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True Emotion?
Investigating How EU Foreign Policy Reacts to an International Norm Violation

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ABSTRACT

Within the international system, the European Union's public diplomacy is increasingly marked by the subtle yet potent influence of emotional communication – or rather, emotional diplomacy. This thesis specifically investigated the role of emotions in diplomatic rhetoric of EU foreign policy when faced with an international norm violation (INV). Using the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a case study, this thesis aimed to answer the following research question: *how does the EU use emotional reactions in its public diplomacy when responding to an international norm violation?*

Emotional diplomacy, conceptualized through a constructivist lens, is the theoretical understanding applied to the emotional reactions observed in this thesis' results, recognizing emotions as socially constructed facets of expression and language which reflect the underlying beliefs and values of actors. A novel fine-grained emotional content analysis tool, the EmoRoBERTa model, was used to evaluate emotion scores from 336 EU foreign policy statements from February 24, 2021 to March 7, 2024, for the following eight emotions: approval, annoyance, disapproval, optimism, disappointment, anger, disgust, and fear.

Using GGPlots with LOESS smoothing developed in Python, the emotional reactions were categorized as affective, where the emotion spiked or dipped but then returned to its baseline; strategic, where the emotion spiked or dipped and then this level was maintained over time; or neither, where the reaction was inconclusive. Disapproval was the only affective reaction, showing a clear increase on the invasion date before returning to its baseline. Optimism, annoyance, anger, and disgust were identified as strategic reactions, suggesting that the EU sustained emotional displays of these emotions to achieve specific diplomatic goals. Approval, disappointment, and fear could not be categorized, indicating that these emotions were influenced by factors beyond the initial INV.

The thesis further explores the patterns of these reactions, distinguishing between the use of positive and negative emotions through identifying patterns in further statistical testing, including OLS regressions and interaction effect models for each emotion. All emotions were found to have statistically significant constant coefficients, implying their inherent baselines within EU foreign policy. The results moreover indicate that negative stimuli, such as the INV, can elevate negative emotions while diminishing positive ones, causing disruptions to the emotions' trends that existed prior to the invasion.

From the nuances between the types of emotions used, along with their observed reactions, this thesis discussed the 'politics of emotion', finding that when the EU displays an affective response, it does so because it feels obligated to; when the EU displays a strategic response, this is because it feels entitled to display that emotion; and when a response cannot be categorized, this entails deference, with the EU deferring the 'right' to display the emotion, perhaps onto another actor. This nuanced understanding of emotional dynamics offers the conceptualization of the EU as not only a normative power, but an emotional one, capable of using emotions to convey legitimacy, leadership, and influence within the international system.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The importance of the European Union's foreign policy has received much attention in recent years, with a multitude of crises demanding the need for the Union to issue a united response, a need that has only increased since the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. While it has been historically overlooked in international relations (Clément and Sangar, 2018), the role of emotions plays a significant role in shaping diplomatic rhetoric, and thus foreign policy. Tracking this 'emotional diplomacy' over time entails identifying emotional stimuli – such as international norm violations – that incite emotional reactions, which can be displayed in certain ways. There are several factors to consider when addressing emotional diplomacy: do certain events garner more positive or more negative emotional rhetoric? Is the type of emotional rhetoric used affected by the policy area being discussed? To what extent does concern for an actor's own interests affect how they interact with an audience? Does this rationality change over time, even if the relationship remains stagnant?

Philosophers such as Aristotle (1954[350 B.C.E]), Plato (1974[circa 380 B.C.E]), Hobbes (1968[1651]), and Descartes (1989[1649]) all emphasized the necessity to understand emotion in order to understand human nature, and subsequently, our capacity for politics. As Clément and Sangar state, people express "love for their fatherlands, hate of their enemies, fear during wars, terror in the face of terrorist attacks and anxiety about the consequences of globalization" (2018). Emotions can be identified in several aspects of international relations. Even classic realist traditions of the twentieth century contain references to trust, pride, frustration, and fear (Russell, 2004, p. 392). Morgenthau argues that fear drives states to war when this fear is transformed into anxiety (1948, p. 78). Wolfers similarly argues that states pursue policies that satisfy their pride, heightening their self-esteem while also reducing their fears (1952, p. 498).

