

2013

Chinese and Western Interpretations of “Peaceful Development”: A Clash of Rules and Rule



By JING Jing

Master Thesis

China and International Relations

Aalborg University, Denmark

Word Count: 103,668 keystrokes

Supervised by:

Li Qing & Peer Møller Christensen

Abstract

The concept of “Peaceful Development”, of which the original term is “Peaceful Rise”, was constructed by the Chinese government and official think tanks in 2003 in response to the “China Threat” discourse made by the West (refers to primarily the U.S. and other G7 group members in this thesis). Since then the “Peaceful Development” discourse has been taken as the approach of China’s foreign policies and Chinese officials have confirmed that it will continue to define China’s foreign policy approach during the Xi-Li leadership.

However, neither “Peaceful Rise” nor “Peaceful Development” discourse is well-received in the West. Most western remarks on the “Rise of China” remain pessimistic or skeptical, regarding the rising China as a potential threat to the rest of the world peace. “China Threat” discourse has also taken various forms in the international “discourse battlefield”, one of which is “China’s Responsibilities” discourse initiated by the U.S. which sounds more “lofty” and “just”.

This thesis takes the Rule-oriented Constructivist approach initiated by Nicholas Greenwood Onuf in analyzing the lack of recognition of China’s “Peaceful Development” discourse in the West. Different from traditional realist or liberalist approaches, Rule-oriented Constructivism adopts a duality between “mind” and “matter”. And its recognition of the ontological status of language, or discourse distinguishes it from the Soft Constructivism initiated by Alexandra Wendt. Rule-oriented Constructivism, as the original form of Constructivism, has not been as popular as the Wendtian Constructivism in the studies on China’s foreign policies. So far only one paper, a MA thesis written by Chinese scholar Feng Xiao, who was a student supervised by Onuf, can be found which systematically introduces the Rule-oriented constructivist approach and discusses its applicability in Chinese context. Besides that one, hardly any attempts can be found applying Rule-oriented

Constructivism in Chinese foreign policy analysis.

This thesis, therefore, aims at offering another attempt to apply Rule-oriented Constructivism in analyzing Chinese foreign policy. In the theory part, the meaning and correspondence between some key concepts, namely speech acts, rules, rule in Rule-oriented Constructivism will be introduced. And a synoptic table presenting the correspondence between discourse, rules and ruling patterns provides the essential theoretical basis of the analysis.

The essential part of analysis, following an overview of Chinese foreign policy approach the construction process of “Peaceful Development” discourse, is divided into two parts: the Western Discourse, Rules and Rules and a Chinese Discourse, Rules and Rules.

The discourse clashed is firstly discussed on a general linguistic level in order to find how the difference between language formation and logic influence the perception of “Peaceful Development” in Chinese and in the West. Then the discourses are studied in a political speech acts sense. The logic is to identify and classify the discourse, rules, and ruling patterns related to “Peaceful Development” and find out whether there are clashes of rules in the conveying of “Peaceful Development”.

It is found that while the general western discourse and the rules are commissive within the ruling pattern of heronomy, the West’s discourse towards the rise of China, as exemplified by “China Threat” and “China’s Responsibilities”, switches to assertive and directive pattern respectively. The assertive pattern of “China Threat” discourse, as the West’s Stress Reaction towards the Rise of China, generates the rule of “hegemony”, making the dialogue between the West and China asymmetrical. “China Responsibilities” discourse is a “Directive Pitfall”, putting China into a dilemma. These clashes of rules and rule impair the recognition of “Peaceful Development”. The mobility of the categories of discourse, rules and rule and the condition of “pattern

switches” is also a key finding of this thesis which specifies the Rule-oriented Constructivist theory to some extent.

For the Chinese discourse, it is found that there is a contradiction between China’s domestic discourse style and its discourse type in foreign diplomacy. China’s domestic political discourse is predominantly assertive. But “Peaceful Development” discourse is largely commissive. This incoherence in discourse patterns lead to the low receptiveness of Peaceful Development in the West. Besides, “Peaceful Development” itself is a “Commissive Trap”, by making the promises China is subject to the judgments of the West. In addition, “Peaceful Development” discourse contains several contradictions within and this also leads to the fragmentation of this discourse framework.

Key words: Rule-oriented Constructivism, “Peaceful Development”, discourse, rules, ruling patterns

Contents

| | |
|---|-----------|
| 1. INTRODUCTION..... | 1 |
| 1.1 PRESENTATION OF TOPIC..... | 1 |
| 1.2 PROBLEM FORMULATION..... | 3 |
| 2. THEORY | 4 |
| 2.1 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM | 5 |
| 2.1.1 Ontological and Epistemological Stands | 5 |
| 2.1.2 Intellectual Lineage | 6 |
| 2.1.3 Literatures and Classifications..... | 8 |
| 2.2 NICHOLAS ONUF AND RULE-ORIENTED CONSTRUCTIVISM..... | 9 |
| 2.2.1 Agents..... | 9 |
| 2.2.2 Speech Acts..... | 10 |
| 2.2.2.1 The Ontological Status of Language | 10 |
| 2.2.2.2 Language as Actions | 11 |
| 2.2.3 Rules and Rule..... | 12 |
| 2.2.4 Culture/Gognition | 14 |
| 2.3 HYPOTHESES & A SYNOPTIC TABLE..... | 15 |
| 3. METHODOLOGY | 17 |
| 3.1 ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS..... | 17 |
| 3.2 THE CHOICE OF THEORY | 18 |
| 3.3 COMMENTARY ON DATA | 19 |
| 3.4 ANALYTICAL STRUCTURE & THEORY APPLICATION | 20 |
| 4. ANALYSIS | 21 |
| 4.1 AN OVERVIEW OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY..... | 21 |
| 4.1.1 Historical Review | 21 |
| 4.1.2 General Approach | 23 |

| | | |
|---------|---|-----------|
| 4.1.3 | Agents..... | 25 |
| 4.2 | THE CONSTRUCTION OF “PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT” DISCOURSE..... | 26 |
| 4.2.1 | “China Threat” Discourse Constructed by the West | 26 |
| 4.2.2 | “Peaceful Development” and the Western Responses..... | 29 |
| 4.3 | WESTERN DISCOURSE & CORRELATED RULES AND RULE | 32 |
| 4.3.1 | Indo-European Languages and Logics | 33 |
| 4.3.2 | Western-led International Rules and Rule | 33 |
| 4.3.3 | Western Discourse and Rules toward the Rise of China | 35 |
| 4.3.3.1 | “China Threat”: An Assertive Stress Reaction..... | 35 |
| 4.3.3.2 | “China’s Responsibilities”: A “Directive Pitfall” | 39 |
| 4.3.4 | Clashes Identified | 42 |
| 4.4 | CHINESE DISCOURSE & CORRELATED RULES AND RULE..... | 44 |
| 4.4.1 | Chinese Language and Logics | 44 |
| 4.4.2 | Chinese Political Discourse | 46 |
| 4.4.3 | “Peaceful Development” in a “Commissive Trap” | 49 |
| 4.4.4 | Contradictions within “Peaceful Development” Discourse..... | 52 |
| 4.4.4.1 | Aggressiveness Vs. Passiveness..... | 52 |
| 4.4.4.2 | Pragmatism vs. Idealism | 53 |
| 4.4.4.3 | Identity Dilemma | 54 |
| 4.4.5 | Clashes Identified | 55 |
| 5. | CONCLUSION..... | 58 |
| 6. | REFERENCE..... | 61 |
| 7. | APPENDIX..... | 68 |

1. Introduction

"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, (...) we had everything before us, we had nothing before us."

—Charles Dickens (Dickens, 2008, p. 1)

1.1 Presentation of Topic

It seems that what Dickens' descriptions of the year 1775 in *The Tale of Two Cities* fit the condition of present China perfectly. On one hand, this second largest economy in the world with the average GDP growth rate in the recent decade around 8%¹ (tradingeconomics, 2013) in the past decade. Currently China's GDP growth slowed a bit. In the first quarter of 2013 The GDP growth rate was 7.7%. (Xinhua News, 2013) But Chinese official attitude is that a growth rate between a 7% and 8% is actually healthy². It seems that while the rest of the world is suffering from financial crisis, China's economic growth is stepping into a healthy yet still rapid growing track. China is increasingly integrated in the global market and involved in global governance. It seems that the country is indeed "rising".

On the other hand, every figure of growth, when divided by 13 million, is hardly noticeable. A large proportion of its population still suffers from poverty. According to the announcement made by the State Council of PRC earlier this year, in 2012 altogether 98.99 million rural people, about one tenth of the country's total population, fell below the Chinese poverty line³. (The Economist, 2013) Besides the dashing economic growth, what the industrialization has brought to this country is severe environmental pollution and its increasing craving for energy.

¹ see Table A in Appendix, (tradingeconomics, 2013)

² It is believed that a GDP growth rate between 7% and 8% percent is the best for China's development according to the comment made by Zhang Ping, minister of the National Development and Reform Commission, on China's officially proposed economy growth rate. (Jia, 2013)

³ 6.3 yuan a day, equals to 1 US dollar

This awaking, hungry “dragon”, though stumbling, worries the rest of the world. Will China be able to emerge in a peaceful way? Or it will repeat the history of the rising path of major powers like Germany and Japan, which have led to human tragedies of world wars? There are divergent opinions on this. The optimists’ holds that the rise of China will bring more opportunities and assist the development of international institutions. And the Chinese government seems to be genuine saying that they would like to have a peaceful international environment for China’s growth.

The skeptics, however, hold that the rise of big powers is never peaceful and China, as a socialist country with a partially free market, can’t be exceptional. For a time a lot of ideas and “theories” arose, pointing at China’s “potential threats” to the world. Some of these remarks went extreme. And it is not surprising to find that a lot of these pessimistic views are from the US. As pointed out by former U.S. Deputy Secretary, “many Americans worry that the Chinese dragon will prove to be a fire-breather. There is a cauldron of anxiety about China.” (Zoellick, 2005) In China, scholars have summarized this kind of remarks and termed them as “China Threat” discourse.

Against this backdrop, the Chinese government raised the concept of “Peaceful Rise”, a term which was later altered into “Peaceful Development” to avoid unfavorable associations brought by the word “rise”.⁴ The main idea is to promise that China will pursue a peaceful path of development without starting wars or seeking hegemony. (State Council Information Office , 2011) Till now “Peaceful Development” has been the approach taken in China’s foreign policy for almost a decade.

However, neither “Peaceful Rise” nor “Peaceful Development” managed to reduce the skepticism of some countries about China’s development. Though “China Threat” discourse faded, other forms of China-phobia were still rampant. And while the Chinese authoritative media claim that “China's peaceful rise is beyond doubt”

⁴ this will be further elaborated upon in Analysis

(Xiwen, 2011), voices from the outside are more on the side of “China’s Peaceful Rise less likely”. (Lee, 2013)

No matter whether the rest of the world is listening to China’s pledges, it is likely that “Peaceful Development” will continue to define China’s international strategy in the coming years under the new generation of leadership with Xi Jinping as the General Secretary of CPC (Communist Party of China) and Li Keqiang as the premier. (Xinhua News , 2013). In March, 2013, President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang confirmed on different occasions that China will stick to the policy of “Peaceful Development”. (Xinhua News , 2013)

1.2 Problem Formulation

Since “Peaceful Development” discourse will continues to play a big role in China’s foreign policy, it can be interesting and worthwhile to explore the factors which impaired the recognition of the “Peaceful Development” discourse in the West. And this thesis, taking a Rule-oriented Constructivist perspective, is able to provide a brand new interpretation, one that different from traditional realist or liberalist views, of this problem. Based on these suppositions, the main problem of this thesis is designed as:

“From a rule-oriented constructivist’s perspective, why China’s “Peaceful Development” Discourse has not been well-received in the West?”

The presupposition this problems takes is that China’s “Peaceful Development” is not well-received in the West yet. And this will be further elaborated upon in the background presentation in Analysis.

It is necessary to define some concepts in this thesis. Firstly, “The West”, or “western countries” in this thesis is defined as the “major developed capitalist countries, especially G7 members with the US as the dominating country”. Among them the US

is the primary referred to in this thesis. But other countries in the G7 group are not excluded. Besides, this thesis does not distinguish “discourse” from “speech acts” since Rule-oriented constructivism takes discourse as speech acts. But the term “language” applied in the analysis refers to human languages in their original, linguistic-oriented sense.

Furthermore, two sub-questions are designed to lead the analysis in each section and ensure the analytical nature of this thesis. They are designed as:

1. “What are the rules and rule constructed in western discourse? How do they affect the West’s perception of “Peaceful Development”?”
2. “What are the rules and rule in Chinese discourse? How do they affect the “understandability” of “Peaceful Development”?”

Here “western discourse” and “Chinese discourse” include Chinese and western political discourse in general and their discourse related to China’s “Peaceful Development”. Correspondent to the primary problem and sub-questions, the essential analysis will also be divided into two parts, namely the western and Chinese discourse analysis.

2. Theory

This chapter introduces the origins, main concepts, hypothesis and arguments of Rule-oriented Constructivism initiated by Nicholas Onuf. The rule-oriented constructivism is taken as the main theoretical framework of the analysis. Related philosophical thoughts which may offer useful insights are also introduced since Rule-oriented Constructivism has its roots from a wide, cross-disciplinary source of theories and thoughts. But firstly the general approach of Social Constructivism will be discussed since constructivism has distinct ontological and epistemological stands to traditional IR theories. Pointing out the differences is helpful for understanding

and applying this approach in the analysis. And there will be a comparison of Onuf's and Wendt's versions of Constructivism since the Wendtian Constructivism is the most widely-accepted branch in Constructivism by the mainstream IR theorists. This also paves the way for the explanations on the choice of theory in Methodology.

