Sino-Vatican Relations

A Conflict Transformation Perspective

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Abstract

This paper examines the complex relations of the Holy See and the Chinese government through a conflict transformation perspective. Using conflict transformation as a theory to view the conflict brings a new outlook on the conflict and the new leaders recently put in power. The ancient relationship, as well as the modern relationship, is examined to give a comprehensive background of the roots of the conflict and the current state. The tension built between the two over who has the ultimate authority over the Catholic Church affairs in China is investigated and explored thoroughly. The context of the lengthy relationship of Catholic in China is presented and significant points are identified. The needs of the groups conflicting are addressed and discussed dissecting the accommodation and repression of groups. Additionally the new leaders of both the Holy See and the Chinese government are assessed as possible catalysts for change, with emphasis on Pope Francis and Xi Jinping as agents for change. Other transformation facilitators are acknowledged and the possibility that lies with each is discussed. The prospect of the Holy See operating in China generating social or political instability is evaluated and the threats are assessed.

The research is primarily obtained from documents from peer-reviewed journals, newspaper articles, and an interview with a central figure: Cardinal Zen of Hong Kong. There was a heavy reliance of English data, which has left much of the Chinese data underutilized but regardless objectivity was a goal of the author.

The conclusions that were reached is a constructive relationship will come with more time, healing, and progressive movement but diplomatic relations will not be re-established in the near future. With perpetuation of a constructive relationship with open communication and possibly negotiation, the situation between the Roman Catholic Church and the Chinese government will transform greatly and when it does it will be a Catholic Church with Chinese characteristics that maintains the fundamental pieces of the Catholic religion.
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Introduction

The relationship between the Holy See and China has been discussed and analyzed throughout the years in hope to try to mend the relations and bring about normalized relations once again. With the new leadership in Rome, Pope Francis I, and the new leadership in China, Xi Jinping, could an agreement and progress be made, or are the two doomed to continued conflict?

China is not know as being a particularly religious country, especially with the country led by a Communist party but there is a surprisingly large presence of religious people in the largest populated country in the world. Despite a large population of atheists as well in China that go seamlessly with the communist foundations, religious ceremonies like modern men carrying large crosses up mountaintops is not completely unfamiliar in China as it is done annually in Shaanxi province at a religious site called Cross Mountain (Hays).

There are a lot of really pressing issues that the Chinese government should deal with and have much more public scrutiny, like their real social problems and pressing economic issues. The normalization of relations is an opportunity to make a move in international relations and signal the international community of change, more than a real domestic change. It would signal to the world that the government is protecting Chinese civil rights by allowing the Catholic Church to operate in all its capacities within their borders.

The likelihood conflict between the Holy See and China will not escalate into any violent conflict is almost non-existent and therefore hasn’t been on the top of the priority list for a long time, however, this does not mean that it’s not very relevant in today’s world that is changing and globalizing so fast. Both the Chinese government and the Vatican have to adapt to this new type of world and modernization, otherwise risk losing power and relevancy. If they are stuck in their ideology, they can easily lose their significance to the people they are governing.

When viewing the two parties there are many comparisons for example, each govern over 1.3 billion people, albeit one is the religious governing. Both parties are built on strong beliefs, one being an ancient religion and the other the deep political view of socialism, however with Chinese characteristics. Both are highly bureaucratic and have extremely opaque decision-making procedures by a few elite men. There are huge differences as well; like one is the most populated country on earth and the other the least populated territory. These differences and obstacles are examined and the conflict between the two is analyzed in this paper.
Thesis Problem Formulation

How can China and the Holy See normalize their relations to transform the conflict constructively to find a way for peaceful co-existence in China? What do the new leaders of China and the Holy See bring into the process that could influence the transformation?

Secondary research thesis: Are there indicators of causation of detrimental social or political change if China possibly allows the Roman Catholic Church to operate in China in all its capacities?

The pursuit of conflicting goals of the Holy See and Vatican are at the heart of the problems of non-normalized relations and the conflict transformation perspective is used to see the foundations, the current status, and future possibilities when addressing the above problem formulation. The debate over who should have ultimate authority over the appointment of bishops lies at the core of the issue, but is further complicated by vague religious law and the presence of underground Churches throughout China. The dynamics are intricate and are not purely just Patriotic Chinese Church versus the Roman Catholic, but involvement of an underground church and infighting in all the aforementioned parties greatly complicate the situation. Much tension and deterioration of relations have occurred between the Chinese government and the Holy See over which body should have autonomy over Church functions within China. In 1951, all normalized relations were dissolved and despite periods when reconciliation seemed possible, there has been little movement to produce hope for a resolution. Pope Benedict XVI sent a letter to the Catholic clergy and lay people in 2007, which seemed like it could make headway towards a solution, however it was only met with suspicion from the Chinese government who ordered it to be distributed within China. Brief periods of cooperation from both sides have arisen, but the Chinese government often reasserts their dominance and relations turn sour once again. These moves are viewed through a conflict transformation lens to better understand and define the conflict and how it has changed over time and to predict the possible transformations to come in the future. The conflict can be used as an opportunity for either party to show the world how they are modernizing or changing with the times and take this chance to progress towards their mutual goal of better governing Catholics in China but the stepping stones towards this reconciliation remain unclear.
Methodology

This section provides a complete explanation of the methodology of research conducted when researching and writing about this topic—more or less the how and why of my research. In this methodology section there are many different headings following the outline of the project. The scope and direction has been provided by the problem formulation to understand the perimeters of my research and their subsequent limitations. The structure of the project is designed to first introduce why this is relevant, a problem exists and a hypothesis is perceived, then which relevant theories are able to assist in analysis, and then a thorough analysis looking at the problem and hypothesis with the theory. In this methodology there will also be a discussion of how data was collected and why some terminology is used, basically to show and defend the validity and credibility of the approach.

Scope and Direction of the Project

The scope of the project is contained by the problem formulation and the questions posed. When dealing with any topic, especially this one about a relationship between a major world religious body and the most populous country in the world, it’s important to bring the scope of the broad topic of diplomatic relations between China and the Vatican City down to a reasonable level that is appropriate for the length and time of my studies.

The Holy See and the Chinese government are both highly bureaucratic systems that have a number of levels to analyze, for example local, province, and national strategies, this complicates the understanding of these systems but it should be stated the analysis focuses on the “macro-level” of relationships between states and non-state actors and their corresponding interests and policies.

The problem formulation discusses the normalization of relations so it must be stated what the author intends when using this phrase. Normalization of relations for the purposes of the problem formulation means the establishment of diplomatic channels in order to open discourse and communication between the two parties. Communication can occur on many levels, but the main focus will be at the formal diplomatic level and it is not exclusive with cooperation but mainly with formal recognition and acknowledgment of positions.

Also new leadership is mentioned and it should be clarified here that the new leadership of China will focus on the newly elected officials during the 18th party congress—mainly Xi Jinping. As for the new leadership of the Vatican, discussion on the new Pope, Pope Francis, will be primarily the subject, but his newly appointed curia will also be examined.
Data Used

The data primarily used in this project are writings on the Sino-Vatican relationship as seen in newspaper articles, academic journals, Chinese articles, and international press articles. The relationship between the Holy See and China is very relevant because of its present changes—during the writing of this topic both the Chinese top leadership and the Pope changed. The Chinese leadership was scheduled to change but the current Pope at the beginning of the research was Pope Benedict XVI. Since there are these current changes, there has been very little academic writing about this relationship and the influences of the new leadership and some of the news used is released at the very same time this analysis is being done. However, even previously there was not much academic work being published about Sino-Vatican relations prior to this. Peer-reviewed articles from the 1980s and evaluating current news coverage of the relations were the main methods of researching for this topic. The outdated studies do not provide current information to make a completely deductive conclusion; hence inductive reasoning was also utilized to form a complete answer to the problem formulation. This has forced the conclusions to be not completely made deductively or inductively, but woven together by both methods.

Data Collection

The reliance on secondary sources for the empirical data for this project is the reality of researching such closed bureaucratic and hierarchical political systems like those of the Chinese government and the Vatican. The sources for the data are found primarily online in academic databases, reputed newspaper outlets, or on official websites of the Vatican and China. There is a disadvantage to writing this paper in China because of the lack of access to certain resources as well as internet censorship due to the sensitivity of the topic. In addition, many of the Chinese government department’s did not have a materials or a website in English, leaving a lot of “official” information from one important source under evaluated. Qualitative and quantitative data were collected, but heavy reliance on the qualitative data was needed because the lack of quantitative data. There are many discrepancies between numbers released by Chinese sources and others, so the differences are noted and when possible mentioned in the paper. There are disadvantages of primarily using secondary data but often cases when looking for official numbers, sources from the Vatican, the Chinese government, and other sources would conflict.

Empirical data that was used could have a potential bias because of the author’s inability to read an academic level of Chinese, therefore leaving a lot of information written in Chinese unread. This dependence on articles written in English could have brought a potential bias
because Chinese perspectives could not be taken into account. This slightly skewed collected of data has been recognized by the author and consequently must be fully disclosed to the readers. Despite this, maintaining objectivity was on the mind of the author and dually sought while writing and researching this topic.

An opportunity to conduct a qualitative interview became available while writing this paper, and this unique chance to include primary data is important to the academic integrity of this paper. The interview was conducted informally via e-mail with Cardinal Zen, the former leader of the Catholic Church in Hong Kong. This interview gave insight and greater understanding from one individual's perspective that has been intimately involved but with a freedom to be open because of his location in Hong Kong. This perspective is important but also an effort to evaluate on an objective level was kept in mind because the bias of the interviewer and interviewee are taken into account when applying the data received in the analysis of the problem formulation. To review the interview questions, see Appendix A.

When researching the Catholic Church, an incredibly bureaucratic ancient organization, the clear distinction of the unique terminology is vital to reach an understanding. The vocabulary is important to embrace in the study of the Catholic Church because of the words deep-rooted meaning. Also it should stated that when mentioning the "Church" in this paper, the meaning is only meant to be the Catholic Church and none other. When discussing the Catholic Church there needs to be a distinction drawn between certain terminologies as well because the term Holy See doesn't necessarily equal the Vatican. Within this paper, the Holy See and the Vatican are terms that are used frequently. However, these terms are used interchangeably within my paper but it should be mentioned the difference between these terms for those not familiar with the political structure and historical background of the Catholic Church. The conventional long form is the Holy See (Vatican City State). The Vatican City State refers to the Lateran Treaty of 1929 that granted the Catholic Church an independent national territory under international law within Italy. Their government is considered ecclesiastical, or a religious form of leadership with the chief of state Pope Francis, who was voted by the College of Cardinals on March 13th, 2013 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013). "The Pope exercises supreme legislative, executive, and judicial power over the Holy See and Vatican City State (Background Notes on Countries of the World, 2011)." Each pope remains in power until his death or voluntary resignation, which Emeritus Pope Benedict XVI had done in early 2013. It was a move in the Catholic Church that hadn’t been seen in centuries and sent Catholics to the history books to find the proper protocol.

The Holy See, albeit similar, cannot be considered a state in the context of my project and this affects how the relationship is portrayed within the context of my paper. The Holy See has an organizational structure, which is comparable to state’s governance structure, strongly
executed leadership, and even territory within the city of Rome. However, the debate on the Holy See being or not being a state is a whole other argument. Their international recognition as an important universal religious body for Catholics worldwide is how the Holy See will be discussed in this paper. They have an observer status at the UN, similar to the EU, but play no decision-making part in international relations, hence why the Holy See is described as a non-state actor in this context. The Holy See “enters into international agreements and receives and send diplomatic representatives (Background Notes on Countries of the World, 2011).” The administration of the Holy See has the Pope as the leader, and his authority over the Roman Curia and the Papal Civil Service. The Curia, which will be mentioned several times throughout the paper, consist of the head named the Secretariat of State and nine Congregations, three Tribunals, 12 Pontifical Councils, as well as a number of offices that support the top affairs of the Church (Background Notes on Countries of the World, 2011). For more information about the Curia, please reference Appendix B in order to gain more information about the structure and conduction of the Church and its agencies.

