades_0_1673232688.html)
- **La Razon, August 30, 2012:** [http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/Gobierno-aprueba-ampliar-consulta-noviembre\\_0\\_1678632160.html](http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/Gobierno-aprueba-ampliar-consulta-noviembre_0_1678632160.html)
- **La Razon, April 11, 2013:** [http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/Asamblea-tratará-leyes-TIPNIS\\_0\\_1813018726.html](http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/Asamblea-tratará-leyes-TIPNIS_0_1813018726.html)
- **La Razon, April 21, 2013:** [http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/Invertiran-Bs-millones-anos-TIPNIS\\_0\\_1818418235.html](http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/Invertiran-Bs-millones-anos-TIPNIS_0_1818418235.html)
- **Los Tiempos, August 23, 2011:**  
[http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/actualidad/economia/20110823/el-gobierno-acusa-a-dirigentes-del-tipnis-de-estar-comprometidos-con\\_138879\\_284420.html](http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/actualidad/economia/20110823/el-gobierno-acusa-a-dirigentes-del-tipnis-de-estar-comprometidos-con_138879_284420.html)
- **Los Tiempos, April 11, 2012:**  
[http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/opiniones/editorial/20120411/el-controvertido-contrato-con-oas\\_167388\\_351158.html](http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/opiniones/editorial/20120411/el-controvertido-contrato-con-oas_167388_351158.html)
- **Macdonald, Laura & Ruckert, Arne, 2009, International Political Economy - Post-Neoliberalism in the Americas. Palgrave Macmillan.**
- **Mares, David R, 2004, Natural Gas Pipeline in the Southern Cone, Institute for Public Policy Forum.**
- **North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) August 12, 2011:**  
<http://nacla.org/blog/2011/8/12/bolivia-indigenous-groups-march-against-tipnis-highway>
- **North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) August 19, 2011:**  
<http://nacla.org/blog/2011/8/19/bolivia-week-barricades>
- **North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) August 26, 2011:**  
<http://nacla.org/blog/2011/8/26/bolivia-tipnis-marchers-face-accusations-and-negotiations>

- North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) September 2, 2011:**  
<http://nacla.org/blog/2011/9/2/bolivia-visit-lula-tipnis-negotiations-falter>
- North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) September 28, 2011:**  
<http://nacla.org/blog/2011/9/28/police-attack-tipnis-marchers-roads-bolivia>
- North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) October 28, 2011:**  
<http://nacla.org/blog/2011/10/28/bolivia%E2%80%99s-tipnis-road-cancelled-deeper-conflicts-remain-unresolved>
- North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) February 10, 2012:**  
<http://nacla.org/blog/2012/2/10/bolivian-congress-adopts-controversial-tipnis-consultation-law>
- North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) February 12, 2012:**  
<http://nacla.org/blog/2012/2/17/bolivia%E2%80%99s-tipnis-conflict-search-alternative-highway-route>
- North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) March 23, 2012:**  
<http://nacla.org/blog/2012/3/23/bolivia-tipnis-communities-plan-national-march-and-resistance-government-consulta>
- North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) April 27, 2012:**  
<http://nacla.org/blog/2012/4/27/bolivia-tipnis-protesters-launch-national-march-seek-indigenous-urban-alliance>
- North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) July 13, 2012:**  
<http://nacla.org/blog/2012/7/13/bolivia-tipnis-marchers-return-home-pledge-resist-government-consulta>
- North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) December 13, 2012:**  
<http://nacla.org/blog/2012/12/13/bolivia-end-road-tipnis-consulta>
- North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) April 25, 2013:**  
<http://nacla.org/blog/2013/4/25/bolivia-tipnis-road-hold-until-extreme-poverty-eliminated>

- **North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) May 28, 2013:**

<http://nacla.org/blog/2013/5/23/industrializing-bolivia%E2%80%99s-gas-bolivia-not-brazil>

- **Pagina Siete, August 3, 2011:** [http://www.paginasiete.bo/2011-08-](http://www.paginasiete.bo/2011-08-04/Opinion/Destacados/17Opi00104-08-11-P720110804JUE.aspx)

[04/Opinion/Destacados/17Opi00104-08-11-P720110804JUE.aspx](http://www.paginasiete.bo/2011-08-04/Opinion/Destacados/17Opi00104-08-11-P720110804JUE.aspx)

- **Pagina Siete, August 11, 2011:** [http://www.paginasiete.bo/2011-08-](http://www.paginasiete.bo/2011-08-11/Nacional/NoticiaPrincipal/2Nac01-110811.aspx)

[11/Nacional/NoticiaPrincipal/2Nac01-110811.aspx](http://www.paginasiete.bo/2011-08-11/Nacional/NoticiaPrincipal/2Nac01-110811.aspx)

- **Pagina Siete, September 11, 2011:** [http://www.paginasiete.bo/2011-09-](http://www.paginasiete.bo/2011-09-12/Nacional/Destacados/03Nal01120911.aspx)