2.1 Social Constructivism

Constructivism arose in the 1980s. Back then the world witnessed great changes: political divisions occurred and countries took diverse approaches to run politics, economy and society. While traditional International Relations (IR) theories seemed to be weak in explaining the problems caused by diverse ideologies and civilizations, Constructivism opened up a brand new horizon for the study of International Relations. (Kubalkova, et al., 1998, p. Preface x)

Nicholas Greenwood Onuf is the one who firstly introduced the term "constructivism" to IR studies. In his book *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (1989), he developed a constructivist framework based on wide theoretical sources, thus providing an alternative approach beyond the "third debate" in International Relations theories. (Kubalkova, et al., 1998, pp. Preface x-ix)

2.1.1 Ontological and Epistemological Stands

The ontological and epistemological stands of Constructivism deviate from traditional IR theories fundamentally. Both realism and liberalism, for example, take a "matter over mind" point of view and rationalism as a presupposition. Mainstream IR researchers see the world as "objectively given". Material conditions are what regulate the rationalism of states in the world of anarchy. (Sun Jisheng (孙吉胜), 2006, p. 61) It is the resource which determines structures and social outcomes. Human actions are caused by "*measurable structural variables*" and are "*involuntary and predictable*". (Kubalkova, et al., 1998, p. Preface xi)

However, it would be over-simplification to say that constructivism takes a “mind over matter” point of view. In fact there are many divisions and branches within constructivism and each has its own stands. Some branches even take opposing ontological stands to each other. But many constructivists take a dialectical view of the relations between facts and knowledge. They, in general, adopt a duality of mind and matter. They regard that human actions and social structures are “*inseparable, simultaneous*” and “*co-constituted*”. (Kubalkova, et al., 1998, p. Preface xi)


This duality between mind and matter is not an invention of Nicholas Onuf. Earlier philosophers have been arguing for a world which does not begin with materials long time ago. Among them are Nelson Goodman, Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant, Bas C. van Fraassen, Thomas S. Kuhn and many others. Among them the nominalist and post-structuralist are more on the radical side. But even they do not totally deny the existence of material world. And van Fraassen, for example, even tries to “save” the status of phenomena in his paper “To save the Phenomena” in which he recognized the limitation of observation. (Fraassen, 1984, p. 256).

2.1.2 Intellectual Lineage

The intellectual origins of Rule-oriented Constructivism can be traced back to multiple disciplines in which the main ones include sociology, language philosophy and international relations theories. (Qing Yaqing (秦亚青), 2006, pp. 1-23)

The following graph is adapted from a graph provided by Vendulka Kubalkova in her paper “The Twenty Years’ Catharsis: E.H. Carr and IR”. Only the part which might be related to this thesis is presented here. It shows the philosophical lineage of Constructivism in a chronological manner.

Table 1



(Kubalkova, 1998, p. 42)

The Sociological origins of Constructivism include the thinking of Emile Durkheim and Marx Weber. Generally there are two groups of opinions in sociology regarding the nature of science and social science. One group promotes mongolism. They hold that social science and science share the same ontology and epistemology. Another group regards that social science is fundamentally different form natural science since it involves people’s thinking and actions. And where there are people, there is value. (Gu Zhonghua(顾忠华), 2004) Cited in (Qin Yaqing(秦亚青), 2006, p. 3) Durkheim emphasizes a lot on “ideas” although he was pretty much a monist. He regards values as the core of social world and they form an independent group of factors which should not be categorized into other groups. And social reality is the result of human being’s social constructions. He also pointed out the importance of social rules. (Ruggie, 1999, pp. 215-246) This combination of positivist approach and the emphasis on values and norms has a big influence on “soft/moderate constructivism” initiated by Alexandra Wendt. (Qin Yaqing (秦亚青), 2006, p. 3)

Constructivism also owns its credit to Marx Weber. Weber’s most famous thesis, “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism” departs from the question why capitalism was initiated in Western Europe instead of other civilizations in the world. And his basic stands were that the Protestant reformation in Europe brought up a

“spirit” of capitalism which leads to the emergence of capitalism. (Turner, 2007, p. 176)

According to Weber, *"The transcendental premise of any science of culture is (...) in the circumstance that we are man of culture, endowed with the capacity and the will of assuming a conscious position in the face of the world conferring sense to it"*. (Weber, 1989, p. 97) So Weber reminds people that social science is different from natural science in the way that it involves people who are cultural beings. Social science is therefore never value-free and is subject to different interpretations. This leaves a room for the attention on culture, value and meaning in social science studies.

2.1.3 Literatures and Classifications

In 1966 Berger and Luckman firstly applied the term “Social Constructivism” in *The Social Construction of Reality*. Alfred Schultz then wrote *The Phenomenology of the Social world* (1967), which is regarded as a “*classic treatment of a Husserlian/Weberian position*”. John Searle’s, a linguistic known for his speech act theory, illustrated in *The Construction of Social Reality* (1995) his ideas on how language constructs social realities. Within the realm of IR studies, Onuf’s *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (1989), and Wendt’s *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999) are preeminent. (Smith, 2001, p. 38)

There are many ways to classify Social Constructivism. This thesis applies the classification made by Kurt Burch. He divides Constructivism into three groups: Rule-Oriented Constructivism (Onuf and Miami Group), Structure-Oriented Constructivism (Wendt) and Norm-Oriented Constructivism. (Kubalkova, 2001, p. 10)

2.2 Nicholas Onuf and Rule-Oriented Constructivism

Rule-oriented Constructivism was developed by the “Miami International Relations Group” which was initiated by Onuf and Vendulka Kubalkova and joined by some other scholars and students in Miami University. (Kubalkova, et al., 1998, pp. Preface x-ix)

The difference in ontology has led to a lot more differences between constructivism and traditional IR theories. Constructivism pays attention to some elements overlooked in traditional approaches. Among them the most prominent one is the role of people.

2.2.1 Agents

While realists take nation states as the unit of analysis and do not take individuals into considerations, constructivists take “people” as the starting point of analysis. In their eyes, people are *“complex social creatures with multiple, often conflicting, goals and a great variety of skills and other resources available to them.”* (Kubalkova, 2001, p. 57)


People are the initial constructors who construct the rules, mechanisms and national identities based on their values and beliefs. (Kubalkova, et al., 1998, pp. Preface x-xi) The social world can be seen as a never-ending construction project carried out by people, the “makers” of the world. (Kubalkova, 2001, p. 58) People are the agents who act in institutions and construct structures. In turn, the constructed social reality constitutes people. Therefore, agents and structure, or people and the social world, are in a process of mutual construction. (Kubalkova, 2001, pp. 61-62)

2.2.2 Speech Acts

2.2.2.1 The Ontological Status of Language

Rule-oriented Constructivism raises language to an ontological position. For rule-oriented constructivists, languages are actions expressed in, of and by utterances and they form rules in society. The following graph shows the differences of the concept of language for positivists and constructivists.

Table 2



(Kubalkova, 2001, p. 64)

Onuf holds that languages are actions which can evolve into rules. And Rules develop into rule, the political paradigm of a society. (Sun Jisheng(孙吉胜), 2006, p. 189) As Onuf puts:

"In representing the way things are and how they work in relation to each other, language make things (including ourselves as agents) what they are by making the world (any world of social relations) what it is." (Onuf, 2001, p. 77)

Therefore language can be regarded as the "maker" or "constructor" of people and the world. This "linguistic turn" in IR studies is closely related to Wilhelm von

Humboldt's theories on language productivity, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of language relativity, Ludwig Wittgenstein's language philosophy as well as Jane Austin's speech act theory.

One thing to clarify is that while Onuf's constructivism does give language an ontological status, it does not deny the existence and importance of materials. He does not draw a clear line between material and social realities. For example, in his eyes people are socially made as well as "natural" biological beings. But the social features dominate human behaviors. And *"to say that people and societies construct each other is not to imply that this is done wholly out of mind"* (Onuf, 1989, p. 40)

2.2.2.2 Language as Actions

For Onuf, *"speaking is an activity with normative consequences"* (Onuf, 2001, p. 77) His stands on language are deeply influenced by J.L.Austin's speech act theory. Austin, in his masterpiece *How do We Do Things with Words*, presents three kinds of speech acts:

- **locutionary act:** *"The act of 'saying something' in this full normal sense"* (Austin, 1962, p. 94)
- **illocutionary act:** *"performance of an act in saying something as opposed to performance of an act of saying something"* (Austin, 1962, p. 99)
- **perlocutionary act:** *"meaningful utterance with a certain conventional force non-conventionally bringing about a certain effect"* (Halion, 1989)

Among these three types, illocutionary acts have been studied most. John R. Searle, in his modified speech act theory, does not distinguish locutionary acts and illocutionary acts. (Halion, 1989) He then classified illocutionary speech acts into

“assertives, directives, commissives, expressives and declarations” (Searle, 1975)⁵

Based on the speech act theory, Onuf categorized the three patterns of speech acts according to the way they achieve social effects:

- **assertive speech acts:** *“We may assert something about the world that others will accept (or reject, qualify, etc.)”*
- **directive speech acts:** *“We may demand that other do what we say.”*
- **commissive speech acts:** *“We can make promises that have consequences for us if others accept them.”* (Kubalkova, 2001, p. 66)

2.2.3 Rules and Rule

Rules

The concept of “rules” is put forward by Onuf to link individuals to each other and to link people with the material world. The construction of structures and social realities are completed through rules. And as Kubalkova commented, *“rules hold the key to [the] understanding”* of Rule-oriented constructivism. (Kubalkova, et al., 1998, pp. Preface x-xi)

Before Onuf, Kant and Foucault have discussed the roles of “rules”. Kant applied the term “constitutive” to refer to the construction of worlds through “analogies of experience”. (Onuf, 1989, p. 38) According to Kant, *“All appearances are, as regards their existence, subject a priori to rules determining their relations to one another in one times.”* (Kant, 1933, p. 208) qdt in. (Onuf, 1989, p. 38) And he regards the role of the rules as “regulative”. (Onuf, 1989, p. 38) Michel Foucault holds that rules themselves are empty and meaningless. But if applied by persons with intentions,

⁵ Searle, John R. (1975), “A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts”, in: Günderson, K. (ed.), *Language, Mind, and Knowledge*, (Minneapolis Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 7), University of Minneapolis Press, p. 344-69.

they may generate great forces. And whoever can seize the rules wins. (Foucault, 1977) qtd. in (Onuf, 1989, p. 161)

“Rules” in Onuf’s theory do not refer to principles of nature, logic or laws. A more complete expression of the “rules” in Rule-oriented Constructivism should be “social rules”. (Onuf, 1989, p. 79) Social rules are omnipresent: where there is human, there are rules. Therefore Onuf denies the existence of anarchy which is taken as a presumption by traditional IR theorists. (Sun Jisheng(孙吉胜), 2006, p. 189) since the status of anarchy is also formed by sets of rules. Anarchy is, for Onuf, a hybrid of hegemony and heteronomy with a slight degree of hierarchy. (Kubalkova, 2001, p. 66)

The rules must be “stated or stable”. They are often manifested through words such as “I must, must not; may, need not; should, should not”, etc. They should be instructions or directions which are capable of resulting in or regulating human performances. And the formulation of “rules” can be generalized as *“a description of a class of actions” and “an indication whether that class of actions is required, forbidden, or allowed”*. (Onuf, 1989, pp. 79-80) In this way Onuf relates rules with speech acts. The correspondence between them is shown in Table 3.

Rule

Another concept related to but different from “Rules” is “Rule”. “Rule” means ruling pattern, or as Onuf termed, *“the paradigm of political society”*. (Onuf, 1989, p. 196) Its German correspondence should be “Herrschaft”. (Onuf, 1989, p. 196) Onuf categorized rule into three types, namely hegemony, hierarchy, and heteronomy. He then related them to three categories of speech acts and rules. In this way he works out a model in which the correlation between discourse, rules, and rule are presented. (Kubalkova, 2001, p. 66) The following table shows this correlation:

Table 3

| Speech Acts | Rules | Rule |
|-------------|-------------------|------------|
| Assertive | instruction-rules | hegemony |
| Directive | directive-rules | hierarchy |
| Commissive | commitment-rules | heteronomy |

(Kubalkova, 2001, p. 66)

The categorization of rules and rule are the core of Rule-oriented Constructivism. But it should not be forgotten that rules and rule are all generated from speech acts. And language is a more linguistic-oriented concept and covers a wider range than speech acts. But the “pure” language in linguistic sense is also essential in constructing rules and rule. As illustrated by Feng Xiao, one of Onuf’s disciples and the only one who applied rule-oriented Constructivism in the analysis of Chinese issues, *“Language affects the way in which the pattern of speech acts is formed and in turn shapes the category of rules and social arrangement.”* (Xiao, 2004, p. 122).

2.2.4 Culture/Gognition

There are a couple of terms related to culture mentioned by Onuf. Among them are cognition, reasoning and consciousness. Onuf also argues that the speech acts and rules have corresponding “modes of reasoning” or “cognition”. He sees reasoning as actions and cognition as conducts. (Onuf, 1989, p. 96) The reasoning process, in rule-based constructivist’ eyes, involves learning about the rules and about how to use the rules.

