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Department of Politics and Society | Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities

Wir schaffen das! But at what cost?

The Securitization of Foreign Aid to Deter Migration in the Case of the Refugee Crisis in 2015/2016 in Germany

Name: Jonas Tobias Träger

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Supervisor: Dominik Schraff

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This thesis deals with the role donor strategic interests hold within the prism of motivations that are responsible for allocating aid to recipients. Thus, the variable of donor interest is too broad for analysis; migration deterrence has been identified as the variable of interest. Germany during the refugee crisis has been chosen as a case due to its increased likelihood of displaying migration-detering characteristics in their response to the crisis. The theoretical underpinnings of securitization theory have been utilized by a process tracing methodological approach combined with aspects of discourse analysis to develop and operationalize a causal mechanism linking migration pressure to the allocation of aid, with the aim to test its validity. The analysis of the paper showed that there had been securitizing moves by members of the German government “Merkel III,” but also opposite actions could be tracked. Furthermore, the audience in the form of the greater public, as well as the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the umbrella organization “Verband Entwicklungspolitik und humanitäre Hilfe” (VENRO) showed a more polarized reception to the construction of migration as a threat to the German state. However, it could be determined that the audience accepted the threat more than opposed it. This subsequently led to the step of emergency measures that were adopted due to a legitimate threat. The ones that were investigated were a disproportionate increase in the BMZ's budget and special initiatives by the ministry. Secondly, through the BMZ, development policy became more intertwined with security motives, which became visible through a joint initiative concerning returning rejected asylum seekers more effectively. The notion of security concerns trumping humanitarian ideals was also visible in the allocation of safe countries of origin. Regarding the two multilateral initiatives it similar findings have been made. In the case of the EU-Turkey Statement, the EU, coordinated by Germany in that case, essentially paid aid in return for security promises. Similar to this, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, focused also more on ordering principles instead of principles of sustainable development. So overall, it has been found that development policy and therefore foreign was central to the response, but had to subordinate it self to security imperative and therefore donor self interest.

Table of Contents

Abstract	1
1. Introduction	4
2. Literature Review	7
2.1 General Motives Behind the Allocation of Bilateral Aid	7
2.2 Motives of Donor Interest	8
2.2.1 Commercial Donor Interest	9
2.2.2 Domestic Donor Motivation	9
2.2.3 International Political Donor Motivation	10
2.2.4 Migration Pressure Prevention	10
2.2.5 Securitization of Aid	11
3. Theory	12
3.1 Securitization Theory	12
4. Methodology	15
4.1 Case Study	16
4.2 Case Selection	16
4.3 Timeframe	17
4.4 Causal Process Tracing	18
4.5 Causal Mechanism	20
4.6 Discourse Analysis	22
4.7 Data Selection	22
5. Operationalization	23
5.1 Construction of the Issue	24
5.2 Audience Reception	25
5.3 Extraordinary Measures	28
5.4 Normalization/Desecuritization	29
6. Analysis	30
6.1 Construction of the Issue	30
6.2 Audience Reception	36

6.2.1 General Public	36
6.2.2 Civil Society Organizations and Donor Agency	39
6.2.2.1 Venro	39
6.2.2.2 GIZ.....	40
6.3 Extraordinary Measures.....	42
6.3.1 Bilateral Extraordinary Measures	42
6.3.1.1 Increased focus on Fluchtursachen and the SI Flucht.....	42
6.3.1.2 Development and Domestic Security Intertwined	43
6.3.1.3 Sichere Herkunftsländer (Safe Countries of Origin).....	46
6.3.4 EU Emergency Measures	47
6.3.4.1 EU-Turkey statement	47
6.3.4.2 European Emergency Trust Fund for Africa	49
7.Conclusion.....	50
Bibliography	54

1.Introduction

Morgenthau defined Aid as *“transferring money, goods, and services from one nation to another.”* (Morgenthau,1964, p.305). This pretty broad statement offers a good point of departure as it encompasses the broad essence of foreign aid. The most predominant definition, which has been adopted by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD DAC, one of the most important international forums in that regard, defines official developmental assistance (ODA) as constituted by 3 elements. First, it has to be provided by *“official agencies, including state and government officials or by their executive agencies”* (OECD DAC, 2024). The relevant ones will be shortly defined later in this section. Secondly, transactions have to be conducted *“(…) with the promotion of economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective”* (OECD DAC, 2024) and furthermore have to be *“concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent)”* (OECD DAC, 2024). In the most updated definition, the grant element of discount was further fanned out by adding different grant requirements for different for different groups of recipients. When one is looking at the global scale, the importance of ODA becomes visible. According to recent numbers from the OECD DAC, official development assistance reached all-time highs in 2022 and 2023, standing at 202 billion USD and, respectively, 223 billion USD, according to recent official estimates (OECD DAC, 2024), due to a variety of reasons, one of which can be seen in the response to the Ukraine war. Those numbers show that there is definitely a need for the existence of such a political instrument. However, motivations by donors might not be as altruistic as depicted above and can be multifold. The literature regarding donor motivations differentiates between three overarching themes guiding the allocation of aid: Altruistic motives that follow the logic of recipients' needs and recipient merit, where donor countries base their allocation to recipients according to different factors like quality of institutions, among others. The last category can oppose the understanding of ODA as an altruistic endeavor, as this category believes that foreign aid is driven by donors' strategic interests. The notion of self-interest was further echoed and supported by Hans Morgenthau, who claimed that diplomacy, propaganda, military policy, and aid *“(…) are all weapons in the political*

armory of the nation” (Morgenthau, 1964, p. 309). Around the same time, in 1962, Montgomery highlighted that *“Foreign aid as a political instrument of U.S. policy is here to stay because of its usefulness and flexibility”* (p.9)

He also indicated the strategic usefulness of aid for donor governments, which would add resilience to the concept. The notion of donor interest is also visible in later accounts, one of them being ex-US President Barack Obama, who stated, *“Development isn’t charity. It’s one of the smartest investments we can make in our shared future — in our security and our prosperity”* (Obama, 2016). One aspect of donor interest is concerned with the objective of deterring migration flows. Migration has been broadly defined by the International Organization for Migration, a UN body specialized in the subject matter, as *“a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons.”* (IOM, 2019). This definition must be mentioned because it is a working definition used internally by the institution, distilled from various international definitions(IOM,2019). However, without a universal definition of a migrant, this definition offers a great departure from the topic, as it can be understood as a distillation of the common features present in various definitions. A narrower definition will be offered by including a table borrowed by Kinzelbach et al. (2017):

	Voluntary	Involuntary
Regulated	Regulated Labour migration through recruitment programmes Family reunification Educational migration Voluntary return	Irregular labor migration Family reunification People smuggling
Unregulated	Irregular labor migration Family reunification People smuggling	Flight and internal flight Human trafficking

From this table, it can be deduced that not all forms of migration can be seen as a threat. Examples of voluntary and regulated migration can generally be regarded as advantageous for states that are most likely not subject to deterrence. Migration has been a polarized topic since what has been dubbed the “*long summer of migration*”, where an extraordinary amount of foreigners entered the EU. Germany was among the most affected states within Europe during this period, with over 1 million out of the 1.2 million migrants and refugees coming to Germany. This led to the infamous “*Wir schaffen das!*” (*We can do it!*) slogan of perseverance introduced by Angela Merkel in 2015. In that sense, the country offers a most likely case for measures undertaken to deal with the migration influx and an extreme case due to the unparalleled number of people entering German borders. This makes it a fitting case for analyzing the variable of interest in the form of migration deterrence and a wider scope as a security variable. Therefore, the research question of this thesis is the following:

How was development assistance used in the German government's response to the refugee crisis in 2015/2016?

By answering this question, this project will contribute to the growing literature regarding the motivations of foreign aid, specifically the literature focusing on the effects of migration pressure on aid allocation and donor strategic interests. Furthermore, this paper will also partially contribute to the growing literature regarding the securitization of aid, as the theory will be utilized in this project.

In the second section of this paper, the variety of motivations by bilateral donors behind the allocation of aid will be introduced. This thesis' third section will first define and operationalize the relevant theoretical underpinnings, namely securitization theory. Further, the selection of the case of Germany as the most likely extreme case for migration deterrence policies will be justified, while the methodology of this paper will be introduced in a causal process tracing approach. The analysis aims to test the causal mechanism established in the theoretical section, which now consists of several mechanisms that will be one by one for sufficiency and efficiency.

2. Literature Review

The Literature review, which will be conducted in the following, aims to illustrate the complexity of states' motivations behind allocating aid.

2.1 General Motives Behind the Allocation of Bilateral Aid

The following section will review the literature regarding the general motives of bilateral aid. The motives of aid are multifold and sometimes hard to disentangle. It can be differentiated between the three motivations behind allocating bilateral aid: recipient needs, donor strategy, and recipient merits.

The first two were outlined in the seminal work *“A Foreign Policy Model of U.S Bilateral Aid Allocation”* by Kinlay and Little in 1977. According to them, there are two different rationales for allocating aid, mainly for foreign aid objectives and recipient needs. They find that the foreign aid argument seemed predominant within the US allocation of the 1960s and 1970s. This is further echoed by one of the intellectual forefathers of the theory of realism, who claimed that foreign aid is one of the tools of the state in pursuit of its foreign policy tools (Morgenthau, 1962).

Donor interest can be understood pretty broadly as it encompasses security concerns, the necessity for access to export markets or specific imports from the recipient nation, the historical ties between the donor and recipient, and power-political motivations. In the second part of this section, donor strategic motives will be further reviewed as they are essential for this project.

Opposite to the view of donor strategic motivation is the view based on the assumption that states allocate foreign aid according to the humanitarian needs of the recipient nation. According to Hoefler and Outram (2011), recipient needs are still important when deciding the motivations behind allocating aid. Further, it has been suggested that the importance of self-interest has been overstated and that recipient merit does not seem to influence bilateral donors (Hoefler & Outram, 2011).

Recipient merit refers to the argument that the quality of governments and institutions in place influences the donor's motivations in allocating aid (Burnside & Dollar, 2000). The literature has discussed further motives and dynamics.

Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor (1998) identify three overarching motives: humanitarian need, strategic importance, and economic potential. They also recognize three additional motives: cultural similarity, ideological stance, and region.

Allesina and Dollar (2000) find evidence that the per-capita income of the recipient nations plays a role in the motives regarding the allocation of aid but also supports the strategic considerations and the notion of colonial ties. Earlier research on aid determinants has shown that colonial legacies lead to greater donor generosity. They further find that formerly colonized country receives more foreign aid than other countries with similar levels of poverty, a superior policy stance but without a past as a colony (Alessina & Dollar, 2000).