States and institutions adhere to the label of international actors, which are individuals or collective entities capable of acting autonomously to achieve their objectives, and also of informing the distribution of resources and the definition of societal values on the global level (Crozier and Friedberg, 1992; Battistella, Smouts and Vennesson, 2006). Because these international actors are in constant interaction with each other, as well as the systems they inform, the rhetoric they issue through their public diplomacy is so often imbued with 'feeling', 'sentiment', or in other words, *emotion*. As with states and intuitions, the EU will be referred to as an international 'actor' in this thesis, as it often is in other academic works (Richard and Van Hamme, 2013).

Indeed, emotions can be seen on all levels of 'actors': small-scale to large. Disapproval is seen in activists of the #MeToo, #BlackLivesMatter, or #FridaysForFuture movements; fear is seen in nationalist far-right parties against minority groups; and anger is seen in protests against kleptocratic governments (Manners, 2021, p. 193). Individuals are able to 'learn' their feelings from not only each other, but from the societal institutions they are part of (Clément and Sangar, 2018). In this sense, actors have an inherent *capacity* to both experience and influence emotions along these different scales. These actors are therefore able to achieve these means, both *to display these feelings* and *to persuade of these feelings*, through their public diplomacy. As former British Ambassador Peter Marshall once stated, "[d]iplomacy must rank as one of the

higher forms of persuasion. People may be persuaded by reason or by feeling, or in all probability by a combination of both" (1997, p. 154).

Against this backdrop, the overarching research question guiding this project is:

How does the EU use emotional communications in its public diplomacy when responding to an international norm violation?

The EU represents an illustrative international actor who not only emits, but influences, emotions within the international system. We can assume, given conceptual considerations, that emotional components are used in public diplomacy at a base level within EU foreign policy: however, *how* they are used is the question being asked. In this sense, emotions offer an alternative means of investigating the many unprecedented challenges the EU has faced of late, including the 2008 financial crisis, the 2015 migration crisis, Brexit, and COVID-19 (Capelos and Katsanidou, 2018; Curtis and Nielsen, 2018; Manners, 2018), which have represented fundamental challenges to the EU's core values and beliefs. Indeed, these challenges facing the EU stem from diverse, but interlinked, global and intra-EU crises that, when combined, result in the 'perfect storm' for EU foreign, security and defense policy (Johansson-Nogués, Vlaskamp and Barbé, 2020). While the EU (arguably) has not been confronted with an active military conflict regarding its own borders, not least because the EU itself is not a military alliance, it has had to confront crises that involve threats to its core interests and values (Smith, 2021). The Russian invasion of Ukraine is just one example, but will be the case of interest for this thesis, since it has been deemed an international norm violation.

The EU–Russia relationship has long been labelled as a "marriage of convenience" (Casier, 2014). Apparent already with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, EU–Russia relations have been plagued by reciprocal economic sanctions, political alienation, and the burial of a possible 'strategic partnership' (Hooijmaaijers and Keukeleire, 2020). Taking sanctions, as opposed to normal procedure, in both 2014 and 2022, the EU sanctions package against Russia was dealt with at the highest level both internally and externally, as well as applied in an atypical scenario – an international aggression against a sovereign state (Portela, 2022). Liberal democracies as a unit have shown great unity and resolve in supporting Ukraine and committing to the condemnation of Russia's invasion (Flockhart and Korosteleva, 2022, p. 470), through sanctions but also through emotional rhetoric.

When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the EU was immediate in its response to classify the invasion as a violation of international law. The first press statement released explicitly states that "Russia is grossly violating international law [...]" (European Council, 2022d). Specifically, the law in question refers to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter which requires member states to refrain from the "use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state" (United Nations, 1945). Interestingly, the EU's response to the invasion, while highlighting its violation of international law, also described the invasion as a violation of "global security and stability" (European Council, 2022d), signaling another (violated) norm for the EU.

The EU's rhetorical reaction towards the invasion, coupled with the multitude of research on its historically-challenged relationship with Russia, paints a picture of an EU that may be experiencing substantial change. Emotions seldom remain the same as time passes, but they also do not change completely, meaning that they can help make sense of how political events are connected and help identify major breaks with the past (Clément and Sangar, 2018). In this sense, the EU's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine can not only exemplify its 'true emotion' towards an international actor in which it has a complicated relationship with, but analyzing the emotional rhetoric present can also conceptualize how a normative power such as the EU uses emotions to respond to violations of international norms which consequently represent violations of the fundamental values and beliefs of its identity.