Furthermore, he argues that Consciousness is regarded by Onuf as the “internal support” for rules. Different categories of the agents’ consciousness lead to different

types of rules. And culture is then constituted by the “internal supports” as well as the rules which have been internalized in people’s mind with their daily practice of these rules constitute. In other words, culture is a mix of correlative rules and consciousnesses. (Onuf, 1989, p. 97) As put by Feng Xiao, *“culture can be understood within the interactive context where the consciousness of agents affects the constitution of rules and social arrangement”* (Xiao, 2004)

2.3 Hypotheses & A Synoptic Table

According to Kubalkova, it is the axioms *“saying is doing”*, *“rules make rule”*, and *“rules put resources into play”* which distinguish Onuf’s constructivism from positivism, Marxism and other versions of moderate constructivism. (Kubalkova, et al., 1998, p. Preface xi) And based on a summary of Dr. Feng Xiao, a direct disciple of Nicholas Onuf and Kubalkova in Miami School who firstly applied rule-oriented constructivism in analyzing China’s foreign policy, the main hypotheses of Rule-oriented Constructivism include:

- *“People, rather than states as agents”*
- *“The constitutive significance of agents’ speech acts for institution and structure”*
- *“The role of web of rules and social arrangement[s] for the constitution of agents’ identities and their rational choice”* (Xiao, 2004)⁶

The following table is a “rule-oriented synoptic table” adapted from a talbe made by Kobalkova in her book. The elements which will be applied in the analysis of this thesis is selected and presented.⁷

⁶ these three points are rephrased based on

⁷ A full version of this table can be seen in Appendix, Table B

| Faculties of experience Paradigms of experience | Category of existence and constitution/regulation of its meaning | Category of material control and its constitution agreement and exchange | Category of discretionary endeavor, of mutual constitution of agency |
|--|--|---|--|
| Speech Acts | Assertive Stating a belief that speaker hopes hearer to accept X counts as Y (if Y is a value, then it is a principle) The world is presented in words | Directives Speaker presents hearer with his intention of some act to be performed X person must do Y Words indicate how the world ought to be and that X will do it | Commissive Speakers commitment to a course of action, promise/offer: if hearer accepts speaker is stuck I state I will do Y Words indicate how the world ought to be and I will do it if you accept my proposition |
| Rules (repeated speech acts) | Instruction-rules | Directive-rules | Commitment-rules |
| Common phrases associated with these types of rules | "I state", "affirm", "report", "characterize", "attribute", "insist", "dissent", "declare" | "I ask", "command", "demand", "caution", "permit" | "I promise", "offer" |
| Rule (form of) (rules determine distribution of material resources and thus "rules yield rule") | Hegemony Ideas and beliefs seem to do the ruling | Hierarchy Chain of command | Heteronomy Agent's roles defined by roles of others The association rules Thus agents do not see rule in their role |
| Examples of bundles of rules and their classification according to predominant rules | Premodern political systems Religions | "Warrior"-type occupations, army etc. Natural sciences | Western capitalist/democratic/liberal state (with sanctions and police) |
| Cultures | Religions based cultures and civilizations | Social sciences based on positivism | Individualism |
| Civilizations | Nationalism, totalitarian and authoritarian political systems (in combination with hierarchical elements) | Analytico-deductive model | Liberal culture |
| Political Systems | | Corporations | Commissive culture of capitalism (rights and duties) |
| Modes of Activities (all are mixes of all three categories but one is more strongly represented) | Principles of identity of self and community high, internalized, leading to martyrdom (e.g. Shi'ism) | Internalize directive rules, calculating responses fear/dread culture | Material achievement Guilt culture, sense of responsibility , concern over performance and failure |

(Kubalkova, 2001, p. 69)⁸

This table presents the correspondence between discourse, rules and rule which will be applied in this these. The complete version of this table is presented in the Appendix (Table B). As the table shows, Onuf contends that different types of society have correspondent patterns of discourse, rules and rule. Premodern, authoritarian and totalitarian societies are featured by assertive discourse, instructive rules and the rule of “hegemony”. “Warrior-type” societies are featured by directive discourse, rules and the rule of “hierarchy”. For Western capitalized societies, the dominant discourse and rule are commissive. And their ruling form is “heteronomy”. (Kubalkova, 2001, p. 69) The analysis of this thesis mainly relies on the contents of this table.

3. Methodology

3.1 Ontological and Epistemological Considerations

This thesis, in consistent with rule-oriented constructivism, adopts a duality between “mind” and “matter”. It holds that “*people and society construct, or constitute, each other.*” (Onuf, 1989, p. 33;38) And language is regarded to have an ontological status in this thesis. From a rule-oriented constructivist view, language can generate rules and rule, thus constructing social realities. And social realities, in turn, reconstruct language and discourse. The epistemology, therefore, would be interpretivism. It is regarded in this thesis that the social realities and discourse are subject to interpretations and they are never value-free.

⁸ This table is cited from (Kubalkova, 2001, p. 69) , which is based on Onuf’s synoptic table of paradigms of experience ad faculties , 1989, P290

3.2 The Choice of Theory

This thesis applies Onuf's versions of constructivism. The rationale behind the choice of theory, especially regarding the choice between Wendtian Soft constructivist and Rule-oriented constructivist theories, is based on the following considerations.

The West's low degree of recognition of China's "Peaceful Development" is commonly explained by realist theories: a rising, hungry China is likely to explore the resources of other countries for its own surviving and thus threatening the world peace. Liberalist, on the other hand, may see China's integration into the world as bringing vast room for international cooperation. Both realist and liberalist theories indeed provide strong arguments on this issue.

Few have looked at this problem from a rule-oriented constructivist view. Wendt's moderate version of constructivism has been applied a lot in analyzing China, especially by Chinese researchers. The rule-oriented constructivism, on the other hand, has been rarely applied. This is because that Wendt's version has a closer connection with traditional realist approach in IR analysis while the ontology of rule-oriented constructivism is opposite to materialist stands. This makes it harder to be applied in researches especially in Chinese since most Chinese researchers tend to take a "materialist" approach in order to be consistent with the approach of Marxism, the philosophical stands adopted and recognized by Chinese government. Besides, Onuf's rule-oriented constructivism contains a wide range of philosophical connections and interdisciplinary intellectual lineages. It is more abstract and requires an endeavor into subjects including language philosophy, linguistics and sociology. It is not as easily applicable as Wendt's Version.

In addition, this thesis falls into the foreign policy (FP) analysis. FP analysis takes states as the units of analysis. By taking account of factors influencing state behaviors the relations between states are explained. (Kubalkova, 2001, p. 16) Steve Smith

claims that *“Wendt’s version of social constructivism offers little scope for the analysis of foreign policy”* (Smith, 2001, p. 51). Although this might be a bit radical, but Wendt’s theory concerns more about the interactions between states other than domestic factors in influencing foreign policies. He does not take the persons’ inner factors which influence his relations with others. (Smith, 2001, p. 51) In Onuf’s theory, people are taken as agents and they influence the foreign policy making. This leaves a lot of room for analyzing domestic factors in foreign policy analysis and this is especially important for analyzing China’s foreign policies which, as a common sense to Chinese, is influenced by the elite’s personalities, China’s domestic policies and cultural factors, etc. So the choice of this theory is out of the wish to introduce Rule-oriented theory to China as well as the consideration of its applicability in Chinese FA analysis and the originality of the thesis.

3.3 Commentary on Data

Since rule-oriented Constructivist theory takes discourse, or speech acts as having ontological status, the analysis of this research will be mostly qualitative. The data in this thesis mainly consists of texts, discourse and document extracts. Discourse and comments from both Chinese and western sides are applied to ensure the objectivity of this thesis.

For the western part, the discourse related to “China Threat” and “China’s Responsibility” are applied to demonstrate the construction of discourse framework in the west, especially in the US, towards the perception of China’s “Peaceful Development”.


For the Chinese part, texts extracted from Chinese governmental documents concerning “Peaceful Development” are applied to demonstrate how the discourse framework is constructed. This would include the texts selected from governmental white papers on China’s “Peaceful Development”. Discourse extracted from the

leaders’ speeches is used as materials to analysis the elite’s influence on Chinese foreign policies. These materials are used to analysis China’s discourse and rules constructed.

Besides, the academic comments and standpoints of both western and Chinese scholars will be applied in this thesis in order to show the divergent approaches between the West and China as well as ensure the objectivity of the analysis.

3.4 Analytical Structure & Theory Application

Table 5



This scheme shows the analytical framework of this thesis. First of all, targets of the analysis: the Western discourse and the Chinese discourse divides the analysis into two parts. Then the discourse of both West and China will be studied upon on three levels: a linguistic level, a general political discourse level, and specific discourse related to China’s “Peaceful Development”.

In this process, the ontological status of language and the culture as “inner supports” standpoints in the theory will be applied to analyze the potential clashes between western and Chinese languages and ideologies. Most importantly, the discourse,

rules and ruling patterns of China and the West will be categorized based on the rule-oriented constructivist synoptic table (Table 4). Then the clashes of patterns, if any, within and between China and west will be addressed and how these clashes interact will be presented thereafter.

4. Analysis

4.1 An Overview of China's Foreign Policy

This section presents an overview of China's foreign policy. It first reviews the evolvement of China's foreign policy since the founding of People's Republic of China. Then the diverse agents in China's foreign policy-making process are identified and their roles discussed. The influence of their clashed interests and mindsets on China's foreign policy is analyzed. Furthermore, the discourse framework and main concepts in China's foreign policy are presented, which lead to an analysis of the correlative rules and rule based on the correlative model (synoptic table) between speech acts, rules and rule in Onuf's theory.

4.1.1 Historical Review

The evolvement of China's foreign policy since the founding of New China can be roughly divided into five phrases. From 1949-1954, China adhered to "Lean to One Side" policy. The country leaned to the "socialist-communist camp" led by the Soviet Union. (Dreyer, 2007) In 1950, China and the Soviet Union signed the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendly Alliance and Mutual Assistance" which aimed at preventing China to be invaded by Japan. During the period, the US has tried to stop PRC to enter international organizations by advocating "two Chinas" and Sino-US

relations was in tension. Then China and U.S. had direct confrontation in 1950 when the Korean War started.

Form 1954-1957 China's diplomatic relations entered a more normal track. In 1954, Chinese delegation with Premier Zhou Enlai as the head participated the Bandung Conference in which he raised "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence": *"mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence."*⁹ (Zhang Lili (张历历), 2009, pp. 14-38) Bandung Spirit generated from the conference emancipated Asian and African countries by encouraging them to pursue independence in fuller sense. This is also China's earliest contributions in promoting an international relations pattern in which everyone enjoys an equal position and the disputes are settled by dialogues. (Zhang Lili (张历历), 2009, pp. 55-64)

During 1957-1969, Chinese foreign policy entered a period of "semi-isolation". There were signs that the Soviet Union was trying to impose its wills on China and conduct Chauvinism and a rift appeared between the two socialist countries. (Zhang Lili, (张历历), 2009, pp. 88-95) It this period China's foreign policy was influence greatly by Mao Zedong's thoughts as exemplified by Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. (Dreyer, 2007)

China's foreign relations between the years 1969-1989 was featured by power-oriented policies. Sino-US relations were improved through "Ping Pang Diplomacy". But as frictions remained between China and the US, Sino-Soviet relations experienced a period of "re-warming". (Dreyer, 2007)

From 1989 till now, China has broken the isolation status and become integrated into the global institutions. China advocates the idea of "multipolarity" which means the

⁹ The translation is from "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence", About China, [www. people.com.cn](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/92824/92845/92870/6441502.html)
<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/92824/92845/92870/6441502.html>

world has “only one superpower but many great powers”. The primary goal in China’s foreign policy is to maintain a favorable international environment for China’s economic development. In 2002 China initiated the idea of “Strategic Opportunity” behind which the assumption is win-win strategy. China believes that its economic growth and international engagements have led to a stable neighborhood and a peaceful international environment. (Qing, 2013, pp. 10-12)

4.1.2 General Approach

The general approach of China’s foreign policies, as described by Chinese official documents, is an *“independent foreign policy of peace”* of which the fundamental goals are:

- *“To preserve China’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity,” and*
- *“To create a favorable international environment for China’s reform and opening up and modernization.”* (C.Fred Bergsten, n.d.)

And the Chinese government adheres to five guidelines, namely *“Independence and self-determination; Opposition to hegemony and to the policy of force; The Five principles of Peaceful Coexistence; The pacific solution of international disputes; Equality, mutual benefit and common development”* in order to achieve the goals. (Qing, 2013)

Traditionally, Chinese takes its relations with major powers as the essential consideration of its diplomacy, the relations with periphery states as the priority, and that with the developing countries as the foundation. Besides, China advocates multilateralism and takes it as an important arena to settle international disputes¹⁰. (Jiang Wei & Wu Qiang (江玮& 武强), 2013) On May 21st, Professor Jin Canrong from Remmin University (China), who is a famous scholar on Sino-US relations and the current vice director of China National Association for International Studies, has

¹⁰ In Chinese “大国是关键，周边是首要，发展中国家是基础，多边是重要舞台”.

added in a speech he gave in University of International Relations that the new dimensions of “public diplomacy” and “participation in global governance”¹¹. (Jin Canrong (金灿荣), 2013) This indicates that China is trying to become a more responsible country in the world and is welcoming new methods of diplomacy in which more groups and people can participate in and contribute to it.

