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1.0 Introduction

On the 18th September 2014 Scotland will go to the polls and decide upon their constitutional future in a referendum. Will Scotland remain a part of United Kingdom or will they regain their independence for the first time in over 300 years?

The debate in Scotland over potential independence has existed ever since Scotland initially became a part of United Kingdom through The Union Act in 1707. Obviously the debate on the topic has varied over times, from rebel risings in the 18th century to a more non-exhilarated debate based on words throughout the 20th century. However, lately this has changed as the nationalist government of Scotland has set the issue on top of the agenda by introducing a referendum, which the Conservative-Liberal Democrat led UK-government have promised to respect the outcome in. Thereby independence is nearer now than ever before in modern time. The question that follows is: Why now?

This master thesis concentrates on the path Scotland and the Scots have taken throughout the last 40 years. The main objective of the thesis is to research why Scotland has moved towards independence and whether there are any specific reasons it is happening right now. Scotland's attitude to devolution, from the early national breakthrough in 1974 until the situation today where the campaign for/against independence is raging before the referendum in 2014, is a subject that have never been researched fully in depth. This thesis intends to do so.

Through discourse analysis on a foundation of the principles from Historical Institutionalism and The Garbage Can Model, I will endeavour to formulate an educated guess as answer to a set problem formulation, which will be elaborated later on. In the frame of a case study design I will perform a discourse analysis on main political parties' approach to Scotland's constitutional affairs within the period 1972-2012. I will do this in order to research why, when and how the Scottish attitude evolved over time, ending with an independence referendum. Furthermore I will explore, whether the theoretical approach is sufficient to explain the development in Scotland.

In the following chapter the historical context will be presented in very short terms as well as the academic problem, which will lay the ground for the thesis and emerge into a defined problem formulation. Likewise, the problem will be expanded and the delimitations will be outlined.

2.0 Problem

The independence cause in Scotland has for long been more or less solely represented by the Scottish National Party, which is by far the most influential force in the campaign for Scottish independence. The party got its major breakthrough in 1974, when they got 11 members elected to The House of Commons. SNP used their strengthened voice in parliament to advocate for Scottish devolution, and soon they were successful in that battle. However, a few years later, in 1979, the Scottish electorate hesitated to vote for the establishment of a Scottish legislative branch, which postponed Scottish devolution for nearly 20 years through the Conservative era in British politics. The mood among the Scots changed and after another referendum on the issue a Scottish parliament became reality in 1999.

The Scottish parliament changed the political dynamics of Scotland dramatically, and in 2007 the Scottish National Party formed a minority government after two election terms in a row with strong Labour majorities. In other words, Scotland was now for the first time ruled by a political party that rejected the idea of Scotland being a part of United Kingdom. Instead, they wanted an independent Scotland. Before the 2007 election, SNP promised a referendum on independence but fell short of support in the parliament and as a matter of fact it was subsequently called off.

By 2011, the SNP government was re-elected in a landslide which secured the nationalists a clear majority. For the first time there was a pro-independent majority in the Scottish Parliament, which made the referendum possible. As a consequence such referendum is now scheduled for autumn 2014, which could see Scotland becoming an independent nation again if the Scottish electorate want so. The Scottish government and their British counterpart, consisting of the pro-union Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, signed a referendum deal in 2012 which secures that the 2014 referendum is genuine and with a legal basis.

2.1 Problem formulation

This short description of the development over the years indicates changes in the Scottish attitude towards the idea of devolution and independence. These changes will be the focal point of this master thesis. The problem formulation is as follows.

Why is independence in Scotland so predominant on the national agenda right now and why not before?

To perform a structured analysis, I have outlined a few research questions that will function as a guideline towards gaining knowledge enough to answer the aforementioned problem formulation. The concept is that if I manage through research to answer the research questions mentioned below, then it should be possible to derive a logical answer from that and be able to answer the problem formulation satisfactory.

1. **What are the main arguments for and against devolution/independence delivered by the proponents and opponents?**

2. **How has the devolution/independence discourse from the proponents changed over time?**

3. **To which degree is the evolution in the discourse on devolution and independence representative for the Scottish population?**

In order to do this, I have decided to use a case study with multiple analysis units. These units will consist of periods and events spread over the period 1972-2012, starting with the SNP breakthrough in 1974 and ending with the concurrent debate on independence in 2012. The analysis will be performed as a discourse analysis in which the tone and use of words through time will be examined in relation to Scotland's constitutional affairs.

The analysis will be performed in relation to the concepts of Historical Institutionalism. This means that I will explore whether the ideas presented in the theory matches the reality in the case of Scotland or not. In relation to the detailed decision-making process among British politicians throughout the chosen period I will attempt to use the Garbage Can Model as explanatory model. This means, if not else is stated, that the thesis will automatically assume coincidences, randomness and anarchic actors makes out the debate which is researched rather than pure rationalism.

Historical Institutionalism and The Garbage Can Model will be explained and expanded later on in a subsequent theory chapter.

The methods employed in this thesis will be explained in the following chapter on methodology.

2.2 The analysis

The analysis will consist of six different analysis units spread over the period 1972-2012. Each of them will be treated individual and on their own. In the end of each analysis unit a sub-conclusion will emerge and finally in the end, I will sum up the conclusions from each of the six chosen events. The thesis will end with one grand conclusion in which the problem formulation will be answered on basis of the analysis.

I have decided to start with the period 1972-1974, which is a period of revival for the independence cause. The Royal Commission on the Constitution, often referred to as the Kilbrandon Commision, launched their final commission report on various models on devolution in various parts of United Kingdom, and the SNP got their breakthrough in Westminster when they won 7 and 11 seats in the February and October general elections respectively. From that the analysis will move on to the devolution referendum in 1979 in which the Scottish population were split and ended up rejecting devolution as a result. There will especially be focus on the debate up to the referendum and the aftermath thereof.

During the Conservative era in British politics 1979-1997, Scotland found itself in a conflict with the Conservative government. The conservative vote in Scotland vanished and The Scottish Constitutional Convention became reality in 1988. These events will make up the third analysis unit. Tony Blair and Labour took up the reigns in 1997 and gave Scotland another referendum on Scottish devolution and the rights such an assembly should be given. The referendum in 1997 showed support for a Scottish Parliament and the Scotland Act 1998 were enacted. These events constitute the fourth analysis unit.

The final two analysis parts will consist of the Labour era in Scottish politics 1999-2007 and the era of the current SNP government (2007-2012). In these two analysis units it would be interesting to research if there is a difference in especially the SNP discourse, as they in this period have been in opposition and in power respectively.

A comprehensive chapter on the complete historical context will be presented later on.

2.3 Delimitation

In this thesis the researcher determines the events which are to be researched. It is not possible to cover every incident during the period 1972-2012, so it is necessary to pick out the events which are considered to be most relevant in order to answer the problem formulation. Ideally, the analysis

would cover a longer period in the history of Scotland, but due to the time, page limitations and resources given it would not be sustainable.

This thesis intends to research dialogue, debate, events and discourse over time in relation to the subject of Scottish independence. Thereby said, analysis on certain political initiatives and their content in substance will not be in focus unless it could be related directly to a potential influence on the discourse and perception within Scotland.

The analysis will cover the discourse of the main parties in relation to the subject. As a consequence I will research the two British government parties Labour and Conservative Party, as well as the main proponents Scottish National Party. The occurrence of the Liberal Party/Liberal Democrats in the analysis will only be present to the extent it becomes significant. This is due to page limitations and the fact, that the Liberal Party/Liberal Democrats for most of the thesis' timeline have been a fringe party in relation to the existing political dynamic.

As the analysis will cover the period 1972-2012 I am fully aware that it is hardly possible to cover the raging debate on referendum issues in a sufficient manner, as this debate primarily takes place in the year 2013. This is a choice I have made for a few reasons. The first reason is that the key issues, and key arguments, have already been presented in 2012 (it could easily be repetition of statements to make an analysis unit on the 2013 debate). Another reason is the page limitation aspect once again.

It will come to the reader's attention that one analysis unit is in particular different from the other five, and that is the one concerning the Thatcher-Major period 1979-1997. It is by far the lengthiest period in relation to the other five, so it is clear that the filtering of information during the period will be somewhat different compared to the other ones. As the period is longer than all the other present in the analysis only the most important issues will find its way to the thesis. The reason why I have tolerated such a lengthy period is that it is a distinct era en British politics, which are to be understood as a whole and not by fragments thereof. Furthermore, it is a period which the devolution cause was paralyzed due to the fact, that the Conservative government instantly rejected any talks about Scotland having a parliament (as mentioned later on in the history chapter). This somewhat stalled the movement towards devolution and no progress could be made under the Conservative reign. Therefore one analysis unit would be sufficient.

The three research questions mentioned earlier will function as an unofficial guideline through the analysis. Question 1 is meant to focus on the heat and the extent of the debate on the time of the event. Question 2 aims to research, whether the proponents have changed their way of using the language through time, and explore whether they have adapted their argumentation into the political and societal reality. The last question aims to find out, whether a heated debate and more focus on the issue in general leaves an impression on the Scottish population and influences their opinion in one or another direction.

3.0 Methodology

In this chapter, the methodological approaches used in this thesis will be reflected upon. In the first section of the chapter the chosen research design will be explained and a discussion of its limitations and implications will be gone through. The next section will contain a descriptive exposition on the academic discipline of discourse analysis to the extent it will become relevant to subject.

Thereafter focus will be on empirical data and document analysis, which will be the main source to analysis in this thesis. The main purpose of the methodology chapter is to make sure that the findings of the thesis is possible to replicate using the same methods, principles and research design.

3.1 Case Study Design

In order to answer the set problem formulation, this thesis will use a case study design as described in Robert K. Yin's *"Case Study Research – Design and Methods"* and in *"Research Design in Social Research"* by David de Vaus. More specifically the name of the research design will be a single case study with embedded analysis units (Yin, 2009: pp. 46-53).

In this thesis the case will be Scotland. Within the frame of Scotland, six different periods throughout the interval 1972-2012 will be chosen as separate analysis units, each of which will stand independently in the frame of the case. Together, these six units will produce a gathered picture that will help answering the problem formulation. Inside each of the analysis units, numerous events, incidents and happenings will be analyzed. In many case studies, as well as in this one, a time dimension will play an integral part in order to outline a sequence of events that could be the basis of causal explanations (de Vaus, 2001: pp. 227).

The strength found in a case study design with embedded analysis units is that it is possible to conduct a varied and yet extensive research by few means. On the other hand, one should be aware that a case study is always in danger of becoming too social-constructivist, hence analyzing things out of a context in order to produce a specific result. This means that the researcher is obliged to follow certain theoretical guidelines in order to produce proper scientific research (de Vaus, 2001: pp. 221). In this case, I have decided upon a typology called theory-interpretive, which means that

the scientific interpretation should be based on already existing theories in order to generate new empirical knowledge (Antoft & Salomonsen, 2007: pp. 34-39).

Furthermore, one should be aware that a case study, even multiple case studies, does not necessarily produce evidence as result that can be applied in general terms (de Vaus, 2001: pp. 237). In other words, it is doubtful whether anything detected in this thesis regarding Scotland would be the case in different countries with similar situations.

3.2 Discourse analysis

Discourse analysis will be the method used in this research. The acknowledgement within discourse theory is the realization that language plays an important role in order to define and continually reshape the perception of reality. By talking about identity, states, people or organizations in a specific way it is possible to influence (and create) a discourse, which influences people in certain ways (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: pp. 1-4). The discourse approach takes a social constructionist starting point as it assumes that no objective truth can be taken for granted, and that history and culture tend to influence the way people discursively construct reality. Social processes, in terms of articulated "collective truths", are resulting in some actions becoming norms and others becoming unthinkable (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: pp. 5-6).

All these assumptions rest on a foundation of poststructuralist thinking that evolved from the structuralism trend back in 1960s and 1970s (Poster, 1988: pp. 5-6). The main difference between structuralism and post-structuralism is that while structuralism assumes a structure to be leading events in their happening, post-structuralism actually presumes the opposite (Deleuze, 2002: pp. 170-193).

Several scholars have contributed to the school of discourse theory. Among them are Ernesto Lacleu and Chantal Mouffe, as well as Norman Fairclough. Norman Fairclough focuses on what is labeled "critical discourse analysis". In contradiction to other variants of discourse theory, the critical discourse analysis takes a stance as critical towards what is analyzed and is therefore not objectivist science (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: pp. 64).

This thesis will not be written through the concept of critical analysis, but still Norman Fairclough offers a model ideal for analyzing a subject like the one concerning Scotland in this case. Therefore in this thesis, I will use Fairclough's three-dimensional model for discourse analysis as a tool to perform the analysis. The model is illustrated on the following page (Fairclough, 1995: pp. 73).

Fairclough's three-dimensional model for discourse analysis.

The three dimensions in the model should be understood as levels on which a discourse should be analyzed. The lowest level is the text itself that should be gone through in details by analyzing linguistics, semantics and the use of words and meaning in the actual context. The second level is the discursive practice, which should be understood as the production and consumption of text. On this level motives and the reception of the text is in focus. The third level is the social practice, which should be interpreted as the influence on the existing discourse or the establishment of a new discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: pp. 66-72). The big picture in other words.

Though this research is not an archetypical example of critical analysis, where a specific stance is taken, the model fits perfectly into the relevant context. However, I do not find it particularly necessary to use the model 100 percent literary and systematic, as it would somewhat hinder the meaning of the empirical findings. The main thing is that the three perspectives are present all the time.

3.2.1 Laclau & Mouffe

Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe offers a lot in regard to a theoretical approach within the field of discourse analysis. Through a moderation of concepts from Marxism and Post-structuralism, they construct a theoretical approach which mixes the social field into a web of processes that creates meaning. This means, that physical presence and social phenomena in itself has no meaning but are given so through social conversation and discourses (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: pp. 25).

The idea of "meaning" should be understood as things have only got a specific meaning if it stands in relation to something else. In that relation they use an example with fishing net, whose holes in the net are only present if we accept that the physical presence is in fact fishing net and not anything else. In the same context "a dog" is only a dog in relation to other animals such as a cat and a mouse. These meanings can be changed, why they are described as contingent (Laclau & Mouffe, 2002: pp. 21).

This meaning is created through articulation, which they understand as the main reason that discourse is established and yet transformed. In this context, however, only little randomness is present as people are historical and cultural beings that primarily adds on to existing discourses. This is resulting in some stability regarding discourses (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: pp. 108-109). Another thing that motivates construction of discourses is institutions, buildings and so on. Together with articulation they help creating a meaning, which is never constant or absolutely agreed upon (as human beings perceive differently).

This failure to construct a unified and undisputed meaning is by Mouffe and Laclau described as equivalence. This does not, however, mean that a discourse is not presented as it had an undisputed meaning. That in fact happens all the time, when people gather round a discourse but actually disagree on why they gather round (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: pp. 127-129). For instance most Scots might agree on "Scot" as a positive word, but for different reasons.

3.2.2 Conclusion

Surely Laclau and Mouffe have many good philosophical approaches towards discourse analysis, but as I see it they fail to deliver a useful model in which to perform a discourse analysis in practice. As a matter of fact I have therefore decided to use the principles from Norman Fairclough's three-dimensional model as my guiding analysis tool, meaning the three levels will become present through the analysis chapter.

Even though Fairclough is usually performing critical analysis, the model suits perfectly to my chosen case and subject. Yet again, at the same time this does not mean that I intend to perform a critical analysis in which I assume that there are rightful discourses and wrong discourses, as is the difference between Fairclough and Laclau & Mouffe respectively.

3.3 Document analysis

This research project will primarily rely on document analysis, which will make out the main source of empirical data used. This is mainly because of the retrospective approach that will be constant throughout the thesis. It will be necessary to qualitatively researching historical events in order to research the discourse on Scottish independence over time.