The expected outcome of the EU's display of emotion is quite self-explanatory: as a norm driven actor, we would expect the EU to express negative emotions towards Russia's violation of international norms. Yet, it is less obvious *how* the EU has chosen to address the norm violation in the sense of using these emotional reactions for diplomatic means. The research question therefore additionally formulates the following puzzle based on this problem: *does EU foreign policy use emotional rhetoric to portray its affective emotions, or to strategically influence the emotions, or actions, of others?* In other words, have the emotional reactions identified from EU foreign policy statements been affective or strategic?

The distinction between the two categories is the following: an affective reaction entails an obvious observance of a jump or decrease in the particular emotion on the date of the Russian invasion, which then returns to a 'baseline' level over time. A strategic reaction, on the other hand, entails the actor displaying the emotional response that it 'feels', and *then* choosing to continuously portray the emotion to achieve specific goals or to achieve persuasive tactics. This conceptual difference will be further explained in the theoretical section.

Distinguishing the type of reaction that the EU chooses to display in response to an international norm violation (INV) will be the key goal of this thesis. It will moreover be important to identify patterns based on the observed results. Looking at both positive and negative emotions allows us to garner whether the *type* of emotion wielded impacts how the reaction is displayed. Doing so, we can identify patterns that positive emotions portray, while negative emotions do not, or vice versa. These patterns can aid in understanding the *why* in understanding the specific types of emotional responses observed, along with the 'politics of emotion', presented in the discussion.

The structure of the thesis will pertain to the following: following a review of the existing literature on the topic, the theoretical framework to be used throughout the analyses and discussion will be introduced. After, the methodological framework will introduce the model being used, as well as the tests that will be applied to the model's results. For the analysis, Section 5.1 will introduce the primary results of the eight emotions being analyzed, including the categorization of the emotional reaction as affective or strategic, as well as examples of the emotions in the data. Section 5.2 will then present the differences between the positive and negative emotions the EU displayed, using further statistical testing.

To open the discussion of this thesis, section 6.1 discusses the emotions that were affective, strategic or neither, supported by the rhetoric used within EU foreign policy statements

following the INV. Section 6.2 will further discuss the importance of analyzing emotions in foreign policy to understand the EU's perceptions and, often, its goals – specifically regarding international norm violations. Lastly, section 6.3 opens the discussion about the EU as not only a normative power, but also an emotional one, discussing how the actor uses emotions to display its values and goals, and perhaps influence other actors. The conclusion of this thesis will summarize this thesis' main findings and highlight its contributions to the field of both international relations and emotional diplomacy. In light of the presented limitations of this research, further research options will also be presented.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Emotions have long been acknowledged as important in international relations. For instance, during and after the Cold War, emotions played a central role in representing the range of feelings from the conflict: from 'enmity' to 'friendship' of the Franco–German reconciliation of the 1960s; the 'fear' of a nuclear holocaust in the peace movements of the 1980s; and the ethnic 'hatred' witnessed in media coverage in the 1990s' civil wars (Clément and Sangar, 2018, p. 3).

While still a growing field, there have been several research developments for emotion discourse within IR. Much of this discourse covers how countries with complicated pasts use emotions to interact with each other. For instance, South Korean–Japanese relations are investigated by Tamaki (2019), who analyses emotionality in documents to uncover a narrative where both groups consider the burden of relational improvement to lie with the 'troublesome neighbor'. Similarly, Chinese–Japanese relations are discussed by Gustafsson and Hall (2021), who illustrate how the 'politics of emotions' can unfold on the international stage. Yet, they importantly point out that these politics are not only limited to state-to-state interactions between government voices. Emotions appear in political arguments to invoke deference, such as for victims of the 9/11 attacks; they appear in internationally religious rows, such as the emotions felt by Muslim communities from the Danish Muhammad cartoons in late 2005 to early 2006; they also appear in struggles on how to handle pasts of colonialism, slavery, and civil wars (ibid.). Emotions are shaped by our interactions with each other, whether on the individual level or the governmental and in turn, we also shape how emotions are (allowed to be) used in deciding who is entitled to feel an emotion, or who is not.