So, overall, the motivations behind allocating aid are complex and multifold. Literature seems to support more substantial evidence for self-interest motives than recipient need and merit. As already established, this project wants to look into recent donor strategic motivations. However, donor strategic motivations are too broad to be the variable of interest for a proper analysis. Therefore, the literature regarding donor strategic motivations can generally be divided into political-related and economic self-interest. They can further be divided into domestic motives and international motives. These three categories will be reviewed before the relevant literature regarding the securitization of aid will be assessed.

2.2 Motives of Donor Interest

The following part of the literature aims to zoom further into the aspect of donors' interests within the literature about allocating aid. This is important as donor motivation itself is too unspecific to allow for conducting a deep analysis of the phenomenon. The structure follows the categorization Dreher et al. (2023) identified in their project.

Therefore, the literature regarding donor motivations will be divided into two bigger subcategories. First, there will be the political-related motives. Those motives have been subdivided into domestic motives on one side and international interests on the other side. Secondly, there is a linkage between commercial interest and aid allocation. In addition, the growing literature about the securitization of aid will also be included in this literature review.

2.2.1 Commercial Donor Interest

Here, the evidence of a link between the commercial interest of donors and their allocation of aid in literature will be reviewed. Empirical research has been suggesting a strong correlation between aid allocation and trade. Research suggests a positive relationship between trade openness and aid allocation (Allesina & Dollar, 2000). Hoefler and Outram (2011) further prove this hypothesis, finding that all states allocate more money to trading partners. Generally, it can be stated that there is a well-established correlation between commercial interests and the allocation of aid.

2.2.2 Domestic Donor Motivation

Generally, it is stated that the domestic environment influences aid allocation. The ideological composition seems to play a role in the channel choice. According to Flynn and Allen(2017), more liberal-leaning partners prefer to allocate aid towards non-governmental organizations and civil society actors, while more conservative governments tend to give more money through bilateral channels.

Secondly, the allocation of money also seems to be motivated by ideological reasons as the government favors like-minded and friendly regimes, at least in the case of the USA. Further, those bilaterally aligned countries seem to receive more bilateral aid during election years. Further, Dreher et al. (2021) showed that Chinese aid increased significantly during election years toward the birth regions of the leader. Overall, there is substantial evidence that domestic politics affect the allocation. Government ideology plays an important role in the allocation and in the temporal position in the election circle.

2.2.3 International Political Donor Motivation

It has been widely accepted in the literature regarding donors' motivations that international political interest is one of the drivers behind the motivation to allocate foreign aid. One particular aspect that has been echoed throughout the literature is the use of aid for geopolitical gains. Bilateral actors tend to use aid to pursue their foreign aid goals. Alessina and Dollar (2000) suggest that aid allocation is connected to the alignment of UN voting patterns and colonial past and, therefore, is used to maintain political ties. According to Weiler et al. (2018), this is also the case regarding allocating climate-related aid. Hoefler and Outram (2011) have also echoed the notion of allocating aid. If only temporarily, being a member of the UNSC has certain advantages for allocating aid to certain countries. For example, Alexander and Rooney (2019) find a causal link: the USA uses the money to “bribe” countries that threaten the adoption of US resolutions. However, the USA is not the only country to employ this strategy. Literature suggests that Japan and China show similar patterns (Alexander & Rooney, 2019) in influencing voting behavior in a multilateral environment. Similarly, evidence has been found that even humanitarian aid is used for geopolitical purposes (Narang, 2015).

Overall, the literature provides solid evidence that several bilateral actors use the allocation of aid for geopolitical purposes. Factors that seem to influence this are maintaining relations with former colonies and the voting patterns in multilateral organizations.

2.2.4 Migration Pressure Prevention

The literature regarding the deterrence of migration pressure has been growing since the events of the migration crisis. Already in 2003, Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen (2003) noted that member states of the EU showed evidence of using development aid to reduce migration and refugee flows from areas such as the Middle East and Africa, while the US connected the issue of migration.

Another aspect that can be identified is the prevention of migration pressures, which seems to be in play in recent years. Here, research conducted by Bermeo (2015) has

proven that the number of migrants from a certain country plays a role in the amount allocated to the diaspora's home country. Similarly, Czaka (2009) observed a rise in aid to those countries where most migrants arrive. Further, it has been established that bilateral donors react especially sensitively to asylum seekers' migration pressure (Czaka & Mayer, 2011). Contrary to that, the argument has been made that migration aids' capacity to deter migration is relatively small, as its effect on improving socioeconomic conditions is limited, and observation suggests the opposite effect of aid on migration flows from low-income countries (Clemens & Postel, 2018). The next section will review the existing literature regarding the securitization of aid.

2.2.5 Securitization of Aid

A growing sub-body of academic literature deals with the securitization of aid. The literature on aid accepts that the events of September 11 led to an increased securitization of aid budgets (Brown & Grävingholt, 2016). Furness and Gänzle (2017) conclude that evidence for the securitization of EU streams seems to be deliberate and, therefore, is not strong enough to function as a causal factor to explain the intertwining between security and development. Regarding the definition of the securitization of aid, there are two predominant definitions. This definition offered by Olivié and Perez is pretty straightforward, focused on the implications of the securitized discourse, following the constructivist logic of speech acts as described in the Copenhagen School of Securitization. They define the securitization of aid as (...) *manifested in increasing references to security, conflict, fragile states, terrorism or the perils of migration in development cooperation white papers, master plans or official interventions in national parliaments or multilateral fora*” (Olivié and Perez, 2021, p.3)

The definition offered by Grävingholt and Brown (2016) goes beyond the focus only on discourse as it defines the securitization of aid as a process “(...) *when donors increasingly justify aid in terms of national or international security when they provide the highest levels of assistance to specific countries and sectors based on security imperatives when security actors (such as military forces) deliver significant amounts of aid, and when donor governments create new institutional units within their aid agencies*

or new interdepartmental coordination mechanisms based on security-related motives” (p.3).

This definition embodies three dimensions of the securitization of aid. First, there is the discourse dimension, similar to the previous definition. The second dimension refers to the aid flows themselves, which are potentially to be changed by security actors providing more aid. The third dimension here refers to the potential policy change that can be seen. The second definition, therefore, goes beyond the scope of the Copenhagen School of Securitization theory and could, therefore, also be of great use for this project. Following the assessment of the literature regarding donor interests in allocating development aid, it can be stated that investigating a causal relationship between migration deterrence and aid allocation can be seen as a good framework for investigating how donor self-interest affects its allocation of aid.

3. Theory

3.1 Securitization Theory

In the case of this thesis securitization theory will be utilized to trace how the framing of migration during the 2015/2016 migration crisis influenced the German aid allocation. Securitization theory is influenced by many other theories, e.g., critical theory and social constructivism. The traditional Copenhagen School was essential for the development of the theory. In its traditional form, securitization has been defined as *“the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat (...) and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat”* (Buzan & Waever, 1998, p.491).

From this definition, three essential aspects of securitization theory can be derived: the framing of a referent object as an extraordinary threat, interunit relations in the sense that the framing of the threat has to be accepted to gain legitimacy; and the adoption of extraordinary measures to deal with the mentioned securitized threat.

As the beginning of this definition already indicates, the process is focused on language in its initial form. Here, language acts play a significant role in the concept. According to Buzan & Waeuver (1998) *“the process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act”* (p.26).

In that sense, securitization displays a constructivist understanding of multiple discursive realities present as reality is perceived in the discourse. The focus on language or speech acts limits the scope of the theory. Limitations of this definition of securitization are the ignorance of “non-language” speech acts and potential silences.

This further hurts marginalized groups as their experience of securitization is inherently a top-down approach, which ignores power inequalities, as not everyone is in a position to voice their opinion (Nymann, 2013, p.61). Another form of criticism of securitization concerns the lack of a normative agenda (Charret, 2009).

In opposition to that, Guzzini states, *“Only in its most legal sense can security be empirically conceived as a “speech act” in terms of a single event (...) Hence, the idea of a speech refers here to a process, not a kind of single bombshell event”* (Guzzini, 2011, p. 335). The focus means that the speech act can refer not only to one specific act but also to the role of the securitizing actor within the process.

The definition of the securitizing actor is pretty straightforward. A problem can be framed as a security threat only when political elites do so, as they have the legitimacy. (Salter, 2008)

Another critical concept in securitization is the extraordinary measures adopted due to an accepted framing of a referent object as a threat. Those are measures that are employed as a result of the threat being accepted as an eminent problem. The logic of existential measures can be described as *“if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our way)”* (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24).

A definition of securitization that partially encompasses the critique of the Copenhagen School of Securitization was offered by Balzacq, who defined securitization as *“(...) an*

articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artifacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions), about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor's reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development." (Balzacq, 2011 p. 3).

This definition slightly offers the scope of the theory by expanding the concept beyond the scope of language. Here, the focus lies on practices rather than speech acts, as securitization, according to Balzacq, *"can be discursive and non-discursive; intentional and non-intentional; performative but not 'an act in itself'"* (Balzacq, 2010, p.10).

As mentioned above, the role of the audience is an important aspect of the securitizing process. The role of the audience is highlighted by Waever & Buzan, who stated, *"Securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech act: does the audience accept that something is an existential threat to a shared value?"* (Waever & Buzan, 1998, p. 26). Securitization can only be successful if the audience accepts it. The audience has two defining features. First, the audience needs to have a direct connection to the issue. Secondly, the ability to allow the securitizing actor to implement the extraordinary measures proposed (Balzacq, 2011).

However, this aspect of securitization has also been criticized as being understudied and, therefore, under-conceptualized (Wertman et al., 2017, p.67). Within this thesis, the audience can be defined as the general public and relevant civil society organizations connected to the topic of development policy. The role of the GIZ will be critically assessed in the operationalization section of the paper as it can be seen as a somewhat ambiguous case for the audience. Desecuritization can be seen as the opposite of securitization in its dynamics. Key aspects here are a normalization of topics. In the case of migration, for example, that would refer to the framing of migrants as an economic policy or a human rights issue instead. Further visible would this be in a

shift in discourse, where existential threats are becoming everyday issues within political discourse (Waeber, 1993).

Another important factor within the theoretical implications of securitization theory is the referent object and the referent subject. The referent object is the central aspect of the analysis. Generally, it refers to the object threatened within the securitization discourse; in this thesis case, that would be the donor countries' societies and the working of state institutions. From the referent object, one can derive relevant questions for the center of the analysis. The referent subject refers to what has been securitized to combat the threat established before.