It is important to assure that only relevant empirical material is being used in the analysis chapter, as it would otherwise become an overwhelming, and yet more importantly, irrelevant to the problem formulation, task to conduct the analysis. In order to avoid this situation certain standards of criteria will be used to select relevant material. More specifically four criteria, all mentioned in Alan Bryman's "*Social Research Methods"*, will be enforced (Bryman, 2004: pp. 381).

First of all, used material has to be unquestionable and thereby authentic. It is of vital importance to ensure that no material is used in other forms than the original. This is to make sure that no vital parts have been left out of the material, and that no manipulation of the content have taken place. This obviously also applies to online sources, which will be marked in the bibliography with a "retrieved on…" marker to specify when it was retrieved to the project. This is done due to the acknowledgement that sources online can be changed over time.

Furthermore documents have to contain representativeness. A used part of a document has to be in line with the content of the rest of the document so the concerning part does not become taken out of a different context than originally intended. This lies perfect in line with the criteria of creditability, which likewise representativeness is of essential value and necessity. Therefore it is important that no document is biased unless it is intended to be to, for instance in case where it is some sort of biased contribution from a political actor which is to be analyzed.

Lastly, the document has to contain clarity and comprehensibility in order to the extent which it has to be used as a subject to analysis. In order words the meaning of the document has to be clear, so it is not analyzed in "another direction" that intended from the author.

3.3.1   Primary and secondary sources

It is important to make a distinction between primary sources and secondary sources, and especially in the case of performing a discourse analysis. The main difference is obviously whether the source is outgoing directly from the author, or whether it is quoted or interpreted by a secondary part such as journalists or commentators. In that case the bias of the document should be taken into consideration, and whether the secondary communicator of the source might have any interests in promoting a certain opinion.

In the case of a country becoming independent or not, feelings might play an integral role and therefore this should always be taken into consideration when analyzing.

3.4 The role of opinion polls

This research project is a discourse analysis based mainly on qualitative data. However, as the problem formulation requires knowledge about the Scottish population and how they stand in relation to the question of independence, it is necessary to include opinion polls on a regular basis in order to find out whether the evolution towards an independence referendum could be explained from an increased desire within the population, or the other way round for that sake.

4.0 Theory

In this chapter concerning theory I aim to give an overview over the theories which will be implied in the thesis. Though, this research project is merely of an empirical kind, it is necessary to connect the empirical findings into a theoretical context. In this case I want to present the theories of Historical Institutionalism and the Garbage Can decision-making theory.

These two theories functions on different levels. Historical Institutionalism functions on the societal level as it assumes that institutions and their history play an integral role in shaping future decisions. It focuses on the principle of path dependency, thereby connecting the present and future to the past. The Garbage Can Model on the other hand focuses on decision-making within an institution. In contrast to rational choice decision-making theory, The Garbage Can Model is rather a confluence of individuals, ideas and opportunities.

The idea of the theory chapter is to give a comprehensive description of these two theories, and in which environment they originated from. In the end of each description I will sum up some critique to each of the theories.

4.1 Neo-Institutionalism

Institutionalism is originally thought as the idea of analyzing politics based on formal institutions of government. The term Neo-Institutionalism evolved as an improvement, or revision, of the term which sought to a more sociological view on the institution. Both Institutionalism and Neo-Institutionalism focuses on isomorphism's (similarities in different institutional organisations) between different unlike institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: pp. 147-160; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991: pp. 1-38).

Neo-Institutionalism has split into several sub-fields all focusing on different aspects. For instance there is Rational Choice Institutionalism, sometimes referred to as economic institutionalism, which attempt to incorporate the rational choice aspects, known from economics, into the field of institutionalism (it exists as well in decision-making theory, which will be explained later on). Another one is the normative institutionalism, which is viewed upon as the "classic" Neo-Institutionalism. It assumes that norms and formal rules of the organization shapes the behavior of the actors inside it. This is named the logic of appropriateness (March, 1994: pp. 57-58).

4.1.1 Historical Institutionalism

Another direction within Neo-Institutionalism is the Historical Institutionalism.

Historical Institutionalism (HI) is not to be understood as a specific theory or a method to use in terms of analyzing changes in politics. It is rather an approach to the study of politics that takes historical aspects into consideration when it comes to institutions and how they influences and shape political behavior (Steinmo, 2008: pp. 150). In popular words it could be stated that "history matters" according to the theory.

The Historical Institutionalism derives, as written earlier, of the Institutionalism theory tradition that puts institutions in the center of the political analysis as they interact with society and creates interdependency between institutions and political life (Thelen, 1999: pp. 369-371). While other Institutionalism theories focuses on a theoretical approach, the HI angle is primarily based on empirical experiences observed in reality (Levi in Lichbach et. al, 1997: pp. 21).

Path dependency remains the key concept of HI. This is the assumption that institutions as a rule follow a path, which is likely to continue in accordance to earlier steps taken. This is at a starting point based on the path dependency paradigm within economical thinking. In economical thinking, in the field of technology, one often ground-breaking technology or invention lays the ground for everything that happens there after (Thelen, 1999: pp. 385). In this reality, future actors on the market had to adjust to the defining technology or face eradication from the market.

In the case of HI, path dependency should be understood in a different way as this interpretation appears too deterministic to apply within contemporary politics. In fact political institutions contain a much more complex composition than anything in the world of technology, whereas success is defined by beating the rival which disappears from the market unless he adjust. This is however not exactly the case in politics, where the losers can stick around for long after their defeat eventually becoming important players again on a later stage. Furthermore, politics in general is characterized by disparities in power and the disagreement over goals. Especially the disparities in power are reinforced by the institutions (Riker, 1980).

Instead, path dependency should be understood as if political development is a question of "critical junctures and developmental pathways" (Ikenberry, 1994: pp. 16). These developmental pathways indicate a certain trajectory which the institution tends to follow, as the culture and history of the institution dictates so. This further influences the institution's ability to maneuver in the political

environment, which is somewhat limited due to historical circumstances (Thelen, 1999: pp. 387). However, the developmental pathways can be changed drastically in the event of a critical juncture. The critical junctures, or defining moments, defines the institution and determines which fundamental direction it should take in the future. Often, in the case of countries becoming independent, the institution is seen as an enduring legacy of the political struggle, which led to the statehood (Thelen, 1999: pp. 388). This is resulting in different countries (or institutions) taking different developmental pathways.

Scholars in the field suggest that HI patterns could be detected when actors in and around the institution starts to show "self-reinforcing positive feedback" (Krasner, 1988: pp. 83). This feedback is divided into two different groups. The functional feedback is meant to strengthen the "logic" of the system in terms of a strengthened incentive structure or coordination effects (Thelen, 1999: pp. 392). This implies that the actors have faith in the system and attempt to strengthen its ability to function properly, which is seen as a clear element in the HI path dependency. The other kind of feedback is the distributional feedback, which is showing of in terms of the institution continuously gaining "self-confidence" enough to influence the political process to a larger and larger extent (Thelen, 1999: pp. 393).

Historical Institutionalism has been met with several aspects of criticism that points out some of the problems and shortcomings with the approach. Some argue that the developmental pathways and what happens becomes reduced into a tautology as institutionalized practices continue because of inertia, which is to some extent vapid as it offers no explanation on why it is happening (Dobbin, 1994: pp. 9). Only that it happens. Another limitation that is often said about HI is that it tends to focus on something in between institutional determination and institutional constraints (Steinmo et. al., 1992: pp. 14-15), and in that case fails to construct any universal points regarding a detection of common characteristics in different cases. In other words, what happens in one country might not happen in another country due to the fact that every country is unique with different specifications.

With this criticism taken into account, it would be interesting to see whether the criticism is justified in the case of Scotland, or whether Historical Institutionalism can be explanatory in a meaningful supplementary way.

4.2 Decision-making theories

Decision-making theories within organisations are many and various. In very rough terms, four main approaches in decision-making theory could be detected. The first of them is The Rational Choice Model, modelled on the concept of "Economic Man". The Rational Choice Model, as well as "Economic Man", assumes that decision-makers act rational and strives towards omniscience in order to reach the most favourable solution possible (Becker, 1976; Lohmann, 2008). However, "rational" in this context should not be defined as an objectively rational, but rather as the attempt to maximize personal advantage (Browning et. al, 2000; Scott, 2007).

In contrast to The Rational Choice Model stands Charles Lindblom's revisionist theory called Incrementalism. Lindblom argues that in reality decisions are results of gradual evolution, path-dependency and could be defined as "small steps" (also called gradualism). It is based on the assumption that decision-makers tend to "muddling through" the existence, and can therefore not be reckoned as rational as The Rational Choice Theory assumes (Lindblom, 1959; Lindblom, 1979). The third approach is rather a set of models than one specific theory, and it is characterised by the fact, that is sees decision-making as an act of compromise between different actors inside an institution. The third approach is in line with the different sub-fields of Neo-Institutionalism that is described earlier in this chapter.

These three approaches all assume that it is possible to measure and analyse decision-making through a logical and rational perspective. In contrast to this stands the fourth approach, which in contrary is anarchic meaning that randomness, coincidences and external events plays a role in decision-making.

4.2.1 The Garbage Can Model

This model has been named The Garbage Can Model. The Garbage Model on the other hand assumes that the output of a decision-making process is the sum of coincidences and individuals. Scholar Guy Peters describes the theory in the following way.

"The fundamental assumption driving this model is that, rather than being programmed or predictable, decisions in many situations are more the result of the serendipitous confluence of opportunities, individuals and ideas" (Peters, 2002: pp. 9)

The theory is originally described as a theory based on organisations, but the meaning of the Garbage Can Theory can as well be applied in the case of "decision situations" such as those in

modern day politics (ibid.). Whilst the rationalist theories assumes that actors base their decisions, or statements, on what is best for the objective common good and the rational in terms of what is best for the organisation, The Garbage Can Theory does not take that assumption as starting point. Instead, the output becomes a mix of all different aspects as mentioned above.

This environment, in the case of this thesis meant politically, is by the scholars described as organized anarchies.

"Organized anarchies are organizations characterized by problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation." (Cohen et. al., 1972: pp. 1)

Hereby further lies the assumption that participation in the process is somewhat voluntary and to some extent non-committal in the meaning that the individual responsibility is limited. This automatically leads to a situation of a "garbage can" full of different opinions and input on a certain subject, serving as possible solutions to defined or undefined problems. However, this problem does not necessary exist in reality. It is by far enough that the problem exist in the eyes of the actors or in the population (ibid.). The concept of unclear technology should be understood as the situation where the actors of the organisation do not have a full view over the processes taking place inside the organisation. This is as a consequence followed by a trial-error mentality (Cohen et. al., 1972: pp. 1-4).

The Garbage Can Model has numerous shortcomings. For instance the nature of the model signals powerlessness in order to analyse and predict the outcome of a specific decision-making process, which to some extent is dissatisfactory in relation to the often cited purpose of these types of theories (to predict). One criticism of the model is that it does not take the buck-passing principle into consideration. The buck-passing principle is the situation in which actors avoid to take decision hence passing them on to colleagues (Fioretti, 2009). Other critical voices argue that the theory lacks systematics and is therefore impossible to use for scientific means (Bendor et al., 2001: pp. 169).

These shortcomings aside, my assessment is that the theory is suitable as explanatory in terms of an analysis the kind this thesis statutes. This is based on the thought, that if randomness is assumed in terms of decision-making, then any specific patterns may be detected should they exist.

5.0 Historical context

In this chapter the historical context will be presented in a descriptive style, starting from the events prior to the Act of Union in 1707 where Scotland became a part of the Kingdom of Great Britain (which sooner became United Kingdom). This exposition of the historical perspective up till today will serve as relevant background knowledge in order to compose, perceive and understand the analysis part later on.

5.1 Act of Union 1707

Many attempts to form a Union between England and Scotland have been made throughout history, most with England as the motivating part through attempts of invasions in the 13th and 14th centuries (known as The Scottish Independence Wars). However, Scotland's independence was maintained.

In 1603, these attempts to unify Great Britain to some extent materialized when the Scottish king James VI inherited the English throne to become double-monarch. This period and the following millennium became known as the Union of the Crowns, a period in which Scotland and England had the same king but remained two independent states. In practice integration between the states became inevitable during the 17th century, and as the common Queen Anne saw it as her mission to unite the kingdoms, a unification process was initiated (Somerset, 2012: pp. 212). It culminated in 1706-1707 when both parliaments enacted the Act of Union bills thereby uniting the two states into one.

Scotland of the time was troubled economically due to unsuccessful investments in Central America where Scotland had attempted to set up a colony. The investment failed and a quarter of Scotland's money vanished in thin air created severe economic depression (Whatley, 2001: pp. 48-52). A Union with England would help the Scottish economy back on track, supporters claimed. Various incidents of bribery of Scottish parliamentarians came clear after the vote, and the entrance to the Union were met with discontent from many Scots at the time (Whatley, 2006: pp. 91-96) (Richetti, 2005).

5.2 The Jacobite Risings

Great Britain in the 17th century was plagued by religious motivated disturbances. These disturbances contained numerous risings by rebel Catholics that became known under the name

"Jacobites" as they supported the deposed Stuart family to retain the throne from the protestant House of Hannover (that took over the British throne in 1714) (Clark, 2000: pp. 94-95). The Jacobites had their stronghold in the Scottish Highlands and soon their struggle against the protestant monarchy became linked together with the existing discontent in Scotland with England. For instance the Jacobite agitated for not only a restoration of the Stuart Monarchy but also the old Scottish warrior clan system. (Squire, 1994: pp. 18-20)

The Jacobites led rebellions against the Crown in 1715, 1719 and finally in 1745 with support from Scotland's old ally France. The incursions mostly failed and the Jacobites were forced back to the Scottish Highlands. It was only when France planned an invasion on Britain the then king George II finally got the rebellion crushed after a decisive victory at the Battle of Culloden in 1746. (Reid, 2002: pp. 88-92)

After the Battle of Culloden the Jacobite risings diminished as steps were taken to populate and "civilize" the Scottish Highlands in order to avoid further threaths to the Crown. A civil penalty system was introduced and traditional Gaelic culture became oppressed by the victors (Gibson, 2002: pp. 27-30).

5.3 Insurrection and Home Rule in Scotland

Dissatisfaction with the Union continued to exist in Scotland and in 1820 the so called Insurrection, or Radical War, broke out in Scotland. Scottish workers were dissatisfied with the rule in London and the economic downturn in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. (Lynch, 1994: pp. 390-392) The big crisis was averted and one week into the insurrection, the situation calmed down again. In order to maintain stability in Scotland, King George IV visited Scotland in 1822 as the first monarch since 1650. The king's visit meant that Scotland's worries were taken seriously, and as a result a new Scottish identity started to form in the aftermath of the visit effectively ending the radicalism trend (Brander, 1980: pp. 155).

In the middle of the century the thought of Scottish devolution started to find ground within the Scottish society. In 1853, the "National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights" was established. Their aim was to promote the idea of devolution in Scotland, which to some extent was motivated on the profound opinion that the then-liberal government gave Ireland to much attention on Scotland's expense. (Devine, 2006: pp. 1-18) The National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights was a shortlived initiative and dissolved three years after its foundation.

However, tensions grew in Scotland. By 1885, the British government set up the cabinet post of Secretary of Scotland in order to systematize the voicing of Scotland's concerns in the Westminster parliamentary system. As Irish Home Rule gained substantial vocal support in Ireland over the years, home rule once again came on the agenda in Scotland (Lynch, 1994: pp. 414-421). In 1913, the Scottish Home Rule Bill was introduced to the British Parliament, but shortly thereafter the First World War broke out putting a temporary end to Scottish devolution. (Lynch, 2002: pp. 28)

5.4 Birth of Scottish National Party

After First World War and into the 1920's the home rule movement proved unsuccessful in order to gather the pro-devolution forces of Scotland (Lynch, 2002: pp. 24-27). In an attempt to unite Scotland behind devolution, The Scottish National Party was founded in 1934 as a merger of The Scottish Party and National Party of Scotland. In these years, a literary wave (later to be called the Scottish Renaissance) struck Scotland with a new discourse of national romanticism, which created somewhat momentum for the nationalists.

