



AALBORG UNIVERSITY

Mastering manipulation through misinformation?

An exemplary study on the dissemination of misinformation by right-wing actors in German-language online discourse.

Master's thesis

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List of abbreviations

AfD	Alternative für Deutschland (alternative for Germany, parliament party)
ARD	Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Public Broadcaster of the Federal Republic of Germany)
BKA	Bundeskriminalamt (Federal criminal police office)
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian democratic union, parliament party)
CeMAS	Center für Monitoring, Analyse und Strategie (Centre for monitoring, analysis and strategy)
CISA	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
DMS	Discourse Manipulation Strategy
DSA	Digital Services Act
GDR	German Democratic Republic (1945-1989)
IB	Identitäre Bewegung (“Identitarian Movement”)
LTM	Long-Term Memory
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OSINT	Open-source intelligence
PSR	Parasocial Relationships
SCA	Social Cognition Analysis
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland (social democratic party Germany, parliament party)
STM	Short-Term Memory

Abstract

With their unrivalled reach and fast publishing pace, online posting platforms allow the diffusion of information to a global audience in real-time. Not only does this make the dissemination of misinformation easy but it also complicates the counteraction to this (Caled & Silva, 2022). The aim of this qualitative research is to add to the research on the use of misinformation on online platforms and their aim to manipulate political discourse. For this, the research question “How can misinformation tactics be used in an online space to strategically manipulate political discourse?” stood in the centre of this research.

With a focus on right-wing populist publishers, an understanding for the strategy behind discourse manipulation through populist narratives and the role of the dissemination of misinformation in this context is developed. The analysis uses data collected from channels on Telegram, YouTube and TikTok. From each platform, two channels were chosen according to their reach and political relevance, featuring channels by partisan and non-partisan actors. As timely limitation, the discourse surrounding the protests throughout Germany, demanding the ban of the AfD was chosen. The timeframe has been narrowed down to January 10th until 31st. The protests arose after the publication of a report from *Correctiv* which addressed a meeting of AfD politicians and supporters of the political right (Schwarz, 2024).

The theoretical framework includes the elaboration of populism with a focus on right-wing populism in Germany. Populism and Discourse Manipulation Theory according to van Dijk (2006a) serves as conceptual basis. With a focus on the dissemination of misleading information within right-wing media or communication channels, this analysis builds on a broad line of research on the importance of misleading information for right-wing communicators, as well as research on the tactical usage of this. Looking at populism as an ideology enables an understanding of the motivations of the manipulators and the belief systems of their recipients possible. The socio-cognitive approach by van Dijk (2006a) additionally is a possible explanation for the function of misinformation tactics in discourse manipulation strategy.

To adequately implement these theoretical approaches to the analysis, an abductive approach is used. The perception of truth through the recipients is considered in the analysis, as it relies “on explanation and understanding on participants’ worldview” (Bryman, 2012, p. 401). The chosen scientific philosophical approaches to this, are Interpretivism and Social Constructionism. Understanding truth as socially constructed and inseparably linked to subjective knowledge, the research builds on the assumption that discourse is constantly

produced and re-produced and thus, dynamically changing, which makes it manipulable (Gyollai, 2022). Therefore, the focus is on the construction of discourse through manipulation by using misinformation tactics.

Based on this, the results of the analysis showed the link between the analysed channels via their common belief systems. This confirmed that one can speak of a right-wing information ecosystem in this case and the shared populist ideology in the investigated channels. The manipulative function of misinformation in the analysed discourse was illustrated through the connected analysis of both aspects in the observed discourse. The question was answered, showing that the misinformation tactics were mostly used to create emotions, polarization, and discredit other political views.

The analysis shows that misinformation tactics are recognizable but cannot with certainty be framed as a misinformation campaign. Besides that, the research gives an insight into the intention behind misinformation to possibly change the mediated discourse, i.e., the resulting action such as electoral behaviour, aggression towards a certain group of people and targets of political action. A further investigation in this, could enable researchers to make stronger statements regarding the campaign-character of populist discourse manipulation. Critical discourse analysis or the focus on visual tools to enhance this, could be subject of further research. Understanding how right-wing populists use misinformation tactics to manipulate discourse, is a first step to encounter their strategies. As other research has shown, the discourse manipulation on online platforms is a far-spread issue. This research therefore serves as an addition to these, regarding a specific time-period which is of recent interest due to the participation of the AfD in the election for the European Parliament.

Introduction

Digitalisation has changed journalism in the last two decades. The accessibility of the internet makes the immediate dissemination of misinformation possible (i.e. Pensold, 2023, Dr. Heft & Bühling, 2023). Whereas traditional media outlets were limited regarding their availability of writers, editors, and capital (Dr. Heft & Bühling, 2023), the use of online platforms has multiplied the number of actors, information, and news. The differentiation between opinion and fact-based information is often not clarified due to the lack of quality checks and filters (Dr. Heft & Bühling, 2023). With the lower cost of production and spreading of news, as much as a drastically increased number of possible recipients, populist actors are enabled to communicate and mobilize on a great scale using online platforms for the dissemination of news and opinions.

As we are moving into an election-year with eighty-three national elections, the manipulation of elections through mis- and disinformation is highly discussed (Butcher, 2024; Murphy, 2024). However, manipulation can happen well in advance to an election. It can be much more subtle than misinformation directly targeting a parties' name and success. This realisation points to the possibility of discourse manipulation. As discourse is "a form of social interaction in society and at the same time as the expression and reproduction of social cognition" (van Dijk, 2014, in: Gyollai, 2022). This means, that its' manipulation can change the way we think. Discourse can be manipulated or influenced through dis- and misinformation. However, untruthfulness is not necessarily spread consciously and thus cannot always easily be debunked as such. When examining the influence of Trump on political discourse in the US, the Washington Post makes a crucial point for this research: False information is not necessarily intentional, as it can derive from mistakes of the presumed manipulator's consumption of misinformation (Bump, 2023). Thus, to narrow down the observation of false information to dis- and misinformation, the theoretical concepts of these will precede the theorization of discourse manipulation.

As Max Rizzuto notes, „[t]here is still progress to be made in boosting public awareness about the unique harm derived from AI-generated propaganda“ (Rizzuto, 2023). The general lack of media literacy does not only affect the possibilities of AI-created content, but it applies to disinformation in general. Mis- and disinformation can be used to create a specific truth in a group when tailored towards already existing beliefs. That is, "people are willing to gravitate toward compelling imagery in the absence of trusted information" (Rizzuto, 2023). AI technologies can therefore be used as a new tool to create and disseminate mis- and

disinformation. It can be used strategically used by manipulators. Bump (2021) states in a Washington Post article that former US president Donald Trump “dutifully planted seeds of doubt about what seemed like a probable Biden win” before the 2016 elections. He names Trump’s tactic of knowingly spreading wrong information about the democratic influence on the elections a “poisonous snowball of nonsense meant to set the stage for his declaring that Biden hadn’t actually won” (Bump, 2021). This notion points to a strategy, as it assumes a targeted communicative behaviour. As the “debunkings don’t permeate right-wing media“ (Bump, 2023), the dissemination of misinformation about right-wing political discourse can be a simple and efficient tool for manipulating the discourse. This is demonstrated in the “debunked claims about [an] election fraud and attempting to reframe President Biden as a threat to democracy“ (Bump, 2023) which withstand to this day.

The importance of right-wing information ecosystems¹ for this should not be underestimated: Hyperpartisan² right-wing online media oppose objectivity and facts and openly communicate their hostility towards societal ‘mainstream’ (Dr. Heft & Bühling, 2023). They position themselves as alternatives to established media sources, sharing right-wing populist and extremist media- and communication sources. The right-wing information-ecosystems are a growing phenomenon with the potential to motivate the recipients within them. According to Dr. Heft and Bühling, (2023), these hyperpartisan online media follow strict strategies, using their practices and organisational resources to adapt to their recipients.

The discussion of political issues on digital platforms harbours another risk, as it takes place in large numbers and at high speed on social media platforms and is often based on little to no research of its own. Often, people do not lose time fact-checking information or arguments that they read online but rather share or re-post them to take part in the quickly evolving online discussions before they – often equally quickly – die down (Pensold, 2023). This makes the introduction and dissemination of false information easier. Looking at this problem leads to another observation: Once a person has been exposed to misinformation, taking it for factually right, a debunking does not always have the effect of reversing their perception (Butcher, 2024).

Therefore, ways must be found to avoid the damage that can be caused by misinformation from the outset. Misinformation is a threat to democracy, as it shifts peoples’ understanding of

¹ This term regards actors who are taking part in the sharing of information, their relations and information (Dr. Heft & Bühling, 2023). Social media platforms take a great part of the dissemination of information.

² In this paper, the term is used to describe actors who strongly associate their behaviour with a particular political party and in equally strong distinction to other parties (Ross et al., 2021).

truth and thus their view on political issues. To protect people from this process and improve their critical thinking skills, examining the tactics and strategies behind the spread of disinformation is crucial to prevent its dissemination.

To this end, I will first conduct a qualitative content analysis of posts and videos from three different social media outlets and search for misinformation tactics in them. This way, it becomes possible to make a statement on whether misleading information occurs in the studied cases at all, relying on research that has been conducted to define misinformation. The results of this first analysis are then analysed discursively within the framework of van Dijk's manipulation theory. This will give an insight into beliefs and aims in which the dissemination of misleading information may be rooted.

The thesis aims to analyse the strategy behind discourse manipulation through populist³ narratives and the role of the dissemination of misinformation in this context. The research will focus on digital media representations of right-wing populist discourse in Germany surrounding the latest protests throughout Germany, demanding the ban of the AfD (Marsh, 2024). The protests arose after the publication of a report from the research network *Correctiv* on January 16. The report addressed a meeting of AfD politicians and supporters of the political right, including two CDU-members (Schwarz, 2024). In particular, the topic of 'remigration', meaning the deportation of people without German citizenship from Germany, led to mass protests calling for the AfD to be banned (reuters, 2024). Some hundred thousand people took part in the nation-wide protests (Al Jazeera, 2024).

The protests were met with different reactions from AfD politicians and right-wing supporters. This research will observe the right-wing discourse on online platforms. The aim is to show, whether and how truth is constructed through misinformation tactics. The thesis aims to answer the research question: **How can misinformation tactics be used in an online space to strategically manipulate political discourse? – An exemplary study of the dissemination of misinformation by right-wing actors in German-language online discourse.** This will give an insight into the intention behind misinformation to possibly change the mediated discourse, i.e., the resulting action such as electoral behaviour, aggression towards a certain group of people and targeted political action.

³ The term 'populism' is often used to describe a mutually exclusive political position, in which a strong division between the own group and a controlling, often malicious elite is depicted (i.e. Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). The understanding of the term in this research is elaborated in the chapter with the same name.

Literature Review / State of the art

The dissemination of right-wing narratives has been repeatedly researched from various perspectives. With a focus on the dissemination of misleading information within right-wing media or communication channels, this analysis can be based on a broad line of research on the importance of misleading information for right-wing communicators, as well as research on the tactical usage of this. This way, the different theoretical approaches, combining misinformation tactics and social media communication networks, will give a profound insight into manipulation strategies that are implemented on those platforms. To base this research on social media sites, the literature review is limited to research regarding Telegram, YouTube, and TikTok.

The Media Authority of North Rhine-Westphalia published a research report in 2020 on digital forensics on Telegram (Jünger & Gärtner, 2020). The selected contents were localised in 22 problem areas in the fields of information, politics, economy and living environment. The researcher revealed that most criminal offences that they found were committed along the lines of right-wing extremism, drug dealing, document dealing, and pornography. Many of their offers are interlinked, leading to the discussion moving from topical issues to disinforming and conspirational topics and finally to extremist discourses. The connection of various criminal leagues on Telegram over disinforming content is however not analysed in the context of tactical information systems. In their notion of right-wing information ecosystems, Baele et. al. (2023) recognize the logic within online communication patterns or systems. These are also named as such by the Centre for monitoring, analysis, and strategy (CeMAS (Ed.), n.d.), which focus their research on the amplification through right-wing extremism on Telegram communication possibilities, which are the interconnection of chats, groups, and channels. Additionally, the research by Koch (2022) offers a context for the function of information ecosystems on social media, reflecting on their algorithms and how the considered platforms are being used. The research by Zehring and Domahidi (2023) examines the relations of German COVID-19 protest mobilizers on Telegram to the far-right. In this, they discovered a relation between the mobilizers, as part of the Querdenken movement, and the far-right in network analysis. Their findings include the similarities between the communication of Querdenken-supporters and the far-right communication networks on YouTube. Zehring & Domahidi (2023) “found that nearly one-third of the Querdenken channels had been classified as right-wing even before they became part of the Querdenken movement” (p. 8). As the Querdenken movement has been connected to the

dissemination of conspirational and disinformative content, this suggests that the right-wing environment on Telegram is likely to feature misinformation. The research further shows that right-wing featured conspiracy theories align with right-wing populist content. Accordingly, the communicative network of the far right and its connection to conspiratorial narratives are “indicative of the far right’s attempts to fuel growing fears” (Zehring & Domahidi, 2023, p. 8). The research also found, that within the communication of Querdenken on Telegram, almost exclusively right-wing alternative media contents were shared and thus, the communication was sealed off from traditional media. In contrast, initial findings in the analysis of right-wing channels on Telegram have shown that they do share traditional media articles. This might point to a tactic or instead is an indicator to differentiate right-wing information ecosystems from conspiratorial communication networks. It is in both ways an important factor to investigate, considering the researchers' conclusion that “[c]onspiracy theorist and right-wing channels are, indeed, just one click away” (Zehring & Domahidi, 2023, p. 9).

The use of disinformation on YouTube and its dissemination on the platform is discussed by multiple articles. The video platform has been researched in the notion of right-wing hate speech by Ottoni et al. (2018). They compared baseline channels and right-wing channels, which gives an insight into the possible discursive differences to be of interest to this research. For example, they investigated the overlap of the use of hateful language and right-wing political orientation. Ottoni et. al. point out, that “right-wing channels are more specific in their content, [...] and also present a higher percentage of negative word categories” (Ottoni et al., 2018, n. p.). The research by Ottoni et al. (2018) involves the analysis of comments and social interactions in the context of the analysed videos. The Lexical Discourse Analysis (LDA) shows the use of i.e. negative vocabulary but does not go any further in analysing the meaning i. e. of a discovered lexical bias towards Muslim people.

Academic research has also been conducted on TikTok and the influence of right-wing actors on the platform (Ozduzen et al., 2023; Pérez Rastrilla et al., 2023). Ozduzen et al. (2023) conducted visual analysis on four TikTok videos which feature certain hashtags related to right-wing ideologies, as well as content analysis on the comment sphere of the selected videos. With a focus on the power of visual images on the perception of right-wing content, the researchers investigated the connection between vernacular communication on TikTok and radicalization as well as the radicalization of British right-wing subcultures on the platform. For this purpose, the research focussed on the “ways individuals and groups disseminate racist

and far-right ideologies using social media platforms whilst identifying the popularity and mainstream reach of right-wing political discourse” (Ozduzen et al., 2023, p. 846). Subject to the analysis were British right-wing actors on TikTok, considering their reach, and their dangers as well as their ability to amplify far-right discourse. Besides that, Ozduzen et al. (2023) highlight the possibilities that users have for content-sharing and -amplifying on TikTok. I.e., they point to the possibility of a multi-platform sharing option, intertextuality, or “the opportunity to create ‘snackable’ short videos” (p. 846). Bösch in Pérez Rastrilla et al. (2023) analysed the AfD’s appearance on TikTok, with the algorithmic features of TikTok as a focal point. He selects the publishers and videos for multimodal content analysis due to their reach, that is, the number of followers and views, rather than a certain topic, as is the case for this research. This gives an insight into the general access of right-wing publishers to the accounts and minds of TikTok users. Bösch also points to inauthentic user behaviour, which is considered a misinformation tactic. However, his focus lies on the strategic use of the algorithmic frame on TikTok.

Rather than considering the psychological aspect of strategic content creation, I will build on populism as a theoretical background to analyse how misinformation is used to speak to many people. In a time of growing right-wing extremism and partisan radicalization, the focus on disinforming content and tactical communication influence must be analysed in their interconnectedness. The various notions of right-wing information ecosystems in the reviewed literature, point to the relevance of those for the analysis of the development and dissemination of right-wing narratives. As part of the theoretical approach to this analysis, this will help to discover whether one can speak of possible manipulation strategies in the researched cases. As a continuation of LDA, I will conduct a discourse manipulation analysis, further investigating the strategical use of language. Some of the viewed articles directly oppose right-wing operators or communication networks to baseline counterparts to stress their strategy or way of communication (Ottoni et al., 2018; Ozduzen et al., 2023). Although this gives a fruitful insight into the specific points in which misinformation enters right-wing communication networks and is woven into those, this contextualization of right-wing narratives within a broader political communication environment will not be considered in this research. The focus will be, to put the theory on misinformation and discourse manipulation theory together within the context of right-wing information systems.

Theory

Populism

When focussing on populist narratives and their reinforcement through misinformation, first, the term populism must be specified. As there are different interpretations of populism, this chapter will give some ideas on how to narrow down a charged and broadly discussed political phenomenon. The term ‘populism’ can be used to describe an ideology, a political tactic, or a political phenomenon (Mudde, 2004). Seeing it in a context of communication and networking between partisan and non-partisan actors and as a way-of-thinking that is spread via those, in this research paper, it is best described as an ideology⁴. To define populism, Muller and Müller (2016) refer to it as a phenomenon which is defined by “a set of distinct claims [which] has what one might call an inner logic” (p. 10). Taking this to the definition of populism as an ideology, one may describe populist ideology as an “emotional and simplistic discourse that is directed at the ‘gut feelings’ of the people” (Mudde, 2004, p. 542). As Mudde states, empirical studies based on this definition meet the problem of finding a rationale of what narratives or formulations can be defined as ‘emotional’ or ‘simplistic’ and thus fall into the definition of being populist (Mudde, 2004). At the same time, the mere social-psychological view of an emotionalized mass following a populist ideology, ignores the individual reasons for these emotions being able to be evoked (Muller & Müller, 2016). This connection to ideology provides an explanatory addition to this: Ideologies influence socially shared beliefs, as they define the relevant cultural values of a specific group (Van Dijk, 2006b). A second definition of populism offered by Mudde is focussing on the opportunistic character of populist narratives employed by populist parties. In this, Mudde (2004) recognizes populist narratives as strategies to convince or ‘buy’ their voters by pleasing them through easy solutions, such as tax cuts. This approach is limited to a hermeneutic interpretation of what falls into it. Accordingly, these two definitions give an insight but are not sufficient as academic definitions of populism.

As Mudde (2004) therefore specifies, the different definitions of populism generally overlap in their spiralling around the opposing relation between ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’. This differentiation in a populist worldview includes the assessment of the division of political actors into friends and foes, which makes compromising impossible (Mudde, 2004). In this, ‘the elite’ is defined as a being “corrupt or in some other way morally inferior” (Muller & Müller, 2016, p. 20) ‘The people’ meet this corrupt elite in an anti-pluralistic ideology, in

⁴ As general definition for the term ‘ideology’ the BPB describes it as a worldview which assumes to have the solution to all problems (Schneider & Toyka-Seid, n.d.).

which “it’s possible for the people to be one and—all of them—to have one true representative” (Muller & Müller, 2016, p. 20). Another characteristic of populism is that, seen in a movement, it is reactionary. That is, people following a populist ideology “must be mobilized by a populist actor to do so, rather than taking initiative themselves” (Mudde, 2004, p. 548). At the same time, Müller emphasizes, populism must be taken as a serious political phenomenon rather than dismissed as a mere socioeconomic, or strictly individual discontent or merely emotional as this would mean to “neglect a basic democratic duty to engage in reasoning” (Muller & Müller, 2016, p. 16).

Right-wing populism in Germany

This research will focus on a specific perspective on populism, that is, right-wing populist communication systems. Lewis and Lewis criticise the use of the terms "right" and "left" for being mostly “a lot of sound and fury signifying nothing” (Lewis & Lewis, 2023, p. 3). Due to the multidimensionality of the political spectrum, it cannot be squeezed into a bilateral mould as the use of physical directions might suggest (Lewis 2023). This shows in the overlapping of demands by conservatives with national views and conservatives with liberal or humanitarian aims. In this research, the term “right-wing” will be used but specified, to avoid unclarity of the academic research. For this, I will rely on the definition of the Italian lawyer and legal philosopher Norberto Bobbio. Bobbio (2006) (in: CeMAS (Ed.), 2022) differentiates the political left and the political right by scaling them according to their views on equality and inequality. In this, the political left aims for a minimization of inequality, whilst the political right naturalises inequality as an unavoidable or unchangeable factor.

Voters of populist parties unite in “both their abstract support for democracy as the best form of rule but remain dissatisfied with the way democracy works in practice (Wegscheider et al., 2023, p. 1236). This suggests the consideration of misinformation in this context, because “[as] citizens’ confidence in institutions declines and the credibility of official information decreases, the audience tends to spiral into alternative sources of information” (Caled & Silva, 2022, p. 124). As Wegschneider further states, the “[...] citizens’ preference for referendums and direct democracy increase the likelihood of supporting populist parties [...] [while] right-wing populist voters are more likely to support authoritarian forms of rule such as a strong leader [...]” (Wegscheider et al., 2023, p. 1236). This implies, that misinformation shared by populist actors puts democracies at risk.

It is not only the parties that are defined as populist that spread populist narratives. In 2023, Friedrich Merz, the head of the christ-democratic union (CDU), criticized the lack of medical

dental support for German citizens, stating that even rejected asylum seekers easily got appointments for that. This statement was followed by a wave of public critique through journalists and was fact-checked, exposing its factual wrongfulness (Aßmann, 2023). This started a public debate on the spread of disinformation through right-wing populists. In early 2023, the same politician had labelled the sons of migrated inhabitants “little pashas” in a different talk show (Rzepka, 2023). This might be an attempt to move the political discourse to the right.

Online posting platforms

With their unrivalled reach and fast publishing pace, online posting platforms allow the diffusion of information to a global audience in real-time. Not only does this make the dissemination of misinformation easy but it also complicates the counteraction to this (Caled & Silva, 2022). Particularly social media makes the detection of misinformation amplifiers difficult as they often allow users to remain anonymous. Caled and Silva (2022) note an effect in which, as the “citizens’ confidence in institutions declines and the credibility of official information decreases, the audience tends to spiral into alternative sources of information” (p. 124). In other words, with the declining confidence in institutions, the recipients lose their trust in media and are more likely to be tricked by misinformation, compromising their political judgement, and ultimately limiting democratic processes (Caled & Silva, 2022). Another advantage that online posting platforms have towards mainstream media is the possibility of parasocial relationships (PSR). Those are “nonreciprocal socio-emotional connections with media figures such as celebrities or influencers” (Hoffner & Bond, 2022 p. 1). Hoffner et al. recognises the possibility that PSRs, in their one-sided relational influence, can evoke feelings of belonging in the recipient and break down prejudices (Hoffner & Bond, 2022). They further state that the “accessibility, frequency of self-disclosure, and perceived intimacy and authenticity of social media have altered engagement and connection with favorite media personae” (Hoffner & Bond, 2022, p. 4). In the case of strategic discourse manipulation through public figures or influencers on online posting platforms, this may jeopardise critical questioning within the respective communities and diminish interest in fact-checking. Right-wing influencers, such as Martin Sellner on Telegram directly address their audience and connect to their feelings and personal experiences.

Misinformation

Misinformation has been proven to have influenced “various contentious events, ranging from elections and referenda [...] to political or religious persecution [...] and to the global

response to the COVID-19 pandemic” (Ecker et al., 2022). To analyse, whether the AfD is using misinformation to manipulate discourse, it must be analysed first, whether one can talk about misinformation on the investigated channels. To this end, the term will be specified and the danger of misinformation as well as its importance in this research will be elaborated on in the following chapter.

The European Commission defines Disinformation as “verifiably false or misleading information that is created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public” (European Commission, 2018, p. 1). Differentiating from this definition, one can speak of misinformation when its disseminators are not aware of the misleading or falsifiable contents of it. Misinformation describes the “dissemination of false or incorrect narratives, which can occur [...] due to lack of information, misunderstanding of a message [...]” (Caled & Silva, 2022, p. 125). In this research, the definition is broadened to describe any misleading information. This includes empirically wrong information, which is generally defined as disinformation, as well as information, that is put out of context or delivered in parts which can lead the recipients to factually wrong conclusions, commonly referred to as misinformation.

The danger of disseminating misinformation on the internet results from the high reach, fast spread, and anonymity on social networks and sharing platforms (Pensold, 2023). Digital platforms thereby fulfil important benefits for the amplification of extremism and ideology: Pensold (2023) speaks of a culture of outrage (“*Empörungskultur*”) referring to cases in which freedom of speech becomes a killing argument within digital discourses. He points to the paradox that the new freedom of speech on the internet is endangered by the freedom of speech on the internet (Pensold, 2023). The problem is still growing: According to research that has been published by Vodafone, the dissemination of disinformation has grown since the Covid-19-pandemic whereas the media competency among youth has grown only slowly (Fuchs, 2021, p. 14).

The non-governmental organisation (NGO) *Debunk*, names six different tactics to spread false information. Among those is impersonation, which means, for example the imitation of a public figure on social media with a fake-profile. The addressing of emotions, as fear and anger, can be another nurturing ground for the spread of wrong information (Timmermann, 2023). Furthermore, polarization, meaning the attempt to drive political “left” and “right” apart. Conspiracy, a “well-crafted lie published at the right time” diminishes peoples’ trust towards public institutions. Discredit, like taking counterattacks against actors who are trying

to debunk their dissemination of untrue statements can have a similar effect. Trolling is aimed to cause societal distrust through disinformation tactics (About: Debunk, n.d.). These tactics do not necessarily point to factually false statements, that is, disinformation. Instead, it is likely that they are used to amplify certain emotions or beliefs of the recipients. This helps, i.e. populist actors, as emotions help to distract “readers from potentially more diagnostic cues, such as source credibility” (Ecker et al., 2022, p. 15). This highlights another important factor, that mis- and disinformation tactics fulfil: Addressing their recipients’ emotions, helps manipulators to find strong support for populist narratives.

Emotionalized debates in the safety of anonymity can also lead to hatespeech. This plays an important role in extremism research (Pensold, 2023). However, not all forms of communication that may cause or amplify extremism are as openly recognizable as hatespeech (i.e. in the form of so-called “shitstorms”). Hatespeech is a well-known tool in political discourses of right-wing orientation and is often based on organised structures (Pensold, 2023). With this, an aggressive minority is trying to make their opinion appear as a majority opinion and thus undermine democratic discourse (Pensold, 2023). Hatespeech is not a merely digital phenomenon as it often involves personal attacks against i.e. politicians or other content producers on digital platform. This may go as far as threats or the publication of personal data such as addresses. The dissemination of mis- or disinformation can be far more subtle carrying similarly biased and emotionalized arguments disguised as facts.

