

**STANDARD FRONT PAGE
FOR
EXAMINATION PAPERS**

To be filled in by the student(s). Please use capital letters.

Subjects: (tick box)	Project	Synopsis	Portfolio	Thesis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Written Assignment
----------------------	---------	----------	-----------	--	--------------------

Study programme:	Culture, Communication and Globalization	
Semester:	10th	
Exam Title:	Thesis	
Name and date of birth/ Names and dates of birth of group members:	Name	Date of birth
	Evaldas Sulcas	15 March 1985
Hand in date:	31 January 2013	
Project title /Synopsis Title/Thesis Title	RUSSIA'S ATTEMPTS TO RETAIN INFLUENCE IN THE POST SOVIET SPACE. (IN)DEPENDENT UKRAINE	
According to the study regulations, the maximum number of keystrokes of the paper is:	192000	
Number of keystrokes (one standard page = 2400 keystrokes, including spaces) (table of contents, bibliography and appendix do not count)*	154287	
Supervisor (project/synopsis/thesis):	Lise Schmidt Nielsen	

I/we hereby declare that the work submitted is my/our own work. I/we understand that plagiarism is defined as presenting someone else's work as one's own without crediting the original source. I/we are aware that plagiarism is a serious offense, and that anyone committing it is liable to academic sanctions.

Rules regarding Disciplinary Measures towards Students at Aalborg University (PDF):

<http://plagiat.aau.dk/GetAsset.action?contentId=4117331&assetId=4171389>

Date and signature(s):

* Please note that you are not allowed to hand in the paper if it exceeds the maximum number of keystrokes indicated in the study regulations. Handing in the paper means using an exam attempt.

ABSTRACT

More than 20 years have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, however the heritage of the Soviets still reflects in Russian policymaking. Some of the countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) have moved on while Russia was still weak and now they are a part of the Western society.

Ukraine started the process of westernization at the same time as Russian authorities decided to regain Russia's international status. Since Putin came to reign he has been pursuing the expansion of Russian influence over its neighbors. Russia raised the idea of the multi-polar world and condemned prevailing dominance of one country. Putin declared that Russia is going to take its role in a multi-polar international system.

In order to balance other power(s) Russia had to construct its sphere of influence and the best environment was the FSU region. Kremlin identified Russian neighbor states as its sphere privileged interests thus in 2003 Russian "backyard became the first priority in Russian foreign policy. Ukraine appeared at the forefront of the political tension between the West and Russia.

EU countries had interests related with the energy infrastructure. Ukraine is a transit country of Russian gas to Europe and transit revenue attracts attention. Russia is using energy as a tool in a strategic policymaking and Ukrainian pipeline system was on its agenda as well. Using Russian capabilities Moscow managed to make some European countries to turn away from Ukraine and stopped their support for Ukraine's European integration.

Russia's confrontation with the US appeared in Ukraine during the 2004 Presidential elections that provoked the "Orange revolution". Then Russia was promoting pro-Russian politician in Ukraine, while Americans were supporting pro-Western authority. Thus Ukraine's population and political elites were partitioned in two parts. Victory of Yushchenko endangered Russia, because he was keen on Ukraine's westernization (transparency, democracy, interdependence with the West) and was eager to join NATO.

Since then Russia has used all of its capabilities in order to turn back Ukraine to Russia. Effective use of the soft power, use of the Russian ethnic minorities and use of the "sticks and carrots" gave positive results. Big part of the Ukrainian population now is in favor of Russia, recent Ukrainian President and government are considered as pro-Russian too. Ukraine rejected the Idea of joining NATO and involved negotiation for closer cooperation with Russia. Tension between Russia and Ukraine decreases.

INTRODUCTION	4
METHODOLOGY	9
THEORIES	13
Realism.....	13
Neo-realism.....	16
Soft Power (and a Hard power)	19
Sub-conclusions	21
REVIEW/BACKGROUND OF UKRAINE – RUSSIA RELATIONS	23
Situation in Ukraine	23
1. Ethnic Russian minority in Ukraine	23
2. Local support, nostalgia	25
3. Polarized country and international course/trend	26
3.1 Pro-Russian political power	27
3.2 Pro-Western political power	29
4. Ukrainian strategic policy and the West	30
Russia's interests in Ukraine	31
1. Political influence and pressure	32
2. Russia's national interests	34
2.1 National security and the threat of the NATO	34
2.2 Russian strategic policy and the balance to the NATO	37
3. Russian economic potential and effects of economic power	38
3.1 Russian energy supplies as an instrument in policymaking	40
3.2 Why Europe is keen on Russia-Ukraine agreement.....	43
ANALYSIS	45
Russian perception and use of the Soft power	46
Regional dominance and realistic approach	50
International status of Russia and perception of the World order	55
CONCLUSIONS	62
BIBLIOGRAPHY	66
Books.....	66
Journals	66
Internet sources	66

INTRODUCTION

It is considered that Russia will be the authoritarian state seeking for its political aims on the international political arena through manipulations with energy resources and influences in neighbor countries. Analysts claim that Russia is working under the principle of “divide and conquer” and seeks to balance American power. It is possible that it is tended to confront the US with the EU, and EU with the Eastern and Middle European countries, thus it will reinforce its influence in “privileged sphere of interests – post-Soviet space”. Lithuanian analysts of the Ministry of National Defense introduced a paper presenting prognoses of masked post-imperialistic Russian policy. According to them Russia plays a zero-sum game with post-Soviet countries, Russia’s aim is to intercept the EU and NATO expansion to the East, thus it could become a guardian/sponsor/administrator of the region that is trying to escape from Russian influence now.¹

History proves that Russia was always ambitious and determined therefore it became the biggest country in the world. Country was ruled by dukes, tsars and emperors. Right after it became an empire (1721 under Peter I) Russia was reoriented towards Western culture and became an active participant in European affairs. In 1917 Russia was reorganized into a USSR and after the World War II became a superpower in a bipolar world. Analysts say that “USSR was both, a State and an Empire.”²

In modern world USSR is a past, so is its power. Despite American hegemony the world is becoming multi-polar and modern Russia wants to be a part of this.

Russian neighbor countries that used to be a part of the USSR or the same soviet ideology now are facing the western culture and values, most of them are seeking for participation in democratic economic and defense organizations. Though Cold War is over, for Russia losing influence in post-Soviet countries associates with the defeat, vulnerability and threat; because former enemy could be just across the border. National defense was the greatest concern of

¹ Kristina Sapkinaite ed. Pasaulis 2030. Lietuvos Respublikos Krasto Apsaugos Ministerija. Vilnius. 08-08-2012. (The World in 2030. Ministry of National Defense of Republic of Lithuania. Vilnius. 08-08-2012)

² Pilar Bonet. *Russia Between Nostalgia and Bitter Reality*. In Global Geopolitics. 5 Dec 2011, <<http://globalgeopolitics.net/wordpress/2011/12/05/russia-between-nostalgia-and-bitter-reality/>> [01-11-2012]

Soviet foreign policy.³ Modern Russia's defense policy is also very important issue and is related with its neighbors. Baltic States, Poland, Bulgaria and others are members of NATO. Ukraine and Georgia were tended to become ones. Thus Russia would lost a major share of power in important geopolitical space and would be surrounded by NATO, thus American military and missile bases, that are considered by Russians as a threat.⁴ This was exactly what soviets were avoiding.

Ukraine requires a special research here, because it takes a very special place in Russia's strategic policy. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia is looking for means to gain over Ukraine. In 2010 Medvedev and Yanukovych met to discuss a strategic partnership, Russia expected Ukraine to take a long-awaited step and rebuilt close relations based on openness. On their agenda was GLONASS satellite navigation system that could be used for military, defense cooperation and civilian needs.⁵ It is likely that Moscow proposed "innocent" cooperation in technology that was expected to develop into a military collaboration.

Post-Soviet countries should be able to determine their fates themselves, but big neighbor Russia so as their old rival US interfere their internal and external affairs. It seems that Cold War is still continuing in a different shape. We can see hints when Washington and Moscow are condemning each other for "seeking allies and military bases in former Soviet republics, using their assets (oil and gas in Russia's case) and aid to friendly governments and regulating foreign money in its political life."⁶ Moreover, in 2008 Putin had threatened Ukraine to aim nuclear missiles if Ukraine joins NATO alliance. US president Bush had aims to expand defense system over the Ukraine, because Yushchenko, former Ukrainian president, was ambitious to join NATO since he became president in 2005. Putin appreciated this as a threat and expressed himself at a news conference, he asked Yushchenko to try to imagine pointed Russian missiles "just for a second".⁷ This proves that post-Soviet area is an important region for Russia.

Russia also has economic intentions in post Soviet space. Russia – EU relations and post-Soviet region have a great importance on economic priorities. Some of the former Soviet

³ J. A. Naik. *Russia's Policies towards Neighbours*. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 3, No. 50 (Dec. 14, 1968), pp. 1905-1907 <<http://www.jstor.org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/stable/pdfplus/4359442.pdf?acceptTC=true>> [26 10 2012]

⁴ Stefan Kiesbye. *Is There a New Cold War?* Greenhaven Press, 2010 p. 14

⁵ Viktor Pirozhenko. *Russia-Ukraine summit: a strategic partnership?* In Geopolitical Monitor. 17 May 2010, <<http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/russia-ukraine-summit-a-strategic-partnership-3822/>> [01-11-2012]

⁶ Kiesbe, op. cit., p. 15

⁷ Peter Finn. *Putin Threatens Ukraine On NATO*. In The Washington Post. 13 Feb 2008, <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/12/AR2008021201658.html>> [01-11-2012]

countries are considered an economic bridge to the EU for Russia. Other than that, former Soviet space is perfect for widening the market, this means stimulation of investments.⁸ After the collapse of the Soviet Union analysts claimed there is a possibility that post-Soviet states will be involved in a new form of the union, because they have economic relations and interdependencies. Today Russia plays significant role in their economies.⁹

In Russia's international affairs economy and especially energy resources are closely related with political issues. Lithuanian professor L. Donskis said: "There is increasingly less politics in Europe, because we live under regime that is enforced by economy".¹⁰ Economy of Ukraine is very dependent on country's political planning. Ignoring any of Russian interests, or political tension would affect the economy of Ukraine.

The "Orange revolution" in Ukraine in 2004 was supported by western countries and non-governmental organizations. The political power that came to reign was perceived as anti-Russian and this was considered as Western invasion into the area of Russian priority.¹¹ In January 2006 Ukraine was able to make sure of Russian anger, when Kyiv had been pursuing western policy Moscow "punished" Ukraine by shutting down the gas flow.¹² Same situation was in a cold January 2009, millions of people in Central and East Europe were freezing for three weeks because of gas disputed between Russia and Ukraine.¹³

The long term Russian-Ukrainian relations have common nuclear energy projects on their agenda. Collaboration on energy issues should encourage development of industry and business relations. Russia is concerned about the cooperation in the area of aerospace. Generally Russia presents itself as Ukraine's opportunity for modernization and seeks for closer collaboration.¹⁴

⁸ E. Vinokurov. *Russian approaches to Integration in the Post-Soviet Space in the 2000s*. K. Malfiet, L. Verpoest, E. Vinokurov. The CIS, the EU and Russia. The Challenges of Integration. New York. 2007, pp. 26-30

⁹ Olexiy Haran. *Geography and economy: integration as a choice*. Projects and Prospects for Cooperation in Eurasia. Vilnius. 2012, p. 41

¹⁰ V. Sernius. *Baltarusija – ekonimisinis ir politinis Rusijos Federacijos vasalas?* In Geopolitika.lt. 2012-06-22, <<http://geopolitika.lt/?artc=5462>> [2012-10-22]; (Byelorussia – is it a economic and political vassal of Russia)

¹¹ Andrei Kazantsev. *Russian Policy in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea Region*. Richard Sakwa. Power and Policy in Putin's Russia. University of Glasgow. 2009, p. 205

¹² German Papers. *Russia's Gas Stranglehold on Europe*. In Spiegel Online. 02 Jan 2006, <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/german-papers-russia-s-gas-stranglehold-on-europe-a-393163.html>> [30-10-2012]

¹³ Jason Bush. *Lesson from the Russian Gas Dispute*. In Spiegel Online. 23 Jan 2009, <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/lasting-implications-for-european-market-lessons-from-the-russian-gas-dispute-a-603108.html>> [30-10-2012]

¹⁴ Viktor Pirozhenko. *Russia-Ukraine summit: a strategic partnership?* in Geopolitical Monitor. 17-05-2010, <<http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/russia-ukraine-summit-a-strategic-partnership-3822/>> [01-11-2012]

It seems that post-Soviet countries should develop democratic ideas and values, they should seek for welfare, but instead corruption is prospering. Even in Lithuania (member of EU and NATO) free and fair elections of parliament 2012 were violated by bribing the voters and propaganda. Pro-Russian parties won the 2012 parliament elections in Lithuania and Ukraine too. Russia was strongly involved in the campaigns. There were reports that Russian operatives are working together with politicians, trying to undermine parties that oppose Russian ambitions and convincing them to favor Russian interests. Occurred that Moscow has made donations for political campaigns or had ties with influential businessmen. Recently it happens more often.¹⁵

Russia's pro-Kremlin party United Russia has ties with the parties in the former Soviet countries. Head of United Russia is V. Putin. "In 2005, United Russia signed a cooperation agreement with the Party of Regions in Ukraine", V. Yanukovich is the head of it. Representative of Russian State Duma confirmed that working with Yanukovich is easier than with Yushchenko, because he understands the interests of Ukraine and he is oriented the right way.¹⁶ Hearing such claims and seeing obvious links between governing parties indicate strong interrelation between these two countries and their governments.

On the other hand there is nothing strange that Moscow is promoting a pro-Russian government in Ukraine, because there and in other former Soviet states Russia has business and political ties, "centuries of shared linguistic, marital [and] religious"¹⁷ ties.

Religion plays a great role in Putin's policy, he encouraged the growing influence of Russian Orthodox Church in country's political culture. He emphasize that Russia is a model to itself and it is going to take a different path of development than the West does, because they have different values that should be protected from "negative consequences of globalization".¹⁸ Legacies of Tsarist and Soviet periods are also obvious in post-Soviet countries. There are ties that bind people in the region: family or personal connections; increasing migration of workers, many Russians or Russian speakers live in Ukraine; countries have "historically special

¹⁵ Janusz Bugajski. Beware Russia's hand in elections in Georgia, Ukraine, Lithuania. In The Christian Science Monitor. 01 Oct 2012, <<http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/1001/Beware-Russia-s-hand-in-elections-in-Georgia-Ukraine-Lithuania>> [02-11-2012]

¹⁶ Robert Coalson. *Russia: partying abroad*. In Geopolitical Monitor. 30-10-2010, <<http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/russia-partying-abroad-4171/>> [01-11-2012]

¹⁷ Kiesbe, op. cit., p. 14

¹⁸ Angela E. Stent. *Restoration and Revolution in Putin's Foreign Policy*. Richard Sakwa. Power and Policy in Putin's Russia. University of Glasgow. 2009, p. 213

relations”.¹⁹ In some countries there is increasing nostalgia for the times in the union. Some of them are still used to present themselves as the “inheritors of superpower legacy”²⁰, mostly because of the achievements in “sports, science, military and technical”²¹ areas.

Russian language in the former Soviet region is a *lingua franca* – a language that is widely used for communication, people use it in work, studies, commerce and etc. Together with the language comes Russian pop culture and consumer goods, Russian films, music, literature, arts. Millions of people migrate there searching for a better life.²² Russia becomes the pole of attraction in the FSU region. Region becomes a cultural mix as it was during the era of the USSR.

Through religion and promotion of Russian culture Russia is able to make influence on the nations of former Soviet republics. Medvedev said: “Russia will defend the lives and dignity of its citizens abroad”²³, this means that Russia will interfere internal affairs of the country that has Russian minorities. Russia considers that Russian speakers are ethnic Russians. Ukraine is a good example here, after Viktor Yanukovich became a prime minister of Ukraine in 2006, he actively tried to make Russian language as a national language. He said he just needs a constitutional majority in the parliament. Geo-cultural spread across the border may be considered as a best effective way to spread the political influence.²⁴

Therefore we can see that Russia interferes actively the lives of the former Soviet republics, whether it is a political, cultural, economic or national security issues. According Andrei Ryabov it “still dominates the region militarily and politically”.²⁵

Fyodor Tyutchev wrote a poem, and one phrase became very famous: “Умом Россию не понять...”²⁶ (you cannot understand Russia by mind...). It is a various state, depends through witch angle you will look at it. It may seem defensive and offensive, helpful or seeking for

¹⁹ Janina Sleivyte. *Russia's European Agenda and the Baltic States*. New York. 2010, p. 50

²⁰ Pilar Bonet. *Russia Between Nostalgia and Bitter Reality*. In *Global Geopolitics*. 5 Dec 2011, <<http://globalgeopolitics.net/wordpress/2011/12/05/russia-between-nostalgia-and-bitter-reality/>> [01-11-2012]

²¹ Bonet, *ibid*,

²² Fiona Hill. *Russia's Newly Found "Soft Power"*. In *The Globalist*. 26 Aug 2004, <<http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2004/08/26russia-hill>> [31-10-2012]

²³ Janina Sleivyte. *Russia's European Agenda and the Baltic States*. New York. 2010, p. 50

²⁴ Vadim Dubnov. *Rusija posovietineje erdveje: "geokulturinio" puolimo ypatumai*. In *Geopolitika*. 14 Sept 2006, <<http://geopolitika.lt/?artc=333>> [31-10-2012]; (Russia in the post-Soviet space: peculiarities of the “geocultural” assault)

²⁵ Andrei Ryabov. *Collective Security Issues in the Post-Soviet Space after the Russian-Georgian War in August 2008*. Projects and Prospects for Cooperation in Eurasia. Vilnius. 2012, p. 8

²⁶ <<http://tyutchev.narod.ru/17.html>> [31-10-2012]

advantage at the same time. Russia is a big country, but it still tries to influence smaller countries around itself. Russia interferes other countries' affairs, but it closes itself from outside influences. I assume Russia a realistic state, but sometimes it applies methods, that are inherent from liberal ideas like the soft power.

Here I raise a question why Russia is interfering other countries' affairs; why it is promoting Russian political culture there; what is the point of being called a threat for a national security and of attracting the negative attention of the western societies?

The main question of my research (RQ) that will help to understand Russian ambitions is:

Why does independent former Soviet country Ukraine is not able to develop under democratic principles, develop cooperation and relations, integrate world society and foster western values self-sufficiently?

In order to understand Russian policymaking I am going to look from the perspective of Ukraine.

METHODOLOGY

I chose this topic because I am interested in the changing the world order, in power balancing between the states and in the developing countries. Russia used to be a superpower in a bipolar world, after the WW II till the collapse of the USSR. Right after that the United States took opportunity to expand its sphere of influence in Russia's neighbor countries. Last two decades are seen as American hegemony.²⁷

In the modern world new powers are developing (EU, China). In my opinion Russia wants to be a part of the multipolar world. I consider that there are other important features than military resources like economy, cultural spread (soft power), or sphere of influence that are enhancing state power in the "modern Cold War". I think Russia is trying to attract former Soviet countries in order to balance American, EU and China's powers. According to neo-realists alliance system is a successful mechanism of the balance of power. Russia is keen on creating a pole.