Initially, the party fought for establishment of a Scottish Assembly but as time went by the SNP became in favor of total independence from United Kingdom (Lynch, 2002: pp. 34-37).

SNP fought in several by-elections in the years after the formation, but initially failed to gain electoral ground on the national level as a result of the British plurality voting system. Furthermore, internal fractions in the party started to make their mark round a gradualist wing and a fundamentalist wing. The gradualist wing accepted the salami slicing method ("step-by-step") as the way to Scottish independence through a Scottish Assembly, while the fundamentalist wing of the SNP wanted nothing less than total and complete independence (Finlay in Hassan, 2009: pp. 24-28). Both of these two viewpoints exist within the party this day today.

The nationalists gained some ground on the local level through the 1960's, and by the beginning of the 1970's the breakthrough came on the national level. In the general election held October 1974 the SNP got about 30% of the popular vote in Scotland resulting in 11 MP's. This is the SNP's best ever electoral achievement in a British general election.

5.5 The Kilbrandon Commission and referendum

In 1969, Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson set up a commission, which was to suggest and examine different solutions to devolution for regions in United Kingdom (Wales, Scotland, Isle of

Man etc.).The Royal Commission on the Constitution, or just the Kilbrandon Commission as it was called in public, launched its report in 1973.

The Kilbrandon Report suggested a Scottish Assembly with round 100 members elected across Scotland under the single transferable vote system which secured proportional representation. The Scottish Assembly would be given responsibilities on education, environment, home affairs, health and social services. On the other hand Scotland's representation in the House of Commons would be reduced from 71 to 51.

On the basis of The Kilbrandon Report, James Callaghan's Labour government enacted the Scotland Act 1978 in 1978. This act would go into force if Scotland, through a referendum, voted in favour of a Scottish Assembly. In addition to a simple majority, 40% of the total electorate had to vote in favor for the bill to pass. Otherwise it would be repealed. The referendum was held in March 1979, and ended with a small majority of 51,6% supporting a Scottish Assembly. However, as the turnout was as low as 63% it fell short of the 40% threshold and was therefore rejected subsequently.

After the referendum, the Callaghan government chose to abandon further policies regarding Scottish devolution. This proved fatal as the Scottish National Party withdrew their support for the government and forced an election in May 1979. (Lynch, 2002: pp. 146-152)

5.6 Scotland under conservative rule

The 1979 election ended in a landslide win for Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party, and with her entrance to British politics a new paradigm in Scotland started. The Thatcher years 1979-1990 put the end to traditional heavy Scottish industry and resulted in high employment numbers throughout the period (Finlay in Devine, 2008: pp. 157). As a result the conservative reign proved very unpopular within Scotland and strengthened the desire for devolution in Scotland (Finlay in Devine, 2008: pp. 158).

The case was that much of the Scottish industry, were at that time relying intensively on state subsidies. As the iron-willed Mrs. Thatcher cut the subsidies, the jobs vanished in thin air. This trend materialized in the 1987 election in which the Conservative Party lost 11 seats in Scotland ending on only 10. This was viewed as a direct rejection of the Tory government under Margaret Thatcher who rejected the criticism right away. She replied in the following manner.

"Judged by cold statistics, Scots enjoy greater prosperity than anywhere in the United Kingdom outside the crowded high-priced South East". (Finlay in Devine, 2008: pp. 161-162)

In addition Thatcher, throughout her premiership, rejected anything such as devolution. She saw it as a way of tearing the United Kingdom apart, and it would definitely not happen as long as she was around (Finlay in Devine, 2008: pp. 170-171). As a reaction to this, the opposition started to form the Scottish Constitutional Convention in 1988, which had as primary aim to debate and formulate ideas to form a Scottish Assembly. If not under the conservative government, then next time a Labour government won power (ibid).

In 1989, the Thatcher government introduced the Community Charge, commonly known as the Poll Tax. The tax was designed to fund local government by the basis on census in a specific area and not as traditional income-related progressive taxation. This meant, in practice, that rich and poor were to pay the exact same tax amount. Scotland was chosen as guinea pig for the tax in 1989, while it was to enter force in England and Wales by 1990. Eventually the tax proved unpopular in the rest of Britain, and forced Thatcher to step down in 1990.

John Mayor took over as prime minister but the damage had already been done. By the 1997 election the Conservative Party was completely wiped out in Scotland without winning one single seat. This did not, however, result in huge gaining for the Scottish National Party. Instead, Labour won a landslide winning 56 of Scotland's 72 seats in parliament.

5.7 The road to a Scottish parliament

With Labour's decisive win in the 1997 election, the path towards a Scottish parliament was open. Tony Blair chose the opposite strategy compared to James Callaghan 20 years earlier. First a non-binding referendum on the subject was arranged, and then the legislative work afterwards should a simple majority vote yes (Taylor, 1999: pp. 126-129).

The referendum was held in September 1997 and ended with a clear majority voting in favor of devolution. The referendum consisted of two questions. The first question was yes/no to the concept of a Scottish parliament. To that question 74,3% voted yes. The other question was, whether this Scottish parliament should have tax-varying powers. To that question a majority of 63,5% voted in favor. The referendum turnout was rather low at 60,4%

As a result of the referendum, the Labour government put the Scotland Act 1998 on vote in the House of Common. The bill was supported by The Liberal Democrats and Scottish National Party, while the Conservatives voted against (Taylor, 1999: pp. 130-138). The Scotland Act installed a parliament with 129 member elected in a mix system of "first-past-the-post" and the additional member system (AMS). Furthermore, the Scotland Act 1998 introduced the "Scottish Executive", later to be renamed "The Scottish Government" (Scotland Act 1998, section 44).

5.8 Political dynamic changes in Scotland

Now with a parliament in Scotland, the political dynamic changed rapidly. At the first election in May 1999, The Scottish electorate paid tribute to Labour that formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats under the former Secretary of Scotland, Donald Dewar. The distribution of seats in the 1999 Scottish election can be seen in the following figure.

The election proved that the known dynamic from British politics had been broken in Scotland, as Scottish National Party seemed to be a factor of power in contrary to British general elections (Mackay in Hassan, 1999: pp. 79-81). The old parties in Britain's political life had been challenged. The honeymoon of the Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition soon ended and Scotland witnessed a stormy start to the Scottish Parliament.

First of all, Scotland was shocked by the sudden death of First Minister Donald Dewar to a brain hemorrhage in October 2000. His successor Henry McLeish then had to resign under dramatic

circumstances in late 2001, as the result of a finance scandal involving McLeish sub-letting his tax-subsided constituency office (BBC, 2001). The turbulent period ended when Jack McConnell took the reign in November 2001.

McConnell managed to get the Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition reelected in 2003. In the meantime Scottish National Party had changed leader, as Alex Salmond had stepped down leaving John Swinney in charge of the party. The SNP campaigned unyielding on the independence question, which were seen as a logical next step after devolution had been reached. However, the strategy backfired on the party leaving them with just a little over 20% of the seats in the 2003 parliament. In comparison Labour managed to get 39% of the seats giving the impression that Labour was still by far the most popular party in Scotland.

The emphatic defeat led to the resignation of John Swinney in 2004, and opened the door for Alex Salmond returning to the post as SNP leader. At this time Tony Blair's Labour British government had caused controversy by entering the Iraq War (The Telegraph, 2002), and combined with somewhat fatigue tendencies in the Scottish Labour government (The Scotsman, 2006), the polls started to change a little by little with the nationalist as the gainers. The result of the seat distribution in the 2007 Scottish election is depicted in the figure underneath.

The figure shows that the Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition lost its overall majority, and as every other party ran a campaign against the government, Labour could impossibly continue in power. As

a result, and as the biggest party with the biggest gains, SNP formed a minority government after the 2007 election.

Alex Salmond became First Minister in the first SNP administration and he had promised the Scots a referendum on independence. However, as the parliamentary situation had formed, there was no majority in favor of this, so he had to slack on his promise (BBC, 2010). The SNP started to reshape Scotland in a self-described "social democratic" direction (BBC, 2012), as well as choosing a more confrontatorial attitude towards the Westminster parliament in London (The Telegraph, 2013; The Telegraph, 2010). At some point Alex Salmond even said, that he considers Scotland mentally a part of Scandinavia rather than United Kingdom (Scottish Express, 2011).

The unresolved referendum question became yet another part of the SNP manifesto in the building up to the 2011 Scottish election. The seat distribution in that election is depicted in the figure underneath.

The election showed that the Scots had won confidence in the SNP administration and Alex Salmond. Furthermore the election showed that the electorate had punished especially the Liberal Democrats for their participation in the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government. Lastly the election gave the impression that Labour had definitively lost its position as the most popular party in Scotland, at least when it comes to Scottish elections.

Scottish National Party used the overall majority to put forward a wish to hold a referendum on independence in 2014. The British government subsequently accepted the will of the Scottish government and promised to accept the will of the Scottish people should they vote for independence (Guardian, 2012). The agreement became known as the Edinburgh Agreement.

As a result "Yes" and "No" campaigns respectively emerged (Scottish Herald, 2012). In London, the Conservative led government passed the Scotland Act 2012, a bill aiming further financial powers to be devolved to the Scottish parliament. The SNP initially were against the bill as it was only "half-done" and a "missed opportunity" but ended up supporting the bill in the end (STV News, 2012).

5.9 Attitude towards independence

Since 1978, Ipsos MORI have conducted polls on the Scottish population's attitude towards independence. It can be noticed that it topped round 1998, and that it has never round 50% of the population. The following figure is from Ipsos MORI (Ipsos Mori, 2013).

6.0 Analysis

As research specifications are now outlined and the theory and historical context have been presented, it is now time for the core of the thesis in form of the analysis. The analysis will take form of six different parts as mentioned earlier, and will be followed by an analysis conclusion in the following chapter.

6.1 Analysis introduction

The six analysis parts will follow a chronological structure starting from the earliest in 1972 and ending with the latest one in 2012. The six analysis chapters are as follows.

- ❖ **Revival of SNP 1972-1974**

- ❖ **First Referendum 1979**

- ❖ **Thatcher and SCC 1979-1997**

- ❖ **Second Referendum 1997-1999**

- ❖ **Birth of a Parliament 1999-2007**

- ❖ **Nationalists in power 2007-2012**

The analysis will as mentioned in the methodology chapter take place with the pinciples named in the frame of Norman Fairclough's three-dimensional model for discourse analysis.

Each of these analysis units will be ended with a part conclusion with basis in the evidence found in the analysis part.

6.2 Revival of SNP

Scottish National Party made its breakthrough into British national politics in 1967 when Winnie Ewing surprisingly won a by-election. The mayor breakthrough, however, was some years underway and finally materialized in 1974 when SNP won 7 seats in the February election. The February election ended in a Labour dominated hung parliament, which forced another election in October, which saw SNP advancing from 7 to 11 MP's and nearly one third of the votes in Scotland.

6.2.1 Overview

The Conservatives had been in government since 1970 under Prime Minister Edward Heath. The Tories had committed themselves to support "some kind" of devolution in Scotland in 1968, when they enacted the Perth Declaration as party policy. This intention would manifest itself already in 1970, when the Queens Speech indicated that this was still the case (Mitchell, 1990: pp. 64). But there were differed opinions within the Conservative Party, and at the February election they lost the majority in The House of Commons.

Labour experienced a turbulent period in regard to Scotland, as the party due to political circumstances had to change their opinion on Scottish devolution. Initially Labour opposed devolution, but threats from nationalist winnings in Scotland made it necessary for Harold Wilson's government to change position on the subject.

The Scottish National Party campaigned on North Sea Oil, thereby famously stating "It's Scotland's Oil". The campaign helped SNP inventing the Scottish dimension of British politics, and they were successful in defining the party as an alternative to the old parties.

6.2.2 An accommodating Tory approach

There is no doubt that Prime Minister Edward Heath had a complaisant approach towards the idea of Scottish Home Rule. He underlined the party policy in a speech in Parliament in May 1973, just a few months before the Royal Commission of the Constitution launched its final report in October that year.

"I pledged then and I pledge again today to give the people of Scotland genuine participation in the making of decisions that affect them, all within the historic unity of the United Kingdom" (Mitchell, 1990: pp. 66)

The statement indicates that Prime Minister Heath is balancing his views in order to the signals he is sending and the recipients he is addressing. The quote is quite pragmatic and gives the impression that he is ready to meet the perceived desire for devolution. Under the other hand he emphasizes that it have to take place within the frame of United Kingdom, thereby addressing element in the Unionist camp that might fear this could lead to independence.

One of the opponents to Scottish devolution within the Conservative Party was MP Iain Sproat, who feared a new Scottish Assembly would be ever so Labour dominated. Though, he wrapped the worries in sincere irony, when he voiced his concerns in May 1973.

"How much more difficult it is going to be to handle a Labour-dominated assembly? It would provide a splendid platform for irresponsible elements and publicity-seekers, and for extremists such as Jimmy Reid" (Mitchell, 1990: pp. 65)

In the irony and thick sarcasm, there is an element of worry. The humor is used to hide the true argument in the statement, which is one related to realpolitik hence the fact that there should be no motivation for Conservatives to wish for an assembly in which Conservatives would probably never hold a decisive majority. Thereby, an assembly would mean the same as shaping Scotland in Labour ideals. Another interpretation could be that of a haughty one, as Iain Sproat somewhat indicates, that Scotland would not be able to govern itself in a responsible way.

Iain Sproat continued his criticism in a more fundamental way.

"There is something ultimatively phoney, something deceiving, in the concept of an Assembly that pretends in some not inconsiderable way to be a national Parliament, and yet in reality possesses only the powers of a glorified local government unit; something faintly ludicrous and disagreeable in somebody strutting about calling himself "Prime Minister of Scotland", but with functions limited to dealing with roads, coordinating tourism etc." (Mitchell, 1990: pp. 67)

In this statement, Iain Sproat worries about a coming Scottish Parliament being something in-between. Thereby he argues that a Scottish Parliament would be with no really influence in relation to core policy questions but still a parliament in which politicians might act like they were really in charge. This could constitute a possible threat to the Unionist thought, which served as core policy within the Conservative Party.

So as illustrated the Conservative Party was sympathetic towards a potential desire for devolution, but was permeated by internal disagreement. As a result, the Conservative approach towards devolution changed with the elevation of Margaret Thatcher to party leader in 1975.

6.2.3 Labour with mixed feelings

It is impossible to detect a unified Labour attitude towards devolution in the period 1972-1974, as the party had mixed feelings about the concept. One thing that is said about Labour's opinion towards devolution at that time was that it was somewhat steered by external factors (Devine, 2008: pp. 143-145). Herein lays the argument, that the Perth Declaration in 1968 by the Conservatives was meant to put pressure on Labour, which was at the time split on the question. Furthermore, Scottish nationalism had become a threat to Labour, which was to be thought of when making policy for a future Scotland.

The question only had little influence up-till the 1974 February election in which Labour concentrated on beating the Heath government. In the election, however, Labour fought on a soft no to devolution platform, which was not completely ruling it out or in any way accepting it as a solution in the future (Devine, 2008: pp. 144; Denver et al, 2000: pp. 6). A reason could be that the extent of the SNP support had not yet become visible to the political environment (Devine, 2008: pp. 144-145).

The February election ended in a hung parliament with Labour as the biggest party but without the possibility to reign without other parties. In Scotland, SNP had made significant impact and gained ground from 11% in 1970 to 22% in February 1974 resulting in seven seats in total. The situation was indefensible for Labour that sought to call an election soon. In order to deal with Scottish nationalism, the Labour government of Harold Wilson in September 1974 published a white paper with proposals for Scottish devolution as a make-believe suggestion (Lynch, 2002: pp. 123). Labour had been forced by political reality to change their mind.