The dangers of misinformation reflect in the main problems arising from their dissemination: Efforts of debunking misinformation are fragmented, time consuming, carry higher costs than the creation of misinformation, and are hard to conduct in real time (About: Debunk, n.d.). Besides that, “[p]ost-corrections and denials may fail to completely eliminate the impressions caused by misleading messages, especially if individuals have preexisting attitudes and formulated opinion about a subject” (Caled & Silva, 2022, p. 129). For these reasons, focusing on an investigation of misinformation alone is not enough to encounter its’ threats towards democracies. A journalistic approach to this is “pre-bunking”. Through the introduction of a piece of misinformation, framed as such, recipients ought to be sensitised to harmful misinformation. This research will serve as such an approach to counter misinformation.

Right-wing information-ecosystems

To put right-wing populism and misinformation tactics together, the next step must be to look on the functioning of online right-wing media. Right-wing media digitally share information

in hybrid information-political organizations which from dynamic interrelationships. Those are broadly described as right-wing information ecosystems (Dr. Heft & Bühling, 2023). These information ecosystems complement the so-called echo chamber, which describes “social media users’ exposure to information that challenges their worldviews can be limited when communication environments foster confirmation of previous beliefs” (Ecker et al., 2022, p. 13). Other than echo chambers, an information ecosystem “seeks to link up to the broader information environment across borders” (Heft et al., 2021, p. 2). This is relevant, as “messaging apps are a central part of their daily communication and are integrated into the information ecosystem in which they receive news and discuss issues” (Puyosa, 2023, p. 20). For example, on TikTok, Neo-Nazis cooperate with supporters of the “New right”, Hooligans, right-wing rockers, and the parliamentary right (pre:bunk, 2023). A further example is brought to light by a 2020 data analysis of legal content in groups and channels on Telegram, conducted by the state media authority of North Rhine-Westphalia. According to this, desinformative and conspirational content on Telegram often leads to extremist chat-groups (Jünger & Gärtner, 2020).

Investigating the role of disinformation on this behalf, includes exploring how and why desinformative contents are disseminated in right-wing populist channels or groups. As Caled & Silva (2022) point out, “a growing demand for immediate [news] coverage [...] pressures news organizations to publish unfinished or unverified material” (p. 124). This points to the relevance to investigate on the tactics of misinformation use in communicative networks. Furthermore, it points to a possible snowball strategy as the participants in certain chatgroups are being led to other media outlets, which creates the illusion of heterogeneity of information sources whilst creating a network of limited sources with similar ideologies in the background. As the DFRL states, “[p]oint-to-point messaging apps are often part of multiplatform ecosystems” (Puyosa, 2023, p. 18) in which the users, or in this case the administrators of the channels share other media that fit their beliefs. This facilitates the way of sharing content and possibly misinformation.

Misinformation tactics

To counter misinformation, OSINT organisations have published different qualitative and quantitative tools to recognize and debunk misinformation. In doing so, it is possible to connect the misinformation with issues, they have arisen from and recognize patterns or organised efforts. The tools used for this, range from cross-checking a sources’ metadata, checking geo-location, social media analysis, reverse image search and checking for digital

footprints (Anonymous, 2023b). These OSINT-techniques aim to collect data and recognise wrong or misleading information (Anonymous, 2023a). These approaches fall under the term digital forensics, that is, the investigation on criminal behaviour online.

This research aims to differentiate the different tactics of misinformation which appear in the observed data and analyse their aim as misinformation and as manipulation tactics. Different misinformation tactics are employed depending on the platform they are being used on. For example, “junk history”, that is, the strategic altering of historic facts or the dissemination of pseudo-historic facts is a tactic, that is usually used in video formats, as available on YouTube or TikTok. The following chapters will serve as an overview over misinformation tactics which will be specifically looked at.

As specified above, I investigate the dissemination of misleading information, regardless of whether the disseminators are aware of its misleading character. However, investigating the tactics to do so, implies the assumption of a strategic implementation of these. Therefore, regardless of the conscious dissemination of factually wrong statements, I will consider, why specific (mis-)information is used by the publishers. The focus will lie on the possible intention of those misinformation tactics rather than their genuineness. Therefore, the tools are employed and regardless of the commonly used notion of ‘disinformation tactics’ will be considered as tactical dissemination tools of possibly unknowingly wrong or misleading information.

Perception-hacking and amplification of falsehoods

To manipulate the perception of recipients, for example, on a political issue, manipulators can employ various misinformation tools. The term perception-hacking is used in this research to bundle tactics which aim to externally influence ones’ perception to amplify misinformation. Perception-hacking can be enhanced through the amplification of falsehoods as in this case, for example, in right-wing information networks. With the creation of a network that connects alternative platforms, disinformation can be disseminated in a surrounding with fewer moderation policies and fewer controls from independent actors. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA, n.d.) characterizes this as the misinformation tactic “Abuse Alternative Platforms”. Accordingly, this tactic aims to amplify misinformation and the linked narratives within a specific group (CISA, n.d.), for example, using alternative social media platforms. This makes the investigation of right-wing information ecosystems in context of misinformation tactics a valuable extension to show how the different tactics work together and can be used to amplify each other.

Influence Operations follow a specific strategy: By claiming to have a huge influence without being able to back that up, they are trying to convince people of the truthfulness of their disseminated information. The danger of this is, that people exaggerate the influence of its impact being made and thus may claim to be the voice of a majority which again, may serve to support their informational influence. People believing in their influence will easily be convinced and thus accept mis- and disinformation. Repetition can be one tactic to achieve this: An issue being discussed multiple times and on multiple platforms, is more likely to be believed in. This can be explained psychologically, as “[the repetition] of information also increases the perception that others believe it to be true” (Ph.D. Ancis, 2021).

Another possibly recognizable tool of disinformation dissemination is the use of “emotional language to elicit a strong reaction” (NATO, 2020). Specifically, fear and anger will be considered as tactically used emotions. To do so, misinformation is often shared together with visuals, such as images or photos. As the platform Psychology today states, “[p]eople are more likely to believe information, whether it is true or not when it is accompanied by a photo or image” (Ph.D. Ancis, 2021). To evoke outrage or other strong emotional responses, misinformation disseminators are likely to use targeted content to seduce their audience: Targeted content that is likely to connect with the audiences’ worldviews or interests (CISA, n.d.) is often employed as a long-term tactic to gain the recipients’ trust. Both tactics link to right-wing information-ecosystems, which, according to Dr. Heft & Bühling (2023) adapt their practice to the needs and surrounding of their recipients. Psychology today explains this with the affinity protective theory. Accordingly, agreement among a large group of people can be reached by connecting to a certain group identity or ideology as “[p]eople are more likely to sign a position statement, [...] because those in one’s personal or professional circle have done so” (Ph.D. Ancis, 2021). NATO makes the concurring statement, that “[r]esearch indicates that people are much less likely to identify disinformation if it aligns with their own beliefs or preferences“ (NATO, 2020).

Additionally, the exploitation of information gaps can further serve as perception-hacking. Misinformation disseminators can benefit from information gaps if they fill the informative void with misinformation, which the recipients cannot oppose with any legitimate verified information. NATO explains how to discover this tactic, stating that with a lack of coverage through mainstream media, “there’s a good chance [the news] can’t be confirmed” (NATO, 2020). On this note, the high frequency of postings must be mentioned: The high input of news is a form of misinformation. Another more less sophisticated explanation is offered by

journalist Bump as he describes this tactic as “[throwing] out so much garbage that the truth is obscured“ (Bump, 2023). Accordingly, the "illusory truth effect" (Fazio et al., 2019) can increase the perceived plausibility of a statement. In an ambiguous environment, that is, if the truth of a statement is unclear to the recipients, they are more likely to judge its truthfulness based on its fluency, rather than their own knowledge.

Post-truth

Post-truth fits the populist idea of morality, in which ‘the people’ who see themselves represented in populist narratives have the moral, as opposed to empirical, right (Muller & Müller, 2016). The meaningfulness of morality thus becomes a tool in the hands of populist actors, employing misinformation in the form of empirically false claims that connect to certain emotions. By connecting to their audiences’ feelings, populists can disseminate falsehoods, while simultaneously claiming a moral high ground. This tactic matches also the notion of dichotomous depictions. The simplification of complex issues enables the juxtaposition of seemingly contradictory sides, depicting a group of people as other and “forcing people to take sides” (Ph.D. Ancis, 2021). One tactic to achieve this, can be the decontextualization of problematized issues. By leaving out details about the context, the issue can be presented in a way corresponding with the demands or critique by the (mis)informant.

Besides that, popular right-wing populist news sites such as *PI-News* and *Breitbart* present themselves as opposed to mainstream media. Accordingly, mainstream media suppress oppositional opinions, however, said news outlets at the same time enhance their own credibility by referencing to their information (Dr. Heft & Bühling, 2023). The way, in which they are stylistically imitating the mainstream media which they oppose in terms of content, can be interpreted as following a strategical approach to positioning themselves between professional media outlets and a political populist movement (Dr. Heft & Bühling, 2023). Furthermore, the use of seemingly credible sources such as public figures can serve as a tactic to make information appear more believable (Ph.D. Ancis, 2021).

Strategic discourse manipulation strategy

The implementation of these tactics is analysed regarding a possible aim to manipulate discourse. Tactical use of misinformation implies the possibility that is being used to advance a strategy. Since the misinformation tactics analysed in this study are exclusively textual in nature, the focus is on the discourse manipulation strategy. If we assume that discourse can be

changed tactically and that the publishers whose use of misinformation is analysed are pursuing a goal, we can speak of a discourse manipulation strategy. As van Dijk (2006a) notes, “manipulation is illegitimate in a democratic society, because it (re)produces, or may reproduce, inequality” (p. 364). This makes it an important concept to apply in academic research on political discourse.

According to van Dijk (2006a), to speak of manipulation “crucial criteria are that people are being acted upon against their fully conscious will and interests, and that manipulation is in the best interests of the manipulator” (p. 361). It is therefore important, to consider power in discourse as power can be gained and played out through manipulation. To investigate manipulation in discourse, van Dijk introduces a triangulation approach to power abuse in discourse: He considers discourse, cognition, and society as explicitly linked in the notion of manipulation (van Dijk, 2006a). In general terms, manipulation takes place in discourse, meaning, in written and visual text. Van Dijk notes that “manipulation always involves a form of mental manipulation” (2006a, p. 360). Therefore, as manipulation implies a change of mind, cognition must be considered. A change of mind can regard “people's beliefs, such as the knowledge, opinions and ideologies which in turn control their action” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 365). This is also true for other influences, such as “informing, teaching and persuasion” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 365) which is why manipulation can be recognized as such only in the context of discourse.

The societal factor enters when investigating the aspect of power. Manipulation specifically implies an abuse of power, as the term ‘manipulation’ “implies the exercise of a form of illegitimate influence by means of discourse” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 360). As I am mainly focusing on the use of misinformation tactics, these imply an aim for manipulation of discourse. Van Dijk points out, that “the boundary between (illegitimate) manipulation and (legitimate) persuasion is fuzzy, and context dependent” (p. 361). As the data is examined according to the misinformation tactics, any findings point to the possibility of manipulation strategy. Thus, the analysis of discourse manipulation strategy involves the assessment of whether the misinformation is shared consciously to manipulate. This requires the distinction of “informative and manipulative communication on the basis of the intentions assigned to the speaker and the ability of the hearer to recognize such intentions” (Furko, 2017, p. 3). According to Furko (2017), manipulative communication is successful when it is only recognized as informative with the speaker’s intention remaining unnoticed. The aim of this research is to recognize linguistic and contextual clues which allow us to make a statement

about possibly manipulative intentions within the analysed discourse. However, “intentions themselves are not ‘observable’; they can only be, more or less accurately, ‘inferred’ by the receiver” (Gyollai, 2022, p. 542).

A step towards the understanding of intentions is the consideration of cognition for the production of discourse. Van Dijk (2014) argues that “although discourse is socially conditioned and impacts upon the functioning of the society, both the formulation and interpretation of discourse is the aggregate function of the participants’ underlying cognitive processes, personal- and socially shared knowledge” (in: Gyollai, 2022, p. 540). It is at the same time “the expression and reproduction of social cognition” (van Dijk, 2014, in: Gyollai, 2022, p. 540). Thus, the discourse manipulation analysis will build on the “SCA’s key concepts, such as personal- and socially shared knowledge, and legitimization” (Gyollai, 2022, p. 543). Within Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), van Dijk argues “for an approach whereby the social and discursive aspects of manipulation (for example, textuality/intertextuality, interactionality and power abuse) are complemented by a cognitive dimension” (Furko, 2017, p. 3). Manipulation can involve the manipulation of short-term memory (STM), episodic manipulation, and the manipulation of social cognition (van Dijk, 2006a). The manipulation of the STM involves the manipulation of shortcuts, meaning the interpretation of communication signs, such as words, clauses, and non-verbal signals. Possible strategies to manipulate STM can for example be the emphasis on specific features or information in the text. Examples of this are the selection of words, layout, or pictures, as well as the choice of words or, in the case of spoken text, the way of speaking or pronunciation (van Dijk, 2006a). This way, the powerful or discourse affecting groups tries to “facilitate the understanding of the information that is consistent with their interests and hinder the comprehension of the information that is not in their best interests” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 366). A more stable approach to manipulating cognition through discourse is manipulating long-term memory (LTM). In this case, mental models are constructed, meaning that personal opinions and emotions are linked to text. Mental models are based on one’s interpretation of text or discourse but are influenced by the social knowledge of one’s group or society. Van Dijk (2006a) differentiates this from cultural knowledge, as he speaks of context models, in which the recipients interpret the text within a dynamically changing communicative event, as we might find in the observed right-populist channels.

Interim conclusion

The theoretical approach to the analysis is the foundation for a connection of misinformation, right-wing populism, and online posting platforms. This is relevant in academic research for several reasons: Online posting platforms are likely to feature misinforming content in one way or another. At the same time, misinformation and populism go hand in hand, as emotionalized language is in both cases a strong factor and the overcoming of rationality and truth, as it is the case with post-truth, pushes extremist narratives. This is, because the “absence of traditional media and the dominance of far-right alternative media are consequently the erosion of traditional media’s democratic function (Reiter & Matthes, 2021) and a further increase of distrust and polarization (Figenschou & Ihlebæk, 2019)” (in: Zehring & Domahidi, 2023, p. 9).

To understand, how misinformation is implemented to support populist narratives, those are analysed against the background of right-wing information ecosystems. Those analytical tools give an insight into which misinformation tactics can be recognized and how. Each misinformation tactic has its own indicators of what strategy the people using them might be pursuing. This way, the theoretical frame for misinformation tactics gives a first insight into possible aims of the publishers. Additionally, the notion of right-wing information ecosystems offers a strong approach to the strategic discourse manipulation analysis. The strategical link of recipients to a specific network of like-minded publishers is not an invention by right-wing publishers. However, it plays a major role in the digital presence of right-wing-partisans, and -activists as well as Neo-Nazis. The attention that right-wing ecosystems have drawn to them speaks to their relevance. I will therefore consider this concept when investigating on the strategy behind the use of misinformation. The strategic discourse manipulation theory by van Dijk is the framework for the key findings from the misinformation analysis. It will illustrate the possible results of misinformation tactics being implemented in the context of discourse manipulation. The interdisciplinary approach considering “social psychology, cognitive psychology, anthropology, sociolinguistics and sociology, all of which are instrumental in understanding the role of knowledge in discourse production and comprehension in a given society” (Gyollai, 2022, p. 540) gives a deeper understanding to the primarily discovered possible strategy within the communication of right-wing actors and their use of misinformation. Gyollai (2022) states, that “SCA would be interested in why leaders of right-wing political parties address their supporters in the way in which they do, and how people make sense of such discourse” (p. 540). This study examines the role of misinformation in the SCA at the core of discourse manipulation strategy. For this, I will investigate the

misinformation tactics that are used and how recipients might make sense of those, as well as the strategy of manipulators regarding each observed misinformation tactic.

Methodology

Philosophy of Science

Starting from the problem formulation of this study, this qualitative research aims to understand the causes and the effects of misinformation tactics for discourse manipulation. A problem formulation must “be precise and investigable and measurable in a scientific manner” (Islam et al., 2022, p. 22). Thus, to recognize and highlight the “causal effects by focusing on striking cases where the impact is clearest and the detailed mechanisms can be examined” (Della Porta & Keating, 2008, p. 36), a selection of different cases has been made. The combining analysis of data from different platforms and different publishers allows a deeper understanding of possible tactics with a broad network of right-wing communicators. Core to the analysis will be to understand human behaviours: The focus lies on the right-wing publishers and their possible ambitions to manipulate, as much as the recipients and their motives to accept the knowledge as produced and disseminated within the channels (Islam et al., 2022). The foundations of knowledge must be outlined to understand what can be known in the researched cases. For the reflection on what is knowable and how social researchers can enhance truth, the considerations of different social scientists will be elaborated in this chapter. Della Porta and Keating (2008) point out the necessity to clarify the “ontological base, related to the existence of a real and objective world; [...] their epistemological base, related to the possibility of knowing this world and the forms this knowledge would take [...]” (p. 21) and the methodological base on which the scientist approaches to gain the possible knowledge. Taking an Interpretivist approach, this research assumes that objective and subjective knowledge are inseparably linked and not individually knowable. Therefore, as a social scientist I must be aware of the subjectivity that my personal experience and interests bring to the analysis due to the “highly complex and necessarily subjective nature of meaning-constitution” (Gylloi, p. 546).

To clarify the ontological base, that is, what this research studies, the aim of the study must be defined. I am elaborating on the use of misinformation and manipulation strategy as, due to former case studies, there is a suspicion that these two issues are at hand and tactically employed. There is the assumption of a case of manipulation through misinformation, which I want to explore, understand, and describe how this might be taking place. In this approach, I understand that there are multiple ways for interpretation, not one way or one truth in that

sense. Social constructivist views imply that the theories are no literal descriptions of the objective truth but serve as “partial ways of understanding the world, which should be compared with each other for their explanatory power” (Della Porta & Keating, 2008, p. 24). What can be known in this research is predestined by the choice of theories that I build my analysis on. In the tradition of social constructionism, I need to reflect on my values and interests that have led to my choice of theory and cases, and on which my approach and findings are accordingly based. Furthermore, the Interpretivist understanding of posts and videos as the studied data includes reflecting the publishers’ interpretations of their truth. This will be done in the content analysis in which I will consider possible motivations of the disseminators of misinformation when found. The analysis of discourse manipulation strategy implies the interpretation of the disseminator’s motives as it considers the misinformation as a tactic as part of a strategy. The Interpretative approach allows to aim for an understanding of the meaning that people attribute to the world around them as opposed to discovering natural laws (Della Porta & Keating, 2008). Accordingly, the studied channels will be seen in a holistic approach as examples of the complexity of their context and the mutual influence of the different entities within their communication systems.

Analysing text regarding its content, it is almost impossible to separate one’s own perceptions and beliefs from the sense that someone makes out of the world (Della Porta & Keating, 2008). The Interpretative approach suggests that normative and empirical work are linked, in the same way in which facts and values are linked. In other words, “scholars must aim at discovering the meanings that motivate their actions rather than relying on universal laws external to the actors” (Della Porta & Keating, 2008, p. 24). All observation is biased, as the research question of a study already frames the analysis: the manipulation strategy theory implies a tactical implementation of narratives that support one’s own goals. To reflect on and limit the intentionality of the research outcome, the research criteria must be elaborated thoughtfully.

Research design and criteria

In this abductive research, the aim is to understand the interplay between different theoretical prerequisites. The aim is, to observe, detect patterns, generalize, and build a theory on the selected data (Islam et al., 2022). This is a largely inductive approach. It does however rely on an abductive reasoning as the understanding which is obtained from the analysis will be grounded “in the language, meanings, and perspectives” (Bryman, 2012, p. 401) of the people who are subject to this research. For this, I am implementing different approaches that

complement each other in a triangulation. A disguised observation of multiple channels on online platforms is used to collect data. This means that the participants cannot refuse to participate in the research. The participants receive neither information about the background of the observation nor about the fact that they are being observed (Bryman, 2012). The data is analysed regarding possible misinformative content which then is triangulated with discourse manipulation strategy. Data and methodological approaches have been chosen to create an understanding of right-wing communication and its possible manipulative tactics. Due to the subjectivity of the selection of data and its interpretation, the research does not have the aim of being a holistic approach nor to define an objective truth. Instead, it will help to explore the use of dis- and misinformation tactics and explain the function of discourse manipulation strategy in the analysed case. This will demonstrate the implementation of the manipulation tools within the discussed discourse, aiming to inform recipients. The analysed cases provide specific insight and are therefore reproducible only to a limited extent as “[p]redictability is impossible since human beings change in time and space and, in the words of Bourdieu (1977: 109), ‘practice has a logic, which is not that of logic’” (Della Porta & Keating, 2008, p. 27). The variables of this research are posts and videos from different posting platforms which will be specified below and are interchangeable due to the enhancement of certain criteria to ensure the scientific quality of this research.

Several social scientists have suggested using specific criteria for qualitative research to improve its’ validity. As the aim of this study is to make a generalizable statement on the use of misinformation tactics of discourse manipulation, it is important to consider its replicability. To make the study replicable by other researchers every step of the research process must be described in detail and the selection of methodology must be well-founded. As this research is strongly based on the Interpretative turn, a single failure to replicate it, is a crucial indicator of possible researcher bias. To avoid this, increasing the research transparency, is an additional criterion. The determined sample size will be disclosed, as well as the measured variables and testing conditions (Zickfeld & Schubert, in: Valsiner, 2019). A criterion, to enhance the integrity of the research, is the consideration of possible ethical issues which might appear in the process. Those will be elaborated in-depth in the following chapter.

Ethical considerations

Bryman (2012) lists ethical principles that reoccur in social scientific considerations of research ethics. Their main questions involve harm to participants, lack of informed consent,

invasion of privacy, and the possibility of deception. Partially, they can be applied to this research. Therefore, alleged ethical transgressions must be considered in social research and therefore, will be discussed in this chapter (Bryman, 2012).

Since the data is collected in a disguised observation, the lack of informed consent and deception of the participants are presumable (Bryman, 2012). To secure the ethical implementation of the research nevertheless, the role of the researcher must be reflected upon. The praxis of disguised observation points to the potential invasion of the participants who are participating unknowingly (Bryman, 2012). With the observation of exclusively public channels, I do encounter this. The selected channels disclose in the case of TikTok and Telegram the identity of some publishers. In this research, the output of partisan and non-partisan personalities and public channels are analysed. To not harm any privacy, I am limiting myself to the observation of public channels that belong to public figures only. This does not shield from the ethical question of whether harm to the administrators of the observed channels might be induced. Qualitative research suggests the close analysis of contents and therefore the disclosure of literal verbal and visual contents. This implies the possibility of negative publicity for the researched channels. The channels were selected because their administrators are known to disseminate right-extremist views. The public discussion and analysis of these channels therefore is an attempt to shed light on harmful narratives and tactics for their dissemination.

The (negative) publicity that this research may reach for the selected channels leads to another consideration: In all cases, the observation adds to the views of the channels. Given the observable and partially known extreme right views of these channels, this is arguably an amplification of the popularity and thus, the algorithmic relevance of possibly inhumane schools of thought. The dilemma of adding to the popularity of the analysed channels should not lead to these channels being completely ignored or excluded from the academic discourse. Since the channels produce a certain knowledge by reproducing and reinforcing right-wing narratives, they need to be analysed as part of right-wing information ecosystems to understand how they function and to fruitfully counter them by screening the narratives that are disseminated through them. Bryman (2012) notes the possibility of having “no choice” and thus, formulating situation ethics which the researcher considers deceptions “on a case-to-case basis” (p. 133). This research accordingly is understood as an attempt to pre-bunk right-wing narratives in German-language right-wing discourse on public online platforms. To minimise the increase of views on the investigated channels, all observed data was saved on

the online archive for websites archive.org. This webpage allows, to save websites in their current state so that they can be called up later without the being distorted through updates or editing. As the site does not allow reliable playback of the videos, the transcripts of the videos have also been attached to the document. This ensures transparency in the analysis and prevents the contribution to the level of popularity of the channels.

Data acquisition

The selected data includes content from the social media platforms Telegram and TikTok, as well as the video platform YouTube. As the DFRL states, “messaging apps have been widely used for political propaganda, social mobilization, and electoral campaigns” (Puyosa, 2023, p. 34). Thus, for political communication, “the main criteria for selecting a messaging app would be reach and amplification potential” (Puyosa, 2023, p. 44). According to the network for digital civil society, Belltower, the AfD is the most successful German party in social media (Amadeu Antonio Stiftung, 2022). This makes the exploration of their public representation of similar platforms important when investigating on possible use of mis- and disinformation, as well as manipulation strategies inevitable. I will limit myself to analysing publications that appeared after the publication of *Correctiv's* research on the secret far-right meeting that sparked historic protests demanding a ban of the AfD in Germany, on the 10th of January 2024 (Bensmann et al., 2024). The aim is to show whether and how mis- and disinformation have been used from this date until the 31st of January. The results will be used to conduct a discourse manipulation analysis, the results of which will then be discussed in the context of previous research. For the analysis, only the spoken text was considered. Visual text was not selected and is not included in the analysis. All numbers of subscribers for the channels were last updated on 28 May 2024.

Telegram

Due to its possibility to disseminate news and content relatively safely and almost without moderation of content, the dark social⁵ platform Telegram is seen as an extremist accelerator by various researchers (i.e. Jünger & Gärtner, 2020; Müller, 2022). Telegram enables users to encrypt communication in a two-way exchange in groups of up to 200,000 members (Telegram Info, n.d.). An additional problem is the lack of controls for the content posted on the platform. According to the Center für Monitoring, Analyse und Strategie (CeMAS), there is moderation in the form of restrictions and limitations on accounts, channels, and groups on Telegram. However, it takes place far less than on other social networks (Dittrich et al., 2020).

⁵ Dark Social is the term for social messengers with closed communication (Dittrich et al., 2020).

This makes it attractive to the spreading of unverified content. The danger of Telegram has been recognised on an institutional political level: Nancy Faeser (Social Democratic Party, SPD), the German interior minister, has recently voiced the possibility of banning Telegram in Germany due to its great feature of far-right content (*German Police Pressure Telegram to Delete Far-Right Content*, 2022).

Researchers, too, recognise the importance of Telegram for right-wing mobilisation. This shows in the numerous well-founded analyses of a wide range of chat groups, channels, posts, and comments on Telegram (i.e. CeMAS, n.d.; Dittrich et al., 2020; Jünger & Gärtner, 2020; Müller, 2022). To add to the status of the research, this analysis will focus on a small sample rather than the broad picture of a possible discourse manipulation strategy. The focus will be on the development of the use of misinformation and disinformation on two public Telegram channels that are known to feature right-wing populist narratives.