I took Ukraine as a study case in this paper, because in my opinion it reflects how Russia is behaving in the region. Ukraine's case is similar to the other Russia's neighbor countries

²⁷ *Mr. Putin's two faces*. In The Guardian. 12 July 2000, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/jul/12/russia.guardianleaders?INTCMP=SRCH> [17-01-2013]

despite some of them are members of the EU and NATO (Lithuania, Latvia). Russia is trying to create a hierarchy system in the region of Former Soviet Union (FSU).

In this paper I am going to put my focus on Ukraine – Russia relations in all aspects and I will try to come up to the conclusion that realistic – neo-realistic Russian thinking and Russian use of the liberal means are related with Russian strategic policy.

Problem formulation was not easy task. After I had an idea I made a literature review. This helped me to settle the topic. At first I made a study on secondary sources (media articles), but after I had a detailed plan I started a research on the primary sources such as scientific articles on the databases. For each of my sub-topics I have been looking for information at first on the databases. I always try to find a reliable source. If I am not lucky I continue my search on the web. If I find something there I check reliability of the source. Web articles usually have references to a primary source. If not, I compare information with other sources. I also tried to find some Russian sources and to find out their notion. I used few methods of data collection and checked the credibility, I used triangulation technique.

I also made a research on the books (secondary sources), but not all of them are appropriate for my thesis, because information there is not new enough. Research on the international relations requires modern information.

In search for sources I used my computer, because it saves time. I was able to read abstracts and sort the information really fast. I have been using online databases where I found many relevant academic papers, books and articles published by scholars, universities and scholar organizations. Databases I usually use are: Academic Research Library; Academic Search Premier; JSTOR; Web of Science; Google Scholar.

I have read hundreds of the articles, and tens of books, most of them were relevant to my topic only partially. However there were few that I have used a lot. Books of Jack Donnelly, Tim Dunne and Bryan C. Schmidt helped me a lot in perception of realism and neo-realism. Though two books may seem not enough, anyway, they perfectly and comprehensively define theories of the international relations by comparing the thoughts of the great thinkers. I have checked other sources, but the essence is the same. So the basis were these two books and the article of Dr. Bruce Bordner. Articles of J. Nye, Alexander Bogomolov and Oleksandr Lytvynenko helped me to understand the essence and the use of the soft power. I also used them all while doing the analysis.

In the review part I used a lot of different sources that were relevant to my topic. Each sub-topic is based on a number of different sources. I could not say that I had one particular and dominant source for my thesis.

While referencing my work I decided to use footnotes/endnotes, because I am used to it. In my opinion it is simple and clear, it is easy to follow which source and what page I refer. Also I think that it is less distracting than Harvard style and takes less space in the main body.

For this research I chose qualitative research strategy, first of all because this research is concerned with words, not with numbers. This strategy is also appropriate because theories are related with research, or my research is confirming the theories. In this research I try to explain the outcomes that arise from interactions between subjects. My point is not to show the extension of the problem, but answer the question “Why” this problem arose. I put emphasis on the descriptive details, because I want to explain why something is happening. In this research it is necessary to understand the context, thus it is possible to understand the behavior of the actors.

Grounded theory is the framework of qualitative data analysis in this research. “In this method, data collection, analysis and eventual theory stand in close relationship to one another.”²⁸ I held a question like a theory that I want to develop out of data.

Critics claim that qualitative research is subjective and findings may be influenced by subjective interpretations of researcher.²⁹ I agree with this opinion, but in this research I will try to avoid any bias. However most of the data is already the interpretations by other researchers or authors of articles, so it is hard to claim that my data is objective. Other disadvantage of this strategy is richness of qualitative data. It is important not to go too broad.

One more thing to mention is that I made a case study. It is focusing on process and discovery.³⁰ I think that a case of Ukraine is going to reflect the Russian actions with the other states too. It would be too broad to make a research on a whole region. In my opinion situation of Ukraine is a perfect example. In answering this RQ I will be able to explain the reasons that may reflect much higher Russian ambitions.

I divided this paper in six main parts. Introduction – there are my aims and problem formulation. I think it is very important part, that later will be used as a guideline. Theories –

²⁸ Strauss and Corbin (1998: 12) in Alan Bryman. Social Research Methods. Third edition. Oxford University Press. New York. 2008, p. 541

²⁹ Alan Bryman. Social Research Methods. Third edition. Oxford University Press. New York. 2008, p. 391

³⁰ Robert. B. Burns. Introduction to Research Methods. Sage Publications. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi. 2000, pp. 460-461

there I present theories of international relations that help to understand state behavior in international system. I will use them in analysis part where they will help me to explain behavior of states and to answer my research question. Methodology – here I explain how I am going to do my research, what methods and structure I chose.

Literature review or retrospect is the most important part. There I am going to represent the situation in Ukraine-Russia relations. It will help to answer the part of the RQ. This part helps to understand how Ukraine is restricted with Russian influence and the extent of this phenomenon. I will represent facts about Russia's interference in Ukraine's internal and external affairs. This is a descriptive part.

Analysis – there I will apply theories of IR on the literature review in order to understand Russia's purposes of the expansion of its influence on Ukraine. Thus I want to show that Russia's development as a great power state, and its capabilities to balance the power depend on its neighbor states. This is the part where I will do a qualitative data analysis.

I chose the unusual style, because I am using three theories. It is necessary in order to make this research consistently. My idea is that Russia is a unique country and a model to itself. It uses the soft power combined with the realist thinking in order to achieve a dominant status, in order to compete on a wider international space. Russian international status of "super-state", thus the balance of power "game" depends on its "smart power" and policymaking in "near abroad".

Last part is conclusions where I will represent short summary about how I succeeded to reach my goals.

THEORIES

Realism

Realism is one of the most important and dominant theories of the international relations. It is hard to find an exact definition for this theory, because of the great variety of different theorists in different times. Though it is hard to define it is easy to recognize when you see it. Realism is based on many propositions and assumptions that make this theory exceptional and recognizable. This approach to international relations emerged in the course of time, and many prominent scholars have contributed in shaping this theory. Jack Donnelly has classified a box where he put together the main assumptions of realism by Waltz, Morgenthau, Mearshimer, Gilpin, Keohane, and the others.³¹ Here I present some of them:

- The state's interest provides the spring of action;
- The international system is anarchic;
- Success is the ultimate test of policy, and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state;
- Universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states;
- No state can ever be certain another state will not use its offense military capability;
- The most basic motive driving states is survival;
- States are motivated primarily by their national interests;
- Power relations are fundamental feature of international affairs;
- States seek power and they calculate their interests in terms of power;
- Skepticism towards international laws, institutions and ideals that attempt to transcend or replace nationalism;
- Primacy of balance of power politics;
- States seek to maximize their security or their power.

As we can see, and we will see later, words like state, power, security, nation, survival, balance, self-help, anarchy are the basics of this theory. This is one of many ways to recognize it. However it is necessary to study realism in more detail in order to understand it.

³¹ Jack Donnelly. *Realism and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2000, pp. 6-9

Construction of definition of this theory starts with the days of classical antiquity and includes figures like Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.³² According Jack Donnelly and other realists since then nothing has changed about the human nature, it is egoistic and immoral.³³ Realists believe that the aspects of human nature are the most important in constructing this theory. Realism reflects such features of human nature like dominance, egoism, ambition for power, competition and fear. The same features can be seen in international politics. Hans Morgenthau claims that “human beings are flawed creatures”³⁴.

Egoism comes together with the self-interest and immorality leads to distrust. Realists argue that state government cannot be based on some ethical norms or moral principles, because such things do not exist in international relations and state survival can be assured only if state leaders are working “under the doctrine of *raison d’etat*, or reason of state”³⁵. In international arena states are always competing for territory, market, influence or resources. Distrust is encouraged and actors are suspicious on one another.³⁶ Though some realists agree that man is a moral being still they all are unanimous that egoistic passion has to take top in political actions.³⁷

In the globalizing modern world states are actors in the international politics, they actively participate in dealing with their foreign affairs. One of the main assumptions of this theory is that state is the primary actor in international relations, and role of non-state actors has to be minimized as much as possible. States should work as equal political units.³⁸

Realists emphasize a state-centric assumption thus according to them the structure of international system is anarchic. The existence of anarchy means chaos and disorder, but they are not implied by anarchy. Anarchy means that there are no central authority that could control the actions of sovereign states that take place in international politics. The lack of international government encourages anarchy, according to them anarchy can be abolished only by central government³⁹. Anarchy “encourages the worst aspects of human nature to be expressed”⁴⁰.

³² Tim Dunne. Bryan C. Schmidt. Realism. John Baylis. Steve Smith. Patricia Owens. The Globalization Of World Politics. Fourth edition. Oxford University Press. 2008, p. 92

³³ Donnelly, op. cit., p. 9

³⁴ Baylis, op. Cit., p. 95

³⁵ Tim Dunne. Bryan C. Schmidt. Realism. John Baylis. Steve Smith. Patricia Owens. The Globalization Of World Politics. Fourth edition. Oxford University Press. 2008, p. 92

³⁶ FaustoSicha. International Relations: Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism. In EIEcua. 20 Jul 2010 <<http://elecua.com/?p=384> > [07-11-2012]

³⁷ Donnelly, op. cit., p. 10

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 8-17

³⁹ Baylis, op. cit., pp. 92-94

Anarchy raises some challenges that states have to overcome in order to survive. First of all and most important is that survival is closely related with the dominance. Hans j. Morgenthau claims that “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power”⁴¹. States that participate in anarchic space of international politics do not recognize a higher authority of the others. Instead, independent sovereign states want to increase their own power and authority.⁴² According to that, realists see politics as the relations between powers.

The concept of power is also complicated. Morgenthau suggested a following definition: “man’s control over the minds and actions of other men”⁴³, but state capabilities like tanks, aircraft or number of troops should not be devaluated.

Morgenthau was not the only one who talked about the struggle for power, Schwarzenberger and Waltz also claim that power is essential in international relations. Realists say that conflict exists, but it has to be managed, and that security does not mean a safe or peaceful world it means a less violent and less dangerous one.⁴⁴

Power is a substantial principle of realism. History proves that states with less power were condemned to lose their existence and states with more power had more chances to survive. “A nations survival is its first and ultimate responsibility; it cannot be compromised or put at risk”⁴⁵. States that are willing to survive in an anarchic system without moral principles also have to look after themselves, principle of self-help can ensure survival. Self-help means that actors should not trust their own well-being and security to someone else, they should not depend on other actors. Cooperation in self-help system is usually based on the principle of selfishness, each actor seeks for maximum profit. Because of the relative gains, it is a great challenge to establish a successful cooperation.⁴⁶

Realists claim that dependency is good only in one way – when other actors depend on you. States also should avoid of interdependence, because it also increases a possibility to

⁴⁰ Donnelly, op. cit., p. 10

⁴¹ Baylis, op. cit., p. 93

⁴² Baylis, *ibid.*, p. 93

⁴³ Baylis, *ibid.*, p. 100

⁴⁴ Donnelly, op. cit., p. 10

⁴⁵ Baylis, op. cit., p. 102

⁴⁶ Baylis, op. cit., pp. 93-103

become vulnerable. States should be independent if possible, if not, dependency or interdependence has to be minimal.⁴⁷

According H. J. Morgenthau, states may pursue either status quo either imperialistic policy, but it is very difficult to distinguish them. Status quo policy means that states are linked to strengthen power of authority and thus insensibly imperialism is awakened.⁴⁸ Machiavelli said that imperial expansion is a justifiable/right way in order to gain a greater security⁴⁹. Therefore it does not matter what is the ideological curtain, still struggle for power exists and is driven by interests, self-help and survival.

Sovereignty of state is one more principle relevant with realism. Theorists claim that in anarchic space sovereign states participate as independent actors. They compete for power and security in a zero-sum form when one actor gets more thus another gets less. According to realists in this competitive phenomenon there are no universal agreements on principles, but one – non-intervention. This means that no other state is able to intervene internal affairs of the other sovereign state. But there are theorists that claim about the exception here and great power states has right to intervene the affairs of their ‘near abroad’. Realism is encouraging to enhance power internationally.⁵⁰ “In anarchic orders, states are exposed more or less directly to the competing desires of other states.”⁵¹

It is necessary to keep in mind that this theory has many different sub-streams. Here I represented the assumptions that help to recognize a classical realism. The trigger of this approach is a bad human nature and main focus of states is gaining power. Conflict is a result of state’s search for power or glory. However this theory was evolving and thinkers found new streams of it.

Neo-realism

Neo-realistic approach or structural realism was developed and first described by Kenneth Waltz in 1979. Waltz is not a founder of a new theory, he just developed classical

⁴⁷ Evaldas Sulcas. China and Africa Relations. Aalborg University. 2010, p. 6

⁴⁸ Jaunius Petraitis. *Politinis Realizmas Tarptautiniuose Santykiuose: Samprata ir Nesupratimai Po Saltojo Karo*. In Leidykla.eu 2012, p. 47 <http://www.leidykla.eu/fileadmin/Politologija/2012-1_65/29-92.pdf> [02-11-2012] (*Political Realism in International Relations: Conception and Misunderstandings After the Cold War*)

⁴⁹ Baylis, op. cit., p. 100

⁵⁰ Baylis, ibid.

⁵¹ Jack Donnelly. *Realism and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2000, p. 73

realism. Structural realism and classical realism are not that different, they have a lot of similarities, but their essence differs.

Idea of Waltz is that human nature is not the most important factor in international relations. He puts emphasis on power and agrees with other realists that there is a struggle for power in international politics. Power is very important here and especially power distribution.⁵² The meaning of power in neo-realism is interpreted as capability. Waltz says that states should count on their capabilities in order to assure survival. State power/capabilities are constructed of “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.”⁵³

According to Waltz states are unitary and rational actors that seek to “improve their material welfare”⁵⁴. States do not engage the conflict because of the human nature. The structure of the international system makes them compete. He also says that international system is anarchic and states there act like separate, autonomous and equal political actors. States have to rely only on their own capabilities and fight for their interests. No state should let other state to take care of it. In the anarchic system states by their nature are security seekers, they want to assure state survival.⁵⁵ So that is different from realists’ focus on power.

Waltz claims that all states have similar or common aims, states are not so different in what they aspire. The only difference is that not all of them are capable to reach that end. So principle of self-help is inherent from this theory as well.⁵⁶ According to Waltz the order of the international relations is anarchic and it “is not imposed by higher authority but arises from the interactions of formally equal political actors.”⁵⁷ Therefore anarchic system is a result of the absence of the central authority and thus competition. State behavior is determined by given conditions in conflicting international system, where survival and security are the main goals.⁵⁸

According to Waltz states are ready to do anything in order to assure survival. States are “security maximizers”⁵⁹, but they are not power maximizers, this means they are rational actors.

⁵² Baylis, *ibid.*, pp. 95-98

⁵³ Baylis, *ibid.*, p. 101

⁵⁴ Donnelly, *op. cit.*, p. 30

⁵⁵ Dr. Bruce Bordner. *Rethinking Neorealist Theory: Order Within Anarchy*. University of Virginia. Dec. 1997, <<http://www.brucebordner.com/Neorealism.html>> [20-11-2012]

⁵⁶ Donnelly, *op. cit.*, p. 17

⁵⁷ Donnelly, *ibid.*, p. 17

⁵⁸ Baylis, *op. cit.*, p. 98

⁵⁹ Baylis, *ibid.*, p. 99

Waltz talks about the balance between major powers. Neo-realism goes for balance of power as a mean to assure security.⁶⁰ However John Mearsheimer claims that anarchy in international system makes states to seek for more power “at the expense of other states”⁶¹. This version of neo-realism is called offensive realism.⁶²

According to Waltz balance of power theory exists “whenever two or more states coexist in an anarchic order with no superior agent to come to the aid of states that may be weakening or to deny to any of them the use of whatever instruments they think will serve their purposes”.⁶³ Neo-realists claim that the world should be bipolar or multi-polar instead of a one state hegemony.

According to this theory in anarchic order states are linked to balance rather than to join leading power. States should always consider other powers as a threat. Only weak states may have no other choice than to obey or join the dominant, thus trying to ensure survival or gain some vital interests. Great powers always try to balance.⁶⁴

Balancing other power can be internal or external. Internal balancing means that state is trying to increase its power by economic growth, or greater military spending. External balancing is when the state enters some alliance.⁶⁵

Though realistic states are skeptic about the cooperation neo-realist states goes for cooperation among states, but only if “state security is not placed at risk”⁶⁶. Problem is that states can never be sure about the intentions of the ally, because they can be friends one day and the enemies the other day, whether it is economic or military cooperation. Usually cooperation is encouraged against a common enemy in order to balance its power. Though neo-realists sometimes approve cooperation on the international level, they still object to collective security cooperation because of sovereignty issues. Neo-realists claim that states usually enter cooperation leaded by national interests.⁶⁷

Anarchy and international organizations are very important issues in this theory, however they claim that international organizations has not enough power. There is one more thing to

⁶⁰ Bordner, op. cit.

⁶¹ Baylis, op. cit., p. 99

⁶² Baylis, *ibid.*, p. 99

⁶³ Donnelly, op. cit., p. 17

⁶⁴ Donnelly, *ibid.*, p. 18

⁶⁵ Bordner, op. cit.

⁶⁶ Bordner, *ibid.*

⁶⁷ Bordner, *ibid.*

know, international economic interdependence plays special role as well. According to Waltz states should be self sufficient, because dependency makes state vulnerable, but he has different opinion about interdependence. Usually interdependence develops among the nations that are cooperating in order to balance a great power. Interdependence changes the way states cooperate, it is also closely related with globalization. Neo-realists claim there is disadvantages of globalization. It may affect some areas of state authority and control, thus state's sovereignty may be put in danger.⁶⁸

In summary we can see that classical realism and neo-realism are similar theories. They both focus on power and security issues, they both claim about the importance of self-help and independence. Both theories agree that world is a competitive place and self-interest rules. However they have different approach on power, international organizations and economic interdependence. Neo-realists rejects the idea of a bad human nature and emphasize that state behavior depend on the structure of international system.