The next election in October ended with a Labour majority of only two, which made it virtually impossible for Harold Wilson to rule without help from other parties. And as defections could be expected in an election period, help was needed. Scottish National Party had gained four MP's in the election and were on 11 with 30,4% of the popular vote in Scotland. A combination of these two factors meant that Scottish devolution had to be the opinion of Labour in the aftermath of the October 1974 election.

As a result of the SNP gaining's in Scotland, SNP were now the second largest party in 42 Labour constituencies. Then Secretary of Employment Michael Foot put words on the Labour fear of Scottish nationalism in a debate with SNP's Winnie Ewing:

"It is not the eleven of you that terrify me so much, Winnie, it is the 42 seconds" (Devine, 2008: pp. 145)

As a consequence of the spoken fear within Labour, the government initiated an appeasement policy, which shortly after the election meant that plans for devolution were presented (ibid.). The Home Secretary Roy Jenkins was one of the critics towards the idea of devolution, as it would hurt Labour in its efforts to perform well in future UK elections. He said the following in late 1974:

"Any question of separation would be very damaging for the Labour Party because, while it might give Labour a very powerful position in Scotland, if you do not have Scottish members of parliament playing their full part in Westminster then the Labour Party could pretty much say goodbye to any hope of a majority ever in the UK" (ibid.)

It is interesting to note, that the argument is not based on what is the best for Scotland as an entity, but rather of what is in the best interest of Labour as a political party. This shows an "UK-thinking" rather than a "Scotland-thinking".

6.2.4 SNP on the big stage

The sudden rise of the Scottish National Party in the beginning of the 1970's is closely connected to the fact, that enormous oil deposits were detected in the North Sea by the end of the 1960's. The nationalists argued, that the oil was detected in what they defined as "Scottish water" thus it was juridical owned by Scotland and not Britain. On that base SNP introduced the "It's Scotland's Oil" campaign which proved to be very effective (McLean et. al, 2013: pp. 150-152; Lynch, 2002: pp. 123). The party wrote the following in their campaign material before the February 1974 general election.

"The discoveries could make a vast difference to our basic standard of living particularly if royalties etc. are used to prime the pump of Scottish entrepreneurial potential, improve social conditions and protect the environment. It is equally certain that the resources are not sufficient to fulfill anything like as radical transformation of the UK economy. And there lies the difficulty. If we remain in the UK the benefits of Scottish oil will be marginal" (Lynch, 2002: pp. 126)

The campaign material points out a number of areas wherein oil money would be able to help the Scottish society. Then it is pointed out that due to the "membership" of the UK, Scotland will miss the opportunity to improve Scottish everyday-life. Regarding the words used in the campaign text it is noticeable, that it is relative neutral in its expression and lacks value-laden argumentation in contrary to later SNP material. This could be due to the fact, that only 12 percent had supported independence, why a more aggressive approach in rhetoric could scare potential groups away from the parties (Devine, 2008: pp. 146)

In general the SNP advance should be interpreted in the light of the added national-dimension to Scottish politics. Beforehand, politics were merely class-divided, but with the new national-dimension this changed Scottish politics forever. Therefore, in an attempt to create a unique Scottish identity approach to politics, SNP attempted to focus on areas, which the traditional parties for long had neglected (Hassan, 2009: pp. 35). A few of them are mentioned above – environment for instance. SNP made it clear, that not only were they a national-party, they also disagreed with the other parties when it came to economical politics. Hence the party used a lot of energy to send the signal, that Scottish National Party was a "Social-democratic" party, as Scotland was a Social-democratic country in mind and heart (Hassan, 2009: pp. 35-37; Bennie et. al, 2012: pp. 25).

After the February election, SNP found itself in an unused situation, as the Labour government could not carry a majority, and could not do so with the help of a single party. So a new election was underway. SNP had won 21,9% in Scotland in the February election, and at the October election, that number grew dramatically to 30,4% In the inter-election period, SNP attacked all other parties for lacking answers to Scotland's problems, which they on the other hand delivered with enthusiasm (through the oil campaign for instance). This led to SNP being the preferred party among young Scots in the October election (Bennie et. al, 2012: pp. 25).

The second election gave Labour a majority of two, which could soon give SNP a leading role as kingmaker party. That situation soon occurred and the nationalists succeeded in pressuring the government to concessions in regard to devolution. In advance, SNP promised to vote with the Labour government in "less-important" policy areas (Denver et al, 2000: pp. 11). For Scottish National Party devolution was the goal in itself. Discussion between gradualists and fundamentalists came as a consequence, as the fundamentalists would accept no more than independence. But due to the low backing of population within the population, the gradualist line became policy of the party (Devine, 2008: pp. 146-147.

6.2.5 Conclusion

The analysis show that the so-called Scottish dimension in British politics was at the time largely overseen by the traditional parties Labour and Conservatives. In the light of this, the Scottish National Party exploited the situation and changed it to their advantage. With relative success, especially among young voters, they managed to turn oil findings into a question about Scotland being overlooked by the British government, which took the old parties by surprise.

The Conservative government under Edward Heath had an accommodating approach towards the idea of devolution, which they as a concept had promised to support. However, they failed to deliver a substantial bid to how devolution could ever take place in the aftermath of the Kilbrandon report in October 1973, and they lost both elections in 1974, which led the road for the elevation of Margaret Thatcher to party leader.

Labour, initially without intentions to deliver devolution for Scotland, were forced to rethink their attitude after two elections had resulted in an unstable political situation. They made a compromise with Scottish National Party over the devolution issue, despite internal fear that appeasement of the nationalists would damage the party.

It is noticeable that there were substantial internal disagreements within the two old parties Labour and Conservative. Even more noticeable it is to watch, that the abstentions to support devolution is based on a fear that devolution, in each of the parties' cases, will damage their effort on the UK level. In other words, the criticism towards devolution is not based on a "what is best for Scotland?" question, but rather a "What is best for us as a party – and the UK".

So it could be said, that the two parties, unlike SNP, failed to understand the new Scottish dimension to politics.

6.3 First Referendum

In 1979, a slight majority of the Scottish electorate voted yes in a devolution referendum, but due to a low turnout the 40% of eligible voters to vote yes, the Scotland Act was not obtained and as a result the British Labour government collapsed.

6.3.1 Overview

The Scottish National Party took the role as the one clear proponent of a yes vote despite some minor controversies within the party regarding a yes vote to devolution being a de facto acceptance of the authority in London (Bochel et. al, 1981: pp. 18). Labour being the architect of the Scotland Act was in general in favor of a yes vote but failed to signal unification. The same was the case for The Conservatives that as a party was against the Scotland Act despite a minority within the party supporting it (ibid.). The Liberal Party were in favor of a yes but failed to play any significant role in the campaign.

Both sides tried to initiate cross-party campaigns in order to signal unification regardless political differences. However, the "Yes for Scotland" group was severely hindered by the fact that many moderate politicians denied to identify themselves with the more left-wing nationalists such as Margo McDonald and Jim Sillars (Bochel et. al, 1981: pp. 15). Unification was also limited within the "Scotland says No" campaign, however the involved parties avoided internal confrontations in contrast to the yes campaigns (Bochel et. al, 1981: pp. 25). Still, the cross-party campaign made only a little impression.

6.3.2 A big chance for SNP

The Scottish National Party fought a battle, not only to win a yes in the referendum but also to exchange the breakthrough reached in the past few years to permanent support in Scotland. Therefore SNP bet on two horses, as they supported the Yes for Scotland campaign as they made their own "SNP Yes" campaign (Bochel et. al, 1981: pp. 18).

"SNP Yes" was launched in late 1978 with the following words from SNP party president Robert McIntyre.

"As committed advocates of self-government for Scotland, we share your disappointment at the weaknesses of the Scottish Assembly proposed by Westminster. We believe, nevertheless, that a resounding "Yes" vote will inaugurate a new era in Scottish politics..." (ibid.)

What is interesting here is that SNP emphasizes that the idea of a Scottish Assembly in the form on vote is disappointing and containing weaknesses. This is a criticism not only towards what is on vote in the referendum, but also towards Labour government at the time, which is illustrated by using the term "by Westminster". What is interesting as well is that it says "we share your disappointment". Thereby SNP assumes that there is a common understanding of disappointment which is a discourse SNP tries to incorporate in the political environment.

"…The SNP is not just another political party. It embodies the will of the Scottish people to determine their own future as a free nation..." (ibid.)

In this sequence SNP tries to manifest themselves as the true protectors of the Scottish cause. By saying "The SNP is not just another political party" there is a clear reference to the other political parties as being somewhat indifferent with Scottish matters (as they are perceived by the SNP as local branches of the "London parties" (Hassan, 2009: pp. 150-151)).

Another thing that instantly springs to mind is the use of the words "as a free nation". This indicates that SNP without any hesitation sees Scotland as a nation, and not as a part of United Kingdom. This is meant as a clear provocation, and speech to the base of the national support base, as the referendum was about devolution and not independence. It underscores again that SNP want to portrait themselves as the "true Scots". The confrontatorial style continued.

"…It will give Scotland a political voice again after 272 years of enforced silence – Scotland's first truly representative and democratic voice…" (ibid.)

This is once again an attack directly towards England and in this case Labour, as they were at the time the administrators of the system that, according to SNP, "enforced silence" on Scotland. There is a clear attitude of Scotland being oppressed by England, and this point is put emphasis on by the term "after 272 years". By saying that an assembly would be "Scotland's first truly representative and democratic voice" the SNP argues, that the British electoral system in unfair, especially towards the SNP.

The discursive practice used by the SNP campaign is playing on the national discourse, which sees the nation Scotland as being oppressed by forces in the south. In the big picture, or the social context, the SNP is aware that nobody should be in doubt that SNP is in favor of a Scottish Parliament. But at the same time the SNP uses the opportunity to deliver a clear message to the

Scottish population that they are different from the other parties as being more sinister in their love for Scotland.

6.3.3 Labour defending – and attacking

The Scotland Act was Labour's own piece of legislation so obviously the party was supporting the cause, though a minority within the party formed a no campaign (Bochel et at, 1981: pp. 16-18). Scottish Labour, the Scottish branch of Labour, insisted on making its own yes campaign to avoid any affiliation with nationalists or conservatives.

Scottish Labour started the campaign with a written campaign statement from general secretary Helen Liddell.

"First, the Labour Party is the only party in Scotland which believes in devolution for its own sake. Some others believe in it because they want to make it a shortcut to separation" (ibid.)

Labour uses the term "for its own sake", which is a use of words that indicates that Labour is the only party that supports a yes based on what is actually on the vote. Thereby they indirectly give the impression that the other parties take their stance on basis of ideology and national preferences, while Labour on the other side is the pragmatic party. This point is underlined by the latter part, where it says that "…others believe in it because they want to make it a shortcut to separation", which is to be considered a snide remark towards the SNP campaign. Liddell continues:

"…Second, the achievement of an Assembly for Scotland will be ours and it would be wrong to allow our consistent opponents – including those who helped to destroy the last Bill – to claim credit for this constitutional advance…" (ibid.)

Here yet again Labour is attacking their nationalist counterpart by solely taking the credit for the Scottish Assembly, should it go through the referendum. This is an answer to the SNP claim that it is their achievement that the Scotland Act became reality by putting pressure on the Labour minority government. And the attack continues:

"…The history of Labour's fight for devolution, both for Scotland and for the people in general, precedes by a century the rise of the separatists. We have now in Parliament reached that point at which real and desirable home-rule is almost with us, yet within the framework of a United Kingdom…" (ibid.)

This is once again Labour taking the credit for the devolution progress. They use a seniority argument by saying that they have fought for devolution much longer than the SNP. It is furthermore interesting that they label SNP as "separatists", which is an attempt to discursively construct them as possible more "extreme" that they are in reality. In contrast to this, Labour makes it clear that devolution should take place "within the framework of a United Kingdom", which is somewhat a guarantee to those Scottish voters, that might fear devolution being a stepping-stone towards independence.

In general it could be said, apart from the attacks on SNP which dominates the Labour statements, that Labour based their campaign on being the more responsible and slightly more conservative choice within the yes camp (still in favor of devolution – but no more than that). They attempt to build on to the discourse, which is to ridicule the nationalists as being somewhat more pragmatic towards the subject than the SNP thus saying they want devolution, but inside the frame of a United Kingdom.

Labour were at the time of the referendum by far the biggest party in Scotland and their instant attack on the nationalists could be interpreted as an attempt to avoid increasing influence to the nationalists in the future. This could be ascribed to the fact that the nationalists and Labour at the time fought over some of the same working class voters in general elections (Bochel et al., 1981: pp. 14).

6.3.4 A conservative defense of the Union

The Conservative Party chose a completely different strategy in comparison with the yes parties. The Conservatives sought unity within the no camp, although they insisted on maintaining their own campaign for a no. The party leadership even encouraged party members to join the cross-party campaign "Scotland says No". The main thing for the Conservative leadership was that the referendum failed, and they did not care who they had to fight that battle together with. This could be connected to the profound wish of the Conservatives to give Labour a defeat that might help the Conservatives winning the next general election later in 1979 (Bochel et al., 1981: pp 22-23.

What was essential for The Conservatives to signal was that they were not necessarily against the principle of devolution for Scotland, but rather the solution enacted in the Scotland Act that was now on vote. This distinction is sorted out by party president Russell Anderson in a letter to local constituency chairmen by December 1978:

"…Let me make it quite clear that in campaigning for "No", the Party will not be campaigning against Devolution for Scotland but only against the type of Devolution contained in the Act. In the event of the "no" campaign being successful, the Party is committed to the establishment of an all-Party Conference to discuss better forms of Devolution…" (ibid.)

The attitude in this letter is much less absolutist and confrontational than the other parties participating in the campaign. The Conservatives somewhat accept the desire for devolution, but are however against the form suggested in the Scotland Act. This attitude was as well exposed in the campaign itself, where the Conservatives fought a more varied campaign than the parties on the yes side (ibid.). A Conservative banner against the Scotland Act said:

"…Bearing in mind that the "no" campaign can be supported by all who are opposed to the present Government's proposals, no matter what their views may be on the principle of Devolution itself…" (ibid.)

It is evident that the Tory's attempt to reach beyond their base with this banner is significant. They show a complaisant attitude and tries to make this as much a campaign against the then sitting Labour government, as well as the Scotland Act itself. They somewhat camouflage their staunch Unionist approach to the matter in a combination of pragmatism and aversion towards the sitting Government. Thereby they play on some well-known discursive practises.

This accommodative approach towards different viewpoints was exposed during the campaign, and combined with the fact, that the Conservatives were better at organizing their support base in the campaign, helped the No side severely (Bochel et, al., 1981: pp. 47). This could especially be ascribed to the fact that the no-side was not fighting each other internally.

6.3.5 Umbrella groups with little influence

Both the "Yes for Scotland" and "Scotland says No" campaigns failed to play an integral part of the campaigning as they were overshadowed by the parties campaigning on their own.

"Yes for Scotland" was driven mainly by nationalists, and thereby failed to recruit supporters from other parties (Bochel et al., 1981: pp. 14). Therefore the campaign was limited to banners within the big cities with vague slogans such as "Scotland deserves home-rule". It was by many seen as an SNP attempt to make a broader approach to people that did not identify themselves as nationalists. This was to some extent seen as a threat from especially Labour that feared this trend to continue in

the aftermath of the campaign, why they in public used their energy to attack the "Yes for Scotland" campaign (ibid.).

The unity within the "Scotland says No" campaign were much better, and some key Conservative MP's even organized rallies in the name of the campaign (Bochel et al., 1981: pp. 25). The no-campaign covered everything from socialists fearing devolution would end in social destitution for Scotland, to staunch unionists such as Reverend Andrew Herron who famously proclaimed: "Assembly be damned. Keep Britain united". This created a unity which was only kept together by the fact that they had to campaign AGAINST the Scotland Act. If they were to defend it, harmony would probably soon diminish (ibid.).

All in all, however, the cross-party organisations were in the media overshadowed by the parties campaigning on their own.