The channels that will be analysed function primarily as news aggregators. Research has shown that group chats on Telegram tend to be used in small regional contexts, while the channels tend to be used by organisations and work cross-regionally to inform, mobilise, and connect regional groups (Amadeu Antonio Stiftung, 2022). This makes the investigation of channels an interesting starting point to analyse the use of misinformation on a broader scale, fitting the scale of discourse manipulation. The considered channels are *V2 Unzensiert* and *Martin Sellner [TELEGRAMELITE]*. Martin Sellner is the head of the right-wing extremist organisation “Identitäre Bewegung” (IB, Engl.: “identitarian movement”). Both channels are public, which makes them accessible to hidden observation. Sellner’s channel reaches 67 400 subscribers which is similar to the channel *V2 Unzensiert*, which reaches 64 900 subscribers.

According to CeMAS, there are a few thousand channels on Telegram, used for the dissemination of conspirational content and disinformation in German (CeMAS, n.d.). Among these, the chosen channels are two out of the 83 channels which reach more than 50.000 followers. This makes the channels particularly interesting research objects.

Due to the high frequency of postings, not all messages will be analysed. I will limit my research to the fact-checking of written text, that is, empirical data that is being quoted, and the postings featuring or pointing to newspaper articles, that are referred to as “mainstream media”. To further narrow down the research, the analysed posts must include the keywords “Remigration”, “Sellner”, or “Correctiv”. During the observed period, these can be directly linked to the publication by *Correctiv*.

Due to the restriction in shown results for the keyword search, the channels were manually searched for the specific keywords. The number of posts for each keyword made the restriction to fewer keywords and a shorter period from which the posts were taken unavoidable. This was, to avoid cutting down of the selection of three online platforms, as the research connects different online platforms and tries to view the tactics used on different platforms instead of focusing on Telegram.

YouTube

Besides Telegram, YouTube has been recognised as a popular channel for the dissemination of mis- and disinformation (Dittrich et al., 2020). An issue that might play a role in this, is, that the YouTube algorithm is separate from the company's content-moderation operation. That is, whether a video is popular or not, depends on the viewer's engagement alone, regardless of its content. In other words, the YouTube algorithm will recommend extremist content again to someone who has once watched a video with extremist content (Lavin, 2018). However, the algorithm must not be overestimated: Research by Brendan Nyhan, a political scientist at Dartmouth, has shown, "that almost all extremist content is either consumed by subscribers to the relevant channels—a sign of actual demand rather than manipulation or preference falsification—or encountered via links from external sites" (Lewis-Kraus, 2022).

YouTube is the most important platform for video streaming in Germany (acquisa, 2024). This makes it an important connection to a broad, mainstream audience. Furthermore, YouTube has its biggest audience among youth, which makes its observation an important factor for the protection of youth. With the algorithm helping to lead the audience to further right-wing populist or extremist content of other channels, they are likely to become linked to a right-wing information ecosystem (Frank, 2019). Influencers on YouTube are using fascist narratives to persuade viewers of their ideological views. The focus in this research will be put on the dissemination of a seemingly majority-held opinion. For this, rather than analysing the channels of 'influencers', I will examine a broadcasting channel as well as a partisan channel. As an example for this, I will look at the private broadcasting channel *DeutschlandKurier*. The channel posts videos which are framed as broadcasting content, commenting on current events featuring representatives of right-wing organisations or parties, such as the AfD. The channel has 220.000 subscribers, which seems to be a relatively considerable size for a channel, considering that the public German broadcasting channel *tagesschau* has 1,53 million subscribers.

A second, with 267.000 subscribers similarly far-reaching channel is the official account of the AfD, *AfD TV*. It has the appearance of a private broadcaster, publishing news from all over Germany and commenting those. The party-political background of the channel implies possible institutional political ambitions in its communications and public reach. This makes it an important example to look at when exploring the use of mis- and disinformation in right-wing channels on YouTube. To ensure consistency in the analysis, I will select and analyse videos which contain the same keywords in their titles or descriptions, which were chosen for the analysis of the Telegram channels.

TikTok

In addition to YouTube, TikTok is also an important video platform for right-wing communication strategies in Germany. It has almost 20 million users per month in Germany, 41 per cent of which are adolescents (Amadeu Antonio Stiftung, 2022). This makes TikTok an attractive recruiting platform for right-extremist activists and particularly important in the view of youth protection (pre:bunk, 2023). A study on right-wing extremism on TikTok by the public broadcaster ZDF has revealed that the AfD has three times more views on its videos than the parliament parties FDP, CDU, Linke and SPD combined (Metzger, 2024). The use of TikTok by right-wing-communicators ranges from an advertisement platform for right-extremist fashion to statements of party members of the AfD or its youth organisation, which has been named right-extremist by the constitution protection service. The platform has repeatedly been core to studies on right-wing extremism.

The practicality of TikTok includes the possibility to link one's account to Instagram or YouTube (TikTok, n.d.). This facilitates cross-media strategies, such as linking to other channels, reusing content from YouTube, sharing clips on multiple channels, or simply increasing the mass of content (Amadeu Antonio Stiftung, 2022). Those strategies also enable the expansion of a right-wing information ecosystem. Another decisive factor for the importance of TikTok is the possibility of creating parasocial relations with the users. Streamers let their viewers „take part“ in their day-to-day lives. The algorithm plays a significant role in this: TikTok shows every uploaded video in a randomised selection to a specific number of users. When it is engaged with, that is, when it is liked, commented on, or watched, it will be sent to other users' timelines (Neumeier et al., 2024). This implies an exponential character of the algorithmic selection of viewers on TikTok (Neumeier et al., 2024). This way, the channels on TikTok have the advantage of a particularly high reach, even

on new networks. The SPD-affiliated Amadeu-Antonio Foundation finds that the right-extremist cross-media strategy on TikTok works in two ways: On one side, politicised users can be moved to platforms with more radical content. At the same time, the channels link platforms that are not state regulated to ensure their reach in case the channels are banned on TikTok (Lehmann, 2023). Additionally, fan accounts serve as multipliers of banned channels. This enables the accounts to reach an audience even after being banned from the platform (Lehmann, 2023).

One of the channels of interest for this analysis will be the channel named after Petr Bystron, *@petrbystronafd*, who has been a member of the German Parliament since 2017 and is one of the AfD's candidates in the 2024 European elections (Gaschke, 2023). On TikTok, he addresses a new, young audience for the AfD and this way has acquired 47.600 followers. A second channel to be analysed is the channel of the official account for the AfD parliamentary group, named *AfDFraktionimBundestag*, *@afdfraktionimbundestag*, which reaches 422.500 followers. The official channel of the AfD is also looked at in the YouTube analysis. However, to enable a far-reaching analysis and to show the German far-right communication networks, I will look at channels from different publishers on individual platforms.

As videos on TikTok do not usually have a detailed description of their content, all the videos in the period from the 10th until the 31st of January 2024 were transcribed and then searched for the keywords “Correctiv”, and “Remigration”. As none of the videos included the keyword “Sellner”, it will not appear in this chapter of the analysis.

Qualitative content analysis

In the first part of the analysis, the focus lies on the content of the data with a particular focus on misinformation tactics. For this, the qualitative content analysis as suggested by Mayring (2000) is conducted as an “empirical, methodological controlled analysis of texts within their context of communication” (p. 2). It has the advantage that it offers a structured approach to content analysis which is nevertheless open enough to be combined with the strategic discourse analysis method (Flick, 2014). As categories are in the centre of qualitative content analysis, Schreier suggests for this to systematically assign “successive parts of the material to the categories of a coding frame” (in: Flick, 2014, p. 2). This way, by reducing the data to certain groups of meaning, it will be possible, to later insert the results into the second part of the analysis, which is the analysis of discourse manipulation strategy. Since some misinformation tactics, such as repetition, only become recognizable in context, the data was first systematically reviewed for the contents of the posts and videos. For this, each platform

was looked at individually. The following steps were carried out separately for each channel. The data for the different channels are therefore summarised under their respective platforms.

With the help of colour codes in the transcripts, some thematic categories were made visible in which the data was structured before the analysis. To ensure that these inductively created categories match the data, the selection of misinformation tactics was adapted and supplemented in feedback loops (Mayring, 2000). Thereby the thematic categories were deductively revised, checked for their reliability and finally reduced to the three categories: “Remigration as a solution”, “Debunking mainstream media and government”, and “Critique on *Correctiv*”. The text excerpts, category definitions and limitations selected for this purpose were revised against the background of theory and material (Mayring, 2000). Within the categories, the content of the videos and posts was analysed regarding the choice of words, the context to which they are pointing and in which they were made, and statements regarding their factual accuracy. In doing so, the misinformation tactics were elaborated on, and the supposed purpose of the misinformation tactics was investigated. The analysis of the discourse manipulation strategy will build upon these insights.

In the last step, the thematic categories were subordinated under each of the discovered misinformation tactics. The found misinformation tactics are “Repetition”, “Decontextualization”, “Dichotomous Depiction”, and “Language use and emotions”. With the material being structured in these three categories, I was able to explore in-depth what purpose each of the four misinformation tactics serves. This helped to understand the purpose of each misinformation tactic for the investigated publishers.

Discourse manipulation strategy analysis

To understand a possible discourse manipulation strategy which is hinted at in the previously analysed misinformation use, I will conduct a discourse manipulation strategy analysis according to van Dijk, building on his approach of “triangulating a social, cognitive and discursive approach” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 361). A social cognition approach (SCA) creates a broad picture of the function and impact of misinformation tactics in discourse manipulation. Social cognition describes the relation between objective and subjective truth. With misinformation being used to create or enhance a certain truth, their dissemination, and the function of it are crucial considerations for this research. To discover a discourse manipulation strategy, this analysis will examine three aspects of discourse, that van Dijk names relevant to the manipulation of cognition. Those are manipulation of STM-based discourse understanding, episodic manipulation, and manipulation of social cognition. To investigate

those, the data will be grouped according to the previously discovered misinformation tactics. Within these, the discourse manipulation is analysed considering the three aspects as introduced by van Dijk.

For this, in a first step the manipulation of STM-based discourse understanding will be analysed. For this, I will elaborate on the attribution of meaning to “words, clauses, sentences, utterances and non-verbal signals” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 365) through misinformation. The previously discovered misinformation tactics are elaborated including some other textual orientation points such as fond and verbal emphasis (for example through raising the voice) in the context of the misinformation. These aspects can be manipulative if intended, as the powerful, discourse-controlling group (i.e. the administrators of the investigated channels or the speakers in the videos) can “facilitate the understanding of the information that is consistent with their interest” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 366). The aim is to discover whether there is “an explicit plan to impair or bias understanding” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 366) of the recipients.

The second aspect of manipulation that van Dijk (2006a) suggests, is the manipulation of LTM which is of higher interest for manipulators. This episodic memory is decisive for how we understand and emotionally evaluate events. To analyse, how manipulation of this episodic memory can be enhanced here, it must be investigated, how the alleged manipulators are “restricting their [recipients] freedom of interpretation or at least the probability that they will understand the discourse against the best interests of the manipulators” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 367). Formerly mentioned victim-perpetrator-reversion is an example of the manipulation of the mental models of the recipients are discursively manipulated. Another sign could be an attempt “to influence the structure of the mental model of the event by emphasizing the preferred agent” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 367). To discover other possible strategies, the misinformation tactics will be investigated.

The third step of the analysis will regard the manipulation of social cognition. To find these shared attitudes, the aim will be to discover whether there is manipulation of mental models of the recipients, as those form understanding and thus are nothing less than the basis of discourse. Mental models “evolve as they are reappropriated and updated in line with individuals’ new experiences and interactions with others” (Gyollai, 2022, p. 548). As they are mainly constructed within socially shared knowledge, “the formation or modification of more general, socially shared representations” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 368) is crucial for successful discourse manipulation. Socially shared representation creates sociocultural knowledge and

can be influenced, for example, through the enhanced association of social issues with certain emotions (van Dijk, 2006a). One example for this is the typical association of immigration with fear or anger in right-wing populist discourse. Mental models which define social cognition, are mainly based on both, semantic models, which “represent the individuals’ subjective understanding of the situation” (Gyollai, 2022, p. 542), and context models, “which account for how individuals define the circumstances of [...] the communicative situation in which they are involved in terms of relevance” (Gyollai, 2022, p. 542). The latter “control the content, style and genre of discourses” (Gyollai, 2022, p. 542).

As this analysis is based on the findings of the misinformation tactics, which were discovered in the content analysis, the discourse strategies according to van Dijk (2006a) will be elaborated in the context of those. As manipulation of social cognition “may affect the very norms and values used to evaluate events and people and to condemn or legitimate actions” (van Dijk, 2006a), this third aspect of discourse manipulation is the possible aim of the previously described strategies. Van Dijk (2006a) notes, that “manipulation of social cognition may affect the very norms and values used to evaluate events and people and to condemn or legitimate action” (p. 371). Therefore, the analysis will elaborate on this note to the greatest extent.

Analysis

Qualitative content analysis

In this first part of the analysis, the results of the categorization and analysis of misinformation is presented. The publications on each of the three investigated platforms are summarized according to their significance for the analysis of misinformation tactics and their possible meaning for discourse manipulation strategy. All quotations were translated from German by the author.

Telegram

At first sight, it became clear that most of the inspected posts have been edited since they were posted. This speaks to the forced high production of messages with a smaller interest in its rightfulness, for example in grammar and spelling but possibly also in factual content. The focus may lay less on the information but rather on the binding of followers to a continuous output of news and comments. This impression is strengthened with the analysis of the second channel *V2 Unzensiert*. Even though the found data under the focus keywords remained far below the ones from the first channel, the overall activity in the channel is strikingly high.

Repetition

In Martin Sellner's channel, many posts regarding remigration as a solution to current issues can be related to different forms of perception hacking. One example of this is the repetition of remigration in connection with problems, that is, migration leading to problems that can be resolved with remigration. The high number of posts including the keyword remigration exaggerates the importance and common interest in the topic. This may enhance the topics' memorability and make the issue appear more urgent at the same time. As it is of particular interest of the political right and particularly of the AfD this may have the effect that recipients of the channel feel more attracted by respective political views: Assuming that the issue is of high political relevance and at the same time observing, that almost no party is actively addressing this issue, may bring supporters closer to the AfD, which has included the topic into the parties' program.

Sellner also uses repetition to sow distrust towards mainstream media. Less trust may result in less engagement in these media outlets which binds the recipients of the observed channels to those and the linked "trustworthy" alternatives. An example for this is Sellner repeatedly referring to the publication by *Correctiv* as a "campaign of lies" (post 19324, Appendix, p. 72). The fact that Sellner is discussing the work by *Correctiv* in the channel and calling them out for allegedly sharing misinformation can be interpreted as an attempt to spread distrust towards a journalistic platform and the numerous mainstream media outlets which have shared their research. This way, he focusses on disinformation in mainstream media coverage. And Sellner closes the circle of right-wing information ecosystems. This shows for example in post 19230 (Appendix, p. 67). The structure of this post gives an insight into the workings of a right-wing information ecosystem: With a relatively short post, in terms of word use and content, the publisher introduces the recipient to a multitude of further reaching social media platforms and channels. Not only does the post introduce alternative platforms through weblinks, but those are at the same time opposed to the "mainstream"-platform, which is named in brackets behind the alternative platform. This can be understood as approval towards certain platforms, linking them to a right-wing accepted truth. The CISA identifies an aim in this tactic to push a disinformation narrative among a specific group, which here are the Telegram users in the channel (CISA, n.d.). Instead of the amplification of one specific narrative, this tool could serve as a preparation for this, as it leads users to supposedly independent alternative platforms and thus possibly leads to an echo-chamber for right-wing discourses. For example, the mentioned post includes two links to sources, and two links to a subscription and a fundraising page of Martin Sellner. The fundraising page features multiple

links to different social media platforms and their common alternatives (i.e. Rumble, as an alternative for YouTube).

Decontextualization

One narrative that repeatedly appears, both in posts by Sellner and in posts of the channel V2 *Unzensiert*, is the pointing towards crimes committed by people with migration backgrounds. The posts focus on racialised people, thus not creating an actual comparison of statistical relevance. In post 19375 (Appendix, p. 74), Sellner states for example the growth of criminality is linked to „foreign infiltration and culturally segregated parallel societies“. This is misleading as it recreates a myth that has lately been largely discussed and debunked, claiming that criminality rises with an increase of migrants moving to Germany (Geyer, 2024). In context, the number show that the emphasis on migrants as more likely to commit crimes does not depict an empirically verifiable fact. Both channels use the strategy of decontextualizing numbers to construct a seemingly empirical danger. This also emphasises this supposed danger by spreading it further. The aim is presumably to increase support for right-wing narratives and create a stronger enemy image for political actors who think differently. A further example for this is post 19414 (Appendix, p. 76), in which Sellner points to a case of Islamic extremism at a school in Neuss. The case is taken as a reason for the demand for remigration. A statistical background given by the Federal Ministry for Education and Research relativises this and shows, that this case, too, is decontextualised and the dangers thereby exaggerated significantly. This deepens the perception of a misinformation tactic used by Sellner: Using verifiable information, he appears to reflect relevant facts to objectively estimate dangers of societal developments. Through the decontextualised presentation of these facts he draws a picture which fits his own idea of moral. A morally righteous way to govern, thus lays the focus on the preservation of security. Constructing a sense of threat in context with people with migrant background, Sellner connects the value of security with the urgency of a call for remigration.

These examples for decontextualization may have been published to create fear or anger, assumingly with the goal to direct these negative emotions towards ruling parties and adding to dichotomous perception of the partisan environment in Germany. Although the decontextualised information can be quickly debunked, it serves as an effective tool to create a basis for other misinformation tactics, such as dichotomous depiction and emotionalised language. The repeated critique of mainstream media and the government may have the effect of exacerbating the governmental repression of right-wing political actors. This could have

the aim of framing the right-wing camp, represented through Sellner, as a victim towards a repressive government, putting its democratic values such as liberty of thought and speech in question.

Dichotomous Depictions

There are multiple attempts by Sellner to depict remigration as uncompromising solution to various social issues. An example for this is the repeated notion of the threat of an increased criminality, posed and exacerbated by an increase of migration. Besides the factual inaccuracy of this implied causality, this is an example for the function of dichotomous depictions as disinformation tactic: As humans want to act morally right, pointing out the increase of criminality with a particular focus on examples including minors creates a strong dichotomous depiction. As the examples pointing to criminal offences and dangers posed by migrants are insufficiently contextualised and include minors in all the cases studied, this points to a strong tendency towards a dichotomy in dealing with migrants. Sellner does not depict the complexity of the discussed issues in his posts, which again, is an example for dichotomous depiction.

He strengthens this perceived division, by stating that remigration is a called-for and without-alternative approach to problems of migration, those being mostly costs and criminality. With exclamations like "the people want remigration" ("Das Volk will Remigration") in post 19470 (Appendix, p. 78), he makes the topic appear of united societal interest and at the same time possibly evokes negative feelings towards the ruling parties, not acting sufficiently in accordance with this.

The use of terms such as "Systempress" or "FRG-Democracy-Simulation" in post 19344 (Appendix, p. 73) serve as a further amplification of mistrust towards the public and governmental authorities. In post 19402 (Appendix, p. 76), Sellner problematizes the modernised law for naturalization, determining it as problematic and dangerous to German citizens and naming it a „demographic death sentence to German democracy“. This thought is hinted at in different other posts, such as in post 19435 (Appendix, p. 77), stating that they will "continue until we are faced with fait accompli". These analyses hardly leave a moral alternative to Sellner's elaboration of the unrighteous methods of mainstream media. Sellner could thereby strengthen mistrust towards them on the one hand and an enlightened and therefore trustworthy position for the political right on the other.

Reinforcing this polarizing image of a powerful, state-owned media and the attacked rightful political right, posts by both V2 *Unzensiert* (i.e. post 33153, Appendix, p. 86) and *Martin*

Sellner [TELEGRAMELITE] (i.e. post 19572, Appendix, p. 82) suggest the dissemination of misinformation through *Correctiv*. The title of the post says, “they are washing their hands of responsibility...”, specifying in a more direct phrasing the first bullet point as “now they don’t want to have done it”. Sellner quotes the research by *Correctiv*, in which the publisher's state, referring to a speech held by Sellner at the meeting in Potsdam, that his suggestion “reminds of an old idea: 1940, the National Socialists planned to deport four million Jews to the island of Madagascar” (post 19572, Appendix, p. 82). If you take a quick look at the text, this comparison does seem like an equalisation. It is likely a tactical formulation made by the researchers from *Correctiv*. Sellner uses this to create a dichotomous depiction and is a populist tool for creating a black-and-white pattern of moral right against wrong.

Language use and emotions

Giving examples of extremism and criminality, the appeal to the recipients’ emotions has been achieved through decontextualization and repetition. Additionally, certain formulations can be targeted to activate these emotions or reinforce them. For example, in post 19261 (Appendix, p. 69) Martin Sellner opposes remigration to the “Fearmongering” of other media which supposedly distracts the people from the issue of remigration. This reverses the idea that remigration emerges from a fearmongering narrative, the solution to which would be remigration. He thus builds on the feeling of having to differentiate oneself from a mind-control from the political opponents. A similar attempt can be observed in post 19254 in which Sellner confronts the unjust scandalisation of remigration with the actually “scandalous observation and criminalisation of an assembly of the opposition as in the GDR” (Appendix, p. 68). Both examples show the reversal of blame, which Sellner appears to be enhancing here.

In some posts, Sellner refers to the event as a secret meeting which it has been referred to by mainstream media outlets in an ironic tone. This might be an attempt to ridicule the inherent warning of the danger that has been verbalised in different news reporting. In another post, Sellner names the observation of the event a scandal, pointing to the exclusiveness of the meeting. By ridiculing the media narratives, he may evoke feelings of mistrust and thus possibly anger or frustration towards mainstream media and government. At the same time, blaming the *Correctiv*-journalists for observing a private meeting, he denies them moral behaviour on two levels: As journalists, who dramatize a harmless meeting and perhaps even put their resources on pointless research. And as political opponents, who espionage rather than research on their foes.

A further tactical approach of creating mistrust towards media outlets which are not within the reach or control of right-wing information ecosystems is the word choice in some of the posts. Sellner refers to the publication by *Correctiv* as a campaign in multiple posts. For example, he opens post 19566 with the headline “The 4 aims of Correctiv – A failed Campaign?” (Appendix, p. 82). This suggests a campaign character of the research and publication of the researchers from *Correctiv*. *Correctiv* claims to have a mere journalist entitlement, that is, the ambition to investigate politically relevant behaviour and to uncover any democracy-harming activities. Opposing that, Sellner suggests that the publication has been part of a campaign, which implies that it has been created to reach a certain goal rather than being conducted merely to inform the public about a secret meeting of right-wing functionals. To reinforce this impression, Sellner names the publication a “smear campaign” in some posts (i.e. 19226, Appendix, p. 67). This may aim to evoke anger amongst his recipients. Besides that, administrators in an open but not open-for-interaction Telegram channel sharing their own subjective individual knowledge, creates inequality through a power division within the channels. The recipients meet a power concentration within the administrators who share their sometimes inaccessible, subjective knowledge. Whether or not, they are willing to adapt to or take in the knowledge depends on individual knowledge and imprint. Possibly, the administrators enhance the creation of an exclusive, shared knowledge themselves.

In post 19454 (Appendix, p. 77), Sellner seemingly debunks the publication by *Correctiv* as conspiracy. With this word-choice and the direct comparison to the journalist-groups’ own definition of the term, he seemingly turns their own weapons against them, uncovering the groups double-standard and malicious ambition. He thus denies their credibility and journalistic motivation, emphasising his suspicions of a political strategy expressed elsewhere.

The choice of the word “campaign” as opposed to “research” or “article” which are used in most reporting on the case through public broadcasters, shows a different, rather negative validation of the publication. It implies a mistrust towards the motives of the *Correctiv* publishers and victimizes ‘the right’. This becomes clear as he states in one short text in post 19226 (Appendix, p. 67) in which he states that the “political media dropped a nuclear bomb on the right-wing camp”. Not only does this formulation speak to the victimization of “the right” but also an interpretation of the publication, or “campaign”, as an attack rather than a description of a state of art. The metaphor of dropping a nuclear bomb indicates a particularly destructive attack. The emotionalised language Sellner uses suggests that people might tend to

turn to his role as a victim of contradictory information given through representatives of *Correctiv*.

YouTube

The videos by *DeutschlandKurier* and *AfDTV* were chosen according to their titles or video descriptions featuring the keywords “Correctiv”, “Sellner”, or “Remigration”. This way, eleven videos were collected for the period from 10th until 31st of January. Three were published by *AfDTV* and eight by *DeutschlandKurier*. The results are summarised in the listed categories.

Repetition

One reappearing tactic of perception hacking is the repeated use of the narrative that people seek refuge in Germany to profit from the social system. The narrative is used by Maximilian Krah in one video which was posted on the channel *AfDTV*. It is a well-known and repeatedly debunked narrative (Bauer, 2023). Since 2015, with the rapid increase of immigration numbers in Germany, the allegation has been made repeatedly by right-wing populist politicians. Last, Friedrich Merz named the increase in the numbers of Ukrainian refugees due to the Russian invasion war “Social tourism” in 2022 (Kordes & Straatmann, 2022). With this statement, Merz himself disseminated a Russian disinformation narrative, knowingly or unknowingly. The repetition of narratives, regardless of their truthfulness, is a misinformation tactic. As Ph.D. Ancis, (2021) explains, people are more likely to assume that a narrative is commonly believed in if it is repeated by others. The persistence of this narrative and its reproduction on different channels, that is, newspapers, magazines, YouTube and TikTok channels, makes its debunking therefore more difficult. Among other reasons, this may be an explanation for the failed attempts to permanently debunk this narrative as disinformation.

AfDTV also reproduces the disinformation about criminality among immigrants (Appendix, p. 111), assumingly aiming to create distrust towards the morals of people coming to Germany and applying for asylum. This is employed also by the channel *DeutschlandKurier*, in which Matthias Helferich, member of the state executive committee of the AfD in North Rhine-Westphalia, calls the “imported criminality” the “most negative result” of “uncontrolled immigration” (Appendix, p. 111 f.). Besides that, the repetitive choice of topics points to the significance of those: Five out of the eight videos by *DeutschlandKurier* regard the topic remigration, framing it as a legitimate request, and one of the titles for example taking the

perspective of “mass-migration is ruining the economy and welfare-systems” (Appendix, p. 88).

The videos posted by *AfDTV* disclose in their titles an inherent critique on *Correctiv*, ‘the media’ and the ruling government. (“Correctiv & Media vs. AfD: The truth about the smear campaign!”, “Instead of homeless with the traffic lights: live nicer with the AfD!”⁶). The repetition does not regard one specific topic, as three different opponents are identified here but it shows a unique position of the AfD, which must position itself against external forces. This may serve again as a perception hacking method, to create the impression, that there is an elite of opinion leaders which oppose the AfD. This dichotomy could help to create an impression of a populist societal structure: The AfD politicians and supporters appear to be a closed group which must stick together to fight against the campaigns and lies of others. This narrative aims to strengthen the bond between supporters as they may see themselves as outcasts in the political environment.