Soft Power (and a Hard power)

Soft power is “the ability to get what you want through the attraction rather than coercion or payments.”⁶⁹ This term and the definition were coined by Joseph S. Nye Jr. and generally it means that state should show the attractiveness of its culture and political values. It is important to be seen as honest, good and fair in the eyes of the others in order to enhance ones soft power. Nye gives the United States as an example of this phenomenon, because American culture spread around the world without an extra push. After the WW II American music was popular manner of resistance in the Soviet countries.⁷⁰

J. Nye opposes to Niccolo Machiavelli who said that it is better to be feared than loved. Nye says that in modern world it is important to be feared and loved. Concept of power is changing in years, modern power is information. Globalizing world enforces the spread of information that better to be attractive than unpleasant. Power was always negotiable term, neo-realists believed that capabilities are the power. Nye claims that power in general is “the ability

⁶⁸ David Galbreath. *Neo-liberalism*. IR2501 Theories of International Relations in University of Aberdeen, <www.abdn.ac.uk/pir/notes06/Level2/IR2501/IR2501.6.ppt> [21-11-2012]

⁶⁹ Joseph S. Nye Jr. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York. 2004, p. X
<http://books.google.dk/books?id=sFNfYvNtw5AC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false> [11-11-2012]

⁷⁰ Nye, *ibid*.

to get the outcomes one wants.”⁷¹ British realist E. H. Carr even before the WW II acknowledged that power over opinion is at the same level as military and economic power.⁷²

To understand how much power you have at first you have to understand what are you competing for and in what “game” you are involved. According to Nye world can be uni-polar and multi-polar at the same time, depend through which angle you will look at it. If state had military power that no other state can compete with, than this state is a hegemony in the uni-polar order. However the same superpower can be not so strong economically and interdependent with other states. In this case world order would be multi-polar with distribution of power. Third issue is transnational issues, where power is also distributed and not even between states, distribution includes non state actors as well. Nye claims that states should not put their concern on one dimension, it is necessary to use the soft power and be diverse in order to survive in this chaotic system,⁷³ but “some goals can only be achieved by hard power.”⁷⁴

Soft power is when states are using other manners that military or economic ones to get what they want. Nye says that “a country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it.”⁷⁵ Countries may show their attractiveness in culture, political values or institutions that have moral authority. Soft power is related to persuasion and attraction. Usually soft power is a feature of democratic states, but not necessarily. Stalin in the USSR pursued a great policy of soft power and attracted some other countries.⁷⁶

One of the most important sources of the soft power is distribution of country’s culture whether it is arts, literature, language or pop-culture. Internal and external policy of government is also an essential source of the soft power. The role of institutions can enhance country’s attractiveness as well.⁷⁷

⁷¹ Nye, *ibid.*, p.1

⁷² Nye, *ibid.*, pp. 3-8

⁷³ Nye, *ibid.*, p. 4

⁷⁴ J. S. Nye Jr. *Think again: Soft Power*. In Foreign Policy. 23 Feb 2006, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/02/22/think_again_soft_power> [20-11-2012]

⁷⁵ Nye, *op. cit.*, p. 5

⁷⁶ J. S. Nye Jr. *Think again: Soft Power*. In Foreign Policy. 23 Feb 2006, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/02/22/think_again_soft_power> [20-11-2012]

⁷⁷ Nye, *op. cit.*, pp. 11 - 14

The term hard power is related with the realist school (Machiavelli, Hobbes, Morgenthau) and is linked with the resources like “population, territory, natural resources, economic and military strength”⁷⁸. Hard power is perceived as manipulation of other states.

Hard and soft powers are easy to mix, because they both imply the “ability to achieve one’s purposes by affecting the behavior of others”.⁷⁹ However there is difference between coercion and attraction. Influence is attributed to a hard power. Economic strength can be perceived either a soft or a hard power. Economically strong state can put sanctions on the other country or it can just attract it by wealth and stability. The same situation is with the military resources. States can use their military resources against the other state as a hard power. However, military competence can be used to provide humanitarian help or attract other states just by being strong itself thus becoming a source of the soft power.⁸⁰

Hard power is related with the realism and soft power with the liberalism. It looks controversial, but scholars, including Nye, claim that states should use both of them in order to achieve their goals. They suggest that combination of soft and hard powers is a key to success and consider this phenomenon as a “smart power”.⁸¹

Sub-conclusions

I have represented three theories that I will apply in my analysis. Though theory of soft power is a stream of liberalism and it is opposite to realism and neo-realism, I believe that in modern world they all can be applied. I agree with Nye, that states should be diverse in their policymaking. Modern world is in the age of globalization and liberals see this phenomenon as the core of world politics. However some interdependent states still seek for power. Balance of power is very important feature in state policy and international political system.⁸²

Though I am looking to the Russian international relations through the neo-realistic angle I still consider that Russia could not manage to balance successfully without applying realistic approach and the soft power. In my opinion “smart power” is a measure of a successful Russian policymaking.

⁷⁸ Hard Power. In Public Diplomacy. <http://publicdiplomacy.wikia.com/wiki/Hard_Power> [23-11-2012]

⁷⁹ Nye, op. cit., p. 7

⁸⁰ J. S. Nye Jr. *Think again: Soft Power*. In Foreign Policy. 23 Feb 2006, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/02/22/think_again_soft_power> [20-11-2012]

⁸¹ Nye, ibid.

⁸² Tim Dunne. Bryan C. Schmidt. Realism. John Baylis. Steve Smith. Patricia Owens. *The Globalization Of World Politics*. Fourth edition. Oxford University Press. 2008, p. 7

REVIEW/BACKGROUND OF UKRAINE – RUSSIA RELATIONS

Situation in Ukraine

1. Ethnic Russian minority in Ukraine

Ethnic situation of Ukraine has a great influence on Ukraine's politics. Officially around 17.3 percent of Ukraine's population is Russians. The largest concentration of Russian speaking community is in south-eastern part of Ukraine. Though it may seem not a big population on a whole country, however in Crimea more than 50 percent are Russians. Crimea is important for Russia, because of the city Sevastopol, there is located Russian Black Sea Fleet. There is noticeable influence of ethnic Russian population in the region, because local Ukrainians generally speak Russian. They also support Ukraine's pro-Russian politicians, hence the support for Yanukovich's controlled Party of Regions comes from there.⁸³

Some politicians even try to improve their votes by emphasizing their good relations with Russia. Russia also uses its ethnic population whenever it needs to influence politicians. South-eastern Ukrainian Russians are powerful tool in political affairs.⁸⁴

The Russian activist groups "Nashi" and "Eurasian Youth Movement" have spread outside Russia. Their activity together with the personnel from the Black Sea Fleet have significant influence in Crimea. In the region there are more organizations that Russia is using in its favor. Russian intelligence service is encouraging and supporting separatist activities in Ukraine's territory. According to the Security Service of Ukraine there were three organizations: Donetsk Republic, Peoples Front "Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia", Rusyns organization in Transcarpathia; that were controlled from abroad. They are considered as a threat for Ukrainian integrity and have to be banned.⁸⁵

Anatoly Sobchak former mayor of St. Petersburg once said: "Crimea has never belonged to Ukraine and there are no legal or moral grounds for Ukraine to lay claim to the Crimea"⁸⁶. Though this region is a part of Ukraine, however it is an obstacle for country's intentions. In

⁸³ Derek G. Webb. *Russian Influence On Ukrainian Strategic Policy*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 2011, p. 33
<<http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/utis/getfile/collection/p4013coll2/id/2734/filename/2785.pdf>> [02-11-2012]

⁸⁴ Webb, *ibid.*

⁸⁵ Webb, *ibid.*, p. 34

⁸⁶ Elena Mizrokhi. *Russian 'separatism' in Crimea and NATO: Ukraine's big hope, Russia's grand gamble*. Laval University. Quebec. August 2009, p. 8
<http://www.psi.ulaval.ca/fileadmin/psi/documents/Documents/Travaux_et_recherches/Crimee.pdf> [05-12-2012]

2007 99percent of residents were against Ukraine's ambitions to join NATO. This result is related with the legacy of the Soviet propaganda and Russian speaking communities. Russia decided to use this in its favor. Russia is providing moral and financial support to the pro-Russian organizations in order to destabilize Ukrainian political situation. That is to say, Russia is continuing propaganda campaign.⁸⁷

After Putin's arrival to the Kremlin many more pro-Russian organizations founded in Ukraine. Most of them are related and are financed by Russian political institutions (former Moscow Mayor Luzhkov, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Presidential Administration). Russian Orthodox culture is the main platform for those organizations. Russian media in Crimea is dominant. They all have common aims to "increase cultural and other cooperation with Russia; nurture of a Russian consciousness and identity; promote of Russian language, literature, culture."⁸⁸ Thus Russia is increasing its influence within Ukraine's territory and is able to use those groups as a tool in its favor.

Dual citizenship is illegal in Ukraine however Russia is not only spreading Russian culture, but also granting citizenships to Russian speakers. Scholars claim that this is Russian strategy, to make Ukraine's government to seek for Russia's assistance in dealing with minorities. What is more, Russia claims it is always ready to defend its minorities in other countries.⁸⁹ Russia actively plays "anti-Russian" card in post-Soviet countries. Politicians together with media are emphasizing the violation of the rights of ethnic Russian communities thus trying to attract the international attention.⁹⁰

In "near abroad" affairs Russia is applying realistic approach. Russia's eight days war with Georgia is a perfect example for Ukraine, that it is going to use military means to protect minorities if necessary. Military is still a tool in Russian policy.⁹¹

However Russia's direct interference and especially criticism of Ukrainian government is not always welcome. Several years ago Russia attempted to influence Ukrainian government through coercive methods using energy blockade. The outcome has not been as desired, Russian

⁸⁷ Mizrokhi, *ibid.*, p. 14

⁸⁸ Mizrokhi, *ibid.*, p. 16

⁸⁹ Mizrokhi, *ibid.*, p. 19

⁹⁰ Grigorii Amnuel. Humanitarian issues in Post-Soviet space: origins and solutions. Projects and Prospects for Cooperations in Eurasia. Collection of Articles. Vilnius. 2012, p. 63
<<http://www.geopolitika.lt/print.php?artc=5591>> [30-10-2012]

⁹¹ Mizrokhi, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19

actions were considered as hostile acts and created an anti-Russian attitude in most of the Ukraine.⁹²

2. *Local support, nostalgia*

After Putin became a President for a second time, he declared the goals of the foreign policy. The most important and the final goal was a status of a “modern great power”. As one of the means to achieve that Putin emphasized the use of a soft power. He emphasized the use of the Russian cultural influence on the surrounding nations as a key to become a global actor. Thus reinforcement of the cultural ties with Ukraine remain one of the most important national interests.⁹³

According to some sources more than 30 percent of population in Ukraine is Russian speakers officially. Language is a very relevant topic there, because it is one of the principles that divide the nation. Politicians try to make Russian language as a second official language of the country.⁹⁴

Language is used as a tool by Russia in spreading its culture and propaganda about the “good old days”. “...there is a range of new Russian consumer products, a burgeoning popular culture spread through satellite TV, a growing film industry, rock music, Russian popular novels and the revival of the crowning achievements of the Russian artistic tradition.”⁹⁵ Russian language is dominant on Ukrainian television and broadcasts about Russia and the USSR are common. According to some researchers, mostly it is propaganda. Noteworthy is that in 2011 Ukrainian government announced that on the 9th of May everybody will be able to go to cinema for free and watch movies about the victory in 1941-45 “Great Patriotic War”. These movies are really and truly Russian propaganda. Moreover there is growing number of the Russian-speaking classes in schools and Russian-language newspapers, radios and TV channels.⁹⁶ Results of such activity are in favor of Russia.

⁹² Webb, op. cit., p. 33

⁹³ Webb, op. cit., p. 23

⁹⁴ Daniel Kalder. *Transmissions from a Lone Star: You Say “nomudop” I SAY “nomidop”*. In Rianovosti. 01 May 2012, <<http://en.ria.ru/columnists/20120601/173793426.html>> [08-12-2012]

⁹⁵ Fiona Hill. *Russia’s Newly Found “Soft Power”*. In Brookings. 26 Aug 2004, <<http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2004/08/26russia-hill>> [30-10-2012]

⁹⁶ Inna Zavhorodnya. Vladyslav Hrynevych. *Archetypes From the Past*. In The Ukrainian Week. 3 July 2012, <<http://ukrainianweek.com/History/54391>> [08-12-2012]

In Ukraine not only Russian minority is supportive of the expansion of Russian culture and influence. “For some, the collapse of the Soviet Union is still the greatest tragedy, a “geopolitical disaster””⁹⁷. These people do not want to admit that they were living under the totalitarian government and society was controlled by the Party that is considered as an evil. However all ethnicities in the Union were equal in rights. Ideology was creating a new community – Soviet people. Some people believe they are Soviet people and they remember only good things and retain nostalgic about the former Union and the “great idea” of communism.⁹⁸

In 2011 Ukraine was celebrating 20 years of independency, but many people were not happy at all. More than a half of Ukrainians expressed nostalgia for the “old days” of the USSR. Absolute majority of these people are pensioners. They claim about better former living conditions concerned with sustenance, social security, recreation. People praise cheap or free services and great necessities. People complain about unemployment, alcoholism, instability, disrespect and disorder. They all emphasize former respect for government, for offices and each other. Now people consider that soviet propaganda about capitalism was true. People now believe that capitalism is good just for rich and powerful, as the Soviets said.⁹⁹

However some Ukrainians are concerned about this propaganda and “russianism”. There arise discontent about the new monuments for the Soviets and the restoration of the cult of Soviet heroes including Joseph Stalin.¹⁰⁰

3. *Polarized country and international course/trend*

The disunity of Ukrainians determined political variety and division into pro-Western and pro-Russian political groups. Researchers claim that Ukraine appears as a country between

⁹⁷ Grigorii Amnuel. *Humanitarian issues in Post-Soviet space: origins and solutions*. Projects and Prospects for Cooperations in Eurasia. Collection of Articles. Vilnius. 2012, p. 58
<<http://www.geopolitika.lt/print.php?artc=5591>> [30-10-2012]

⁹⁸ Amnuel, *ibid.*, pp. 58-60

⁹⁹ Mike Freeman. *Ukrainians Nostalgic For Soviet Union Era*. In Allvoices. 26-08-2011,
<<http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/10150122-ukrainians-nostalgic-for-soviet-union-era>> [30-10-2012]

¹⁰⁰ Zavhorodnya, Hrynevych, op. cit.

democracy and authoritarianism. However that cannot last long and sooner or later country will fall under the democratic or the undemocratic system.¹⁰¹

3.1 Pro-Russian political power

People that used to support the Communist party of Ukraine now give their votes to the Party of Regions. This party confirms that it is representing the interests of the Russian-speaking communities. As I wrote above, majority of Russian-speaking communities live in the eastern part of the country and in the western part Ukrainian speaking population is dominant. Therefore regional difference correspond political split. Western population supports European path (pro-European) and eastern part goes for Russian Ukraine (pro-Russian).¹⁰²

Ukraine's rapid warm-up of the relations with Russia experts relate with the Yanukovych's coming to power. He is the head of the Party of Regions and experts see his intentions to involve Ukraine into "the Russian geopolitical, cultural, humanitarian, socio-economic civilizational space."¹⁰³

Viktor Yanukovych became a president of Ukraine after 2010 presidential election. Analysts claim that since then Ukraine is turning into a "soft" authoritarianism. During his campaign Yanukovych promised things that attracted support of ethnic Russians and Kremlin. He promised to make Russian language as a second national language, to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia and he also emphasized his anti-NATO position.¹⁰⁴ Western countries are concerned that Yanukovych will lead Ukraine under Russia's authority with disrespect for 20 years of the western support for independent Ukraine.¹⁰⁵

Yanukovych solved one of the greatest Russia's concerns in Ukraine. In 2012 he signed an agreement for the lease of the Russian Black Sea Fleet for 25 years more, but in exchange

¹⁰¹ Andriy Meleshevych. *Evolution, Present State and Future of Political Parties in Ukraine: Expert Opinions*. Razumkov Centre, National Security and Defence. No.5. 2010, p. 35

<http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/files/category_journal/NSD116_eng_2.pdf> [09-12-2012]

¹⁰² Ihor Zhdanov. Vadym Karasiov. *Evolution, Present State and Future of Political Parties in Ukraine: Expert Opinions*. Razumkov Centre, National Security and Defence. No.5. 2010, pp. 37-40

<http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/files/category_journal/NSD116_eng_2.pdf> [09-12-2012]

¹⁰³ Vadym Karasiov. *Evolution, Present State and Future of Political Parties in Ukraine: Expert Opinions*. Razumkov Centre, National Security and Defence. No.5. 2010, p. 40

<http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/files/category_journal/NSD116_eng_2.pdf> [09-12-2012]

¹⁰⁴ Olexiy Haran. *From Viktor to Viktor: Democracy and Authoritarianism in Ukraine*. Demokratizatsiya 19.2 In ProQuest. 2011

¹⁰⁵ *Call foul; Ukraine and Europe*. The Economist. 5 May 2012, in ProQuest

<<http://search.proquest.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/docview/1011292517>> [10-12-2012]

Russia promised to sell gas for a reasonable price. Yanukovych's decision was appreciated as controversial, because according to Ukraine's Constitution no foreign military troops are allowed to have a permanent basis in country's territory. Moreover, in 2010 the mayor of Moscow, Luzhkov, repeated his claims about Crimea and said that Russian military base will be there forever.¹⁰⁶

One more significant issue in Ukraine is religion. Yanukovych gave preference to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, "that is under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate."¹⁰⁷ The "Pussy Riot" incident proved that Orthodox Church and Russian government (Putin) are very related: "if you are against Putin, that means you are against the Orthodox church."¹⁰⁸ Church plays a significant role in Russia's political and social life, and reinforces influence in Ukraine.

Yanukovych was seeking to apply Russian methods against Western funded NGO's by preventing Western assistance. There is a proposition that through these NGOs Western intelligence services are supporting the opposition and this is not acceptable for Yanukovych. He is very hostile to the opposition, especially to Yushchenko. Former President Kuchma also believed that opposition works under American money and orders. Spy-mania is a legacy from the USSR and it is still evident in the policy of Russia and Ukraine. Though security services in both countries have new names (FSB and SBU) they still work under the KGB principles. Anti-Americanism is clear in Yanukovych's policy, especially when he defines Ukraine as a non-NATO member.¹⁰⁹

However Party of Regions and its head Yanukovych are not linked to make concessions to Russia on the issues where they have their own interests. Usually it is economic interests and energy infrastructure. Russian oligarchs have interests there and are threatening local business elites. Ukraine rejected proposal to merge Naftogas Ukrainy and Gazprom, it is also hesitating to join Customs Union.¹¹⁰ Yanukovych tries to maneuver between Russia and the West. He said that Ukraine would like to have closer ties with the EU. On the other hand he does not want to

¹⁰⁶ Olexiy Haran. *From Viktor to Viktor: Democracy and Authoritarianism in Ukraine*. Demokratizatsiya 19.2 In ProQuest. 2011, <<http://search.proquest.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/docview/872172896>> [09-12-2012]

¹⁰⁷ Haran, *ibid*.