6.3.6 Conclusion

The 1979 referendum would be remembered by the dis-harmony within the yes camp, which made it a lot easier for the no camp to concentrate on securing, if not a no, then just as much resistance to the Bill so it would fail the 40% threshold. And in that matter the no side came out as the winners.

The analysis of the discourse shows that at this time SNP is driven by a staunch nationalist attitude towards devolution. In reality SNP are talking more about independence, as they consequently refers to Scotland as one nation, as well as they depicts England as the evil oppressors that for 272 years have forced Scotland to silence. Labour, even as they agree on the substance in the Bill on vote, sees this as a threat and uses a lot of energy to attack the SNP and even the SNP-affiliated "Yes for Scotland" campaign.

In general Labour chooses the pragmatic attitude, with a seniority argument, towards devolution. They argue that devolution is the right thing and that Scotland has the right to home-rule (which is a logical reasoning as Scotland is Labour land more than anything else). But again they make it absolutely clear that devolution should happen within the frame of United Kingdom, and once again uses energy on accusing SNP for seeing devolution as a stepping-stone towards Scottish independence. Labour uses a seniority argument when they make it clear that they have been in favour of devolution in Scotland long time before SNP was created as a party.

The Conservatives saw the battle against the Bill as a double-edged sword. First of all the support base of the Conservative Party have always been staunch Unionists, why they obviously fought devolution for ideological reasons. But furthermore The Conservatives saw the campaign as a good possibility to provide Labour with a defeat so that they could gain in the general election later on in 1979. The Conservatives, however, chose the pragmatic approach and avoided too strong unionist remarks that could provoke those voters who felt more as Scots than Brits. It could be said that the Conservatives were aware that there were many different reasons to vote no in this referendum, and they attempted to mobilize them all with success.

The low turnout at 63,8% on this important issue as well as the very slight majority on only 51,6% voting "yes" could indicate that Scots in general were satisfied with the "status quo" solution. Some might have believed the scaremongering from the Labour Party when they said that the SNP would then fight for independence if they got devolution, while others simply could not see a reason to change what was already functioning adequately.

In any case it could be concluded, that the yes arguments did not convince the Scots at all.

6.4 Thatcher and SCC

The period 1979-1997 is known as the Conservative era in British politics, as The Conservative Party through the period had a calm and steady majority in the Westminster Parliament. Labour and SNP on the other hand experienced this period as turbulent and transformative in order to their perceived political image.

6.4.1 Overview

The Conservative Party under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher won a stunning victory in the 1979 general election, and soon started to transform United Kingdom in a more rightist direction than seen before in newer British history. The Conservative policies hit Scotland hard, as Scottish industry became among the casualties, but Margaret Thatcher remained confident in her policies and the unionist approach to Scotland's constitutional affairs. The grip loosened a little under John Major, but it was already too late for the Tories.

Labour struggled through the 1980's on the opposition benches, while their stance towards devolution became more insisting through the years. This initiated the establishment of the Scottish Constitutional Convention in the late 1980's. The SCC became the framework of the upcoming Labour government in their attempt to secure Scottish devolution.

Scottish National Party experienced a period of crisis when a fraction within the party urged civil obedience as a consequence of the Conservative government. Later the party gathered together behind new Alex Salmond and started a professionalization process in order to dam up for high Labour popularity.

6.4.2 Iron-willed conservatism in practice

Margaret Thatcher showed no signs of recognizing Scotland as an entity different from other within the United Kingdom. Up until the later part of the 1980's, devolution did not play an important role on the national agenda. Nevertheless, the Thatcherite policies hit Scotland hard, as much of Scotland's traditional industry lost its state subsidies. The social consequences were imminent but the Prime Minister defended the consequences in Scotland unaffected in 1988.

"The consistency with which the same regions have unemployment rates which are above the national average over time may be taken as evidence of employees or firms has been insufficient to reduce these disparities" (Mitchell, 1990: pp. 102)

This quote reflects the Conservative approach to the events in Scotland pretty well. First of all, by referring to the example of Scotland as "same regions" she indicates that there is no difference from Scotland to any other region of United Kingdom in her opinion. Secondly, she argues that the responsibility for these high unemployment rates lies within the local civil society, that are apparently not capable of dealing with these disparities. So basically the point was that Scotland is nothing unique as an entity and Scotland can blame itself for its social consequences of the conservative policies.

In 1987, the government was re-elected, but in Scotland the Tories saw its number of MP's reduced from 21 in 1983 to only 10. This was due to widespread tactical voting in which the other parties in partnership managed to beat several incumbent MP's (Finlay in Devine, 2008: pp. 160-163). One of them was Anna McCurley that was beaten in Renfrew West. As reaction to her defeat she proclaimed:

"Unionism has lost its significance in Scottish politics. The days of being able to count on solid support from those whose profound belief in Protestant ethic and the empire transcended economic and social divisions have vanished" (Mitchell, 1990: pp. 11).

The statement from Anna McCurley probably tells a story about how many Conservatives might have thought and felt at the time of the 1987 election. The impression that Unionism had a hard time, with devolution wishes from Labour and independence thoughts hold by the SNP, could seem logical in the light of the election result. Still it sent an explicit signal from the back of the Conservative mind-set, that Unionism (in contrast to devolutionism) was surely the right track for Scotland in contrast to the devolution thoughts mastered by the combined opposition, and not a position which to give up at any costs. That approach was agreed upon in the Conservative leadership.

Margaret Thatcher continued her policies but was stopped in 1990 when the Community Charge was introduced to fund local government. At that time it had already been introduced in Scotland the year before, and gave fire to the increasing Labour support in Scotland. This was viewed as Scotland being used as a guinea pig for increasingly hard-hitting Conservative policies implementing against the will of Scotland and its people (McLean et. al, 2013: pp. 187; Mitchell, 1990: pp. 117-118).

John Major took over as Conservative leader and Prime Minister, and he instantly removed the Community Charge as he realized it was too unpopular. He chose Ian Lang as new Secretary for Scotland, a staunch devolution supporter since the 1970's. However, as the Scottish Constitutional Convention was seen as a "Tory-free area", it was hard work for Major to get true dialogue in regard of a solution to the increasing wish for devolution in Scotland (Denver et al, 2000: pp. 37).

The lack of dialogue between the government and the political representatives in the Scottish Constitutional Convention, largely made up by Labour MP's from Scotland, was a worrying factor for John Major. In 1992, he addressed it in the following way in the warm-up to the 1992 election, that the Conservatives surprisingly won.

"The United Kingdom is in danger! Wake up my fellow countrymen! Wake up now before it is too late" (ibid.)

The Prime Minister's dramatic use of words indicated the increased fear within the Conservative Party, that too deep division between Scotland and the government would destabilize United Kingdom on the long path. The "wake up" refers to Labour MP's in the SCC that refused to "share" the discussion on Scottish devolution with the government that on the other hand could not agree internally on how to suggest a solution to the issue on its own (ibid.).

As the conservative era draw to a close, the government tried to reach out at Scotland. First then-Scotland Secretary Michael Forsyth arrived to the premiere of the movie "Braveheart" wearing a kilt. Secondly, the government decided to legally return the Stone of Scone, a stone used for the coronation of Scottish monarchs, to Scotland as a part of a charm offensive (Denver et al, 2000: pp. 39).

It failed. At the 1997 general election, the Conservative Party failed to regain representation in Scotland.

6.4.3 SNP – crisis and transformation

Scottish National Party suffered a defeat in the 1979 referendum, and their crisis was further deepened when their influence in British politics vanished with the Labour election defeat in the 1979 general election. After the referendum defeat SNP started to re-evaluate their identity as a political party. Before SNP had seen itself as a national party for all of Scotland, but as the referendum showed that middle class voters had preferred status quo and therefore voted no, this

was soon to change. Instead, a group of young leftists within the party, including a young Alex Salmond, formed the Group 79 fraction.

The fraction represented a new radical trend within the party. A trend that would rather define the party as a working class party, mainly due to the fact, that the working class population of Scotland was the most positive towards devolution (Lynch, 2002: pp 166-167). In 1981, their front figure Jim Sillars issued the following statement at a SNP conference.

"This conference expresses its outrage at the destruction of Scotland's industrial base by the policies of an English Tory government. Conference notes the massive rise in unemployment, the lack of hope amongst our young and the mood of black despair among now overwhelming our people…" (Lynch, 2002: pp. 167)

Sillars uses the word "English" about the government, which is a clear way to indicate that he does not recognize its legitimacy in reigning over Scotland. He uses quite strong words to underline his points, for instance putting "massive" in front of "rise" and using "black despair" as a description of the human state in Scotland. The reason why he is doing it becomes clear afterwards as he uses it to legitimize the measures towards the Tory government. So he continues:

"…Conference recognizes that a real Scottish resistance an defense of jobs demands direct action up to and including political strikes and civil disobedience on a mass scale; declares that the time has come to end British misrule…" (Lynch, 2002: pp. 167)

Drastic problems call for drastic measures, is the mantra used in this speech from Jim Sillars. His use of words like "resistance" and "British misrule" once again indicates that he does not recognize the British government's right to reign over Scotland. Furthermore, the legitimation of "civil obedience on a mass scale" underscores this outright hatred towards the British government.

The discursive practice should be seen as an internal struggle for power within the Scottish National Party between what could be the moderates in power, and the radicals in internal opposition (ibid.). However, it clearly sends a signal of pure hatred and devastation over the then state in British politics that, especially from the SNP point-of-view, could at that time seem hopeless with the rejection of an Assembly in Scotland and a solid Conservative majority in the British parliament.

The year later, in 1982, the Group 79 fraction dissolved and fell apart after a vote on the yearly SNP conference (Lynch, 2002: pp. 173-179). Sinn Fein, the political party of the Provisional IRA, had

invited Group 79 to their conference. Group 79 rejected the approach initially, but the invitation had been leaked to the press and soon the two parties had been linked together, which forced then-SNP leader Gordon Wilson to gather the party behind him and expel the leaders of Group 79 (however, the most of them were allowed back later).

With a moderate victory over the radicals, the SNP membership started to decline drastically from approximately 28.000 in 1979, over 22.000 in 1982 to only 12.000 in 1987 (Lynch, 2002: pp. 163). Instead, Labour seemed to gather support due to the in Scotland unpopular Conservative government. Especially when Labour took the initiative to establish the Scottish Constitutional Convention and the Claim of Rights for Scotland in 1989, the role of SNP as a marginalized party was sealed. SNP initially supported the claim, but withdrew after Labour and The Liberals rejected to discuss Scottish Independence as an option (Mitchell, 1996: pp. 127-133).

SNP changed its leader in 1990, when Alex Salmond took over after Gordon Wilson. Salmond chose a more gradualist approach toward the leadership (Lynch, 1992: pp. 191-195). He used energy to renew and reform SNP, as well as introducing a higher level of professionalism within the party. The main concept was to down tune the radical rhetoric and instead use the energy in order to prepare Scotland internally for a time after devolution, which could become reality in the case of a government change in Britain (ibid.). The fear was that SNP would be marginalized in the shadow of Labour if not the rhetoric tune changed was the impression.

Not all SNP candidates, however, understood the message. For instance Alex Neil campaigned in the 1992 general election with a "Scotland free by 1993" slogan. It was merely ignored by the SNP leadership and Neil was not elected. Internal opposition started to form again, especially from the old Group 79 leader and staunch SNP-fundamentalist Jim Sillars, who on many occasions challenged the moderate gradualist line from the Salmond leadership (Lynch, 2002: pp. 201-205).

6.4.4 Labour forced to action

Labour found itself in total defeat in the aftermath of the 1979 election. Not only had they lost the referendum on Scottish devolution, they were also defeated in a landslide by the Conservative Margaret Thatcher. If anyone had thought that the devolution question would be dead for that reason in Labour context, they were wrong. Labour MP Donald Dewar launched the following statement in the aftermath of his own personal reelection in Glasgow.

"It may be that many who did vote No. or who abstained, may come to regret the indecisive result of the referendum as Mrs Thatcher's shock troops ride rough-shod…over Scotland" (Hassan et al, 2012: pp. 24)

Dewar seemed to be aware what was in the making regarding the conservative government. He emphasizes that Scotland will see itself in a situation where "shock troops ride rough-shod". By using these words, Dewar makes it clear, that Mrs Thatcher's policies would be severely damaging to Scotland. There is even an element of us-versus-them attitude in the statement, which could signal a sharpened voice in regard to devolutionism. This could obviously be interpreted as once a welcomed opportunity to attack the incoming government, but the necessity of something to happen soon became clear as the conservative policies hit Scotland.

Not all put is as discreet as Dewar. Another Labour MP George Galloway used a completely different rhetoric in 1982 in the House of Commons but the meaning was the same.

"Mrs Thatcher's holocaust further devastates Scottish society…Scotland knows as a nation, that it did not vote for Mrs Thatcher, indeed it decisively rejected her…The Tory writ in Scotland is increasingly seen as that of an occupying power, with millionaire George Younger as governor-general" (Hassan et al, 2012: pp. 28)

George Galloway's rhetoric is by far the most significant from that of a Labour MP at that period. First of all he used "holocaust" as a reference which is probably the worst damnation of one's political opponent. Furthermore he emphasizes that Scotland have not voted for the government, and thereby have no legitimacy in reigning over Scotland. He furthermore uses the "occupying power" argument, which is also seen from the SNP. He even goes as far as labeling George Younger, the then-Scotland Secretary, as "governor-general". It is off-course difficult to decide, whether Galloway's remarks can be considered "Labour policy", but it could be logical to assume, that the backbencher Galloway says some of the things that the shadow government at the time were unable to do. It is evident that Labour sought to use Scotland's situation as victim of conservative policies politically. Up through the decade, Labour once a year put a "Scotland Act" for vote in the House of Commons knowing well that the government party would instantly vote the bill down (Hassan et al, 2012: pp. 49).

When Labour had lost its third election in a row to The Conservative Party, members of Scottish Labour felt there was need for action. Donald Dewar issued the following warning to the government after the 1987 election.

"Labour MP's are not a Scottish pressure group at Westminster, but in moral and electoral terms the real representatives of a real majority. If the government does not recognize that they will be set on a very dangerous course" (Hassan et at, 2012: pp. 43)

Dewar was at this time Shadow Secretary of State, and therefore there is some weight behind his words. He argued, that the government has no "moral" legitimacy in Scotland, and this lead up to what was yet to come from Labour. Labour started to form the Scottish Constitutional Convention and attempted to make it a cross-party campaign. The first meetings were held in 1988 with representatives from Labour, Liberal Party and SNP. SNP however soon left the cooperation as independence could not be agreed upon as a goal (Hassan et al, 2012: pp. 54-57).

The idea behind was a pragmatic desire of self-determination for Scotland that – in the founding parties' opinion – had been misruled by a hardnosed British government. They saw it as a catastrophe that Scotland had for nearly 10 years been ruled by an un-elected majority without legitimacy, which should be avoided in the future (Taylor, 1999: pp. 45-51; Hassan et at, 2012: pp. 56-60). These points were repeated through the years along with the substantial policy making in regarding to the formation of an Assembly.

As the power shift in British politics came closer, Labour decided to use the work of SCC as a campaign issue in the running up to the 1997 election. A fear was, however, that a Scottish Parliament would give the Scottish National Party a platform from which they could evolve over the years. Labour's Shadow Secretary for Scotland George Robertson denied that point with the words that have since gained fame in retrospect back in 1995.

"Devolution will kill nationalism stone dead" (Maxwell, 2012: pp. 40)

6.4.5 Conclusion

The conservative era in British politics will in regard to Scotland be remembered by a determinant approach to politics by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. This iron-will approach had severe consequences in Scotland, but the Conservative government somewhat ignored what happened for a long time. It became too much with the Community Charge in 1989-1990, which led to the end for

Margaret Thatcher. John Major, her successor as Prime Minister, had a far more complaisant attitude towards Scotland, but at that time it was already too late and it seemed the Conservatives had outplayed their role in Scotland for good. Their fight for continuous Unionism in Scotland had apparently failed.