Regarding the theories' application to the aid domain, it has been stated that “(...) *several referent objects might eventually be securitized: energy and the environment, global health, trafficking, identity, and migration, religion, or cybersecurity.*” (Olivé & Perez, 2021, p.1905).

Despite its valid criticism, securitization offers a valuable theoretical understanding of the link between aid allocation and deterrence. This project's theoretical underpinnings and methodology will be operationalized to establish an adequate mode of action to answer the research question.

4. Methodology

The following section will describe the methodological considerations for this thesis. In the first part, the case study framework will be outlined, followed by a chapter that justifies the selection of Germany as a case. Afterward, two methodologies relevant to this thesis will be outlined: casual process tracing and discourse analysis, which will be utilized partly in this paper. As a last step, data selection will be outlined before the proposed mechanism is operationalized.

4.1 Case Study

Regarding its empirical framework, this project will act as an explanatory single case study for the overall motivations behind bilateral donors' allocation of aid. The case that will be chosen here will be elaborated on in more depth in the next part.

Generally, a case study has *“an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not evident”* (Yin, 2009, p.14). The research design can be divided further into small and big n-samples. Small n-sample sizes are primarily based on qualitative data, while more extensive n-size samples utilize quantitative methods. As this paper will be based on qualitative data, a smaller sample will be utilized, to be precise, only in the case of Germany. Therefore, $n=1$ in this project. The shortcomings of a single case study are that simple generalizations are more challenging to generate, as the sample size is harder to accomplish. On the other side, it allows a much deeper understanding of the case due to the focus on one specific case. However, the hardships of generalizations can be circumvented by including the case in a bigger theoretical canon, such as the securitization of aid. Therefore, one of the weaknesses of the single-case study does not hinder the relevance of this study. In the case mentioned above, the phenomenon to be analyzed in this project remains potential self-interest in the form of securitization theory. The case selection will be elaborated on in the next section of this paper.

4.2 Case Selection

The following section of the paper will justify the case selection by using the relevant methodology of case sampling, namely purposively sampling. This paper aims to test the validity of a causal mechanism based on the theoretical foundations of securitization theory, which connects migration pressure with aid allocation. Therefore, a case is needed that shows relevant patterns and conditions of the mechanism theorized. As the selection of the case is theory-driven, the aim is to select cases that are expected to provide evidence relevant to the hypothesized causal mechanisms. However, as one is unsure about the theorized outcome, a most likely case sampling will also be employed.

Most likely cases are cases in which a theory is to be considered likely to provide a good explanation for the phenomenon in question if it is to have any application at all (Bennett & Elman, 2010, p. 505). Such a strategy is important when the authors are skeptical of whether the theoretical causal mechanism in its theorized form exists. According to Bleach, *“a positive result will significantly update our confidence in the mechanism in a positive direction (confirmation).”* (Bleach, 2016, p. 16). Germany has been chosen as a case for several reasons.

It offers both an extreme case and a most likely case. Germany did receive during the years of 2015 and 2016 the most refugees within the European Union, with 442.000 people applying for asylum in 2015, constituting for 1/3 out of all European applications in 2015. This makes it, in terms of migration pressure, an extreme case to consider as the number has been comparably higher to other European states (Pew Research, 2016).

On the same side, it makes Germany a very likely case for the theoretical dynamics offered by securitization theory and, therefore, a fitting case to be investigated in this thesis. The quantity of migration influx makes it more likely that migration was framed as a threat to a referent object, e.g., the state and the social cohesion of the nation, which would subsequently lead to the adoption of emergency measures.

This form of migration pressure makes it more likely that the issue of migration will be framed as a threat to aspects of the state; subsequently, adopting emergency measures looks pretty likely to occur in that context.

4.3 Timeframe

In the following section, the timeframe of this study will be described. It has been stated that crisis periods offer an excellent opportunity for establishing a causal link (Robinson, 2017). Guzzini (2011) suggests that the starting point can be more like a series of events, commonly constituting the so-called speech act (p.335).

After considering this aspect, a starting point for analyzing the occurrence of a potential causal mechanism could be the first of January 2015. Those events have the potential

to be catalysts that trigger securitization moves by political elites. Secondly, this timeframe offers great insight as many documents and speech acts make an in-depth case analysis possible. However, this paper needs a temporal end to conduct an adequate analysis of the paper. Here, several cut-off points are possible. One potential cut-off point could be the end of 2017 or 2018, as numbers suggest a decrease in the number of migrants (ProAsly, 2017). An advantage of this would be an advanced focus on the dynamics of the crisis, which could be investigated more in-depth, allowing for a deeper understanding of the underlying mechanisms during that time. A disadvantage of choosing such a relatively short time frame is that it makes tracking some form of institutionalization or normalization a rather difficult endeavor, given its temporal constraints. A mid-range timeframe, for example, until 2020-2023, allows us to focus more on the aspect of “normalization.” However, a disadvantage of such a timeframe could be that other variables, for example, the Covid-19 pandemic or the renewed migration crisis, could cloud the analysis. The timeframe chosen enables this to assess the evolving patterns of aid securitization, as it entails the whole period of 2015.

4.4 Causal Process Tracing

The following section aims to explain another key methodological section of this paper, causal process tracing (CPT). As previously mentioned, the causal relation between the state's self-interest in the form of the deterrence of migration pressures and the allocation of aid and political outcomes within the cases must be explained.

This makes the application of causal process tracing reasonable for this project. A process approach understands the world as events or situations connected through specific processes. As an analytical approach, CPT traces the processes that lead from the causal factor to a specific outcome (Blatter & Haveland, 2014). In other words, CPT depicts the causes of an effect. One important factor making the application of causal process tracing useful in this thesis is the focus on answering how questions (Blatter & Haveland, 2014). This is important as this thesis utilizes those questions to identify how the conditions make the outcome possible and how the underlying mechanisms created the outcome, thus how reality came to be.

Three different uses of the causal process tracing method have been identified. Two of the three categories are centered around theories: theory-testing, process tracing and theory-building process tracing. The other prominent use in social science is explaining outcome process tracing. However, the theory-testing method will be utilized for this project. This form of process tracing aims to investigate whether a particular causal mechanism derived from the theoretical aspects of securitization theory is evident in the case chosen (Blatter & Haveland, 2014).

Therefore, the research mode is inherently deductive. Overall, a theoretical testing process tracing mechanism will be utilized in this project as it allows the distilling of generalizable knowledge by establishing a causal mechanism. Following the explanation of the mode of CPT, which will be utilized in this paper, another core concept of the CPT method, the causal mechanism, will be described in the following section.

Connecting the theoretical implications offered by securitization with the process tracing methodology is possible but not free of contestation. Aligning those is possible as in securitization theory, process tracing seeks *“to examine the social mechanisms which brought a social phenomenon into being”* (Balzacq, 2010, p. 49). Further, it has been suggested that securitization cannot be understood as a mechanism but as a process containing several mechanisms and facilitating mechanisms (Robinson, 2017).

As a result, securitization has exploratory and explanatory power depending on the case context. It could either trigger something else or be triggered by something. It can also work both ways when used in a fitting setting. This makes it an applicable theory to this paper. An issue that potentially, however, arises from this conception of the temporal dimension of the established process. According to Guzzini (2011) *“the very definition stresses the moment of the trigger, whereas the political theory stresses the content of the routine action involved, and most of the empirical applications trace the evolution of the conditions for the performative to take effect – that is, the process.”* (p.337). However, it further states that the temporal dimension of the case should be decided depending on the research objectives and the specifics of the case (p.338).

Therefore, this allows for a more pragmatic handling of the temporal dimension of the process that will be traced. Applying securitization to the means, the core problems are typically illegal and/or involuntary migration. Legal and voluntary forms of migration are not the issue at this project's core, as they are encouraged.

4.5 Causal Mechanism

Here, we will zoom into one of the main concepts regarding the CPT, the causal mechanism. A widely accepted definition of a causal mechanism defines the concept as *“(...) as a series of intervening variables through which an explanatory variable exerts a causal effect on an outcome variable”* (Beach & Pedersen, 2010, p.6).

Two understandings are based on two ontologies when discussing those intervening variables. First, there is a mechanistic understanding of casualization. Here, the causal mechanism is *“a theory of a system of interlocking parts that transmits causal forces from X to Y”* (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 29). This can be best understood using the machine analogy. Each part of the chain is insufficient on its own, but together, they make the x to y sufficient.

Logically, that also means that the absence of one part stops the whole of the machine from working correctly. The other aspect of causalization follows a Humean logic. Here, causalisation is defined as a constant correlation between factors. For causality to be evident, the following three aspects have to be in place: (Beach& Pedersen)

1. X and Y have to be continuous in time and space
2. There is a temporal dimension where Y follows X
3. There are no other alternative explanations. (Beach& Pedersen)

Therefore, this ontology is usable for observing regular patterns between events. However, this is not the aim of this project, as we want to look at the underlying mechanics. Therefore, a more deterministic view makes more sense for this project. The deterministic ontology asserts a cause-effect relationship. According to this belief, there are no random effects along the causal chain, as every cause leads to a particular effect, which is ideally in line with the overall mechanical understanding of causalization

and seems to be more in line with the rest of the methodology of this paper, especially the causal process tracing methodology.

Further, there has to be a description of the differentiation between sufficient and necessary conditions in the causal mechanism. A condition can be defined as necessary if there isn't an expected outcome without its occurrence. Therefore this affects the mechanism because one gear is missing from the mechanic chain comprising many gears. A sufficient condition always leads to the desired outcome, no matter how many other conditions are in place. However, it also has to be mentioned that the condition is not standing alone, and there might be other sufficient causal mechanisms for how x can affect y. Regarding the categorization of mechanisms, academic literature has identified four different shapes of causal mechanisms.

Firstly, there are structural mechanisms. These refer to external constraints and opportunities for political action created by actors' material surroundings. Structural mechanisms try to explain how preferences paired with a certain material structure influence the observed behavior in the chosen case (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

Another category of mechanism is the institutional mechanism. It differentiates from the above-mentioned structural mechanism in the way that institutions can here be understood in a constructivist way as they are man-made. Institutional effects usually deal with how presently able institutions channel actors unintentionally in a specific direction (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

The third category of mechanisms is social. Here, the constructivist methodology is evident as the common denominator. Here, it is claimed that ideas matter for the formation of behavior, and structures or institutions do not constrain those ideas. The last mechanism is physical. Here, the mechanism deals with the hardwired psychological rules and how those psychological dispositions create political action in combination with other factors. What has to be taken into consideration here is that the use of the mechanism is always embedded into the structure of institutions as those are man-made (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

In summary, it can be said that his project will utilize a mechanical understanding of causalization as it is suited best for the already proposed research design.