Structure of the Project

The introduction serves as a brief look at the relationship and its relevancy. This is followed by the problem formulation that operates as the research parameters. The next section of the paper is about methodology, which discusses the methodological considerations that were taken in account for the research of this topic. This should stand behind the validity of the research as well as the method. Theory is the title given to the theoretical discussion part of the paper. In this section, the theory is introduced as well as the aspects of the theory that will be applied in the analysis. It should function as the basics of the theory, to show the author's take on the concepts and angles of the theory, which will be applied in the next section, the analysis. Empirical data will be not addressed separately from the analysis of the data because most of the data is qualitative data taken from the history of the relationship. The next section delivers the context for the complicated relationship that China has with the Catholic Church throughout history. The perspective that the empirical data of the historical background provides is valuable when looking holistically at the relationship between the Vatican and China and the progression or regression made in time. Each history has created an identity that has been shaped from their respective histories. The analysis will show the application of the theory on the data to address the original problem formulation and examine the ideas in order to be fully thought-out and supported. Finally, the conclusion will summarize the findings of the research
and subsequent analysis. This section should serve as the concise answer to the problems presented in the problem formulation.

Use of Theories

In order to validate the arguments made in the paper and show the change and transformation, a conflict theory named conflict transformation will be used. Its application will address the problem formulation that has been previously stated in the paper. This complex issue has very few theories that can fully describe the relationship between the two quite like conflict transformation but it is clear that no theory is perfect for every intricate relationship. Hence, the theory as developed by Lederach, Vayrynen, and Azar are used to discuss, analyze the constructive opportunities for the parties researched and analyzed in this paper. These theorists’ ideas, works, and models are used in accordance to my purposes to show a full comprehensive picture of the context in which the problem is based and bring about the reframing of the problem so to benefit all parties. There are particular aspects of key importance, although it should be noted that some parts of the theory will not be fully addressed because it’s not applicable to my specific problem formulation but a look at the comprehensiveness of the theory will be done.

The goal is to use conflict transformation to see beyond the perceived threats and identify the conflict’s opportunities to grow and increase the understanding of each side. Using a transformative perspective of the conflict between the Holy See and the Chinese government, there is no focus on just one peak or valley of the relations, but the view of the entire mountain range or the ebb and flow of the relationship (Lederach, 2003). When viewing one particular episode in the conflict, Lederach uses a sea as an analogy, how there is a rhythm and pattern to the movements but there are periodically changes the affect the sea and everything around them (Lederach, 2003), and so the episodes are viewed as embedded in the bigger pattern. In order to look at the trends and embedded meaning of event, the mapping of the conflict is done so to understand it.

The identification and definition of the conflict is concluded by a close look at the parties, these parties’ objectives, the means the parties are employing to achieve their objectives, and their orientations to handling the conflict and the environments which these things are set in. When the mapping of the conflict is comprehensive enough, it brings about creating proactive and prescriptive future outcomes for the new leadership and their impact on the conflict.

Since some of the main questions around conflict transformation are about violent conflict, there is less focus on the perspectives about reducing violence and increasing justice because the problems between the two parties are not likely to develop into this type of destructive
conflict. The main focus is put instead, on the constructive interaction that can address more systemic and structural obstacles. The problem formulation is not based on a interpersonal interaction level, and therefore the conflict transformation theory will not be used at this low level, but instead looking at the level between the two relatively closed systems of the Holy See and the Chinese government. The models of dimensions of change as described by Vayrynen are utilized because actor transformation is especially relevant because both the Holy See and China have very recently obtained new leaders.

There are some concerns that the focus on the less visible factors is difficult to do when addressing both China and the Vatican because of their heavy leaning towards opacity, because of this some assumptions must be made to try to infer into the workings and decisions of both sides of the conflict but each assumption will be explained as to why the assumption has been made in the text. The ability to identify the conflict dynamics is difficult, and the mapping done and subsequent analysis is meant to delve down to a deep level of context the conflict is based, however, it must be realized that exhaustive research might not uncover all aspects of this deeply complex and at times, obscure relationship.
Theory

This section should introduce and provide the reader the explanation of the theory of conflict transformation as it is perceived and used in this paper. The key features, differentiation from other similar theories, and the elaborations from a few influential theorists are discussed. The explanation serves as the theoretical background in order to understand its relevancy, application, and conclusion drawn from the problem formulation.

Conflict Transformation

Conflict transformation is not a static theory and this makes it difficult to introduce and describe as it is often described in terms of how it is different from conflict resolution, management, engagement, etc. Furthermore, the inconsistent usage and practices further obscure the basics of the conflict. During the 1990s the language within conflict resolution took a turn to conflict transformation and much of the process and terminology shifted and the approaches became developed and practiced (Botes, 2003). It has been the topic of much debate that the conflict theories: conflict transformation, conflict resolution, and conflict management are just semantics. However this confusion is because of the similar foundations and the great length conflict has been theorized. Lederach, one of the theorists that will be further addressed, defined conflict transformation as follows:

“Conflict transformation must actively envision, include, respect, and promote the human and cultural resources from within a given setting. This involves a new set of lenses through which we do not primarily ‘see’ the setting and the people in it as the ‘problem’ and the outsider as the ‘answer’. Rather, we understand the long-term goal of transformation as validating and building on people and resources within the setting” (Lederach as quoted in (Miall, 2004, p. 4))

The perspective of the conflict from a transformation viewpoint enables the natural process of conflict to be evaluated in accordance to its dialectic nature and then predicted because of the mutual cause-and-effect the conflict creates between the groups in conflict. The prescriptive nature of the conflict transformation also lets the transformation of perceptions allow the conflict to not harm or be destructive to the parties and over time build mutual understanding (Spangler, 2003).

Differentiation between Conflict Theories

Even within the different theories of conflict there are different schools of thought with significant amount of overlapping concepts. The easiest way to understand conflict transformation as opposed to conflict management and conflict resolution is as “a re-
conceptualization of the field in order to make it more relevant to contemporary conflicts (Miall, 2004, p. 3). As seen in Table 1 below, the specific probing questions when addressing conflicts are not the same for both conflict resolution and the conflict transformation perspective, these examples show the outlook that distinguishes them. Conflict transformation supporters often criticize conflict resolution because the view is inherently viewing conflicts as a negative occurrence without looking at the fundamental nature of relationships.

Table 1: Resolution and Transformation: A Brief Comparison of Perspective

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(Lederach, 2003)

Conflict management can generally be defined as "the positive and constructive handling of difference and divergence... rather than advocating methods for removing conflicts, it addresses the more realistic question of managing the conflict (Miall, 2004, p. 3)". The general idea is that resolution of conflicts is too idealistic in nature, so therefore the management to keep it constructive and positive is the best way to deal with these issues. Conflict management usually has a very political viewpoint of conflicts, where there are other actors who are able to put pressure on the groups with the conflict to settle. In contrast, conflict resolution does not have such a political tie when viewing these conflicts; the main view they employ is about the fundamental needs of groups when looking at conflicts from the identity and community context. Conflict resolution streams usually have a creative look into the past to look to see if there are opportunities to become "entrenched" from their positions that have caused them to conflict (Miall, 2004, p. 3). These ideas of conflict management and conflict resolution are different from conflict transformation because there is more than meets the eye when looking at contemporary conflicts besides just “reframing of positions and the identification of win-win outcomes.” The conflicts can come from embedded structural and patterns of the relationships that extend beyond these given actors or circumstances, conflict transformation is a process of
“engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses, and if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of the conflict (Miall, 2004, p. 4).

All conflict theories, including conflict management, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation are all generally linked to the study and analysis of violent conflicts, but this link is not universally linked to conflict. In fact, these theories about conflict can be used with different actors and different conflicts very well. The actors can vary from the interpersonal, the organizational, or to the state level and the conflicts can vary just as extremely as the actors, for example from violent types to managerial types.

Conflict management focuses on the relationship and managing it, however the goal is not to find a resolution but to look more practically at preventing the relationship to deteriorate into something violent or destructive. This is most commonly used in situations where there are conflicts with non-negotiable human needs because it is seen as more feasible to manage the conflict (Spangler, 2003). The main compliant of conflict management is the viewpoint that groups can be controlled like objects and the lack of deeper look or consideration about the roots of the conflict, instead just the management of the root cause’s symptoms as visible in society.

Voices of Conflict Transformation

For the purposes of my usage of conflict transformation, there are three dominant theorists ideas and models employed. These three different theorists, Azar, Vayrynen, and Lederach, contribute a context and framework to understand the conflicts roots and the future of the conflict. The range of these men’s ideas will bring a dynamic view of conflict transformation from the descriptive process on through the prescriptive process. Their work creates a comprehensive viewpoint to analyze the relationships between groups.

Edward Azar

Best known for this work in the study of social conflict, Edward Azar was never a part of the “era of conflict transformation” because he predated it. Azar’s work has been developed over time to add much to the analysis of conflicts and his model of protracted social conflict has been used for the analysis of conflicts since it was created. His model of protracted social conflicts, as developed in Miall’s contribution in the Berhof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management handbook, breaks apart the pieces into 5 parts: context, needs, capacity, actors, and conflict. Context refers to background, or bird’s eye view, of the layout of the problem, needs refers to the different needs of the parties within the conflict. Capacity refers to the amount that something could produce, or the size and scope of the stakeholders. The portion for
actors is not just meant for the actors within the parties conflicting, but also the possible outside interventionists, social groups, etc. Finally, the conflict part of the figure is about the nature of the conflict and whether it could be used constructively to build better relations, or destructively to produce a negative outcome. According to the results of each area, there can be some prediction to the next stage of transformation. This model is especially vital because of its ability to be read forwards and backwards to look at conflicts because forward movement is not exclusive in most conflicts.

“The model goes beyond simple structural or behavioral explanations and suggests how patterns of conflict interact with the satisfaction of human need, the adequacy of political and economic institutions and the choices made by political actors. It also suggests how different options can lead to benign or malignant spirals of conflict (Miall, 2004, p. 5).”

Figure 1: Transformation of Protracted Social Conflicts

Raimo Vayrynen

Raimo Vayrynen has contributed considerably to the discussion of conflict transformation and international relations. It’s Vayrynen’s approach to conflict transformation that has special relevance because it focuses on the change over time to the issues, actors, and interests “as a
consequence of the social, economic, any political dynamics of societies (Miall, 2004, p. 5).” His theoretical and analytical approach looks at the following ways conflicts are transformed:

- Actor transformations- internal changes in parties, or the appearance of new parties
- Issue transformations- altering the agenda of conflict issues
- Rule transformations- changes in the norms or rules governing a conflict
- Structural transformations- the entire structure of relationships and power distribution in the conflict transformed

(Miall, 2004, p. 5)

Actor transformation can include things such as changes of leadership, changes of goals, intra-party change, change in the party’s constituencies, and changing actors (Miall, 2004). These can be major or minor to the transformation of the conflict, depending on the significance. Issue transformation can be seen in things like transcendence of contested issues, constructive compromise, changing issues, and de-linking or re-linking issues (Miall, 2004). Issue, rule, and structural transformations can affect the context and contradictions at the heart of the conflict, while actor transformations are seen to affect the attitude, memories, behavior and relationships generally (Miall, 2004).

Built on Vayrynen’s approach, there are important links that connect the contradictions, attitudes and behaviors in conflicts and they can be summarizes as the context, the relationships, and the memories. The context is arguably the most important when looking at conflicts because of the background information of the groups conflicting and the cultural differences are crucial to the comprehension of what is at the root of the problem. Relationships are about the “whole fabric of interaction within society (Miall, 2004, p. 8)” and can bring more obstacles when doing peace building in the aftermath. The memories are about the groups’ socially constructed understanding of the conflict, which is shaped by culture, learning, and discourse and belief (Miall, 2004, p. 8).

John Paul Lederach

Lederach is seen as one of the biggest contributors to the conflict transformation perspective. His work gives prescriptive paths to enable the conceptualization of the route to desired outcomes. Lederach theorized similar dimensions of transformers like Vayrynen, however he summarizes it in four groups: personal, relational, structural, and cultural. There is much overlap within these models and therefore Vayrynen’s model will be the main model used in this paper. Lederach’s view about the process being more important than the outcome exemplifies his focus on the ebb and flow of relationships and the creation of better functioning relationships to the continual evolvement of the relationships. He also emphasizes that conflicts are not solely about solving the problems that lead to the conflict but changing the relationships of both parties that lead to the conflict. The transformation is often seen as circular, like
relationship and life cycles. Lederach’s development of conflict transformation is undeniable and his themes of viewing the conflict as a journey similar to the body parts: head, heart, hands, and legs. The head refers to the conceptual understanding of the conflict, how it is perceived and then therefore approached. The heart is seen as the center of emotions, intuitions, and spiritual life and like the body it’s the starting and ending point, which is a unique way to view the relationship and opportunities of a conflict. The hands refer to the building and changing that can occur as a result of conflict. Finally the legs are about the journeys taken and the viewpoint that the end is not static but a continuously evolving and developing voyage (Lederach, 2003, p. 4).