¹⁰⁸ Oleg Kashin. *Putin's message: if you're pro Pussy Riot you're against the Orthodox church*. In The Guardian. 17 Aug 2012, <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/aug/17/pussy-riot-putin-message>> [10-12-2012]

¹⁰⁹ Taras Kuzio. *Soviet conspiracy theories and political culture in Ukraine: Understanding Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions*. Communist and Post-Communist Studies. Ontario. Sept 2011, in ScienceDirect, pp. 221-232 <<http://www.sciencedirect.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/science/article/pii/S0967067X1100033X>> [11-12-2012]

¹¹⁰ Haran, *op. cit*.

fall into disgrace of Russia, so he rejected the possibility for Ukraine to become a member of NATO.¹¹¹

3.2 Pro-Western political power

In 2004 in Ukraine was the Orange revolution. People were protesting against unfair presidential elections. After the revolution and re-voting, in 2005 the pro-Western president Viktor Yushchenko came to power. He promised to work more on the western agenda. As a President he emphasized European integration and NATO membership as the main goals of Ukraine. He argued to honor Ukrainian history. Concerning internal affairs Yushchenko spoke about needs to enhance mutual respect of Ukrainian-Russian relations. However Yushchenko was not popular in Kremlin. Energy and NATO became the basic issues in their relations.¹¹²

Yushchenko is called pro-Western not without a reason. There is an opinion in Russia that the US was behind the “Orange revolution”. Some politicians in Ukraine also claim that Ukraine was playing according to American rules, and that elected Yushchenko were appointed by the US in order to pursue American interests. Yushchenko was seen as a hater of Russia, he was compared to G. Bush and related with the CIA.¹¹³

In 2008 Yushchenko met with George Bush in Ukraine. For Yushchenko joining the NATO was the top priority and the President of the US declared his support. He said that it is a “bold decision” and that Russia has no right to interrupt the expansion of the alliance and Ukraine’s affairs. Bush said that it is in the interest of the alliance to ensure security in this region. He was talking about the former Soviet bloc. Both presidents knew that Russia’s view on that issue is negative. This event has exacerbated relations between the US and Russia. Under Yushchenko Ukraine became a tool for the US in relations with Russia. People and politicians in Ukraine divided into two groups. There were protests against NATO and Bush. However Yushchenko believed in Bush, he tried to explain that joining alliance would help to ensure the sovereignty. Ukraine is the only non-NATO country that supports missions of the alliance.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Sergey Borisov. *ROAR: The CSTO is “alternative” to Ukraine’s NATO bid*. In RT. 25 Jan 2010, <<http://rt.com/politics/roar-csto-alternative-nato/>> [02-01-2013]

¹¹² Haran, op. cit.

¹¹³ Kuzio, op. cit., pp. 221-232

¹¹⁴ Steven Lee Myers. *Bush Supports Ukraine’s Bid to Join NATO*. In The New York Times. 2 April 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/02/world/europe/02prexy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0> [12-12-2012]

Great countries of Europe like Spain, Germany or France later opposed Ukraine's accession to the alliance, because they knew this will strongly deteriorate their relations with Russia. Despite that Washington had its own ambitions to do that and was actively pursuing NATO expansion into Eastern and Central Europe. Thus Yushchenko's hope was still alive, but the decision had to be made by divided nation.¹¹⁵

Yushchenko and his party Our Ukraine were supported by the Western Ukrainians. However together they were called as "nationalists" or "nazis" by the other part of Ukraine. There were broadcasted TV shows slandering western part of the country and Yushchenko himself. This was propaganda by the opposition (Yanukovych). This campaign was organized with the help from Russia.¹¹⁶

4. *Ukrainian strategic policy and the West*

Ukraine and NATO relations are not the only thing that Russia is concerned about. European Union (EU) recognized Ukraine as the European country with the European identity and it is pursuing closer cooperation. The framework of cooperation includes economic, cultural and social areas. EU is concerned about improvement of democracy, rule of law and human rights in Ukraine. EU requires many reforms to be made in Ukraine, but in advance it promises free trade, cooperation on energy issues, investment flow and stable development.¹¹⁷

Though promotion of closer mutual relations is mostly about the business cooperation, EU is still strict about the respect to its values like democracy and human rights. The case of Yulia Tymoshenko is a great obstacle in development of EU and Ukraine relations. Though today Ukraine is under the power of pro-Russian political units it is still keen on European relationship. Leadership complains that EU takes the case of Tymoshenko in parallel with the whole scope of their relations. Some leaders of Eastern and Central Europe states (EU members) are concerned that this conditional distance between EU and Ukraine may impel Ukraine to fall under the influence of Russia. It is not a secret that Putin asked Yanukovych to join Russia's leaded economic alliance. Russia is also involved in Tymoshenko's case. However the majority of Ukrainian's would like their country to be a member of the EU. Unlike the case of NATO this

¹¹⁵ Thom Shanker. *On NATO's Table, Ukraine and a Test of Russian Ties*. In The New York Times. 11 Nov 2008, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/12/world/europe/12nato.html>> [12-12-2012]

¹¹⁶ Kuzio, op. cit., pp. 221-232

¹¹⁷ *Worldwide New Ukraine Discusses Association Agreement Between Ukraine and EU*. Close-Up Media, Inc. 4 April 2012. In ProQuest, <<http://search.proquest.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/docview/963779077?>> [12-12-2012]

time they are not in favor of Russia.¹¹⁸ Elected new President Yanukovych also showed his sympathy to the EU and made his first visit to Brussels. There he declared that closer relations with the EU is still country's priority.¹¹⁹

It seems that EU now is playing the card of imprisoned Tymoshenko and it is making pressure on Yanukovych to make reforms. But Ukrainian leader is not tended to submit, therefore Ukraine is now compared to Byelorussia, and relations with it are cooling.¹²⁰ However experts claim that the biggest obstacle to the EU-Ukraine cooperation is Russia, because it also has economic intentions and is attractive market for Ukraine. It is believed that Ukraine is necessary for the EU just because it is in a good location and is a transit country of energy.¹²¹

So as we can see Ukraine is politically and socially divided between pro-Western and pro-Russian forces and it is also a tool for both sides. Nevertheless experts have a theory that Yanukovych just tries to maneuver between East and West in order to obtain gains from both.¹²² The EU thinks that Russia's influence in Ukraine weakens the role of Europe as a promoter of democracy. Thus the EU feels like losing its status. On the other hand Putin and Yanukovych know that the EU is very keen on having good friendly relations with Russia, therefore it tries to balance Russia's power in Ukraine gently. East and West know their advantages that help to retain Ukraine closer.¹²³

Russia's interests in Ukraine

Russia's foreign policy goal is multi-polar world. Russia's President Vladimir Putin claimed about the necessity of multi-polarity himself. According to him such international order would be against the West. In 2007 Putin had accused the West for the promotion of the unipolarity. He said that such order means that the world has one master, he pointed to the US and said that unipolar world is not safe enough and encourages new conflicts. Russia expresses

¹¹⁸ *Ukraine EU wishes blocked*. In Euronews. 19 Oct 2012, <<http://www.euronews.com/2012/10/19/ukraine-eu-wishes-blocked/>> [12-12-2012]

¹¹⁹ Simion Costea. *EU-Ukraine Relations and the Eastern Partnership: Challenges, Progress and Potential*. European Foreign Affairs Review 16. In Kluwer Law Online. 2011, p. 264

<<http://www.kluwerlawonline.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/document.php?id=EERR2011018>> [13-12-2012]

¹²⁰ Roman Goncharenko. *EU at crossroads with its policy towards Ukraine*. In DW. 20 Nov 2012, <<http://www.dw.de/eu-at-crossroads-with-its-policy-toward-ukraine/a-16391912>> [12-12-2012]

¹²¹ Stratfor. *Russia battles with Europe over Ukraine*. In KyivPost. 8 April 2011, <<http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/russia-battles-with-europe-over-ukraine-101882.html#ixzz1J3ArOUNo>> [12-12-2012]

¹²² Costea, op. cit., p. 266

¹²³ Costea, ibid., p. 269

the concern about the Western supremacy in global politics and requires to stop the monopoly in global processes.¹²⁴

Russia felt inadequacy while participating in the West-centered multilateral frameworks. Though it is a member of the G8 it still cannot participate in the financial meetings, because until 2012 it was not a member of the WTO. Therefore Russia balances Western power by creating analogous alliances like Customs Union including Byelorussia and Kazakhstan. This postponed Russia's membership in the WTO. Russia's decisions aggravates operations under the multilateral settings, sometimes it still operates its own instructions. Experts claim that thus Russia revealed the concern about retaining influence on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).¹²⁵

The "Orange revolution" in Ukraine caused the dissatisfaction of Russia, because of the American interference. Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) accused the US for backing this revolution in Ukraine and other CIS. This phenomenon showed that Russia is still considering the US as rivals and that Cold War is still in progress. "Our opponents are steadily and persistently trying to weaken Russian influence in the CIS and international arena as Whole".¹²⁶ This speech clearly shows that Russia is anxious to retain its influence in Ukraine and relates this with the international status of itself. Calling the Americans as opponents rises an idea about the "New Cold War" and still continuing competition.

1. Political influence and pressure

There is no hope that any state leader will get an appropriate respect from Russian leadership, because Russia is not linked to treat its neighbor countries as equal partners. In Russia there is an opinion that neighbor countries has to obey Moscow, otherwise country is declared as anti-Russian.¹²⁷ During the 2004 elections in Ukraine it was obvious interference of

¹²⁴ Andrey Makarychev. Viatcheslav Morozov. *Multilateralism, Multipolarity, and Beyond: A Menu of Russia's Policy Strategies*. Global Governance 17. In Ebscohost. 2011, pp. 355-356

<<http://web.ebscohost.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=506849ad-84e6-498f-acfa-a040f0dbca59%40sessionmgr14&vid=5&hid=21>>

¹²⁵ Makarychev. Morozov, *ibid.*, pp. 359-360

¹²⁶ Taras Kuzio. *Soviet conspiracy theories and political culture in Ukraine: Understanding Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions*. Communist and Post-Communist Studies. Ontario. Sept 2011, in ScienceDirect, pp. 221-232 <<http://www.sciencedirect.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/science/article/pii/S0967067X1100033X>> [11-12-2012]

¹²⁷ Grigorii Amnuel. *Humanitarian issues in Post-Soviet space: origins and solutions*. Projects and Prospects for Cooperations in Eurasia. Collection of Articles. Vilnius. 2012, p. 61 <<http://www.geopolitika.lt/print.php?artc=5591>> [30-10-2012]

Russia. Its actions were related with the attempt to “reassert Russian dominance over Ukrainian politics.”¹²⁸

It is clear that Yanukovych is favorable to V. Putin. Also it is clear that Russia is considered an authority in the region. In 2004 at the very beginning of the Orange revolution then the President Kuchma had telephoned Putin for the advice. Putin suggested to transfer the power to Yanukovych, or to declare the state of emergency. Both options were in Russia’s favor – either pro-Russian leader, or instability. However Putin is not the best opinion about Yanukovych regarding his intellectual potential.¹²⁹ Despite that after Yanukovych became the President in next election campaign, relations between Russia and Ukraine began warming-up.¹³⁰

Experts claim that Ukraine is the most important sphere of Russia’s near abroad. According to them losing Ukraine would weaken Russia’s authority not only in Eurasia, but also its international status. Therefore there is a theory that Tymoshenko’s case is closely related with the Russia, EU and Ukraine. After Ukraine has turned to the West, Russia was looking for ways to pull it back. Tymoshenko is a supporter of democratic values and pro-Western Ukraine, she may have been an obstacle for Russia’s intentions. She was abused by pursuing a deal between Ukrainian “Naftogas” and Russia in her favor. Therefore she was sentenced to seven years in prison. Experts claim that it was a political move. Compromising and sentencing her was the proper solution for Yanukovych and Putin. EURO2012 was the chance for Ukraine to expose as modern, peaceful and prosperous state with the rich culture. Instead it made one’s mark as disrespectful for human rights and democratic values. EU leaders boycotted EURO2012 because of Tymoshenko. After Tymoshenko trial EU-Ukraine relations had worsened. According to analysts Ukraine’s membership in the EU is postponed for a long time and it was the goal of Russia’s foreign policy.¹³¹

Though Tymoshenko case is a strong argument, analysts say that there are some secret intentions of EU members. Germany and France consider that Ukraine would serve as a lobbyist to the US in case of closer EU-Ukraine cooperation. However they do not want the US to have

¹²⁸ Webb, op. cit., p. 23

¹²⁹ Kuzio, op. cit., pp. 221-232

¹³⁰ Viktoria Potapkina. *Ukraine’s Neutrality: A Myth or Reality?* In e-International Relations. 30 Nov 2010, <<http://www.e-ir.info/2010/11/30/ukraine%E2%80%99s-neutrality-a-myth-or-reality/>> [20-12-2012]

¹³¹ Evelina Vilkaite. *Interests and Influences within Russia’s Foreign Policy*. In e-International Relations. 14 Sept 2012, <<http://www.e-ir.info/2012/09/14/interests-and-influences-within-russias-foreign-policy/>> [14-12-2012]

more influence on the EU. They also are linked to have good relations with Russia instead of confrontation, because Russia opposes Ukraine's membership in Western alliances.¹³²

2. *Russia's national interests*

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia is still searching for its place in the world order. It is a part of both Europe and Asia. Russian political elites always claimed that "near abroad" is the "natural sphere of Russian interests and influence" or a "national security zone" where Russia has "special responsibilities"¹³³.

Shaping an effective security policy is one of the goals and Ukraine includes Russia's national security issues. Russia seeks to be a hegemonic power in its near abroad. Retaining a leading role among the countries of FSU means stability in the region and successful achievement of Russian national interests.¹³⁴

Russian government is working under the principle of centralization and control. Political control of economic resources gives an ability to benefit the obedient and allied countries. Before the Soviet Union Ukraine was a part of the Russian Empire, this makes Russians consider Ukraine as a natural ally. Both nations have common history, ethnical ties, former security concerns, related economics and common defects (lack of transparency, disrespect to the rule of law and lack of political competition). Ukraine is a vital element of Russia's security. There is an opinion that Russia's prestige collapsed together with the collapse of the USSR, Putin resolved to bring back Russia's prestige on the global level. That explains why Russia is focused on retaining the influence on Ukraine. Ukraine's membership in the EU or NATO is considered as a loss of Russia's prestige and power.¹³⁵

2.1 *National security and the threat of the NATO*

Though possibility of Ukraine's membership in the EU was not in favor of Russia, its bigger trouble is still considered NATO. The Black Sea area is under a specific focus of Russia's security policies. One of the reasons is that outside influence in this region may increase the vulnerability of Russia. Russia is a country that still considers military power as a very important

¹³² Potapkina, op. cit.

¹³³ Janina Sleivyte. *Russia's European Agenda and the Baltic States*. London and New York. 2010, p. 20

¹³⁴ Sophia Dimitrakopoulou. Dr. Andrew Liaropoulos. *Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020: A Great Power in the Making?* Caucasian Review of International Affairs. Vol. 4. 2010, pp. 35-36

¹³⁵ Webb, op. cit., pp. 21-22

factor in international relations. Other than that, this area also “matters in terms of Russia’s broader stake in the international arena.”¹³⁶ This is not hard to notice. Fear of Russia still exists and Russia is getting back its positions in the game of balance of power. To confirm these statements is a part of my goals of this paper.

“We opposed to the entry of Georgia and Ukraine because we think that it is not a good answer to the balance of power within Europe and between Europe and Russia”¹³⁷. “We” means France and Germany, and their decision to oppose Ukraine’s membership in the Western alliance is based on the fear to confront Russia. Otherwise why would they support Russia on this issue.

In 2002 Kuchma declared that Ukraine will try to join NATO – Russia’s military rival. This political ambition set off the alarm in Russia. Since the collapse of the USSR now Russian Federation is still anxious about retaining former block countries under its influence. Specifically the independence of Ukraine has been assumed a temporary phenomenon.¹³⁸

The biggest threat for Russia was the success of the Orange revolution in Ukraine in 2004. Then Yushchenko and Tymoshenko declared about the necessity of the democratic reforms in the country and the ambitions to join NATO. Threat was not without a reason, because Russia has a Black Sea Fleet in Crimea port of Sevastopol. This fleet is one of the most strategically important. It is also important for Europe, because there is a major transit routes for energy supplies. Yushchenko said he will not extend the lease agreement and that this agreement is against Ukrainian constitution. However Yanukovich and the Party of regions were flexible on the issue of extending the agreement with Russia. Nevertheless if Ukraine would be a member of NATO, Russia would have to remove the paramount importance fleet from NATO territory. According to analysts in that case the relations between the West and Russia would bring a great discord, because NATO would enter the core area of traditional Russia’s influence.¹³⁹

By Russia the Expansion of NATO is related with the US policy and its motives. Expansion towards Russia is seen as a threat to national interests of Russia and is deteriorating bilateral relations between the US and Russia. According to some researchers such NATO policy

¹³⁶ Sleivyte, op. cit., pp. 20-21

¹³⁷ Myers, op. cit.

¹³⁸ Elena Mizrokhi. *Russian ‘separatism’ in Crimea and NATO: Ukraine’s big hope, Russia’s grand gamble*. Laval University. Qubec. August 2009, p. 1
<http://www.psi.ulaval.ca/fileadmin/psi/documents/Documents/Travaux_et_recherches/Crimee.pdf> [05-12-2012]

¹³⁹ Mizrokhi, *ibid.*, pp. 12-13

made Russia to undermine democratization, to prevent market reforms and to put emphasis on militarism again.¹⁴⁰ Relations between Russia and the US became so tense that in 2008 Medvedev threatened to set missiles in Kaliningrad. It was declared in return to the US support for Ukraine's NATO membership and the US missile defense system placement in Eastern Europe.¹⁴¹ Participation of Ukraine "in the western security architecture constitutes a red line for Russia".¹⁴²

It was not the first and only time, when Russia is threatening to use its military power in order to make influence on Ukraine's decision towards NATO. In 2008 Putin clearly declared that in that case if Ukraine will join the NATO, Russia will aim nuclear missiles at it. In the news conference in Moscow he asked former Ukrainian president Yushchenko to try to imagine that "just for a second".¹⁴³

Ukraine is a special case for Russia and for the NATO. Bush agreed to postpone the NATO aspirations of Ukraine in exchange for the installations of a missile defense system in Eastern Europe. President Bush was accused by the Russians using Ukraine as a tool in bilateral agreements between NATO and Russia. However Bush denied that he is playing with the card of Ukraine in order to reach a compromise.¹⁴⁴

Some of the former Soviet countries now are the members of the NATO (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia), but Ukraine would be the largest country with 46 million of population. It also has vast agricultural and industrial resource and is the country with specific political, economic and cultural ties to Russia. This explains why NATO needs it and why Russia has a firm opinion about that. However Western officials still try to persuade Russia that NATO expansion is not a threat to anyone and that becoming a member of the alliance is a decision of the sovereign states. "This is not encirclement of Russia. This is not a NATO strategy going against Russian interests."¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁰ Andrew M. Beehler. *NATO Expansion: Worth the Cost?* In e-International Relations. 28 June 2012, <<http://www.e-ir.info/2012/06/28/nato-expansion-worth-the-cost/>> [20-12-2012]

¹⁴¹ Yu-Shan Wu. *Russia and the CIS in 2010*. Asian Survey. Vol 51, No. 1. Jan/Feb 2011, pp. 64-75. In Jstor, <<http://www.jstor.org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/stable/pdfplus/10.1525/as.2011.51.1.64.pdf?acceptTC=true>>

¹⁴² Sophia Dimitrakopoulou. Dr. Andrew Liaropoulos. *Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020: A Great Power in the Making?* Caucasian Review of International Affairs. Vol. 4. 2010, p. 36

¹⁴³ Peter Finn. *Putin Threatens Ukraine On NATO*. In The Washington Post. 13 Feb 2008, <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/12/AR2008021201658.html>> [06-10-2012]

¹⁴⁴ Myers, op. cit.