4.6 Discourse Analysis

This paper will utilize discourse analysis as one method to complement the method of process tracing outlined before. Generally speaking, discourse analysis “(...) *is the study of language in use. It is the study of the meanings we give language and the actions we carry out when we use language in specific contexts.*” (Handford & Gee, 2012, p.1).

Building on the theoretical framework of securitization, discourse analysis is suitable for analyzing how threats are linguistically constructed within discourse analysis has theoretical underpinnings of social constructivist beliefs, namely the social construction of reality through text, language, and discourse. One byproduct of the belief in a constructed reality is the neglect of universal truth. By paying attention to different properties of texts, discourse analysis can be explanatory in how these outcomes may come about (Given, 2008, p.146). This allows for reflection on the potential implications of using security language in framing the threat and will therefore be utilized to track securitizing and desecuritizing moves in the first step of the causal chain.

4.7 Data Selection

As this paper utilizes a case study framework, the data that will be the foundation of this study will be quantitative and qualitative. The nature of a case study approach allows us to utilize several methods for this project. This is because the boundaries between the phenomenon and its context are sometimes hard to distinguish (Yin, 2009).

However, the data selection is not random but logically derived from the research question and sub-questions. Therefore a variety of sources is necessary to be able to test the validity of the established causal mechanism in question.

Different forms of data are used to test each condition present in the theorized mechanism. Therefore, documents, opinion polls, and speeches are the foundation of this project. Those aspects are different for different cases of the causal chain. Speech acts are essential for building the threat and tracking securitization. Therefore,

documents, government interventions, and speeches by securitizing actors will form an important pillar of the first section, as it aims to derive intersubjective truth to assess if and how migration was securitized. Further, the application of language has to be addressed, as there is a difference between the language used in this thesis and the language used in most sources. Almost all relevant sources are logically German, while the official language of this thesis is English. Due to German being the author's mother tongue, it seems plausible for this project to utilize the documents in their original form to catch the construction of a threat as close to its original form. To guarantee a better reading flow for the recipient, quotes in the text will be included with a reference to a footnote containing the original quote. For reasons of coherence and to avoid personal bias, this translation will be conducted using the translation website [deepl.com](https://www.deepl.com). A second form of data, which will be utilized mainly regarding the audience's reception, is opinion polls, which measure the perception of migration as a threat in general and the audience's satisfaction with the measures undertaken and statements by relevant actors within the space. The third part of the paper will again focus on various data to showcase emergency measures connected to the construction of migration as a security concern that were somewhat connected to the notion of aid.

5. Operationalization

The following section will establish the theoretical mechanism linking migration pressure with aid allocation based on securitization theory. The causal mechanism in this paper will be partly based on the Copenhagen School of Securitization theory. Securitization has been defined as a process in which *“an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by labeling it as security, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means”* (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26).

The following sub-questions will further guide the analysis to account for a sufficiently deep analysis to be able to answer the research question.

1. Who needs security?

2. What is the threat?
3. How is the threat constructed?
4. How is migration constructed?
- 5 Who is to provide security? Through what mechanisms?
6. Who is the “audience” of the securitization?
7. Can change be observed over time?

The proposed elements of the causal mechanism will be provided in the following sections.

5.1 Construction of the Issue

The first aspect is the construction of the threat or the issue unfolding. According to the theoretical underpinnings of securitization theory, we expect in this section the mechanism of the framing of migration as a threat to the security of a referent object. The referent object could potentially have multiple facets. Potential referent objects could be social cohesion and the connection to economic systems or the general public order that might be in danger due to increased criminal activity. An important aspect here is the definition of the securitizing actor. As established in the theoretical section, the securitizing actor holds specific authority and is considered legitimate by the audience. Further, they have political influence as well. With that in mind, relevant securitizing actors are members of the government of Merkel III. The government consisted of two different parties, namely The Union, consisting of the Christian conservative party (CDU) and the Christian Socialist Party (CSU), and on the other hand, as well as the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Generally, government members can be regarded as securitizing actors, as they fulfill the conditions outlined before. However, some are closer to the referent object of aid than others. Regarding relevant resorts for the topic, there is first the BMZ to mention as it is concerned with the policy field of development policy. The minister of this ministry was Dr. Gerd Müller until 2017. Secondly, the Ministry of Interior could also be a relevant actor. It is not unlikely that migration can be seen as a threat to the state and the resort, which is concerned with

the internal security dimension. At the time of the trigger events until 2017, the minister would have been Thomas de Maizière. Thirdly, other resorts of interest could also be the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Affairs office. The latter *“represents Germany’s interests to the world. It promotes international exchange and offers protection and assistance to Germans abroad.”* (Federal Foreign Office, 2024). The link to the Ministry of Defense is also constituted by its mandate for Germany's defense. Those are, however, of secondary importance as mentions from that resort can be seen as a form of last resort. However, connections to the development policy field are not impossible to assume. Potential themes and sources to analyze for this section are presented by Olivie & Perez (2021), who did state *“The securitization of the aid discourse is manifested in increasing references to security, conflict, fragile states, terrorism or the perils of migration in development cooperation white papers, master plans or official interventions in national parliaments or multilateral fora.”* (p.3).

This also indicates some methodological considerations regarding potential sources. Speech acts of importance are also official parliament interventions, documents, and official speeches the relevant actors hold. All those aspects have in common that political elites initiated the issue. Therefore, those observations are of interest in the issue's construction. After the issue has been constructed, the next logical step would be to measure how the relevant audience has received the constructed threat.

5.2 Audience Reception

In this step, the audience reception will be operationalized. The public, policymakers, and relevant stakeholders receive the securitizing discourse, with many accepting it as a legitimate security concern.

Acceptance by the audience will substantially enhance the success rate of the threat's framing. As mentioned, the audience consists of actors connected to the issue in multiple ways and is not regarded as one homogenous element. The general public is one relevant actor within the audience for the adoption of the threat. As Germany is a democratic society, it, in theory, serves the will of the people and, therefore, makes decisions and therefore relies on the general public for legitimacy and sovereignty.

One way to measure such a reception would be to look at public opinion polls regarding perceptions towards immigration over time, starting from around 2015. However, as the starting point has been defined at the beginning of 2015, only perceptions in the aftermath are of importance as perceptions that are temporally further away from the events could be altered and influenced by other events, which have been after the predefined trigger event.

The focus lies on perceptions as they follow the constructive logic of constructing the issue, focusing more on constructing the threat instead of its empiric nature. However, indicators of greater importance for the general public are surveys that ask questions like e.g. Do you feel that Germany has taken enough refugees in? Are refugees a threat to the social cohesion of the state? Do you see more advantages than disadvantages regarding an influx of migration?

All those questions refer to the different aspects of the threat. For example, a higher number of people perceive migration as a disadvantage, which indicates a working securitization process, as migration is seen here as a threat to the public order and the state and its order. This order as a referent object is harmed as migration only brings disadvantages. Following that logic, measures must be taken to prevent the threat from influencing.

Dissatisfaction would further indicate some support for extraordinary measures, as measures and politics in place do not successfully protect the referent object in question. What is also important in that regard is that one survey alone is insufficient to guarantee valid results. Therefore, various surveys can be used to capture the general public's perceptions of the threat. Here, it should also be noted that the general public is only one actor within the audience of securitization. Another crucial factor regarding the acceptance of the threat is civil society organizations that receive because they are at the receiving end of the aid allocation and are concerned about it. However, what also has to be taken into account is that one issue in this regard is that the German civil society organization space is as there are around 650.000 registered CSOs. (Stifterverband, 2023)

A holistic analysis of the perception of civil society organizations would be behind the scope of this thesis. Therefore, only relevant actors will be included in the reception analysis. One strategy to limit the scope of civil society organizations of interest is to include umbrella organizations like the “Verband Entwicklungspolitik und humanitäre Hilfe” (The Association of Development Policy and Humanitarian Help) in short Venro.

They can be considered essential audience members as the organization consists of 145 organizations rooted in different development policy sections, from church-based development organizations to lobby organizations (Venro, 2024). Therefore, Venro's statements and press releases capture perceptions and opinions backed by various development organizations and, therefore, a variety of audiences.

Another essential audience member can potentially be the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), as it is directly connected to the topic of aid and development policy. However, there are also elements of the GIZ that offer contradictory evidence. As mentioned above, one of those elements is that it is a joint venture between two ministries: The Ministry of Finance (BMF) and the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).

The GIZ project's central commissioner is the BMZ (GIZ, 2014). This indicates proximity and dependence on securitizing actors, which would make an analysis redundant. Contrary to that, the organization also describes itself as a “*service provider*” (GIZ, 2024), that offers global expertise to different partners, which would indicate more independence. In addition, the evaluation by Kinzelbach et al. (2018) states that “*GIZ's scope for implementing BMZ's objectives and designing projects varies greatly depending on the client.*”¹ (Kinzelbach et al., 2017, p. 16) This indicates at least some openness to act independently from its commissioning parties, which justifies the inclusion of this actor in the analysis. Once this step has been successfully investigated and the audience has accepted the Construction of a threat as a danger to a referent

¹ Die Möglichkeiten der GIZ, die Ziele des BMZ umzusetzen und Projekte zu gestalten, sind je nach Auftraggeber sehr unterschiedlich.

object, the political elite can justify extraordinary means to tackle the constructed emergency.

5.3 Extraordinary Measures


This step of the causal chain refers to the implementation of so-called extraordinary measures. According to the securitization logic, the government implements emergency measures to allocate aid for addressing migration-related security threats. Extraordinary measures refer to actions or policies that are deviating from established procedures. While successful securitization is not necessarily dependent on the adoption of emergency measures (Floyd, 2016), it seems plausible to include it in this case as it can potentially be a crucial step in this chain to explain the securitization of aid and, therefore, helps to answer to the research question by offering validity to the mechanism. Extraordinary measures are typically employed in response to exceptional circumstances.

At this point in the causal chain, the referent object has already been framed as being in danger by an influx of migration seekers. Accepting such measures by a broader audience legitimizes the securitizing actor to implement extraordinary measures. When applying those theoretical implications to the case chosen, one would expect a short-term revision of the federal government's development aid strategies toward the root causes of migration. Further, we can expect development assistance to pursue security goals instead of humanitarian ones.

So, an extraordinary measure would, therefore, be the coupling of development policy with other policy fields. This could lead to redirecting development aid to fund “migration management” measures, which are more concerned with protecting and ordering migration than actually about improving the living situation. Those measures are connected with an increased focus and allocation to countries of origin and transit countries. This leads to the next step within the causal, the transformation of the emergency measures into everyday political tools, which will be the hardest to measure out of this causal chain.