Asymmetric and Symmetric Conflicts

Another vital piece to the conflict transformation is the understanding of the parties involved and were the power lies. The mention of power is unavoidable when discussing conflict and the study of asymmetric and symmetric conflicts have been done at length. When there is an unbalance, the conflict has a normal routine of a process of a form of oppression, awareness, mobilization, confrontation, and ultimately empowerment via mediation. The identification of the power balance in conflict transformation is important to fully understand the relationship and helps define and map the conflict better, in addition the view of "hard" power and "soft" power is important when looking at the possible impetuses to resolve the conflict. War and military is often discussed when looking at asymmetric conflicts, nevertheless it is still relevant in the study of non-violent conflicts because it builds to the understanding of the relationships. The trend of destabilization of the relationships when power is severely unequally distributed is a dangerous reality these types of relations. Looking at the model of transforming asymmetric conflicts on the next page, it can be seen as the route for the balancing of power and an agreed relationship. It also highlights the loop that parties can be trapped repeating over and over, until the transformation of attitudes and relationships.

The piece also goes back to Azar’s protracted social conflicts, were there is also discussion of power inequalities in conflicts. There is a dominant social group, which gets its needs met at the direct expense of the other group(s). The needs refer to political access, security, etc. The other groups are then dissatisfied and feel more marginalized and if the state cannot properly mediate, then comes a there is ‘disarticulation between the state and society as a whole (Azar, 1990). Azar’s protracted social conflicts show that most often these countries in which the conflict takes place is governed by "incompetent, parochial, fragile, authoritarian regimes
(Reimann, 2001)” because governance provided by the state will be in direct affect to the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the identity group needs.

**Model 1: Transforming asymmetric conflicts**

![Model Diagram]

*Source: from Francis, 1994*

**Figure 1.12 Transforming asymmetric conflicts (II)**

(Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011)
Empirical Analysis

The empirical analysis portion of this paper will provide an analysis based on the conflict transformation theory, as it has been outlined previously, on the empirical data collected. The empirical data collected is primarily based on the relationship between the Holy See, Catholics, and the Chinese government. The conflict will be defined in accordance to the conflict transformation view, and mapped thoroughly by looking at the context, capacity, and actors. Next, the conflict transformers will be evaluated and analyzed and the secondary research question will be addressed.

Introduction of the Conflict

The current conflict between China and the Holy See can be crudely summed up in two points: autonomy and Taiwan. There are several smaller points of contention that also further aggravate the conflict but the largest and most significant issues are those stated above. Firstly, the autonomy issue can be explained as the problem of which body, the Holy See, or the state run Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association have the ultimate say in the workings of the church, most often played out in the ordinations of bishops. According to the Holy See norms, the Pope has the only authority to appoint and ordinate bishops because of their high status within the Church, based on Canon Law #377 “the supreme pontiff freely appoints bishops or confirms those lawfully elected.” This has not been happening in the Chinese Patriotic Church uniformly. Both have a pretty fair claim to ordaining the leaders of the Catholics in China, but both also exaggerate the threat the other poses. The Chinese government wants to ensure the bishops, with such power, are not seeking radical societal or political change, but are ultimately loyal to the commitment towards the government goal of social stability. The government wants to protect the Chinese people from the Vatican if the Church wanted to plant some bishops with a rebellious nature. The Chairman of the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association is quoted as saying, “bishops should love the country, love religion, and politically they should respect the constitution, respect the law, and fervently love the socialist motherland (New Tang Dynasty Television, 2012).” This type of bishop that the state run Church is trying to promote is not the same as the Holy See. The Vatican keeps the view that fundamentally, Catholics follow the teaching of the Pope, and he is therefore at the head of the Church. The Holy See looks at the Priests who are coerced by the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Church to ordain Bishops, who have not been approved by the Pope, as going against the central governance of the Catholic Church that the Holy See holds and therefore risking excommunication. In a way this can be seen as a
struggle over the control of the hearts and minds of the China Catholics. This, however, can turn destructive when competing for the control, and the Catholics in China get stuck in the middle.

Also threatening China’s territorial claims is the Vatican’s recognition of Taiwan as an independent nation from China and as the “real” government of China. Few countries still support the idea of Taiwan as an independent country from China, but the Vatican still holds that line that was drawn right after the formation of the People’s Republic. This obviously undermines the integrity of the Chinese state and hurts the legitimacy of their claim of the territorial declarations. This issue is not necessarily permanently labeled a barrier to relations because the Vatican has let it be known that they are willing to negotiate on this matter. The former minister of foreign affairs of the Holy See has made this potential change of acknowledgment very clear in a statement released in October 2005, but he also stipulated that the Vatican be treated fairly and that Beijing must recognize religious freedom. Taiwan still remains a bargaining chip because the international norms now do not support this idea of Taiwan being independent from China and now almost all countries have established and maintain normalized relations with Chinese government in Beijing.

The issues of autonomy contribute to the each sides’ having suspicions of perceived threat. Their ideologies bare no commonalities besides the need to guide a billion of their constituents. Ideological differences continue to resonate, like in particular the field of human rights. The papacy have historically been outspoken about human rights and an international advocate for championing human rights. Despite Western criticism of human rights in China, there is no denying the outstanding job to eradicate millions of Chinese from poverty. The problem comes down to the very definition of human rights and whether this definition has civil liberties come before eradicating poverty, or collective welfare is before individual welfare. China is not receptive to criticism about human rights, and this area has contributed to tension between the two, as well as between China and the international community.

The Chinese official stance on religious affairs seems contradictory to the strained relationship with the Vatican. The formation of the People’s Republic of China and the rule of the Chinese Communist party brought with it the Marxist ideology of atheism. Members of the Communist party are not supposed to be openly religious, but may keep their personal beliefs to themselves. Perhaps lack of history and lack of experience render most of the leaders in China to underestimate the persistence of all religious traditions (Hong, 2011). The first attempt to deal with religion was to remove it completely from the citizen’s lives—during the times of “‘Anti-Rightest Campaign’ in 1957-1958 and the Cultural Revolution period of 1966-1976” and this was in spite of the declaration of religious liberty in the first constitution promulgated in 1954 (Hong, 2011). Since this time though, tremendous effort has been made to the policies of
religion in China. The formation of several organizations, like the National United Front Work, Religious Affairs Bureau, and State Administration for Religious Affairs, acknowledge the legitimacy of religion and that the religious needs of Chinese citizens need to be addressed or risk societal instability and political instability. The Chinese government feels that freedom of religious belief should be upheld but the religious activities should be limited and incorporated in the idea of becoming a harmonious society.

There comes another twist in the conflict when looking deeply and this is the underground Catholics in China that have remained faithful to the Holy See. They are a non-focal party within this conflict but their presence adds a layer of complexity to the issue as the underground rely on the Holy See to look after their interests and could potentially feel betrayed or alienated if the Holy See strikes a compromise with the Chinese government. Their role in the conflict, along with both focal parties, will be elaborated further later in the analysis.

Context

The context of the on-going tensions between the Holy See and China serves as the backdrop of the current relations. The context, or mapping of the conflict covers the past relations, like the historical background of the Catholics in China and the previous experiences both have of each other as this is vital to gain a full understanding. When looking at the historical relations, the memories of each party contribute to their socially constructed understanding of the conflict and therefore bring better comprehension to the conflict at hand.

Describing the history of the Catholic Church in China is like an endless series of peaks and valleys of relations, characterized by the Chinese generally being guarded and suspicious of the very “foreignness” of the Catholic institution, often lumping it together with the other Christian religions. Foreigners’ mistreatment of Chinese, although not necessarily associated with Catholicism but linked to them because of their relations to organized religion, in large part, brought that distinct viewpoint. This section should provide a full look into the relationship and go beyond the challenges they’ve had, but also the successes gained. This section should provide a holistic viewpoint that better embodies the real challenges and opportunities that the Catholic Church and China have had in the past as well as the future. A significant look into the past can also help identify attitudes and norms that have been established and then see what barriers remain. A look into the ancient past is useful to comprehend the historical value that the relationship can hold.
Ancient Historical Relations

Christian history within China has been quite long, stemming all the way back to the Tang dynasty in AD635, when Nestorian priests came to Hangzhou as merchants (Chan, 1989, p. 815). The city’s location for traders brought in many people of different backgrounds, including Christian, Muslims, and Jews. These Nestorian priests did not make much impact and mostly are not considered influential during that time in either evangelization or conversions. Much later in the 13th century, Franciscan Catholics established several missions, likewise in Hangzhou but also in other open ports (Leung & Liu, 2004), and has been said to have been able to convert around 30,000 Mongols, however it had little impact in the long run and those Mongols leaving little trace of this in their lineage. It was the famed Marco Polo and his entourage who are among the first Catholics to ever come to China. Marco Polo and the Yuan emperor Kublai Khan struck an accord and there was a letter sent to Pope Clement IV (Melvin, 2013). By the time the letter had reached Rome, a new Pope was being sought but there was too much division between the College of Cardinals to choose a successor, however despite this correspondence and eventual Catholic envoy to China, all efforts ended when the Mongol Yuan dynasty was over and the new Han Chinese Ming Dynasty came into power and closed China to the outside world (Melvin, 2013).

It’s generally acknowledged that the Modern Catholicism came to China through a few influential priests but most notably Francis Xavier, Matteo Ricci, and Michael Ruggieri, all practicing Jesuits. Their arrival corresponded during the Ming and Qing Dynasty (Hays, 2011). In the Jesuit tradition, which is a distinct religious order of Catholicism, retains a focus on education, and the collection of intellectual and cultural research. This approach of knowledge exchange and education achieved some followers and fans in China, eventually including even the Emperor, but won relatively few converts. The majority of the Catholic missions weren’t successful because of the lack of time they were permitted on Mainland China from Macao, for example one Jesuit priest, Mechior Nuñez Barreto, was permitted to Canton twice for one month each time in 1555 (Brucker, Matteo Ricci). This time was mostly used for language study since the Jesuit priests are interested in academic and cultural exchange but the short time frames could not allow relationships to blossom or even take root. Most missionaries were asked to refrain from proselytizing and “forming a Christian Christianity”, which can be relatively difficult when exchanging different viewpoints and at times they were treated antagonistically and expelled from China.

Father Francis Xavier brought the Society of Jesus and Catholicism to the East as a pioneer of the Church. He’s commonly referred to as the Missionary of the Orient and considered to be the second greatest missionary besides Saint Peter who founded the Church. Before he departed
to the Orient, he co-founded the Society of Jesus with a few close priests. He was originally sent to the Orient as commissioned by Pope Ignatius at the request of the King of Portugal. St. Francis Xavier went to Mozambique, India, Malaysia, and Japan but it was his dream to evangelize in China. He reached an island outside the Bay of Canton in 1552, but never stepped onto the mainland because he fell ill and died on the island shortly after. He inspired countless Catholics to travel and spread the word of Catholicism, especially in the Orient. He was canonized in 1622 by Pope Gregory XV and shaped the way for the likes of Father Matteo Ricci and Michael Ruggeri (Wintz, 2006). It was his description of China that has inspired so many to seek the evangelization of China:

“an immense empire, enjoying profound peace, and which... is superior to all Christian states in the practice of justice and equity... Their country abounds in all things... In intellect they are superior even to the Japanese... I am beginning to have great hopes that God will soon provide free entrance to China, not only our Society, but to religious of all Orders... (Melvin, 2013)”

Father Matteo Ricci, the most well-known Catholic priest in Chinese history, was highly respected by Emperor Wan-li and because of this relationship he should get a significant amount of credit for helping the early Sino-Catholic relationships flourish and build mutual trust (Brucker, 2012). His mastery of the Chinese language and contributions of geographical maps increased the knowledge of China’s geography were at that time groundbreaking, as well as his contribution to weather forecasting. He spent nine years in Peking with the Emperor Wan-li, beginning in 1601. Those nine years, there was a lot of knowledge exchange because despite how advanced the Chinese were in arts and sciences, Ricci showed there were many parts of astrology and mathematics that expanded the traditional Chinese education (Brucker, Matteo Ricci). Father Michael Ruggieri was welcomed into China because Father Ricci’s previous work in China as well as a piece of western craftsmanship that had caught the attention of some Chinese officials (Leung & Liu, 2004, p. iv). He later was invited to Hangzhou in 1585 and founded a long running tradition of Catholic presence in that city. Later, in the year 1658, Priest Martin Martini, another renowned Jesuit, was stationed in Hangzhou and authored the “Atlas of Description of China” which still holds significant academic value today (Leung & Liu, 2004). These Jesuit priests translated science and technology literature into Chinese, introducing “Western medicine, modern hospitals, and Western-style secondary and tertiary educational institutions (Liu & Leung, 2002, p. 122)”. It was under this spirit, and not under the more traditional Catholic doctrine that most the relationship was made which is why these success stories do not reflect the attitudes today of the Sino-Holy See relations. The problem of reaching Chinese people at a spiritual level beyond their traditional Confucian or Daoism, and not solely at an educational level, remained. A prominent Catholic method of inclusion with local cultures
and beliefs hadn’t been successfully utilized in the Catholic missions to China, and this became a barrier between the traditional Confucius and Daoism beliefs and the Catholic doctrine (Hong, 2011). Although some of Father Matteo Ricci’s works were read with respect and esteem, it did not revolutionize Chinese thought or spirituality.