Through the years China has put forward several concepts and terms to summarize the approach of its foreign policy in different phrases. These concepts, seemingly separated, are in fact interrelated. The following table shows the main concepts in China’s foreign policy since 1954:

| Term | Definition | Implications |
|---|--|--|
| Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; • Mutual nonaggression; • Noninterference; • Equality and mutual benefit; • Peaceful coexistence” | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good neighborly relations—preventing external instabilities from “spilling over” to fuel internal frictions. • Noninterference in internal affairs, most notably Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang. |
| New Security Concept | Unveiled in 1997 to reflect China’s aspiration for a new post-Cold War international security order: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; • Emphasis on mutually beneficial economic cooperation among states; • Pursuit of confidence-building measures amongst states • Establishment of bilateral “strategic partnerships” that are not directed at any third country | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marks new proactive Chinese approach to international affairs. • Offers alternative vision of international order, particularly in relation to the U.S. alliance-based security structure in East Asia. |
| Peaceful Rise/ Peaceful Development | Campaign to reassure the international community, particularly neighboring countries, that China’s future is benign and that its rise will not be a zero-sum game. | |
| Period of Strategic Opportunity | The next 20 years was conceived in 2002 as a period during which China’s relations with its periphery and with major powers such as the United States are expected to remain essentially stable to allow the PRC to focus its attention on “building a well-off society” at home. | |
| Harmonious World | First publicly introduced by Hu Jintao at the World Summit and 60th General Assembly of the United Nations in 2005. Although the exact meaning and policy implications of “harmonious world” are undefined, the slogan is meant to demonstrate China’s commitment to global peace and stability and to the goal of a more just and equitable international system. | |

¹¹ He made a speech entitled “contemporary international relations and China’s foreign diplomacy” in University of International Relations on 21st, May, 2013

(Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009)

Among them “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, “Peaceful Development” and “Harmonious World” show the evolvement of an “*independent foreign policy of peace*”. For the Chinese, these concepts are easy to be understood and accepted since they bear strong features of Confucius idea on “Peace” (He, 和) and “Harmony” (He Xie 和谐). For the westerners, however, these concepts are unfamiliar. The connotations are vague and overlapped. The reasons of these differences in understanding will be analyzed in the coming analysis.

4.1.3 Agents

China’s foreign policy is influenced by diverse actors and interests groups. In 2010, Swedish scholars Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox have made an influential report on the agents in China’s foreign policy-making which was widely quoted and analyzed upon in Chinese media. They have found that the agents in China’s foreign policy-making are becoming more and more diverse. Among them are the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party, departments of Chinese government, People’s Liberation Army, energy companies, financial institutions, local governments, research organizations and netizens. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, is more of an executive department nowadays than a policy-maker. (Linda Jakobson, 2010)

The interests of these agents are correlated but sometimes contradicted. The participation of multiple agents has reduced the absolute authority of CPC and the government in the process of China’s foreign policy-making. This also makes China’s foreign policy incoherent, fragmented and hesitating which increased the difficulties for the rest of the world to understand China’s foreign policy. It is no wonder that the term “*fragmented authoritarianism*”¹² was applied to describe China’s current policy

¹² Professor Aoyama Rumi, a Japanese professor in Waseda University applies the term to describe China’s

making.

A factor which has been overlooked in traditional foreign policy analysis is the influence of the mindset, or in Onuf's term, the "internal supports" of the agents. An example is the nationalism of Chinese netizens influencing the Chinese foreign policies towards disputes with the peripheral countries. In settling disputes with Japan on the Diaoyu Island, Chinese netizens have shown strong nationalist sentiments and this pushed the government to act more harshly and give more concrete condemnations on this issue.

4.2 The Construction of "Peaceful Development" Discourse

This section presents how China's "Peaceful Development" discourse was constructed. Specifically, the mutual construction, or a double movement between western and Chinese discourse is presented. This dual process is the context in which the clashes between Chinese and western discourse, rules and ruling patterns will be addressed.

4.2.1 "China Threat" Discourse Constructed by the West

According to Onuf, speech acts can constitute social realities and structures. In the realm of international relations, countries can make use of the constructive force of discourse in order to construct social realities they are in favor of. The discourse framework of "China Threat" is such an example where dominating western countries, especially the US and Japan, constructed social realities and relations for the benefits of their interests. Since 1990s, US politician and scholars have made various remarks on the rise of China. Among them the "China Threat" discourse

current foreign policy making system. (Rumi, 2012)

framework was directly related to China's construction of "Peaceful Development" discourse.

"China Threat" is a term widely accepted and applied by the Chinese scholars to refer to a series of remarks holding that China will be a threat to the rest of the world especially considering the fact that it is a socialist country with growing economic and military capabilities. In 1992, Munro Ross H. published his paper titled "Awakening Dragon" in *Policy Review*. In this paper he declared that "*the real danger in Asia is from China*". And China, according to his description, is a hybrid of "Leninist Politics", "Capitalist Economics", "Mercantilist Trade Policy" and "Expansionist" military policies and a threatening power to the US in Asia. (Munro, 1992, p. 10)¹³ This was one of the earliest versions of "China Threat" discourse. Since then, a lot of articles and books expressed similar ideas were published.¹⁴

Samuel Huntington, in *The Clash of Civilizations?* (1993) and *The Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of World Order* (1996), contended that the future clashes between nations will not taken form in the clashes of political system as in the Cold War but in the realm of ideology and civilization. Confucius and Islamic civilizations are in nature against the western civilizations. China, pushed by its distinct history, culture and traditions, will seek hegemony in East Asia. (Yuan Shengyu(袁胜育), 2009, pp. 7-8)

In 1997, Richard Bernstein & Ross H. Munro wrote in their book *The Coming Conflict with China* that China takes the US as an enemy and will act like Fascist, threatening US without respect to the international order. (Yuan Shengyu(袁胜育), 2009, pp. 7-8) In 2005, Robert Kagan, in his passage titled "The Illusion of 'Managing' China", stated that

¹³ full text available at:

<http://web.ebscohost.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/ehost/detail?sid=56dcae7b-b753-4891-baa7-4675d19ed2c7%40sessionmgr112&vid=4&hid=121&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWVhvc3QtGjI2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&AN=9302070122>

¹⁴ Table C in Appendix shows the most known ones among them and their main arguments.

“The Chinese leadership may already believe the United States is its enemy (...) That is likely what the future holds. The United States may not be able to avoid a policy of containing China; we are, in fact, already doing so.” (Kagan, 2005)

These discourses have a similar starting point which is China will surely take the US as an “enemy” and the U.S. has to contain, or in a more updated term, to “rebalance” China to prevent China from threatening the U.S.

From a rule-oriented constructivist perspective, these US scholars and politician are “doing things” by making this discourses. And it is interesting to think about the fact that when the U.S. repeatedly says that China takes the US as an enemy, the US itself is actually taking China as an enemy. This “threatening China” is not a result of China’s actual actions, but a constructed image of China by the U.S. The illocutionary and perlocutionary effects of these speech acts are evident: they have constructed not only a threatening image of China but also an international structure in which China is preparing to seek hegemony through military force.

There is also a mild version of “China Threat”. This group holds that China wants, and probably will resort to wars if needed in order to seek hegemony once it becomes stronger. But for now, China does not want to ruin its “peace-loving” reputation and she has not yet figured out what exact role she wants to play in the world system. The thoughts of Susan Shirk¹⁵, for example, can be grouped into this category. She said in an interview that:

“China remains torn between its traditional principles of non-intervention and the fact that it has a lot at stake in all of these situations. (...) it feels cross-pressured to play some kind of role but still reluctant to risk its reputation in circumstances where there is a very uncertain outcome.” (China Economic Review, 2012)

Both strong and weak versions of “China Threat” discourse are well organized in a

¹⁵ the former deputy assistant secretary of the U.S. in the Clinton administration, a current professor in the University of California, San Diego specializing in Sino-US,

way that every aspect in China's development are constructed as "threatening" to the rest of the world. Regarding economy, China is depicted as the one who threatens the US leading role in the world market. This is understandable since China's GDP has surpassed Japan to become the second largest economy in the world. And if judging by PPP the difference between China and the US is even smaller. (Fish, 2011)¹⁶

China's military capability also worries the western countries. China Threat "theorists" have also pointed out that China's military budget which increased by double digits in almost every year since 1989 while the countries education, healthcare system are seriously underfunded. (Dreyer, 2007) In fact the construction of China's "military threat" is inherent to the US policies since its Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) of which one of the aims is to coerce any military competitor to the US. (Grainger, 2010)

Besides, China's socialist ideology, which is fundamentally different to the western ideology, is also a target of "China Threat" discourse. (Fish, 2011) This corresponds to Huntington's predictions about the future clashes between civilizations.

It seems that "China Threat" discourse has a good logic and is well-organized in a way that most western would easily accept it. On the other hand, the logic within "Peaceful Development" discourse is quite "Chinese", which enhances the difficulties for the West to understand and accept. And this will be further elaborated upon in the following part.

4.2.2 "Peaceful Development" and the Western Responses

The concept "Peaceful Rise" was initiated by Chinese official think tanks and recognized by Chinese government in order to respond to the skepticisms and fears in the West about the rise of China. So the primary agents involved in this case are

¹⁶ available

at<<http://web.ebscohost.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/ehost/detail?sid=13ecd98d-2daf-4964-81f9-a82ffc56d001%40sessionmgr111&vid=2&hid=113&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWZwc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=buh&AN=57420361>>

CPC (Communist Party of China), Chinese government and official think tanks.

The term “Peaceful Rise” was firstly introduced by Zheng Bijian (郑必坚), former vice principal of Central Party School and a top-rank think tank of Chinese government, in his speech at Boao Asian Forum in 2003. (Bijian, 2003, pp. 13-17) This term was then used by former Premier Wen Jiabao in his speech at Harvard University¹⁷ in the same year and later by former President Hu Jintao in his speech at the 110 anniversary of Chairman Mao’s birthday meeting. The leaders’ recognition of the term marked the official acceptance of “Peaceful Rise” as a national strategy. (Ren Fang & Wang Yingcheng (任芳、王英诚), 2004)

However, the raise of this notion did not manage to deconstruct “China Threat”. On the contrary the term “rise” (in Chinese Jue Qi 崛起) caused more fears and skepticisms unexpectedly. A report titled “Peaceful rise—Even when China is trying hard to be conciliatory, it scares its neighbors” in *the Economist* says that the word “rise” reminds the western countries of the rise of Germany and Japan. And on one would like to have the history repeat itself. (The Economist, 2004) Similar reactions became prevalent in the western media. The western media argues that all rises of nations in the history were accompanied with violence, and China cannot be exceptional. And “*the idea of China’s exceptionalism, the notion that it has forged a new, self-sustaining model has a lot of holes in it.*” (Fenby, 2012)¹⁸

In order to reduce the fears of the western countries, Chinese government officially changed the term from “Peaceful Rise” to “Peaceful Development”. Former president Hu Jintao used “peaceful development” in his speech at the 2004 Boao Forum. (Jintao, 2004) In 2005, the State Council of PRC issued a white paper entitled “China’s

¹⁷ English version of the speech: <http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/12.11/10-wenspeech.html>
Chinese version of the speech: <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/1061/2241298.html>

¹⁸ Fenby, Jonathan (2012) *China's geoeconomic strategy: does China have a foreign policy? Domestic pressures and China's strategy. IDEAS reports - special reports, Kitchen, Nicholas (ed.) SR012. LSE IDEAS, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.*

Peaceful Development Path”, which officially settled the term “Peaceful Development”. In 2011, another white paper, “China’s Peaceful Development” was issued.¹⁹ Both white papers are key governmental documents stating China’s resolutions to seek domestic development without threatening the safety and interests of other countries. Since then the term “Peaceful Rise” couldn’t be found in any official documents and speeches but in academic discussions and debates.

Nevertheless, neither “Peaceful Rise” nor “Peaceful Development” managed to reduce the syndrome of “Chinaphobia” in the West. The US continues to construct the role of China in a way beneficial for the US. And “China Threat” discourse was upgraded into a more “moral” version—“China’s Responsibilities”.

In 2005, China received some “glorious” titles and flatterings. Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of the US, applied a seemingly rational, moral and high-profile term, “a responsible stakeholder”, to describe China’s role in the international relations. In his speech “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” he stated that:

“It is time to take our policy beyond opening doors to China’s membership into the international system: We need to urge China to become a responsible stakeholder in that system.” (Zoellick, 2005)

In the 2006 National Security Strategy of the US, the role of China as “responsible stakeholder” is again mentioned and thus officially recognized. (The White House, 2006) Then in the “Princeton Project on National Security Report” (June, 2009), a report which epitomizes the essential ideas of US political elites and scholars, the US once more stated that:

“The rise of China is one of the seminal events of the early 21st century. America’s goal should not be to block or contain China, but rather to help it achieve its legitimate ambitions within the current international order and to become a responsible stakeholder in Asian and

¹⁹ the full texts (Chinese and English versions) are available at: <http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/>

international politics.” (G. John Ikenberry, 2006)

This series of discourses soon became popular in the West. And soon China's Responsibilities “theory”, as termed by the Chinese, has then taken the place of “China Threat” as the main discourse framework of the West's attitudes on China.

Nevertheless these good names did not make China feel good. For China, “China's Responsibilities” is in nature not much different from “China Threat”: both aims at curbing China's development and this version aims at reaching this goal by putting extra burden on China's not-yet-strong shoulders. This is not helpful for China because China is not as half developed as the current western capitalist countries. Its huge population and tremendous domestic problems make it unrealistic for China to shoulder world-class responsibilities. The “China's Responsibilities” discourse is a pitfall, which has put China in a dilemma. This will be further explained in the next section.

4.3 Western Discourse & Correlated Rules and Rule

The correspondence between discourse, rules and ruling patterns is the core of Rule-oriented Constructivism. The following analysis (4.3& 4.4), therefore, explores the clashes between the rules and ruling patterns generated from the western discourse towards the rise of China and China's discourse on “peaceful Development”.