¹⁴⁵ Shanker, op. cit.

2.2 Russian strategic policy and the balance to the NATO

Russia is unhappy about any external influence on its domestic and foreign affairs. As I wrote above it rejects external influence on its “near abroad” as well. Usually Russia accuses the US and the NATO for influencing the policymaking in the region, though the US and the NATO is the same for Russia. The leaders of Russia understand that they cannot resist for the Western penetration, therefore was made a decision to reinforce regional integration associations with Russian authority. One of them would be a Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) that should serve as a counterbalance to the western organization NATO.¹⁴⁶

CSTO was founded in 2002 as a Russian controlled military security alliance and as an interstate instrument to fight regional military threats. The foundation of the CSTO is the Russian military system, Russia is also a weapon supplier for this organization. In 2009 Medvedev proclaimed that CSTO also aims to fight terrorism, transnational crime and drug trafficking, thus elevating the prestige of the organization and making it more attractive. In 2009 Russia also proclaimed that cooperation within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is the priority of its foreign policy and that CSTO is the instrument of their security.¹⁴⁷

After Russia opposed Ukraine’s NATO membership it said it would like Ukraine to join CSTO instead. Russia is so willing to attract Ukraine that it is inviting it to participate in any form. In 2010 CSTO general secretary said: “it is impossible to provide security in the Western direction without the participation of Ukraine.”¹⁴⁸

Using CSTO in order to reinforce Russia’s influence on its “near abroad” and global status was a successful idea. Russia believed that Ukraine will join CSTO after a pro-Russian President came to power. He was considered as a key to push Ukraine towards the Russian sphere of influence.¹⁴⁹ However Yanukovich did not fulfilled Russian expectations when he proclaimed about Ukraine as a neutral state. He said that Ukrainians do not want their country to

¹⁴⁶ Dimitrakopoulou, Liapopoulos, op. cit., p. 37

¹⁴⁷ Webb, op. cit., p. 24

¹⁴⁸ Sergey Borisov. *ROAR: The CSTO is “alternative” to Ukraine’s NATO bid*. In RT. 25 Jan 2010, <<http://rt.com/politics/roar-csto-alternative-nato/>> [02-01-2013]

¹⁴⁹ Webb, op. cit., p. 25

join any military alliance, neither the NATO, nor the CSTO.¹⁵⁰ Yanukovych also added that both alliances are the neighbors of Ukraine and it could bring negative outcomes to join any of them. In that case the balance of power would change, thus the danger for global peace and stability could arise. He said it is better to be a partner of the both alliances. After the outgoing of Yanukovych there were comments on the internet that he is pursuing a smart policy.¹⁵¹

3. *Russian economic potential and effects of economic power*

Despite the fact that Russia sometimes is still playing a military power card on the international arena, Russian leaders already know that nowadays there are more effective means to extend the influence. Trade, investments and economic interdependence reflect the foreign policy course of the modern Russia.¹⁵²

As I mentioned above Russia does not accept external influence and it is not linked to participate in western alliances, therefore it tries to balance the power by creating alternative organizations. The Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) is an alliance based on the economic cooperation.¹⁵³

EurAsEC was formed under the same framework as the CSTO, it is oriented towards the CIS. The aim of this organization is to attract countries to join a customs and trade union. The final aim is a single economic space that would give leverage in the world economy. Yanukovych declared that Ukraine will not join the Russian led union.¹⁵⁴

According to Mr. Putin the Customs Union (CU) is working under similar principles as the WTO. Free trade agreement makes this union attractive not only for the CIS, but also for countries like New Zealand, or Vietnam. However Putin is focused on Ukraine.¹⁵⁵

Putin is not linked to give up easy. He is pursuing a brand new project Eurasian Union that would be alternative to the EU. Putin has a dream to establish Eurasian Union until 2015. He is making pressure on Yanukovych to join the Customs Union that could develop than to the

¹⁵⁰ *Yanukovych: Ukraine will remain a neutral state.* In Kyiv Post. 7 Jan 2010, <<http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/yanukovych-ukraine-will-remain-a-neutral-state-56539.html>> [02-01-2013]

¹⁵¹ *Yanukovych vows better Ukraine-China cooperation.* In China.org.cn. 31Aug 2010, <http://www.china.org.cn/world/2010-08/31/content_20832947.htm> [02-01-2013]

¹⁵² Webb, op. cit., pp. 21-22

¹⁵³ Dimitrakopoulou, Liaropoulos, op. cit., p. 37

¹⁵⁴ Webb, op. cit., pp. 21-22

¹⁵⁵ Vadim Volovoj. *Customs Union helps and wins?* In Geopolitika. 10 Oct 2012, <<http://geopolitika.lt/?artc=5638>> [02-01-2013]

Eurasian Union. There are rumours that Putin might put pressure on Yanukovych by using his influence and get Tymoshenko out of the jail, thus Yanukovych's positions would be weakened. The opposition of Ukraine's president would be in favor of Russia than. Putin declared that reinforcing regional influence is the most important goal of Russia's foreign policy. "The Financial Times" added that Putin has support even from his opposition regarding this policymaking.¹⁵⁶

Lithuanian professor L. Donskis said: "There is increasingly less politics in Europe, because we live under regime that is enforced by economy".¹⁵⁷ The so called "Putin Doctrine" is emphasizing the establishment of unions and organizations that would include the CIS. CIS integrations to such units like CSTO, Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), later replaced to a Single Economic Space (SES), Customs Union, or Eurasian Union according to Putin is the priority in Russian foreign policy and they are in the area of strategic interests. Strategic interests are related with the political influence.¹⁵⁸

It is not easy task for Russia to make integration to for example Eurasian Union more attractive than to the EU. However here I am able to apply the statement of professor Donskis, Russia is using its economic potential and energy supplies in order to attract the FSU countries. Anatoly Chubais also said that Russia is establishing a "liberal empire" that really is just a reinforcement of its influence "through the expansion of Russian capital".¹⁵⁹ The expansion of Russian capital not only helps to built a political weight in its "near abroad", this also builds a concept of Russia as a great power.¹⁶⁰

Ukraine is eager to join the EU, because it considers EU as a guarantee of stability and prosperity. However there are too many obligations to be fulfilled. Russia put efforts to turn things different direction, it made its policy better developed and more attractive than the EU's, because it used such tools as economic, energetic and military resources. Actually Moscow does not ask for great commitments except loyalty. Kremlin is offering plenty of baits for its neighbor

¹⁵⁶ Česlovas Iskauskas. *Maskva Kijevo asaromis netiki*. In Geopolitika. 21 March 2012, <<http://geopolitika.lt/?artc=5280>> [02-01-2013]; (Moscow does not believe in the teardrops of Kyiv)

¹⁵⁷ V. Sernius. *Baltarusija – ekoniminis ir politinis Rusijos Federacijos vasalas?* In Geopolitika.lt. 2012-06-22, <<http://geopolitika.lt/?artc=5462>> [2012-10-22]; (Byelorussia – is it a economic and political vassal of Russia)

¹⁵⁸ Sleivyte, op. cit., p. 53

¹⁵⁹ Sleivyte, ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Dmitry Trenin. *Russia and the CIS countries: the relations getting mature*. In RIAC. 02 March 2012, <http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=138#top> [03-01-2013]

countries: a relatively free labor market, market for goods, a visa-free regime, diplomatic protection, Russian social security, but the most important – cheap energy.¹⁶¹

Recent Prime Minister of Ukraine Mykola Azarov says that there are no politics in joining the Customs Union. He refers to the possible benefits for country if it would become a member of the union. He emphasizes that CU is a great opportunity to sell Ukrainian goods that have no potential in other markets and it is “vital to the country’s economy”.¹⁶² It is necessary to notice that fear of Russia also includes this package of attractiveness, because Russia can impose a quick blockade or increase energy prices, or even apply the military pressure. Analysts claim that energy, economy, politics and security are interconnected spheres that include Russia’s national interests.¹⁶³

3.1 Russian energy supplies as an instrument in policymaking

It is considered that energy sources are the most effective economic tool that Russia uses to influence Ukraine and other countries including the EU. “It is not surprising that pipeline politics and energy resources are at the forefront of Russia’s foreign policy agenda.”¹⁶⁴ Ukraine rejects the offer to join Customs Union and still claims that its strategic task is to join the EU, however country’s economy suffers because of the growing prices of the Russian gas. Ukrainian leaders make frequent visits to Moscow regarding the gas prices, however Moscow seems enjoys such obedience.¹⁶⁵

In 2005 Russian gas giant Gazprom took a new policy of profit maximization. This policy was supported by Russian government, thus the subsidizing for energy supplies to the CIS stopped. Ukraine wanted to be independent and Western oriented and Russia “gave freedom to it”, it will be treated just like the other countries of abroad. This means an expensive energy supplies.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶¹ Sleivyte, op. cit., p. 54

¹⁶² Interfax-Ukraine. Azarov: *Cooperations with Customs Union vital to Ukraine’s economy*. In KyivPost. 27 Dec 2012, <<http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/azarov-cooperation-with-customs-union-vital-to-ukraines-economy-318228.html>> [05-01-2013]

¹⁶³ Sleivyte, op. cit., p. 54

¹⁶⁴ Webb, op. cit., p. 28

¹⁶⁵ Ceslovas Iskauskas. Moscow does not believe in the teardrops of Kyiv. In Geopolitika. 21 March 2012, <<http://geopolitika.lt/?artc=5280>> [03-01-2013]

¹⁶⁶ Trenin, op. cit.

Gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine are common phenomenon in the last decade. The first cut off of supplies to Ukraine was made in January 2006. It was soon after Ukraine declared about its NATO and EU ambitions. As I wrote earlier there was an “Orange revolution” in 2004 and pro-Western leader came to power. This was not in favor of Russia, so Gazprom was used as an instrument of Kremlin. “Gazprom, the Russian energy giant, 51 percent of which is owned by the state”¹⁶⁷, claimed for Ukraine to pay 230dollars per 1000 cubic meters instead of 50 dollars. Gazprom argued that it is a reasonable market price, however Kyiv accused Russian company of acting for political gain. At that time Russia was also in negotiation of purchasing Turkmenistan gas that was a second largest supplier to Ukraine. Ukraine’s economy was in great danger. This showed that Russia is making Ukraine completely dependent.¹⁶⁸

Seems like Russia likes to use cold winters in its favor: the coldness of 1812 winter helped to achieve the victory against the Napoleon army¹⁶⁹; extremely cold winter of 1942 was unexpected for Nazis.¹⁷⁰ It is not surprising that second cut off of the supplies to Ukraine was made in 2009 and it was done again in January, when the demand for gas is increases. Gazprom explained that Ukraine does not agree to pay the required price, and if client does not pay, he does not receive the product. Moscow again repeated that there is no reason to subsidize energy supplies for the country that is keen on joining western communities.¹⁷¹

Nevertheless there were some differences between the 2006 and 2009 cut off. Before the 2009 Moscow said it is not going to force Ukraine to join the Customs Union, instead Russia wanted to get the control of Ukrainian pipeline system.¹⁷² Situation after 2009 started to change. Since then Ukraine was officially under the pressure to join a Russian led Customs Union. Ukraine was rejecting that idea, because it was willing to improve cooperation with the EU. However Ukraine and the EU relations started to cool down after Tymoshenko was imprisoned

¹⁶⁷ Andrew E. Kramer. *Russia Cuts Off Gas to Ukraine in Costs Dispute*. In The New York Times. 2 Jan 2006, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/02/international/europe/02russia.html?pagewanted=all>> [03-01-2013]

¹⁶⁸ Tom Parfitt. *Russia turns off supplies to Ukraine in payment row, and EU feels chill*. In The Guardian. 2 Jan 2006, <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jan/02/russia.ukraine>> [03-1-01-2013]

¹⁶⁹ *How Russia really won*. In The Economist. 15 April 2010, <<http://www.economist.com/node/15905807>> [04-01-2013]

¹⁷⁰ Laurence Rees. *Hitler’s invasion of Russia in World War Two*. In BBC. 30 March 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/hitler_russia_invasion_01.shtml> [04-01-2013]

¹⁷¹ Christian Lowe. Pavel Polityuk. *Russia cuts off gas to Ukraine*. In Reuters. 1 Jan 2009, <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/01/01/us-russia-ukraine-gas-idUSTRE4BN32B20090101>> [03-01-2013]

¹⁷² Iskauskas, op. cit.

because of her 2009 gas deal with Gazprom. The other option for Ukraine was to sell the control over the Ukraine's gas-pipelines network to Gazprom.¹⁷³

Disputes for gas price and pressure on Ukraine towards Customs Union intensified in 2012-2013. At the end of 2012 Ukrainian leader said that country cannot join CU, because being a member of CU is against the country's Constitution and thus referendum is required. Yanukovich again emphasized closer ties with the EU. However people opinion has changed, Ukrainians now see cooperation with Russia as a real opportunity to get tangible benefits. The voice of the nation, constant Russian pressure and hazy hopes of cooperation with the EU made Yanukovich to consider the possibility of CU membership.¹⁷⁴

It is possible that Ukrainian government eventually decided to change the mind after Russia said that it is not going to lower the price for the gas. Russia explained that if Ukraine wants the same gas price as the CU members, the only way to get this price is to join the union. Russian representative Alexander Gorban explained that Russia has invited Ukraine not once to join the union and develop common cooperation. He criticized Ukraine's ambitions to join two unions (EU and CU) and the same time and benefit from both of them. He also said that 2009 contract between Russia and Ukraine was beneficial for Ukraine. Than Ukraine got reasonable price, Russia also offered to set up a jointly consortium to operate the pipeline system in Ukraine. However Ukraine's inability to make a decision made Russia to built a bypassing pipeline system, thus Ukraine's pipeline system will become a "scrap metal" he said.¹⁷⁵

In the middle of January 2013 Russian Foreign minister Sergey Lavrov is planning to visit Kyiv regarding the Ukraine's participation in Customs Union. Ukraine would not have a full member status, but it still expects to get cheaper gas in return.¹⁷⁶ In order to justify decision to join the CU Yanukovich said that there are other positive sides than energy. Post-Soviet countries that are in the CU now is a big market for Ukrainian goods and trade with them

¹⁷³ Economic Intelligence Unit. *Ukraine gas: A rock and a harder place*. In *Energie Realities*. <<http://www.energyrealities.org/content/ukraine-gas-a-rock-and-a-harder-place/erp46DFF84DF6325031E>> [04-01-2013]

¹⁷⁴ *Ukraine leader cautious on Russian customs union plans*. In BBC New Europe. 4 Jan 2013, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20909041>> [04-01-2013]

¹⁷⁵ Interfax-Ukraine. *Diplomat: Russia won't lower gas price for Ukraine unless it joins Customs Union*. In KyivPost. 01 Jan 2013, <<http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/diplomat-russia-wont-lower-gas-price-for-ukraine-unless-it-joins-customs-union-318342.html>> [04-01-2013]

¹⁷⁶ Grigoriy Sysoev. *Lavrov to Discuss Ukraine's Participation in Post-Soviet Customs Bloc*. In Rianovosti. 03 Jan 2013, <<http://en.rian.ru/world/20130103/178559991.html>> [04-01-2013]

contributes annual trade over 60bn dollars.¹⁷⁷ According to the latest data almost a half of Ukrainians support country's decision to join the CU.¹⁷⁸

It would be true to say that Russian pressure on Ukraine over the gas issue was a tactical decision, because Russia seems to achieve its goal again.

3.2 Why Europe is keen on Russia-Ukraine agreement

During the gas cut off in 2006 and 2009 Ukraine was under the pressure not only by Russia. International media was discussing the gas shortages in other countries than Ukraine. Gazprom provides about a quarter of Western Europe's natural gas. Ukraine has a significant importance for Russia and for the EU, because there is a pipeline system through which billions of cubic meters of gas are carried to the countries like France, Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Romania and etc. Ukraine was warned by Russia, that worsening the relations between the EU, Russia and Ukraine depend on Ukraine itself. It is Ukraine's responsibility to guarantee uninterrupted delivery to these countries, because Russia has only stopped supply to Ukraine, but not Europe.¹⁷⁹ Though Russia claimed it is providing usual amount of gas to the West, some of the EU countries still felt the drop of supplies. Ukraine was accused by interfering the supplies that go through its territory. Thus the EU countries expressed their hope that Russia and Ukraine will solve the conflict and they supported Russia for its demands on market price for gas. It was likely that the EU had doubts on reliability of Ukraine after 2006.¹⁸⁰ Moreover it is also likely that the EU got scared of Russia and was keen to keep warm relations with it and to have "warm" winters and stable economy in the future.¹⁸¹

18 countries in the EU were affected during the 2009 cut off. Russia is trying to influence not only Ukraine, but the EU as well. It demanded the EU to give a loan to Ukraine, so it could pay gas bill. In 2009 that loan was around 4.2 billion dollars, that much EU was pressured to

¹⁷⁷ *Ukraine leader cautious on Russian customs union plans*. In BBC New Europe. 4 Jan 2013, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20909041>> [04-01-2013]

¹⁷⁸ Interfax-Ukraine. Poll: *Ukrainians prefer Customs Union accession rather than association with EU*. In KyivPost. 20 Dec 2012, <<http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/poll-ukrainians-prefer-customs-union-accession-rather-than-association-with-eu-317919.html>> [04-01-2013]

¹⁷⁹ Parfitt, op. cit.

¹⁸⁰ Kramer, op. cit.

¹⁸¹ Christian Lowe. Pavel Polityuk. *Russia cuts off gas to Ukraine*. In Reuters. 1 Jan 2009, <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/01/01/us-russia-ukraine-gas-idUSTRE4BN32B20090101>> [03-01-2013]

give in order to avoid another gas dispute.¹⁸² The cuts off of energy supplies immediately cause a gas price growth in markets, affect European consumers, put Ukrainian economy and reliability in danger, and also cause political instability in country.¹⁸³ Russia is using an energetic blackmail in order to extract money from the EU, to show that union also depends on Russia. Other than that, it makes Ukraine to get into debts, thus make it vulnerable.

However in near future Russia will have more advantages over Ukraine, because of the new pipeline systems to the Western Europe that bypass Ukraine. Thus Ukraine will lose its protection over pressure on Russia. It is possible that the West will lose interest in Ukraine, because of the reduced importance in energy transit. Russian energetic policymaking increases Ukraine's vulnerability to the highest level.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸² *Europe: Energetic blackmail; Ukraine, Russia and gas*. In The Economist 4 Jul 2009, <<http://search.proquest.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/docview/223984808>> [05-01-2-13]

¹⁸³ Henry Meyer. *Russia, Ukraine Scramble for Gas Deal as Cutoff Looms*. In Bloomberg. 29 Dec 2008, <<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aolF0OjRObts>> [04-01-2013]

¹⁸⁴ Webb, op. cit., p. 39

ANALYSIS

The aim of this research is to determine the effect of Russian actions on Ukraine and to find the connection with the world order. The idea is that Russia want to regain and to reinforce its international status and prestige, thus Ukraine became a tool in this policymaking and it cannot chose its path of development itself. However I needed to create a framework with the secondary questions that would constructively lead to the primary idea.