[12/Nacional/Destacados/03Nal01120911.aspx](http://www.paginasiete.bo/2011-09-12/Nacional/Destacados/03Nal01120911.aspx)

- **Pagina Siete, September 28, 2011:** [http://www.paginasiete.bo/2011-09-](http://www.paginasiete.bo/2011-09-28/Nacional/Destacados/9Esp00128.aspx)

[28/Nacional/Destacados/9Esp00128.aspx](http://www.paginasiete.bo/2011-09-28/Nacional/Destacados/9Esp00128.aspx)

- **Pagina Siete, April 11, 2012:** [http://www.paginasiete.bo/2012-04-](http://www.paginasiete.bo/2012-04-11/Nacional/Destacados/5nac110412.aspx)

[11/Nacional/Destacados/5nac110412.aspx](http://www.paginasiete.bo/2012-04-11/Nacional/Destacados/5nac110412.aspx)

- **Pagina Siete, July 11, 2012:** [http://www.paginasiete.bo/2012-07-](http://www.paginasiete.bo/2012-07-11/Nacional/Destacados/4900000101.aspx)

[11/Nacional/Destacados/4900000101.aspx](http://www.paginasiete.bo/2012-07-11/Nacional/Destacados/4900000101.aspx)

- **Pagina Siete, August 15, 2012:** [http://www.paginasiete.bo/2012-08-](http://www.paginasiete.bo/2012-08-15/Nacional/Destacados/4000001151.aspx)

[15/Nacional/Destacados/4000001151.aspx](http://www.paginasiete.bo/2012-08-15/Nacional/Destacados/4000001151.aspx)

- **Pagina Siete, August 30, 2012:** [http://www.paginasiete.bo/2012-08-](http://www.paginasiete.bo/2012-08-30/Sociedad/Destacados/38Al-00130-01.aspx)

[30/Sociedad/Destacados/38Al-00130-01.aspx](http://www.paginasiete.bo/2012-08-30/Sociedad/Destacados/38Al-00130-01.aspx)

- **Parkswatch.org on TIPNIS:**

- *Geography:*

<http://www.parkswatch.org/parkprofile.php?l=eng&country=bol&park=isnp&page=phy>

- *Human influence:*

<http://www.parkswatch.org/parkprofile.php?l=eng&country=bol&park=isnp&page=hum>

**- Management:**

<http://www.parkswatch.org/parkprofile.php?l=eng&country=bol&park=isnp&page=man>

**- Project Closing Report, Natural Gas Centre of Excellence Project, Narrative, March 20, 2005:**

[http://web.archive.org/web/20070927192628/http://www.ctgas.com.br/conteudo/img\\_upload/Project\\_closing\\_report\\_Narrative\\_Mar\\_20\\_05.pdf](http://web.archive.org/web/20070927192628/http://www.ctgas.com.br/conteudo/img_upload/Project_closing_report_Narrative_Mar_20_05.pdf)

**- Reuters, October 22, 2012:** <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/22/bolivia-debt-idUSL1E8LME4Q20121022>

**- Schilling-Vacaflor, Almut, Indigenous identities and politico-juridical demands of CSUTCB and CONAMAQ in the constitutional change process of Bolivia, La Paz 2008:**

[http://socialsciences.scielo.org/pdf/s\\_tinkazos/v4nse/scs\\_a03.pdf](http://socialsciences.scielo.org/pdf/s_tinkazos/v4nse/scs_a03.pdf)

**- The Ecuadorian government's webpage for the Yasuní initiative:** <http://yasunitt.gob.ec/quees.aspx>

**- The Guardian August 16 2012:** <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/16/belomonte-dam-construction-suspended>

**- The World Fact book, CIA – on Bolivia:** <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bl.html>

## Abstract

This project is about the TIPNIS conflict in Bolivia. The conflict is about a highway the Bolivian government want to construct directly through the heart of the national park TIPNIS. In addition to being a national park TIPNIS is also an indigenous territory. That means the official ownership of the park belongs to the indigenous population of it. These indigenous groups, who are originally from the area, are self sufficient and live by the nature. With the construction of the highway their living conditions will be destroyed in addition to the environmental impact it will have. The government claims the highway is necessary to build for the developing of Bolivia. It will connect isolated parts of the country, making trading possibilities better and be improving the relationship with Brazil, by making their access to the Pacific Ocean easier.

What started the conflict and making it escalate was when the two organizations CIDOB and CONAMAQ got involved. Together these organisations represent all indigenous peoples in Bolivia. They arranged a protest march to show their opposition to the government on this matter, since the government is violating human rights as well as the nature's rights if they carry out their plans. The conflict escalated and peaked with the protest march being attacked by the police, resulting in one death and many injured. This made the government postpone the project until a consultation had been held among the inhabitants of TIPNIS. This consultation was claimed to be very undemocratic and the conflict has turned into a slow endlessness process, where the government denies cancelling the plans, yet keeping on postponing them because of the opposition towards it.