In the first place, the Western discourse and correlated rules and ruling patterns will be analyzed and categorized. This is a crucial link to explain the failure of the recognition of China's “Peaceful Development” discourse. If the conveying and interpreting of “Peaceful Development” can be compared to a phone call between person A (the West) and person B (China), then only if the two sides are applying compatible discourse framework can they achieve successful communication.

4.3.1 Indo-European Languages and Logics

Although Chinese is the language spoken by the most people in the world, Chinese language is by no means as popular as Indo-European languages regarding the range of people who speak the language. Chinese is almost only spoken by Chinese but English is spoken by a majority of people in western developed countries. In this sense English is the true “Lingua Franca” which rules the world.

English is a hypotactical language. Meaning is conveyed not only through words but also through grammatical formations and the structures of sentences. The structure plays a big role in indicating the logic of the discourse. And English is often compared to the formation of “grapes” or “trees”. A main branch can be followed by several subordinating sentences and clauses.

Table 6



4.3.2 Western-led International Rules and Rule

According to Onuf, the pattern of “contemporary” international relations was “*pervasively heteronomous*”. (Onuf, 1989, p. 282) Of course the “contemporary”

international relations he referred to is that around 1989, the year when his book was published. But it still fits to today's international relations. The ruling pattern in international relations still falls into the range of "heteronomy" in which "the agents' roles are defined by roles of others". (See Appendix, Table B)

Onuf mentioned that the two super powers back then, Soviet Union and the US, were in a heteronomous relations. (Onuf, 1989, p. 282) Nowadays Soviet Union is no longer one of the heads, but the United States remains dominant. The difference is that the world nowadays is a world of multi-polarization. The US is now in a heteronomous relationship with more powers including the EU, Japan, and the BRICS countries. Each power is checked judged and balanced by other powers and there are perpetual invisible comparisons between countries. No one can escape from this heteronomous pattern.

Since the western countries are the dominant countries in the current international arena, the pattern of rules and rule of the world actually overlaps with that of the western world since the international rules are also western-led. This is also in consistent with Onuf's classification of the rules and ruling pattern of the western capitalist countries. (See Appendix, Table B)

Based on the synoptic table of Rule-oriented constructivism, the correlative discourse style to heteronomy is commissive speech acts and commissive-rules. Associations are the main forms of organization. The corresponding social objective is wealth, and the primary categories of political practice focuses on "rights". (See Appendix, Table B) This can be illustrated by the case of United Nations. It is an international association led by the US. And its discourse is largely commissive. Its members have to makes pledges and commitments so that countries can come to terms with certain issues.

However, heteronomy is not isolated to hegemony or hierarchy. Heteronomy,

according to Onuf, “implies a dominance of internal comparison, with asymmetries in the resources available to free choosers yielding a stable pattern of asymmetric outcomes subject to hegemonial support”. (Onuf, 1989, p. 282)

Countries in the world are involved in a process of invisible comparison. There are asymmetry relations between the dominating countries and dominated countries. Therefore Heteronomy also contains hegemonial ruling. In this sense heteronomy and hegemony are connected. Then what can be deduced is that even in heteronomous relations, the agents can resort to directive, even assertive speech acts since they want to rule the weaker agents. This standpoint can be again proved by UN discourses in which words such as “shall”, “should not” also appear frequently. This is because the US wants the rest of the world to play by its rule of game.


4.3.3 Western Discourse and Rules toward the Rise of China

The next two sections identify the discourse pattern and the pattern of rules and rule in the western discourses about the rise of China. This refers to specially “China Threat” and “China’s Responsibilities” discourse frameworks. It is necessary to clarify the importance of this step now since I take the western discourse and Chinese discourse as two persons at the ends of phones. Only when they are speaking the “same languages”, or compatible discourse patterns, can they communicate with each other and get their meaning conveyed.

4.3.3.1 “China Threat”: An Assertive Stress Reaction

As analyzed in the previous section, the current “rules” in the internal system is mainly western-led and therefore the pattern of international relations is primarily commissive. The world’s predominant ruling pattern is “heteronomy”. Each state has to be checked and regulated by “others” and this makes a balanced status of international relations.

The western-led international rules would include economic rules, political rules, social rules and many more. But directed related to the West's judgments on China's "Peaceful Development" are the rules describing a conventional way of a countries' rise. The capitalist countries have, based on modernization theories and their experiences, recognized a pattern of a country's developmental path. As Peer Møller Christensen observes, there is a distinct difference in the western and Chinese logic on the evolvement of a country.



(Christensen, 2012)

In the capitalist "rules", the path of a country's development follows a pattern in which one begins from a pre-modern capitalist country and ends up as a democratic market-driven society through modernization. The Chinese, however, accepts a Marxist's development path of a country in which a country evolve into a communist country. In this logic China has passed the stage of semi-feudal and semi-colonial society, and is now in the phrase of socialist society. And the country will be a communist country.

Zheng bijian has made a similar generalization on the western "rules" of a country's developmental mode. According to him, two rules feature the developmental path of capitalist countries:

- *"the old path of industrialization characterized by rivalry for*

resources and bloody wars”

- *“the cold-war mentality which rejects peaceful development and cooperation on the grounds of differences in social systems and ideologies”* (Bijian, 2005, p. 63)

The above divergent views between China and the West on the developmental path of a country reflect the different thinking, experience and mindset of the Chinese and western people. One reason of this difference lies in differences in education. In China, Marxism is the only officially recognized philosophy, or world view, taught in schools. In middle school the subject of “political economy” refers to Marxist political economy instead of other thinkers’ ideas. And the subject of “philosophy” means, in fact, Marxist philosophy with materialism as the ontology and “practice” as the way of knowing the world. And these subjects are all obligatory. Therefore most Chinese have accepted since their student period, voluntarily or not, the Marxist world view and his ideas about social evolvement. This is not to say that Marxist philosophy is in anyway inferior to any philosophies, since it does offer a dialect way of seeing things. However, it does limit the way people think, especially when compared with the West in which diverse world views and philosophies are taught, allowed and even appreciated. And this does partially explain the difference of Chinese and western established “rules” of a country’s development.

An Assertive Stress Reaction

The internal logics of “China Threat” are generated from the above inner reasoning. And the discourse of China Threat is quite assertive in a way that they argue that a country’s rise will surely be accompanied by wars and conflicts. That what happened to Japan and German and China will not be an exception.

As the synoptic table of rule-oriented constructivism shows, the assertive discourse referring to the statements of “a belief that speaker hopes hearer to accept”. In the case of China Threat, the speaker is trying to make other believe that “China is a

threat". And this kind of "China as a threat" statement is also consistent with the pattern "X counts as Y" in assertive discourse. One thing to mention is that assertive discourse does not necessarily equals to completely groundless sayings. The term "assertive" in the context of rule-oriented theory primarily refers to the manners, and logics of expression.

Assertive discourses have strong illocutionary and perlocutionary effects and they generate instructive rules. By saying China as a threatening emerging country, the speaker is trying to call on the hearers to be aware of the "threats" of China and then adopt some methods to curb China's rise. Besides, by these discourses the speaker affects China's national image and increases the media pressure for China. This reduces the pace of China's domestic development. The perlocutionary effects of China Threat can be the antagonism between China and "speaker". If a country asserts China as threatening and directs China to acts according to her rules, it is hardly that this country can understand and accept "Peaceful Development".

According to Onuf's theory, the US-led western countries should originally fall into the realm of commissive discourse producers since they share a "commissive culture of capitalism", (See Appendix, Table B). Then what makes the speaker gave up the more advanced commissive discourse and resort to assertive speech acts? This thesis argues that the switch of discourse pattern is the speaker's stress reaction. The rapid and all-rounded development of China has made the US and other western countries anxious and stressed. With the stimulation of China's rise, the liberal, commissive culture does not function anymore. The instant reaction of the speakers is to express his/her fears, call the other's attention to the emerging rivals and try to contain the new power. In this way, the capitalist countries which in normal conditions belong to "heteronomy" ruling pattern with their discourse being commissive, can switch to an assertive discourse pattern with hegemony as the rule in cases of emergency.

4.3.3.2 “China’s Responsibilities” : A “Directive Pitfall”

Lofty and just as it seems, “China’s Responsibilities” is a political discourse framework constructed out of certain political purposes. It is a reflection of the US intention to balance the power of China under the disguise of a justifiable slogan. This discourse framework managed to put China into a dilemma: On one hand, China is after all a country with a population of 13 million and an extremely low GDP per capita, it does not have the capability to shoulder the world-class responsibilities. On the other hand, if China argues back and refuses to play the role of “responsible stakeholder”, its reputation will be ruined and the rest of the world will condemn China even more harshly. The rise of China will then cause more fears, which will in turn impair China’s domestic development.

The discourse of “China’s Responsibilities” again deviates from the commissive discourse style inherent in western capitalist countries. This discourse framework, different from “China Threat” discourse, is directive. Based on the constructivists synoptic table, “directives” refers to the speech acts in which the *“speaker presents hearer with his intention of some act to be performed”*. And the directives often take the grammatical form of “X person must do Y”. Words bearing directive implications include “I ask”, “command”, “demand”, “caution”, “permit” and so on. (See Appendix, Table B)

A look at discourse interactions in Sino-US relations may better illustrate how this “directive pitfall” works. China has been in fact always in a passive position in the dialogues with the US. The US discourses are in the pattern of “China should”. The following examples may illustrate the directive nature of the discourse of China’s Responsibilities.

In Zeollick’s speech in 2005, the directive features of speech acts have been more then evident. A lot of his sentences are just in the form of “X must do Y”.

“As China becomes a global player, it must act as a responsible stakeholder that fulfills its obligations and works with the United States and others (...)” (The White House, 2006, p. 41)

“China needs to recognize how its actions are perceived by others”(...) “China should work with the United States and others to develop diverse sources of energy (...).” (Zoellick, 2005)

These sentences are explicit directives demanding China to shoulder more responsibilities. While joining into the international system and cooperate with other countries also benefit China, the US seems to have forgotten that China is not yet as developed as western capitalist countries. China still has its own business to mind. Poverty, corruptions, environmental pollutions, these are all problems which will bring more harm to the world without proper actions taken.

In Zoellick’s speech there are other types of directives. Some of them take the negative linguistic form of “X mustn’t/ should not do Y” as in the following sentence:

“a responsible major global player[China]shouldn’t tolerate rampant theft of intellectual property and counterfeiting (...)” (Zoellick, 2005)

In fact “X shouldn’t do Y” has a stronger directive effect than “X should do Y” pattern since “should do” can be still understood as strong suggestions while “shouldn’t do” are sheer prohibits. Of course in this case intellectual property rights should not be violated and this is a problem China needs to fix, the emphasis here is that this “shouldn’t” pattern also indicate strong “hegemonic” role of the US in the asymmetrical Sino-US relations. There are also examples of implicit directives such as in the following sentences:

“China has a responsibility to strengthen the international system that has enabled its success.” (Zoellick, 2005)

“From China’s perspective, it would seem that its national interest would be much better served by working with us to shape the future international system.” (Zoellick, 2005)

In the first sentence, “has a responsibility” actually means “should”. But the word responsibility makes the sentence sounds more moral and persuasive. After all western culture is featured by “guilt culture, sense of responsibility” as observed by Onuf. (See Appendix, Table B) The directive rhetoric is more subtle in the second sentence. By saying that “its national interest would be much better...” he is actually saying that if China does not cooperate with US, China will surely be in an unfavorable condition. This can be even taken as a threat, though not an apparent one. And only the stronger part in asymmetrical relations can make these kinds of utterances.

In the beginning of this section I have argued that the discourse of “China’s Responsibilities” is a pitfall which puts China in a dilemma. And the “pitfall” effects are closely connected to the strategy of applying directives in speech acts. Therefore if the assertiveness of “China Threat” discourse is the result of the US unconscious stress reactions, the directive “China’s Responsibilities” discourse is then a carefully designed framework which aims at lure China into this directive trap. The final goal is to let China be self-contradicted and pressured. This adds up to the tension between China and the West, leading to the low recognition of “Peaceful Development” discourse.

This part also proved the mobility of the categories of speech acts, rules and rule. The discovery of mobility of the categories specifies Onuf’s theory since Onuf did made quite a fixed pattern for the discourse styles of difference kinds of agents. He bounds commissive discourse to western capitalist countries, and assertive discourse to totalitarian and authoritarian political systems. But what he has neglected is that the roles of agents can change in different contexts. For a nation, the rules and ruling patterns connect to it may change according to whether it is in the domestic context or the international one.

4.3.4 Clashes Identified

Table 7



The above analysis reveals the nature of the discourse and correlated rules and ruling patterns of "China Threat" and "China's Responsibilities". It has been found that "China Threat" is assertive in discourse. It generates instructive rules and a ruling pattern of "hegemony". The "rules" are also a result of the western logics on the development path of a nation in which pre-modern societies develop into capitalist countries through modernization. And the "rise" of a country always comes along with wars and violence. This assertive discourse and rules and the "hegemonic" rule of the West prevents China's "Peaceful Development" from being accepted. And the judging and aggressive tones of assertive discourse make equal dialogue between China and the West hardly achieved.

"China's Responsibilities" is directive in discourse. It is an upgraded version of "China Threat" and both discourse share similar perlocutionary effects. It generates directive rules and the ruling pattern of "hierarchy". And this creates a "Directive Pitfall" which puts China in a dilemma. If China promises to take the responsibilities it is likely that China will fail to keep the promises since its national capability prevent it

from acting like a mature developed country. But if China refuses to take the responsibilities China's image and reputation is hurt. This "directive pitfall" and asymmetrical relations between China and the West impairs the reorganization of "Peaceful Development" in the West.