Both, *AfDTV* and *DeutschlandKurier*, post a video of a speech by Alice Weidel referring directly to the publication by *Correctiv* and its unreliability in January (Appendix, pp. 88-90, and 98-100). The tactic is the repetition of a certain narrative, that is, *Correctiv* being state-funded media and lying in the interest of the ruling government. Martin Reichardt repeats this narrative, picking up on the campaign-character of the publication, further stating that *Correctiv* “in reality is a state-financed medium, endowed with large sums of money by the left-wing establishment to defame the conservative opposition in particular” (Appendix, p. 108). This serves to reinforce the narrative of *Correctiv* not being trustworthy and at the same time connecting it to other mainstream media and the government parties and, again, reproduces a lone-wolf narrative with which the AfD designated itself.

Decontextualization

The videos in this category feature different societal issues, the solution to which supposedly is remigration. One of the videos posted by *AfDTV* addresses the problematic housing situation and the economic struggles of citizens. The title opposes homelessness, being an issue under the current government on one side to the promise “Live nicer with the AfD” (Appendix, p. 87 f.) on the other. In the video, the temporary housing of people who are applying for asylum in Germany in hotels is thematised as opposed to “German” households,

⁶ „Traffic lights“ is the name of the current government in Germany, the parties of which are designated to the colours of a traffic light: SPD (red), FDP (yellow), Greens (green).

struggling to pay heating expenses. One can speak of a decontextualization of both social issues being addressed here. The shortage of accommodation for refugees and the resulting uncertainty about their personal whereabouts is concealed by the emphasis on the fact that some of them are temporarily housed in hotels. The aim could be to provoke feelings of envy towards refugees and incomprehension towards the government in power because it is not able to control the general housing shortage. The juxtaposition of those creates the perception of an interrelatedness and could therefore spark incomprehension and anger among the recipients of these channels about the supposedly unfair distribution of state aid.

Thus, the juxtaposition of two seemingly contradictory, yet interrelated sides can be interpreted as the attempt to create a negative emotional response to “the government”, presenting it as an entity that acts to the benefit of non-German people to the disadvantage of German citizens, and to the migrants coming to Germany and profiting from this. This abbreviated presentation of different challenges creates the image of comparability and thus implies the direct link between the two problems. Thus, recipients are likely encouraged to draw a connection between the two issues and assume and express unfair treatment regarding financial benefits or cuts for German citizens in comparison to asylum seekers. This serves two further misinformation tactics: firstly, a dichotomous presentation, and, resulting from this, an emotional reaction. This is because a simplified picture is painted that contrasts an unfair favouring of refugees with a direct disadvantage for German citizens in terms of their housing situation, without there being any factual causality. Thus, the decontextualised depiction of social issues enhances other misinformation tactics. Those are directed towards evoking negative emotions within the recipients and stronger support for the AfD which seemingly recognizes the true causality of those issues and has political answers to them.

AfDTV features a video of Maximilian Krah, in which he states, that governmentally controlled media want to create fear among German citizens of being deported (Appendix, p. 90). He supposedly debunks this misinformation by stating, that the remigration plans by AfD refer to those people who entered Germany since 2015 and live on state support, which “damages the economy, increases crime because rents are exploding, and our cities no longer look like German cities” (Appendix, p. 91). This is a similar tactic to the previously elaborated approaches. He connects a general constructed threat with the supposed debunk of mainstream media, which adds mistrust towards those to his tactic. The aim is again to provoke emotions like anger towards mainstream media and the government in power.

Dichotomous Depictions

The depiction of the AfD as a victim to smear campaigns and misinformation while requesting the economically only right decision of remigration as a response to mass immigration, does not leave any room for discussion. In a video by *DeutschlandKurier*, „Love Priest“ Tim Kellner examines the topic of remigration. In the video, he reproduces misleading information on the implementation of Sharia at a German high school, again creating a moral high ground for the political right, being concerned with safety and the protection of the German people.

Similarly to the Telegram channels, the YouTube channels criticise the mainstream media for disseminating the research by *Correctiv*, specifically criticising the framing of the meeting as a secret meeting. In a video posted by *DeutschlandKurier*, the AfD politician Martin Reichardt announces that the “German media” picks up on any story that opposes the AfD (Appendix, p. 105). With high political representatives of the governmental parties having participated in the Anti-AfD demonstrations that followed the publication by *Correctiv* in January, Reichardt emphasizes the polarization against the AfD. Framing the engagement as election propaganda by parties, which are driven “to harm Germany, to destroy Germany's economy and ultimately also to destroy the prosperity of the German people” (Appendix, p. 108). This way, formulating an existential threat towards the German recipients of the channel, Reichardt assumingly aims to trigger an emotional reaction. This may lead to political activation of the recipients or, more likely, to a stronger political polarization and reassurance of the moral superiority of the AfD.

Additionally, we find accusations towards *Correctiv* regarding the meeting in Brandenburg in the examined YouTube channels. Aligning with the accusation of disseminating wrongful statements, *AfDTV* compares the journalistic methods of *Correctiv* with the work of a secret service and calls the journalists activists which accordingly employ “GDR-methods” (Appendix, p. 98). This creates a strong moral divide between *AfDTV*, supposedly educating, speaking the truth, and debunking ‘lying mainstream media’ on the one side and *Correctiv* being part of ‘the media’ and the passive government on the other. This moral division and validation of high and low morals, as *AfDTV* highlights their care for the German citizens. This also fits the populist narrative of a morally superior, closed group, being recipients and AfD supporters, opposing a morally reprehensible elite (government, and government lead media). This division is reinforced by different formulations such as the framing of the publication and its medial discussion as “malicious misinterpretation” (Appendix, p. 120).

Language use and emotions

One of the videos on the channel *DeutschlandKurier* is titled: “Without remigration, we lose our homeland” (Appendix, p. 109). This fits a classification as post-truth as it does not connect to falsifiable, evidence-based data but rather describes an impression and enhances an emotional response. Helferich, who is being interviewed in this video, bases this statement on the observation of “uncontrolled migration”, or “mass migration” being a “massive problem” in Germany. These formulations point to a threat, with the result of recipients likely experiencing emotions like unease or even fear and possibly aspiring towards a dichotomous attitude towards the position of the right-wing in German politics. The discussion of migration issues is made in differentiation towards the ruling parties. AfD TV also repeatedly features strong emotional language when comparing the housing situation of refugees in Germany to that of German citizens, stating “It's a disgrace that asylum seekers in Germany live in luxury hotels while Germans no longer dare to turn on the heating in winter” (Appendix, p. 88).

AfD TV ascribes the investigative work of Correctiv to German politics and media overall. This way, the unique position of the right in Germany, as the political middle and left are presented as an ideological unit, which attacks the right and thus threatens democracy. The notion of the “Unword of the Year” 2023 being “Remigration” in Germany, hints to a more direct victimization again of right-wing aims. As the “unword of the year” is selected according to language-critical criteria to sensitize people to the meaning and the use of the selected word, this selection is an unambiguous critique of a commonly used formulation of the political right („*Remigration*“ Ist „*Unwort Des Jahres*“ 2023, 2024). This makes the legitimacy of remigration as a reasonable political goal questionable. *AfDTV* recognizes this and meets the choice by naming the Green party as unword of the year. Naming the Green party (“die Grünen”) “Germany-haters” (Appendix, p. 109) ruling the political climate enhances the polarization of ‘us’ against ‘them’ as the Green party is presented as highly influential opposition to the state. This way, the victimization of the AfD or the political right-wing recedes into the background to make the polarization appear like a bigger picture: This way, it is the country that is threatened by a governmental party. At the same time, the nationalist imprint of the right-wing implies the attack being directed towards supportive recipients of the channel. Differently to the more direct opposition of a lying mainstream media and a truthful and constitutional right-wing, this lifts the division on a level of personal identity of the supportive recipients of the channel.

DeutschlandKurier employs the populist idea of a closed group acting against this controlling and morally despicable elite. To this end, they call out untruthful statements, which however, had not been made by *Correctiv*. Martin Reichhardt, Chairman of the Saxony-Anhalt branch of the AfD, for example, calls the investigation a “long-term planned action” (Appendix, p. 108) and ridicules the framing of the meeting as a “secret meeting” (Appendix, p. 107). This points to the functioning of right-wing information ecosystems: Confirming, non-verifiable information is disseminated on different online media platforms. This reinforces the psychological effect of mere repetition as the dissemination through different actors and on different media platforms points to broader societal support of the supposed facts.

TikTok

Even though, the chosen channels have a wide reach, the low quantity in published content in comparison to the channels on YouTube and Telegram is noticeable. Nevertheless, the selection was further limited to videos including the keywords “Correctiv”, or “remigration” in their transcripts. The result of this was the selection were six videos on the channel *AfDFraktionimBundestag* (@afdfraktionimbundestag) and two videos on the channel or Petr Bystron (@petrbystronafd). The transcripts were then coded according to the previously chosen thematic categories to structure the content. In the following sub-chapters, the found misinformation tactics are elaborated.

Repetition

As the selection of data on TikTok is small, repetition does not appear as conspicuously in comparison to the data which was collected from the other online platforms. However, seeing the data in relation with each other, that is, the content of speeches by different politicians on the partisan channel, as well as the videos by Bystron in comparison to those, shows repetitive patterns. One recurring topic is the critique on *Correctiv*. The research network is mostly framed as a political group, which disseminates false statements. Critique includes the slightly ironic note of a “supposed secret meeting” (Appendix, p. 119), when elaborating on *Correctiv*’s publication. Another point being made, is that in the publication the demands by the party are “falsely represented” (Appendix, p. 117) and the research not investigative journalism (Appendix, p. 123) but “criminal research” (Appendix, p. 122), using “StaSi⁷-methods” (Appendix, p. 120). The criticism of *Correctiv* that it is not a trustworthy news

⁷ The *Staatssicherheit* (engl.: state security, short: StaSi) was the secret service that was used in the GDR for espionage against political opponents, such as critics of the system, and also used torture during interrogations.

medium is repeated with a slightly different emphasis. The choice of different points of critique which are published in the different channels, seemingly adds some substance to the critique as it appears to be more justified when multiple indices seem to support it.

Similar to the narratives on Telegram and YouTube, on TikTok, too, the deportation of people with rejected asylum applications is repeatedly presented as a just and constitutional reaction (Appendix, pp. 119 and 122). This on one hand creates a dichotomy between the rightful demands by the AfD politicians and the unrightful acting of the government in power. On the other hand, by the repeated presentation of these slightly different, but in their content concurring statements by different AfD politicians, the party's internal unity and their conviction of their morally righteous position are enhanced.

Not only in the comparison between different videos and platforms, but also within the videos themselves, sometimes the rhetoric stylistic device of repetition can be observed. For example, Alice Weidel repeats the words 'scandal' or 'scandalous' nine times in total when regarding the publication by *Correctiv* and the public handling of it. This creates a mental connection of the recipients of the word 'scandal' with the various issues surrounding the publication and enhance a conclusion in agreement with this. For example, Weidel names it 'scandalous' that "leftist activists attack a private meeting with secret service-methods and disruption-methods similar to the StaSi" and that "a majority of established media disseminate the malicious misinterpretation and false statements of dubious activists without testing them" (Appendix, p. 120). This structure of repeating this validation together with certain aspects of the publication makes it appear dubious in its entirety. In the same manner, Bystron accuses mainstream media and *Correctiv* of lying (Appendix, p. 117).

Decontextualization

In many of the videos, the funding of *Correctiv* is a repeated point of critique. That is, the collective receiving funds i.e. by state programs and George Soros. Again, as examples on criminality in the context of a demand for remigration on Telegram have shown, the tactic of putting out facts, without contextualizing them, is enhanced here. Soros' Open Society Foundation has been among the top donors for *Correctiv* until 2021. In 2023, the two listed governmental donations are project specific and committed by different governmental educational programs. Without giving this context, *afdfraktionimbundestag* makes the research collective appear as distinctively founded by one known anthropologist and the German government (*Correctiv*, n.d.). This parallel depiction implies that both donors have similar ideals or ideological reasons to financially support the journalists. There appears to be

equality between both donors in values and ideological background. It is likely a tool to generate a unidimensional image of the government being politically opposed to the AfD. This fits the framing of the medial discussion on the publication as campaign of “politicians and journalists of the depleted left-green class” (Appendix, p. 121).

Another example for decontextualization may be the reappearing demand of the state to conduct deportations as its’ constitutional duty (Appendix, p. 122). The repeated demand for the enforcement of existing law (Appendix, p. 122) does not in-depth discuss how this exactly is possible, as the lawful deportations are already being carried out. Also, the note of “forced expulsions” and “mass deportations” without naming a context of media outlets or the general, thematic contextualization does not give enough insight into the connotation of these frames. It makes different media outlets appear as they are reporting in the exact same way. It furthermore depicts a monolateral political opposition, the focus of which it is to oppose the AfD.

Bystron strongly contextualised the research by *Correctiv* with the protests by farmers in Germany. His aim is to strengthen the narrative that the publication is part of a campaign to distract the public from the failure of the government in power. Regarding the publication and the mainstream media taking on the publication, Bystron states that “the attempt is being made to simply continue playing this out for days in order to overshadow the coverage of the major mass protests” (Appendix, p. 117). This re-contextualisation serves the purpose of a justification for the assumption that the publication was part of a campaign. This narrative may seem more reasonable for people, as they are presented with a comprehensible causality. Thereby, the credibility of the publication is attacked, and the journalistic motivation denied.

Dichotomous depictions

This is an example for dichotomous depictions which become more clearly visible with further examples. Generally, the videos by *afdfraktionimbundestag* depict a clear picture, of a united, righteous party which stands behind and with “the people” in Germany.

This shows for example in the repeated presentation of *Correctiv* as an activist group, which, using secret service-like methods (Appendix, pp. 117 and 120), committed an act of espionage when observing “a private meeting to exchange views” (Appendix, p. 120) and who’s aim is to control their recipients’ attitudes towards the participants (“Gesinnungskontrolle”, Appendix, p. 120). Bystrol goes so far as to saying, that regarding the farmers protests in January the “chancellery gives no answer, instead a prepared campaign is produced by an NGO” (Appendix, p. 117). This fits the accusation that its aim is to “silence legitimate

political debates” (Appendix, p. 120). These examples depict a picture of *Correctiv* being an anti-democratic, ideological actor. At the same time, the government in power is depicted repeatedly as standing on the same political side as *Correctiv*, of which the ruling parties “adopt the campaign framing” (Appendix, p. 120). The united group of media and ruling parties is seemingly only pursuing the goal of opposing the AfD. The government is supposedly “trying to distract from their own failures with this comedy of shame” (Appendix, p. 122). The bad government style is opposed to the AfD demands to implement existing law, which the state fails to do (Appendix, p. 122). This shows again the critique of the state being biased towards the leftist *Correctiv* and thus acting against, or not implementing constitutional justice. This makes it seem like the government and media oppose a righteous, democratic AfD, which they aim to weaken and finally exclude from the public political discourse.

This dichotomy is increased by adding the citizens to the juxtaposition: As “the citizens see through [the governing parties], they no longer believe their nonsense” (Appendix, p. 121), it is the *Correctiv* and the ruling government lying (Appendix, pp. 117 and 123) and opposing the citizens’ interest, whom the AfD which supposedly tries to protect as well as the democratic constitution. Bystron formulates this when producing a stronger unity of AfD with the citizens when saying “we are on the side of the working people of the middle class” (Appendix, p. 118), differentiate those from the people taking part in the mass-demonstrations for a ban of the AfD. This again puts political opponents openly on a side, that should not be supported, while at the same time depicting the opponents of those as united with the AfD and framing the parties’ policies as in their interest, while the government in power, standing on the side of *Correctiv*, acts against the citizens’ best interests.

Language use and emotions

To testify for these accusations, the *afdfraktionimbundestag* uses some linguistic tools. For instance, the comparisons with Hitler-Germany, are criticised sharply (Appendix, p. 119). Naming those “scandalous” strengthens the dichotomous perception of a morally inflicted mainstream media, attacking the righteous AfD-supporters who are fighting to realise existing law and defend the constitution. This impression is strengthened when using formulations such as “*StaSi*-like secret service and subversion methods” (Appendix, p. 120). The aim could be to evoke strong negative feelings in the recipients, as the opposition appears to be merely defaming the AfD-supporters, to the end, that the political right-wing is subverted and weakened. Framing the research as a campaign which “is obviously pursuing the purpose of whipping through the radical left-wing demand for the right to stay for all with the moral

cudgel” (Appendix p. 120), makes the research appear irrelevant in terms of content, as the actual background appears to be a political campaign with the aim of damaging the AfD. Bystron also frames the campaign as “smear campaign” and names the government the “worst government in a long time” (Appendix, p. 117). This could be an attempt to add to the mistrust. Apart from this repetitive formulation, it could be weighted more heavily by recipients here, as Bystron himself is a politician running for election to the European Parliament.

The channel *afdfraktionimbundestag* notes, that this campaign is carried out “under the guise of journalistic research” (Appendix, p. 120). The tactics of *Correctiv* being “criminal research” (Appendix, p. 122) to “criminalise private exchange of opinion” (Appendix, p. 120). Here, the repeated reference to the criminality of the methods by *Correctiv* also depicts a picture of the AfD being wary of the rule of law and shows their stronghold of values such as security and the constitutional national state.

Summary content analysis

The content analysis has shown that some publications in all the channels monitored can be characterised as misinformation tactics. The tactics in this do mostly not include disinformation but show a misleading character, which may have a strategic background. For example, the analysis of Telegram and YouTube has shown that there is a repeated dissemination of disinformation on a link in the increased criminality and increased migration in Germany, as well as multiple attempts of listing the cost of migration or opposing the cost of giving social aid to migrated people to the financial insecurities of German citizens. This produces a perceived causality of the latter in case of an increased number of asylum seekers. It directly creates a hostile image towards people seeking asylum in Germany, framing them as unwilling to work or looking for financial aid. Lower expenses for immigrated welfare recipients would most likely not lead to an increase in welfare expenses for German citizens, as the current welfare policies of the German parliament suggest. Besides that, the attempt of reinforcing an inner division of the working class between people with and without the German citizenship diverts attention from the lack of practical partisan solutions to real problems. This is observable also in the TikTok channels, in which the strong dichotomy between the working German citizens and a controlling government and media is constructed. All observed channels generate a mistrust towards mainstream media and the government. This is particularly evident in the case of the partisan channels, *@afdfraktionimbundestag*,

and *AfDTV*. These repeatedly imply political cooperation between the media and the government.

The different observed misinformation tactics are often intertwined. The choice of words and emotionalized language help to enhance a dichotomous view on what is right or wrong. For this, the decontextualised presentation of facts serve as evidence and thus provoke feelings which may strengthen the agreement within the ‘right side’ of the dichotomous presentation of political actors. Through the repeated equation of the *Correctiv*’s and the ruling parties’ aims, this dichotomy is strengthened. Repetition of certain narratives through different actors serves in almost all channels as a tool to strengthen the agreement to their statements. Additionally, the repetition of corresponding statements by different publishers creates an image of those getting broad support in the civic and right-wing spectrum.

For an observer, the opposition between the right-wing being compared to national socialists whilst comparing the political left to the *StaSi* gives a view on two similar yet opposing strategies: The *AfD* appears to create this image to gather supporters and strengthen the support among them while at the same time defaming their political opposition and most mainstream media. On the other side, *Correctiv* is exacerbating the danger emanating from the political right, to manifest a warning to protect their own values.

The manipulative function of the employed misinformation tactics becomes conspicuous within a first analysis of the context of the right-wing information ecosystem in which they are employed. To understand in-depth how these tactics are used and for what purpose, the misinformation tactics will be analysed against the background of possible discourse manipulation strategy in the following chapter.

Discourse manipulation analysis

As van Dijk (2006b) puts it, ideologies “control and organize other socially shared beliefs” (p. 116). The ascription of an ideological character to all the analysed channels cannot be made based on this analysis as it is exclusively aimed towards findings on misinformation. However, given the right-extremist character and multiple times employed racist narratives, some signs of ideological control of discourse may be adequate to describe the discourse manipulation tactics here. How this takes place, will be elaborated in the following chapters.

Repetition

One influence on meaning constitution, that is, of the mental models which constitute how people make sense of social events, are personal experiences. In turn, “experience is always constituted in the context of past constituted experiences” (Gyollai, 2022, p. 545). Repetition could therefore be a tactical approach to manipulate discourse. It serves as a tool, to repeatedly address the recipients STM, adding information to it and creating memorable experience, for example, through the repeated intake of certain information. Using examples which appeal to the recipients’ need for security and possibly evoke negative feelings such as fear and anger. Sellner and *DeutschlandKurier* for example repeatedly imply a supposed causality of migration with an increase in criminality which is likely to stick with people.

Another example is the repeated questioning of the credibility of mainstream media to sow distrust towards those. As elaborated beforehand, the misinformation tactic may lead to people believing that respective statements are supported by many and thus more likely to be true. These repeated experiences of a false causality as interpretation frame “are synthesized in the stock of knowledge as meaning-contexts” (Gyollai, 2022, p. 545). This way, they become embedded in the LTM. In this, “the understanding of situated text and talk is [...] related to more complete models” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 367). These mental models do not only contain emotions and understanding of words, but are also linked to personal opinions and emotions. Accordingly, the episodic repetition in the observed channels leads, for example, to the association of migration with threat, of government and mainstream media with lies and of the AfD and right-wing views with being excluded and oppressed politically. The aim is to anchor these associations in the LTM and thus generate a faster response from recipients to similar information. The right-wing information ecosystem is strengthened as the published information is less questioned while at the same time, opposing information appears more questionable.

The misinformation tool of repetition thus can lead to the manipulation of both, the STM and the LTM. Through the repetition of negative associations with migration, such as the financial insecurity of German citizens or the increase of criminality, a meaning is asserted to the words ‘migration’ and ‘remigration’. Migration is depicted as the source to multiple social issues, while remigration is framed as the constitutionally righteous solution to those. Channels such as *DeutschlandKurier*, *AfDTV*, *@afdfraktionimbundestag*, and *Martin Sellner [TELEGRAMELITE]* thereby impose a motivational relevance to remigration as they determine why it is a solution. They do this, by artificially creating a shared experience of this

threat, for example, through the repeated and exaggerated attribution of statistical relevance to the criminality increase (Gyollai, 2022). This may be another hint towards a tactic for discourse manipulation through the influence of the STM and the LTM as this leads to the influence of mental models.

The non-partisan channels, being *Martin Sellner [TELEGRAMELITE]*, *V2 Unzensiert*, and *DeutschlandKurier*, present themselves as knowledgeable publishers of truthful information, which is being defamed by mainstream media. Opposing themselves to a lying mainstream media, makes the publisher appear as spokespersons for the truth. The aim is to assure that “subjectively acquired knowledge that solves a problem is ‘imitated’ by others, whereby it becomes a taken-for-granted ‘recipe’ knowledge or skill of the entire community” (Gyollai, 2022, p. 552). This is one step into achieving manipulation of social cognition as the manipulation of “attitudes implies influencing whole groups, and on many occasions” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 368). Repetition is a helpful tool for this: The repeated publication of the same or similar issues increases the chance of it being seen and the manipulation tactic increases the chance of a statement being believed.

Additionally, the function of other misinformation tactics is strongly enhanced through repetition. This way, the partly very different approaches to disseminating misinformation work together: As in some cases possibly not very believable information is repeated and disseminated on multiple online platforms, this makes information appear much more believable and works to their further dissemination. Repetition works as both, misinformation, and an accelerator of other misinformation tactics at the same time.

Decontextualization

Van Dijk states, that “partial or incomplete understanding is in the best interests of a powerful group or institution, and against the best interests of a dominated group” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 366). Besides linguistic aspects, the thematic context can be used to manipulate the understanding of recipients. Decontextualization is aimed to hindering the recipients’ understanding of certain issues. By sharing news while omitting information that could significantly influence the evaluation of those messages, the meaning of those can be altered to support the publisher’s messages (van Dijk, 2006a).

On the observed online platforms this became visible regarding the alleged causal link between a rise of migration and criminality, between migration and the struggle of the socio-economically weaker class. These examples of how the misinformation tactics were employed show the aim to overly simplify complex issues to support the own claims. This helps also to

alter the context models of the recipients: In their understanding of the shared information, the communicative event in which their understanding of i.e. an increase of extremism in schools moves, is influenced. The context now appears to be the context of an increased criminality, the increase of extremism being one sign of the issues arising with migration in Germany. Giving other forms of extremism into the communicative event, to context could be an increase of extreme worldviews, in different ideologies appearing among high school students. However, this way, the context model of recipients is emphasizing the fears and hostility towards people with migration background which fits a right-wing populist ideology. As manipulators aim to change how the recipients see the world by forming their mental models, this includes “restricting their freedom of interpretation or at least the probability that they will understand the discourse against the best interests of the manipulators” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 367). Decontextualization is an effective manipulation tactic to do so.

Manipulation of social cognition regards the socio-culturally shared knowledge. If a group shares context models, they will be likely to believe information that is corresponding with their shared beliefs. Thus, to protect these context models, once formed by a manipulator, it is “in the best interests of dominant groups to make sure that relevant and potentially critical general knowledge is not acquired” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 371). One attempt to achieve this, is the decontextualised presentation of the funding of *Correctiv*. Thereby denying credibility to them and to other media that disseminated the results of the *Correctiv* research “without verifying it” (Weidel, Appendix, p. 91) is intended to prevent recipients from believing other news publishers. The aim subsequently is the manipulation of “more general and abstract beliefs such as knowledge, attitudes and ideologies” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 368).

Presumably, the recurring comparison with ‘GDR-methods’ is primarily aimed at evoking negative emotions, as the memory of years of observation and mistrust is still present in a large part of German society today. This creates a recurring parallel between the comparison of journalistic behaviour with the ‘*StaSi*-methods’ on the one hand and the strong rejection of being compared with the National Socialists on the other. The comparison with the National Socialists in the 1930s is intended to warn of an inherent danger and parallels with the beginning of the Nazi regime in Germany, which emerged in a democratic system. On the other hand, the *StaSi* of the GDR used torture and imprisoned people for politically dissenting opinions, which constitutes authoritarian state behaviour. Both comparisons are strategic exaggerations. The criticism of the Nazi comparisons is intended to contrast a fundamentally moderate, constitutional policy of the AfD with the extreme, authoritarian behaviour of the

free press. The consistency of the argument is lost due to the parallels between the comparisons on both sides. This strongly dichotomous portrayal serves the cause to change the collective perception of the mainstream media and thus is another attempt to manipulate social cognition.