In the review part I represented the facts how Russia is influencing every aspect of Ukraine's life. It is interfering country's international relations when opposes membership in NATO or the EU. Russia is also resisting closer Ukraine and the US relations. It seems that Ukraine cannot make strategic policy decisions without Russia's interference. In my opinion, thus Russia is trying to create a hierarchic system in the regions and be at the top of it. In that case Russia would achieve one of its primary national interests – a greater authority in the international community.¹⁸⁵

However Russian influence over Ukraine's strategic policy would be impossible without the support from inside. Pro-Russian politicians are also the key to a successful Russia's business development and energy projects in Ukraine. Russia is persistently interfering in Ukrainian politics. Kremlin is a supporter of Yanukovych and the Party of Regions that are in rule now. Russia is concerned that pro-Russian politicians would be elected. It is considered that unfair election campaigns are related to Russian influence. It helps to pursue campaigns according to the particular PR strategies, independent media is under the pressure, police and tax authorities are pressuring business that support opposition leaders and of course the prosecution of propaganda.¹⁸⁶ Russia has a neo-imperial attitude towards Ukraine and some other FSU. That means that cooperation with Russia is based on a strong dependence and puts a sovereign state in a potential danger.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁵ Webb, *ibid.*, p. 52

¹⁸⁶ Borys Tarasyuk. *Russia's Interference in Ukraine Is in Vain*. In The Moscow Times. 27 Oct 2004, <<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russias-interference-in-ukraine-is-in-vain/227410.html>> [06-01-2013]

¹⁸⁷ Jaroslaw Cwiek-Karpiwicz. *Limits to Russian Soft Power in the Post-Soviet Area*. In DGAPanalyse. July 2012, p. 1 <<https://dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/21791>> [09-12-2012]

Russian perception and use of the Soft power

Nevertheless politicians are elected by people so it is necessary to influence them and have their support. Ukrainian population that is in favor of Russia is a very powerful tool in Russia's policymaking towards Ukraine. It is not only that Russia is trying to become the top of the hierarchy system in the region using coercive methods, but it is also trying to become the pole of attraction. In order to achieve regard from the Ukrainian population Russia is using a newly found soft power. "Soft power is typically based on projections of shared future prosperity and success. In Russia's case, however, its soft power is strongly associated with discourses of a shared past and with the common values, culture and history that arise from it."¹⁸⁸

However Russian idea and the perception of the soft power are a bit different. Russian leaders consider that capability to manipulate or influence population also attributes to the soft power.¹⁸⁹ J. Nye says that ability to induce somebody to change the position is also a feature of the hard power. He says that using inducements (carrots) is different from the propagation of right beliefs and values that are features of the soft power. Nevertheless J. Nye agrees that hard and soft powers are related and it may be difficult to see the difference.¹⁹⁰ In Russia's case it uses both powers and represents them as one – soft power.

In Ukraine presidential elections in 2004 Russian Duma deputies and Mr. Putin have used more airtime on Ukrainian networks than local politicians. Russian pop stars were also involved in this political move to promote a pro-Russian attitude in Ukraine. Thus Russia expected Ukrainian nation to vote for Yanukovich. According to Nye attractive political agenda, ideology, or attractive culture are great instruments to make other to do what you want them to do.¹⁹¹

For a newly independent state of Ukraine European or Euro-Atlantic integration became the target. Protection of liberty and democracy was the admiring values that determined Ukraine's political agenda. Russian elites see Ukraine as a part of their country and still they try to convince that both countries should have tight economic and humanitarian ties. However their

¹⁸⁸ Alexander Bogomolov and Oleksandr Lytvynenko. *A Ghost in the Mirror: Russian Soft Power in Ukraine*. In Chatham House. Jan 2012, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0112bp_bogomolov_lytvynenko.pdf [09-12-2012]

¹⁸⁹ Cwiek-Karpiwicz, op. cit., p. 1

¹⁹⁰ Joseph Nye. *Hard and Soft Power in a Global Information Age. Re-Ordering the World*. 2002, pp. 4-5 kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/.../01_HardSoftPower.pdf > [09-12-2012]

¹⁹¹ Nye, ibid., p. 5

perception to this cooperation is more masterful, according to Russians Ukraine should have ties with Russia. They do not see this cooperation with even distribution. Since the collapse of the USSR Russia was looking for plans how to bring Ukraine's interest back. Under Medvedev Russia renewed the "modernization", launched high-tech projects (Silicon Valley at Skolkovo) thus it made Ukraine to think that it needs modernization as well, but it has to reform the socio-political order with Russia at first. The idea that Russia's past is Ukraine's present made Russia attractive.¹⁹²

In 2010 Ukraine joined the Russian GLONASS satellite navigation system that is the only alternative to the American GPS. Both countries agreed that it is a logical step. GLONASS may be used not only by the civilians, but also by military. That means cooperation in military technology. Even that in 2010 Ukrainian President was still Yanukovich, till then Ukraine and Russia have achieved a lot in mutual cooperation. Without GLONASS there were serious nuclear energy projects, new plans towards the aerospace industries, and collaboration in humanitarian sphere. Though Yanukovich was considered a pro-Western president, he realized that "a reconstruction of formerly integrated technological chains, which, in the majority of cases, Ukraine used to share with Russia, is the only strategy that can open to Ukraine opportunities to sustain and modernize its industry, as well as to shift from consuming to generating innovations."¹⁹³ Moscow managed to enhance its attractiveness, in this case it established the attractive institutions or areas of cooperation, that works as the "intangible power".¹⁹⁴

According to J. Nye, one of the best means to pursue the soft power policy is to promote one's culture, whether it is arts, literature or language. Attractiveness also may be enhanced by institutions.¹⁹⁵ Mr. Putin encouraged Russian diplomats to employ the soft power in spiritual, cultural and intellectual areas in order to promote Russia's interests. Soon after that Moscow Patriarch Kiril has visited Kyiv. It is an example that religion/spirituality plays its part in geopolitical games under Putin.¹⁹⁶ Language is a part of the culture and promotion of Russian

¹⁹² Bogomolov, Lytvynenko, op. cit., p. 3

¹⁹³ Viktor Pirozhenko. *Russia-Ukraine summit: a strategic partnership?* In Geopolitical Monitor. 17 May 2010, <<http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/russia-ukraine-summit-a-strategic-partnership-3822/>> [09-12-2012]

¹⁹⁴ Nye, op. cit., p. 5

¹⁹⁵ Joseph S. Nye Jr. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York. 2004, pp. 11 - 14 <http://books.google.dk/books?id=sFNfYvNtw5AC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbg_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false> [11-11-2012]

¹⁹⁶ Lada Roslycky. *Nothing soft about Russia's "soft power"*. In KyivPost. 27 July 2012, <<http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/nothing-soft-about-russias-soft-power-310616.html>> [09-01-2013]

language is the prosecution of the soft power. Ukraine is a very suitable country, because majority of the population understands Russian, so it is a perfect stage for the promotion of the Russian literature or pop-culture. “Russian popular culture including contemporary music, books, films and TV programs are also widely popular”.¹⁹⁷

Moreover in 2012 a language law was approved, that means that Russian language is the second language of Ukraine, that makes the use of Russian soft power even more feasible. Ukrainian TV had an idea to broadcast on a free airtime an intellectual program that would teach Ukrainian language, history and culture. Soon after that this station was accused of tax evasion. It is considered that this was a politically motivated attack. Maybe it is just a coincidence, but Ukraine’s prime minister called Ukrainian language as the “small Russian language”. So it would be right to say that recent government helps to promote Russian culture via the soft power.

As I wrote above Russian media is dominant in Ukraine and it is employed in Russia’s favor. It is the most “effective product” of Russian culture. Media promotes Russian high and mass culture and reinforces nostalgia for the “old days”. Despite it promotes Russian culture, it also affects people opinion regarding state’s strategic decisions, like WTO accession, or Customs Union, NATO and the EU issues. Sometimes it distorts the facts, or diverts people attention from the important policy areas.¹⁹⁸ Russian sponsored media in Ukraine works in order to persuade the society in one way or another. According to J. Nye soft power is related exactly to persuasion.¹⁹⁹ However he claims that this persuasion is more than ability to affect by arguments, it is the “ability to entice and attract”.²⁰⁰ Confusing similarity leads to the relations between soft and hard power.

This would not be the first time when emerges the idea that Russians misinterpreted the concept of the soft power. Though they strongly associate it with the discourse of the shared history, common culture and values²⁰¹, Russian authorities still put their focus on a target

¹⁹⁷ Cwiek-Karpiwicz, op. cit., p. 6

¹⁹⁸ Bogomolov, Lytvynenko, op. cit., pp. 5-9

¹⁹⁹ J. S. Nye Jr. *Think again: Soft Power*. In Foreign Policy. 23 Feb 2006, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/02/22/think_again_soft_power> [20-11-2012]

²⁰⁰ Joseph Nye. *Hard and Soft Power in a Global Information Age. Re-Ordering the World*. 2002, p. 5 <kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/.../01_HardSoftPower.pdf> [09-12-2012]

²⁰¹ Bogomolov, Lytvynenko, op. cit., p. 3

audience. They targeted to the compatriots living in Ukraine that are loyal to Russia's goals and that follow its principles.²⁰²

Some regions in Ukraine, particularly Crimea, are considered as "Russian lands", because of the big Russian population. There are a lot of activist groups and organizations that work in favor of Russian intentions and priorities towards Ukraine. They were going against NATO expansion, they supported Russian language to become an official and they also had a great influence on local elections, and supported Yanukovych and the "Party of Regions" in national elections.²⁰³ Russians constitute around 18 percent of Ukraine's populations and around 50 percent in Crimea, and they successfully help to promote Russian culture and influence in Ukraine, thus Russia's soft power achieves success. In 2007 Russia has established the Russkyi Mir Foundation (Russian World) that should unite people that speak and think Russian. The purpose is to propagate Russian culture around the world. If you feel yourself Russian, you can join this organization. However there is an opinion that some of its activities are controversial, because of strengthening the position of Russians living abroad. This includes Ukraine as well. Organization is considered as nationalist, pro-Kremlin organization. This was confirmed after the Russian Orthodox leader Kiril said that "the core of the Russian World today is Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, and... regardless of state divisions...we are spiritually one people".²⁰⁴ Again this confirms that church is involved into politics and plays its part in the pursuance of the soft power. The main principle of the soft power is "to make others want what you want". Russia is trying to "make" those who already want.

One more thing to know is the role of nostalgia. After the color revolution in 2004 Moscow decided to refer to the joint victory of the Soviet Army against Nazi Germany. Than Russia supported film productions about the war and organized anniversary celebrations. "The most influential products of Russian soft power tend to use the rhetoric of fraternity in reference to the common victory in World War II and nostalgia for the lost Soviet empire."²⁰⁵ Some people are affected of the great Soviet idea and they feel nostalgia for the "good old days". According to J. Nye Stalin tried to create an image of the invincible state, thus to make it attractive.²⁰⁶ In

²⁰² Cwiek-Karpiwicz, op. cit., p. 1

²⁰³ Bogomolov, Lytvynenko, op. cit., p. 14

²⁰⁴ Cwiek-Karpiwicz, op. cit., p. 7

²⁰⁵ Cwiek-Karpiwicz, ibid., p. 6

²⁰⁶ Joseph Nye. *Hard and Soft Power in a Global Information Age. Re-Ordering the World*. 2002, p. 6
<kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/.../01_HardSoftPower.pdf > [09-12-2012]

modern Ukraine sympathies for a former empire are still active, but now it works in favor of Russia.

Though economic cooperation with Russia did not seem attractive, the first signs of attractiveness start to emerge. Syria wants to start the oil-for-food program and aims for dialogue with the countries of the Customs Union, including Ukraine. That is a great opportunity for Ukraine to export wheat in return for oil and use the CU for its benefits.²⁰⁷

In summary, Russia is trying to reinforce its strategic values and has employed the soft power in help. Maybe Russians cannot offer an idea of interdependent productive partnership and its economic model is still not attractive enough, they use their soft power in other spheres quite successfully. Russians try to influence Ukraine through the Russian Orthodox Church, the mass media, business networks, non-governmental organizations, idea of modernization, shared past and common values. Russia has targeted spheres are difficult to resist or deny. You can say no to Putin, but you cannot say no to common language, culture or religion.

Regional dominance and realistic approach

Despite the fact that Russia is trying to become an attractive country for its neighbor countries, it is still not the only way Moscow tries to reinforce relations with them. Experts claim that Russian attitude towards its former satellites did not change from the times of the USSR. Moscow seeks for a hegemonic role in the region and it is “practicing a stick-and-carrot approach to Ukraine”.²⁰⁸ According to J. Nye sticks and carrots are attributed to the hard power, which is related to a realist school of thinking.²⁰⁹

There are more aspects of the Russia - Ukraine relations that can be related to realism and the use of hard power. One of the main principles of realism is that states should keep on a non-intervention agreement, but there is an exception. Great power states has right to intervene internal affairs of their “near abroad”²¹⁰ and seems that Russia is not going to miss this

²⁰⁷ Xinchua. *Syria embraces oil-for-food plan to relieve people suffering*. In Global Times. 16 Jan 2013, <<http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/756151.shtml>> [16-01-2013]

²⁰⁸ Georgiy Voloshin. *Russia's Eurasian Union: A Bid for Hegemony?* In Geopolitical monitor. 24 Sept 2012, <<http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/russias-eurasian-union-a-bid-for-hegemony-4730/>> [10-01-2013]

²⁰⁹ J. S. Nye Jr. *Think again: Soft Power*. In Foreign Policy. 23 Feb 2006, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/02/22/think_again_soft_power> [20-11-2012]

²¹⁰ Tim Dunne. Bryan C. Schmidt. Realism. John Baylis. Steve Smith. Patricia Owens. *The Globalization Of World Politics*. Fourth edition. Oxford University Press. 2008, p. 100

opportunity. I wrote above that Russia considers Ukraine as its “near abroad” and it does interfere Ukraine’s internal affairs. First of all it is the issue of minorities and the elections.

Since 2004 elections it is obvious that Russia has been trying to reinforce its dominance over Ukrainian politics. Then Putin’s open support of Yanukovich revealed Russian intentions to influence Ukraine’s political process. Russia has a great influence in the region and political disunity in Ukraine proves that. Political elites are divided into pro-Russian and pro-Western.

After the 2004 Orange revolution Russia felt indirect defeat, because a pro-Western politician came to power. Since then Kremlin was pursuing a strategic policy towards its neighbor and declared it as a priority of foreign affairs. Russia and then the opposition started propaganda campaign in Ukraine. Moscow expressed support to the Party of Regions and Yanukovich, and helped in a 2010 campaign of the presidential elections. Then Yanukovich won and in 2012 his Party of Regions also got a majority in Ukraine’s parliament Rada.

Recent leaders of Ukraine are considered as favorable to Russia, they came to power with the help from Russia. Thus Moscow has increased its authority. If we put this together: media, majority of the population, politicians and business elites are in favor of Russia, so Russia is able to manipulate over Ukraine. Manipulation of the other state is a feature of the hard power, thus realism. Russia’s attempt to gain Ukraine’s control from inside the country can be associated with the imperial expansion, because Russia seeks to strengthen its authority and expand influence.

Russian claim that Ukraine is in its sphere of influence confirms Russian realistic approach towards the neighbor country. This also confirms and justifies Russian attempts to influence Ukrainian policy, particularly interference in Ukraine’s relations with the West.

Russia was making a pressure on Ukrainian politicians to reject the idea of becoming a NATO member. Since 2004 Ukraine was keen on joining the Western security alliance and Russians perceived this as threat. Pro-Russian Ukrainian leaders claimed about their anti-NATO position during the campaign as well as the majority of the population. In 2010 Yanukovich came to power and said that Ukraine will not join NATO, thus Russia achieved one more great goal concerning security and authority issues. According to Morgenthau international politics is about the struggle for power, thus survival that is related with the dominance by realists. Loosing dominance in the sphere of influence to the old rival would be equal to the loss and threat.

Pro-Russian Ukrainian government contributed to the security of Russia. Kremlin was driven by interests and used Ukrainian government in order to gain a greater security. Ukraine's military cooperation with NATO by Russia is perceived as a threat to its national interests and security. NATO for Russia is the same as the US and their strategic planning of expansion to the FSU had a great affect on Russian actions.

Propaganda and the resistance of the ethnic Russian population had a great impact on Ukraine's decisions, however Russia showed that it still considers military measurement as means to protect state interests or to increase power and authority. Russia said it would oppose Ukrainian NATO membership and not once Russian officials warned that Russia would use its military measures if necessary. According to realists state military capabilities should not be devaluated.

One more great victory concerned with Russia's interests was the extension of the Black Sea Fleet lease that contributes to Russian security and power. Despite the fact that the fleet violates Ukrainian constitution, Yanukovych still extended the lease and rejected the idea of NATO membership, thus expecting to make Russia's approach less aggressive. Russian military base in Ukraine not only assures the safety in the strategically important area, but also remains as a point of disunity in Ukrainian government. That base and Ukrainian instability could be used in Russian advantage to gain a greater security and according to Machiavelli it is the reason for imperial expansion.

Russia is also backed by ethnic minority in Ukraine that is used as a tool to influence political decisions. Russian leaders have told that a part of Ukraine should declare autonomy (Crimea), because majority of population there are Russians. Issue of Crimea reasserted Russian intentions to influence Ukrainian politics. Issue of minorities is used as a tool by Russia in order to make Ukraine to make concessions regarding some questions.

Russia is successfully using ethnic relations as a tool in foreign policy. Yanukovych's political strength is based on ethnic Russian population. It was his idea to make Russian as a second language, and this impelled the spread of Russian culture, thus strengthened Russian influence. Ethnic division is a source of political instability. Ethnic Russian groups and organizations support the interests of the motherland and are considered as a threat for Ukraine. Russia was financing those groups, and has been providing Russian citizenship documents, thus violating Ukrainian law. However the more Russians live in Ukraine the more rights Russia

“has” to interfere internal Ukraine’s affairs in order to protect them. Providing citizenship and spreading own culture is related with the growth of Russian power.

Ethnic minority is one of the interests of Russia, because it contributes to its power. Protection of minority is one of Russia’s priorities and the invasion of Georgia is a natural example of that. Georgia and Ukraine have a lot in common in relations with Russia and the West. Invasion in Georgia in 2008 showed that Russia is linked to solve regional problems in its own way. It caused fear in Ukraine regarding the possible similar actions in Crimea. Ukraine also realized that it cannot rely on the West. Majority of western states did nothing to help Georgia, because of the fear of Russia. After this conflict some western countries (France, Germany) refused to support the idea of Ukraine as a member of NATO, because they did not want to involve into a potential conflict with Russia. Thus Ukraine was left alone. Russia reinforced its prestige and authority in the region. It was achieved by using an “ethnic power”.

Ukrainian – Russian relations in terms of ethnic minorities, NATO/US and the Black Sea Fleet are not about Ukrainian choices. It is about Russia’s interests and ambitions for power that provide the spring of other actions. Looking through the angle of realism we can see that Russia is concerned about maximizing power and that it tries to use of instability in Ukraine is in order to achieve its dominance.