This part also proved the mobility of the categories of speech acts, rules and rule. The discovery of mobility of the categories specifies Onuf's theory since Onuf did made quite a fixed pattern for the discourse styles of difference kinds of agents. He bounds commissive discourse to western capitalist countries, and assertive discourse to totalitarian and authoritarian political systems. But what he has neglected is that the roles of agents can change in different contexts. For a nation, the rules and ruling patterns connect to it may change according to whether it is in the domestic context or the international one.

Now that the language applied by "Person A" at one side of the phone has been catagorized. The next step is to investigate the discourse of "Person B", namely China, in this communication process.

4.4 Chinese Discourse & Correlated Rules and Rule


This section analyzes the general patterns speech acts and the correlated rules and rule in China's general political discourse and in "Peaceful Development" discourse. The contradictions between these two discourse patterns and paradigm of rules and rule will be presented and how they affect the West's perception of "Peaceful Development" is addressed.

4.4.1 Chinese Language and Logics

Chinese foreign policy has been frequently accused of its "fragmentation", not only regarding the policy-making process, but also the discourse of foreign policy. For example, after Wang Yizhi, a Chinese scholar in IR studies gave a speech named "From Peaceful Rise to Harmonious Society: the Evolvement of Chinese Foreign Policies" in Korean, a Korean scholar raises the question that *"the terms in Chinese foreign policies change a frequently on a same issue. At one time it is "Peaceful Rise" or "Peaceful Development", at other times it is "Harmonious world". If China cannot be consistent in discourse, how others can expect it to be consistent in actions?"* (Wang Yizhi(王义桅), 2006)

Indeed, it is hard to find systematic, all-inclusive descriptions of China's foreign policy. Rather China's foreign policy is constituted of several expressions, concepts and terms which sound quite similar. One needs to go through Chinese discourse on foreign policy and select the key notions in order to get a whole picture of Chinese foreign policy approach. But for the Chinese, the discourse on the foreign policy does not seem to be as fragmented as in the eyes of the westerners. Chinese politicians and scholars seem to be able to switch from one term to another in a heartbeat without noticing the confusions this term-switching has caused.

The fragmentation of Chinese policy is, on one hand, the reflection of the “fragmented” policy-making process which involves multiple agents with different interest. However, one factor which has been neglected by researchers is the features and formation of Chinese language.



In most of the time the logic is also conveyed through the meaning of words and the natural relations between them. The “bamboo scheme” on the left demonstrates this feature of Chinese language embodied in Chinese foreign policy.

This scheme explains why the China’s foreign policy contains many concepts and terms which are related while no evident logic indicators stating the causal relations between the concepts can be seen. For the Chinese, the internal logics and relations between these concepts are self-evident. From “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence”, “Peaceful Development” to “Harmonious World”, the natural flow of logic is continuous and understandable. “Peaceful Development” is the way to follow while “Harmonious World” is the end to reach. “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence” is the rules to abide in the pursuit of the Harmonious World. All of these terms have their origins to China’s history and the Confucius world view.

Therefore these concepts form an organic whole in the eyes of Chinese policy-makers and policy-readers.

4.4.2 Chinese Political Discourse

“Socialist” Remains

The ideological clashes between China and the West also affect the West’s understanding of China’s discourse on Peaceful Development. In fact China’s political discourse is deeply influenced by the remaining features in language during China’s socialist revolution period. And the Soviet style of socialist speech acts, although almost completely evaded from common people’s language, can still find their place in the political discourse of China.

Many words in Chinese political discourse are related to revolutions or military. Words such as “fight” (Dou Zheng, 斗争), “hold high the banners” (Gao Ju Qi Zhi 高举旗帜), “march forward” (Qian Jin 前进) and so on can often be seen in political speeches and documents. The general style of China’s political discourse is high-flowing and flowery with a lot of meaningless political cliché. For example, former Secretary General Hu Jintao said in a speech he made in 2004 that:

“China will follow a peaceful development path holding high the banners of peace, development and cooperation, join the other Asian countries in bringing about Asian rejuvenation, and making greater contribution to the lofty cause of peace and development in the world.” (Jintao, 2004)

Here “holding high the banners” actually means “advocate” or “adhere to”. This is a typical “socialist” remain in political discourse influenced by Soviet Union-style political discourse. It is hard for the West to understand and appreciate. And “the lofty cause” also sounds high-flowing and insincere. This is also related to the fact that Chinese media was once a sheer spokesman of the party in the early years when PRC was founded. The media news was all about the leader’s

speeches made up of assertive expressions. The discourse became a sheer manifestation of political ideology. (冉华, 2009, pp. 710-715)

Assertive Discourse in Domestic Context

According to Onuf, the discourse type of authoritarians and totalitarians are in general assertive. And that of western capitalists should be commissive. This brings a problem for the classification of Chinese discourse and rules since China can be viewed as a hybrid of socialist system and capitalist economic features. But the clue is that the Chinese discourse pattern within and out of China is quite different. And the ruling pattern within Chinese society is also different from that of China in international arena.

Within Chinese society, its discourse pattern is a hybrid of assertive, directive and commissive discourse. But the predominant type is still assertive. And therefore the rules within China are mostly instructive-rules and the ruling pattern of Chinese society is “top-down”. This is related to the fact that China is an authoritarian state with single-party as its political system.

In this system, the political leaders and elites have a big say in making foreign policies. They are the real and major agents in foreign policy making. For a long period after the founding of PRC, China was ruled by assertive political discourse pattern and the instructive-rules were pervasive. A typical example is the raise of “Two Whatevers” policy. This notion was initiated by Hua Guofeng, the designated CPC leader by Chairman Mao. He advocated that *"China should uphold whatever policies Mao Zedong has adopted and abide by whatever instructions the late chairman has given."* (CRIENGLISH.com, 2008) This assertiveness was, however, criticized within China and was replaced by Deng's more pragmatic discourse of the “Cat Theory” which holds that *"it doesn't matter if a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice"*. (CRIENGLISH.com, 2008)

Even in Deng's era the predominant political pattern in China was still assertive. Although Deng Xiaoping had a pragmatic and straight-forward way of speaking, his words are also on the assertive sides in retrospect. For example, he stated that *"China belongs to the Third World now, and it belongs to the Third World still when it develops into a more prosperous country"*. In fact it is not possible for China to always stay a third world country. Deng realized this absoluteness of this discourse later and revised it into a more flexible version (Deng Xiaoping (邓小平), 1984)

The assertiveness of China's political discourse and the instructive-rules are the result of authoritarian political system. But the new generation of Chinese leaders is trying to bring freshness to China's stiff political discourse. Xi Jinping, the current General Secretary of CPC and Chairman of China adopts a quite "modern" and "grass-root" discourse style. When the new leaders greeted the public for the first time after the election, his words "sorry for keep you waiting" broke the solemn atmosphere of the meeting. (People.com(人民网), 2013) In his speech at Boao Forum this year, he applied a lot of metaphors, making the speech easily understood. Sentence include *"Peace, like air and sunshine, is hardly noticed when people are benefiting from it."* and *"a single flower does not make spring, while one hundred flowers in full blossom bring spring to the garden."* are metaphoric, vivid and easy to understand (Jinping, 2013)

It seems that the political discourse pattern in China is experiencing a reform as China enters the international system. But how far this reform can go is still a question.

The problem of assertive discourse and instructive-rules is that they are not the discourse and rules accepted in the western-led international arena. The West and international arena share the commisive discourse pattern, which according to Onuf, is the inherent discourse pattern of capitalist countries as a result of their culture and religion. Therefore the traditional assertiveness of China's discourse has lead to a

poor foundation of the communication between China and the West. This also leads to the contradictions between China's discourse in domestic and international contexts which will be further elaborated upon in the next section.

4.4.3 “Peaceful Development” in a “Commissive Trap”

China's market economy has a lot resemblance to capitalist societies. This resemblance has extended to the country's discourse and rules in its foreign relations. Contrary to China's domestic political discourse, the “Peaceful Development” discourse is quite commissive. The discourse contains a lot of promises and pledges.

The frequency of words and expressions relating to “promises”, “commitments”, “vows” and “responsibilities” is very high in Chinese political discourse on peaceful development policy.

One may think that by applying the same discourse pattern with the international arena China can make its voice better received. Yet facts have proven the opposite. This is because that China is not a capitalist country in real sense, so its application of commissive discourse is not natural. It is a superficial commissive discourse and this cannot not with the trusts of the West. On the contrary, by applying this type of discourse China puts itself in a “commissive trap”.

“Commissive Trap” is a term of my invention based on Onuf's theory. According to Onuf's theory, commissive discourse refers to the speakers commitments to *“a course of action, promise/offer”* and *“if hearer accepts the speaker is stuck”*. Commissive discourse is correspondent to commissive rules and the rule of heteronomy. (See Appendix, Table B) This means that by promising and pledging, one is actually handing over the listeners the rights to judge. Once the promises are made, one needs to fulfill them. And whether to what degree they are fulfilled depend on the judgments of the listeners and readers instead of the speaker. The commissive

trap puts the agents in the ruling pattern of “heteronomy”. The following examples show how this “commissive trap” worked.

In some cases the commissive words are explicit in “Peaceful Development” discourse, for example:

“Here I’d like to point out: It’s the destined mission for the Chinese Communist Party to adhere to and unswervingly follow this new path [of peaceful development]”. (Bijian, 2005, p. 18)

This statement was presented by Zheng Bijian in his speech entitled “New Path for China’s Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia” at the Bo’ao Forum for Asia in November, 2003. Here “the destined mission” is a strong commissive word. The rule it generates is that the adherence of the path of peaceful development is a destiny, a mission of Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the rest of the world has the right to judge whether China fulfills its mission or not. In this way China puts itself in the trap of “heteronomy” and the rest of the world can judge whether China is an honest, promise-keeping country or a hypocritical liar.

In the white paper on *China’s Peaceful Development* issued by the Information Office of the State Council in 2010, this kind of “promises” also scatters throughout the text. For example:

“China has declared to the rest of the world on many occasions that it takes a path of peaceful development and is committed to upholding world peace (...) China declared solemnly again to the world that peaceful development is a strategic choice made by China to realize modernization (...).”

(State Council Information Office , 2011)

By this declaration China put itself into the “international court of justice” of which the judges are not Chinese. And the supreme judge is the US, the current dominant country who has a bigger discourse power.

The new generation of leader's discourse about Peaceful Development has not deviated from the previous "commissive style" too much. In a speech made by Xi Jinping in January, 2013, he said:

"We will stick to the road of peaceful development, but will never give up our legitimate rights and will never sacrifice our national core interests." (Xinhua News, 2013)

"China will never pursue development at the cost of sacrificing another country's interests. We will never benefit ourselves at others' expense or do harm to any neighbor." (Xinhua News, 2013)

In March he said in an interview by reporters for BRICS countries that:

"The Chinese government has made the promise to the international community several times that China will stick to the path of peaceful development, never seek hegemony and never pursue military expansion. A word spoken is an arrow let fly." (CRIENGLISH.com , 2013)

The underlined expressions indicate that the discourse of Xi's generation is not likely to escape from the "commissive trap" set by China itself. Rather, it seems that the promises are even more firm. These two examples of discourse are also consistent with the commissive speech act categorized by Onuf and Kubalkova. And based on Kubalkova's synoptic table of Rule-oriented Constructivism, the commissive speech acts are in the patter of "I state I will do Y" and if hearer accepts the saying then the speaker is stuck. (See Appendix, Table B). By saying that "China will..." and "will never...", China is again stuck in the commissive trap. This is not saying that it is wrong to make promises, since it is just normal and understandable that China's is eager to explain itself and to erase the fears and negative sayings from the rest of the world about China's rise. But by continuous operating the commssive speech acts the rule of heteronomy is formed, thus put China in an inferior status, more or less like a criminal who is subject to the judgments and accusations of other, in its foreign relations with other countries.

So China's defensive and weak commissive discourse is under the perpetual pressure of the US strong and directive discourse. And this makes China's discourse lost the active position in dialogues and is therefore hardly accepted in the US-led western world.

A deeper reason is that China has not yet developed to the stage in which it can apply commissive discourse in the full sense. The "Peaceful Development" discourse is only commissive in the linguistic sense, but behind the discourse is the assertive pattern of the general political discourse in China. This contrast reduces the liability of "Peaceful Development" discourse. The West would not really accept the discourse of a socialist country with authoritarian rule only because she is making promises. After all, commissive discourse pattern is a feature of democratic, capitalist countries and it requires the inner supports of western culture according to Onuf's theory. Although every country can make promises, but it is not like every country has the capability to adopt a commissive discourse pattern with their promises taken seriously since this would require a shared culture and social backgrounds as the within the western world.

4.4.4 Contradictions within "Peaceful Development" Discourse

This chapter investigates the inner contradictions with China's "Peaceful Development" discourse. These contradictions form another part of the reason why China's "Peaceful Development" discourse is not well-received in the West since it is regarded by this thesis that a self-contradicted discourse will lead to vagueness and confusions in the rules it constructed.

4.4.4.1 Aggressiveness Vs. Passiveness

The first is the "coexistence" of passiveness and aggressiveness of China's discourse

on Peaceful Development. “Peaceful Rise” sounds more or less aggressive because “rise”, from a western perspective, has negative associations to the old paths of the rise of Germany and Japan. Though “Peaceful Development” sounds milder, but alternating the word does not completely change the deep linguistic structure of this term. The meaning remains similar. This is also why the change of one word did not ease the skepticism of the rest of the world. In fact even Zheng Bijian himself admitted that in fact “Peaceful Rise” and “Peaceful Development” mean the same. (Bijian, 2005, p. 63)

However, a deeper observation of the constructing process of China’s Peaceful Development discourse framework leads to the idea that the formation of this set of discourse is in nature passive. From beginning to end it is the West who has the judging power, and China has to react according to the West’s attitudes. The Peaceful Development discourse is formed to respond to “China Threat” and the word is changed from “rise” to “development” not because China wanted to but because the feedbacks from the judges are not as good as what China had expected. The US is always pushing forward while China is always defending. Behind the “aggressive” terms hides a passive, timid and weak speaker. This is also a result of heteronomy, a trap made by China itself in the beginning and enforced through the countries speech acts over the time. The mutual construction of speech acts on Peaceful Development and the heteronomy type of ruling has made both even stronger.