There were some controversies during this early time of Catholicism in China, namely with the “Chinese Rites Controversy”. The general controversy was about whether a Chinese Catholic could continue being a Confucian as well as a Catholic. Emperor Kangxi is said to have responded to Pope Clement XI’s decision to have Chinese Catholics not participate in rituals to honor their ancestors by saying this:

“Reading this proclamation, I have concluded that Westerners are petty indeed. It is impossible to reason with them because they do not understand the larger issues as we understand them... To judge from this proclamation their religion is no different from other small, bigoted sects of Buddhism or Taoism. I have never seen a document, which contains so much nonsense. From now on, Westerners should not be allowed to preach in China, to avoid further trouble. (Melvin, 2013)”

This soured the standing relationship between the Catholic Church in China and the Emperor and it never fully recovered mostly because of political struggles within the Holy See and the time period of dissolution of the Jesuits.

The early Church’s role in China, of course prior to 1949, was as a contributor to health, welfare, and education. There was controversy of Catholic clergy during the Opium Wars and Boxer Rebellion that have been condemned by the Chinese, but not all work of Catholics in China were damaging. Together Catholics and Protestants supported and ran 16 universities, 5,000 schools, 216 hospitals, and 781 clinics. They worked in poor and remote areas of China and focused on woman’s education, which was considered quite revolutionary because it gave rural women a chance at a much different life and aided social mobility (Leung & Liu, 2004). This work in lower social sphere was important but also did not have a large impact because of the clan associations that Chinese society had.

The Post-1949 Background of Relations

The previous section gave a historical background from pre-1949 and this next section focuses on the happenings after the formation of the People’s Republic of China, when the Church became an uncomfortable institution for the new government of China. Arguably, the most important times is those after 1949 and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China because of the current mistrust between the current government of the PRC and the Holy See. The era of relations gives pretext to the current lack of bilateral talks.

Consequently, because China had fought fiercely against European powers and their unequal and unfair treaties, the workers within the Christian faith were grouped together with
the European powers as oppressive Westerners’ that were exploiting and humiliating the Chinese people. No matter if there was some truth to this combination, Christianity in China was viewed with distrust and hostility, which was left over and actually grew with Mao Zedong’s led government and their nationalist fervor.

The first contact between the Holy See and China was in 1922, when the Holy See was first able to send an ecclesiastical representative, however he did not hold any formal diplomatic title or experience which pointedly could reflect the feelings of the relations between the Holy See and China. Previous to that, there had been attempts to exchange diplomatic courtesies in 1888 and 1918, but French missionaries were successful in keeping a tight control of the Chinese Church and has warded off those attempts (Chan, 1989). The diplomatic attempts they made in 1888 and 1918 were bugled because of French political pressure on the Vatican (Ashiwa, 2009). Interestingly, France had placed a type of “protectorate” over the Chinese Church and all communication to and from Beijing had to go through Paris. This led to a strong control that left the Vatican out of the loop for quite some years. It wasn't until 1922 that the Vatican was able to make direct contact and set up a Chinese synod of bishops, which brought real claim of Vatican control. One of their first major moves was to build a basilica on the grounds where several clergymen had prayed to the Virgin Mary for safety during the Taiping Rebellion. When it was upgraded as a basilica in 1943, a special designation in Catholic buildings, it brought about the shift of China's church becoming a national church where it would have a new Chinese jurisdiction that was not under the control of the Vatican office for foreign missions (Ashiwa, 2009).

The Vatican was able to receive a representative, holding real titles and experience, from the Republic of China government in 1943, and reciprocated by appointing an apostolic internuncio is 1946, during the extensive time period of the Chinese Civil War (1927-1950). However, these positions were not filled long because of the radical changes occurring within China as the end seemed near with the Communists being the prevailing winner, so the representative from China who was stationed at the Vatican, Wu Jiaoxiong, “abandoned his post” and returned to China briefly and finally fled with his family to the US (Chan, 1989, p. 815). Antonio Riberi, who was the apostolic internuncio at the time, remained in Nanjing, which was the headquarters of the Nationalist faction, after most of the diplomatic corps fled. After the Three Self movement was introduced, Father Riberi issued a warning not to follow this proposed movement. In 1951 he was expelled to Hong Kong for the reason of “colluding with colonials and imperialism in exploiting the Chinese (Chan, 1989).” His move alienated him politically within the Church for a time because he seemed to favor the PRC government because of his duration in Nanjing when
everyone else was fleeing. After tensions subsided, Father Riberi was stationed in Taiwan and supported the “Republic of China” government.

After September 6, 1951 when the Papal Nuncio was expelled there were no more normalized relations between the Holy See and China (Brown, 2007, p. 13) and this was when it has been identified as the date of broken relations. It however did not stop there and further deteriorated occurred in 1957 when “Pope Pius XII excommunicated two bishops that had been appointed by Mao (Hays, 2011).” It was after this period that the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association was created to be able to govern the Catholics still within China and a large portion of Catholics still loyal to the Pope were pushed underground. However, this underground Catholic Church had little chance to meet because of the Cultural Revolution conducted by Mao’s government.

In 1957 Pope John XXIII as a good-will gesture stopped referring to the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association as schismatic from the Roman Catholic Church, however the relations were pretty frosty until 1980. From the period of 1966 to 1980 basically all religious activities were stopped because of the radical changes brought to China by the Cultural Revolution (Brown, 2007, p. 13). Most Catholic churches were lucky if they were just closed because they faced demolition or extreme vandalism. Despite the bad tiding for the Churches, the Catholic clergy faced worse. During this time they were largely persecuted, imprisoned, and most tried to flee the country.

A move that further escalated the tension was when Pope Pius XII (1939-1958) was an ardent anticommmunist, and chose to excommunicate the bishops who established the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association. This really marked the end of the Pope’s approval of bishops for ordination and brought in condemnation of the Chinese state’s laws and policies that contradicted Church teachings, like the one child policy and the means of achieving that.

Pope John Paul II made a conciliatory speech to China from his visit in Manila in 1981 and through the public sphere as the medium some messages were sent to China and back, however overt. The most noteworthy coming from Qiao Liansheng, who was the director the Religious Affair Bureau at the time, said this about the Pope and the Holy See to really show the attitude of the Chinese Patriotic Church:

“...The reality of the so-called pope is the monarchical power of this [sovereign] state. This state mixes politics with all religious matters, masquerading under a religious guide. All religious manifestations of the Vatican, all instructions and so on have a political color; all are in political service to its colonialism. Against this, the Catholics of our nation and other citizens must be sufficiently alert and informed... so as never to allow a monarchical political party with the status of a nation to become the partner of faith, because of one’s allegiance to Catholicism, or to blindly follow and serve, and this to be hoodwinked by politics, even to betray our nation.
The Vatican is an enemy of the Chinese people, which came only to serve the expansion of colonialism in the twentieth century. ... When the Japanese militarism invaded China, dividing our nation's soil by force of arms, when the puppet government of Manchukuo was established in our northeast provinces, the Vatican was the first to give diplomatic recognition. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Vatican maintained a hostile attitude to new China, and from the beginning carried on a series of wrecking [sabotage] activities toward our nation..." (Brown, 2007, p. 16).

After Pope John Paul's passing in 2004 and the emergence of Pope Benedict XVI, a trend was established around 2006, to have the Vatican and China working together to select which bishops to ordain (USCIRF, 2012, p. 143) which showed some easing of the tension between the sides. However, these periods have always been relatively short lived. The below table is a summarized of the last decade of relations, with the look into which bishops have been ordained and other happenings.

Table 2: Overview of Catholic Activities since 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bishops Ordained with Vatican Approval</th>
<th>Bishops ordained without Vatican Approval</th>
<th>Other highlights/lowlights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Ma Yinglin in Kunming</td>
<td>Liu Xinhong in Anhui, Wan Renlei in Jiangsu</td>
<td>Letter from Pope Benedict XVI; Bishop Jia Zhigao from an underground church in Hebei was arrested for the 11th time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese Philharmonic Visit Vatican; Leading up to the Olympics, underground churches were harassed and controls was tightened.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Paul Meng Qinglu, bishop of a diocese in Inner Mongolia and Joseph Han Yinghin, bishop of Sanyuan</td>
<td>Guo Jincao</td>
<td>Benedict XVI canonized 120 Chinese martyrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Joseph Huang Bingzhang in Guangdong</td>
<td></td>
<td>Detention of Joseph Lei Shiying; Joseph Sun Jigeng was detained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Harbin’s Yue Fushen named Ma Daqin quit the association and was later allegedly placed under house arrest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Taiwan’s top leader Ma Ying-jeou at the Pope’s inaugural mass</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Hays 2011, USCIRF 2012, and Gosset 2013)

Those watching the Sino-Vatican relations had the feeling in 2004 that with the death of Pope John Paul II, a chance to re-establish relations could happen, but with Pope Benedict XVI, the relations were just as mixed as previous years. For example in 2007, Pope Benedict XVI wrote a letter addressing the "bishops, priests, consecrated persons and lay faithful of the Catholic Church in the People’s Republic of China" that pleaded for an open dialogue to ease tensions and help build a “harmonious society” in China (Lazzarotto, 2012). This letter wasn’t met with the expected reaction from the Chinese Central government though, because after initial distribution of the letter, quickly dioceses stopped distribution of the letter because the Chinese authorities felt it was an intrusion of Chinese internal affairs. The United Front Department, with the Special Administration of Religious Affairs, declared the Pope’s letter as a “Vatican infiltration attempt and a challenge to China’s sovereignty” (Lazzarotto, 2012). Afterwards, from 2010 to today, there have been several bishops in quick succession that were appointed without Pope Benedict XVI’s approval (National Catholic Reporter, 2007). Pope Benedict XVI was very public about his disapproval of these ordained bishops while pushing further for a “constructive dialogue with the authorities of the P.R.C.” (Lazzarotto, 2012). The Vatican has reported “forced” ordination of bishops and the Vatican had to threaten excommunication to those who disobeyed canon laws of the Church. The letter also indicated that there were several hard lines that the Vatican sought, or “unrenounceable principles of the faith”, and so China should also be flexible if there is to be headway in relations (Brown, 2007, p. 8). The depth of the letter goes much further than the Catholic ecclesiology, but how the issues could be address for the underground Church, the bishops that have been ordained without the pontifical mandate, and how the government would grant a more “authentic” religious freedom structure (Brown, 2007, p. 2). As it stands, the religious law can be interpreted too loosely, for example no one can ask anyone else to believe in a religion. “Proselytizing is considered a violation of religious freedom in that atheistic belief is being violated (Leung & Liu, 2004)” In the letter, Benedict writes “As far as relations between the political community and the Church in China are concerned, it is worth calling to mind the enlightening teaching of the Second Vatican Council, which states: The Church, by reason of her role and competence, is not
identified with any political community nor is she tied to any political system (Brown, 2007, p. 10).”