5.4 Normalization/Desecuritization

Whether or not this institutionalization can be successful depends on the impact of extraordinary measures on combating the threat. An effective measure is more likely to be normalized as one that didn't follow the desired outcome. Over time, the securitization of migration aid becomes normalized within the political discourse and institutional practices. Normalization involves a shift in perception, where what was once deemed exceptional or outside routine politics becomes integrated into the everyday governance agenda. However, this step is difficult to operationalize as the long-term effects are hard to measure in this project. In some cases, normalization may occur relatively quickly, especially if there is strong political will and support for the redefinition of the issue. However, in other cases, normalization may be a gradual and ongoing process that unfolds over years or even decades as perceptions, policies, and institutions evolve. Therefore, the measurement of some form of normalization is out of the scope of this study and will not be included in the analysis. The operationalization of theory and methods leads to the following mechanism, who will be analyzed in the following:



6. Analysis

After establishing the above-mentioned causal mechanism, the analysis will critically assess the above-mentioned causal mechanism. Therefore, the first section will utilize some form of discourse analysis to determine if and how migration has been constructed as a threat. The second section will analyze the response of important members of the audience, namely Venro and the GIZ, as well as the general public. The third section of the analysis will show extraordinary measures undertaken in response to the crisis. The normalization aspects of the measures undertaken are outside the scope of the study and will, therefore, not be included in this paper.

6.1 Construction of the Issue

The first aspect is the construction of the issue. According to the theoretical underpinnings of securitization theory, one can expect in this section of the mechanism that political elites declare migration in one form or another as a threat to the referent object. Subquestions to guide this part of the analysis are the following:

How is the threat constructed?

What is in danger?

The following section will analyze what has been framed as the object in danger in official parliament interventions and strategic communication published by the securitizing actors defined above, as well as the subject that threatens the object. The threat is constructed in different dimensions.

One dimension of the construction of the threat lies in the extraordinary quantity of people arriving. The number of people in need was framed to overwhelm the capacities of the states. The logical outcome would, therefore, limit the number of people arriving. The notion of an overwhelming majority has also been illustrated by the interior minister, who stated this early in October 2015: *"In the long term, a country like Germany cannot take in and integrate 800,000 refugees a year. This is also part of an open discussion."*

*We will, therefore, have to try to reduce the number of refugees coming to us."*²
(Bundesregierung, 2015).

In the same speech, he highlighted the use of targeted development aid as one adequate measure to reduce the number of asylum seekers at German borders, offering already potential extraordinary measures. Minister of Development Dr. Gerd Müller also used the narrative of an extreme number of refugees and connected it with his policy agenda. He stated in a parliamentary intervention regarding adopting the 2016 budget that *"The African continent (...) will double in population by 2050. Two billion babies will be born, two billion babies in the next 30 to 40 years! These children will later need work, they need a future, a perspective in life. Otherwise, they will later travel across the Mediterranean to Germany, to Europe."*³(Bundesregierung, 2015). He constructed the threat of extreme migration flows toward Europe by repeating the extraordinary number of babies born and highlighting the lack of possibilities on the African continent, which logically would lead to more migration. On another occasion in early 2015, he employed a similar strategy in a more informal setting when he claimed that countries had to eradicate their problems domestically as otherwise, those problems would come to us (Schwäbische, 2015). In connection, he also constructed the threat of an extreme dimension of migration by stating that millions would come otherwise (Schwäbische, 2015). By linking the two continents, he aimed to increase the importance of development work. He utilized the threat of an extraordinary number of incoming migrations to gain momentum to give his policy field greater weight. The notion voiced by Gerd Müller was also shared by Angela Merkel, who claimed at an event by her party in 2016 that "The central problem is migration from Africa with 1.2 billion" (SZ, 2016). Here, a strategy similar to that of the development minister can be observed. Due to a discrepancy between population increase and economic

² Auf Dauer kann ein Land wie Deutschland 800 000 Flüchtlinge im Jahr nicht aufnehmen und integrieren . Auch das ist Teil einer offenen Diskussion . Wir werden also versuchen müssen, die Zahl der zu uns kommenden Flüchtlinge zu senken .

³ Der afrikanische Kontinent (...) wird seine Bevölkerung bis 2050 verdoppeln. Zwei Milliarden Babys werden geboren werden, zwei Milliarden Babys in den nächsten 30 bis 40 Jahren! Diese Kinder werden später Arbeit brauchen, sie brauchen eine Zukunft, eine Perspektive im Leben. Sonst machen sie sich später auf den Weg über das Mittelmeer nach Deutschland, nach Europa.“

development, an extraordinary amount of asylum seekers at German borders would be the consequence. On another occasion, he emphasized the security dimension of the migration question directly by stating, „*At the same time, we have more than 500,000 refugees in the country who are not even registered yet. So, in some cases, we don't know who is here. That is a high-security risk* " ⁴ (Scheffer, 2016). Merkel's 2015 budget speech also echoed this quantitative notion, highlighting the challenges arising from the different numbers of migrants (Bundesregierung, 2015). While this gives a partial answer regarding the dimension of the threat, it can also provide possible indications regarding the referent object. The extraordinary amount of refugees can be seen as a threat to procedures already in place to steer migration. Those seemed overwhelmed by the number of asylum seekers arriving at a concentrated point. The absence of institutionalized ordering principles regarding orderly migration and asylum procedures leads to less control over migration streams and, therefore, has also affected domestic security.

The effects of a higher form of irregular migration have also been described in the white paper on national security from 2016. While highlighting the ordinary nature of migration, it also states the adverse effects "involuntary and irregular migration in high numbers" has on German society. According to the white book, this specific characterization of migration documents damages "*the capacity to absorb and integrate migrants can be overwhelmed, resulting in social instability.*" (Ministry of Defence, 2016, p.42).

Therefore, unregulated migration can be seen as a threat to the state's social stability and its institutions' security. Two other external events can be seen as changing the trajectory of the framing only in quantitative terms.

First, the events of the New Year 2015/2016 in Cologne have to be taken into account have to be taken into account when analyzing the framing of the issue, where a group of migrants and asylum seekers with a North African background sexually assaulted over

⁴ Gleichzeitig haben wir mehr als 500.000 Flüchtlinge im Land, die noch nicht einmal registriert sind. Wir wissen also teilweise nicht, wer sich hier bei uns aufhält. Das ist ein hohes Sicherheitsrisiko

600 women. In 2016, then Minister of the Interior de Maizière claimed that those events were *"perhaps a turning point in the debate about refugees in Germany."*⁵ (Der Tagesspiegel, 2016).

The events added a physical dimension to the perceived threat. Discourse now differentiated between good and bad migrants and did tend to show less empathy for the situation. This point can also be partially underlined by Merkel, who stated the events from New Year in Cologne: *"Unfortunately, on the night of December 31st to January 1st, we got a negative impression of what unsound integration could cause insecurity, anxiety, and worry. That is another reason why we take the issue of integration very seriously."*⁶(Bundesregierung,2016)

Regarding that, migration can be seen as the construction of migration as a threat to the physical well-being of the state. The necessity to integrate is highlighted here by linking unsound integration with negatively associated verbs like insecurity, anxiety, and worry. Those moves contradict the discourse offered by the chancellor before, which focused on highlighting Germany's positive aspects and openness, which the notion of welcome culture can best summarize. So did Merkel highlight the positive aspects of migration in her New Year's Eve speech in 2015 by stating *"I am convinced that if tackled correctly, today's major task of immigration and the integration of so many people will be an opportunity for tomorrow."*⁷ (Bunderegierung, 2016).

Here, migration is not framed as a threat but rather as a chance for a greater future. Further, she constructed Germany as a strong country that can endure the crisis by stating, *"We can do it because Germany is a strong country."*⁸ (Bundesregierung, 2016). Therefore, in 2015, Merkel showed some de-securitizing elements throughout the crisis.

⁵ vielleicht ein Wendepunkt in der Flüchtlingsdebatte in Deutschland

⁶ Wir haben in der Nacht vom 31. Dezember zum 1. Januar leider einen negativen Eindruck davon bekommen, was nicht gelingende Integration an Verunsicherung, Ängsten und Sorgen hervorrufen kann. Auch deshalb nehmen wir das Thema Integration natürlich sehr ernst.

⁷ Ich bin überzeugt: Richtig angepackt ist auch die heutige große Aufgabe des Zuzugs und der Integration so vieler Menschen eine Chance von morgen.

⁸ Wir schaffen das, denn Deutschland ist ein starkes Land.

The second important external event can be seen as the terrorist attack on the Breitschaldt Platz conducted by Anis Amiri, who came as a refugee in 2015 and had been known to the authorities for a while. Therefore, the connection to the topic has become apparent. This event led to the clear discursive distinction between "good and bad migrants." This dichotomy became visible in the New Year's speech one year later by Merkel, where she stated *"And - yes - it is particularly bitter and disgusting when terrorist attacks are committed by people who are supposedly seeking protection in our country. Those who have experienced our country's willingness to help for precisely this reason are now mocking it with their actions. Just as they mock those who actually need and deserve our protection."*⁹ (Bundesregierung, 2017).

By stating that the attack would mock both those who sought help and those who offered help equally, she equaled "good migrants" with the general population while excluding the criminal irregular migrants. Another byproduct was the equalization of migration and crime by addressing the notion that the perpetrators of those attacks, both in Würzburg earlier this year and in Berlin in late 2016, were people who came to Germany to seek "supposedly" help.

In the context of Merkel's construction, this is a rather radical step against the notion of welcome culture, which became more evident in 2016. So, did she, for instance, distanced herself from her infamous "Wir schaffen das!" slogan by stating *"Sometimes, however, I also think that this sentence is somewhat exaggerated, that too much is being insinuated into it. So much that I hardly want to repeat it anymore, as it has become a kind of simple motto, almost an empty formula (...)." ¹⁰* (Wirtschaftswoche, 2016).

⁹ Und – ja – es ist besonders bitter und widerwärtig, wenn Terroranschläge von Menschen begangen werden, die in unserem Land angeblich Schutz suchen. Die genau deshalb die Hilfsbereitschaft unseres Landes erlebt haben und diese nun mit ihren Taten verhöhnen. Wie sie auch diejenigen verhöhnen, die tatsächlich unseren Schutz brauchen und verdienen.