4.4.4.2 Pragmatism vs. Idealism

Another contradiction is China’s pragmatic approach and utopian discourse. Chinese leaders have taken a quite pragmatic approach in both domestic and foreign policies for a long time. This can be seen from Den Xiaoping’s “Cat Theory” which has become a well-know Chinese saying, telling people to be pragmatic and face the reality. And China did manage to develop by applying this pragmatic approach. The

country's economy has been boosted. It seems that as long as the country can be richer, Chinese do not care too much about whether the system is termed "socialism with Chinese characteristics" or "state capitalism".

This pragmatic Chinese leadership style is also resulted from the harsh social realities in China. China's boosting economy has created many opportunities, but university graduates could hardly find a job to sustain; Chinese people work extremely hard for living, but they have to endure the worst air in the world caused by pollutions; Children from rich and privileged Chinese families enjoy a luxurious life, but common citizens have to fight everyday for survival. It is not even exaggerating to say: "Contradictions, thy name is China".

4.4.4.3 Identity Dilemma

China is also suffering from a national identity dilemma. From a rule-oriented constructivists' perspective, national identity can be viewed as the people's cognition, or consciousness about the role of their nation. And Onuf regards this consciousness as the inner supports of rules. The rules can be then externalized into national interests since people can define their interests according to their cognition about themselves. So at this point Onuf and Wendt's ideas can be well accommodated since Wendt regards that culture, or shared ideas can construct national interests.

China's identity dilemmas exist on multiple levels. Economically, the country's income level is categorized by the World Bank as upper-middle income, but the country is still, as least as claimed by its official government, a developing country. (The World Bank, 2011).

Politically, China is single-party socialist country and the Chinese government defines the country as "socialist country with Chinese characteristics". But the "Chinese characteristics", to a large extent, refers to the market economy which is the most


evident feature of capitalist countries.

Mentality, China has an ambivalent attitude, a mixed feeling of pride and shame towards the nation itself. This is related to China's ups and downs in her five-thousand-year history. At one time she was the "Middle Kingdom", the core, while others were the ones who showed respects and send gifts. At other times she was a pathetic hybrid of semi-feudal and semi-colonial society. A typical political discourse related to China's identity is the "the Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation" or the "Chinese Dream" put forward by Xi Jinping recently. "Chinese Dream", in fact, also refers to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. (YUWEN, 2013) However this discourse may lead to controversies. What does this "rejuvenation" mean? Does it indicate that China is reminiscent for the "good old days" China's relations with the foreign countries were framed in the Tribute System? Is the "Chinese Dream" compatible with the world's dream? This makes China's discourse very vague in itself and the uncertainty increases the skepticisms of the western countries about the connotation of "Peaceful Development".

4.4.5 Clashes Identified

This part (4.4) analyzes how the Chinese discourse, rules and ruling patterns and the interactions between them affect the West's perception of "Peaceful Development".

Table 8



As the scheme shows, there are three clashes identified in this part. This first is the clashed between the general pattern of discourse and rules in China’s political discourse and that of “Peaceful Development” Discourse. The former is assertive and the latter is commissive. This inconsistency of discourse and rules within and out of China leads to an inconsistent image of China. It makes China a double-faced man and this impairs the trust of the western countries towards “Peaceful Development”.

The second clash is between “Peaceful Development” discourse and western discourse. “Peaceful Development” is largely commissive in discourse and rules, and the rule it generates is “heteronomy”. Based on Onuf’s theory, in a “commissive rule” the speaker makes promises, and if the hearer accepts then the speaker is stuck. Here China is the speaker and the West is the hearer. And the “commissive” pattern of China’s “Peaceful Development” gives the readers, or the West the power to judge China’s words and actions. So China has made a trap for itself by applying this discourse pattern and this phenomenon, as I term it, is the effect of “Commissive Trap”.

The third clash refers to the contradictions within China’s “Peaceful Development” discourse. “Peaceful Development” is a concept containing both aggressive and

passive connotations. Beside, its utopian discourse contradicts with the pragmatic approach taken in Chinese domestic and foreign policies. Furthermore, it reflects the identity dilemma of China resulted from its historical experience.

5. Conclusion

This thesis takes a rule-oriented constructivist perspective to explore the problem why China's "Peaceful Development" discourse is interpreted differently and not well-received in the West. Through the analysis, the response to the primary problem of this thesis should be that the clashes within and between the Chinese and western discourse, rules and rule have affected the recognition of China's "Peaceful Development" discourse in the West.

The clashes identified through the analysis of the western and Chinese discourse related to "Peaceful Development". The clashed can be divided into two groups: the clashes within Chinese discourse itself and that between western and Chinese patterns of discourse, rules and rule.

Specifically, the "China Threat" discourse is assertive. It generates instructive rules and the ruling pattern of "hegemony". Therefore the "dialogue" between China and the West takes place in an asymmetrical relationship. The west was in a dominating role in this communication process in an assertive discourse framework. This impairs its recognition of "Peaceful Development" discourse.

The discourse and rules of "China's Responsibilities" is largely directive within a ruling pattern of "hierarchy". This created a "Directive Pitfall" which puts China into a dilemma: if China take the "responsibilities" then she risks eating her promises since China is after all does not have the capability to shoulder as much world-class responsibilities as western developed countries. But if China neglects the "responsibilities", its national image will be hurt and it will be criticized of being "irresponsible". So this "directive pitfall" puts China is a passive position, impairing the west's recognition of "Peaceful Development".

Another major finding generated from this part of analysis is the mobility of the patterns of discourse, rules and rule and the conditions of “pattern switches”. In Nicholas Onuf’s Rule-oriented Constructivist theory, he bounds the pattern of discourse, rules and rule with certain types of society. Assertive, directive, commissive discourse/rules are bounded with authoritarian, warrior and army-oriented and western capitalist societies. This thesis, however, argues that this correspondence is not totally fixed. When a western capitalist country is stimulated, it can switch from commissive discourse to assertive or directive discourse. The rules generated and ruling patterns are changed accordingly. “China Threat” is an example of stress reaction of the West stimulated by the rise of China. The assertiveness is not an inherent feature of western discourse but is triggered in this “emergency”. “China’s Responsibilities” is an upgraded version of “China Threat”. This discourse was not a spontaneous reaction to the rise of China, but a carefully designed “directive pitfall” with similar illocutionary effects as “China Threat”. Both “China Threat” and “China’s Responsibilities” are speech acts which gave China unfavorable pressures to deal with.

The discourse and rules of China’s “Peaceful Development” is commissive. There is a high frequency of “promises” and “pledges” in the discourse. The ruling pattern it generates is “heteronomy”. This, again, makes China in a passive condition in the discourse communication. In “heteronomy” ruling patterns, the speaker are subject to the judgments of the hearer once the promises are made. However, the current social and political conditions make China vulnerable to changes in the international arena. And as long as China is involved in rifts with other countries, China’s actions will be judged strictly by the West. So by making promises in “Peaceful Development” discourse, China puts itself in a “Commissive Trap”. This also enhances the West’s low recognition of “Peaceful Development”. The contradictions within Chinese political discourse also “contribute” to this problem. It is found that the general pattern of Chinese domestic political discourse is predominantly assertive. The corresponding

rule of assertive discourse should be “hegemony” according to the synoptic table, but since here it refers to the ruling within a country it should be termed as “top-down” or “hierarchical”. This contrast between China’s assertive domestic political discourse and the commissive “Peaceful Development” diplomatic discourse lead to an inconsistent image of the nation, impairing the credibility of “Peaceful Development”.

Besides, the “Peaceful Development” discourse also contains several contradicted notions. It is a hybrid of aggressiveness and passiveness and its utopian tones contradicts with China’s pragmatic approaches in domestic policies. Furthermore, it reflects China’s national identity dilemmas among which the country’s reminiscent towards the tributary system and victim mentality interact. In addition, the difference between Chinese and English on a pure linguistic level has been discussed. It is found that the paratactic formation of Chinese language echoes the fragmentation of expressions and lack of explicit logical relations between the concepts in foreign policies.

6. Reference

Austin, J. L., 1962. *How to Do Things with Words*. 1 ed. Oxford : Clarendon Press .

Bijian, Z., 2003. "A New Path For China's Peaceful Rise and The Future of Asia" in "China's Peaceful Rise: Speeches of Zheng Bijian 1997-2004". Accessed on: 15th, 4, 2013. Available at: <<http://www.brookings.edu/fp/events/20050616bijianlunch.pdf>>

Bijian, Z., 2005. "New Path for China's Peaceful Rise and the Futre of Asia". in: *Peaceful Rise-China's New Road to Development*. 1 ed. Beijing: Central Party School Publishing House, CPC, pp. 9-20.

C.Fred Bergsten, B. G. N. L. D. J. M., *China Balance Sheet: Chinese Foreign Policy: what are the main tenets of china's foreign policy?* Accessed on: 17th, 4, 2013. Available at: <http://csis.org/files/publication/091019_china-bal_26-Chinese-Foreign-Policy.pdf>

Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009. *Chinese Foreign Policy: what are the main tenets of china's foreign policy? (China Balance Sheet)*.

Accessed on: 1st, 5, 2013. Available at:

<http://csis.org/files/publication/091019_china-bal_26-Chinese-Foreign-Policy.pdf>

China Economic Review, 2012. Q&A with Susan Shirk: the Foreign Policy Expert Discusses the Rise of Chinese Nationalism. [Accessed on: 13th, 5, 2013].

Available at: <<http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/qa-susan-shirk>>

Christensen, P. M., 2012. "The 18th Party Congress in a Wstern Perspective", Beijing : University of International Relations.

CRIENGLISH.com , 2013. "China Committed to Peaceful Development: Xi".

Accessed on: 6th, 5, 2013. Available at:

<<http://english.cri.cn/6909/2013/03/20/53s754806.htm>>

CRIENGLISH.com, 2008. The "Two Whatever's" Policy. Accessed on: 24th, 4th, 2012.

Available at: <<http://english.cri.cn/3126/2008/10/31/53s419820.htm>>

Dickens, C., 2008. *A Tale of Two Cities*. 1 ed. Shanghai: Shanghai World Publishing Coperation.

Dreyer, J. T., 2007. *Chinese Foreign Policy*.

Accessed on: 20th, 4, 2013 Available at:

<<http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/125.200702.dreyer.chineseforeignpolicy.html>>

Fenby, J., 2012. "China's geoeconomic strategy: does China have a foreign policy?"

Domestic pressures and China's strategy". IDEAS reports - special reports, 7, Issue SR012.

Fish, I. S., 2011. "The China Threat". *Newsweek*, 4(157), pp. 28-29.

Foucault, M., 1977. *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Fraasen, B. C. v., 1984. To Save the Phenomena. In: J. Leplin, ed. *Scientific Realism*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, pp. 250-259.

G. John Ikenberry, A.-M. S., 2006. "Forging a World of Liberal under Law" U.S. National Security In The 21st Century Final Report of the Princeton Project on National Security. Accessed on: 30th, 4, 2013. Available at: <<http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/report/FinalReport.pdf>>

Goodman, N., 1984. *Of Mind and Other Matters*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Grainger, R., 2010. "What is 'China threat' theory".

Accessed on: 10th, 5, 2013. Available at: <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-09/09/content_11277503.htm>

Halion, K. J., 1989. *Deconstruction and Speech Act Theory*

Accessed on: 3rd, 5, 2013. Available at: <<http://www.e-anglais.com/thesis.html#2.2>>

Humboldt, W. v., 1988. *On language: the diversity of human language-structure and its influence on the mental development of mankind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jia, C., 2013. Slower GDP Growth "Best Option". Accessed on: 10th, 5, 2013. Available at: <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-03/07/content_16286222.htm>

Jinping, X., 2013. Xi Jinping's Speech at the Opening Ceremony of Boao Asian Forum: Working together toward a better future for Asia and the world. Accessed on: 15th, 5, 2013. Available at: <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/language_tips/news/2013-04/11/content_16393483.htm>

Jintao, H., 2004. Full Text of Hu Jintao's Speech at BFA Annual Conference 2004. Accessed on: 7th, 4, 2013. Available at: <<http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/93897.htm>>

Jisheng, S., 2006. *Language and Rule Construction in International Relations* on

Nicholas Onuf's Rule-oriented Construction. *World Economics and Politics*, 6, pp. 60-66.

Jisheng, S., 2006. Language, Rule and the Constructed World-Reflections on "International Relations in the Constructed World". *International Politics Quarterly*, Issue 2, pp. 189-190.

Kagan, R., 2005. The Illusion of 'Managing' China.
Accessed on: 16th, 5, 2013. Available at:
<<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/13/AR2005051301405.html>>

Kant, I., 1933. *Critique of Pure Reason*. London: Macmillan and Co..

Kubalkova, V., 1998. The Twenty Years' Catharsis: E.H. Carr and IR. In: V. Kubalkova, N. Onuf & P.

Kowert, eds. *International Relations in a Constructed World*. New York; London: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 25-57.