On October 1st 2010, Pope Benedict canonized 120 Chinese martyrs and despite the honor it was meant to bestow was not received well by the Chinese government, instead it was seen as a slight because of the date of the ceremony. For the Pope to use the anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China as the day for the ceremony was met with great backlash from China. Most interpret the Holy See’s decision was to honor, but it’s difficult to say because the Chinese government has made it clear how they view those killed during the Opium Wars and Boxer Rebellion. The presence of many Chinese clergy members, especially Cardinal Paul Shan Kuo-hsi of Taiwan, could have also been a good reason why the canonizations were met with hostility. Cardinal Shan is quoted as saying that the event “is a great honor for the Chinese people and a great encouragement for the Church in China (AD2000, 2000).” Many of the underground Churches asked for the text of the mass from Pope John Paul II so they could celebrate the masses at the same time. The Holy See refutes that those who were canonized were “anti-Chinese” but in fact had a deep love for China according to Joaquin Navarro-Valls, a spokesperson for the Holy See said (AD2000, 2000).

Other small bilateral issues that have come between the diplomacy processes are the latest sticky episodes don’t show much help for normalized relations. First in November 2012, a party document leaked that showed their deep suspicions of religious foreigners in China and quietly initiated a plan for Chinese universities to begin to root out those who are using Christianity to plot against the government (Wan, 2012). Then in December 2012, China’s Patriotic Catholic Association renounced Bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin’s title of auxiliary Bishop of the diocese of Shanghai. The pope announced his continued support of Bishop Ma, and condemned the supposed “house arrest” the bishop currently is facing (Main, 2012).

Most recently in 2013, when Pope Benedict XVI chose to resign and Pope Francis I was elected in his stead, a spokeswoman from the Foreign Ministry released statement about improving ties with China but not interfering with internal affairs of China (Mullany, 2013). The appointment of bishops, religious freedoms, and persecution of Catholic underground Church members continues to be obstacles in restoring diplomatic relations.

**Actors**

Identification of the actors and their roles in the conflict bring more understanding to the way this came about and to be able to find the roots of the situation. There is a layer of suppression or accommodation from the state actors and the feature of the communal groups
either becoming confrontational or violently rebelling that occur in this actor identification process. The actors are as follows: the Holy See, the Chinese government, the communal group of Chinese Catholics attending the Patriotic Church, the communal group of Chinese Catholics attending the underground Church, and the Taiwanese Catholics. These classifications are the most useful units when analyzing the conflict because each has their own needs, identities, and roles within the constructed relationships.

The Holy See, in the view of Azar’s model, is a state actor, along with the Chinese government. Both of these are stakeholders in the livelihoods of the Chinese Catholics and contradict each other on how to best attend to their needs. Both purport that they are trying to best care for the needs of the Catholic in China. However, this claim from both sides in untrue. The Vatican is unable to properly take the interests of the underground Chinese Catholics or the Taiwanese Catholics into consideration when using the diplomatic measures to negotiate with the Chinese government. The Chinese government is also unable to properly provide the recognition of needs of the Catholics within China because of the heavy hand of authority they place over religious activities in China. The state actors are not accommodating the other actors in the conflict. The inability for the Chinese government to accommodate the minority identity groups domestically is one element to the protracted social conflict that this paper is detailing and analyzing. This however is not just a problem for the state actor of the Chinese government.

One of the units or factors that most complicates this conflict is the division of the Catholics in China. One of the groups attending the Patriotic Church, one group remaining underground to practice their interpretation of their religion, and the final group in Taiwan that has links to the Holy See in complete defiance to the Chinese government. The Chinese government accommodates some and some are suppressed, and vice versa with the Holy See. The underground church sentiments towards those Chinese Catholics who have not been suppressed but who seek to have a cooperative relationship with the Chinese government as a betrayal. However, it can be understood that those within the Vatican, or who have not personally been oppressed in their religious lives by the Chinese government would want to use the relationship constructively to better spread the faith and spiritually guide the Chinese Catholics and not view a reestablishment of relations as disloyal.

Expanding more on the communal group, like the Patriotic Church because of their central role in the protracted social conflict, the suppression/accommodation issue is addressed. The State Administration for Religious Affairs reports China has more than 5.3 million Catholics that are registered with the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA). Other reports say China has closer to 12 million- regardless of the exact number, the sizable community is not able to meet it’s needs for bishops in almost half of the 97 dioceses in the country (Hays, 2011), and most
bishops are over 80 years of age and will soon have to be replaced. Average age of the bishops in China is 74 (Brown, 2007, p. 22). Around 85% have asked for pardon and recognition from the Holy See, which they request for through Hong Kong or Taiwan, and most requests have been fulfilled but the fact of the matter is the Patriotic Church needs more clergy, and badly. A formal agreement would help solve this problem of clergy but there remains a lot to mend in order to establish this. More than 4 million Catholics in China attend the state-sanctioned Church, which does not recognize the Pope as the head of the Church, but they reportedly have the opinion that not following the Pope’s church is not a schism from Catholicism nor sacrilegious. Their belief that the Pope should be equal with other bishops is one that the Vatican or Catholics loyal to the Holy See can never accept. The Chinese Patriotic Church can been seen to have been partially suppressed and partially accommodated by the Chinese government, with the allowance of the practice of their religion but under the control of a government agency. It’s a tactful move that has proved to be quite effective except the irony of the ideological clashes between Chinese socialism and Catholicism.

There are a number of underground Churches that now operate within the Chinese borders, concentrated mostly in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces (USCIRF, 2012) but because of their "underground" nature there are no official numbers. These underground Catholic Churches remain faithful to the Roman Catholic Church and have been in operation since the time of the Cultural Revolution, although not particularly active in those days because of the risks. Their rejection of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Church and unwillingness to be subservient to the government over their religious beliefs has clearly divided the Catholics within China. These so-called "underground Catholics" remain loyal to the Roman Catholic Church above all, and have therefore set up services outside of government's observations. These activities are deemed illegal and the lack of registration of services and members with the Patriotic Church is prohibited. The underground Church hasn’t felt much support from the very institution they’ve been loyal to because the Holy See seems more focused unification and recognition through diplomatic measure with Beijing. Most are considered harmless and not bothered by Chinese authorities but others are threatened if they start to cause problems or stir up trouble. This underground Church complicates the situation because if the Vatican chooses to reconcile with Beijing, it will be seen as turning their back on those Catholics who have remained loyal behind the scenes and push them away despite their commitment to the Catholic canon law. When looking at the accommodation of the underground Church, it seems they have been receiving repression from both the Chinese government and the Holy See. Despite this, there is little confrontation done and really no violence from the underground Church because of the structure of the conflict and the risks it would pose.
It's important when viewing this conflict between the Vatican and China that proper attention is paid to the Catholics in China that are also deeply involved in this discussion. The Holy See and China are both looking out for their constituents, which include the small faction of Chinese society, but what is also a piece of the puzzle to this conflict is how the Catholics in China, in the underground Church or patriotic Church, are in conflict as well. Looking at Azar’s model of protracted social conflicts this part of the analysis will evaluate the role of the Chinese Catholics and how they are involved in this spat between the Holy See and the Chinese government.

The needs of each party of the conflict are important when looking towards possible transforming facilitators and methods that can bring about a constructive transformation. According to Azar’s model, looking at the specifics of this conflict, the acceptance of the needs of the parties that give the recognition of identity and culture. Obviously there are conflicting goals of the parties, which are the basic definition of conflicts, and in this instance both want to have autonomy to "govern" the Catholics within China without interference. There are needs from both sides that need to be reframed in order to transform the conflict in a positive manner. In order to understand conflict better and the ways to transformation, the needs of the Catholic Church need to be evaluated. When looking at the needs of the Catholics in China there is great importance in their identity and security. Their identity and culture should be recognized by allowing their complete religious expression of following the Roman Catholic Church, allowing them to go to mass and have the Pope as their spiritual leader, and maintain the validity of the Holy See as a part of their Church. Some of the Chinese Catholics, which rejected the state-run church turned around and set up the underground Church, however this is covert and illegal in the eyes of the law, making it another denial of needs. This is the need of security, for the physical security to practice the religion, as they believe it to be.

Political and economic participation for the Chinese Catholics are complicated matters. Since of the structure of the Chinese government and the vague manner in which laws regarding religious freedom is written, there is no room for participation for Chinese Catholics. Those in the government, i.e. party members, make the laws from the top down and themselves are personally not allowed to have a religious denomination, so there is no access to participation in the political process to bring more change. There has been signs of opening up in the laws of religion but this will be expanded later in the rules of the conflict part of the analysis. However, it can be noted that there has been change in the better ways in which religion is treated in
China, but there is much more progress needed before the Chinese Catholics can get their needs met.

The economic needs of the Chinese Catholic Church are met by the Chinese government, however not the underground Church. The Chinese Catholic Church accepts foreign donations for building projects and Church needs, but the majority amount of funds comes from the government. Because of this, the control remains in the hands of the conflicting party, which complicates the issue much more. The underground Church on the other hand deal with many issues besides just lack of economic support. The security needs are not met, because their activity outside the framework of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association are considered illegal. Priests and Catholic who openly defy the Chinese government risk a lot, such as house arrest or imprisonment.

Capacity

In Azar’s protracted social conflict models there is a tendency to have the states in which are unable to effectively govern the state to anyone other than the dominant identity group and in this Sino-Vatican conflict there is a major tendency to have the state ineffectively deal with the “other” (Demmers, 2012, p. 81). The policy capacity of the Chinese government has not been great enough to include excluded groups, like Catholics or generally religious Chinese people and gives an insight in how to transform the conflict—empower the non-dominant identity groups. Similarly, the Chinese government, like many other states with protracted social conflicts, can be characterized as authoritative with one main group monopolizing power that causes the needs of the overlooked identity groups and the varied type of constituents like the Catholic minority in China, to go unmet and unsatisfied. Also one of the defining factors is a legitimacy crisis of the states, which China has been able to handle due to their great economic success. Another aspect of Azar’s model when viewing the capacity is about the politics of the state. The characterization of the Chinese government would be closer to militarized politics than civic politics in a relative sense because of the way power is distributed in the political system. This doesn’t mean that the Chinese government uses the military to deal with problems like it has with the Vatican, but more has a relatively more military type style to it.

A contradiction of the Sino-Vatican relations to Azar’s theory is the international linkages do not fall in line with the model, but do have relation to the international linkage to the universal Catholic Church. Usually the states with the protracted social conflict are dependent on external or international parties but in this instance it’s not the case because the Chinese government has rejected the inclusion of the international linkage to the Roman Catholic Church. China has
not been relying on international links to gain legitimacy and have been generally success of keeping their internal problems internal. In accordance, there is much criticism abroad of their actions and the human rights records but they castoff all criticism and demand outside parties do not interfere with the internal problems of the country. In order to find a way for the Catholic Church to operate in China and bring normalized relations, the capacity of the Chinese government has to expand.

Conflict

The mapping of the conflict showed the context in which the conflict has only been perpetuated but the underlying issue, or nature, of the conflict should be addressed. Without addressing the nature of the conflict, the correct steps to lead to normalize relations cannot be realized. When analyzing the nature of the conflict between the Catholics and the Chinese government as of now can be defined as having more a relatively more destructive nature as opposed to constructive. Often this means there are violent and open rebellions of the communal groups according to Azar’s model. Contrary to the model, in this conflict there remains no open "rebellion" besides that of some clergy members of the Patriotic Church resignations and the continuation of the working of the underground Church, but there are definite frustrations of many of the actors for the perceived opposition to their values and desires. There is not much room for open rebellions of Chinese citizens because of the way organizing and the way the Chinese government handles protesting, so there is more silent rebellion like working underground and out of sight of the government.

During the early years after the PRC was founded, this conflict had a very destructive nature, which had the main goal of “stamping out” religion, which only brought negativity to the situation. Over the years, the conflict has transformed with better attitudes from both the Holy See and the Chinese government, but there has yet to been much leeway. Both parties, to create a more constructive and mutually beneficial transformation of the current situation, should apply flexibility, instead of rigidity. Destructive periods have arisen when there is an overt power struggle over the authority of the Church in China. The Chinese government is often hostile when there are threats of change because it could potentially see too much change and damage the social or political aspects of China (this perceived threat will be explored more later though). However, if both parties can redefine the positions so both can work together for a win-win outcome, then the true constructive transformation can occur. A perpetuation of constructive relationships can bring open communication or possibly negotiation between the Holy See and the Chinese government, but as of now the avoidance of the situation from all
sides and the lack of proper diplomatic communication channels prolongs the destructive nature of the conflict and the degradation of the transformation as time continues.