Dichotomous Depictions

The use of dichotomous depictions for the manipulation of discourse can be explained as followed: An “emotional event with a strong impact on people's mental models is being used in order to influence these mental models as desired - for instance in terms of a strong polarization between Us (good, innocent) and Them (evil, guilty)” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 370). Addressing the recipients’ feeling for example regarding the passiveness of the government or ‘the media’ campaigning against the right-wing, the LTM is activated, and their understanding of those becomes biased. Manipulators do so to “discursively deemphasize the properties that are inconsistent with [their] interests” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 367 f.). At the same time, presenting the AfD and political right as constitutionally acting and democratic, the manipulators discursively emphasize those examples to enhance mental models in which they are acting righteously and consistently with the interest of their recipients, the German citizens (van Dijk, 2006a).

The aim of this misinformation tactic is to alter mental models and form a strong dichotomous perception. This leads to the legitimization of the knowledge, that the manipulator shares with the recipients. To enhance a “[s]uccessful transmission of [...] knowledge depends not only on the reliability of the source, but a Common Ground must be established between the speaker and receiver in the particular communicative situation” (Gyollai, 2022, p. 554). This common ground could be enhanced through the polarization by creating a sort of us-against-them-narrative. The victimization of the own interest-group while at the same time opposing this group to a lying elite, could be an attempt to unite the group of recipients and strengthen their cohesion as they face a common enemy. The populist juxtaposition between morally superior AfD supporters and the morally questionable media and government aligns with the victimization of the AfD. At the same time, it delegitimizes the supposedly shared knowledge of mainstream media and government in power. The formation of a dichotomous perception like this, is of interest for the manipulation of mental models that also “help to avoid ambiguity” (Gyollai, 2022, p. 543). Depicting a dichotomous image of the German political environment accordingly could help to consolidate a mental model in favour of right-wing populist ideology through a strong opposition of ‘right’ against ‘wrong’. Generalization is

another strategy which is employed through dichotomous depictions: Assuming that there is a polarized political environment of two mostly homogenous opposing groups, reinforces strongly opinionated mental models in the recipients.

Van Dijk introduces the notion of victimization when analysing discourse manipulation strategies. The perpetrator-victim-reversal adduced by multiple observed accounts becomes conspicuous: The multiple attempts to discredit the investigation by *Correctiv* as an illegitimate campaign with the mere goal of harming the AfD, are a reoccurring pattern on all three of the investigated platforms. Following the notion of misinformation, the communicational maxim according to Grice (1979), according to which contributions to conversations must “be truthful, relevant, relatively complete, and so on” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 363). Thus, manipulation is not necessarily defined as consequence of the speakers’ intention, “nor on the more or less conscious awareness of manipulation by the recipients, but in terms of its societal consequences” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 364). With approaching elections in two states in Germany and the EU in which AfD politicians are electable, this is a decisive factor for the analysis of manipulation strategy in right-wing discourses. Van Dijk furthermore notes that these specific attitudes can be formed “by generalization and abstraction from mental models formed by specific news stories, government declarations as well as films, among other discourses” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 371). The simplified depiction of issues regarding migration and critique of the government and mainstream media also serves as an act of generalization. On the note of populism, the strong generalization of migrants, mainstream media and the government in power as opponents to the AfD and political right, helps to form a general knowledge which fits a right-wing populist ideology.

In the observed misinformation tactics, dichotomous depiction is a tool that influences mental models and thus can at the same time be part of a manipulation strategy. Additionally, it mirrors the dichotomy of ideologies which in their core draw “sharp and value-loaded dichotomies” (Galtung, 1990, p. 298) that were evident in the observed data. With this, structural violence can unfold, as it operates on the terms of self against other. In the case of a mostly racist ideology, ‘the other’ are mostly non-German citizens who meet structural violence such as marginalization and segmentation, as they are depicted as a homogenous group that is divided from German citizens, regardless their personal cultural identity and experience (Galtung, 1990).

Language use and emotions

The observation of “discourse processing in STM involves such different forms of analysis as phonetic, phonological, morphological, syntactic and lexical operations” (van Dijk, 2006, p. 366). As mental models “are based on, and ‘instantiated’ from, the socially shared generic knowledge of the participants which manifests in language” (Gyollai, 2022, p. 543). Accordingly, the language use will provide an insight into how manipulation tactics are consolidated. As “experience is always constituted in the context of past constituted experiences” (Gyollai, 2022, p. 545) a manipulation of the entire habitus of a person is enhanced, which the shared knowledge is built on and strengthened with. In this research, the focus is limited to the choice of words, and thus, the misinformation tactic of language use and emotions is of particular interest.

As stated previously, there are ideological aspects in the examined discourses. These show, among others, in the addressing of core values being central to the argumentation regarding topics as remigration and the credibility of other information sources. On this note, the observed channels align in their perception of a threat of criminality and, in some cases, extremism coming from people with migration background. As van Dijk states, “anti-terrorist discourse celebrates the value of security, assigning it a higher priority than, for instance, the value of civil rights, or the value of equality” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 372). This aligns with the function of the examined misinformation tactics. Additionally, formulations such as ‘campaign of lies’ and ‘smear-campaign’ “discursively influence the mental models of recipients, for instance by the re-attribution of responsibility of actions in their own interests” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 368) as they create an impression of a political and unrighteous character of the research. This may provoke distrust towards other media.

This victim-perpetrator-reversal connects to socio-cognitive manipulation. The discursive efforts to manipulate the STM and LTM find their fulfilment in socio-cognitive manipulation, because “a general, socially shared attitude is far more stable than the specific mental models (and opinions) of individual language users” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 368). An influence on the word choice and the emotionalization of the language can impact the attitudes of the recipients and thereby a whole group towards the discussed topics.

Discussion

This analysis served to answer the research question: *How can misinformation tactics be used in an online space to strategically manipulate political discourse?* To this end, the effect and aim of misinformation tactics were investigated through a content analysis. Based on this, a link to discourse manipulation strategy was elaborated in the second part of the analysis. As this research shows, one can speak not only of the use of misinformation tactics on the observed online platforms, but also their possible use for a discourse manipulation strategy. The employed misinformation tactics can mostly be assigned to three of the categories which are described by debunked.org. In most cases, *Emotions*, *Polarization*, and *Discredit* were used. As seen in the analysis, most observed misinformation tactics in the investigated data fit into at least one of these categories.

The discourse manipulation strategy analysis found multiple approaches to changing the recipients' attitudes towards different topics. Language use, emotions, and the repeated reference to certain topics, such as migration and the government in power, help the manipulator to influence the recipients' STM. Associating these topics with certain information through repetition, but also de-contextualisation and dichotomous depiction, the speakers evoke certain emotions and appeal to the attitudes of their recipients. This way, they link certain social issues to the emotions which the manipulator wants to evoke and thereby create a socially shared understanding of those social issues within their channels (van Dijk, 2006a). For this, the content is targeted to evoke an emotional response of the recipients: By addressing social issues, such as criminality and rising living cost, which the recipients are likely to have already encountered in their lives, the publishers can connect to their personal experience. The notion of criminality additionally serves the manipulative goal of reaching people through morals, as "most people do not want to be on the wrong side of justice" (Ph.D. Ancis, 2021).

The repeated notion of a problematic housing situation divides the working class, creating a simple solution to a common problem. It conceals the privatisation of the living market throughout the last decades and redirects the insecurity and possibly resulting anger towards issues of migration and government failure. As migration is a central theme in the AfD's party programme, this underlines its role as a pro-active, problem-solving party. Addressing social issues that are likely to be in the personal experience of many recipients establishes a connection to the audience's worldview and helps to gain their trust over time (CISA, n.d.). The repeated addressing of reoccurring social issues creates a sense of relevance which

“accounts for the habitual and stereotypical knowledge we rely on to navigate in every day (communicative) situations and, ultimately, in the social world” (Gyollai, 2022, p. 546).

Another focus of the discourse manipulation strategy lies on creating an internally closed and exclusive group with strong inner cohesion. In the future, processing the issues and evaluating them in a way, that is in the best interest of the manipulator, will take the recipients less time, as their LTM, which is closely linked to the social understanding, will evoke faster associations and emotions in them. In other words, “much model formation and activation tend to be automatized, and subtle control of mental models is often not even noticed by language users, thus contributing to manipulation” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 368). A successful manipulation of socially shared cognition creates a discursive environment in which “little or no further manipulation attempts may be necessary in order for people to act according to these attitudes” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 369).

The evocation of emotions is further enhanced through discrediting other media and partisan actors. The observed speakers repeatedly deny the independency and thus credibility of other media. Thereby, channels such as *DeutschlandKurier*, *AfDTV* and *Martin Sellner [TELEGRAMMELITE]* emphasize their own credibility. The portrayal of the German political environment as dichotomous with a strong and homogeneous group of opponents, including journalists and the ruling government, suggests the AfD’s and its supporters’ own moral superiority and presents them as truthful and courageous. At the same time, they establish an opposition, namely the mainstream media, which are presented as fearmongering and hyperpartisan. The questioning of the competencies of the ruling parties reinforces this impression. This can be interpreted as a counterattack against opposing actors: The own morals and expertise to rule are constructed through the discredit of opposing partisan actors. This shows the populist ideology within the observed channels as it demonstrates an attempt of creating a strong polarization within the political landscape. This attempt to drive the political ‘right’ and the political ‘left’ apart becomes ominous in their presentation of self and other. The audience of the channels are implied as part of a morally superior, truthful, and oppressed group which must stand against a homogenous political opposition. The political right is illustrated as a victim to a political campaign, which is carried out by both, the ruling parties, and the mainstream media.

The victimization of oneself and blame for the own victimization on the other group, could help to legitimize the own political attacks against certain social groups. These own values which include, among others, security, national cohesion, and a somewhat absolute state

sovereignty, are reproduced in the repetition of examples of criminality, ‘espionage’, and deficiencies of the welfare state towards its citizens. This legitimizes the demands of the supposedly suppressed group. These demands are structural violence, meaning the structural suppression of human rights of certain groups. This could be interpreted as an aspect of cultural violence, according to Galtung (1990). In this, direct and structural violence seem right for the people sharing the same cultural belief. Besides the legitimization of values and resulting demands of right-wing discourse groups, the repetition of those might lead to their internalization. An internalization of the cultural belief with values which might make direct and structural violence “look, even feel, right – or at least not wrong” (Galtung, 1990, p. 291) could strengthen the right-wing populist ideology that is enhanced by the observed right-wing channels. As Galtung (1990) puts it, “one way cultural violence works is by changing the moral color of an act from red/wrong to green/right” (p. 292). Accordingly, the change of mental models according to van Dijk (2006a) would have a strong influence on the culture of a certain group through the manipulation of their main discourse. At the same time a strong dichotomy is produced: What is right, is then ascribed to ‘us’, the morally right victims, against ‘them’, the morally wrong opponent. ‘Us’ in this example, is the group of publishers and recipients in the right-wing channels, being victims of the malicious other.

The use of these tactics has been shown in the analysis of discourse manipulation as they serve the goal to change the general “shared beliefs such as knowledge, attitudes and ideologies” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 368). As van Dijk (2006a) states, influencing attitudes requires the manipulation strategy to be used on different occasions and in multiple persuasion attempts. Therefore, a further example for discourse manipulation is given by the extremely high rate of postings in some of the channels. Examples for this are both channels on Telegram, and both YouTube channels. In comparison, the posting rates on TikTok were ominously low, however, this observation may lie in the selection of channels. The high posting rates are an example of an enhanced impact on the STM of recipients: As people are continuously confronted with opinions, news, and comments by people of similar ideological beliefs, the mere number of postings can create a passage from STM towards mental models and LTM. The use of manipulation strategy to influence the populist ideology manifests in this. The ideological manipulation of social cognition aims “to provide (ideological) coherence to the beliefs of a group and thus facilitate their acquisition and use in everyday situations” (van Dijk, 2006b, p. 116).

During the process of this analysis, there were physical attacks on representatives of the parliamentary parties in different parts of Germany (i.e. tagesschau, 2024). The attacks mostly targeted members of the Greens and the AfD (Müthing & Trebing, 2024)⁸. Violent outbreaks point to an increased polarization within the political landscape. An increase of politically motivated violence is of general interest for academic research. Research that deals with the transition from online discourse to offline discourse could establish a possible connection to the subject of this research, in the case of right-wing motivated attacks. The radicalization of people on the political right is enhanced through discourse shifts. For example, right-wing populist parties rely on the reproduction of a mostly negative discourse on migration. It is repeatedly depicted as a problem that needs a solution. For this, occurring events are put out of context to make them confirm the expressed warning. At the same time, contrary beliefs on different media sources, and the political opposition are defamed as liars or malicious actors. This raises the question about the possibility of a person becoming radicalised and violent because of misinformation tactics, such as the dichotomous depiction of the right-wing politics and a group of media and parliamentary parties which are most ominously summarized. As “[m]anipulation in this case is an abuse of power because citizens are manipulated into believing that such measures are taken in order to protect them” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 370). On this note, the examples of violence towards politicians of other parties, could be an extreme sign of discourse manipulation.

When manipulation succeeds to influence social cognition, it is a powerful tool in the hands of a manipulator, interfering deeply with social knowledge of people as “meanings cannot be arbitrarily ‘attached’ to actions as they are meaningless without the anticipated project” (Gyollai, 2022, p. 544). The power of discourse manipulation becomes even clearer in the notion of right-wing information ecosystems: In social cognition, “knowledge is considered legitimate by the receiver, if and only if integrative and well-formatted concerning the shared beliefs, common-sense knowledge, problems, attitudes and (discursive) practices of the particular social group the receiver belongs to” (Gyollai, 2022, p. 554). Thus, right-wing information ecosystems, sharing certain beliefs tend to reinforce the manipulation of discourse. Additionally, „misinformation is most effective when it exploits people's emotions and pre-existing attitudes“ (Debunked, n.d.).

It remains in question, whether one speak of a misinformation campaign in the observed channels. What is certain is that a continuous dissemination of misinformative content was

⁸ This shows that extreme discourse shifts and political polarization are relevant issues not only for the extreme right. Due to the content of this research, the focus will remain on right-wing motivated violence.

recognizable. Some of the observed channels post a lot of verifiable information, which is also being posted by different official sources. This makes information which is posted on the respective channels appear more trustworthy. Additionally, fake news can hurt the cause, such as getting caught in an obvious lie (Debunk, n.d.). However, the strong ideological background and resulting focus on issues that thereby are exaggerated towards being pressing societal problems, is a misinformation tactic. For example, Sellner strives for strong cohesion within the community. By making it impossible to interact with his posts, he creates an image of general approval within the channel, which may persuade recipients not to question his posted content. He also links to several right-wing platforms. This helps to create and strengthen the right-wing information ecosystem, in which his recipients operate. The research did not focus on whether the misinforming content was shared intentionally, but on the results of its dissemination.

The analysed data shows that misinformation tactics are disseminated on different online platforms. It further illustrates how misinformation can be used to manipulate discourse. The strategic use of information, regardless of whether it is knowingly misleading, can be used as a manipulation of political beliefs to one's own benefit and to dismiss other political views as illegitimate or false statements. This research has shown how this is happening in right-wing information ecosystems, which partly relate to each other and overlap in many respects regarding the published information. This points to the necessity for media literacy.

Cybersecurity implies the necessity of media literacy, that is, a good understanding of mis- and disinformation tactics and how to recognise them. Besides media literacy, an issue that has been shown in this research are the structures behind right-wing populism: structural problems, such as low chance-equalities, cause fear and make people search for easy solutions. One of which, the AfD has found in problematizing migration. Being the only party with a strict focus on issues surrounding migration and using its resulting interpretative authority, the AfD is forcefully trying to create a negative connotation with the term and its surrounding issues. To encounter this, a new connotation of migration is needed. We must encounter misinformation on online platforms through an enhanced media literacy as "[...] one of the best ways to detect and resist manipulation attempts is specific knowledge (e.g. about the current interests of the manipulators) as well as general knowledge [...]" (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 371). This general knowledge could include pre-bunking, for example through the education on misinformation-tactics and the exemplary presentation of cases of already

debunked and accordingly framed information. Those could serve to showcase the motivation of manipulators and thereby create an understanding of their manipulative character.

The misinformation tactics that have been observed here, are mostly aimed at a long-term influence on social cognition. This strengthens the danger of misinformation of the upcoming elections of the European Parliament. The threat of disinformation being created in automatised processes by AI and shared on online platforms, reaching a vast number of recipients is vastly discussed. In a report that was prepared for the European Parliament by a Special Committee on Foreign Interference, the publishers note the danger of “[f]oreign interference and manipulation, including disinformation” (Caprile, 2023, no page). Foreign interference, being “any illegitimate interference by foreign powers in the democratic and political processes of the EU and Member States” (Caprile, 2023, no page) can include misinformation and manipulation tactics. The publication shows an attempt to counter the danger of those through research and education. In it, they elaborate that foreign interference includes “negatively impacting values, procedures and the legitimacy of political processes” (Caprile, 2023, no page). These manipulation tactics were observed in the investigated online platforms. This points a threat towards the democratic elections in June 2024: In addition to targeted attacks by AI, states and non-state actors that systematically spread disinformation via social media and other platforms, long-term manipulation strategies are difficult to recognise in the run-up to a particular event. As explained above, the manipulation of social cognition serves to reject the critical thinking that the Special Committee's publication seeks to promote through its publication.

Once pre-bunking as a tool to counter misinformation becomes more widespread and is disseminated in mainstream media as well, “[...] manipulation functions less efficiently and finally may become useless, because the citizens have enough counter- information and arguments to resist manipulative discourse” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 376). This helps to link the behaviour of a disseminator of misinformation with their intention, as research on mis- and disinformation helps to discover and interpret discourse manipulation tactics. The analysis can discover an interrelatedness of discourse manipulation tactics and the use of dis- and misinformation. This might clarify the objections of the manipulator which helps to recognize misinformation tactics more easily.

Conclusion

This research provides an insight into the manipulative function of the use of misinformation tactics in a right-wing information ecosystem. It became clear that manipulation of discourse is promoted by both, partisan and non-partisan players. In the studied case, manipulation strategy is strongly intertwined with a populist ideology. The research also highlights the danger of manipulation which is rooted in its' psychological depth. Reversing a worldview that has been constructed or reinforced by a strategy of manipulation is a difficult task that cannot be accomplished solely by educating people on misinformation.

During the last months, the dangers for the democratic state coming from the AfD and other right-wing actors, as Martin Sellner, have been broadly discussed in German media, and lately on a pan-European scale. The lead-candidate of the German far-right party AfD, Maximilian Krah, has been demanded to step back from campaigning for the election of the European parliament (Schuetze, 2024). Before his announcement of doing so, Marie LePen, leader of the French far-right party, and Anders Vistisen, a Danish far-right MEP, have shown clear opposing towards the politician (von Pezold et al., 2024). Although Krah remains the lead candidate of the party for the election, this shows the shift within right-wing discourses among European parties but even within the AfD, as the spokesperson of the party, Alice Weidel, distanced herself from Krah. As the approaching election of the European Parliament show, the disagreement between different European right-wing parties has led to a political distancing among those. Furthermore, the publication by *Correctiv* made the division within the party and its' supporters visible. One example of this is Sellner's Telegram channel, in which he repeatedly criticises AfD politicians for backing away from migration plans and thus weakening the internal cohesion of the political right in Germany. Among the observed data, Sellner was the only publisher to thematize this. To understand how the AfD has reached the limits of its discursive unity, it is important to understand how it initially creates unity among its supporters. This research showed the strategy of the political right is being mostly opposed to other political parties. One of the main characteristics of this populist discourse in the observed channels was the depiction of a dichotomy in the German political environment and a victimization of the own supporters in this. With the publication by *Correctiv* thematizing the strong focus on remigration by the political right-wing groups participating in the meeting, unclarities within a political right have emerged. As Germans with migration background also vote the AfD, and withing the right-wing there are neo-fascist as well as 'merely' nationalist

interest-groups, the formulation and exacerbation of the topic through the publication might have sparked dividedness among different voter-groups of the AfD.

To elaborate on this, a critical discourse analysis of the same data could be a fruitful addition to my research. As I focussed on the use of misinformation, I was unable to include these further insights into the right-wing information ecosystem and the differences among the channels. A more comprehensive look at the data, which does not only focus on the use of misinformation, could provide further insights into the manipulation strategy in right-wing discourse. A critical discourse analysis could thus provide context and possibly even relativise the significance of misinformation. Besides that, an investigation of the relationship of online and offline behaviour in these cases could be a meaningful extension to further enhance the importance of media literacy in the specific case of the observed channels and publishers. On the notion of the recent attacks against politicians from the ruling parties, the question again becomes more urgent, whether digital discourses can cause offline activities in the case of right-wing information ecosystems.

In addition to the education of citizens and users of online platforms, those platforms must be held accountable for the content, they share. A strict regulatory oversight is important: social media companies should not have the power to apply lax codes of conduct or weak supervision on their platforms that favour their monetisation over the humanitarian needs of users. An attempt of this is the Digital Services Act (DSA) which has become fully applicable in Germany in February 2024 (die Bundesregierung, 2024). The new law is aimed to protect fundamental rights of the users and accelerate the removal of illegal content (Milmo, 2022). It demonstrates the publicly recognized need to take action against online criminality, such as the spread of disinformation, but also against manipulation by social media companies. It is a first step towards a European framework for digital services, the effects of which remain to be seen.

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Appendix

Telegram

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YouTube

YouTube 1

Statt obdachlos mit der Ampel: Schöner wohnen mit der AfD!

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Transcript

Speaker 1

Sehr geehrte Frau Präsidentin, meine Damen und Herren, unzählige Menschen in unserem Land sind auf der Suche nach einer bezahlbaren Wohnung. Verzweifelte Mieter zittern jetzt schon vor der nächsten Nebenkostenabrechnung und fleißige Häuslebauer vor den horrenden Summen, die sie in Zukunft für Wärmepumpen und Dämmwahnsinn aufbringen müssen. Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz, wir haben es eben schon gehört, hat den Bau von 400 000 Wohnungen pro Jahr versprochen. Doch wie wir mittlerweile alles wissen, ist das nur eines von den vielen Versprechen, an die er sich ja nicht mehr erinnern kann. Die Realität ist nämlich eine ganz andere. 2023 war ein Insolvenzrekordjahr für die Immobilienbranche. Das Geschäftsklima ist laut ifo Institut so schlecht wie noch nie. Laut Angaben des Pestel Instituts fehlen Neunhunderttausend Sozialwohnungen in Deutschland und die Angebotsmieten stiegen in den vergangenen Jahren um bis zu 40%. Wohnen wird also zum Luxusgut. Und um den Präsidenten des ZIA zu zitieren, was muss denn eigentlich noch kommen, damit die Politik die Kurve kriegt? Wir als AfD Fraktion werden ihnen konkrete Vorschläge vorgelegt, wir befreien die Bauherren vom grünen Klima Korsett, das allen die Luft abschnürt und Neubau verhindert. Mit uns gibt es keinen sinnlosen Sanierungszwang. Wir schaffen das Gebäude-Energiegesetz wieder ab und lassen die Menschen endlich wieder heizen wie sie es möchten und wie es ökonomisch sinnvoll ist. Und ja, auch wenn Sie alles natürlich nicht hören wollen, wir sorgen für Remigration. Wir sorgen dafür, dass ausreisepflichtige, Ausländer und Illegale hier keine Wohnung mehr belegen, weil wir konsequent und rigoros abschieben werden, meine Damen und Herren. Und wenn ich mir anschau, wo sie ihre Schwerpunkte im Bauhaushalt hinsetzen, dann ist das schon interessant. Ein paar Beispiele. Die Blumenprivilegienübung interkulturelle Musik und Tanzgruppen, Diversity on Stage oder der Bau von Lümmelbänken, denn ich zitiere „Chillen war gestern, lümmeln ist heute“. Meine

Damen und Herren, diese Bundesregierung hat fertig. Anstatt echte Probleme anzupacken, versenken sie deutsche Steuergelder in irgendwelchen linksgrünen Elfenbeinturm-Projekten und wehren sich das Establishment dann in der Penthousewohnung Zuprostet und irgendwelchen interkulturellen Musikgruppen lauscht, sammeln deutsche Rentner Flaschen, weil sie die Miete nicht mehr bezahlen können. Und als wäre das alles noch nicht genug, holt die Ampel Hunderttausende ohne Bleiberecht ins Land, erleichtert den Familiennachzug, verweigert die Grenzkontrollen und verramscht den deutschen Pass jetzt noch schneller als vorher. Und dann sitzt Ministerin Geywitz bei Markus Lanz und ist völlig überrascht: Der Wohnungsbedarf ist höher als angenommen. Frau Ministerin, es ist eigentlich ganz einfach: Wenn der Wohnungsbedarf höher ist als angenommen, dann muss in Zukunft gelten: Deutschland hat Eigenbedarf. Es ist eine Schande, dass in Deutschland Asylbewerber in Luxushotels residieren, während sich Deutsche nicht mehr trauen, im Winter die Heizung aufzudrehen. Und es kann doch nicht sein, dass die einzige Baustelle, die in ganz Deutschland überhaupt noch schnell vorankommt, der millionenschweren Neubau des Bundeskanzleramts ist. Eines kann ich Ihnen versprechen mit der AfD endet diese Ungerechtigkeit, denn für uns ist klar, unser Geld für unsere Leute und unsere Leute kommen immer zuerst. Ich danke Ihnen für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit.

YouTube 2

Massenmigration ruiniert Wirtschaft & Sozialsysteme: Remigration JETZT! | Gunnar Beck

Access via:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20240414115121/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DdulwOiLkF2U>

Transcript

Nicht weniger als die Rückkehr fast aller Migranten seit 2015 ist notwendig, wenn unser Land nicht in 10 Jahren zum dritte-Welt-Staat werden soll.