Kubalkova, V., 2001. A Constructivist Primer. In: V. Kubalkova, ed. *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World*. New York; London: M.E.Sharpe, pp. 56-76.

Kubalkova, V., 2001. *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World*. 1 ed. New York; London : M.E.Sharpe.

Kubalkova, V., 2001. Foreign Policy, International Politics, and Constructivism . In: W. Kubalkova, ed. *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World* . New York, London : M.E.Sharpe , pp. 15-37.

Kubalkova, V., Onuf, N. & Kowert, P., 1998. Preface. In: N. O. P. K. Vendulka Kubalkova, ed. *International Relations In a Constructed World*. New York; London: M.E. Sharpe, pp. Preface ix-xiii.

Lee, J., 2013. "China's peaceful rise less likely".
Accessed on: 5th, 4, 2013. Available at:
<<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/opinion/chinas-peaceful-rise-less-likely/story-e6frgd0x-1226589469155>>

Linda Jakobson, D. K., 2010. *New Foreign Policy Actors in China*.
Accessed on: 2nd, 5, 2013. Available at:
<<http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRI26.pdf>>

Mueller-Vollmer, K., 2011. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2011 Edition). Accessed on: 24th, 4, 2013. Available at:
<<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/wilhelm-humboldt/>>

- Munro, R. H., 1992. "Awakening Dragon". *Policy Review*, Fall, Issue 62, p. 10.
- Onuf, N., 2001. "Speaking of Policy" . In: V. Kubalkova, ed. *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World*. New York; London : M.E.Sharpe , pp. 77-95.
- Onuf, N. G., 1989. *World of Our Making: Rules and Tule in Social Theory and International Relations*. 1 ed. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Qing, L., 2013. Lecture on "Chinese Foreign Policy", Beijing, University of International Relations
- Ruggie, J. G., 1999. What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge. In: R. R. O. K. S. D. K. Peter Joachim Katzenstein, ed. *Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics*. Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp. 215-246.
- Rumi, A., 2012. *China's Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change*. Accessed on: 10th, 5, 2013. Available at: <http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00802/>
- Searle, J. R., 1975. "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts". In: K. Gunderson, ed. *Language, Mind and Knowledge*. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, pp. 344-369.
- Smith, S., 2001. "Foreign Policy is What State Make of It: Social Construction and International Relations Theory" . In: V. Kubalkova, ed. *Foreign Policy in A Constructed World* . New York, London : M.E.Sharpe, pp. 38-55.
- State Council Information Office , 2011. *China's Peaceful Development*, Beijing: Renmin Press.
- The Economist, 2004. Peaceful rise—Even when China is trying hard to be conciliatory, it scares its neighbors. Accessed on: 10th, 5, 2013. Available at: <http://www.economist.com/node/2792533>
- The Economist, 2013. World-class poverty. Accessed on: 17th, 4, 2013. Available at: <http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/02/chinas-poor>
- The White House, 2006. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Accessed on: 6th, 5, 2013. Available at: <http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/nss2006.pdf>
- The World Bank , 2011. *China Overview*. Accessed on: 14th, 5, 2013. Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview>

tradingeconomics, 2013. China GDP Annual Growth Rate. Accessed on: 20th, 5, 2013. Available at: <<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp-growth-annual>>

Turner, J. A. R. a. C. A., 2007. "The modern Weberian thesis: A Short View of the Literature". *Journal of Enterprising Communities: People and Places in the Global Economy*, 1(2), pp. 175-187.

Weber, M., 1989. *Sociologia* (Coleção Grandes Cientistas Sociais). 7 ed. São Paulo: Editora Ática.

Xiao, F., 2004. "China and Constructivism", MA thesis submitted to Miami: University of Miami.

Xinhua News, 2013. "Peaceful development" concept continues to define China's international strategy. Accessed on: 26th, 4, 2013. Available at: <http://www.china.org.cn/china/2013-03/21/content_28317988.htm>

Xinhua News, 2013. "China Focus: Chinese premier reaffirms road of peaceful development".

Accessed on: 28th, 4, 2013. Available at:

<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/17/c_132240659.htm>

Xinhua News, 2013. China's Q1 GDP growth slows to 7.7 pct.

Accessed on: 2nd, 5, 2013. Available at:

<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/15/c_132309224.htm>

Xinhua News, 2013. Xi vows peaceful development while not waiving legitimate rights. Accessed on: 3rd, 5, 2013. Available at:

<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/bilingual/2013-01/29/c_132136438.htm>

Xiwen, Z., 2011. China's peaceful rise is beyond doubt. Accessed on: 3rd, 4, 2013.

Available at: <<http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91342/7444877.html>>

YUWEN, D., 2013. How to Understand China's Foreign Policy.

Accessed on: 10th, 5, 2013. Available at:

<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/23/how_to_understand_china_s_foreign_policy>

Zoellick, R. B., 2005. "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?".

Accessed on: 3rd, 5, 2013. Available at:

<<http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm>>

邓小平, 1984, “领袖人物资料库: 维护世界和平, 搞好国内建设”(Deng Xiaoping, 1984, "the Archive of Leaders: Safeguard World Peace, Maintain Domestic Construction") Accessed on: 7th, 4, 2013. Available at:

<<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/33839/34943/34944/34947/2617901.html>>

顾忠华, 2004, 《韦伯学说》, 第 1 版, 桂林: 广西师范大学出版社.(GuZhonghua, 2004, *The Theoreis of Marx Weber*, 1 ed., Guilin: Guang Xi Normal University Press)

江玮、武强, 2013, “大国外交新思维”. (Jiang Wei, Wu Qiang, 2013. New Thinking of Grand Nation Diplomacy) Accessed on: 22nd, 5, 2013. Available at: <http://epaper.21cbh.com/html/2013-04/22/content_64532.htm?div=-1>

金灿荣, 2013. “当今国际形势与中国外交” 讲座, 北京: 国际关系学院.(Jin Canrong, 2013. Lecture on "Contemporary International Relations and China's Foreign Diplomacy", Beijing: University of International Relations)

秦亚青, 2006. “建构主义: 思想渊源、理论流派与学术理念”, 《国际政治研究》, 第 3 期, pp. 1-23. (Yaqing, Q., 2006. Intellectual Origins, Theoretical Currents and Academic Ideas. *International Political Quarterly*, 3, pp. 1-23.)

冉华, 2009, 《中国传媒公共话语领域的建构》, 武汉大学学报, 9, 60(9), pp. 710-715. (Ran Hua, "Chinese Media Public Discourse Sphere: Reconstruction", *Journal of Wu Han University*, 9, 60(9), pp. 710-715)

人民网, 2013, “媒体解读‘习式’话语风格: 质朴清新 善用隐喻”. (People.com, 2013. The Media Interpret "Xi Style" discourse: fresh and concretewith Frequent Use of Metaphors) Accessed on: 20th, 5, 2013. Available at: <<http://gx.people.com.cn/GB/n/2013/0518/c229247-18684917.html>>

任芳、王英诚, 2004. 新闻背景: “中国和平崛起论” 的诞生和发展. (Ren Fang&Wang Yingcheng, 2004. *the Creation and Development of China's Peaceful Development Theory*) Accessed on: 18th, 4, 2013. Available at: <http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-04/23/content_1436993.htm>

孙吉胜, 2006, “国际关系中的言语与规则建构—尼古拉斯·奥努弗的规则建构主义研究. 世界政治与经济”, 第 6 期, pp. 60-66. (Jisheng, S., 2006. Language and Rule Construction in International Relations on Nicholas Onuf's Rule-oriented Construction. *World Economics and Politics*, 6, pp. 60-66.)

孙吉胜, 2006, “语言、规则与建构的世界——读《建构世界中的国际关系》”, 《国际政治研究》, 第 5 卷, 第 2 期, pp. 189-190. Jisheng, S., 2006. Language, Rule and the Constructed World-Reflections on "International Relations in the Constructed World". *International Politics Quarterly*, Issue 2, pp. 189-190.)

王义桅, 2006, “从‘和平崛起’到‘和谐世界’”. (Wang Yizhi, 2006, "From 'Peaceful Rise'to 'Harmonious Society'")

Accessed on: 4th, 5, 2013. Available at:

<http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2006-02/23/content_4215250.htm>

袁胜育, 2009, 和平发展道路, 第 1 版, 重庆: 重庆出版社 (Yuan Shengyu, 2009, *the Path of Peaceful Development*, 1st ed. Chongqing: Chongqing Press)

张历历, 2009, 当代中国外交简史. 第 1 版, 上海: 上海人民出版社 (Zhang Lili, 2009, *A Brief History of Contemporary Chinese Foreign Affaris*. 1st ed. Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Press).

7. Appendix

Table A



(tradingeconomics, 2013)²⁰

²⁰ adapted from the data given by National Bureau of the Statistics of China

Table B A Full Version of Rule-oriented Constructivist Table

| Faculties of experience Paradigms of experience | Category of existence and constitution/regulation of its meaning | Category of material control and its constitution agreement and exchange | Category of discretionary endeavor, mutual constitution of agency |
|---|---|--|---|
| Speech Acts | Assertive Stating a belief that speaker hopes hearer to accept X counts as Y (if Y is a value, then it is a principle) The world is presented in words | Directives Speaker presents hearer with his intention of some act to be performed X person must do Y Words indicate how the world ought to be and that X will do it | Commissive Speakers commitment to a course of action, promise/offer; if hearer accepts speaker is stuck I state I will do Y Words indicate how the world ought to be and I will do it if you accept my proposition |
| Rules (repeated speech acts) | Instruction-rules | Directive-rules | Commitment-rules |
| Common phrases associated with these types of rules | "I state", "affirm", "report", "characterize", "attribute", "insist", "dissent", "declare" | "I ask", "command", "demand", "caution", "permit" | "I promise", "offer" |
| Strength of rules Support/sanctions of rules | Normatively weak (needs support) internal consciousness | Normatively strong external | Normatively weak (needs support) internal/other rules |
| Defining features of society | Status | Office | Role |
| Rule (form of) (rules determine distribution of material resources and thus "rules yield rule") | Hegemony Ideas and beliefs seem to do the ruling | Hierarchy Chain of command | Heteronomy Agent's roles defined by roles of others The association rules Thus agents do not see rule in their role |
| Form of organization | Informal networks | Organizations | Associations |
| Social Ambition | Standing | Security | Wealth |
| Main form of activity/occupation | Prophecy "priests and professors" (and their derivatives) | War "Warriors and diplomats" (and their derivatives) | Provisioning "Physicians and merchants (and their derivatives)" |
| Main form of reasoning | Conjecture/Abduction | Deduction | Induction |
| Typical Logical Procedures | Metaphor, "conjunction hypothesis", which is either —accepted on faith or —explained by referring to column 2 and 3 reasoning Global comparison "I want to be the best" (of the rank ordered field of many) | Analytico-deductive model Scientific research justification Combat Binary comparison "I want more so that the other has less" (absolute gain) | Academic research Implication Clue finding Medical Professional Internal comparison "I want as much as I can get" (relative gain) |

(Kubalkova, 2001, p. 69)²¹

²¹ This table is cited from (Kubalkova, 2001, p. 69), which is based on Onuf's synoptic table of paradigms of experience and faculties, 1989, P290

| | | | |
|--|---|---|--|
| Primary categories of political practice | "Manners" Ethical conduct | "Virtue" to regulate individual appetite since coercion is allowed" | "Rights" (deciding about conflicts involving rights) |
| Main exhortation | Tell the truth | Do no harm (since violence of sanctions is allowed) | Keep promises |
| Regime (form of) | Monitory regimes | Executive regimes | Administrative regimes Privileging merchants and property owners |
| Examples of bundles of rules and their classification according to predominant rules Cultures Civilizations Political Systems Modes of Activities (all are mixes of all three categories but one is more strongly represented) | Premodern political system s Religions Religions based cultures and civilizations Nationalism, totalitarian and civilizations Universities, media, educational bodies, religions Principles of identity of self and community high, internalized, leading to martyrdom (e.g. Shi'ism) | "Warrior"-type occupations, army etc. Natural sciences Social sciences based on positivism Analytico-deductive model Corporations Internalize directive rules, calculating responses fear/dread culture | Western capitalist/democratic/liberal state (with sanctions and police) Individualism Liberal culture Commissive culture of capitalism (rights and duties) Material achievement Guilt culture, sense of responsibility, concern over performance and failure |

(Kubalkova, 2001, p. 69)²²

²² This table is cited from (Kubalkova, 2001, p. 69) , which is based on Onuf's synoptic table of paradigms of experience ad
faculties , 1989, P290

Table C China Threat

| Time | Author | Title of Article/Book | Main Arguments |
|-----------|-----------------------------------|---|--|
| 1992 | Munro Ross H. | "Awakening Dragon" | Leninist, Capitalist, Mechanist, Expansionist |
| 1993/1996 | Samuel Huntington | "The Clash of Civilizations?" "The Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of World Order" | China's history, culture, tradition, economy and self-esteem will push China to seek hegemony in East Asia (袁胜育, 2009, p. 7) |
| 1997 | Richard Bernstein & Ross H. Munro | "The Coming Conflict with China " | China takes the US as an enemy and will act like Fascist, threatening US without respect to the international order. (袁胜育, 2009, p. 8) |
| 2005 | Robert Kagan | "The Illusion of 'Managing' China" | " The Chinese leadership may already believe the United States is its enemy" "That is likely what the future holds. The United States may not be able to avoid a policy of containing China; we are, in fact, already doing so. " ". (Kagan, 2005) quoted in (袁胜育, 2009, p. 8) |

summarized and adapted from the information given in (袁胜育, 2009, pp. 7-9) ²³