Apparent Transformation Facilitators

Transformation has many different facilitators that can act as a catalyst to the constant continuing change seen in any relationships and their conflicts. According to Vayrynen, the main facilitators of transformation are the actors, issues, roles, and structures. Each will be explored and analyzed in order to look to the past changes of the conflict and the future. First the actors are analyzed, and because of the particular relevance to the Sino-Vatican relationship that the new leadership could play, there is a particular focus on this facilitator. After the actors, the other three: issues, roles, and structures will also be investigated as they have brought transformation over time and what can lie in store for the conflict.

Actors

The most important changes seen recently in the relations are the introduction to new key players, the political leaders of both groups. Ways in which transformation can come from actors is from changes of goals, intra-party change, change in the party’s constituencies, and changing actors. The biggest transformation in the actor arena in the current year and while writing this paper is the introduction of such: these new lead actors. Both the Holy See and the Chinese government top positions have changed, so a closer look at the new Pope and the new President of China can bring light to the revival of “one of the most significant moments of the dialogue between civilizations, but could also contribute to the solidarity and unity of humanity (Gosset, 2013).” Cardinal Zen of Hong Kong, one of the Catholic pushing hardest against the Chinese Patriotic Church, believes that the heart of the issue is at the human level and it is human weakness that is a barrier in the actors to developing relations (Cardinal Zen, 2013).

The Papacy

“People listen to the Pope because they want to hear what he has to say—not just religion but about the mysteries of life and the intricacies of statecraft. He lifts people out of drudgery, drabness, and boredom that plague life for both rich and poor. He gives them a vision of what man can be if he will listen to what Lincoln called the better angels of his nature. Against such a faith as this communism, the anti-faith cannot prevail.

(Nixon as quoted in Brown, 2007, pg. 10.)

This quote from US President Nixon to the Stalin, Russia’s leader, shows the appreciation of the incredible power that the Pope carries as a symbol and as the leader of the Catholic Church. There have been several Popes that have been involved in the relationship with the Chinese government after 1951 when normalized relations were cut off, but because of some of their
short tenures as Pope, there was not notable transformation of the conflict with each newly elected Pope. The popes that have led the Catholic Church after the formation of the People’s Republic of China have been Pope Pius XII, Pope John XXIII, Pope Paul VI, Pope John Paul I, Pope John Paul II, Pope Benedict XI, and now Pope Francis. Each has had different methods to dealing with relations in China and brought different methods to transforming the universal Catholic Church.

After the broken normalized relations, the next transformation to come from an actor was when Pope John XXIII introduced a progressive enhancement to the Catholic faith. His new perspective and modernization of the running of the Church came from his fostering of the Second Vatican Council. It was a major reformation of the Church that was the biggest development “since the Council of Trent in 1545-1563, which brought a powerful institution into opposition to dictatorial regimes [...] and provided protection, support, resources, and leadership to pro-democratic opposition movements (Brown, 2007, p. 9). Despite Pope John XXIII’s contributions to the Church, his era did not see enhanced improvement to the relations with Beijing due to his hard line against communism, but it was his change to how the Holy See conducts diplomacy that changed some of the rules of the relationship, like allow diplomacy to be on two tracks.

Another leader of the Catholic Church whom made changes in the relationship was Pope John Paul II, easily recognized one of the most influential leaders of the 20th century across the world. When Pope John Paul II was chosen as the successor of Pope John Paul I, he brought a new breath to the old institution. Namely it was his significant relevance of anti-communism during the time before and after the Iron Curtain fell in Europe that changed the world, as it was known.

When conservative Pope Benedict XVI took the papacy in 2004, there wasn’t much hope that his presence would bring much to the relationship with China. He, however, surprised many with his attitude of reconciliation and rejuvenation. He had made improvement of the strained relationship with China a priority of his papacy. His many attempts at outreach did not see much progress however, especially the hopeful letter he wrote in 2007. When Pope Benedict XVI issued an apology for the Western missionaries in colonial times stating that if mistakes were made and any Catholic at fault “then we ask for forgiveness (ICN, 2013)” after the uproar from the Chinese government for canonizations of missionaries killed during the Opium War and the Boxer Uprising, it fell upon deaf ears. Cardinal Zen of Hong Kong expressed in an interview that Pope Benedict XVI was too shy and therefore couldn’t properly become the beacon of change to the Sino-Vatican relations that had been hoped (Cardinal Zen, 2013). He was able to use the modern world of the Internet and social media to outreach to his disciples
by joining the social media medium of twitter and utilizing using modern technology to leverage positive attention. Although Pope Benedict XVI was considered to be very traditional, he made a huge mark on the Catholic Church and his choice to resign from his position opting to become the Emeritus Pope, which has not been seen in hundreds of years of Catholic history, was considered revolutionary. He also is the first Emeritus Pope to meet with the Pope replacing him and this relationship could provide Francis with some guidance and counseling.

This current year Pope Francis was chosen as the successor to the retired Pope Benedict XVI and with his selection has brought a lot of discussion of his background. He's the first Pope to come from outside Europe, although his parents were Italian immigrants to Argentina, so he speaks Italian, which is an important tool for communication for Popes. The view of Pope Francis I from abroad have been as an inspiration for change. One of the first things he has done is chosen not to live in the papal quarters and instead chose to stay in the much more modest guest quarters. He has also been reportedly making his own phone calls, paying his own bills, and in a ceremony washing the feet of prisoners he allowed women to partake for the first time in Church history to show his humility and modesty (Chesnut, 2013). These gestures and focus on the poor are powerful tools to attract believers back to the faith and to reach those who don’t attend Church. One of the factors of why he is so special is because of his membership in the Society of Jesus, making him a Jesuit. He’s the first Jesuit Pope and as a member of this special order of Catholics founded by St. Ignatius of Loyola, he is a part of their world-renowned charter for their "educational, missionary, and charitable works (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013)". They have typically been seen in the last era of the Catholic Church as innovators for change and modernization but their order is not universally esteemed. Some feared it and it was abolished by Pope Clement XVI in 1773 because anticlerical and antipapal themes during that period. However, in 1814 Pope Pius VII reestablished the order and the Jesuits gladly went back to their work in education, communication, social work, ecumenism, and even politics (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013). In the past, Jesuits have been largely successful in China, i.e. Matteo Ricci, and displayed the value of having intellectual and spiritual exchange to enhance and enrich the world and the current Pope could build the bridge again to create a better connection to the East, similar to the goal of another Francis in Catholic history—Francis Xavier. Jesuits are known for their positive flexibility and practicality, which is what is needed to transform the relationship in to a constructive one.

To look to the future, it’s necessary to see how Pope Francis can transform the relationship to become constructive and to lead to the better spiritual guidance of the Chinese Catholics. He possesses a humbleness and lack of arrogance that will bode well when reaching out to the Chinese. He’s already changed the roman curia, or the Holy See diplomatic corps, by creating an
advisory board that has been said to revolutionizing the functions of decision-making. This move was to bring a wider international (representing five continents) panel of cardinals to assist with the mismanagement of the central administration and reform the Vatican bureaucracy (Rocca, 2013).

There’s a hopeful outlook that with Pope Francis as a new actor, constructive transformation will come to heal the strained ties and open the door for a fresh dialogue, as Cardinal Zen says, in a true Franciscan spirit of simplicity and determination (Cardinal Zen, 2013). The secular world has been pleased and positive so far, with the secular media portraying a simple man with love for Jesus and the poor (Schneible, 2013). The reception of the new Pope by the Chinese government has been mixed, Hua Chunying Foreign Ministry spokeswoman has congratulated him, but also said “The new pope must cut the so-called diplomatic relations with Taiwan, recognizing the Chinese government as the sole legal representative of the whole of China and should not interfere, using the excuse of religion, in the internal affairs of the country (McElroy, 2013). Pope Francis himself has said what his title means to him, pontiff’s literal meaning of builder of brides with God and between people (Rocca, 2013)”.

**Xi Jinping**

Comparatively there is a lot less accessible literature about Xi Jinping than the Pope, but this new generation of the top of the Chinese government is a fundamental piece to the puzzle of the relationship and much guesswork is done to evaluate their decisions and standpoints. Xi Jinping was elected the same day as Pope Francis, although it had been predicted for his appointment as president for quite a while beforehand so this coincidence can hardly be considered divine. For the first couple months of his leadership, there are not as many signs or personal details about Xi Jinping as the pope, but so far Xi sent mixed signals as to his openness of reform China, and it’s leadership, is not yet ready to have relaxation of controlling of institutionalized religions including Catholicism (McElroy, 2013). "Most China-watchers believe the real obstacle lies with unresolved tensions between pragmatists and Communist hard-liners within the country’s ruling elite, resulting in a sort of multiple personality syndrome when it comes to religious policy (Allen, 2013)."

The question is whether Xi Jinping will follow his predecessors or take a new approach is rather obvious, no radical change is expected but instead the carryover of the idea of a "peaceful rise". Under Jiang Zemin, the Chinese government set the policy for religion to focus on three guiding principles: enforcement of party policy on religion, stronger management of religion in accordance with law, and guidance of religions in their adaptation to socialist society (Brown,
Xi is predicted, and has defended, the continuation of top down governance style, which doesn’t promise much when it comes to the issues like a better-defined view of religious freedom. What is known about Xi, is he will not be following any Western model to bring about change in China, he is quoted as saying “Some people define reform as reforming in the direction of Western universal values and a Western political system, otherwise it's not reform. This is a stealthily switching one idea for another, and it distorts what reform is for us (Buckley, 2013). People may be expecting more liberalization than what they will actually see from him. He has boosted economical liberalization but has also stood his ground with it comes to ideological conformity in China. Major political liberalization should not be expected during his tenure at the helm.

Much alike to presidents before him, his private life is not very open with the public at large but he has shown a slight lighter public touch than his predecessor is more comfortable in the spotlight, and for the first time a first wife figure is getting media attention (Buckley, 2013). He has shown that he is more willing to have citizens criticize the government, allowing pollution to become part of the public discourse but that doesn’t show any radical shift of attitude. Also his fight to end corruption shows his commitment to better the country and its people, and this commitment will be done thoughtfully and forcefully (Kissinger, 2013).

**Issue**

Looking at conflicts and how they transform over time, it is often the issues between the parties that change and then the relationship readjusts. This reaction of the relationship is why the issue transformation can be a mighty cause of transformation. Earlier when looking at the conflict, the two main barriers to normalized relations were identified as autonomy and Taiwan, and importantly this has not always been the barriers because of the vast transformations that have occurred. Over time the agenda has changed and it’s possible that issue of Taiwan as a hindrance could be set aside if Beijing agreed to setting up an agreement with the Holy See.

Looking at the ancient relationship of Catholics in China, there were many problems that came about the issue of contention of Catholicism in China but usually it was the foreignness of Catholicism that led to the conflict. At the point of 1951, the issue wasn’t about autonomy or Taiwan, but about religion as a whole in China being non grata. After the Cultural Revolution, it seemed that religion remained and so some space needed to be carved out for it but without its ties to the foreign entities. This is when the issue changed again from removing religion to allowing and limiting religion without foreign connections. There has been a negative transference of the memories of Christians in Chinese history that have been working in the favor of a foreign entity that has been bottled up from the memory of the “100 years of
Humiliation” that has brought a touch of anti-Western sentiment to almost all foreign entities in China.

This variation in the issue, however small, indicates that the relations continues to evolve and transform and give hope to the idea that real change can occur and constructive transformation remains a possibility. Unfortunately to use this idea of issue transformation as a facilitator for change doesn’t bring much analysis other than looking at the previous relationship. It is best to look at the relationship issues as of now and see the issue the issue between the two is persistently autonomy and Taiwan. It can be concluded that an issue transformation facilitator will not exclusively be able to bring about a positive relationship and constructive transformation but paired with other facilitators there is a good chance for this change.