Yanukovich realized that he has to solved the issue of the Black Sea Fleet and refuse of NATO idea, and mitigate ethnic tension in order to reestablish relationship with Russia. However this was not all, Russia also had further plans on Ukraine. According to realists states should avoid dependencies, thus not to become vulnerable. Since Yanukovich solved greatest Russian security concerns, Russia still could feel threat for its economy. Russia perceived that now it is time to reinforce Ukraine’s dependence and offered cooperation in many spheres. Nevertheless it considers Ukraine as a client and as a patron itself.

Military threat, use of the ethnic minority and political interference was effective, but not the only Russian methods to increase the power. The use of its economic power to influence Ukrainian policy decisions is also very important. Threat for Russia’s national interests including economy and energy sector emerged after the EU involvement. EU demanded Ukraine for transparency, it also wanted to involve Ukraine’s pipeline infrastructure and other business. Russia and Ukraine operated under corruption and non-transparency in politics and economy for

decades. Changes from the west would make Ukraine interdependent with the Western states, thus Russia would not be able to retain its influence.

Russia used economics as a tool of influence in order to maintain its regional dominance. Ukraine is a transit country for Russian oil and gas to Europe. Transfer fees are a major source of revenue for Ukraine. Pipelines are also Ukraine's source of influence over Russia. Russia's attempts to put pressure on Ukraine through the gas cuts off gave a negative outcome. Europe doubted that Russia is a reliable energy supplier. However Russia is developing new pipeline systems bypassing Ukraine, thus removing Russian dependency on Ukraine's pipeline system to Europe. In case of further blockades it is likely that Ukraine would not get Europe's support and would be left all alone; vulnerable and dependent on Russia. It is also likely that then gas cuts off in cold winters could repeat more often if Ukraine would not coordinate its policy together with Russia. New pipeline system is nothing else than the coercive method to make Ukraine to obey Russian demands. Russia removes its dependency and at the same time reinforces Ukraine's dependency.

Gas cuts off and gas price is a great power in Russia – Ukraine relations. Russia used it also as sticks and carrots in order to attract Ukraine. Ukraine's economy depends on Russian energy. Ukraine and EU cooperation was a key to a greater degree of autonomy. Russia offered to join alternative regional organizations, where it plays the dominant role. It is considered that Russia seeks to expand its influence through these organizations. That makes them not so attractive.

On the other hand recently Russia's sticks and carrots "work" better than EU's soft power. Though Russian use of ethnic persuasion is considered successful, still the major role plays economic benefits. Population is linked to focus on a short term gains rather than long term progress. EU wants Ukraine to fulfill some obligations, extended crisis in the Western economies does not promise fast results. In case of joining Russian alliance economic improvement is more plausible, because of cheaper energy and big Russian market for Ukrainian goods, and labor market. Ukraine needs to make changes and improve economic conditions. Putin said that Ukraine could become one of the leaders of economic growth and could attain prosperity if it would become a member of Russia's leaded economic block. Here is also obvious Russian intention to expand influence over Ukraine as soon as it joins Russia. Moscow pursued a "smart

power” by attracting population and using its soft power, and putting pressure thus hard power on Ukrainian government.

Using economy and energy as the instruments of power has brought results. After Ukraine entered discussions regarding the Customs Union, Russia hinted at a possibility of reducing energy price. Gas price was also a tool in dealing the Black Sea Fleet. So sticks and carrots, or economic tools, had the most powerful effect on helping Russia to retain its strategic military capabilities and geopolitical, geo-economic influence in its southwest, and they helped to restore old Soviet linkages and retain the gate to Europe.

Few years ago there was no chance that Ukraine would consider joining the Customs Union. However Russian pressure, new Moscow’s pipeline strategy, attractive economic opportunities and fear of Russia in the West probably will make Ukraine to turn to Russia. Ukraine’s reliance on Russia may bring increased Kremlin’s influence in the political system. It is believed that Russia will take over the Ukrainian energy sector as well. Ukraine’s sovereignty may be put in danger.

According to realists weak states has no other choice than to join the dominant state. This is the only way for them to ensure the survival and gain some vital interests. Russia acts in the FSU region as a dominant state and seeks for other FSU countries to join it. Though Ukraine tried to maneuver for more than 20 years between the West and Russia, it seems that Kyiv now has a limited room for maneuver and is pushing itself towards Russia. In my opinion Russia’s interests in Ukraine are driven by its natural seek for dominance, ambition for power and fear of loss.

International status of Russia and perception of the World order

Ukraine still rejects possibility of joining CSTO. However Ukraine’s membership in Customs Union becomes more reliable. That would improve the quality of this organization and Putin would be able to develop it into the Eurasian Union. That would be a powerful organization with a great internal market and economy. It would be right to say that Ukraine is a necessary part of Russian political leverage on the international arena. Energy projects and establishment of economic block are the examples of the expansion of Russian influence in the FSU, thus trying to strengthen Russia’s international status. Ukraine is involved in Russian balance of power plans. According to Waltz struggle for power and power distribution is very important in international politics.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union American foreign policy was focused on changing the political landscape of former Union. The US was seeking to expand NATO and expand influence in the neighbor countries of its former enemy. In post-1991 Russia was weak. United States exploited this opportunity to get closer to Russian borders with the military bases. At the moment the US and NATO have bases in more than half of the former Soviet states, thus Russia is enclosed with the American “iron curtain”.²¹¹

Ukraine is still not a member of NATO, despite that it was the only non-member supporter of NATO missions. Russia put efforts to prevent Ukraine’s membership, because it considers this area as Russia’s sphere of influence. Shared linguistic, marital, religious, economic and security ties give a reason to Russians to think that they are the masters in the region. But the most likely is that the “loss” of Ukraine is equal to the loss of the core zone of Russian security and the loss of power. According to neo-realist theory the size of population and territory is one of the components of the state power. On the other hand such loss of the power may be related to the Russian security issues. Ukraine’s importance is also attached to the Russian international status.

Kremlin’s influence on Ukrainian political authorities is criticized in the West. United States encourages Ukraine to keep distance from Russia and keep developing the democracy. NATO expansion is considered as an improvement of democratic principles in Ukraine so pro-Western Ukrainian government was keen on joining the alliance. Moscow was criticized for promoting pro-Russian government in Ukraine, but at the same time pro-Western government and “Color revolution” was maintained by the United States. The issue of NATO and revolution became the tools of the “game” of Russia and the US. As a tool there were also used ethnic Russian organizations that served to counter pro-Western ideas and values. These organizations contributed much to rejection of NATO membership and to the support of the current pro-Russian government in Ukraine. On the other hand “orange” movement was backed by Western intelligence services and Western-financed NGO’s. So called independent politicians were promoted by the West. So there is no difference between Russian and American interference, it just confirms their competition for power.

This situation reminds the times of the Cold War when American actions were considered as valid because they promote democracy. However Russia had no right to influence

²¹¹ Stefan Kiesbye. *Is There a New Cold War?* Greenhaven Press. 2010, pp. 10-14

other country affairs and it is condemned immediately. The Cold War was the greatest example of balance of power, when two great powers were balancing each other for years. It seems the competition still continues. Russian policy towards Ukraine is called as imperialistic.

United States have employed democracy, thus it can justify its actions as protection of other state. Russian attempts to claim about influence outside its own border are called “neo-imperialism”.²¹² In turn Putin proclaimed that Russia wants to protect region from the negative impact of globalization. According to neo-realists globalization affects some areas of state authority and puts sovereignty in danger. This proves that there still is confrontation between these two countries. Confrontation can be clearly discerned in Ukrainian elections and the Orange Revolution.

Actually there is also a balance of soft powers of both Russia and the US. Orange revolution was backed by the US. People were fascinated about democratic values and American culture. They wanted Ukraine to follow democratic ideas. However since then Russian soft power has started to work and people opinion has changed. Yanukovych came to power, majority of the population is against the NATO and are in favor of Russia.

There were other methods to gain over Ukraine and to balance American power. After Yushchenko came to power he declared about Ukraine’s democratic model of development. This may had been considered as a victory of the US, however since then Ukraine and the West had met Russian aggressive attitude. According to Waltz economic capability and military strength also contributes the state power. Without the soft power Russia also used its other capabilities in order to retrieve respect, and balance other power. Gas cuts off caused a number of problems not only to Ukraine. Of course Ukraine’s economy was put in danger as well as people, because of the cold winter, but in this balance of power “game” it is more important that energy policy affected the West. Than EU realized the dependence on Russian gas and that Russia has leverage.

Other than that, by invading Georgia in 2008 Russia showed that it will protect its citizens and the sphere of influence. Considering Ukraine’s NATO membership, Russia warned that it could use its military capabilities if necessary.

²¹² Kiesbye, *ibid.*, p. 16

Russia showed that it will not give up easy and will not let be “humiliated”. NATO works under the principle that an attack on one member is an attack on all. Events in Georgia made the US to think again if it is worth to enter a serious confrontation with Russia because of Ukraine.

Countries in Western Europe perceived their dependency on Russian energy and rejected support of Ukraine’s membership in NATO. Neo-realists claim that states should rely only on their own capabilities and fight for their interests and Russia did that. American interests in FSU caused Russian military response that emerged in Georgia, and caused potential threats in Ukraine. Than Russia lost its trust in the United States, though before that Russian President Putin expected for improvement of their relations.²¹³

In this situation Russian actions could be evaluated not as power maximiser, but as a security maximizer. It is different from the Russian regional policy, when it acts as the authority state, as a pole of power and attraction. When Russia is in affairs with other world powers it is trying to protect the sphere of influence and assure the survival. As I mentioned above Ukraine is vital for Russia. Ukraine is important country in terms of economy, population, size, security and authority. Ukraine’s agriculture makes a vital input in Russian economy. But the most important is the city of Sevastopol that is a key to Russia’s geopolitical strength and safety. Without Ukraine Russia would be weaker and likely with more US and NATO bases across the border.

Situation in Ukraine and Russia’s battle with the West over Ukraine reflects a special feature of neo-realism. According to Waltz and Mearsheimer balance of power is a way to assure security. If Russia would be considered as security maximizer and one of the major powers in the world it would be right to say that it just tries to balance the other major power. In case of Ukraine Russia chose the offensive way, because it is balancing other power “at the expense of other state”. On the other hand according to neo-realism weak states has no chance to assure their survival, thus they have to join dominant state.

Ukraine’s case confirms neo-realistic approach about anarchy and competition in the international system. This state was condemned to join either eastern, or western power. Ukraine tried to maneuver for some time, but it never had a chance to make a decision. Decision to ally with the West was utopian because of the long process, many obligations and fear of Russia.

²¹³ Fyodor Lukyanov. *Russia and the United States: A Precarious Balance*. In *Russia in Global Affairs*. 21 June 2012, <<http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/Russia-and-the-United-States-A-Precarious-Balance-15568>> [15-01-2013]

Alliance with Russia was seen as economically beneficial, culturally non-controversial and eventually inevitable. In other words Ukraine's fate depends on higher authorities.

If Ukraine will join Customs Union it is possible that later it will join CSTO as well. Step by step Moscow involves Ukraine into cooperation. Though realists are skeptical about the cooperation, on the international arena Russia acts more like neo-realist state. Russia is a leader of all regional alliances that means that its sovereignty is not placed at risk. Other condition for cooperation usually is a common enemy.

In this case it would be hard to call the US as enemy of Ukraine, but in my opinion it will be in near future. Since Ukraine was a part of the Soviet Union, Americans used to be enemies of the union. At the moment American soft power with democratic values in front has made a significant impact on Ukrainian population. However recently Russia has employed its soft power that is influencing the same population in opposite way. Russian soft power brings people back to the "good old days" and evokes nostalgia. Russian attitude may spread together with their culture. In this way Russian enemy will become Ukraine's enemy as well, just like the good old days. Russia together with Ukraine is stronger and more confident.

Tymoshenko case may also be related to the Russian balance of power. She was considered as pro-Western politician, and Kyiv authorities may have hoped for support from Russia, when she was imprisoned. It is possible that Ukrainian government expected Russia to revise gas prices. However imprisonment of Tymoshenko affected Ukraine – Russia relations in negative way, Russia did not revise energy prices, instead asked for a share of Ukraines pipeline system, or suggested to join Customs Union. National standing of Ukraine deteriorated as well. Leaders of the EU countries made harsh statements concerning Tymoshenko's imprisonment. Yanukovich pushed Ukraine closer to Russia himself, because EU links Ukraine to a "dictatorship". Nevertheless Russia's suggestions are still valid. Moscow played an important role in this case, because Tymoshenko was abused for signing a gas contract with Russia. Other issue is that EU was interested in the pipeline system that revenue is vital to Ukraine's economy. However it will not have much importance, because of the new ones bypassing Ukraine, thus putting country's economy in danger and distracting the interest of the EU.

Moscow's political influence in Ukraine, dependence on Russian energy sector, economic instability, new pipeline systems and threat of Russia repel Western investors. Gazprom gets the price, Tymoshenko is in prison, EU turns away from Ukraine, Yanukovich is

at the deadlock – seems like friendship with Kremlin is the way out. Thus Russia seems to win this struggle against the EU.

Western countries consider that Ukraine may become their bridge to Russia, however Russians consider that if Ukraine will cooperate with Russia it will become Russian bridge to Europe. Different viewpoints mean competitions that links to the balance of power.

However according to neo-realists there are some conditions for the theory of balance of power. There should be two or more powers in an anarchic international system and the absence of the superior agent. That means that world should be bipolar or multipolar and there should not be any superior state or organization that could prescribe.

After Putin was elected as President in 2000 he declared his “desire to create a “multipolar” world free of American hegemony.”²¹⁴ Since then Russia have been developing this idea and trying to regain its power and rejecting lessons from the West. Russia’s primary national interest is focused on gaining greater political standing in the international community. This would be hard to do if it would not have regional influence. This is why it has been trying to increase economic and political influence in the CIS.

In 2006 at the G8 summit Russia made it clear that it is going to flex the power it has and that it “is seeking to reclaim Russia’s place as part of a multipolar world, and loudly.”²¹⁵ Kremlin has been working hard at its sphere of influence in order to create a “pole” that would stand up to the West in the multipolar world. The construction of pole is on the basics of the former Soviet Union. That is one of the reasons why Russian strategic policy decisions and actions incorporate Ukraine into Russian pole and affect the United States. In order to obtain concessions from Russia Ukraine involves more closer cooperation, thus the US and the EU reduce their support.

Putin opposes to the unipolar world order with the dominant state. He opposes idea that hegemonic state pursues its own global interests and represents itself as a source of security and stability. United States always defended the legitimacy of its actions by using a card of democracy. However Russia saw this unfair, because the US looks more like a power maximizer to them, that is using power selfishly. Putin perceives Russia as a great power too, that means that the US should stop acting like a dominant power that has right to undermine the interests of

²¹⁴ *Mr. Putin’s two faces*. In The Guardian. 12 July 2000,

<<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/jul/12/russia.guardianleaders?INTCMP=SRCH>> [17-01-2013]

²¹⁵ C. J. Chivers. *Russia’s Back, and Raring to Roar, So No Lectures, Please*. In The New York Times. 16 July 2006, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/16/weekinreview/16chivers.html?pagewanted=print>> [17-01-2013]

the other states. Therefore Russia established security and economic alliances and opposed the extension of NATO and American influence. According to neorealists states always should consider other power as a threat and that state should try to balance that power.

Statement “Georgia is the graveyard of America’s unipolar world”²¹⁶ can be considered as right. As I wrote, situation of Georgia was very similar to Ukraine’s. It is very likely that Russia has scared the West by invading Georgia and by warnings to point its nuclear missiles to Kyiv if necessary. Thus Russia has stopped the expansion of the American influence to the east, thus Russia is still not surrounded with American military bases. However Russian balance of power is external, because state enters alliance. On the other hand Russia established alliances and it has the leading role. Russian army and military spending are the basis for CSTO and Russian energy resources are the impetus of the economies of the FSU countries.

Moscow reinforces its own influence in order to counterbalance Western one. Russia is consistently looking for the ways to improve cooperation with the FSU countries. It tries to strengthen the role of their common organizations, thus the role of itself. EU depends on Russian energy resources and Kremlin is able to make impact on it. Thus it gains even greater political standing and respect, and also gains influence in the American sphere of influence. Nevertheless Moscow develops CSTO that is considered as a counterbalance to NATO and Custom Union to the EU. If Ukraine’s cooperation with Russia will intensify, it is possible that Putin’s dream about the Eurasian Union will become reality.

According to Waltz state power is state capabilities and not just an economic or military capability, but it also the size of population and territory. State goals: survival and security are closely related with maintaining its power. Many Russian politicians and ordinary Russians still perceive Ukraine as part of their country’s identity. That may be one more reason why Russia is so keen on retaining influence on Ukraine. Russian warning to use military capabilities if necessary is something more than a foreign policy. Russia is ready to do anything in order to assure survival.

²¹⁶ Keith Jinks. *Russia’s Threat to a multipolar world*. In The Guardian. 30 Aug 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/30/russia.georgia1?INTCMP=SRCH> [17-01-2013]

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this research is to determine the reasons of Ukraine's inability to be self-sufficient despite the fact that it is independent country for more than 20 years. My point was to show that the extension of Russian interference in Ukraine's internal and external affairs is the main obstacle for Ukraine to develop self-sufficiently. I wanted to show that Russia is influencing every aspect of Ukraine's social, political and economical life. Thus this is the reason why Ukraine is not able to be self-sufficient. However Russian intentions have reasons.

Ukraine's strategic policy is driven by its economic conditions. Economy is considered the first national interest. Though its economy depends on Russian energy supplies, it is obvious that Ukrainian government is trying to enhance cooperation with the West. Cooperation agreement with the EU is a guarantee of financial and economic support from the West. Economic development based on Western investments, market and support is the way out of strong dependence on Russia and thus may help to maintain sovereignty. However in order to develop closer cooperation with the West Ukraine has to make internal reforms related with the corruption.

Western countries are requiring Ukraine to make reforms not only in the domestic economy, but at the governmental level as well. Pro-Western government that was determined to make the reforms, make a progress in transparency and westernize Ukraine was not able to finish their agenda. During the rule of Youshchenko tension between Russia and Ukraine began to increase. Though increased investment from the West were going to strengthen Ukraine's sovereignty and reduce Russian economic influence was the reason for Russian discontent still it was not the main reason for tension between former allies.

Yushchenko was keen on joining the NATO. Ukraine's participation in NATO missions and negotiation for the membership access were promoting Russian concerns. Moscow perceived that the Black Sea Fleet would have to be removed in case of NATO expansion. On the other hand Yushchenko said he will oppose the extension of the fleet lease any way.

The westernization of Ukraine was pulling it off from Russia and it was endangering Russian national security and economy, therefore Moscow started to pull it back.

Though Ukraine was trying to reduce economic dependence on Russia it was still strongly dependent on Russian gas and gas transit to Europe. Gas disputes between Ukraine and Russia caused gas cuts off, that affected European and Ukrainian opinion about Moscow's

capabilities. New pipeline systems made a major impact on Ukraine's decision to turn back to Russia.

Russian authorities were trying to attract Ukraine with the prospects of Customs Union, big market for Ukrainian goods and labour, however sticks and carrots, or coercive means gives a better result.