Liebe Zuschauer, guten Tag aus Brüssel. Über die Kosten der Zuwanderung in Deutschland habe ich schon mehrfach berichtet. Eine umfassende deutsche Studie – ich berichtete von

niederländischen und Dänischen – dazu gibt es leider nicht. Denn kein Wissenschaftler in Deutschland ist bereit, selbst gegen ein gutes Honorar zu berechnen, wieviel uns jeder Einwanderer aufgeschlüsselt nach Herkunftsland kostet. Immerhin gibt es nun eine Teilstudie von Prof. Raffelhüschen von der Universität Freiburg zu den Auswirkungen der Migration auf die deutschen Sozialsysteme. Bislang galt unter den von der Merkel und Ampel Regierung mit Forschungsmitteln und Honoraren Bestochenen oder eingeschüchterten Experten das Dogma: Deutschland kann seinen Wohlstand in Zukunft versichern, wenn es neben der Integration von sogenannter humanitärer Zuwanderung gezielt Arbeits- und Fachkräfte aus dem Ausland anwirbt. Mit diesem Schwachsinn hat Raffelhüschen mit seiner neuen Studie für die Stiftung Marktwirtschaft nun aufgeräumt. Migration, auch Fachkräftemigration wird unsere Wirtschaft und unsere Renten- und Sozialsysteme nicht retten können, sondern ruiniert uns. Zuwanderung, Zitat, wie sie bisher geschieht, so ein Raffelhüschen errechnet, kostet uns gesamtwirtschaftlich 5,8 Billionen Euro. Zitat Ende. Raffelhüschen erläutert, es gibt wegen unserer alternden Gesellschaft schon jetzt eine gewaltige Lücke zwischen dem, was Wirtschaft und Arbeitnehmer ins deutsche Steuern- und Sozialsystem einzahlen, versteuern, Pflegerenten und Krankenversicherung und den Leistungen, das heißt Rente, Pflege, Zuschüsse, die durch diese Beiträge finanziert werden können. Diese sogenannte Nachhaltigkeitslücke wird auf mindestens 19,2 Billionen Euro anwachsen, so Raffelhüschen. Wenn wir weiterhin 300 000 Ausländer pro Jahr ins Land lassen, die sich nur langsam, wenn überhaupt, integrieren und qualifizieren, danach, selbst danach deutlich weniger Einkommen haben und dafür weniger in die so, daher weniger in die Sozialsysteme einzahlen. Kaffeewüschen hat auch berechnet, was theoretisch geschähe, wenn wir ab sofort einen Zaun um Deutschland zögen, also keinerlei Zuwanderung mehr zuließen. Das Ergebnis: Ohne Zuwanderung läge die Finanzlücke für die Steuer- und Sozialsysteme bei 13,4 Billionen Euro statt 19,2 Billionen Euro, also 5,8 Billionen Euro niedriger. Diese mindestens 5,8 Billionen Euro sind der Preis der Zuwanderung in unseren bisherigen Migrationssystemen, so der Sozialexperte. Denn als Kassenpatienten, Pflegebedürftige und Rentner die gleichen Leistungen wie Deutsche, obwohl fast alle Migranten entweder lebenslang nicht oder nur zeitweise oder nur als gering qualifizierte und Beschäftigte arbeiten, ihre Beiträge nur für Leistungen reichen, die durch Grundsicherung aufgestockt werden. Zitat: Das rechnet sich nicht, so Raffelhüschen, das alles ist viel zu teuer. Das gilt selbst dann, wenn Deutschland zusätzlich zu den bisherigen dreihunderttausend Zuwanderern pro Jahr weitere Einhunderttausend topqualifizierte Ausländer mit Berufsabschluss aufnahme. Dann läge die Nachhaltigkeitslücke immer noch bei 40,2 Billionen Euro und damit über der

Finanzierungslast ganz ohne Zuwanderung, die bei 13,4 Billionen Euro liegt. Was bedeutet das? Gesamtwirtschaftlich wäre Deutschlands Wohlstand, unsere soziale Sicherheit, ohne Zuwanderung besser gesichert als selbst mit der klügsten Migrationspolitik. Das ist Raffelhüschen im Wortlaut. Machen wir weiter wie bisher, ir sind dumm wie Stroh. Migration hat keine positive Bilanz, so der Wissenschaftler. Raffelhüschen weiter: Obwohl die Altersstruktur der Migration potenziell eine demografische Verjüngungsdividende birgt, führt dies in keinem der betrachteten oder möglichen Szenarien zu einer positiven fiskalpolitischen Bilanz der Migration. Selbst ausländische Fachkräfte werden unseren Sozialstaat also nicht retten können. Die politische Lehre aus Raffelhüschen Studie ist klar: Erstens der Zugang zum Sozial und Rentensystem muss auf Inländer beschränkt werden, werden Zugewanderte nur die Lebensnotwendigsten was anderen Töpfen versorgt werden müssen. Doch dies reicht nicht. Raffelhüschen geht in seiner Analyse von unrealistisch niedrigen Migrationszahlen aus, die 300 000 pro Jahr tatsächlich sind seit 2015 jedes Jahr weit mehr illegale Migranten ins Land gekommen. Wir brauchen also neben einer Sozialreform zugunsten der Inländer, zweitens, einen sofortigen Einwanderungsstopp und, drittens, Remigration, unzwarmillionenfache Remigration nicht weniger als die Rückkehr fast aller Migranten seit 2015 ist notwendig, wenn unser Land nicht in 10 Jahren zum dritte Weltstaat werden soll. Vielen Dank für Ihr Interesse. Bis zum nächsten Mal.

YouTube 3

"Du wirst abgeschoben!" - Maximilian Krah

Access via:

<https://web.archive.org/watch?v=VY4V4ucWtOs>

Transcript

Du wirst abgeschoben! Dass ich das will, wollen wir ARD, ZDF und die Regierungsnahen Medien klarmachen. Aber es ist wie immer: Sie lügen. Es geht nicht um dich, es geht um Menschen, die hier aufgewachsen, geboren sind, deutsche Staatsbürger sind, deren Eltern hier gearbeitet haben oder die jetzt selbst hier gute Jobs haben und zu unserem Wohlstand beitragen. Es geht darum, dass seit 2015 über 10 Millionen Menschen in dieses Land gekommen sind, die meisten von denen leben immer noch vom Bürgergeld. Das zahlst du.

Und genau weil das nicht geht, weil das, unsere Wirtschaft schädigt, die Kriminalität steigen lässt, weil die Mieten explodieren und unsere Städte nicht mehr aussehen wie deutsche Städte, genau deshalb müssen wir fragen, wer von denen hat eine Chance, kann hierbleiben, aber wer muss zurück. Zurück müssen die, die längst zurückmüssen, obwohl die Regierung nur zu feige ist, sie endlich auszuschießen. Zurück müssen die, die Straftaten begehen und trotzdem bleiben, voll bezahlt von dir. Für all die gilt, wenn wir sie hierlassen, wird unser Land schlechter, ärmer, auch für dich. Es geht darum, jenen, die hierhergelockt wurden, nicht weil das Wetter schön ist, sondern weil man ihnen Geld versprochen hat, eine Chance zu geben, freiwillig zurückzugehen durch gute Handelsbeziehungen ihren Herkunftsländern, auch hier mauert die Regierung. Es geht also nicht darum, irgendetwas zu tun, was Menschen, die eine Existenz aufgebaut haben, die zu uns gehören, gefährdet, es geht darum, Normalität herzustellen. Du wirst nicht abgeschoben, denn du sollst mich wählen, damit wir gemeinsam ein besseres Deutschland bauen.

YouTube 4

Correctiv & Medien vs. AfD: Die Wahrheit über die Schmutzkampagne!

Access via:

<https://web.archive.org/watch?v=OpmHoJOAANM>

Transcript

Die Unterstellung des linken Aktivisten-Netzwerkes Correctiv und die ungeprüfte Weiterverbreitung und Instrumentalisierung von Correctiv und die Instrumentalisierung und die Weiterverbreitung der unwahren Behauptungen und unwahren Unterstellungen stellen einen der größten, ungeheuerlichsten Medien- und Politikskandale der Bundesrepublik Deutschland dar. Sehr verehrte Damen und Herren. Das sind DDR-Methoden. Es handelte

sich nicht um ein AfD treffen, ich finde super, dass Sie das alles jetzt ganz genau mitschreiben, sondern um eine private Begegnung von Persönlichkeiten mit unterschiedlichem Hintergrund. So auch AfD-Politikern und CDU-Politikern und Menschen ohne Parteibuch. Es handelte sich auch nicht um ein Geheimgespräch, sondern um eine private Zusammenkunft, die von diesen Korrektiv-Aktivist*innen mit Geheimdienstmethoden unter Missachtung von Persönlichkeitsrechten infiltriert und ausgespäht worden war, um eine Verschwörungstheorie gleich zu Jahresbeginn zu konstruieren. Die Position der AfD und der AfD-Bundestagsfraktion zum Umgang mit der millionenfachen, irregulären und illegalen Migration seit 2015 wird nicht in angeblichen Geheimgesprächen festgelegt, sondern auf Parteitage und in Parteigremien. Das wissen Sie auch. Sie ist dem Grundsatzprogramm von 2016 dargelegt, dem EU-Wahlprogramm und den zahlreichen Stellungnahmen sowie Parlamentsreden nachzusehen und zu -hören. Das erklärte Ziel der AfD ist die Ausschöpfung aller rechtsstaatlichen Mittel, um illegale Grenzübertritte zu verhindern durch effektive Grenzkontrollen. Nicht aufenthaltsberechtigter krimineller und terrorverdächtige Migranten auszuweisen und abzuschieben, Einbürgerungen restriktiv zu handhaben und missbräuchlich erlangte Staatsbürgerschaften abzuerkennen. Wer deutscher Staatsbürger ist, gehört ohne Frage, ohne Zweifel zum deutschen Staatsvolk. Gerade deshalb darf die deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft nicht verramscht werden und mit der Gießkanne verteilt werden. Und das, sehr verehrte Damen und Herren, ist die Durchsetzung von geltendem Recht und Gesetz, das von Regierungsseite seit fast einem Jahrzehnt sträflich vernachlässigt wird.

Skandalös an diesem Vorgang von letzter Woche ist, dass über den eigentlichen Skandal letzter Woche geschwiegen wird. Es ist skandalös, wenn linke Aktivist*innen mit stasiähnlichen Geheimdienst- und Zersetzungsmethoden eine private Zusammenkunft angreifen, um unbescholtene Bürger abzufragen und auszuspähen. Es ist skandalös, wenn diese Aktivistengruppe unter dem Deckmantel der journalistischen Rechercheauftritte von staatlichen Stellen massiv mit Steuergeldern finanziert werden. Es ist skandalös, wenn eine Mehrheit der etablierten Medien die böswilligen Fehlinterpretationen und unwahren Behauptungen dubioser Aktivist*innen ohne Prüfung aufgreifen und weiterverbreiten, als handle es sich um eine seriöse Quelle. Es ist ein Skandal, wenn solche Machenschaften für eine Kampagne instrumentalisiert werden, die das Ziel verfolgt, privaten Meinungsaustausch zu kriminalisieren und unter Gesinnungskontrolle zu stellen, um es mal ganz deutlich zu sagen. Es ist skandalös, die Opposition zu diffamieren und mit Verbotsforderungen zu überziehen und legitime politische Debatten abzuwürgen. Die unreflektiert übernommenen, maßlosen NS-Vergleiche, Stichwort Wannsee-Konferenz 2.0, wo leben wir bitteschön, sind nicht nur

eine skandalöse Verharmlosung von NS Verbrechen. Die Korrektivkampagne verfolgt offenkundig den Zweck, die radikal linke Forderung nach Bleiberecht für Alle mit der Moralkeule durchzupeitschen, indem Abschiebungen mit Vertreibungen und Deportationen gleichgesetzt werden. Das ist der Kern. Denselben Zweck, den die politisch einseitig motivierte Erklärung des Begriffs – welch Zufall – ‚Remigration‘ zum Unwort des Jahres. Die Durchsetzung geltenden Rechts wird moralisch für unsagbar und undenkbar erklärt. Skandalös ist die Doppelmoral in der Ampel und Unions-Politiker dieses Kampagnen-Framing übernehmen obwohl sie selbst eben noch Abschiebungen im großen Stil gefordert haben, wie Olaf Scholz, nachträgliche Ausbürgerung von Antisemiten und Hamas Anhängern, wie die SPD und die CDU Rheinland-Pfalz und sogar die tatsächlich verfassungsfeindliche Abschiebung ganzer Clanfamilien auch ohne Straftatbestand gefordert wurden von der super Innenministerin Nancy Faser. Wo war da die Empörung. Die wahren Verfassungsfeinde sind jene, die nach Parteienverbot, nach Entzug von bürgerlichen Grundrechten und dem politischen instrumani...instrumentalisierten sogenannten Verfassungsschutz rufen. Weil sie die Möglichkeit eines demokratischen Machtwechsels zur Opposition nicht akzeptieren können, weil sie der wachsenden Unzufriedenheit der Bürger über ihre Politik nicht mehr Herr werden können und weil sie von ihrem eigenen Versagen ablenken wollen. Schämen sollten sich alle Regierungspolitiker, die mit ihrem gratis-Mut am Sonntag in Potsdam gegen die Opposition demonstrierten, aber am Montag in Berlin vor dem Zorn rechtsschaffender Bürger kneifen, weil sie die Nase voll haben von dieser Verarmungspolitik. Und als Letztes: Wer die Opposition als, ich zitiere ‚Nazi-Partei‘ bezeichnet, diffamiert, wie der Ministerpräsident in Nordrhein-Westfalen Henrik Wüst, oder die AfD in Fäkalsprache als – ich zitiere: ‚Scheißhaufen‘ bezeichnet und ihre Wähler im untersten Proleten-Jargon als, ich zitiere: ‚Schmeißfliegen‘ entmenslicht, wie die EU-Spitzenkandidatin der FDP, Frau Strack-Zimmermann, der ist nicht nur ein Heuchler sondern der sollte künftig wirklich den Mund halten, wenn über die Verrohung der politischen Sitten in diesem Land gesprochen wird.

YouTube 5

Stephan Protschka (AfD): „Unser ganzes Unheil in Bayern geht von Brüssel aus!“

Access via:

<https://web.archive.org/watch?v=C-M9XaHYBMg>

Transcript

Speaker 1

Roger, deine Arbeit als Landeschef wurde bestätigt. Du bist wiedergewählt worden, herzlichen Glückwunsch. Welche Aufgaben wollen wir in den kommenden 2 Jahren konkretisieren und erledigen? Und ganz wichtig, wie wichtig ist das Thema Remigration für Bayern?

Speaker 2

Also erstmal, danke für Glückwünsche. Ich bin ja der erste bayerische Landesvorsitzende, der wiedergewählt wurde, das gab's ja in Bayern noch nie. Also das zeugt ja von meiner guten Arbeit für den Landesverband und Danke auch an die Mitglieder, die mich diesbezüglich auch unterstützt haben, auch die, die mich nicht gewählt haben, wir werden alle mitnehmen. Wichtig für den Landesvorstand ist jetzt zuerst einmal in der Europawahl, dann stehen die Bundestagswahlen an und ganz, ganz wichtig sind 26 die Kommunalwahlen, da steckt noch sehr viel Arbeit vor uns. Und das Thema Remigration ist auf allen Ebenen ein sehr sehr wichtiges Thema. Die Leute, die hier nicht verloren haben, die müssen nach Hause. Das ist ein ganz einfaches Thema, da ist nichts böses dran, da ist nichts radikales dran, das ist die bestehende deutsche Gesetzgebung und die gilt es umzusetzen.

Speaker 1

Wie unterstützt Bayern den Europawahlkampf?

Speaker 2

Ja Europawahlkampf ist ein sehr, sehr wichtiger Wahlkampf, weil genau von Brüssel geht das ganze Urteil aus, das wir in unserem Land zu erleiden haben. Und deswegen ist für uns auch der Europawahlkampf sehr, sehr wichtig. Wir haben auch 2, vielleicht 3 Bayern, dann wieder in Brüssel sitzen und die werden wir mit vollster Kraft unterstützen, dass auch Bayern in Brüssel mit der AfD wieder stark vertreten ist und deswegen werden wir im Wahlkampf Vollgas geben und für Aschermittwoch hat sich ja schon unser Spitzenkandidat Maximilian Krah angekündigt, also wir werden da in Bayern richtig stark in den Europawahlkampf starten.

Speaker 1

Vielen Dank.

YouTube 6

Rainer Rothfuß (AfD): „Remigration ist völlig legitim und absolut notwendig!“

Access via:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20240414115246/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D53M553IWzNY>

Transcript

Speaker 1

Correctiv will einen Skandal daraus machen, dass wir für Remigration sind. Was ist daran dran?

Speaker 2

Ja, mal wieder die alte Leier. Man braucht jetzt Skandale, wenn sie keine finden, werden sie erfunden um die AfD zu dämonisieren. Dass wir für Remigration sind, ist kein Geheimnis, und das ist auch gar keine Frage, ob da jetzt ein Martin Sellner dafür ist. Wer auch immer dafür oder dagegen ist – wir haben das schon immer im Programm gehabt. Dass wir letztendlich ganz verantwortungsvoll auswählen wollen, wer nach Deutschland reindarf. Und nachdem die Grenzen aufgemacht wurden, die europäischen Außengrenzen, die Schengengrenzen und es gar nicht mehr möglich war, zu verhindern, dass alle diese Migranten nach Deutschland kommen, weil dort das Sozialsystem so komfortabel ist, müssen wir natürlich nach Lösungen suchen. Denn diese gesamte Migration nach Deutschland rein widerspricht einfach dem Grundgesetz Artikel 16 a, wo es heißt, dass jemand, der aus einem sicheren Drittland kommt eben kein Asyl genießen kann. Und genau das wird ständig misachtet von der Bundesregierung. Das ist verfassungswidrig wenn wir davon ausgehen, dass das Grundgesetz unsere Verfassung ist. Und wir von der AfD stricken seit Jahren an Konzepten, wie man tatsächlich Remigration fördern könnte. Also nicht nur die Grenzen schließen, sondern auch die Probleme, die durch Migration entstanden sind, lösen könnte. Das ist ein völlig legitimes Anliegen, auch ein völlig legitimer Wunsch, das im politischen Raum zu diskutieren, das ist Demokratie, und das lassen wir uns auch nicht durch Skandalisierung wie durch Correctiv und die ganzen Mainstream Medien verbieten. Na klar, denen sind unsere Umfragewerte zu gut. Warum sind die so gut? - Weil die Menschen einfach total unzufrieden sind. Ihre Anliegen werden ständig vergessen und wenn Menschen aus aller Welt kommen,

Anforderungen aus aller Welt kommen, wir brauchen Entwicklungshilfe für dies und das und Waffen für dies und das, dann ist die Geldbörse sofort wahnsinnig weit auf in der Bundesregierung, wenn dann aber die Landwirte mal Unterstützung brauchen, dann ‚Ja, wir haben kein Geld, wir müssen jetzt bei euch sparen‘ und das ist einfach verlogen. Ich habe selbst ja zur Remigration eine Studie geschrieben, die kann man auch runterladen auf meiner Seite. Ich lese gerade kurz den Titel vor: ‚Wege aus der Migrationskrise Leitlinien für ein exterritoriales Schutz- und Entwicklungskonzept und eine Remigrations-Agenda für Europa‘. Der Titel sagt schon Schutz und Entwicklungskonzept, das ist natürlich eine öffentliche Ansatz, wir wollen nicht die plumpe Kiste der Abschiebungen, wie es momentan die hilflose Bundesregierung Vorgängerregierungen machen, die völlig ineffizient sind, völlig inkonsequent sind, die meistens auch die braven, gut integrierten Ausländer treffen, die kein dauerhaftes Rederecht haben, die gut integriert sind, die gemeldet sind im festen Wohnsitz, Arbeit haben, Steuern zahlen. Und dann sagen natürlich die vom Bürger ‚Abschiebungen sind ungerecht. Abschiebungen dürfen nicht fortgesetzt werden, dürfen nicht ausgeweitet werden‘. Warum aber hat die Regierung sich nicht fokussiert auf die Straftäter? Die, die wirklich unsere Bevölkerung belasten, die vom Sozialstaat leben, die wirklich auch die Sicherheit gefährden. Da guckt der Staat weg und tut, als wäre er wahnsinnig hilflos. Deswegen, ich spreche da nicht gerne von Abschiebungen. Ja, das braucht es, es muss auch Teil eines Remigrationskonzepts sein. Denn der erste Fokus kommt natürlich auf der Straftäter liegen und da haben wir auch, ich würde sagen, 90% Einigkeit unter den Bürgern, wenn wir die Frage mal richtig diskutieren würden, dass Straftäter ihr Bleiberecht verwirkt haben und abgeschoben werden müssen. Das ist klar. Aber das ist ja auch nur ein gewisser Anteil derer, die von einer Reimigrationsagenda erfasst werden sollten. Wer definitiv da nicht reingehört sind Menschen, die schon lange hier liegen, gut integriert sind, sogar schon familiäre Verbindungen haben, die die deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft haben und gut integriert sind. Das hat die AfD nie in Frage gestellt. In unseren Reihen sind viele Migranten, ich spreche gerade übrigens in einer, fällt mir da ein, genau, und die sind ein Teil unserer Gesellschaft, die sind extrem wertvoll. Ich selbst habe von Kindesbeinen an einen Freund, der kommt aus der Türkei. Das ist mein bester Freund, den wollte ich niemals abgeschoben sehen. Der lebt auch die deutschen Werte, der integriert sich in die Gesellschaft, er zahlt Steuern, der ist hilfsbereit. Warum sollte die AfD solche Leute abschieben wollen? Die wählen auch uns, der macht Werbung, du kämpfst für uns im Bezirkstag für die Anliegen deiner Heimat. Also das ist Nonsense, wenn uns das angedichtet werden soll, dass wir auch alle schon gut integrierten sogar den deutschen Pass besitzenden Migranten abschieben wollten. Das ist Quatsch. Das ist

wirklich, nicht nur Quatsch, das ist böswillige Verleugnung und der Versuch und als Oppositionskraft unglaublich zu machen und zu zerstören. Was wir wollen, ich würde sagen, es sind mittlerweile Millionen von Menschen, die in unser Land gekommen sind und die einfach in unserem Wirtschaftssystem kaum zu integrieren sind. Dass wir denen nicht falsche Hoffnungen machen, dass sie irgendwann integriert werden. Es wirkt durch die digitale Revolution, es wird durch die künstliche Intelligenz noch einen großen Verlust an Arbeitsplätzen geben, das heißt, nur die am besten gebildeten, die am besten integrierten können überhaupt dauerhaft in unser System integriert werden. Und wenn wir das falsche Versprechen machen, kommt alle in unser Land, wir lösen eure Probleme, die in euren Ländern existieren, wir füttern euch durch, dann verraten wir auch diese Menschen und ihre Hoffnung auch von unserer Seite aus. Wir müssen da klar sein und sagen, wir haben nicht mehr die Möglichkeiten, wir können unseren Bürgern unsere Wirtschaft noch mehr Steuern aufbrummen, um alle Welt durchzufüttern, denn die Standort Wettbewerbsfähigkeit Deutschlands ist unter Druck, ist in Gefahr. Wir schmieren langsam ab gegenüber China, Indien, USA et cetera. Wir haben 125 Milliarden Investitionen mehr verloren aus Deutschland 2022, also zugewandert sind. Das heißt, wir sind in Gefahr als ja, Demokratie, als Volkswirtschaft. Und deswegen müssen wir schauen, dass wir bei einem Remigrationskonzept natürlich zuerst mal die Fluchtursachen abstellen. Und da gibt es ganz konkrete, zum Beispiel völkerrechtswidrige Militärinterventionen wie Jugoslawien, 1999, Millionen Flüchtlingswelle, dann 2003 im Irak, Millionen Flüchtlingswelle, dann 2011 Libyen bombardiert, alles völkerrechtswidrig, Flüchtlingswelle bis heute und Ukraine, statt auf Dialog Diplomatie zu setzen, das wäre möglich gewesen, hat NATO-Generalsekretär Stoltenberg erst bestätigt im September, man hätte das per Diplomatie lösen können durch die Neutralität der Ukraine, wieder Flüchtlingswelle millionenfach nach Europa, nach Deutschland hinein. Irgendwann sind unsere Kapazitäten erschöpft unsere Leistungsfähigkeit. Wir müssen das erstmal stoppen, dass solche Kriege für weitere Flüchtlingswellen sorgen. Und da war einfach immer der Westen treibende Kraft Mitschuld und da müssen wir jetzt einfach schauen, dass wir das Abstellen und dass wir jetzt übergehen in Remigrationen. Und wir sagen, jeder, der illegal die Grenze überschreitet, wird mit Sicherheit wieder sofort zurückgebracht und sein Anspruch auf Asyl wird nur extraterritorial bearbeitet, also das heißt, nicht nur außerhalb Deutschlands, sondern auch außerhalb Europas. Es reicht auch nicht, wenn wir das in Serbien machen, weil das außerhalb der EU ist, die Leute werden irgendwann über die Grenze gekommen und werden irgendwann wieder drin sein. Wir müssen das außerhalb von Europa machen. Wir brauchen Abkommen, so wie es Großbritannien und Dänemark jetzt schon verhandelt mit

Staaten, sicheren Staaten, wo wir die Menschen hinbringen und dort ihre Schutzbedürftigkeit prüfen und dort dann auch Entwicklung fördern, Arbeitsplätze durch Investitionen, da können gute Wirtschaftsbeziehungen auch entstehen, dort sollen Menschen integriert werden können, die auch Schutz brauchen. Die, die aber nur eigentlich in die soziale Hängematte in Deutschlands liegen wollten oder das gute Gesundheitssystem, Bildungssystem hier ausnutzen wollten, die werden natürlich in solchen Schutzzonen gar nicht bleiben, die werden sagen: Na gut dann geh‘ ich wieder zurück nach Hause, weil eigentlich gibt’s bei mir daheim keinen Krieg, sondern ich fand es nur schöner, in Deutschland zu leben. Aber das ist ja nicht Sinn der Sache, also man muss sein Land schützen. Das sagt auch Sarah Wagenknecht. Sie hat auch mal gesagt als Linke es ist unmöglich ein Sozialsystem aufrechtzuerhalten, ohne die Grenzen zu schützen. Das ist mathematischer Schwachsinn, wenn ich alle Welt reinlasse. Und das ist alles an der gesamten Sache und wir müssen jetzt schauen, dass wir die Frage nach der Remigration rausholen aus der bösen Ecke, wo sie jetzt reingeschoben werden sollte. Das ist eine ganz normale Frage, die gehört in der breite debattiert und das fordert nicht nur die AfD, das fordert die Bevölkerung. Die wollten, dass jetzt endlich Lösungen kommen. In meinem Buch habe ich es genau ausdifferenziert, welche Schritte nötig sind dafür, welche Allianzen auch geschmiedet werden müssen, innereuropäisch um wirksames sein. Und diese Diskussion ist es überfällig und da müssen wir Korrektiv sogar dankbar sein. Durch ihre Skandalisierung ist jetzt die Debatte angestoßen, das Volk will jetzt endlich hier mal Konzepte sehen und die AfD hat diese Konzepte.

YouTube 7

„Das sind Stasi-Methoden!“ – Alice Weidel (AfD) schlägt zurück

Access via:

<https://web.archive.org/watch?v=kbWRiXtsGag>

Transcript

Speaker 2

Sehr verehrte Damen und Herren, das sind DDR-Methoden.

Speaker 1

Ahoi, meine Lieben. Die Zahl der sogenannten Asylanträge ist im letzten Jahr um Sage und Schreibe über 50% auf über 350 000, das ist eine ganze Stadt. Und dann heißt es ja immer so schön, na ja, das sind ganz viele von der Ukraine dabei, die hauen ja sowieso wieder ab. Nein,

sind es nicht. Gehen wir die Zahlen doch mal durch. Wir haben hier mit über 100 000 Asylanträgen Menschen aus Syrien. Danach kommt die Türkei. Wieso eigentlich die Türkei? Wieso kann jemand aus der Türkei...? Also über 60 000. Dann kommt Afghanistan über 50 000, Irak, über 12 000, Iran, über 10 000. Nichts von der Ukraine, gar nix meine Lieben. Und dann wird es gewagt, das Wort Remigration also wieder Zurückführung als Unwort des Jahres zu erklären. Es wird ein Skandal aufgebauscht um ein angebliches Geheimtreffen der AfD, und darüber soll es in diesem Video auch gehen, meine Lieben. Alice Weidel hat dazu Stellung genommen und damit begrüße ich euch beim DeutschlandKurier.