Rule

Rule transformations give a lot of perspective to the possible transformations that are possible in the future of conflicts, because at the core it’s about the norms or rules that govern a conflict that influence. Along with the other transformation facilitators, rule transformation brings another look in the aspects how changes occur.

Over time there has been rule transformation, one of the biggest in the history of the Church in China was the Three-Self Movement. The Three-Self Movement has been disputed from both sides as to the origins and the purpose, the views of Chinese and Western are not the same about the movement, one views it as a way to control the development of Christian religions and the Chinese officially says it was actually a voluntary action by Chinese Christians to end the entwined religion and colonialism as a tool for advanced foreign ideas (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, 2008). Widely in the Western World it is believed it was introduced by Mao Zedong to take the control away from the foreign led churches and put that control in the communist party. Furthermore, it has been postulated that the real purpose of the Three-Self Movement was to slowly encourage religions to fade away but Chinese have voiced that this is an unfair look at the movement. The Three-Self Movement was focused on the idea of self-administration, self-support, and self-propagation. These three things were supposed to put the control of the Church into the hands of the Chinese Christians, but it was also an organizationally strategic move to remove the moral and ecclesiastic authority that the Papacy brought the Catholic Church. Self-administration means Chinese people themselves run the churches. This is not completely opposed to the Catholic tradition, which has local people supporting their local Church and has it’s own national jurisdiction, however still under the wings of the Vatican. Different dioceses evaluate their needs for priests and other Church
clergy, and act accordingly to ask the national diocese for more ecclesiastical support. The self-administration cut out the Roman Catholic Church completely. Self-support refers to the idea that they are no longer funded by the international sources but purely from domestic sources, however this too has been controversial. There have been reports of cash donations made to the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association to gain some leeway in the church teachings and cooperation between the underground and the official church (Leung & Liu, 2004, p. xi). Self-propagation refers to the idea that preaching duties were put into the hands of the Chinese, which also doesn't follow the Catholic canon law. The Catholics have books used in mass, the missalette, lectionary, and book of the gospels, which are not organized at the local level but at the international level.

The Three-Self Movement's undertaking to obtain control for most Christian religions, has a fundamental flaw for those believing in the Catholic dogma because the head of the church will always be the Pope and the spiritual leadership led by the Holy See and the Papal authority. The Catholic Church without the Pope is considered a schism from Catholicism. Christianity and Christian religions are not all the same, and while there are many major differences, the biggest and most defined is the role of the Holy See and the Pope as the spiritual leader. Therefore the three-self movement as a tool to take control away from the "neo-colonialists" and used across the board for religions in China has hurt the integrity of the Catholic Church in a very deep way and actually set the grounds for the formation of the underground Church.

The rules have also changed for religious freedom in China and this has affected the relationship of the Vatican and the Chinese government. Since 1979 and the reform and opening of China, religious liberty has seen much improvement due to many new regulations and policies (Hong, 2011). Some new government agencies were made to help govern the religious people in China. The Chinese government's Regulations on Religious Affairs, which was enacted in March 2005, has stated that all religious organizations, venues, and believers have to obey the laws of China and in no way "destroy social order, harm bodily health of citizens, interfere in the State educational system, or harm the national interest, the public welfare of society or the lawful rights of citizens (Brown, 2007)". This viewpoint that the Catholic Church is a social entity that has the possible to rationalize the restrictions on freedom of religion, which includes the limiting the freedoms of association and maintaining a registry system of religious people. Working out of the framework of the State Administration for Religious Affairs is deemed illegal but because economy is king, the situation becomes ironic as China has become the world's largest bible producer. When Deng Xiaoping gave the speech about the black cat and the white cat, he justified the changing of the style of economy to shift the rules in China have shifted their ideology to allow a liberalized economy. With the way the laws are now, there is
flexibility for the government to use it as they wish and this flexibility in interpretation will keep the rules for religious people in China in jeopardy.

The international norms have also changed over time because when the People's Republic of China was formed in 1949, there was no international norm set for associating with the Chinese “nationalist government”. In the time afterwards, norms were set to establish ties with the PRC, especially as they became to participate in the international arena. Today most countries recognize “One China” but the Holy See never shifted their recognition. The issue of Taiwan remains a tough spot between the Church and Chinese government but not a non-negotiable one. The Holy See has made it clear that it would remove its mission in Taiwan, if it would be able to open one in Beijing.

Within the Catholic Church, diplomacy rules have changes that could bring transformation in this conflict. Pope John XXIII used pastoral and humanitarian measures instead of diplomatic protocol in the past in Bulgaria and Turkey, and this move outside of the normal role is seen as a threat by the Chinese government (Brown, 2007, p. 29). This pope made diplomacy into two tracks, engaging in humanitarian issues and sociopolitical. This change of rules for diplomacy also made room for different alternative models of cooperation used in Cuba and Vietnam. These models have potential to be used in China, but it's other issues beside the rules that lie in opposition to this.

Structure

The structure of the conflict is about the power distribution between the parties, which has a cyclical manner that could lead to the restructuring of the power, however is not always the case to lead to the restructuring of power. It also could become contained intermittently in a conciliation process. Asymmetry of the conflict and the different stages of the transformation of the structure are imperative when looking at the changes over time and to see which stages they are in and how they could settle on a new structure of power distribution. In a spiral motion, things have progressed over time to be where they are now, with the conflict being at a standstill of no communication.

The claim of the separation of Church and State in China has the irony of allowing the government to intervene in Church affairs but not allowing the Church any participation on the state or educational level. This unbalanced power if often used when the Chinese government wants to interpret the laws to their own benefits. Another example being the freedom of religion and religious affairs that is ambiguously defined in the law and used by the government to further have control over all functions. The state bodies, which govern and overlook religious affairs, are just further propagating control and this tight reign is ill fated as time progresses.
The formation of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Church can be viewed through this process, as one of the cycles in which the relationship transformed but it still kept the power within the Chinese government, so there as the relationship continues the cycles continues as well. The first stage was the oppression after the formation of the People's Republic of China, or when the Chinese government did not allow the Catholics to practice their religion in their way, this brought awareness of the oppression in the religious groups, and on the mobilization of the opposition. The timing of the mobilization brought on the persecution of Catholics and churches throughout China as it went through the adjustment period of accepting a communist government and eventually led to the Cultural Revolution that brought on the overt conflict. The power was not in favor of the Catholics, which led them to dissent and go underground, and those who chose to openly object were sent to prisons or reeducation camps. The further oppression changed the attitudes of the Chinese religious people that they must covertly practice their religion or work within the framework that the country has given them, like the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Church.

If using the current times and looking at this cycle of unbalanced power in the structure of the conflict, it can be seen that the output of an agreed relationship is yet to have been reached, in which the power could be redistributed. Some analysts of China have postulated that if change were to happen then the Chinese officials would have to “amend their legitimacy formula (Brown, 2007, p. 28)”, but the is short-sighted because as China becomes more international there is a need for better protection of the rights of minority identities within China. The process of restructuring the conflict seems to be stuck because of the lack of cooperation, and therefore attitudes and the relationship cannot move forward in a constructive manner.

Once a more open attitude is taken, then the positive things like the changing of attitudes from both the Holy See and Chinese government can begin, with an extended process of mediation and negotiation to agree to a situation where the Catholic Church can control the actions within the Church and not be labeled as a threat. This will bring about a new power balance and into an agreed relationship, and just like most everything in China, the agreed relationship will probably not be seen in other countries or models but be Catholicism with Chinese characteristics without taking out the fundamental pieces of the ancient religion.

**Risks of social or political change**

One of the main themes of the relationship that can be seen is the perceived threats that both sense of each other. The party with the most to lose with the restoration of relations is the
Chinese government though because their perception of a threat to social and political stability is much more serious than the Vatican's possible scrutiny from abroad for negotiating a relationship with China. There are indicators that could show the potency of the threat though remain small and the evaluation of possible threats is important, especially in China where stability is key to the advancement of development. It would be a mistake to not take threats seriously. Nevertheless, it could not be said that the Chinese government has not taken it seriously when looking at the Chinese government's assessment of the Roman Catholic Church and the Pope. The negative transference of past historical misdoings of Christians and Catholics in China, there is an immediate sense of threat by the Chinese government but with more time and healing there will be bigger transformations. The success of China relies on continued development and there are several social problems that could bring it off track, but should the relaxation on the Chinese Catholic Church be considered one of these?

Looking at the things that could threaten the Chinese government or Chinese social stability, civil society is not high on the list as it is still developing from its infancy. Although with continued development, maturity, and allowance of the government for this development, it is possible that Chinese civil society will have a lot of power in the future. However, within this scope of civil society of China, Catholics will always remain a small minority. With cooperation with other groups in civil society, like other Christian religions, there is potential for influence and a wish for social and political change that will benefit China and the Chinese people (Cardinal Zen, 2013). It can only be surmised that Catholics who are loyal to the Holy See "would prefer political conditions that safeguard their religious inclinations (Brown, 2007)" but that doesn't make them outright dissidents. This could be by supporting openly or quietly of a more democratized China with better laws to protect religious freedom. This scenario of an empowered civil society that works with the Catholics to bring change is very hypothetical though, and dangers that could come from a more mature civil society are actually outweighed by the benefits of empowering the Chinese people to become major stakeholders in the governance of Chinese affairs.

China, a state that is demanding conformity, the rejection of religious groups and their main principles of their religions could pose a threat as it is seen over time that with more awareness of the oppressed group will eventually led to confrontation and empowerment. Religion should be included into the fold, or otherwise it will be a push towards a more individualist society and potentially drastically change the social and political landscape. However, looking at the Church as an institution, it is not adverse to authoritarianism, for example in the past it was a "willing companion to the landed aristocracy and the nondemocratic status quo, giving legitimacy to authoritarian regimes in many countries (Brown, 2007, p. 9)". The best thing it to find the right
Timing for the Chinese government to allow the reintroduction of the universal Catholic Church in China without hurting its international image abroad, and if so where does it fall along with China’s economic growth, social liberalization, and internationalization. Predictions that the authorities, which have current control over the religious affairs in China, would fear that normalization of relations would “strip them of their influence” and take adverse measures to keep power, however this would be a cynical view of those working of the Chinese Patriotic Church. Thus, the main reason to maintain the current relations status quo is because the power remains in the hands of the state and that feels most comfortable for the Chinese government for the time being.

Looking at Catholicism’s history with communism could also be seen as a sign of a threat, but for this to be credible the history and landscape of China must look dramatically different. Ideologically the Church opposes much of the doctrine of Socialist China, however it also is possibly more strongly opposed to the materialism and capitalism values of the Western countries it already currently operating in. Realistically speaking though, this threat remains small, as there is no direct threat and it remains just a hypothetical situation with many imaginary factors that do not exist in this situation. When looking at post Cold War Europe, the Catholic groups within the country brought about support to bring an end to different regimes but this did not create the rule that Catholicism brings the fall of communist regimes. As seen in other instances with different backgrounds, Catholicism has not changed or threatened the governments of Cuba or Vietnam by being allowed, with or without restraints to their activities, in those respective countries. The Chinese government wants to guarantee that the Holy See does not place people within the hierarchy of the Church who would be subversive to the development of China, but there are different ways to guarantee this instead of just rejecting the Holy See as a whole. For example, Vietnam has taken to proposing three bishops they approve of and then give the final decision to the Holy See and this was seen periodically around 2006 in China until a succession of priest without papal approval where ordained. Creative approaches could inspire a way for the Chinese government to make concessions to allow a decision-making style of bishops that they could not only feel comfortable with but also support.

The growth of the Church in China shows no indications of expansion as it is actually quite in line with the population growth. The Holy See has seen an increase in the number of Catholics in the regions of Africa and Asia but not specifically in China (Glatz, 2013), and for a Church who has struggle to keep up with Protestant evangelism, this has sparked a lot of interest in the regions for more focus. This focus from the Holy See could be taken defensively, however it would be done too sensitively. The Catholic Church is not known for their high rates of
conversions or their evangelism, so the Chinese government shouldn't take this focus as a serious threat.