Specific to foreign policy discourse, there have been several case studies done on different aspects of emotions within diplomacy: the interplay between emotions and conflicts, interpersonal trust, and coercive diplomacy. Emotion is often conceptualized as something that can cause the significance, as well as the stakes, of a dispute to increase. Hall (2021) refers to this phenomenon as "dispute inflation": he uses the Chinese–Japanese dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to examine how emotion can be used to expand the non-material stakes that protagonists perceive to be threatened. Wirth (2019) even argues that the perceived 'humiliation' and 'rejuvenation' narrative has informed Chinese maritime politics and deepened its ideational isolation, increasing the risk of violent confrontations.

Sangar and his colleagues (2018), using a computer-assisted narrative analysis to compare political discourses legitimizing force, investigate how political leaders manufacture emotional

consent to use force beyond their own borders. As Duncombe (2019) illustrates, social media statements which relate to a state's identity can incite strong emotions, possibly undermining positive diplomatic relations, but can also provide openings for communication to ameliorate crises. Likewise, threats themselves cause no direct harm, according to Reichberg and Syse (2018): when a state openly expresses disapproval of another's behavior by using a threat, a space is instead opened for negotiation and compromise. While threats can produce fear, inciting strong emotions that have the potential to become violent, forced communication can strengthen diplomatic channels and lead to resolution. Moreover, scholars such as Michel (2012), Rathbun (2012), and Wheeler (2018) have contributed to the study of emotions by widening the concept of interpersonal trust to include its emotional basis. In this sense, trust between actors who are engaged in peaceful dialogue, or in conflictual dialogue, is an important facet in emotional discourse.

Coercive diplomacy has acted as an introduction of emotions into foreign policy, allowing for their analysis in previously constructed paradigms such as realism and liberalism. As argued by Markwica, emotions play "a significant role in foreign policy decision-making in general and in target leaders' responses to coercive diplomacy in particular" (2018), as emotions shape behavior in powerful, but also predictable, ways. Much of the research done on coercive diplomacy focuses on China, due to an observed rise in its use of coercive diplomacy since 2018. Analyzing the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute mentioned above, Wiegand (2009) proposes that China has used the territorial dispute as bargaining leverage through threats to compel Japanese behavioral changes on other issues, indeed allowing China to gain concessions. Forsby and Sverdrup-Thygeson (2022) discuss how China's coercive diplomacy is also used to pursue its expanding development interests. Moreover, Primiano (2018) uses the Chinese reaction to the 2008 torch relay fallout in France as a case study for understanding the key factor that identity and emotion play in international politics for China.

There are several researchers who emphasize the importance of studying emotional diplomacy, going further than that of coercive diplomacy (Koschut, 2022; Mercer, 2010; Reichberg and Syse, 2018, etc.). Particularly, there is a need to study emotions outside of the common realist and liberalist paradigms of international relations. Emotional diplomacy is commonly perceived as the deliberate use of particular emotions by diplomatic actors to shape the perceptions and behaviors of others (Smith, 2021). Such a definition is derived from the idea that diplomats are barred from revealing their personal emotions, and instead must refrain from emotionality. This idea, however, neglects the psycho-social aspect of diplomats being human beings, as well as states being institutions governed by human beings, who feel, think, and act through the emotions they experience. State officials and diplomats must "display the mandated emotions as part of their professional roles" (Smith, 2021), insinuating that emotions are indeed present within public diplomacy.

However, because emotional diplomacy is such a new field, there have also been several calls for the development of different approaches to understand and explore a topic as unorthodox as emotion. On the theoretical scale, Koschut (2018a) has illustrated the importance of the inclusion of a socio-emotional perspective in studying the discursive exercise of power at the international level. This view is supported by Pace and Bilgic (2019), who advocate for the

inclusion of social psychology and sociology in studies on how political actors invoke emotions. Methodologically, several scholars have called for the advancement, but also creation, of methods in which to analyze emotion (Mattern, 2012; Clément and Sangar, 2018; Koschut, 2022a).