Wer es nicht mitbekommen hat, vor circa zwei Wochen trafen sich ein paar rechte Aktivisten und ja, auch ein paar AfD Mitglieder, wohlgemerkt Mitglieder keine Mandatsträger zu einem Treffen bei dem es um die Remigration ging. Und was wurde daraus gemacht und zwar von den linken Aktivisten kollektiv Korrektiv? Ein Geheimtreffen. Und darauf geht Alice Weidel gleich am Anfang ein.

Speaker 2

Die Unterstellung des linken Aktivisten-Netzwerkes Correctiv und die ungeprüfte Weiterverbreitung und Instrumentalisierung von Correctiv und die Instrumentalisierung und die Weiterverbreitung der unwahren Behauptungen und unwahren Unterstellungen stellen einen der größten, ungeheuerlichsten Medien- und Politikskandale der Bundesrepublik Deutschland dar.

Speaker 1

Und damit sind wir direkt beim ersten Skandal, meine Lieben. Die vermeintliche Recherche des linksextrem Aktivisten Kollektivs wurde ungeprüft übernommen vom ZDF, vom diversen anderen Mainstream Medien, von den Altparteien und so weiter und sofort. Woran erinnert uns das? Genau, damals in Chemnitz, die angebliche Hetzjagd, wo die Mainstream Medien ein Video übernommen haben, zusammengeschnibbelt von der Antifa. Es ist ja regelrecht Hanebüchen, dass versucht wird den Leuten da draußen etwas als Neuigkeit zu verkaufen, das im AfD Parteiprogramm steht. Selbstverständlich möchte die AfD illegale, in Deutschland lebende Ausländer abschieben, das ist ihre Aufgabe, dafür wird sie gewählt und von mir aus kann sie da auch noch ein paar Schritte weitergehen, ich möchte auch keine Menschen im Land haben, die sich nicht selber finanzieren können, die auf Kosten der Allgemeinheit leben.

Speaker

Die Position der AfD und der AfD-Bundestagsfraktion zum Umgang mit der millionenfachen, irregulären und illegalen Migration seit 2015 wird nicht in angeblichen Geheimtreffen festgelegt, sondern auf Parteitag und in Parteigremien.

Speaker 1

Der nächste Skandal ist natürlich, dass solche Dings linksextremen Aktivisten auch noch vom Steuerzahler finanziert werden, zumindest zum Teil.

Speaker 2

Deckmantel der journalistischen Rechercheauftritt von staatlichen Stellen anziehen, mit Steuergeldern finanziert werden.

Speaker 1

Wir leben ja bekanntlich in Zeiten, in denen schon Nazi ist, wer pünktlich zur Arbeit kommt und so durften selbstverständlich auch die Nazi-Vergleiche nicht fehlen von einer Wannseekonferenz 2.0 wurde gesprochen. Erst einmal das 2.0 ist auch ein bisschen veraltet, hat man vor 15 Jahren gesagt, aber unabhängig davon: Auf der Wahnsinn Konferenz wurde die sogenannte Endlösung der Judenfrage beschlossen und das zu vergleichen, das belegt doch wieder nur die Geschichtsvergessenheit und die skandalöse..Aber lassen wir Alice Weidel selber reden.

Speaker 2

Die unreflektiert übernommenen, maßlosen NS-Vergleiche, Stichwort Wannsee-Konferenz 2.0, wo leben wir bitteschön, sind nicht nur eine skandalöse Verharmlosung von NS Verbrechen. Die Korrekturkampagne verfolgt offenkundig den Zweck, die radikal linke Forderung nach Bleiberecht für Alle mit der Moralkeule durchzupeitschen, indem Abschiebungen mit Vertreibungen und Deportationen gleichgesetzt werden.

Speaker 1

Alice Weidel geht dann nochmal darauf ein, dass Remigration zum Unwort des Jahres erklärt wurde.

Speaker 2

Denselben Zweck, den die politisch einseitig motivierte Erklärung des Begriffs – welcher Zufall – ‚Remigration‘ zum Unwort des Jahres. Die Durchsetzung geltenden Rechts wird moralisch für unsagbar und undenkbar erklärt.

Speaker 1

Und wer nun geglaubt hat, die hervorragenden Umfrageergebnisse der AfD hätten unter diesen fantasierten Skandal gelitten, der hat sich gehörig geirrt. Das Gegenteil ist der Fall.

YouTube 8

„Love Priest“ liest die Messe im Deutschland-Kurier: Remigration – ja bitte, und zwar ganz schnell!

Access via:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20240414120714/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DO6dtKXZA8kM>

Transcript

Speaker 1

Schon mal vorab, das Geld der Deutschen für die Deutschen, ewig gestrige, kein Geld für deutsche Landwirte, aber Bundesregierung zahlt indischen Bauern hunderte Millionen Euro – wieso nur so wenig – und das Volk wird euch hier wegfeigen: Davos!

Speaker 2

And I appreciate the World Economic Forum providing me the opportunity to be on this stage and say „Fuck you, Klaus Schwab, and fuck your new world order. We, the people were born free, we will stay free, and you and all your globalist friends, including everyone in this room can go fuck yourselves.

Speaker 1

Beruhigt euch, leider nur Satire, Ukraine Konferenz mit rund 80 Staaten hat in Davos begonnen; in Wirklichkeit ist das ein World Economics Treffen, am Rande eine kleine Konferenz zum Ukraine-Krieg.

Speaker 3

Denn die Frage ist, haben die Mitgliedstaaten die Ausdauer, die Ukraine weiter zu unterstützen? Und wie soll der Wiederaufbau laufen? Denn die Ukraine braucht Stand jetzt, schon rund 400 Milliarden Euro.

Speaker 1

Ja, das sind doch Peanuts, überweist das mal.

Speaker 3

Dabei richten sich die Augen auf Deutschland.

Speaker 1

Absolut. Germany!

Speaker 4

Im Sommer ist die große Wiederaufbaukonferenz für die Ukraine in Berlin. Die wird heute mit vorbereitet und für Deutschland aus kann ich sagen, dass wir im letzten Jahr etwas gemacht haben oder was wir sonst nie gemacht haben. Also wir garantieren Investitionen in andere Länder und wenn dann irgendwas schief geht, das ist wie eine Versicherung, dann springt der Staat ein.

Speaker 1

Einzigartig. Je größer der Haufen Scheiße, umso mehr Fliegen. Antiampelpodeste erreichen vorläufigen Höhepunkt also da geht noch was; AfD-Fraktion beschließt Sofortprogramm für den Mittelstand, reiner Aktionismus, und hier geht Alice Weidel zu den Demonstranten total gestellte Propaganda also ehrlich. Aber Anti-Ampelproteste, Russlands Botschafter weist Verschwörungstheorien scharf zurück, eine prorussische Disformationskampagne!

Speaker 5

Tausende Landwirtinnen und Landwirte, Herr Rukwid, alles ist gut, alles ist gut.

Speaker 1

Ja, alles Bestens!

Speaker 5

Sie können mir doch nicht erzählen, dass sie wegen des Agrardiesel hier sind.

Speaker 1

Handball WM: Senilus wird gnadenlos ausgebuht.

Speaker 6

Olaf Scholz ist eingetroffen, der sich das hier auch nicht entgehen lassen will und Sie hören die Reaktionen.

Speaker 1

Aber auch die Hühnerzüchter, die Linksaktionistin und Daniela Günther werden da ausgepiffen. Da haben die Kommentatoren geschwiegen, aber Handballboss entschuldigt sich beim Kanzler. Der war beim Spiel da mit seinem Bodyguard und aus Angst vor Pfeifkonzert spricht Senilus also nicht auf der Beckenbauer Trauerfeier. Die AfD ist bei 24% überholt die CDU bundesweit, nur eine Frage der Zeit, Umfrageklatsche für die Ampel, Sinilus hinter Chrupalla jetzt auch und die SPD verliert an allen Fronten – ist das NS-Vokabular? – auch (incomprehensible) sieht die AfD weit vorne. Wagenknecht scheitert an 5% Hürde, richtig so. Oh ein ewig gestriger Verfassungsschmutz hat keine Erkenntnisse über Geheimtreffen in Potsdam. Kann man viel erzählen und behaupten aber die AfD trennt sich von Weidels Referent. Also in beiderseitigen Einvernehmen. Also, 1,13 Millionen – so viele Asylanträge wurden 2023 in Europa gestellt, müssen wir als Chance sehen. Remigration, das

ist das Stichwort. Denn wir müssen endlich im großen Stil abschieben, oder alle Flüchtlinge müssen zurück. Asylmissbrauch beenden, die Rechtsradikalen von gestern und egal was uns die Sprachpolizei erzählt, Remigration ist das Wort des Jahres.

Speaker 7

Selten war ein Unwort des Jahres so brisant und so aktuell.

Speaker 1

Äh nochmal, wieso ein Unwort?

Speaker 7

In diesem Jahr kührte eine Jury aus Sprachwissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftlern das Wort Remigration. Das sei ein rechtsextremer Kampfbegriff. Er stehe für Zwangsausweisungen oder Massendeportationen von Menschen mit Migrationsgeschichte, so die Begründung.

Speaker 8

Beim Begriff Remigration empfinden viele hier Beklemmungen, sogar Furcht. Sie verstehen ihn als Angriff gegen sich.

Speaker 1

Nein, das müsst ihr nicht. Seht das mal als Chance!

Speaker 9

Ich mache jetzt Ausbildung als Pfleger und wenn ich höre, wie jemand sagt ‚Warum ist Ausländer hier‘ und so gefällt mir nicht und macht mich traurig.

Speaker 1

Nein, das muss es nicht. Apropos, muslimische Jugendliche wollen Scharia an Schule einführen?

Speaker 10

Maschallah!

Speaker 1

Richtig so! Scharia-Schüler drohen mit Steinigung – ha! So moderne Zeiten. Aber die schweigende Mehrheit muss aufwachen, mein Reden, ne, die geile Halde. Und Ampel senkt übrigens Kinder-Porno-Strafen. Was hält der Merz eigentlich von so einem AfD-Verbot?

Speaker 11

Wir werden wieder ernst und gehen dahin, wo wir gerade waren, zum AfD-Verbotsverfahren und wir hören noch mal rein, warum Friedrich Merz nicht wirklich ein Fan von einem AfD-Verbotsverfahren ist. Er hat es am Wochenende so begründet.

Speaker 1

Ah, da sind wir mal gespannt.

Speaker 12

Ich glaube, wir müssen die Parteien politisch bekämpfen. Es bleibt immer eine ultima ratio, man sollte das nie ausschließen, aber zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt die AfD noch sozusagen in ihrem Opfer-Mythos und in ihrer Märtyrer-Rolle zu bestärken. Dass man dagegen ein Verbotsverfahren anstrengt, davon halte ich wenig.

Speaker 1

Der Running Joke Wanderwitz lässt alle Hemmungen fallen, denn er plädiert für Öffnungen zur Linkspartei, großartig. Derweil in den USA Trump triumphiert bei Vorwahlen der Republikaner in Iowa.

Speaker 13

But one man, one movement can change all that for us.

Speaker 14

Und hört mal kurz rein, der Sound, der Ton noch einmal deutlich rauer.

Speaker 15

Wir werden die Granze schließen. Denn im Moment haben wir eine Inversion.

Speaker 1

Ah das sind Fake-News

Speaker 15

Eine Invasion von Millionen Menschen, die in unser Land kommen. Ich kann mir vorstellen, dass Sie denken, dass es eine gute Idee ist. Es ist aber eine schlechte.

Speaker 1

Ja, er könnte damit Recht haben.

Speaker 15

Und ihr wisst, dass sie aus Gefängnissen kommen. Die kommen von überall her, die kommen aus Ländern, von denen viele noch nie gehört haben.

Speaker 1

Haha, aus Germany?

Speaker 15

Und sie kommen aus psychiatrischen Anstalten und Irrenanstalten in unser Land.

Speaker 1

Ha! Also doch Germany.

Speaker 15

Und es kommen auch viele Terroristen.

Speaker 1

Oh bei den Göttern!

Speaker 15

Wir müssen abschieben, wir müssen eine Abschiebungsquote haben, wie wir sie noch nie hatten.

Speaker 1

Also remigration?

Speaker 15

Oder seit Dwight Eisenhower nicht mehr hatten.

Speaker 1

Ja, oder bei uns seit..Helmut Kohl, ne Angela Merkel.

Speaker 15

Ich will nicht zu grob mit dem Präsident sein, aber ich muss sagen, dass er der schlechteste Präsident ist, den wir je hatten in der Geschichte unseres Landes.

Speaker 1

Ha ist ja bei uns so ähnlich.

Speaker 15

Er zerstört unser Land.

Speaker 1

Ja das ist allerdings bei uns genauso. Weiter geht's! Fast 6000 Milliarden Euro, so viel kostet uns die Zuwanderung, dreimal mehr als die Wiedervereinigung aber es bringt uns ja auch 30 mal so viel. Schon fast jeder zweite Alman bereit zu Anti-Ampel-Aufstand, Wohlstandsvernichtung – Apropos:

Speaker 16

...nur Fettsack genannt.

Speaker 1

Dumm, dümmer, grün: Ricarda Lang schätzt Durchschnittsrente auf 2000 Euro.

Speaker 17

Ich würde gerne nochmal fragen, wissen Sie ungefähr, wie hoch ist die Durchschnittsrente in Deutschland?

Speaker 18

Durchschnittsrente kenne ich tatsächlich nicht.

Speaker 17

Haben Sie ne Idee?

Speaker 18

Ne tatsächlich keine konkrete.

Speaker 17

Ungefähr.

Speaker 18

Ich würde davon ausgehen, dass wir 2000 Euro (incomprehensible).

Speaker 17

Durchschnittsrente.

Speaker 18

1543 Euro.

Speaker 17

Das ist nochmal ein Stück weniger.

Speaker 18

Nach 45 Jahren Arbeit.

Speaker 1

E-Auto, nein danke. An allen Ecken und Enden fehlt Strom für Ladesäulen, egal, Özdemir will neue Steuer auf Fleisch und Butter, richtig so, Pharma-Lobbyist Klabauterbach streicht Homöopathie als Kassenleistung, genau, und: Pleite-Ampel will neue Luxus-Hubschrauber für 200 Millionen Euro anschaffen, damit sie irgendwann besser fliehen können. I'm outta here!

YouTube 9

Martin Reichardt (AfD) im DK-Gespräch: „Die Story von 'Correctiv' ist erstunken und erlogen!“

Access via:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20240414120808/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3Dm5xesBbpd04>

Transcript

Speaker 1

Herzlich willkommen, liebe Zuschauer vom Deutschlandkurier, ich darf heute bei mir Martin Reichardt, Mitglied der AfD Bundestagsfraktion und Landesvorsitzender der AfD Sachsen-Anhalt begrüßen.

Speaker 2

Hallo.

Speaker 1

Ja, Martin, die AFD ist ja wieder einmal Lieblingsthema der hessischen Leitmedien und auch der linken Altparteien. Ein sehr geheimes Geheimgespräch mit geheimen Geheimnissen wurde veröffentlicht. Das investigative Medium Korrektiv hat da ja ein paar Dinge ans Tageslicht gebracht. Jetzt mal Hand aufs Herz: Was ist da wirklich dran?

Speaker 2

Ja also im Endeffekt ist das, was wohl tatsächlich stattgefunden hat, ein Treffen von Menschen, die sich über politische Fragen oder Ähnliches unterhalten haben. Das hat's wohl gegeben, aber das, was daraus gemacht wurde, das ist natürlich zu einem erheblichen Teil insbesondere was unsere Partei und deren Willen angeht, erstunken und erlogen. Also wir müssen uns ganz deutlich sagen, das, was dort gesagt worden ist, wir würden Millionen Deutscher, ähm, abschieben oder wie gesagt worden ist, sogar deportieren wollen, eine Unverschämtheit. Wir haben das nie gewollt. Und wir haben tatsächlich als Partei unser Parteiprogramm und an dessen Durchsetzung arbeiten wir. Wir wollen kriminelle Ausländer abschieben, und wir wollen Ausländer ohne Bleiberecht abschieben. Das wollen wir, das ist Durchsetzung deutsches Recht, und dazu stehen wir. Und alles andere sind Erfindungen sogenannter investigativer Medien. Das ist ganz einfach so, denn selbst wenn auf einem Treffen irgendwer irgendwas sagt, dann ist das ja kein Geheimplan. Und es ist eben auch eine Unverschämtheit, dass die gesamten deutschen Medien auf diesen ungeprüften Unsinn aufgesprungen sind. Das kann man ja nur damit letzten Endes erklären, dass die deutschen Medien und das wissen wir ja alle, immer nur gegen die AfD sind und jeden Unsinn aufgreifen, der gegen uns hervorgebracht wird.

Speaker 1

Ja, und jetzt ist es sogar schon so, dass du hast auch selber gesagt, die Medien und aber auch einige Politiker Worte wie Deportationen verwenden. Wie empfindest du das? Was sagst du dazu, dass jetzt feinsten Sprech quasi unterstellt wird?

Speaker 2

Ja gut, man hat das ja alles, das ist ja alles eine lang, aus meiner Sicht lang geplante Aktion. Ist ja vom sogenannten investigativen Medium Korrektiv, das in Wahrheit ein

Staatsfinanziertes und vom linken Establishment mit großen Geldern ausgestattetes Medium zur Diffamierung insbesondere der konservativen Opposition ist, hervorgebracht worden und in diesem Gesamtframing, da sollte natürlich eine maximale Nähe zum Nationalsozialismus erzeugt werden. Man hat ja auch den den Unsinnigen, äh die unsinnige Entfernung des Hotels zu einer Villa, in der die Wannseekonferenz stattgefunden hat, herangezogen, das muss man sich mal überlegen, ich glaube, die Zentrale der Grünen ist in Potsdam, ist dichter an der Wannseekonferenzvilla. Also es war alles schon von vornherein darauf ausgerichtet, Hetze zu betreiben, ein Framing anzusetzen und natürlich auch die Bürger mit Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland gegen die AfD einzunehmen. Und man kann eben nur sagen: Es gibt keine geheimen Geheimpläne, es gibt nur unser Wahlpro.. es gibt nur unser Parteiprogramm und da kann jeder nachlesen, was wir wollen. Wir sind eine Rechtsstaatspartei Abschiebung krimineller Ausländer und Abschiebungen von Menschen ohne Bleiberecht. Das ist alles. Und ich denke, damit sind wir auf einem guten Weg.

Speaker 1

Das ist auch gut so, genau. Ähm jetzt gab es ja schon eine ein paar Demos quasi gegen dieses Geheimgeschehen und damit auch Anti-AfD-Demos, kann man ja schon sagen und auch Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz, Außenministerin Annalena Baerbock haben an einer dieser Demos teilgenommen. Warum machen das Politiker in derart gehobenen Positionen, ist das eine Art Wahlpropaganda oder wie findest du das?

Speaker 2

Ja, natürlich. Also da müssen wir uns doch drüber einig sein. Ich meine, die SPD krepelt (?) im Moment irgendwo bei 15% vor sich hin. Die Grünen in ähnlicher Höhe die gesamte Ampel hat zusammen vielleicht noch gut 30%. Wir als AfD nähern uns der 30%. Da ist es natürlich deren Sorge, dass wir stark werden, weil wir ja die Partei für Deutschland, die Partei des Volkes sind und Herr Scholz und Frau Baerbock haben ja in den letzten zwei Jahren bewiesen, dass sie von dem Willen getrieben sind, Deutschland zu schaden, Deutschlands Wirtschaft kaputt zu machen und letzten Endes auch den Wohlstand des deutschen Volkes zu vernichten. Und diesem Ziel kann man eben nur dann mit der gleichen Inbrunst weiter nachkommen, wenn die AfD schwach bleibt und darum hetzt man gegen uns. Aber ich glaube, das Volk wird sich da nichts vormachen lassen.

Speaker 1

Ähm ja, wir haben auch schon über ganz viel über Remigrationen mittlerweile gehört in den Medien, Remigration wurde ja jetzt zum Unwort des Jahres gekürt. Zum Abschluss wollte ich

dich gern fragen: Es ist sicherlich nicht dein Unwort, wenn du dir jetzt eins aussuchen dürftest. Welches wäre das und warum?

Speaker 2

Ja, das Unwort des Jahres ist für mich die Grüne und das hat auch einen Grund. Die Grünen bestimmen seit Jahren das ideologische Klima in Deutschland, sie sind eine Partei von Deutschlandhassern, sie sind eine Partei, die quasi aus sich selbst heraus die Ablehnung Deutschlands in sich trägt. Wir müssen nur Zitate nehmen, wie ‚eklige weiße Mehrheitsgesellschaft‘ wie Einwanderung bis zum Volkstod alles von führenden Vertretern dieser Partei gesagt. Mit Vaterlandsliebe konnte selbst unser Wirtschaftsminister Habeck ja nie etwas anfangen und so weiter und so weiter. Ähm, Grüne ist das Unwort des Jahres und der Grund dafür, dass man es zum Unwort des Jahres machen, ist, dass die Grünen Deutschland hassen.

Speaker 1

Ja, das war ein sehr passender Abschluss auf jeden Fall. Ich danke dir sehr für dieses Gespräch und verabschiede mich von unseren Deutschlandkurier-Zuschauern und sage, bis zum nächsten Mal!

YouTube 10

Matthias Helferich (AfD): „Ohne Remigration verlieren wir unsere Heimat!“

Access via:

<https://web.archive.org/watch?v=l5hZwk0gCuc>

Transcript

Speaker 1

Herzlich Willkommen, liebe Zuschauer von Deutschlandkurier. Ich darf heute bei mir Matthias Helferich, Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestags, Mitglied der, im Rat der Stadt Dortmund und Rechtsanwalt begrüßen. Herzlich willkommen, Herr Helferich.

Speaker 2

Ganz herzlichen Dank für die Einladung.

Speaker 1

Sehr gerne. Herr Helferich, Ihr Wahlkreis ist ja Dortmund und für jemanden, für den Remigration quasi eine Herzensangelegenheit ist, ist ja die Stadt Dortmund mit einem Auslandsanteil von rund 22% ja quasi ein heißes Pflaster, kann man sagen, oder?

Speaker 2

Na, es ist so, dass wir auf viel Zuspruch von Einheimischen mit Migrationshintergrund erfahren. Ich glaube, dass es auch immer mehr Staatsbürger mit Migrationshintergrund gibt, gerade im Ruhrgebiet, die seit Jahrzehnten dort leben und auch Städte wie Dortmund als ihre Heimat anerkennen und sich dort sehr wohl gefühlt haben, die leiden halt auch unter dieser Massenmigration. Und wir haben's legendär zu meinem Wahlkreis gehört auch die Dortmunder Nordstadt, wo auch der Dortmunder Tatort regelmäßig gedreht wird als düsteren Pflaster von Dortmund, und wenn man da eben vor allen Dingen mit türkischen Einwanderern spricht, dann leiden die unter dem Zuzug von Romafamilien aus Südosteuropa und die leiden auch unter dem arabischen Zuzug auch dem Afrikanischen Zuzug. Und das sind letztlich auch unsere Verbündeten zum Erhalt unserer Heimat und auch die Verbündeten im Kampf für eine demokratische und rechtsstaatliche Remigration.

Speaker 1

Ja. Und Sie haben ja auch ein Projekt oder eine Kampagne ‚Remigration‘ ins Leben gerufen. Was ist denn Ihre Version von Remigration beziehungsweise wie sieht für Sie eine erfolgreiche Remigration aus?

Speaker 2

Letztlich ist ein Bündel an Maßnahmen, es ist ja auch kein Begriff, der neu ist, auch letztlich kein rechter Begriff, sondern es ist auch ein Begriff, der aus der Politikwissenschaft der 90er Jahre stammt. Es ist eben die andere Seite eben der der Migration ist eben die Remigration und dieses Bündel an Maßnahmen umfasst eben eine Familienpolitik, die deutsche Familien, die einheimische Familien fördert, ein Grenzschutzsystem, das diesen Namen auch verdient, an Abschiebesystem, wir stimmen jetzt heute Nachmittag über das Rückführungsgesetz der Ampel ab, wo man davon ausgeht, dass dann 600 Abschiebungen im Jahr mehr erfolgen, das ist natürlich zu wenig und auf europäischer Ebene wird gerade über das gemeinsame europäische Asylsystem gesprochen, was letztlich auch die Hauptzuwanderergruppen, die Syrer, Iraker und Afghanen überhaupt nicht erfasst. Es würde Außengrenzschutzverfahren geben, die Hauptzuwandergruppen durchlaufen aber diese Außengrenzschutzverfahren überhaupt nicht. Deshalb ist das letztlich auch wirkungslos.

Speaker 1

Hm, ja. Dass wir in Deutschland oder dass Deutschland allgemein ein massives Problem mit der unkontrollierten Einwanderung hat, mit der Massenmigration, ist ja offensichtlich und klar. Welches ist denn für sie die negativste Auswirkung, die diese unkontrollierte Einwanderung hat in Deutschland?

Speaker 2

Das ist sicherlich die importierte Kriminalität, die wir erleben. Ob das diese Schwesternächte sind, ob das die Austragung von ethnischen Konflikten auf unseren Straßen, das ist sicherlich auch der Wohnraumangel, der daraus resultiert und es ist wahrscheinlich auch ein identitätspolitisches Problem, dass immer mehr Menschen in unserem Land erkennen, dass sie ihre Heimat verlieren, dass sie sich nicht mehr im anderen wiedererkennen, dass ihre Straßenzüge nicht mehr wiedererkennen, dass sie auch den öffentlichen Raum letztlich nicht mehr in der Form betreten, wie es früher getan haben. Frauen, gehen nicht mehr Abends joggen. Jugendliche gehen nicht mehr gerne am Wochenende in die Innenstädte, um zu feiern, weil sie sich bedroht fühlen. Und diese..dieses Damoklesschwert der dauernden Bedrohung wird zumindest teilweise auch durch Massenmigration hervorgehoben.

Speaker 1

Und denken Sie, wir könnten, oder Deutschland könnte quasi mit einer Remigrationsoffensive quasi diese Probleme beheben und wieder, sag ich mal, zu einer normalen Realität, Normalität zurückkommen?