Looking from the perspective of the Holy See, the threat of the Chinese government to their religion has brought about different conclusions. The Patriotic Church actually brought a surprised indigenization of the church, which brings better possibilities for the Church in China in the long run if they can reunite. This is probably the cause of the more conciliatory relationship from the Vatican because of the integration of the local cultural values with the teachings of the Church bring a revitalization (Liu & Leung, 2002).
Conclusion

The Sino-Vatican relationship has changed over time but the fact of the matter is the conflict still remains and destructive patterns continue to bog down the progress of the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. The incompatible goals of the groups still indicate the longstanding stalemate will continue. With research and a look into the actors, needs, context, and capacity it can be determined that little movements and an attitude adjustment will not bring any resolution because its roots run deeper than that. The mapping of the conflict brought the understanding of the underlying issues and attitudes that pre-date the formation of the People’s Republic of China that need to be healed before the mutual distrust of the parties can constructively address each other.

The introduction of new leaders does bring potential for transformation of the relationship, however further time and restorative actions need to take place before the re-establishment of relations will begin. Both Pope Francis and Xi Jinping will have their individual legacies but its still unclear if the restoration of relations could be one of those legacies. Pope Francis I is striving to bring Francis Xavier’s spirit to the relationship and reach a billion people with his charismatic leadership style and Jesuit background. Xi Jinping’s goals are not as clear in relations to the Vatican because his main concern, along with the central government’s concern, is the continued development of the country and the further success that the economy is bringing. Any forward movements and restorative actions between the Vatican and China will most likely be spearheaded by these new leaders, and will hopefully facilitate the needed recovery that the relationship needs. Both parties of the conflict have time to proceed slowly and cautiously towards bringing better relations. The Catholic Church will wait until it feels comfortable with the Chinese government acknowledging the irrefutable principles of the Catholic Church and the authentic reforms to bring more expansive religious freedom. The urgency of wanting to restore relations could only be used as a political tool to gain leverage in the relationship rules. With a more constructive relationship developed over time, open communication and mediation can adjust the framing of the opposing parties.

Ideally the conclusion that was to be made after the research and analysis was to be the steps to the re-establishment of relations but even those steps do not properly accomplish the effective transformation of the relations. Suppose China took a less guarded view to the Vatican, the real change that could occur is minimal, as the real change will come from an open dialogue. Social change first needs a developed civil society, and the political system of China has been proven to work very successfully in China. The real trick is the Chinese government to tactfully remove the Patriotic Church without losing face. Moreover, since the Chinese government does not openly discuss the decisions made, it’s only their actions that can be used to show progress.
Allowing the dialogue with the Catholic leadership in the Vatican City will be viewed as a sign of progression. It’s a step towards a more tolerant government and would be good for the national image of China across the globe. It’s ultimately up to the Chinese government how much they want to compromise, but just the start of communication between the two would show significant strides towards the adjustment of religious civil liberties and policies. The opaque nature of the Chinese government does not allow researchers or foreign states access to the inner workings of the vague religious laws, leaving outsiders to draw their own conclusions. There is much to be done to repair and mend the relations between two influential world leaders and looking at the past events has helped be able to look towards the future. Many of the events that have been analyzed brought hope for beginning of better relations, but for now that is all it remains: hope.
Bibliography


Appendix A: Interview Questions for Cardinal Zen

1. What barriers do you see that hinder the reconciliation of relations between China and the Holy See?

2. How can the Pope better serve the Chinese Catholics than the state run Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association?

3. Do you think this "new generation" of Chinese leadership will be more open to re-establishing diplomatic relations?

4. Could allowing the Holy See to operate in all its capacities in China somehow been seen as a threat for detrimental political or social change?

5. Could Pope Francis's charismatic leadership style or Jesuit affiliation be beneficial in his impact to the Catholic Church in China?
Appendix B: Roman Curia

Source: Catholic Pages, 2007

The Roman Curia

The Roman Curia is the ensemble of the dicasteries and bodies that assist the Pope in the exercise of his supreme pastoral office for the good and in service of the Church throughout the world and of the particular Churches, assisting in the maintenance of the unity of the Faith and the communion of the People of God and in the promotion of the proper mission of the Church in the world.

There are a number of departments of the Roman Curia, each with their own responsibilities and competencies. The most important parts of the Curia are the Secretariat of State and the various Congregations. Then, there are Pontifical Councils and Pontifical Commissions.

Apart from the formal structures of the Roman Curia, the Pope may convene an extraordinary consistory of the College of Cardinals to consider special difficulties or questions. In this way, they can advise him as a body, not just the Cardinals who advise the Holy Father as part of the Roman Curia itself, but all the Cardinals from around the world. The Pope has done this on a number of occasions during his pontificate. This is quite a novelty and was not done often during the pontificates of any of his modern predecessors.

In particular, the Pope has established a "Commission of Cardinals for the study of the organizational and economic problems of the Holy See" which meets regularly to assist the Holy Father with the economic management of the Vatican. The Holy Father established this commission early in his pontificate to help turn around a growing deficit in the Vatican’s books that he inherited from his predecessors.

SECRETARIAT OF STATE

The Secretariat of State is headed by the Cardinal Secretary of State (currently Angelo Cardinal Sodano). This is the most important body within the Roman Curia. It is divided into two sections.

The first section (the "General Section") is responsible for:
- affairs relating to the day-to-day service of the Papal office
- examine matters which fall outside the competence of any of the other dicasteries of the Holy See and the bodies of the Holy See
- regulating the functions and activities of representatives of the Holy See
- distribute encyclicals, apostolic constitutions, apostolic letters and the like to the bishops throughout the world
- publication of the "Acta Apostolicae Sedis" -- the official record of all official documents and acts
- the official communication of Pontifical acts and activities of the Curia (the Press office)
- overseeing the official media organs of the Holy See, the daily newspaper "L'Osservatore Romano", Vatican Radio and the Vatican Television Centre
- maintaining the statistical bureau of the Church and publishing the data from time to time

The second section (the "Section for Relations with States") is responsible for the Holy See’s diplomatic corps, its relations with civil society, negotiating concordats with States relating to the Church’s position and status, ensuring representation of the Holy See before international organizations.
CONGREGATIONS

Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith

The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith is the next most important dicastery of the Roman Curia. Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger has been Cardinal Prefect of this Congregation since 1982. (Archbishop George Pell of Melbourne is a member of this Congregation.)

The primary duty and responsibility of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith is to promote and preserve the Catholic Faith throughout the Church. Anything touching on the doctrine of the faith or on morals is within the competence of this dicastery.

Congregation for the Eastern Churches

This Congregation has full responsibility for matters pertaining to any of the Eastern Rites of the Church and their governance. It has competence over all matters (which in the Latin rite would be governed by one of the other dicasteries).

Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments

This Congregation has primary responsibility (subject to any competency of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith) for the Sacred Liturgy and the Sacraments. They must prepare all rubrics, approve translations, etc.

Pontifical Commission "Ecclesia Dei"

This Commission was established by the Holy Father in 1988 when he introduced the indult for priests to say the Tridentine Mass as a response to the ex-communication of Archbishop Lefebvre and the members of the Society of St Pius X. The role of the commission is to assist the faithful in the establishment of Indult masses and parishes in their dioceses.

Congregation for the Causes of Saints

This Congregation is responsible for the investigation and examination of the lives and the writings of candidates for beatification and canonization. It is responsible for verifying and preserving sacred relics.

Congregation for Bishops

The Congregation for Bishops is responsible for the delineation, division, establishment and merging of Dioceses, for the consideration of candidates to be appointed to Dioceses and the recommendation of candidates to the Holy Father. It is also responsible in a more general sense for assisting the Bishops in their governance of their own Dioceses. It receives their quinquennial reports and organizes their visits "ad limina Apostolorum".

Pontifical Commission for Latin America

This Commission is charged with assisting the various Dicasteries of the Roman Curia by studying the life of the Church and its development in Latin America. It operates under the auspices of the Congregation for Bishops.

Congregation for the Evangelation of Peoples

This is the Congregation responsible for missionary activity throughout the World. It is the Congregation which used once to be called the Propaganda Fide (Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith).

Congregation for the Clergy

This Congregation is responsible for matters relating to secular priests and deacons (ie, those incardinated in particular Dioceses not members of Religious Orders). One of its chief roles is to try and ensure a more equitable distribution of priests throughout the world. It is also responsible for the laicization of priests wanting to leave the priesthood.

Congregation for Institutes of Consecrated Life and Societies of Apostolic Life

This Congregation has responsibility for matters concerning religious orders and the priests and religious belonging to them. It is also responsible for the establishment of new orders, and for reviewing changes to the constitutions of orders (where approval by Rome is required).

Congregation for Catholic Education
This Congregation is responsible for seminaries, Catholic Universities, Pontifical Institutes and Catholic Education generally.

TRIBUNALS

*Apostolic Penitentiary*

The Apostolic Penitentiary is responsible for all matters concerning the "internal forum" and indulgences. It is also responsible for providing priests to hear confessions to the Patriarchal Basilicas of Rome. During a Conclave, the Major Penitentiary (the Cardinal who heads the Apostolic Penitentiary) is one of the only Cardinals permitted to receive messages from his office or to return to it if required.

*Supreme Tribunal of the Apostolic Signature*

This is a tribunal of appeal from the Tribunal of the Roman Rota. It is the highest court of appeal available in matters concerning the Church’s tribunals.

*Tribunal of the Roman Rota*

This is a court of appeal from local Tribunals, and a court of first instance where there is no competency with local Tribunals. For example, any matter concerning a bishop would have to be dealt with by the Roman Rota rather than the Bishop's own tribunal. In addition, certain matrimonial matters must come to the Roman Rota rather than the local tribunal (eg, those involving Royalty!)

PONTIFICAL COUNCILS

*Pontifical Council for the Laity*

This is the Council that Archbishop Stafford of Denver (USA) has been called to Rome to head. Pio Cardinal Laghi has only recently resigned from the post having reached the age of retirement. The council is responsible for matters relating to the coordination and promotion of the apostolate and Christian life of the laity.

*Pontifical Council for Christian Unity*

This Council is headed by Edward Cardinal Cassidy (an Australian cardinal). It is responsible for ecumenical dialogue and relations with other Christian Churches.

*Pontifical Council for the Family*

This Council (headed by Alfonso Cardinal Lopez Trujillo) is responsible for protecting and promoting the Family. It assists Bishops throughout the world in Family matters, organizes conferences on Family issues, etc.

*Pontifical Council for Life*

This Council was constituted by the Holy Father just a few years ago to advise him on issues relating to the sanctity of human life. Its members are bishops, theologians and laypeople whose expertise or talents lie in the development of the culture of life the Holy Father called for in Evangelium Vitae.

*Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace*

This Council is responsible for promoting peace and justice in the World according to the Gospels and Catholic Social Teaching. It is headed by French Cardinal, Roger Cardinal Etchegaray.

*Pontifical Council "Cor Unum"*

This Council is responsible for expressing the care of the Church towards those in need. It fosters charitable works by the faithful, assists those in urgent or calamitous situations, and those in special need of assistance.

*Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant Peoples*

This Council is responsible for the care of people who are transient (such as the gypsies in Europe) and who do are not readily cared for within traditional diocesan structures.

*Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Health-Care Workers*
This Council is primarily responsible for assisting Health-Care Workers, their spiritual needs and those of their patients, assisting local churches to train and regulate the activities of hospital chaplains, etc.

**Pontifical Council for the Interpretation of Legislative Texts**
This Council’s role is to advise on matters of the interpretation of canon law.

**Pontifical Council for Inter-religious Dialogue**
This Council is responsible for ecumenical matters concerning the Church’s relations with non-Christian Faiths.

**Pontifical Council for Dialogue with Non-Believers**
This Council is responsible for the Church's relations with those who do not believe.

**Pontifical Council for Culture**
This Council facilitates relations between the Holy See and the Cultural World.

**Pontifical Council for Social Communications**
This Council is headed by Archbishop John Foley (an American). It is responsible for matters relating to the use of the media for the spreading of the Gospel.

**OFFICES**

**Office of the Camerlengo**
This Office takes on importance during the vacancy of the Holy See (after a Pope dies and before a new Pope is elected).

**Office for the Administration of the Patrimony of the Holy See**
This Office is responsible for administering the Holy See’s property and goods.

**Office for the Economic Affairs of the Holy See**
This is essentially the Vatican Treasury, administering funds donated by the Dioceses around the World, income from investments and the proceeds of the annual Peter’s Pence collection.

**OTHER CURIAL BODIES**

**Prefecture of the Papal Household**

**Pontifical Master of Ceremonies**