More specifically, there has been some research done to understand *how* certain actors use emotion when exercising diplomatic actions, not simply how they achieve their perceived end-goals. Some examples include the following: in Nair's (2020) analysis on emotional labor at the ASEAN, it is shown that diplomats are faced with the task of mastering 'feeling rules' – what emotion is supposed to be felt in certain situations – as well as 'display rules' – how they must display the emotion – in order to be efficient in their diplomatic relations. Cornut (2022) analyses how diplomats use emojis on WhatsApp during negotiations at the UN Human Rights Council, showing how these emojis represent important mundane emotions which can be used to persuade and negotiate in informal diplomatic settings. Similarly, Jones and Clark (2019) demonstrate how emotions are inseparable facets of everyday life for UN diplomats, through illustrating how emotional embodiments emerge out of diplomatic claim-making.

Identifying emotion in specific actors' diplomatic actions extends beyond those mentioned above to include the actors focused on in this thesis. A case study on Russia uses an emotion discourse analysis to analyze NATO's foreign policy discourse regarding Russia over the annexation of Crimea (Koschut, 2022a). A different case study addresses the emotion-driven cooperation between Serbia and Russia, showing how the Serbian society and political elite address Serbia's potential accession to the EU as a pragmatic utility maximization, while its relations with Russia are addressed as an identity-laden issue (Patalakh, 2018).

Other studies have been done on Russia's own use of emotional diplomacy, with an analysis of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy towards the West, illustrating that Russian policy shifts are the result of extrinsic motivations, but also a significant result of intrinsic motivations, influenced by emotions such as anger over its status deprivation by the West (Heller, 2018). In regard to the annexation of Crimea, an affective lens shows that fear for regime survival, elites' fears for personal safety and well-being, and internalized anger over perceived status denial are persistent drivers of Russian foreign policy (Edinger, 2023), a view that can only be renewed with the invasion of Ukraine. As Edinger states, the shortcomings of the prevalent paradigms of structural realism and liberalism fail to address why affective, or emotional, phenomena matter in analyzing Russian foreign policy (2023): they matter because they *produce* the observed responses. Outrage conveys that a line has been crossed and lends credibility to a threat; contempt is problematic because it prohibits diplomacy and thus, resentment is preferred; and fear destroys trust but also encourages risk taking (Edinger, 2023).

Here, the same approach can be used in analyzing the reverse: the EU's emotional diplomacy towards Russia. Yet, research on emotion-use in public diplomacy coming from the EU is few and far between. The EU is conceptually considered to be a 'non-emotional' or 'neutral' actor within diplomacy. European diplomacy in general emphasizes emotional control, particularly control of negative emotion, and these European conceptions have come to dominate modern diplomatic assumptions, particularly for the West (Russell, 2004). As a highly technocratic organization, the EU is often perceived to deliberately take emotion out of political discourse

to avoid emotions escalating into conflicts: from the beginning of economic integration to expanding into foreign, security, and defense cooperation, EU policies were 'institutionalized' and 'legalized' so that agreement-reaching processes were both bureaucratized and depoliticized (Smith, 2021).

The EU's foreign policy is "not the stuff of high drama" in which foreign policy analysts tend to focus on, such as war, responses to aggression, etc. (Smith, 2021). Yet does this hold true when the EU is directly involved in a conflict where it is expected to respond to such aggression – a conflict that fundamentally goes against the values it bases its identity on? The complex and multilayered foreign policy-making process of the EU is intended to 'smooth out' the emotions that inevitably play a role in the organization's decision-making. However, the perceived threats to the core interests and values of the EU presented by the euro crisis, 2014 Crimea annexation, and Brexit have all resulted in the highest level of EU decision-making becoming much more political and less technocratic (van Middelar, 2020). Moreover, as Sjursen and Rosén point out, socialization alone cannot explain why member states reach a consensus; there must be something that triggers the agreement (2017). In the case of the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 by Russia, for instance, the emotions felt, and displayed, by the EU in response to the loss of life, including the anger felt towards Russia, set the boundaries of what was acceptable or not, resulting in stronger and quicker coercive action taken by the EU (Smith, 2021). In the case of this thesis, the INV of Russia's invasion is assumed to be that trigger. Yet it remains to be seen whether the emotion presented by the EU in response was affective or strategic.

From the existing literature on emotions within diplomacy, it is identifiable that there exists a gap in research on the EU's emotional diplomacy in several aspects. First is the methodological. As stated, there is much room for improvement in methods to analyze emotion. A common method is that of discourse analyses: however, this method runs the risk of creating bias when labelling instances of emotion within texts. The method is also time-consuming, limiting the amount of data that can be analyzed for emotional instances.