¹⁰ Manchmal denke ich aber auch, dass dieser Satz etwas überhöht wird, dass zu viel in ihn geheimnist wird. So viel, dass ich ihn am liebsten kaum noch wiederholen mag, ist er doch zu einer Art schlichtem Motto, fast zu einer Leerformel geworden

This distancing can be interpreted as weakening the de-securitizing agenda visible in 2015, indicating a strengthening of the perception of migration as a threat to the state and its institutions and, therefore, can be understood as more of a securitization move from her perspective. Another dimension of framing the threat concerns the health of the migrants. The threat in this dimension can be seen in the irregular migration itself. Irregular migration is here framed as the referent subject, threatening the well-being of the migrants themselves. Migrants are here the victims of criminal gangs that take profits and endanger the lives of those people in the pursuit of a better life. This framing, however, has the advantage for the political elites, as Germany can construct itself as a more humanitarian actor while simultaneously implementing a restrictive and deterring migration policy. The theme of the dangers of irregular migration seemed to be predominant in the construction through 2015 and 2016. So was the EU-Turkey agreement framed by Merkel as a way to combat human smuggling and prevent further suffering (Zeit, 2016). Another effect of this rhetorical strategy is that while showing empathy on one side, it also equals the question of migration to a question of security, as it reduces migration to a fight against its criminal opponents. Therefore, the outcome of the framing remains similar to the notion analyzed earlier. However, the referent object slightly changed. Irregular migration is not seen as a threat to the social cohesion of the state, but the migrants themselves are the objects in danger, as they are subjected to criminal gangs. Therefore, it is the state's obligation to secure the borders to fight to protect the refugees.

So overall, it can be summarized that the construction of a threat happened along three different dimensions. First, the sheer quantity of migration seekers has been framed as a threat to the capacities of the German state. Secondly, and influenced by the event in 2016, a qualitative dimension has also been added. The qualitative dimension referred to the framing of migrants as criminals who are unwilling to integrate and, therefore, pose a physical threat as well. The third dimension changes the parameter slightly. Here, the migrants became the object of interest, and criminal organizations became the threat.

Therefore, this part of the causal chain can be seen as sufficient for the theorized causal mechanism, as there has been evidence of securitizing elements by members of the political elite present within the crisis discourse. However, opposing evidence has also been provided, indicating the opposite notion. This positive evidence prevailed over the disproving evidence. Consequently, the first condition of the mechanism can be accepted. In the second step, the audience's reception will be analyzed to determine whether or not sufficient evidence can be provided for the next step within the causal chain.

6.2 Audience Reception

The audience is an essential aspect of the securitization theory. Therefore, the next step of the causal chain, which will be tested in the following, concerns the audience's reception. Regarding the mechanism this thesis is trying to test, it can be expected that most of the audience accepts the construction of migration pressure as a threat along the dimensions described before. This acceptance legitimizes the threat, allowing the securitizing actors to implement new policies. Relevant actors are the general public, civil society organizations, and technical donor agencies, namely the "Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit" (GIZ).

6.2.1 General Public

First, the role of the general public in adopting the threat will be analyzed. Generally, the role of this stakeholder is relevant to the adoption of the threat in the sense that the general public, primarily in democratic societies, can pressure ruling parties to adopt policies (Page & Shapiro, 1983).

According to the theoretical foundation of securitization theory, one would expect a majority of the audience to accept the construction of the threat.

Audience reception of the different dimensions of the threat proved more complex than indicated. Early opinion polls indicate an acceptance of the "Wir schaffen das" paradigm and the connected notion of welcome culture. According to a survey conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation, around 72 percent perceived the acting of German institutions

as positive regarding migrants and refugees, whereas migrants scored more positive than refugees (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2017a). The perceived welcome culture within the population shows a similar pattern, although less optimistic. Here, 59 percent perceive refugees as positively welcomed within the population, an increase of 10 percent from 2015 (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2017).

However, supporting evidence regarding adopting the threat can be found when looking deeper into the topic. The same survey reference above also found that 54 percent of those asked stated that Germany had reached its capacities regarding the number of refugees coming in (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2017, p.6).

This marks a difference of 14 percent from the results of 2015. On the same note, 51 percent of participants in the survey disagreed with the notion that Germany should take any more refugees only for humanitarian reasons. This rather significant change within a relatively small timeframe indicates the adoption of migration as a threat. Another survey conducted by the Bertelsmann Stiftung in 2017 supports the acceptance of migration as a threat to the social cohesion of the state. According to the survey, 38 percent stated that the social cohesion of the state was in danger, while only a fourth negated the statement (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2017b). While those numbers indicate a direct move away from the preached welcome culture and, therefore, can be seen as evidence for adopting the treat, the perception regarding European solidarity must also be considered when interpreting those numbers. Over 80 percent of the population supported a fairer allocation mechanism. Combining those numbers weakens the significant skepticism but indicates a departure from the welcome culture (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2017b, p.6).

Similar numbers can also be found in the Ipsos survey from 2017. Here, 50 percent stated that migration had a negative impact on the country and that the country would host too many migrants (Ipsos, 2017). Regarding the temporary dimension, it has to be stated that this survey was conducted in early 2017 (Ipsos, 2017).

However, as clear as those numbers seem, another study by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung indicates a more positive picture regarding the overall perception of migration but also states that a growing minority opposes those numbers (Friedrich et al., 2016).

Therefore, those numbers indicate at least scepticism regarding the migration compared to 2015 on the broader public. This partial scepticism can be partially interpreted as a form of acceptance of the construction of the threat by the government as it indicates an ambivalent perception of migrants. That scepticism and, therefore, the perceived reality of migration as a threat can become further evident in two other instances. One instance that can be interpreted as evidence of an acceptance of migration as a threat can be seen in the electoral rise of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). The party tripled its electoral result in the federal election between 2013 and 2017 from 3,4 percent to 12,4 percent. The party ran on an anti-migration and anti-establishment platform, which drove most of its voters to vote for them. Therefore, their rise can be attributed to the migration crisis (Hansen & Olsen, 2019, p.1). The growth indicates an increase in anti-migration sentiments, which suggests that migration as a threat seemed more accepted by the German public.

Secondly, there was an increase in attacks on refugees during the years 2015 and 2016. Those years saw a significant increase in criminal attacks against migration seekers. Statistics indicate that during those years, the number of attacks against migrants increased rapidly. It has been estimated that alone in 2015, around 1,000 attacks against migrants were conducted (Pro Asyl, 2015).

This trend increased in 2016 with other 3760 documented attacks against refugees and asylum seekers (Pro-Asyl, 2016). Those numbers become evident when looking at timeframes outside 2015 and 2016. To provide some context, temporal outliers, the number of attacks in 2014 was only around 300. However, regarding those numbers, it also has to be stated that the quantity of irregular migration had been lower.

Nevertheless, the increased number of xenophobic attacks can be interpreted as an acceptance of the construction of migration as a threat to the state has been accepted by some members of the public, as these attacks indicate an "imperative to act" against a perceived threat to the nation (von Rosen, 2019, p.37).

The general public offers a polarized picture regarding the adoption of the threat within the audience. On one side, there was growing support for the notion of a welcome culture in 2015 and, therefore, against the securitization of migration, which, however,

seemed to be less evident during 2016 and 2017, where perceptions measured highlighted growing concerns vis-a-vis asylum seekers.

Overall, however, it can be stated that there is enough evidence to state that the audience at least has been polarized due to the migration crisis but showed indicators of accepting migration as a threat and, therefore, legitimizing potential emergency measures.

6.2.2 Civil Society Organizations and Donor Agency

6.2.2.1 VENRO

The following section will explore how civil society organizations, in this section, are represented by VENRO perceived the threat. The organization also acknowledged the challenges arising from the increasing number of refugees (Venro, 2015). However, the organization warned against instrumentalizing development aid for self-interest, therefore already advocating against framing migration as a threat to German society. Further, it highlighted the positive aspects of migration for the development of the countries of origin, claiming that *"Migration can be an expression of self-determined development and contribute to development in the countries of origin and destination."*¹¹ (VENRO, 2015).

This statement offers the opposite of the construction of the threat as it highlights the normality and positive aspects. Migration cannot be a threat as it is a great form of development. By doing that, it highlights the positive attributes connected to migration.

The des is also visible in the sense that it frames the actions of the German federal government as of November 2015 in a relatively good light. The notion of opposing the securitization attempt by the government of Merkel III also became evident in another statement from February 2016, which openly criticized the wrong short-term focus of Valetta Summitt as well as the EU-Turkey agreement due to concerns about the use of

¹¹ Migration kann Ausdruck selbstbestimmter Entwicklung sein und zur Entwicklung in den Herkunfts- und Zielländern beitragen."

development aid to restrict migration flows (VENRO, 2016). This limited quantity of evidence already indicates enough valid evidence to support the claim that Venro did oppose the construction of the threat as it opposed the emergency measures that were put in place to combat migration and instead showed desecuritizing behavior by highlighting the positive and normal aspects of migration and framing it in the light of human rights. Furthermore, the opposition of this actor does not harm the securitization process but proves it. The process is proved because this opposition indicates extraordinary behavior in the migration domain, where aid can be a relevant tool.

6.2.2.2 GIZ

The following section will investigate whether or not the GIZ accepted the threat constructed by the securitizing actors within the German government, Merkel III. While one would expect little to no opposition regarding the adoption of the proposed threat, there is also evidence that suggests the opposite. An evaluation report from 2017 noted that there had been some discrepancies between the goals formulated by their political clients, which can be predominantly identified as the BMZ and the EU, and their understanding of the new nature of tasks that came with the migration crisis (Kinzelbacher et. al, 2017, p.27). Especially new projects regarding stabilization and migration management have been seen as critical as they would not correspond to the understanding of some employees regarding the Nature of development policy (Kinzelbacher et al.,2017, p. 27). However, those numbers did not appear sufficient, as they were equaled in the same sentence with an explanation of people who saw the focus toward more self-interest-driven projects as inevitable and tried to adjust to those new realities (Kinzelbacher et al.,2017). In addition, the report highlights that the GIZ used has limited room for maneuvering to influence the BMZ. So, was the organization able to influence the ideas of the BMZ regarding its return policy demand (Kinzelbacher et al.,2017). However, this is the only form of rejection of a securitizing narrative that can be observed by the agency. Instead, some evidence points towards the opposite, an acceptance of the threat for financial reasons. Their business volume increased by over 110 million euros to a new record volume of 2,1 billion euros (GIZ, 2016). The threat's acceptance can also be seen in the agency's success as the biggest bilateral

implementor of projects within the European Emergency Fund for Africa (EUTF, implementing projects with an overall volume of 850 million euros (DW, 2022). Therefore, it can be stated that the increased focus on the refugee crisis benefited the organization financially and allowed for potential growth.