Labour clearly decided to use the Scottish perspective as ammunition towards the Tory government throughout the 1980's. The impotence and powerlessness of being in opposition and losing three elections in a row, lead to the formation of the Scottish Constitutional Convention, which played a significant role in the years following. They viewed Scottish Home Rule as a winning case when using it politically, and therefore they did what they could to avoid sharing the issue with especially the SNP, which left the SCC due to the question of independence. Later, Labour had a possibility to discuss some kind of solution with the Tory government of John Major, but failed to do so in practice. All through the period Labour had very solid pollings in Scotland, and as all opposition parties agreed upon (at least) devolution, it is fair to assume that the Thatcherite policies invoked in Scotland had risen the desire for devolution within the population

The Scottish National Party saw itself almost completely marginalized throughout the conservative era. The party was having several decisions to make over whom to fear the most: a robust conservative Prime Minister that had let Scotland down – or a very popular Labour Party, that would possibly marginalize SNP even further in a situation after potential devolution. The conclusion was clear for SNP, who sought to reshape the political profile. The fear of not to be taken serious was a continuous fear within the party, and therefore flighty statements promising independence tomorrow had to be withdrawn from the campaigning. Alex Salmond, who had been in favor of civil obedience as a member of Group 79, saw that there was need of change. Not necessarily because he liked the pragmatic approach, but something could indicate, that he meant it was necessary.

6.5 Second Referendum

The 1997 devolution referendum took place in the light of Princess Diana's death on 31th August, and occurred only months after Tony Blair's New Labour had won the general election in a landslide victory. The referendum featured two questions, one on the existence of a parliamentary body and one whether the parliament should have tax-varying powers.

Both questions ended with an overwhelming majority voting yes.

6.5.1 Overview

Labour under the guidance of Tony Blair enjoyed their honeymoon after the 1997 general election victory, and used the energy from the stunning victory in the cross-party pro-devolution campaign "Scotland Forward".

The Conservative Party had opposed the idea of a parliament for the past 18 years in government, and at the election the party had been eradicated in Scotland. New leader William Hague knew of the outcome long before voting-day, and as a consequence the Tories only mastered a low-key performance within the "Think Twice" no campaign.

Scottish National Party had mixed feelings about how to perceive the referendum, as the old battle between the fundamentalists and gradualists came to the surface again. SNP once again orchestrated its own campaign, but contrary to the 1979 referendum, SNP put effort in getting along with the rest of the yes camp.

The death of Princess Diana on 31th August resulted in a suspension of mayor campaigning until the funeral had taken place on 6th September.

6.5.2 Labour riding the wave

Labour rode the wave in the slipstream of the groundbreaking 1997 election, and used the energy to secure a double-yes within the frame of the "Scotland Forward" campaign, which was furthermore supported by SNP and the Liberal Democrats. For Labour the referendum was a successful round-off of the Scottish Constitutional Convention, and the party was confident of an overwhelming majority being in favor of devolution (Hassan et. al, 2012: pp. 81-83).

The attitude of Labour was clearly all the way through, that devolution was it and to be reckoned as the final destination of devolution in Scotland. Labour's Secretary of Scotland Donald Dewar underlined that in the summer of 1997.

"Scotland will remain firmly part of the United Kingdom" (Hassan et al, 2012: pp. 82)

This statement, and that it was necessary to make, gave the impression that this referendum was only on devolution and not to be considered as a stepping-stone towards independence as the nationalists gave an impression of. In the Labour camp there was great confidence that it would end with a double-yes, however the memory from the 1979 referendum remained a nightmare. The fear was that the old rivalry with Scottish National Party would gloom once again (Hassan, 2009: pp. 152-157).

Chairman of the "Scotland Forward" campaign Nigel Smith made it clear that unity in the yes camp was crucial for the outcome.

"We need to provide a single, unifying force in Scotland during this campaign" (Taylor, 1999: pp. 128)

And unity in the yes camp was indeed obtained, as not only Labour but also the Liberal Democrats and SNP supported the initiative. However, snide remarks towards Scottish National Party was made when Minister without Portfolio Peter Mandelson jokingly stated that SNP voters should abstain to vote, as the referendum did not concern independence and a vote would be an acceptance of the United Kingdom (Denver et. al, 2000: pp. 74; Hassan et. al, 2012: pp. 84).

After the double-yes was obtained the preparations for the first Scottish parliamentary election began. And with the prospect of a Labour administration in Scotland, worries within parts of the Scottish Labour Party were shared. Tommy Sheppard made up internal opposition within Scottish Labour, and gave this warning to his party affiliates.

"If the party does not devolve and is seen as having its Scottish policy run from London, it will put itself at a considerable disadvantage compared to its competitors. In time, Scottish people will want their parties home grown, and Labour will have to change or leave the political stage to others" (Hassan et. al, 2012: pp. 88)

Herein lay the concern within fractions of Scottish Labour that Scottish Labour in the upcoming Scottish parliament is in danger of being a local branch of that Labour Party reigning in London. This is primarily based on the fear, that if not Scottish Labour develops a unique Scottish approach and its own identity, the Scottish National Party will inevitably profit from that in the long run. This

opens a whole new flank in Scottish politics between London-based centralism and Scottish-based decentralism.

6.5.3 Conservatives avoiding attention

Everybody knew how the referendum was going to end, as the polls were identical in their predictions (Denver et. al, 2000: pp. 68). The Conservative felt committed to deliver expertise and effort to the "Think Twice" campaign, despite leading members of the party avoided too much attention in fear of being connected to the inevitable defeat that would come (Denver et. al, 2000: pp. 68-71). In many ways the referendum was perceived as a "lose-lose" situation for the hangover-plagued Conservative Party, that did not even have any representatives elected in Scotland.

One of those who participated in the campaign on the no-side was the former Secretary of Scotland Malcolm Rifkind. Rifkind based his opposition on the economic reality, and that he doubted that Scotland could manage to uphold the quality in education, health services and so forth in the suggested outlined frame (Taylor, 1999: pp. 136). However, he pointed out:

"I was and remain sympathetic to the argument that Scotland with its own distinctive law, administration, education and ethos could benefit from a devolved legislature." (ibid.)

Rifkind's statement indicates a complaisant attitude towards the desire for devolution within the Scottish society. Though still an argument in favor of a no vote to both questions in the referendum, it could be described as an attempt to win sympathy while using economic rationalism as an argument in favor of a double-no. It had little impact what so ever, as the yes camp as well used economic based arguments.

After the Conservative era, and what it had done to Scotland, Unionism was shattered in Scotland, apparently, why more emotional outbreaks referring to the greatness of a United Kingdom could not be seen as clear as before (Miller in Devine, 2008: pp. 189-191). The "Think Twice" campaign appeared vague in comparison with those in the yes camp. They mostly based their campaign on less-convincing slogans such as the following.

"Can you really face a Scottish Parliament? NO NO!" (Hassan et. al, 2012: pp. 84)

It is in particular interesting that the slogan used the word "really" in the actual context, which could indicate a sort of arrogance in relation to the recipient (as if the logical answer would be no to

that question). This haughty attitude did not help the no-side in a referendum they never had the chance to win.

6.5.4 SNP divided over devolution

It would probably surprise many people, but actually the Scottish National Party disagreed upon what to make out the devolution referendum. The gradualists felt devolution would be a step in the right direction, while the fundamentalist wing felt devolution would be equal acceptance of Scotland being a part of United Kingdom (Hassan, 2009: pp. 38).

A majority in the Scottish National Party's national council decided to support a double-yes in the referendum, thus adding, that it was only half the way towards independence.

"National Council re-iterates standing policy that gives primacy to the independence campaign, but which does not seek to obstruct devolution. In that context, National Council resolves that The Scottish National Party will campaign for a "yes, yes" vote in the referendum on September 11th and instructs the National Executive to organise and run a distinctive SNP Campaign designed to mobilize the support of the more than 620.000 people who voted SNP on May 1st." (Lynch, 2002: pp. 222)

This decision could be seen as a way of uniting the factions within the party. By emphasizing the independence campaign as the primary campaign, while the fight for devolution is just a step in the right direction, the National Council tries to reach out to the faction of fundamentalists. Furthermore, the SNP once again decides to initiate its own campaign to avoid being lumped with the Labour-dominated "Scotland Forward" campaign. However, the National Council was at the time aware that a crisis situation like that one of the 1979 referendum should be avoided at any costs. Therefore, additionally, the SNP supported the "Scotland Forward" campaign (ibid.).

Party leader Alex Salmond underlined the SNP intentions in a campaign statement at the launch of the SNP "Yes Yes" campaign on 22th August.

"We believe that devolution is not an end, but a beginning – a step towards real Independence. We hope to persuade the people of Scotland to share that view and to act on it. But to commence on any journey, we must take our future into our own hands – and we can do that only by voting positively and decisively on 11th September." (Lynch, 2002: pp. 223)

Once again there is focus on independence and not devolution, though this is not what the referendum is concerning. Alex Salmond further states, that he "hope to persuade" the Scottish people that independence is the right thing for Scottish. Thereby he responds to the fact, that only a minority of the Scots at the time supported independence (ibid.).

The approach, however, was not shared by everyone in the Scottish National Party. Former MP and SNP fundamentalist Jim Sillars urged people not to vote, as he noted that devolution was not independence (Lynch, 2002: pp. 224). 22% of SNP voters abstained from voting on voting day (Taylor et. al, 1999: pp. 43).

6.5.5 Conclusion

The 1997 referendum was characterized with the three parties having extremely different starting points. Labour was still enjoying positive energy from the 1997 general election and tried to utilize that onto the referendum campaign, where they favored a double-yes. The Conservatives on the other hand kept a low-profile attitude in acknowledge of the fact that a double-no was not within reach due to the Thatcherite policies in the past. Finally, the Scottish National Party was primarily focusing on independence in order to cope with a fundamentalist wing accepting nothing less.

Labour maintains a pragmatic attitude towards devolution, hence once again making it clear, that Scotland will remain a part of United Kingdom with devolution. The party makes an effort to avoid a situation similar to the one of 1979 in which disharmony between Labour and Scottish National Party became a contributing factor in the rejection for the 1979 Scotland Act.

The Conservatives kept a low profile throughout the campaign in order not to get too identified with another embarrassing defeat. The conservatives were against devolution once again, but fought behind the lines within the "Think Twice" campaign, that never really got the grip into the population.

Scottish National Party were in generally favoring devolution, even though a minority within the party rejected the idea, as it would mean the acceptance of a United Kingdom and the Queen reigning over Scotland. The SNP fought their own campaign called "Yes Yes", which focused on the perspectives of independence following devolution. Still, the SNP supported the cross-party Labour-dominated "Scotland Forward" campaign, so in general the Yes camp focused on keeping the moods positive.

6.6 Birth of a Parliament

The establishment of a parliament in Scotland changed the political dynamic of Scotland drastically, as it moved national politics back into a Scottish frame. The first election in 1999 ended with a coalition government consisting of Labour and the Liberal Democrats, and that coalition survived all the way up to 2007.

6.6.1 Overview

Labour was the most popular party in Scotland and even though they had a tough beginning, they maintained popularity for most of the period. They saw nationalism and the debate on independence as a threat to their rule, and as an alternative discourse they attempted to change to focus towards other policy areas where they considered themselves stronger than the Scottish National Party.

Scottish National Party started the period with staunch nationalism, but ended a bit more moderate in their attitudes. Still, independence was the mail goal and main purpose of their existence, but over time they developed a broader political attitude with focus on other policy areas. In the end they succeeded in axing the Labour-Liberal Democrat majority in the 2007 election.

The Scottish Conservatives had a hard time being the right-wing opposition to the Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition. They took a usual Unionist stance and over time it became known, that SNP was the main opposition party. The Conservatives did what they could to signal, that they were a Unionist alternative to Labour and the Liberal Democrats as well.

6.6.2 SNP as main opposition

The Scottish National Party launched two different manifestos for the 1999 Scottish election. One manifesto was launched for SNP leadership in a devolved Scotland and one for a completely independent Scotland (Lynch, 2002: 225-226). The difference between the two manifestos was meant to outline the constraints of Scotland within United Kingdom compared to a situation, where Scotland was completely independent.

As a consequence of the election defeat, SNP changed its leader. Alex Salmond decided to step down and was replaced by his deputy John Swinney. Swinney soon made his impact in a 2002 interview, where he put words on the SNP fight for independence.

"When I look at the dramatic picture of liberation in Czechoslovakia on the wall of my study, I think back to what Scotland was like on 9 December 1989. A Scottish parliament was then a far

distant hope – or perhaps even a fantasy. However, today it is here and our country has changed. The creation of that parliament makes clear to me that we're just a few thoughts away from making my dream of being Scottish a living reality" (Devine et at, 2002: pp. 258)

John Swinney here compares the communist-led Czechoslovakia with Scotland under Margaret Thatcher, which is a very strong analogy that describes the hatred to the Thatcherite period. He praises the role of the new parliament that has moved decisions from London to Scotland. Finally, he dreams about an independent Scotland when he states that "we're a few thoughts away from making my dream of being Scottish a living reality".

By the end of 2002, the crisis surrounding Iraq was severely in focus. Especially the SNP used a lot of energy on the case as it outlined the problems with Scotland being a part of United Kingdom, according to SNP. Opinion polls suggested that Scots were in general against military intervention, but the Scottish parliament had no influence over foreign policy, which became – and still are – a key SNP argument for Scottish independence. At a rally in early 2003, party leader John Swinney voiced his resistance towards the invasion.

"The people of Scotland have not been moved. We - and millions across the globe - are saying to George Bush and Tony Blair: Not in our name." (SNP, 2003)

These words pretty much speaks for themselves. John Swinney gives the impression, that Scotland is forced into a war by its British rulers, even though, in fact, at motion was passed in the Scottish Parliament by Scottish Labour and the Scottish Conservatives, which both supported the military invasion against Iraq (BBC, 2003b). It did not help SNP, as the Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition was reelected in 2003.

Alex Salmond returned as SNP leader and soon he became aware, that if SNP was to be successful in Scotland, they had to concentrate on more than independence. He focused on reshaping the SNP profile on education, health and social issues, still with a leading contrast to United Kingdom. In 2007, SNP had a lead in the polls over Labour, but even though the SNP modified their expression, the main goal was still independence. As it said in the 2007 election manifesto:

"Scotland can be more successful. Looking around at home and at our near neighbours abroad, more and more Scots believe this too. Independence is the natural state for nations like our own." (SNP Manifesto, 2007: pp. 7)

This soon became the leading discourse by the SNP, understood that membership of the United Kingdom was more to hinder for Scotland than beneficial. Furthermore, he continues to talk about Scotland as a country in which independence is a "natural state". This tactic, combined with fatigue in the leading majority, led SNP to a slight election victory in 2007.

6.6.3 A conservative walk in darkness

The Scottish Conservatives knew right from the beginning that elections in Scotland would be a tough game. Only two years after they have been completely wiped out in Scotland, they had to face the Scottish voters again. The outcome was predictable and the Conservatives ended as the third party behind Labour and SNP.

Just before the opening of the parliament's first session, the leader of the Scottish Conservatives David McLetchie voiced his support for the new parliament. Now it existed, it had to be recognized.

"Many of the people gathered here thought that they would never see this day. And let's be honest, some of us hoped that we would never see this day... The Scottish Parliament is a reality, a permanent institution which will govern and affect the lives of the people of Scotland for generations to come." (BBC, 1999)

The quote was once again a reminder that the Conservatives had been, and still was, on those opposing devolution and independence as well. Now the Conservatives had to get the best out of it under the circumstances. The first years of the parliament were tough. In the beginning, the parliament building in Holyrood turned out to be far more expensive than expected, as well as the running of the parliament showed that expenses would rise over the first years in operation. The Conservatives attempted to use this politically by suggesting a reduction of the elected representatives in order to limit the influence and significance of the parliament (The Telegraph, 2002b). This tactic however failed to make an impact.