Second, identifying emotion as a driver of diplomacy, especially in a Western entity, needs to be expanded. While it has been illustrated that much research has been dedicated to *why* actors use emotion, there is a lack of research that aims to understand *how* actors respond the way that they do. In this sense, there is the need to not only identify the EU's emotional rhetoric towards the INV as being affective or strategic, but to also discuss possible reasons why the EU chose to pursue the reactions it did.

Finally, there is also a need to understand emotional choices in the context of presented security threats. The INV presented by Russia's invasion of Ukraine presents the unique opportunity to investigate this phenomenon, as such an instance may produce different findings of how the EU uses emotional diplomacy than during times of normalcy.

3. THEORY

3.1 Emotions Through a Constructivist Lens

Emotions are often misconstrued as factors that are "natural", "legitimate", or "authentic" rather than "socially acquired, inherited, or learned" (Heaney, 2019, p. 234). Even more, emotions have regularly been regarded as aberrations from rational choice: they are what women, lower-class citizens, or foreigners have (Ringmar, 2018, p. 33). While there exists a multitude of research that debunks such ideas, there is no doubt that emotion plays a significant role in the everyday life, and decisions, of all individuals.

Emotion itself can be a tricky variable to pinpoint. There is much debate about what constitutes affect, emotion, or feeling (see Mercer, 2014). Yet by incorporating these facets together, Crawford defines emotions as "the inner states that individuals describe to others as feelings, and those feelings may be associated with biological, cognitive, and behavioral states and changes" (2000, p. 125). Emotions are an essential part of what it means to be a sentient being – of being human. They emerge from interactions with others, as well as the structures that constitute both the material and social. As Mattern states, emotions "are neither substance nor process, neither natural nor cultural, neither cognitive nor physiological" (2012, p. 63).

One of the biggest questions within emotion research does not ask what emotion is, but what constitutes emotion. Many believe that an automatic reaction forms the presence of emotion; in other words, something that happens without conscious processing. While our emotional reactions can indeed be informed by a certain situation, they are still biological reactions that we experience. For instance, in social situations where emotions can be particularly intense, these sensations can activate subcortical areas in an individual's brain, pressing 'emotional buttons' before they can consciously attach cultural 'labels' to them (Koschut, 2022b, p. 6).

However, there is increasing evidence that we, as individuals, respond to stimuli with emotional reactions that are constantly, and unconsciously, informed by the society around us. Humans are not automatically biologically wired with emotions from birth. A person's emotional competence emerges through a social process in which the association of social contexts – such as being embarrassed – with specific performances by individuals – such as flushed cheeks or an increased heart rate – are learned 'through sociality' (Cornut, 2022, p. 3). As Mattern states, emotions are "as much a public event as a private way of being" (2012, p. 79).

While it would be unwise to throw the 'neurological anchoring' of emotions completely overboard, it would also be unwise to neglect the social construction of emotions; "emotions cannot be reduced to neither biological nor sociocultural processes but, rather, depend on one another" (Koschut, 2022b, p. 6). If our individual emotions are inherently present in the ways we interact with others, as well as the ways others interact with us, then it can only be assumed that international actors exhibit emotion in the same way.

3.2 Emotions in the Constructed International System

From Thucydides to Hobbes and Grotius, classical philosophers of international relations have long assumed that "passions" seen from actors have an important role in international conflicts, such as explaining war as a product of greed or pride (Russell, 2004, p. 391). Social constructivism offers an approach that allows emotion to be conceptualized as a variable itself, rather than simply a product of state-to-state interaction. Research in the 1970s opposed the assumption that foreign policy decisions are taken based on 'classical rationality', instead stressing that actors often have no choice but to pursue decision-making that involves the emotional, rather than solely calculating, part of the brain (Hill, 2003, p. 116).

Looking at emotions in groups (institutions or states) in comparison to the individual is different, but also similar. Group-level emotions are indeed distinct, as they have the extra dimension of emotions felt within the group, motivating and regulating intragroup and intergroup attitudes and behaviors (Smith, Seger and Mackie, 2007, p. 432). However, this insinuates that groups, or more specifically, states, do indeed have feelings, seen through the language of emotions in government statements (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2014, p. 500).