Speaker 2

In jedem Fall. Davon bin ich überzeugt, sonst hätte ich die Kampagne auch nicht gemacht. Ich glaube, dass man diesen Begriff mit Remigration positiv mit Lebenswillen füllen sollte, man sollte jetzt die Debatte die ja entstanden ist, die kommt uns ja letztlich zugute aufgrund dieses deutschen Ibizas, was man da versucht in in Potsdam zu inszenieren und das, das müssten wir eigentlich nutzen, um diesen Begriff halt positiv zu konnotieren und das war eben auch der Versuch meiner kleinen Kampagne.

Speaker 1

Hm können Sie mal kurz sagen, kann...kann man schon absehen, ob die Kampagnen für Sie jetzt ersönlich erfolgreich ist? Also haben Sie da Zuspruch erhalten?

Speaker 2

Auf jeden Fall. Also man kann bei Twitter jetzt entsprechend sein profilbild gestalten, mit dem Begriff Team Remigration, tun auch viele Migranten, die sich dieser Forderung anschließen, ähm, die Flyer sind gefragt, die Aufkleber sind gefragt und ich glaube, der Deutschlandkurier hat jetzt auch so einen Banner entworfen für die Facebookprofile. Also es

gibt ja Kräfte innerhalb der patriotischen Bewegung, die diesen Begriff jetzt positiv besetzen und ihn eben nicht den Linken überlassen, die ihn ja versuchen, als blutrünstige Deportation zu definieren. Diesen Kampf müssen wir führen und auch sehr selbstbewusst, weil er auch vielen Hoffnungen spendet, dass sie auch ihre Heimat wieder zurückerhalten.

Speaker 1

Ähm zum Abschluss noch eine ganz kurze und vielleicht auch ein bisschen persönliche Frage, wenn Sie der aktuellen Regierung im Bundestag einen Film oder Buch-Titel geben könnten, welcher wäre das und warum?

Speaker 2

Ähm, Regimechange von Rechts von Martin Sellner. Man unterstellt ihm ja auch bei diesen vermeintlichen Geheimtreffen, dass wo der Verfassungsschutz überhaupt keine Erkenntnisse hat, das war gestern Thema im Innenausschuss, was dort überhaupt besprochen wurde, das wurde dort reininterpretiert, dass er auch eine...eine Form der Remigration fordert, die auch Staatsbürger betrifft, mit Migrationshintergrund, das ist definitiv nicht der Fall und es wird auch in diesem Buch ausgeführt und ich würde das jedem etablierten Politiker einfach mal anheimstellen, sich doch da selbst ein Bild zu machen und sich nicht der eigenen Propaganda hinzugeben.

Speaker 1

Ja. Also ich denke, dass sowieso so ein Grundproblem, dass man vielleicht wieder anfängt selber zu denken und sich nicht alles aneignet und glaubt, was man so vorgesetzt bekommt. Ich danke Ihnen ganz herzlich für das Interview..

Speaker 2

Ja, vielen Dank!

Speaker 1

...und verabschiede mich von Deutschlandkurier-Zuschauern und sage bis zum nächsten Mal.

YouTube 11

10 gute Gründe für Remigration — Jetzt!

Access via:

<https://web.archive.org/watch?v=NdBdQpZR488>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NdBdQpZR488>

Transcript

(incomprehensible) das Wort Remigration ist ja momentan in aller Munde und in gewissen Kreisen auch ein wenig negativ behaftet. Zu unrecht, denn es gibt gute Gründe, sogar viele gute Gründe. Wir haben zehn gefunden, es gibt bestimmt noch mehr, aber diese zehn möchte ich heute mit euch teilen. Damit begrüße ich euch beim DeutschlandKurier.

So meine Lieben, willkommen zum ersten Grund, warum die Remigration eine gute Sache ist, ich sage nur fünf Worte, ich sage 5,8 Billionen Euro, das ist eine Zahl, die ist so hoch, man kann sie sich kaum vorstellen. Das sind nämlich 5 800 Milliarden Euro. So viel wird sie insgesamt, sofern sie nicht gestoppt wird, kosten, die illegale Zuwanderung. Mit 5 800 Milliarden Euro wird unsere Volkswirtschaft längerfristig belastet werden. Das sind dreimal mehr als die Kosten für die Wiedervereinigung. Die Zahlen haben wir uns nicht aus den Fingern gesaugt, oh nein, diese Zahlen hat der Wirtschaftswissenschaftler Bernd Raffelhüschen von der Universität Freiburg errechnet. Er gilt als einer der besten Sozialexperten Deutschlands. Und wir kommen zum Grund Nummer 2. Warum Remigration eine fantastische Sache ist. Deutsche Schüler haben im Jahre 2022 im internationalen Leistungsvergleich Pisa das bisher schlechteste Ergebnis überhaupt erzielt. Und Bildung, das wisst ihr, Bildung ist unser einziger Rohstoff, wir haben ja, haben wir ja nicht. Und die schwindet im Zuge der illegalen Masseneinwanderung immer dramatischer diese Bildung. Das ist natürlich auch kein Wunder angesichts von Schulklassen, die bis zu 90 acht teilweise sogar 100% dominiert werden vom bildungsfernen Migrantennachwuchs. Kommen wir zum dritten Grund, warum Remigration eine hervorragende Sache ist. Wenn ihr im Bekanntenkreis oder im Kollegenkreis oder Freundeskreis Familie was weiß ich, ne, da über das Thema Zuwanderung diskutiert, dann kommt ja gerne der Konter, ja, aber die Fachkräfte, die brauchen wir doch. Ja, meine Lieben, welche Fachkräfte? Obwohl wir illegale Einwanderung in Millionenstärke haben, fehlen sie noch immer die Fachkräfte, wo sind sie denn, augenscheinlich sind die Leute die zu uns nach Deutschland wollen, keine Fachkräfte. Da wird jetzt zum Beispiel gefragt, wer erwirtschaftet denn unsere Renten, wenn nicht die fleißigen Migranten, aber auch dieses Argument wurde jetzt von Professor Raffelhüschen weitgehend zerpfückt. Denn durchschnittlich dauert die Integration von Migranten in den Arbeitsmarkt 6 Jahre. In dieser Zeit zahlen sie nicht oder nur wenig in die deutschen Sozialkassen ein. Auch später im Erwerbsleben wird es kaum besser werden, denn aufgrund mangelnder Qualifikation verdienen Migranten meist deutlich weniger als ihre deutschen

Kollegen. Und was ist dann die Folge? Sie zahlen weniger Steuern und Abgaben, vor allem aber weniger Beiträge auch zu den Sozialkassen. Sie erhalten aber im Prinzip die gleichen Leistungen bei Krankheit, bei Pflege und bei der Rente. Wir kommen zu Grund 4, warum die Remigration eine fabelhafte Sache ist. Jahrelang wurde es ja als rechte Verschwörungstheorie abgetan, nun hat es die Bundesregierung in Gestalt der Asyl-Totalversagerin Nancy Faser von SPD ganz offen zugegeben: die zügellose illegale Masseneinwanderung bewirkt, dass Deutschland immer mehr Kriminalität importiert. Selbst die Antifa Sympathisantin Faser spricht im Zusammenhang mit der erschreckend hohen Ausländerkriminalität von einer neuen Dynamik. Der Präsident des Bundeskriminalamtes, Holger Münch, sieht eine Welle der Gewalt und die BKA-Zahlen sprechen eine deutliche Sprache. So sind beispielsweise die Gewaltdelikte also Mord, Totschlag, Raub, Vergewaltigung, schwere Körperverletzung laut BKA im ersten Halbjahr 2023 regelrecht explodiert. Es gab einen Anstieg um 17% gegenüber des Vorjahres und die Zahl der nicht-deutschen Tatverdächtigen nahm sogar um 23% zu. Auch brisant die Zahl der nicht-deutschen Tatverdächtigen im Jugendalter stieg besonders dramatisch an, um sage und schreibe 37% und von der Clankriminalität meine Lieben, da wollen wir gar nicht erst reden. Grund 5 warum die Remigration eine wunderbare Sache ist, denn sie bedeutet ja auch Abschreckung, vor allem im Hinblick auf die oft zitierten Pull Faktoren. In Deutschland gibt es unstrittig mit den höchsten...Willkommen zu Grund 5. Warum die Remigration eine wunderbare Sache ist. Denn die bedeutet ja auch Abschreckung, vor allem im Hinblick auf die Pull-Faktoren. Wir wissen, in Deutschland gibt es für diese Leute die meiste Staats-Knete und deswegen kommen sie. Hinzu kommt der sogenannte Familiennachzug, wenn es sich in Migrantenkreisen aber erst einmal rumgesprochen hat, dass die neue deutsche Einwanderungsdevise ‚Zurück, Marsch, Marsch‘ heißt, wird nach Einschätzung von Experten, ach dazu muss man kein Experte sein, wird der Migrationsdruck ganz automatisch nachlassen. Grund 6 warum Remigration eine feine Sache ist: Ende 2022 lebten in Deutschland bereits 900 000 Syrer, das sind fast 1000000 Menschen, in der Mehrzahl sind das überwiegend...Grund 6 war, ob die Remigration eine ganz, ganz feine Sache ist. Ende 2022 lebten bereits rund 900 000 Syrer in Deutschland, in der Mehrzahl junge Männer, also fast 1000000. Das sind Männer, die dringend zum Wiederaufbau ihrer weitgehend befriedeten Heimat gebraucht werden. Remigration bedeutet in diesem Sinne also auch eine Entwicklungshilfe der ganz praktischen Art, und zwar ohne, dass der deutsche Steuerzahler belastet wird. Grund 7 warum Remigration eine tolle Sache ist, man wagt es ja kaum noch laut auszusprechen, aber Remigration bedeutet auch Wahrung unserer kulturellen Identität. Unserer abendländischen Werte. Wohin die Reise, sonst geht, hat Bestsellerautor

Thilo Sarrazin schon 2010 in seinem Klassiker ‚Deutschland schafft sich ab‘ geschrieben. Vor 5 Jahren legte er mit seinem Buch ‚Feindliche Übernahme‘ nach, wie der Islam den Fortschritt behindert und die Gesellschaft bedroht. Wir kommen zum 8. Grund, warum die Remigration eine ganz hervorragende Sache ist. Es ist ein Punkt, der mir persönlich ganz, ganz wichtig ist, es kann nicht sein meine Lieben, es kann nicht sein, dass die deutsche Frau da, überhaupt irgendeine Frau, ganz egal wo sie herkommt, sich in Deutschland, also in ihrem eigenen Land, sofern sie deutsch ist, nicht mehr angstfrei bewegen kann. Sie kann nicht mehr abends unbeschwert U-Bahn fahren, auf Party gehen, was weiß ich, sie meidet Parks, sie meidet bestimmte Gegenden, bestimmte Straßen, das ist alles kein Zustand, das kann nicht sein und sowas gab es früher nicht, es gab es zu meiner Jugend nicht. Ach es gab es bis in die 90er Jahre gab es das nicht. Da konnte die Frau unbeschwert überall hingehen. Sicherlich, es gab auch damals, aber lässt sich überhaupt nicht vergleichen, also da müssen wir wieder hinkommen, Frauen müssen sich in Deutschland wieder sicher fühlen, sie müssen wieder angstfrei, egal wie sie angezogen sind, da würden sie nackt rumlaufen, müssen wieder angstfrei sich überall bewegen können. Grund 9 warum Remigration einfach nur klasse ist, auch wieder ein Punkt der mir ganz persönlich wichtig ist. Wenn ich in eine deutsche Großstadt gehe, dann möchte ich mich auch wie in einer deutschen Großstadt fühlen. Das gilt übrigens auch für ausländische Städte, wenn ich nach Paris fliege, dann möchte ich da Franzosen sehen, dann möchte ich da die französische Sprache hören, das gilt für Rom, das gilt für London, ganz egal, aber eben auch für Berlin, für München, für Frankfurt, für Köln, für Hamburg und so weiter und sofort, wenn ich da aussteige, zum Beispiel auf dem Hauptbahnhof, dann komme ich mir vor wie den Islamabad und das kann doch nicht sein. Das muss aufhören. Also, ganz ehrlich, Freunde, was ist los? So meine Lieben, wir kommen zum letzten Grund, zum 10. Grund, warum die Remigration eine ganz ganz ausgezeichnete Sache ist. Das ein Punkt, der mich persönlich nicht mehr betrifft, aber ich habe ja ein großes Herz, ich fühle ja auch mit meinen Geschlechtsgenossen. Ratet doch mal bitte ratet doch mal bitte wie hoch die Migrantenzahl ist bei den Jungs zwischen 15 und 20 Jahren. Ja. Die ist 34%. Das bedeutet? Mehr als jeder Dritte. Junge zwischen 15 und 20 ist ein Migrant. Ja, und was bedeutet das? In der Welt der Liebe, in der Damenwelt. Ist eine absolute Katastrophe, eine absolute Katastrophe. Deutschen Jungs haben es sowieso schwer, müssen ankämpfen gegen diese Machos aus dem Morgenland, eh schwer, wir wissen ja, was Frauen so anzieht und dann kommen auch noch die Massen dazu, auch ein Zustand, der so nicht funktionieren kann, weil es kommen ja auch keine Frauen oder kaum Frauen. Es kommen ja immer nur Männer. Also,

meine Lieben. Das waren 10 Gründe, wenn die nicht reichen, dann weiß ich auch nicht mehr weiter. Haut rein und bis später.

TikTok

TikTok 1

Accessible via:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20240525131323/https://www.tiktok.com/@petrbystronafd/video/7325750923521772832>

Transcript

00:00:02

Wir stehen hier mitten in Berlin, inmitten der größten Proteste seit langem. Die Bauern stehen hier, wenige hundert Meter von hier mit ihren Treckern. Es sind Zehntausende am Montag gekommen, sie demonstrieren immer noch. Hinter mir, das Kanzleramt gibt keine Antwort. Stattdessen produziert man eine präparierte Kampagne von einer NGO, die vom Bundeskanzleramt und von Soros finanziert wird.

00:00:33

Correctiv, mit geheimdienstlichen Mitteln wurde ein Kompromaterial hergestellt ähnlich wie in Österreich. 'Ibiza' war mit Lügen versetzt und diese Lügen werden dann in die Headlines transportiert und darüber soll jetzt Deutschland diskutieren. Die Medien haben diese Falschbehauptungen völlig ungeprüft copy und paste übernommen. Alle großen Medien spielen dieses Spiel mit. Es wird versucht das über Tage einfach weiter zu spielen um die Berichterstattung über die großen Massenproteste zu überlagern. Die Menschen stehen auf der Straße. Das sind schon längst nicht nur Bauern; das sind alle möglichen anderen Berufsgruppen.

00:01:05

Es sind Truck-Fahrer, es sind Bäcker, Metzger, alles. Es sind sogar die Gewerkschaften der Eisenbahner, das heißt, das Land steht still, die Menschen stehen auf der Straße, sie fordern Rücktritt dieser Regierung, sie fordern: 'Neuwahlen! Neuwahlen!' Wir lassen uns von dieser Schmierenkampagne gegen die AfD nicht beirren. Die Bauern lassen sich nicht beirren. Die Menschen lassen sich nicht beirren, die wissen ganz genau, was hier gespielt wird. Sie protestieren weiter, bis wir Neuwahlen haben.

00:01:36

Bis diese schlechteste Regierung Deutschlands seit langer, langer Zeit zurückgetreten ist.

TikTok 2

Accessible via:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20240525130602/https://www.tiktok.com/@petrbystronafd/video/7328822400232066336>

Transcript

00:00:04

Ganz Deutschland demonstriert gegen die AfD.

00:00:10

Schauen Sie, wer da wirklich demonstriert. Das sind die Vorfeldorganisationen der linksextremen Grünen, der SPD, das ist die Asylindustrie. Warum demonstrieren die? Sie haben Angst.

00:00:23

Dass sie um ihre Wähler kommen, dass sie nicht mehr von den Steuergeldern, von der Umverteilung leben können werden, wenn wir an die Macht kommen.

00:00:33

So wird das sein. Das ist ein Versprechen, denn wir sind an der Seite der Bevölkerung, wir sind an der Seite der arbeitenden Menschen des Mittelstandes, die demonstrieren mit den Bauern, und das ist ein echter Aufstand, da sind wir dabei.

TikTok 3

Access via:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20240525133051/https://www.tiktok.com/@afdfraktionimbundestag/video/7324672319329160481>

Transcript

00:00:01

Was wir wollen, wenn wir beispielsweise ein Wort wie Remigration in den Mund nehmen, dann ist das klar definiert. Dann ist das die Rückführung von Migranten bei uns nach rechtsstaatlichen Grundsätzen; nach Grundsätzen, die der Rechtsstaat fordert, die der Rechtsstaat quasi erzwingen will.

00:00:22

Das sind die Rückführung all jener endgültig abgelehnten Asylbewerber, die ausreisepflichtig sind und auch aller Bürgerkriegsflüchtlinge, die zu uns gekommen sind, denen wir Schutz gewährt haben, solange der Bürgerkrieg herrscht, die aber wieder zurück müssen. Das sind allein bei Syrern achthunderttausend. Sechshunderttausend haben Schutz bei Zweihunderttausend ist das noch unterwegs, die, die Entscheidung. Aber es gibt auf jeden Fall Hunderttausende, die natürlich zurück müssen nach Syrien, der Krieg ist vorbei, das handelt die dänische Regierung beispielsweise so, da regieren Sozialdemokraten, da müssen die Syrer zurück nach Syrien, nachdem sie hier jahrelang Hilfe bekommen haben, Unterstützung bekommen haben, Schutz bekommen haben;

00:01:03

das ist das, was wir fordern, rechtsstaatliche Remigration in Deutschland, in die Staaten zurück, das hat mit Massendeportation und diesen ganzen Nazibegriffen, mit denen das überstülpt wird, das sehen wir eine Reaktion, einer - lassen Sie mich offen reden – links-grünen Gesamtblase der Altparteien, die von Angst getrieben sind, und teilen der Medien. Wer einen deutschen Pass hat, ist Deutscher mit allen Rechten und Pflichten. Genauso ob der jetzt irgendwie seit 1000 Jahren zurück einen Stammbaum hat hier oder nicht. Das ist keine Frage.

TikTok 4

Access via:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20240525133357/https://www.tiktok.com/@afdfraktionimbundes tag/video/7324717706698050848>

Transcript

00:00:09

Die Position der AFD und der AFD-Bundestagsfraktion zum Umgang mit der millionenfachen, irregulären und illegalen Migration seit 2015 wird nicht in angeblichen Geheimtreffen festgelegt, sondern auf Parteitag und in Parteigremien. Das wissen Sie auch sie ist im Grundsatzprogramm von 2016 festgelegt, dem EU Wahlprogramm und den zahlreichen Stellungnahmen sowie Parlamentsreden nachzulesen und zu hören.

00:00:49

Das erklärte Ziel der AFD ist die Ausschöpfung aller rechtsstaatlichen Mittel, um illegale Grenzübertritte zu verhindern durch effektive Grenzkontrollen. Nicht aufenthaltsberechtigte Kriminelle und terrorverdächtige Migranten auszuweisen und abzuschieben, Einbürgerungen restriktiv zu handhaben. und missbräuchlich erlangte Staatsbürgerschaften abzuerkennen.

00:01:25

Wer deutscher Staatsbürger ist, gehört ohne Frage ohne Zweifel zum deutschen Staatsvolk. Gerade deshalb darf die deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft nicht verramscht werden und mit der

Gießkanne verteilt werden. Und das sehr verehrte Damen und Herren, ist die Durchsetzung von geltendem Recht und Gesetz, das von Regierungsseite seit. Jetzt, fast einem Jahrzehnt so sträflich vernachlässigt wird.

00:02:00

Skandalös an diesem Vorgang von letzter Woche, ist, dass über den eigentlichen Skandal geschwiegen wird. Es ist skandalös, wenn linke Aktivisten mit stasiähnlichen Geheimdienst und Zersetzungsmethoden eine private Zusammenkunft angreifen, um unbescholtene Bürger abzuhören und auszuspähen.

00:02:26

Es ist skandalös, wenn diese Aktivistengruppe, die unter dem Deckmantel der journalistischen Recherche auftritt, von staatlichen Stellen massiv mit Steuergeldern finanziert wird. Es ist skandalös, wenn eine Mehrheit der etablierten Medien die böswilligen Fehlinterpretationen und unwahren Behauptungen, dubiose Aktivisten ohne Prüfung aufgreifen und weiterverbreiten, als handele es sich um eine seriöse Quelle.

00:03:04

Es ist ein Skandal - wenn solche Machenschaften für eine Kampagne instrumentalisiert werden, die das Ziel verfolgt, privaten Meinungs Austausch zu kriminalisieren und unter Gesinnungskontrolle zu stellen. Um es mal ganz deutlich zu sagen. Es ist skandalös, die Opposition zu diffamieren und mit Verbotsforderung zu überziehen. Überziehen und legitime politische Debatten abzuwürgen.

00:03:41

Die unreflektiert übernommenen, maßlosen NS vergleiche, Stichwort Wannseekonferenz 2.0. Wo leben wir bitteschön? Sind nicht nur eine skandalöse Verharmlosung von NS Verbrechen. Die Korrektivkampagne verfolgt offenkundig den Zweck, die radikal linke Forderung nach Bleiberecht für alle mit der Moralkеule Durchzupeitschen, indem Abschiebungen mit Vertreibungen und Deportationen gleichgesetzt werden. Das ist der Kern. Denselben Zweck, den sie politisch einseitig motivierte. Erklärung des Begriffs Welch Zufall Remigration zum Unwort des Jahres. Die Durchsetzung geltenden Rechts wird moralisch für unsagbar und undenkbar erklärt.

00:04:45

Skandalös ist die Doppelmoral mit der Ampel und Unionspolitiker dieses Kampagnen Framing übernehmen. Obwohl sie selbst eben noch Abschiebungen in großen Stil gefordert haben, wie Olaf Scholz. Nachträgliche Ausbürgerung von Antisemiten und Hamas Anhängern wie die SPD und die CDU Rheinland-Pfalz.

00:05:13

Und sogar die tatsächlich verfassungsfeindliche Abschiebung ganzer Clanfamilien auch ohne Straftatbestand gefordert wurden. Von der super Innenministerin Nancy Faeser. Wo war da die Empörung? Die waren Verfassungsfeinde sind jene, die nach Parteiverbot.

00:05:38

Nach Entzug von bürgerlichen Grundrechten und dem politischen instrumentalisierten sogenannten Verfassungsschutz, weil sie die Möglichkeit eines demokratischen Machtwechsels zur Opposition nicht akzeptieren könnten, weil sie der wachsenden Unzufriedenheit der Bürger über ihre Politik nicht mehr Herr werden können und weil sie von ihrem eigenen Versagen ablenken wollen.

TikTok 5

Access via:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20240525140529/https://www.tiktok.com/@afdfraktionimbundestag/video/7325464438104952097>

Transcript

00:00:04

Politiker von der Ampelunion verfälschen unsere Forderungen gerade beim Thema Remigration. Auch in der Tagesschau der AfD war die Woche zu hören, der ARD, war diese Woche zu hören “unter dem Begriff ‘Remigration’ verstehe die AfD die Zwangsausweisung bis hin zur Massendeportation von Millionen Menschen”, so ihre Rede ARD und ZDF. Was für eine hinterhältige Kampagne von Politikern und Journalisten der abgewirtschafteten links-grünen Klasse!

00:00:37

Aber die Bürger durchschauen Sie! Sie glauben Ihren Schwachsinn nicht mehr. Wir erleben das Ende einer Epoche, wir überleben hier, erleben jetzt hier das Ende der links-grünen Dominanz in Deutschland, meine Damen und Herren.

00:00:52

Die Zeiten, in denen solche Politikgaukler alle Macht hatten, sind vorbei. Der Wind dreht sich, für Deutschland kommt etwas Neues, für Deutschland kommt die AfD ob Sie es wollen oder nicht.

TikTok 6

Access via:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20240525134356/https://www.tiktok.com/@afdfraktionimbundes/tag/video/7326983100666285344>

Transcript

00:00:01

Frau Huy ist wie viele in ihrer Fraktion eine Neo-Faschistin.

00:00:09

Also das sind böartigste Unterstellungen, die Sie hier verbreiten.

00:00:14

Sie übernehmen ungeprüft irgendwelche Aussagen einer kriminellen Recherche, lassen Sie mich ausreden, und beteiligen sich an einer Schmierenkomödie ungeheuren Ausmaßes.

00:00:28

Es war weder von Vertreibungen, und hören Sie mir gefälligst zu, noch von Deportationen die Rede.

00:00:32

Meiner Partei geht es ausschließlich um rechtsstaatliche Maßnahmen, die Sie nicht durchsetzen! Das ist Staatsversagen. Deswegen versuchen sie auch mit dieser Schmierenkomödie von Ihrem Versagen abzulenken, weil sie es nicht schaffen, wieder Ordnung ins Asylchor zu bringen.

00:00:48

Die Bürger sehen das, und sie lassen Sie ernsthaft schrumpfen. Danke.

TikTok 7

Access via:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20240525133533/https://www.tiktok.com/@afdfraktionimbundes tag/video/7327249454162038049>

Transcript

00:00:03

Investigativer Journalismus, der ist gut, ich hab selber Journalismus gelernt, ein paar Jahre da gearbeitet, aber er arbeitet nicht mit Lügen und Verleumdung. Da wird behauptet, Sie haben das ja gerade festgestellt, es geht um Deportation oder Massenvertreibung oder sowas, darum ging es bei dem Treffen nicht und darum geht es bei uns nicht so viel zum Journalismus, das deutsche Volk sind alle die den deutschen Pass besitzen mit gleichen Rechten und Pflichten, da gibt es keine Staatsbürgerschaft erster, lassen sie mich doch ausreden, keine Staatsbürgerschaft erster und zweiter Klasse in all unseren Reden, all unserem Programm, all unseren Flyern, all unserem Denken ist das der Kern der Sache, das ist der Kern des Rechtsstaates.

00:00:28

Ja, das stimmt nicht ganz, den wenn man Ihnen in den sozialen Medien folgt und wenn man von einzelnen, auch Bundestagsabgeordneten, sieht, was sie twittern oder welche Plakate sie quasi publizieren, da kann man ihnen widersprechen.

00:00:51

Machen Sie doch Belege. Das ist eine Kampagne übelster Art.

00:01:00

Ja, das haben wir jetzt verstanden, dass das eine Kampagne gegen Sie ist.

00:01:00

Übelster Art!

00:01:05

ARD und ZDF machen sich damit gemein. Das werden die Bürger jetzt ja auch rauskriegen, das sehen die ja.

00:01:13

Die 1 Million, die am Wochenende auf die Straße gegangen sind, um für die Grundrechte, die Verfassung und die Demokratie zu demonstrieren haben glaube ich einen eigenen Willen und sind freiwillig auf die Straßen gegangen, denn noch leben wir in einer Demokratie. Bernd Baumann, vielen Dank.

00:01:19

Die haben Ihre Nachrichten gehört, die sind von ihnen sozusagen falsch informiert.

00:01:24

Ich lass das mal so stehen. Danke Ihnen.

00:01:25

Bitte.