In 2002, leader David McLetchie described his relation between seeing himself as a Scot in Britain.

"I have never seen this pride in being Scottish as diminishing my equally strong commitment to the Union. For me there is no contradiction between being Scottish and British, and different loyalties do not have to be divided loyalties." (Devine et. al, 2002: pp. 174-175)

In this interview McLetchie underscores that being a proud Scot does not contradict being a proud Brit, thereby focusing on a strong passion for the "The Union". This feeling was shared by his

successor as Conservative leader Annabel Goldie, who succeeded McLetchie as conservative parliamentary leader in 2005. She addressed discontent with Labour policies in her acceptance speech, saying that independence as suggested by SNP was not the solution.

"Was this really the Scotland envisaged by the architects of devolution the Scottish Constitutional Convention? I bet it wasn't. And this failure not only leaves the people of Scotland short changed, it plays into the hands of those who seek to beguile with their siren song of independence. My very clear impression from speaking to voters is they don't want independence, they just want devolution to work better." (Scottish Conservatives, 2005)

The natural concept of being in opposition is to make the governing parties and their policies look bad, and as independence had been heavily voiced by SNP, the Conservatives had to voice their opinion which is still staunch unionist in its core. Thereby they make it clear, that discontent with Labour and the Liberal Democrats does not automatically mean that Scottish National Party is the only lasting alternative to the reigning majority.

6.6.4 Scottish Labour in power

Scottish Labour had a bumpy start in Scotland, as they experienced three leaders in only two years. They found their stability with Jack McConnell as First Minister in November 2001. In an interview in 2002, he outlined his views on Scotland vs. United Kingdom.

"Being Scottish for me has nothing to do with not being English. Our new Parliament and system of government can settle that old tension, developing a new relationship with the United Kingdom and allowing us to concentrate on the actions of government rather than the location of the decision makers." (Devine et al, 2002: pp. 147-148)

There are many layers in McConnell's words. First of all he indicates that Scottishness does not contradict Englishness. Secondly, he reckons that there has been a tension between Scotland and United Kingdom, but the new parliamentary system in Scotland has cushioned the tensions. Thirdly, he makes a point, which became quite typical for Scottish Labour in the 1999-2007 period, namely that concentration should be on the actions of government and not the location of same. This is an answer to prolonged criticism from SNP, that the government in London had too much influence in the actions of the Scottish Executive. McConnell states, that SNP should rather focus on the contents of the policy rather than looking at how closely Labour in England and Scotland are related.

Jack McConnell, a close political ally of Tony Blair, publicly supported the Blair government's decision to join the coalition attacking Iraq in March 2003. This caused some controversy within Scotland. The Nationalists attacked the First Minister, who called the SNP "a permanent party of protest" (BBC, 2003). Tony Blair helped McConnell campaigning in the 2003 Scottish parliamentary election, and said the following in April 2003.

"There are still those who question whether there are still values around which Britain can unite. Those who would argue that the values of the people of Scotland are so different from the rest of Britain that they must choose between them as if national identity was some zero-sum game, when in truth, there is no need to choose at all" (Hassan, 2004: pp. 167-168)

Tony Blair's comments lays in line with those of Scottish Labour. There is no contradiction between Scotland and Britain as the Scottish National Party want to give an impression of. He emphasizes that there is no need to choose between British and Scottish. This is a counter-discourse to the SNP approach, which tend to focus on Scottish national identity. Instead, Labour wants to focus on other policy areas which they assume to profit from, results in government i.e.

The Labour attempt to focus on positive results became inadequate, as fatique began to hit the Labour, both in the UK and in Scotland. At the same time, SNP gained ground in the polls and the Labour-dominance were in danger. In the lead-up to the 2007 Scottish parliamentary election frustration hit the Labour camp. Jack McConnell put words to it shortly before the 2007 election.

"Last week Alex Salmond had the opportunity to debate with me and spell out his priorities. He was given the choice between education, the economy and independence. He chose independence." (Hassan et al, 2012: pp. 121)

In this piece Jack McConnell intends to give the impression that the SNP is just an independence party and they do not regard education and the economy as important to that of independence. In his words is furthermore a side-remark that Labour does not reckon the independence debate to be important at level with the other policy areas.

6.6.5 Conclusion

The Scottish Parliament changed politics in Scotland as it contributed with an institution to which the political debate could surround. Initially the votes elected Labour to govern Scotland, but the frame gave Scottish National Party a clear advantage, as they were given a solid parliamentary

platform to build on. The role of the SNP was changed from a fringe political party in Westminster to a top-2 leading party in Scottish politics.

The period consisted of several discourses regarding devolution and independence. The Conservatives sought to present the discourse, initially, that the Scottish Parliament lacked the support and trust of the Scots, thereby attempting to depict a situation in which the parliament was somewhat a failure. Sooner they battled against independence and did much possible to signal, that the conservatives was an alternative to the pro-independent SNP.

Labour avoided talking about independence, as they would rather discuss alternative policy areas such as education and health services. They somewhat ridiculed the SNP approach to independence by depicting SNP as a protest party with no further agenda than the independence cause itself. The Labour approach was again and again, that Scottishness and Britishness were no contradicting identity.

Scottish National Party felt at home within the new frame and made it clear that independence was the right step forward. They continuously attacked England and the rule of Margaret Thatcher, which had made the way for devolution. However, it did not help SNP towards governing, so with Alex Salmond back at the helm Scottish National Party changed tactics and started to focus on a broader political platform, still with independence in the core of the SNP manifesto.

6.7 Nationalists in power

Scottish National Party won the election in 2007 but failed to win a majority, and as a consequence thereof they could not manage to get sufficient support for a referendum in the 2007-2011 election term. The nationalists got re-elected in the 2011 election with an extended vote and now with a majority. Following the re-election, SNP initiated a referendum process, which will culminate in the 2014 referendum on independence.

6.7.1 Overview

Incoming SNP administration still had independence as their main cause, when they took office in May 2007. The hope for a referendum, however, was ditched as they failed to gather support for such in the Scottish parliament. After the 2011 election, the campaigning for independence intensified within the frame of the SNP campaign "Yes Scotland".

Scottish Labour lived through a chaotic period as they throughout the period saw three different leaders in charge of the party. Their attitude to independence was consistent throughout the period, as they were against, but their stance on whether there should be a referendum changed quite a few times. Labour sought to focus on social issues by stating, that independence is not the solution to all of Scotland's problems.

The Conservative Party was a staunch opposition voice throughout the 2007-2012 period, opposing both a referendum and independence.

6.7.2 Conservatives searching for unionist unity

The SNP administration was met with discontent from the Scottish Conservatives that failed to make any significant impact at the 2007 election. The Conservatives gathered with the rest of the opposition parties in 2009 to hinder the SNP minority government sending independence on vote. On the debate in the Scottish Parliament, Scottish Conservative leader Annabel Goldie stated in regard to the perspectives of the Scottish government holding a referendum on independence.

"This referendum bill is a complete waste of public resources on something that the people of Scotland clearly don't want. Alex Salmond should ditch this referendum bill, which the SNP say will cost £9m, and get on with the job he was elected to do." (BBC, 2009)

Annabel Goldie here states that a referendum would be a "complete waste of money", which were quite strong words, indicating the outcome would certainly be a no. She focuses on the price of the

referendum, and not particular on the principle of independence in this quote. The SNP minority government failed to get a majority behind the suggestion, and as a result it was ditched. The independence debate was somewhat cooled down for the rest of the term, as it was clear to everyone that the SNP could not keep their promise on holding in referendum in the 2007-2011 term.

In 2010, Labour lost the British general election and was succeeded by a coalition consisting on the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats. The government was headed by David Cameron, himself a staunch unionist voice. In the up heat to the British general election in 2010, he was quoted for the following in a major British newspaper.

"Scotland will never get independence and Alex Salmond is 'living in perpetual episode of Braveheart" (Daily Record, 2010)

The British conservative-liberal government sent the SNP' poll up, and in the 2011 election, SNP won an overall majority in the Scottish Parliament. The Scottish Conservatives changed their leader in a change that signaled not only change of attitude towards independence but also modernization in itself. Annabel Goldie was replaced with the young, homosexual Ruth Davidson. David Cameron met the SNP majority with something of a compromise, as he enacted another Scotland Bill (Scotland Act 2012) in the House of Commons sending more spending powers to the Scottish Parliament. The Prime Minister stated:

"I am proud that it is the UK Government which is enacting a new Scotland Bill which will transfer significant extra powers to Holyrood and place the responsibility for raising billions of pounds of public spending in the hands of the Scottish Parliament." (The Courier, 2011)

Clearly this was an attempt to meet some of the demands from the Scottish voters that had given the Scottish National Party a majority in the 2011 election. Back in Scotland Ruth Davidson's mission was quite simple: to avoid a yes in a coming referendum on independence. Ruth Davidson soon called to unity within the no camp, so she invited Labour and the Liberal Democrats to form a united front against SNP and their wishes of independence.

"When it comes to the very future of the country I love, I will not falter. As Conservatives, where we need to lead, we will lead. Where we need to join, we will join. And where we need to fight, we will not be found wanting." (Metro, 2012)

Ruth Davidson here plays on words, as she indiscreetly refers to Margaret Thatcher's famous words when entering Downing Street in 1979. The united front emerged into the cross-party "Better Together" campaign which intend for fight for a staunch no in the 2014 referendum. However, the "Better Together" campaign got a quite slow start in comparison to that in the yes camp (ScotsPolitics, 2012).

6.7.3 Labour fighting independence

Upon the election defeat in 2007, Scottish Labour elected Wendy Alexander as their new political leader after former First Minister Jack McConnell. Wendy Alexander denied that SNP had won the election on behalf of support for independence. It was rather the positive tone in debate, she argued in her first statement as leader of Scottish Labour.

"The SNP didn't just win with slick presentational tricks. Nor did they win thanks to their manifesto. They won because they seized Labour's agenda of hope an aspiration. Well I'm here to tell you that we're going to seize it back" (Hassan et al, 2012: pp. 128)

Initially Labour was against an independence referendum, but suddenly Wendy Alexander presented a u-turn on the matter, when she got caught saying "bring it on" on national television (Hassan et al, 2012: pp. 133). The London government, now leaded by Labour Scots Gordon Brown and Alistair Darling, however rejected the idea, and shortly afterwards Wendy Alexander had to resign her post due to a foreign donation in her 2007 election campaign (Hassan et al, 2012: pp. 134-135). Her successor became Iain Gray, who was characterized in anonymity by his Labour colleagues as "boring" and "London's man" (Hassan et al, 2012: pp. 136).

Scottish Labour's opinion on independence was reversed, which came to focus when the SNP minority government attempted to hold a referendum within the 2007-2011term. Iain Gray opposed the idea of a referendum, as the looming financial crisis should give the Scottish government other priorities such as keeping and creating jobs.

"We should not be distracting ourselves with a referendum, with a question which we don't even know what it is, with options we don't even know what they are. It could cost anything up to £12m - that's public resources which could be put to far better use protecting and creating jobs here in Scotland and I think that's what Scots want us to be doing." (BBC, 2009)

Iain Gray insisted that there were much more interesting and important matters than independence, which is a quite pragmatic rejection of the government appeal. But as Labour had a different opinion on the question earlier, it was probably a wise way of rejecting the referendum. The election defeat in the British general election 2010 was contradicting what was happening in Scotland. In one opinion poll Labour neared 50% of the votes in Scotland, way ahead of SNP's 33% (Hassan et al, 2012: pp. 143). But all that changed. Labour focused primarily on social issues, thereby being an alternative to the government in London, while they completely ignored the Scottish SNP and the Scottish government (ibid.). That was an epic failure, which saw Labour reduced to a little over 30% of the vote, while SNP went up and got an overall majority.

Gray resigned as leader and was replaced by his deputy Johann Lamont. She soon indicated that she felt that the independence debate was wrong, and that SNP should rather focus on healthcare and education. However, she welcomed the referendum, as the government had every right to ask the question on behalf of the election result. She said:

"Some people define the only change as constitutional change. That's the first challenge. I've always said that Alex Salmond has the mandate to ask the question. But there is a presumption made among nationalists that constitutional change is the answer to all the questions that are problematic in our communities, and my job is to talk about what is happening in the real world" (The Guardian, 2012)

There are some discourses relevant in the statement from Johann Lamont. First of all, she attempts to remove the SNP argument that independence would necessarily mean all kind of change and help Scotland in a completely different positive direction. On the other hand she acknowledges that SNP has the right to ask the question in a referendum, which is a discreet way to accept the premise of the referendum that had earlier been rejected by Scottish Labour.

Labour joined the cross-party campaign for a no called "Better Together", headed by former British Chancellor Alistair Darling. Labour as well formed its own no campaign named "United with Labour", which intends to cooperate with the "Better Together" campaign.

6.7.4 SNP seizes the moment

Scottish National Party took the reign in May 2007 after the election win. However, the party did not have a majority in the Scottish Parliament, so they had to fight from case to case regarding what could be legislated through parliament. One of the first actions of the new leadership was to rebrand

the leadership as the "Scottish Government", which was formerly known as the Scottish Executive (BBC, 2007). This was once again a signal from the SNP that they saw Scotland as an independent country ruled by London.

Throughout the summer of 2007, Alex Salmond's political honeymoon was disturbed by what is later referred to as the "Lockerbie Deal". The British government under Tony Blair had attempted to include Lockerbie Bomber Abdelbaset al-Megrahi in a prisoner trade deal, well-knowing that the British government did not have the juridical authority to do so (as al-Megrahi was imprisoned in Scotland, thus under Scottish jurisdiction) (BBC, 2007b). Alex Salmond made an "emergency statement" in parliament demanding clarification from the British government, and got broad support from the other parliamentary parties (ibid.). The case became an example of British power-arrogance, which Salmond since then has used frequently in favor of Scottish independence (Daily Mail, 2010)

In 2009, SNP attempted to get through with an independence referendum within the first term in office, but it failed to gain sufficient support in parliament. The First Minister stated in parliament as argument for the referendum:

"It's time for the people to have their say on Scotland's future. The debate in Scottish politics is no longer between change or no change - it's about the kind of change we seek and the right of the people to choose their future in a free and fair referendum." (BBC, 2009)

Alex Salmond here connects change in a positive direction together with the perspective of independence, which is an often used discourse from SNP during this period. Later, Salmond called a referendum of and decided to use in for the next election in 2011. Polls at the moment showed that 80% of the population wanted a referendum, so it was perceived as a winning cause for the Scottish National Party (The Guardian, 2010).

In their 2011 election manifesto, SNP once again addressed the perspective of independence. They wrote:

"It is with independence – the natural state for nations like Scotland – that we will have the ability to determine our own destiny and build the best future for our country. We, the people of Scotland, have the greatest stake in our future. That is why we are best placed to govern ourselves" (SNP Manifesto, 2011)

The Scottish National Party again talks about Scotland as a nation of which "national state" is independence. SNP wants to play on the national confidence of Scotland, which could motivate voters to support independence in a referendum. Soon after the stunning election victory SNP launched the "Yes Scotland" campaign with an ambition to collect one million signatures for a yes in the referendum (Yes Scotland, 2012).

The campaign sought to find issues that could underscore the need of Scottish independence. For instance SNP insisted that nuclear weapons kept in Scotland, would be removed in the case of independence (The Guardian, 2012c). The party then decided to reverse traditional SNP policy to leave NATO if Scotland became independent, thus making it clear that they were willing to make sacrifices to obtain independence (ibid.).

In his second term as First Minister, Alex Salmond was eager to demonstrate that Scotland and the UK government were going in different directions. While the UK government was cutting expenses, Scotland was investing in the future through free education. He attempted to depict UK and Scotland with two completely different visions. This point was repeated several times throughout the First Ministers New Year Message made public on Youtube.