Conclusively, it can be stated that there has been some opposition regarding the adoption of the threat, which can be pinpointed in the discrepancy between the commissioners' interest and their understanding of what development policy should entail. However, in their limited space for maneuvering, the organization was able to influence an extraordinary measure in the form of the BMZ return policy while making extraordinary amounts of profit. The latter aspect, however, weighs stronger when one looks at the organization as a whole. Therefore, it can be concluded that the GIZ has been adopting the threat offered by political elites, which also benefits the organization.

Overall, the perception of the threat by the audience can be regarded as somewhat polarized towards the perception of the framing provided by the securitizing actors, namely government actors within the Merkel III Cabinet. Major majorities cannot be identified from surveys conducted during the period. What can be observed is that there has been growing opposition from 2015 until 2017 and growing fear about the social cohesion of the German state. This negative change, combined with the growing support for the AfD and the increase in violence against migration seekers, provides valid enough evidence to deduct that there has been at least some movement in regards to the perceived migration framing as a threat. Some opposition from civil society organizations has been identified as having mixed effects regarding the effectiveness of adopting the threat. In summary, there is enough evidence to determine that it is more likely than not that the audience had accepted the threat in its qualitative and quantitative form in the form of the defined members of the audience. This acceptance makes it possible to accept this aspect of the causal mechanism to a certain extent.

6.3 Extraordinary Measures

The causal chain's next step is implementing emergency measures to curb the perceived threat. In this aspect of the causal chain, it can be expected that the government, due to the audience's acceptance, will be able to implement emergency measures to combat the different dimensions of the threat analyzed in the first section. A shortcoming in this section lies in the temporary dimension of emergency measures.

As the definition implies, emergency measures are outside the norm and aim to provide immediate solutions to combat the constructed threat. This means that in this section, we can only look at short-term fixes adopted during the established timeframe. A cutoff point could serve the end of 2017 as numbers indicate at least a quantitative decrease regarding the numbers of migrants. Regarding the emergency measures adopted, two different dimensions can be identified that cover the different dimensions of the threat. Bilateral emergency measures refer to measures adopted by the German government and its policies developed. The second dimension refers mainly to EU initiatives, where Germany proved to be influential. To stay within the scope of this study, the two most relevant extraordinary measures will be analyzed in more detail: the EUTF and the EU-Turkey Statement.

6.3.1 Bilateral Extraordinary Measures

The following section will analyze the domestic and bilateral extraordinary measures the German government took in response to a constructed and extraordinary threat: increased migration flows.

6.3.1.1 Increased focus on Fluchtursachen and the SI Flucht

One such emergency measure was an increased focus on the root causes of migration. Already in 2015, Angela Merkel stated, *"We will be a Europe that has to spend more money on development policy, that asks in a more targeted, perhaps also more interest-*

led way, where the refugees are coming from, where we have to help them first.”¹² (Kopp, 2021, p.1). While referring to a broader European approach, her words also indicated action to follow for the national context. One indicator is that the ministry saw its biggest budget increase between 2015 and 2016 budgets, increasing by over 850 million during that period. (Bundesregierung,2015)

This increase might also have external reasons on its own; however, in combination with Merkel's statement that those 850 million euros would be used entirely to fight the root causes of migration, it indicates a clear intent of those increases being connected to the special situation (Bundesregierung, 2015).

The short-term increase is also visible when looking at special instruments by the BMZ designed to target migration specifically. The perhaps most important tool within the BMZ was the *"Sonderinitiative »Fluchtursachen bekämpfen– Flüchtlinge reintegrieren«"* (SI Flight). This initiative has the following goals: First, it aims to support refugees, internally displaced persons, and returnees. Second, it aims to stabilize host regions and mitigate the acute causes of displacement (e.g., through conflict management and reconciliation) (BMZ, 2021). It was already introduced in 2014 and, therefore, falls slightly out of the scope of the timeframe constructed earlier. However, it can still be included in this analysis given its disproportionate increase in funding, which indicates a greater focus on the topic. The budget of SI Flucht has increased from its initial 70 million euros to about 300 million euros within a year, almost quadrupling its budget within a year (Bundestag, 2015). This short-term extraordinary increase can be due to its crisis-driven nature, as the root causes described above seem unlikely to be fixed in the short term.

6.3.1.2 Development and Domestic Security Intertwined

What can be observed as another potential emergency measure is the linkage between two policy fields in order to deter migrants. In this case, one can observe a linkage between the Ministry of the Interior (BMI) and the BMZ. Already in September 2015, de

¹² Wir werden ein Europa sein, das mehr Geld in Entwicklungspolitik geben muss, das gezielter, vielleicht auch interessen geleiteter fragt, wovon kommen die Flüchtlinge her, wo müssen wir zuerst anpacken

Maizière highlighted development policy as an effective tool in fighting the number of migration seekers at the German borders by stating, "(...) *We will have to focus our foreign and development policy more strongly on combating the causes of flight in the most important countries of origin.*"¹³ (Bundesregierung, 2015).

This quote can be seen as a discursive alignment of the goals of both policy domains. The idea of linking those policy fields again received popularity after the events regarding the terrorist attack on Breitschaldtplatz was the conditionality of aid to pressure recipient countries to accept Germany's returnees. The perpetrator of the attack, Anis Amiri, was well known to German bureaucracies and had avoided deportation to Tunisia before. This connection led to the discussion among government resorts to conditionalizing aid to pressure states to take back rejected asylum seekers. Returnee numbers were low during 2015 and 2016, with 17 in the former and 117 in the latter (DW, 2017). Therefore, action was needed. In this context, the interior minister linked both policy domains by stating, "*The willingness of states to take back their citizens must be linked with other policy areas, and one of them is development aid.*"¹⁴ (DW, 2017).

However, such practices never materialized in the form of actual ODA over the years, which can also be attributed to the fact that such a conditionality would have had the opposite effect. Instead, Dr. Gerd Müller highlighted this potential effect, remarking, "*People need work and a future at home; otherwise, they will come here.*"¹⁵ (DW, 2017)

However, he was not necessarily opposed to returning migrants and refugees to their countries of origin, as he also emphasized the security dimension as he stated "*At the same time, we have more than 500,000 refugees in the country who are not even*

¹³ Wir werden dafür unsere Außen- und Entwicklungspolitik stärker auf die Bekämpfung der Fluchtursachen in den wichtigsten Herkunftsländern konzentrieren müssen

¹⁴ Die Bereitschaft von Staaten, ihre eigenen Bürger zurückzunehmen, muss verknüpft werden mit anderen Politikfeldern, und dazu gehört auch die Entwicklungshilfe

¹⁵ Die Menschen brauchen zuhause Arbeit und Zukunft, sonst kommen sie zu uns

registered yet. So, in some cases, we don't know who is here. That is a high security risk." ¹⁶ (Scheffer, 2016).

The cooperation institutionalized itself in a more concrete initiative: a joint return initiative by the BMI and the BMZ. The goal was to offer guided returns and reintegration into the job market of the country of origin. The slogan of the initiative was *"Wir informieren. Wir schaffen Orientierung. Wir setzen neue Anreize."* (*We inform, We create orientation, We are creating new incentives*). This slogan summarized the goals of the early 2017 BMZ-started program *"Perspektive Heimat"* (*Perspective home*), which the GIZ implements on behalf of the BMZ. Those programs' goals have been clearly stated from the development side, which became evident by the slogan *"Refugees should not return home as losers."*¹⁷ (*Tageschau, 2017*)

The interlinkage of two policy fields can be problematic because they have opposing goals. The BMZ, as an actor, is concerned with humanitarian aspects and generally with improving living conditions and alleviating people of poverty. However, the Ministry of the Interior is concerned with the integration and domestic dimension of security. As established above, migrants, especially those who were not granted asylum and, therefore, are irregular, have been seen as threats to the state. Therefore, returning them can be seen as an act of interior security. Intrinsically, the BMI is interested in accelerating those procedures, as it supports its domestic security mission. By supporting the mission, the BMZ also adopted a security mission to its mandate, which, as outlined before, devalues its developmental mission to the extent that it ties its goal to the goals formulated by the BMI. This measure can be seen as an extraordinary measure as it connects to in its goals opposite aspects of policy and, therefore, uses development policy as a means to achieve goals of security

¹⁶Gleichzeitig haben wir mehr als 500.000 Flüchtlinge im Land, die noch nicht einmal registriert sind. Wir wissen also teilweise nicht, wer sich hier bei uns aufhält. Das ist ein hohes Sicherheitsrisiko."

¹⁷ Die Flüchtlinge sollten nicht als Verlierer nach Hause zurückkehren.

6.3.1.3 Sichere Herkunftsländer (Safe Countries of Origin)

Another emergency measure can be seen in the accelerated procedures by which the German government tried establishing new *"Sichere Herkunftsländer"* (safe countries of origin). Originally, those states have been defined as *"(...) Countries where, due to the democratic system and the general political situation, it can be assumed that there is generally no fear of state persecution and that the respective state can, in principle, protect against non-state persecution."*¹⁸ (BAMF, 2024).

In response to the immediate threat, the German government designated two new countries: Albania and Kosovo. This selection was already controversial as both countries were not ideal types for the definition, and there were concerns about the humanitarian conditions in those countries (ProAsyl, 2016).

Declaring states as safe countries of origin has the advantage that asylum applications can be processed much faster. Therefore, it has also been used as an instrument to steer migration flows, as neither of those states fits the definitions above. This intent has further been visible in the case mentioned above of Tunisia. Already in 2016, the government passed a law intending to declare the three Maghreb states, Algeria, Tunisia, and Marrocco, as safe states of origin, which the government controversially discussed. Here is a connection with the dimensions of the threat that can be made as a member of the SPD justified the adoption of such measures, that such a mechanism could benefit the people who really would require protection (Bundestag, 2016). Again, the distinction between good and bad refugees is visible in this case. The controversial character of the decision was also highlighted by the Bundesrat, where the proposal didn't receive a sufficient majority (Zeit online, 2017).

While this measure showed a limited connection to the issue of development aid, it nevertheless can illustrate the negligence of humanitarian aspects in favor of security, visible in the rushed notion to declare the Maghreb states safe states of origin. The mechanism in place here is similar to the one in the previous section in the sense that

¹⁸ Länder, von denen sich aufgrund des demokratischen Systems und der allgemeinen politischen Lage davon ausgegangen werden kann, dass dort generell keine staatliche Verfolgung zu befürchten ist und dass der jeweilige Staat grundsätzlich vor nichtstaatlicher Verfolgung schützen kann.

humanitarian principles, in the form of the protection of people in need, were subordinated to security imperatives at home.