I analyse the actions of the government and other involved actors, by two theoretical perspectives: Post-neoliberalism and populism in Latin America. Post-neoliberalism defines an economic political direction taken by many modern leftist leaders in Latin America showing alternatives to neoliberalism, without turning against all principles of this. Populism in Latin America is about how many leaders try to get the majority of the population behind themselves to remain in power. I use a model describing four different versions of populism to see which models are most similar to the Bolivian government.

From these theoretical perspectives I analyse economical and political changes during the past years of Bolivia, the Relationship between Bolivia and Brazil, the interests of the organisa-

tions involved in the TIPNIS conflict and the democratic processes during the conflict. The purpose is to get an answer to my problem formulation which is: Why is it so important for the government of Bolivia to construct a highway directly through the TIPNIS national park.

## **Annex**


**-Annex 1: Map of TIPNIS National Park and Indigenous Territory.**

**-Annex 2: Torcuato Di Tella's four models of populist parties.**

**-Annex 3: Edited interview with CONAMAQ.**

**-Annex 4: CD-R, audio file of the whole interview with CONAMAQ.**

## Annex 1 - Map of TIPNIS National Park and Indigenous Territory





Annex 2- Torcuato Di Tella's four models of populist parties




Figure I.1. Torcuato Di Tella's Four Models of Populist Parties. (From Torcuato S. Di Tella, "Populismo y reforma en America Latina," *Desarrollo economic* 4, no. 16 [1965]: 391-425.)

## **Annex 3 – Edited interview with CONAMAQ**

### **Q1. “Cuales razones tenía Conamaq para participar en la marcha?”**

“Conamaq es del pueblo indigeno de las tierras altas. Esta movilización es una coordinación entre CIDOB y Conamaq. Antes desde 1999. Porque conoceremos en varias necesidades entre los pueblos indigenas occidente/oriente, los necesarios en las temas de los leys. Por este razón. Uno: Participar en la marcha era muy necesario por el pueblo Boliviano, no solamente para los indigenos. No solamente para el occidente no oriente. Por dos razones. Uno: Tenemos en Bolivia veinte-tanto parque nacionales. Y nosotros como pueblos indigenos estos parques nos da oxigeno al pueblo Boliviano y a nivel internacional. Entonces estos parques nacionales debe ser cuidada por el estado. No solo del pueblo Boliviano o del pueblo indigeno. El motivo es que el Parque Isibore-Secure es un parque de todo el pueblo Boliviano, reconocida mediante un ley, reconocida mediante 18 comunidades indigenas. Entonces este parque nacional, nosotros a pesar varios del oxidente nos entrado como es el parque. Para nosotros es muy importante conservando nuestros animales, silvestres, la vivencia de los indigenos es muy importante alla otra forma, entonces en este marco, nosotros dijimos el parque debe ser cuidada. El gobierno quiere un camino, un carratero troncal. Debería bordear por la derecha por la izquierda, no solamente por la corazón del parque. Entonces por eso que nosotros en articulo constitución 30 en párrafo 3 nos dice que los pueblos indigenos es libre de terminación de los territorias milenarias. Entonces en este marco que nosotros hemos dije no debe romper este corazón del parque entonces por eso nosotros hemos podido para que respecta de Bolivia veinte-tantos parques por eso hemos podido macharlo. Entonces yo creo que estos parques debe ser conservados único no estamos contra la carratera, bueno nosotros queremos que respecta los parques nacionales.”

### **Q2. “No estaban preocupados que la participación en la marcha podía influir la relación entre el gobierno y CONAMAQ negativo?”**

“En la primea gestión a cabeza presidente Evo Morales hemos apoyar todo el pueblo Boliviano. Aquí hay la gente neutral en nueve departamentos de los pueblos indigenos. Gente ni derecha ni izquierda. Gente neutral quiere que cumplas los necesidades del pueblo Boliviano o cumpla la constitución, el estado o derechos internacionales o medioambiente o

esa para que no hay esa probresa extrema. En Bolivia probresa extrema en los altiplanos. Entonces este razón hemos a pedido todo en la primera gestión.”

**Q3. “Por que cree CONAMAQ que el gobierno quiere construir la carretera?”**

“El gobierno no ha mostrado nosotros exigimos cual es el interés del gobierno para construir por el corazón del Tipnis. La preguntamos al gobierno, no nos dije nada. Unico tiene el gobierno convenios con los países vecinos, con el Brasil, tal véz una camino troncal, que puede pasar por este territorio. Tal véz por la corazón del Tipnis, tal véz para que entren los colonizadores, por el tiempo para producir la coca. Puede ser de unos intereses de países vecinos, puede ser un interés del gobierno. Entonces en este marco el gobierno no dice nada, hay espacio como ya dije, por la derecha por la izquierda para lleva el camino, entonces yo creo que aqui el gobierno no respetar los parques nacionales de Bolivia.”