Nevertheless Russian soft power made an effect on Ukrainian population. Promotion of Russian culture and the prospects of closer cooperation made people believe that maybe the westernization of Ukraine is not a good idea. Kremlin has employed ethnic minorities, church, media and pop-stars in order to create an image of the attractive country and induce the effective feeling of nostalgia.

Influencing the population was very important. Though Kremlin is promoting loyal politicians to Ukrainian government, they still need to be supported by the population. Majority of Ukrainian population were against the membership in NATO. In 2010 newly elected Kremlin supported President Yanukovych confirmed that Ukraine rejects possibility to join the alliance.

However this was not achieved without coercive means of Russia. In 2008 it invaded Georgia claiming that it is protecting ethnic Russian minorities. Moscow declared that it will always protect the rights of Russians living in other countries. Considering the fact that Russia is giving passports to all Russian speakers, big Russian population in Ukraine is growing together with the Russia's "right" to take care of them.

Putin has also threatened to use a military power and even the nuclear missiles if Ukraine would join the NATO. This frightened Ukraine and some countries of Western Europe, thus the idea and the support of membership was "killed". Therefore coercive Russian methods mixed together with the soft power had a major effect on Ukraine's choices. It was made to realize that it has no other choice than to be a vassal of Russia.

Though interference of Russia explains why Ukraine is not able to make decisions self-sufficiently, it still does not explain the reasons of such activity of Russia. In my opinion Russia has more ambitions than to keep Ukraine close and thus protect its economy, ethnic minorities and retain the fleet.

Russian leaders are talking about the multi-polar world and I believe that Russia is searching for its place in this world order. Putin expressed his negative opinion about American

hegemony and the impact of globalization. He claimed about the necessity to protect “other” countries from this phenomenon and about the necessity to balance American power.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union United States took an opportunity and expanded influence in former Soviet states. Half of the former Soviet countries now are the members of the NATO. However after Putin came to power Russia became very concerned about regaining its international status.

Russian authorities realized that Ukraine’s westernization process is backed up by the West. NATO expansion in Ukraine and further is strongly supported of the US. Americans supported the Orange revolution and its leaders. EU was interested in Ukraine because of the pipeline infrastructure. Russia perceives Ukraine’s cooperation with the West as loosing an important sphere of influence to the competitor. It is also a threat to Russia’s national interests and security. According to neo-realists competition and assurance of the survival are the features of the balance of power.

One of the means to balance other power is to join or create the alliance. Russia is consistently working on the issue of the “power pole”. Economic collaboration gave results, thus Customs Union was established that is developing into Eurasian Union that may become more important organization. CSTO is a Russian led security alliance. In the FSU region Russia is acting as a hegemonic power trying to maintain a strategic parity with the US.

I have pictured Ukraine as a tool or an object in the competition of two powers. It is obvious that both parties have interests in Ukraine and were trying to woo it to their sphere of influence. Despite these interests Ukraine is also a measure in terms of balance of power. Russian open coercive means, the use of the soft power and influence over politicians, and offered “cooperation/dependence” may not seem as attractive as American soft power with employed ideas of democracy, transparency, economic stability, security and interdependence. However Western intelligence agencies and NGO’s were secretly working in order to gain influence over Ukraine. It is not that different from Russian methods and it proves that the West was struggling for Ukraine. Nevertheless Russia had more advantages over the West because of the shared cultural, marital, religious, economic and security ties, interrelated business and political elites, and ability to use its sticks and carrots.

In my opinion Ukraine is not able to act completely self-sufficiently not only because of the ties mentioned above, but also because Russian elites consider it a part of their country and

because Russia is driven by its national interests. Russian behavior is determined by conflicting international system where it is ready to do everything in order to assure security and survival. In a multi-polar world Russia considers other power as threats and chooses a balance of power as a mean to assure the security. However it is doing that at the expense of the other state.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Stefan Kiesbye. Is There a New Cold War? Greenhaven Press. 2010
- K. Malfiet, L. Verpoest, E. Vinokurov. The CIS, the EU and Russia. The Challenges of Integration. New York. 2007
- Richard Sakwa. Power and Policy in Putin's Russia. University of Glasgow. 2009
- Janina Sleivyte. Russia's European Agenda and the Baltic States. New York. 2010
- Alan Bryman. Social Research Methods. Third edition. Oxford University Press. New York. 2008
- Robert. B. Burns. Introduction to Research Methods. Sage Publications. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi. 2000
- Jack Donnelly. Realism and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2000
- John Baylis. Steve Smith. Patricia Owens. The Globalization Of World Politics. Fourth edition. Oxford University Press. 2008
- Sophia Dimitrakopoulou. Dr. Andrew Liaropoulos. *Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020: A Great Power in the Making?* Caucasian Review of International Affairs. Vol. 4. 2010

Journals

- Kristina Sapkinaite ed. Pasaulis 2030. Lietuvos Respublikos Krasto Apsaugos Ministerija. Vilnius. 08-08-2012 (The World in 2030, by the Ministry of Defence of Lithuanian Republic)
- Projects and Prospects for Cooperation in Eurasia. Vilnius. 2012

Internet sources

- <<http://tjutchev.narod.ru/17.html>>
- Alexander Bogomolov and Oleksandr Lytvynenko. *A Ghost in the Mirror: Russian Soft Power in Ukraine*. In Chatham House. Jan 2012,

http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0112bp_bogomolov_lytvynenko.pdf

- Andrew E. Kramer. *Russia Cuts Off Gas to Ukraine in Costs Dispute*. In The New York Times. 2 Jan 2006,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/02/international/europe/02russia.html?pagewanted=all>
- Andrew M. Beehler. *NATO Expansion: Worth the Cost?* In e-International Relations. 28 June 2012, <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/06/28/nato-expansion-worth-the-cost/>
- Andrey Makarychev. Viatcheslav Morozov. *Multilateralism, Multipolarity, and Beyond: A Menu of Russia's Policy Strategies*. Global Governance 17. In Ebscohost. 2011,
<http://web.ebscohost.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=506849ad-84e6-498f-acfa-a040f0dbca59%40sessionmgr14&vid=5&hid=21>
- Borys Tarasyuk. *Russia's Interference in Ukraine Is in Vain*. In The Moscow Times. 27 Oct 2004, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russias-interference-in-ukraine-is-in-vain/227410.html>
- C. J. Chivers. *Russia's Back, and Raring to Roar, So No Lectures, Please*. In The New York Times. 16 July 2006,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/16/weekinreview/16chivers.html?pagewanted=print>
- *Call foul; Ukraine and Europe*. The Economist. 5 May 2012, in ProQuest
<http://search.proquest.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/docview/1011292517>
- Ceslovas Iskauskas. *Maskva Kijevo asaromis netiki*. In Geopolitika. 21 March 2012,
<http://geopolitika.lt/?artc=5280> (Moscow does not believe in the teardrops of Kyiv)
- Christian Lowe. Pavel Polityuk. *Russia cuts off gas to Ukraine*. In Reuters. 1 Jan 2009,
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/01/01/us-russia-ukraine-gas-idUSTRE4BN32B20090101>
- Daniel Kalder. *Transmissions from a Lone Star: You Say "номудоп" I SAY "номидоп"*. In Rianovosti. 01 May 2012, <http://en.ria.ru/columnists/20120601/173793426.html>
- David Galbreath. *Neo-liberalism*. IR2501 Theories of International Relations in University of Aberdeen, <www.abdn.ac.uk/pir/notes06/Level2/IR2501/IR2501.6.ppt>
- Derek G. Webb. *Russian Influence On Ukrainian Strategic Policy*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 2011

<http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/utis/getfile/collection/p4013coll2/id/2734/filename/2785.pdf>

- Dmitry Trenin. *Russia and the CIS countries: the relations getting mature*. In RIAC. 02 March 2012, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=138#top
- Dr. Bruce Bordner. *Rethinking Neorealist Theory: Order Within Anarchy*. University of Virginia. Dec. 1997, <http://www.brucebordner.com/Neorealism.html>
- Economic Intelligence Unit. *Ukraine gas: A rock and a harder place*. In *Energie Realities*. <http://www.energyrealities.org/content/ukraine-gas-a-rock-and-a-harder-place/erp46DFF84DF6325031E>
- Elena Mizrokhi. *Russian 'separatism' in Crimea and NATO: Ukraine's big hope, Russia's grand gamble*. Laval University. Qubec. August 2009, http://www.psi.ulaval.ca/fileadmin/psi/documents/Documents/Travaux_et_recherches/Crimée.pdf
- *Europe: Energetic blackmail; Ukraine, Russia and gas*. In *The Economist* 4 Jul 2009, <http://search.proquest.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/docview/223984808>
- Evelina Vilkaite. *Interests and Influences within Russia's Foreign Policy*. In *e-International Relations*. 14 Sept 2012, <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/09/14/interests-and-influences-within-russias-foreign-policy/>
- *Evolution, Present State and Future of Political Parties in Ukraine: Expert Opinions*. Razumkov Centre, National Security and Defence. No.5. 2010, http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/files/category_journal/NSD116_eng_2.pdf
- FaustoSicha. *International Relations: Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism*. In *EIEcu*. 20 Jul 2010, <<http://elecua.com/?p=384>>
- Fiona Hill. *Russia's Newly Found "Soft Power"*. In *The Globalist*. 26 Aug 2004, <<http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2004/08/26russia-hill>>
- Fiona Hill. *Russia's Newly Found "Soft Power"*. In *Brookings*. 26 Aug 2004, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2004/08/26russia-hill>
- Fyodor Lukyanov. *Russia and the United States: A Precarious Balance*. In *Russia in Global Affairs*. 21 June 2012, <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/Russia-and-the-United-States-A-Precarious-Balance-15568>

- Georgiy Voloshin. *Russia's Eurasian Union: A Bid for Hegemony?* In Geopolitical monitor. 24 Sept 2012, <http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/russias-eurasian-union-a-bid-for-hegemony-4730/>
- German Papers. *Russia's Gas Stranglehold on Europe*. In Spiegel Online. 02 Jan 2006, <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/german-papers-russia-s-gas-stranglehold-on-europe-a-393163.html>>
- Grigoriy Sysoev. *Lavrov to Discuss Ukraine's Participation in Post-Soviet Customs Bloc*. In Rianovosti. 03 Jan 2013, <http://en.rian.ru/world/20130103/178559991.html>
- Henry Meyer. *Russia, Ukraine Scramble for Gas Deal as Cutoff Looms*. In Bloomberg. 29 Dec 2008, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aolF00jRObts>
- *How Russia really won*. In The Economist. 15 April 2010, <<http://www.economist.com/node/15905807>>
- Inna Zavhorodnya. Vladyslav Hrynevych. *Archetypes From the Past*. In The Ukrainian Week. 3 July 2012, <http://ukrainianweek.com/History/54391>
- Interfax-Ukraine. *Azarov: Cooperations with Customs Union vital to Ukraine's economy*. In KyivPost. 27 Dec 2012, <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/azarov-cooperation-with-customs-union-vital-to-ukraines-economy-318228.html>
- Interfax-Ukraine. *Diplomat: Russia won't lower gas price for Ukraine unless it joins Customs Union*. In KyivPost. 01 Jan 2013, <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/diplomat-russia-wont-lower-gas-price-for-ukraine-unless-it-joins-customs-union-318342.html>
- Interfax-Ukraine. Poll: *Ukrainians prefer Customs Union accession rather than association with EU*. In KyivPost. 20 Dec 2012, <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/poll-ukrainians-prefer-customs-union-accession-rather-than-association-with-eu-317919.html>
- J. A. Naik. *Russia's Policies towards Neighbours*. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 3, No. 50 (Dec. 14, 1968) <<http://www.jstor.org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/stable/pdfplus/4359442.pdf?acceptTC=true>>
- J. S. Nye Jr. *Think again: Soft Power*. In Foreign Policy. 23 Feb 2006, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/02/22/think_again_soft_power

- Janusz Bugajski. Beware Russia's hand in elections in Georgia, Ukraine, Lithuania. In The Christian Science Monitor. 01 Oct 2012, <<http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/1001/Beware-Russia-s-hand-in-elections-in-Georgia-Ukraine-Lithuania>>
- Jaroslaw Cwiek-Karpiwicz. *Limits to Russian Soft Power in the Post-Soviet Area*. In DGAPanalyse. July 2012, <https://dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/21791>
- Jason Bush. *Lesson from the Russian Gas Dispute*. In Spiegel Online. 23 Jan 2009, <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/lasting-implications-for-european-market-lessons-from-the-russian-gas-dispute-a-603108.html>>
- Jaunius Petraitis. *Politinis Realizmas Tarptautiniuose Santykiuose: Samprata ir Nesusipratimai Po Saltojo Karo*. In Leidykla.eu 2012, <http://www.leidykla.eu/fileadmin/Politologija/2012-1_65/29-92.pdf> (*Political Realism in International Relations: Conception and Misunderstandings After the Cold War*)
- Joseph Nye. Hard and Soft Power in a Global Information Age. Re-Ordering the World. 2002, kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/.../01_HardSoftPower.pdf
- Joseph S. Nye Jr. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York. 2004 http://books.google.dk/books?id=sFNfYvNtw5AC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false
- Keith Jinks. *Russia's Threat to a multipolar world*. In The Guardian. 30 Aug 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/30/russia.georgia1?INTCMP=SRCH>
- Lada Roslycky. *Nothing soft about Russia's "soft power"*. In KyivPost. 27 July 2012, <http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/nothing-soft-about-russias-soft-power-310616.html>
- Laurence Rees. *Hitler's invasion of Russia in World War Two*. In BBC. 30 March 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/hitler_russia_invasion_01.shtml
- Mike Freeman. *Ukrainians Nostalgic For Soviet Union Era*. In Allvoices. 26-08-2011, <http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/10150122-ukrainians-nostalgic-for-soviet-union-era>
- *Mr. Putin's two faces*. In The Guardian. 12 July 2000, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/jul/12/russia.guardianleaders?INTCMP=SRCH>

- Oleg Kashin. *Putin's message: if you're pro Pussy Riot you're against the Orthodox church*. In The Guardian. 17 Aug 2012,
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/aug/17/pussy-riot-putin-message>
- Olexiy Haran. *From Viktor to Viktor: Democracy and Authoritarianism in Ukraine*. Demokratizatsiya 19.2 In ProQuest. 2011
<http://search.proquest.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/docview/872172896/13BE35436B527E1DC76/1?accountid=8144>
- Peter Finn. *Putin Threatens Ukraine On NATO*. In The Washington Post. 13 Feb 2008,
<<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/12/AR2008021201658.html>>
- Peter Finn. *Putin Threatens Ukraine On NATO*. In The Washington Post. 13 Feb 2008,
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/12/AR2008021201658.html>
- Pilar Bonet. *Russia Between Nostalgia and Bitter Reality*. In Global Geopolitics. 5 Dec 2011, <<http://globalgeopolitics.net/wordpress/2011/12/05/russia-between-nostalgia-and-bitter-reality/>>
- Roman Goncharenko. *EU at crossroads with its policy towards Ukraine*. In DW. 20 Nov 2012, <http://www.dw.de/eu-at-crossroads-with-its-policy-toward-ukraine/a-16391912>
- Sergey Borisov. *ROAR: The CSTO is "alternative" to Ukraine's NATO bid*. In RT. 25 Jan 2010, <http://rt.com/politics/roar-csto-alternative-nato/>
- Simion Costea. *EU-Ukraine Relations and the Eastern Partnership: Challenges, Progress and Potential*. European Foreign Affairs Review 16. In Kluwer Law Online. 2011,
<http://www.kluwerlawonline.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/document.php?id=EERR2011018>
- Steven Lee Myers. *Bush Supports Ukraine's Bid to Join NATO*. In The New York Times. 2 April 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/02/world/europe/02prexy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
- Stratfor. *Russia battles with Europe over Ukraine*. In KyivPost. 8 April 2011,
<http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/russia-battles-with-europe-over-ukraine-101882.html#ixzz1J3ArOUNo>

- Taras Kuzio. *Soviet conspiracy theories and political culture in Ukraine: Understanding Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions*. Communist and Post-Communist Studies. Ontario. Sept 2011, in ScienceDirect,
<http://www.sciencedirect.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/science/article/pii/S0967067X1100033X>
- Thom Shanker. *On NATO's Table, Ukraine and a Test of Russian Ties*. In The New York Times. 11 Nov 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/12/world/europe/12nato.html>
- Tom Parfitt. *Russia turns off supplies to Ukraine in payment row, and EU feels chill*. In The Guardian. 2 Jan 2006, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jan/02/russia.ukraine>
- *Ukraine EU wishes blocked*. In Euronews. 19 Oct 2012,
<http://www.euronews.com/2012/10/19/ukraine-eu-wishes-blocked/>
- *Ukraine leader cautious on Russian customs union plans*. In BBC New Europe. 4 Jan 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20909041>
- V. Sernius. *Baltarusija – ekonimisin ir politinis Rusijos Federacijos vasalas?* In Geopolitika.lt. 2012 June 22, <<http://geopolitika.lt/?artc=5462>>
- V. Sernius. *Baltarusija – ekonimisin ir politinis Rusijos Federacijos vasalas?* In Geopolitika.lt. 2012-06-22, <<http://geopolitika.lt/?artc=5462>> ; (Byelorussia – is it a economic and political vassal of Russia)
- Vadim Dubnov. *Rusija posovietineje erdveje: “geokultūrinio” puolimo ypatumai*. In Geopolitika. 14 Sept 2006, <<http://geopolitika.lt/?artc=333>> (Russia in the post-Soviet space: peculiarities of the “geocultural” assault)
- Vadim Volovoj. *Customs Union helps and wins?* In Geopolitika. 10 Oct 2012,
<http://geopolitika.lt/?artc=5638>
- Viktor Pirozhenko. *Russia-Ukraine summit: a strategic partnership?* In Geopolitical Monitor. 17 May 2010, <<http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/russia-ukraine-summit-a-strategic-partnership-3822/>>
- Viktoria Potapkina. *Ukraine's Neutrality: A Myth or Reality?* In e-International Relations. 30 Nov 2010, <http://www.e-ir.info/2010/11/30/ukraine%E2%80%99s-neutrality-a-myth-or-reality/>
- *Worldwide New Ukraine Discusses Association Agreement Between Ukraine and EU*. Close-Up Media, Inc. 4 April 2012. In ProQuest,
<http://search.proquest.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/docview/963779077?>

- Xinchua. *Syria embraces oil-for-food plan to relieve people suffering*. In Global Times. 16 Jan 2013, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/756151.shtml>
- *Yanukovych vows better Ukraine-China cooperation*. In China.org.cn. 31Aug 2010, http://www.china.org.cn/world/2010-08/31/content_20832947.htm
- *Yanukovych: Ukraine will remain a neutral state*. In Kyiv Post. 7 Jan 2010, <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/yanukovych-ukraine-will-remain-a-neutral-state-56539.html>
- Yu-Shan Wu. *Russia and the CIS in 2010*. Asian Survey. Vol 51, No. 1. Jan/Feb 2011, pp. In Jstor, <http://www.jstor.org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/stable/pdfplus/10.1525/as.2011.51.1.64.pdf?acceptTC=true>