6.3.4 EU Emergency Measures

Multilateral influence also plays a role. From the beginning of the crisis, German elites have emphasized the role of European solidarity in that regard. De Maizièrre stated in 2015 *"Germany is making its contribution—also out of humanitarian conviction—but nobody in Europe and beyond should believe that our country alone will or even wants to shoulder this task."*¹⁹ (Bundesregierung, 2015). This indicates the relevance the German government asserted to the multilateral sphere. However, the multilateral dimension in its entirety is outside the scope of this thesis. Therefore, this section will limit its scope to two of the most important extraordinary measures in that regard: the EU-Turkey Statement and the European Emergency Fund for Africa.

6.3.4.1 EU-Turkey statement

One important extraordinary measure on a multilateral level under German influence was the EU-Turkey statement. The statement from early 2016 was built on the already in late 2015 negotiated comprehensive EU-Turkey action plan. Turkey was a relevant actor due to its shared border with Syria, which led to the republic hosting around 2 million refugees who fled as a result of the Syrian Civil War. Out of this number, a significant amount used Turkey as a transit country to get into the EU or, more precisely, Greece. The greater concentration of refugees made the country of greater interest to European policymakers concerned about migration and German political elites. German interest can be underlined by the fact that since Christmas 2015, Germany allegedly negotiated on its own to find an adequate solution to decrease the quantity of migration influx (Wölfl, 2018).

However, the negotiations regarding the agreement were led by her, indicating Germany's more significant role in that issue. The resulting EU-Turkey deal was signed

¹⁹ Deutschland leistet seinen Beitrag – auch aus humanitärer Überzeugung –, aber niemand in Europa und darüber hinaus soll glauben, dass unser Land allein diese Aufgabe schultern wird oder auch nur will.

on March 18th, 2016. Essentially, the deal was based on three modes of action. First, Turkey would take in all the irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greece from March 20th, 2016. Second, for each illegal Syrian migrant returned to Turkey, one regular asylum seeker would be resettled into the EU Territory. The third element refers to Turkey taking the necessary measures to prohibit new sea or land migration routes (EU, 2016).

In response to the actions of Turkey, a total of 6 billion euros would be disbursed by the EU into the facility for refugees in Turkey, a mechanism aimed at supporting the situation of those refugees (EU, 2016).

Germany proved to be the most significant bilateral contributor to the facility for refugees in Turkey, contributing at least 1/5 of the whole pooled budget provided by EU Member states (European Court of Auditors, 2018). This sum is proportional to Germany's predominant role within the European Union but affirms the importance of this deal for Germany. While providing aid to help the country seems to be a move within the altruistic spectrum, it becomes a security move in the context of this agreement. The statement implies a logic of conditionality, as the allocation has only happened in connection with agreements and promises made by the Turkish side. Therefore, the allocation of aid in the context of the EU-Turkey agreement indicates the self-interest present in the agreement.

The reception of the agreement has been positive by the German government. Angela Merkel, for example, highlighted the role model character this agreement could have for other agreements with, for example, the Maghreb states (Euractiv, 2016). The agreement has been widely regarded as a major success that slowed down migration rapidly, as numbers indicate (Deutschlandfunk, 2021). One indicator of the agreement being an emergency agreement can be stated in the missing institutionalization of the agreement. The official document refers to it as a statement, which does not indicate a strong legal legitimacy. Additionally, and more clearly, its temporal and extraordinary nature is evident in the EU-Turkey statement, which states *"It will be a temporary and extraordinary measure which is necessary to end the human suffering and restore public order."* (EU, 2016).

6.3.4.2 European Emergency Trust Fund for Africa

Another emergency measure that the EU developed during this period was the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). The EUTF is a product of the 2015 Valetta Summit, an intergovernmental summit between European and African heads of state held on November 10th and 11th to find ad-hoc solutions against the growing threat of migration.

Here again, the strategic importance for Germany is visible if one looks at the member state contributions to the fund. Germany contributed the most of the 11,4 percent allocated, with a total contribution of 222 million Euros towards this fund (Schacht, 2023). This constituted around a third of all domestic contributions to the fund, namely 34,7 percent. (Schacht, 2023)

The goals of this fund were to address the root causes of instability, forced displacement, and irregular migration and to contribute to better migration management (EUTF, 2024). The scope of EUTF has been relatively wide. From creating jobs and prospects at home, the main drivers of migration management help to prohibit movement. The allocation focused on three geographical groups: countries in the North of Africa, countries in the Horn of Africa, and lastly, countries in the Sahel zone and Lake Chad. When looking at the projects implemented, analysis by the EU Data Journalism platform showed significant differences regarding the nature of certain projects. First, it can be stated that a relative majority of the total amount was distributed to themes of migration management (24 %). In contrast, only 10 % of the funds were allocated to theme-complex economic and employment opportunities (DW, 2022). If projects in Northern Africa receive significantly more funding regarding migration management, out of the combined contributions to all three Maghreb states between 2015 and 2021, most of the projects approved and implemented have been migration management projects. This indicates that the funds were not used according to the developmental political logic but followed an ordering logic. This became more evident when looking at the aims the German government pursued through its participation in the fund. The German government defined its goals for the participation threefold: First, it aimed to *“support the voluntary return and reintegration of migrants.”* (Bundestag,

2022, p.33) This can be seen as a response to the threat's quantitative and qualitative versions and in connection with the interlinkage between development and interior policy motives, which has been examined above.

Secondly, the German government pledged support for “*communities along the migratory routes*” (Bundestag, 2022, p.33). This could generally refer to a more ordering approach to migration, and it also considers humanitarian aspects as those societies face challenges through an increased number of societies. However, the numbers above indicate a more self-centered approach in this regard. Communities along the migration routes are strategically important, as they are an agglomeration area for migration seekers. Investing in migration management tools, for example, in the Maghreb states, helps curb migration. The securitized issue is also visible in the first category of interest, categorized as “*measures to prevent extremism*” (Bundestag, 2022, p.33), as it equals migration with extremism. Considering those facts, it can be stated that the EUTF can be interpreted more as a tool of European and German self-interest than a development tool that aims to improve the situation of the people substantially, as it has security considerations at its core. All in all, it can be stated that the data provided, combined with the formulated goals by the German government, indicates that it has been, to an extent, an effective tool that helped curb the threat. To determine to what extent the EUTF served more European interests than German interests is outside the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, it can be stated that the fund can be classified as an extraordinary measure taken as it targeted those regions most affected by migration, its wide focus scope. Also, the disproportionate amount of migration management-themed projects funded indicates its extraordinary character in handling migration flows and streams outside of political norms at the time.

7. Conclusion

This section will discuss and conclude the analysis's results. By conducting a case study of the case of Germany during the events of the refugee crisis in 2015/2016, this paper has gathered evidence to confirm whether or not an established mechanism based on securitization theory can determine how self-interest in the form of security concerns affects the allocation of official development assistance. The analysis has

shown that securitizing and de-securitizing moves have occurred within the realm of securitizing actors. Chancellor Angela Merkel showed elements of both types of behavior, constructing migration on hand as chance but also highlighting the difficulties and implications of increased migration. Especially 2016 saw a shift away from the notion of welcome culture and a positive framing, indicating more of a securitizing move through external pressures such as in the form of migration committed crimes at New Year's 2015 in Cologne as well as the terrorist attack in Berlin later that year. Those events led to a discursive shift from "all refugees welcome" to "only good refugees welcome" as migration became increasingly connected with security concerns

The analysis of the second step was more inconclusive than the first step. Here, the reception by the general public showed a polarized picture, with people initially supporting the welcome culture. It also exemplifies growing dissent, showing accepting characteristics towards the framing of migration as qualitative and quantitative, visible through increased support for the AfD, as well as an increased number of attacks against migrants. For reasons of validity, it has to be also stated that the attacks against migrants, as well as the increase of the attacks, are not monocausal but based on a variety of issues. Another potential issue for the validity could be the focus on only two civil society organizations. Here, further research could add more, which would result in a greater, more in-depth understanding of the role of the audience in the process and increase its validity. An increased validity could also be achieved by including more surveys to paint a more concrete picture of the general public's perception. Those actions would help improve the validity of this aspect. The next step of the analysis showed five different emergency measures that have been adopted. The first extraordinary is relatively self-explanatory: a disproportional increase in the BMZ budget and relevant initiatives such as the mentioned SI Flucht showcased the potential the German government attributed to the root causes approach championed by the minister of development and economic cooperation Dr. Gerd Müller, who highlighted the importance of creating possibilities at home. The increase, both for the BMZ and specifically initiatives such as SI Fluchtursachen bekämpfen, showed a significant valuation for the topic of development policy. One possible explanation for this has been the increased interest, as it was seen as a way to stop the quantitative dimension of

migration as a threat. Due to its securitized nature, development policy has further been linked with interior security, therefore adopting goals of internal security, which obstructed their developmental and humanitarian goals to an extent. The declaration of safe countries in two cases, the successful one in the case of Albania and Kosovo as well as the unsuccessful one, namely the Maghreb states, showcased how security imperatives subordinate development concerns. This notion was also visible in terms of both multilateral and extraordinary measures. The EU-Turkey deal also amplified that logic by including some form of conditionality in the form of assistance to those refugees against promises based on security. At last, the EUTF for Africa also served self-interest predominantly as most of the measures implemented through the fund have been within the theme of migration management and, therefore, can be seen as a more restrictive tool that served the interests of its conceptions more than it helped the people on the ground as it aligned with German interests.

By establishing and testing a causal mechanism based on securitization theory, evidence has been gathered to suggest that self-interest in the form of migration deterrence due to constructed security concerns has been an influential factor in aid allocation. Development policy and, therefore, development aid did play a visible role in the response of the German government to the events of the migration crisis from 2015 and 2016. The emergency measures analyzed showed that the budget and relevance increase was further connected to trade-offs that clouded the altruistic aspects of German development assistance. Using foreign aid as a short-term tool in the many constellations above showed that the logic of security trumped the logic of sustainable development, which ultimately harms the reputation and efficiency of development policy in terms of accounting for recipient needs. To what extent this did happen cannot ultimately be determined as the motivation behind the location remains complex and multifaceted. To what extent the evident notion of donor self-interest harmed the efficiency of German development cooperation and the notion of the recipient is difficult to prove empirically, but the adoption of security imperatives over development logic, which has been shown at least would at least indicate so, as those interest where of rather short term and repressive nature instead of aiming for the improvement of peoples lifes. However, the efficiency of those measures, at least in quantitative, cannot

be contested. The number of people who requested asylum in Germany decreased after 2016 and rose again around 2020. Further research could determine to what extent the mechanism in place is also visible in the most recent case where Germany was confronted once again with a lot of people looking for protection due to the increasing amount of global violence and crises, e.g., the war in Ukraine.

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