"One of this Scottish Government's first decisions back in 2007 was to restore Scotland's centuries old tradition of free education. The results of this are now plain to see. This year people accepted into Scottish universities have increased…In contrast the prospect of sky-high tuition fees in England had seen acceptances for universities there sinking like a stone…This contrast between what is happening here and what is not happening there has only been made possible because it is the Scottish Parliament which runs Scottish education"

The quote is followed by a "what if" statement suggesting that it would be in Scotland's best interest if the same concept were repeated on other policy areas. This seems to be the leading discourse of SNP in the coming referendum.

6.7.5 Conclusion

The period could be described as a period in which SNP with intensified eager fought for a referendum on independence, while the opposition parties did everything in their might to avoid the referendum. However, when the referendum was to become reality especially Labour welcomed it with open arms.

Scottish National Party had a vision for changing Scotland in a completely different direction than the case was in the UK, led by the conservative David Cameron. This difference was used by First Minister Alex Salmond to signal that Scotland and England was unlike each other, and therefore independence was the logical consequence as answer to the situation. Examples like the Lockerbie Deal and the fact that UK hid nuclear weapons on Scottish soil, became additional arguments for independence from the SNP.

Scottish Labour emphasized that there were more important issues than independence and they tried to depict SNP as a party, which only focused only on battling London and fighting for independence. Themselves they were against independence, and then initiated the fight to defeat the referendum within the cross-party campaign "Better Together", which however has a slow start. Furthermore, the launched their own no campaign called "United with Labour", which was not contradicting the "Better Together" campaign in attitude.

The Conservative Party won the British general election in 2010, which gave them a voice on two levels in the fight against Scottish independence. Initially they ridiculed the SNP and the thought of independence, but as reality evolved, David Cameron's government changed attitude and were ready to give the Scottish Parliament more spending powers in order to avoid a strong desire for independence. In Scotland, a new-look Conservative Party under the leadership of Ruth Davidson attempted to unite the pro-union parties for a no in the referendum within the frame of the "Better Together" campaign.

7.0 Analysis Conclusion

In this chapter, a conclusion on the analysis chapter will emerge. Through the years the parties have had different opinions and discourses in regard to devolution and independence in Scotland, and this chapter will attempt to conclude on behalf of the research conducted.

The chapter will sum up what has been analyzed, and will be followed by the grand conclusion in which the problem formulation will be answered.

7.1 The Conservative flip-flop

The Conservative Party, which name is officially The Conservative and Unionist Party, would presumably be considered the most anti-devolutionist and anti-independence party of the three concerned in the thesis. However, as the analysis shows, The Conservative Party had hold different opinions and played on different discourses throughout the period.

Under the leadership of Edward Heath, the attitude towards the desire for Scottish devolution was quite complaisant, as the Conservatives had committed themselves to support some kind of devolution should Scotland wish so. This changed drastically with the arrival of Margaret Thatcher. In the beginning, Thatcher camouflaged the resistance towards devolution in principle, as criticism towards the kind of devolution that the Callaghan Labour government had suggested for the 1979 referendum. When Margaret Thatcher took over as Prime Minister, the resistance became a principle cause, while Thatcherite policies were implemented in Scotland to much Scottish discontent. Under the reign of John Major, the Tories attempted to win support back in Scotland, without directly supporting devolution.

In 1997, The Conservative Party kept a low-key performance through the second devolution referendum, in which the party supported a no shortly after being eradicated in Scotland at the 1997 general election. The party's Scottish branch supported the Scottish Parliament, though criticizing its spending and criticizing the parliament for lacking faith in the population. The composed the sole unionist opposition to the Labour-Liberal Democrat leadership, and in the process they used a lot of energy signaling that SNP was not the only opposition to Labour-dominated rule in Scotland.

The conservative approach changed after SNP took office in 2007, and especially after the election win by David Cameron in 2010. In the beginning, the Tory approach was a ridicule attitude towards First Minister Alex Salmond and his wishes for independence, but as a SNP majority became reality

in Scotland, the Conservative led government changed its attitude with the Scotland Act 2012, which effectively increasing the grade of devolution.

In the referendum 2014, the Conservatives are fighting for a no within the frame of the "Better Together" campaign.

7.2 Labour: Yes to devolution – No to independence

Labour initially were against devolution, but the SNP advancement in the 1974 elections changed that, as Labour needed SNP votes to rule within the 1974-1979 election term. As a consequence Labour changed their stance on the issue, and became the designer of the 1979 referendum. In the referendum campaign, they fought for devolution – and against the SNP. This fight was one of the reasons that the referendum failed.

After Margaret Thatcher took office, Labour found themselves on the opposition benches, and Scottish Labour MP's started to argue, that the Thatcherite policies hit especially Scotland hard (and used a Scotland vs. Thatcher attitude). After a third defeat to Thatcher's conservatives in 1987, Labour established the Scottish Constitutional Convention, which sought to prepare plans for devolution in Scotland next time a Labour government came to power. The plans finally emerged in a second devolution referendum in 1997, and with a positive vibe Labour secured a determinant yes.

Scottish Labour easily won the two first Scottish elections, and attempted to cool down the nationalist claim for independence. They attempted to ridicule the SNP attitude, while signaling that Scottish and British were not contradicting identities. They indicated that politics in Scotland should rather be focused in "important matters" such as education and health services, and not the independence debate. First Minister Jack McConnell, a staunch New Labour-man, lost the Scottish election in 2007 just as the New Labour decline in Britain had begun.

The new Scottish SNP government wanted to hold a referendum, and Labour had a hard time finding their feet. Labour had some success in gathering the opposition parties in Scotland to reject a referendum in the 2007-2011 election term, insisting the government should rather focus on social issues and creating jobs in the cold economic climate. After the 2011 election, which saw SNP gaining a majority while the Labour vote collapsed, Labour chose a more humble attitude. They agreed SNP had the right to hold a referendum, but still insisted that focus should rather be on the more "important issues".

In the 2014 referendum, Labour is fighting for a no through the "Better Together" campaign. In addition, Labour has launched its own no campaign called "United with Labour".

7.3 SNP won devolution and Scotland

Scottish National Party campaigned in the early 1970's on oil in the North Sea. They claimed "It's Scotland's Oil" and got some support over that campaign, which helped them to a national breakthrough in the two elections in 1974. Both elections ended with SNP being the kingmaker party in a de-facto hung parliament in which Harold Wilson's Labour needed nationalist votes to govern. SNP demanded a devolution referendum and in return they would support Labour policies in other areas.

The 1979 referendum turned out to be a bitter affair, as SNP and Labour used a lot of energy attacking each other. SNP used a very patriotic attitude, effectively depicting England as Scotland's oppressor. The referendum ended in failure and depression hit the nationalists in the years following. During the conservative reign, a group of left-wingers established the Group 79 fraction. The group used revolutionary rhetoric and argued for civil obedience towards the British government. The group was crushed in 1982, which came as a pyrrhic victory for the then-leadership of the party, as membership numbers started to fall dramatically in the years to follow.

Alex Salmond's leadership marked a modernization change within the party, as a more gradualist line characterized by pragmatism was introduced. This was due to Labour gaining all support in spite of the unpopular conservative government. In the 1997 referendum Scottish National Party focused on positive campaigning and avoided clashing with Labour as in the 1979 campaign. Initially, there was doubt within the party regarding their stance, as a minority fundamentalist wing would not recognize devolution as an opportunity – they wanted nothing more than independence. But in the end the party gathered together and fought for a yes in the referendum.

SNP stated that devolution was just a job half-done, so before the 1999 Scottish parliamentary election they launched two different manifestos: one for a devolved Scotland and one for an independent Scotland. In the aftermath of the 1999 election defeat, John Swinney took over as leader for SNP. He introduced a sharp nationalist attitude in which he compared the situation in Scotland under Thatcher with Czechoslovakia under communist rule. The attitude resulted in yet an election defeat in the 2003 election. Salmond returned as leader and decided to use the Iraq war against Labour, and as an argument for independence.

Salmond took the First Minister's office after the 2007 election, and started by renaming the Scottish Executive the Scottish Government, signaling that Scotland was a nation without independence. Attempts to enact a referendum became possible during the government's second term, and every possible argument was used to legitimate independence, while the status quo was described as a hinder to further Scottish development.

Scottish National Party leads the "Yes Scotland" campaign, which is favoring Scottish independence in the 2014 referendum.

8.0 Conclusion

In the problem chapter I set up three research questions, which I intend to answer in the conclusion, in order to answer the problem formulation.

The first question regarded the main arguments for and against devolution/independence. The main argument against devolution was unionism itself, mainly delivered by the Conservative Party some times throughout the period. This was an argument guided by motion, which insisted on seeing United Kingdom as, literally, united. This argument was used against independence as well. Another argument against independence is a warning against believing in independence as the solution to other problems, hence arguing that some problems, for instance social ones, will indeed not be solved. This is closely connected to the argument, that Scotland will not be able to survive economical if independence is achieved, which is related to the fact, that the pro-independent voices automatically assumes that large amounts of North Sea Oil will end up being Scottish.

The pro-arguments are many and various. The main argument used by the Scottish National Party is, simply, that Scotland is a nation, and as such it deserves its independence. This argument is primarily emotional based. Other arguments, however, are based on practical experiences. One thing is, for instance, that Scotland does not have the ability to operate a foreign policy. This means that Scotland can always be dragged into wars, which it do not necessarily support, as well as there is a fear of United Kingdom acting over the head of Scotland. The Iraq War and the Lockerbie Deal are examples thereof. Another argument is ideological differences between Scotland and England. Scotland is arguably more leftist-minded than England, which may cause disharmony when two ideological different countries within a union walk in a completely different political direction. This argument is widely used by the SNP government.

The second question raised was how the devolution/independence discourse from the proponents has changed over time. In the case of Labour, they started out as opponents, but were forced by realities to change their opinion. Over the years of Margaret Thatcher, they became hardline supporters of the principle of devolution, even with some Labour MP's using quasi-nationalist argumentation from time to time. This could probably even be seen through the legislation, as the first referendum in 1979 consisted of a 40% threshold needed for devolution to pass. This threshold was eliminated in the 1997, which could be seen as an increased will to implement devolution.

The nationalists fought for independence all through the period, so a change can be a bit harder to detect as discourse on a subject with no evolution tend to be the same. However, it is noticeable that parts of the SNP fundamentalist wing, namely Jim Sillars, supported devolution in 1979 at the referendum, while the same Sillars endorsed abstention in the 1997 referendum. Some would argue, that this could indicate that the fundamentalist wing is only fundamentalist, when it is in a position to make a statement – thereby meaning, that a yes vote was almost certain in the 1997 referendum contrary to 1979, where the fundamentalists supported a yes. A rapid change in attitude could be seen under the reign of Alex Salmond, who himself is a gradualist. Under his leadership SNP tend to be more moderate and positive, in comparison to the time before his reign as well as the time under John Swinney 1999-2003. The tendency is clearly that SNP is taken more seriously when a more moderate version of nationalism is presented to the voters.

The third question raised was whether the evolution in the discourse on devolution and independence is representative for the Scottish population as a whole. In regard to that question, the short version is no. There seem to be no significant connection between the evolution towards either devolution or independence and the support for independence within the population.

The first point which should be made is that there has never, throughout the period, been a majority in favor of independence.

The second thing I will point to is that there seem to be a clear connection between UK being led by a Conservative government, and a rise in the support for independence. Apparently a conservative led government is causing the national self-awareness to increase in Scotland, probably due to the fact that Scotland has relative few conservatives elected in Scotland (at the moment there is only one conservative MP elected in Scotland). This could explain Alex Salmond focusing a lot on ideological differences between England and Scotland.

The third point to make is that actually, during the SNP reign in Scotland, the average support for independence has actually dropped compared to the Labour period 1999-2007. This could indicate a general satisfaction with how things are going in Scotland at the moment, why only few feel it is necessary to become an independent nation. Another reason could be that the more independence is discussed, the less appealing it tends to be among Scots.

8.1 Can theory explain the development in Scotland?

The problem formulation issued a question on why independence is so predominant on the national agenda in Scotland and why not before. In order to answer this, I will attempt to apply the empirical findings researched in my analysis chapter on Historical Institutionalism and the Garbage Can Model.

The main concept of Historical Institutionalism is path dependency. Evidently the debate on Scottish independence was not present, apart from within the SNP attitude, before devolution became reality with the Scottish Parliament in 1999. This proves that devolution had to take place before the independence debate could emerge, and even so it took further ten years before it could reach the national politics surface with the SNP majority reached in the 2011 election. In the light of this, the existence of a Parliament, the birth of a Scottish legislative body, became a "defining moment" in the history of Scotland, and it completely changed the political debate within Scotland as it gave the SNP a political platform to gain influence. So the reason why the debate on independence did not emerge before now can be explained as it would make no sense to discuss Scottish independence on a mainstream level, at a time where Scotland did not even have devolution (which was considered the logical step forward, should anything happen). Furthermore, a pro-independence party had to have the legislative initiative in Scotland in order to put the debate high on the agenda, which did not happen before 2007.

The next question is: Why right now? Surely there is an evolutionary path from 1972 to 2012, starting with devolution being controversial, then becoming mainsteam, leading to independence becoming controversial, ending as a somewhat mainstream position. This is solely thanks to the SNP, which motivated the entire motion, though helped by Labour throughout the conservative era. However, it does not answer the question why it is happening right now, and that is because there is no specific reason so. Obviously the Scottish Parliament and the SNP government is the direct reason, but the deeper reasons appear to be somewhat blurred. In other words a long range of coincidences created the path Scotland took throughout these 40 years. Had a little different happening, the history could have been changed decisively. I will give a few examples of these small corrections in history that could have sent Scotland towards a completely different path.

For instance, let us assume that Labour had won the October 1974 election with a larger majority than the majority of two they got. Then SNP would have been unable to force the 1979 referendum to take place. Let us furthermore assume that Margaret Thatcher had been willing to loosen her grip

on Scotland, why a staunch desire for devolution in mainstream Scotland might not have happened. Or let us assume that David Cameron's Conservative Party had won a majority in the 2010 election. In that case there would have been no coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, whose vote would probably not have collapsed in the 2011 Scottish election in which they lost 12 members of parliament, eventually giving the SNP a majority. These three examples show how big an impact coincidences play in relation to the development in Scotland, why Historical Institutionalism to some extent delivers an explanation. Still, the problem with the theory is that it does not set up a guideline, which makes it possible to predict anything from what is known from the Scotland case – every case is still unique.

What is further interesting in relation to why it is happening right now is related to the question why SNP got the overall majority after the 2011 election. The reason for that could arguably be connected to the other parties and their whereabouts over time. The Conservative Party had lost Scotland for good as a consequence of Thatcherite policies, and the Liberal Democrats had entered a government with the Conservatives in 2010 (which they were punished for). Labour had had the chance, but was tormented by fatigue in Scotland and by 13 years in the UK government. All these aspects led to a SNP majority in parliament despite the support for independence were relative low at the time of the election.

In regard to the Garbage Can Model, it can as well be applied to some of the events mentioned in the analysis. Alex Salmond, for instance, uses opportunities politically and sometimes in a relative random way to make his case clear. The Lockerbie Deal is a good example as well as the situation with nuclear weapons on Scottish soil, which will be removed in the case of Scotland gaining independence. These are examples that the composition of a case makes up the opinions of the actors. However, I feel the Garbage Can Model is quite vague in its formulation, and what it says is to some extent common logic, at least in the case of political analysis such as this thesis.

To sum up it could be said, that the debate did not reach the mainstream agenda in Scotland before a Scottish Parliament was in place, and there was a pro-independence party with the political initiative in Scotland. This was at the same time the direct reasons to why it is happening right now. On a deeper level, however, there are no specific reasons for it to happen right now, as coincidences throughout the history have shown that only little should have been different to change the whole picture. If the picture had been changed just a little, Scottish independence would never have been a mainstream issue.

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