Emotion research in international relations has long stressed that actors' preferences, desires, and beliefs are shaped by the emotional dimensions of their existence (Mercer, 2005; Crawford, 2009; Hall and Ross, 2015). For instance, if an actor feels angry or ashamed, the emotion felt often depends on the social context of whether such an emotion *should* be felt or *when* it should be felt. In this sense, emotions within international relations involve value judgements from the necessary actors involved.

As Goleman argues, emotions represent a form of intelligence, as 'tools' that are used by actors within projects or aims (1995). Utilizing emotions can be viewed as laying a claim about a subject, thus endowing 'others' with meaning (Ahmed, 2012, p. 4). In this sense, emotions are *intentional*; they involve "a direction or orientation towards an object" (Parkinson, 1995, p. 8). Both these 'tools' or 'intentions' can also be considered motivations. While motivation is regularly only one component of emotion, "emotion and motivation are inextricably linked" (Fanselow, 2018, p. 105). Moreover, 'reason' can also act as an emotional strategy. Public diplomacy initiatives depend on reason, meaning that they also depend on the emotional context in which their initiative is portrayed (Graham, 2014 p. 524). This connection becomes even more evident when the initiative is addressing values, since emotions become even more invested when value is placed on something (ibid.).

Several scholars studying emotional diplomacy have questioned rational choice models that are premised on the understanding of actors as autonomous and egoistic beings. They instead call for the consideration of *reasoning* rather than rationality in theorizing emotions in decision-making, arguing that while rationality entails actors making connections to maximize their chances of achieving their goals, reason gives a more-complete account of what actually drives this interaction (see Crawford, 2000; Graham, 2014; Mercer, 2006). As Aristotle points out, reason involves judgement, and judgement depends on emotional intuition, as well as the appraisal of both an external situation and of the self (2012, p. 9).

If emotions are the moral judgements which represent an individual's appraisal of past experiences and future expectations, then emotions contribute significantly to the "discursive construction of social identities and power relations in international relations" (Koschut, 2018b, p. 496). Going further than implying that emotions are inherently present in the international system, it can also be argued that the social construction of the power structure in international politics is built through the socio-emotional underpinnings of status and identity (Koschut, 2018b, p. 496). As Koschut puts it, "emotions are cultural products that owe their meaning and purpose to learnt social rules" (2018a, p. 278).

Through a constructivist lens, emotions follow social norms in the sense that they are managed by the individuals who apply particular emotions to particular situations according to what is considered 'normal'. Norms, here, are understood as the socio-political expressions of inter-subjective standards of appropriate behavior (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Mercer argues that emotion can even explain why actors adhere to norms: if an actor violates a norm, they should feel embarrassment, shame, or guilt, while others should feel anger or indignation (2006, p. 298). Moreover, even when an actors' own feelings are not moved to induce emotion, an actor can perceive how others might react, allowing them to play to or along with this (Hall, 2021, p. 3).

Yet, identifying emotional reactions specific to INVs becomes tricky when the violating actor does not adhere to the same norms as the ingroup: they will not display the expected embarrassment, shame, or guilt. Thus, norm contestation can be identified when the offended actors express disapproval of certain actions, often with the aim of establishing emerging or continued legitimacy (Tully, 2002). In other words, an actors' emotional reaction to an INV can be just as telling as the violating actors' emotions. Indeed, "[if] norms play an important role in relations between states, then analysts should be able to see emotion when norms are violated" (Mercer, 2006, p. 299).

3.3 How Emotions Shape Public Diplomacy

Emotion specific to diplomacy adds another facet to the interpretation of emotion within the relationships between international actors. In other words, diplomats represent different countries, and thus encounter different cultural norms that not only govern the display of emotion, but also influence the way in which actors experience emotion (Russell, 2004). Because diplomats may possess different emotion cultures and organizational cultures, a new culture in itself is created: diplomatic culture. Bull describes diplomatic culture as "the common stock of ideas and values possessed by the official representatives of states", including the "common notions and techniques that derive from the universal espousal by governments in the modern world […]" (1995, p. 317). Emotions thus involve institutionalized responses that allow diplomats to participate in world politics through shared meaning structures (Koschut, 2022a, p. 170). As Fattah and Fierke state, "emotions [are] socially meaningful expressions, which depend on shared customs, uses and institutions" (2009, p. 70).

Yet, others argue that this diplomatic culture, and its associated norms, have not evolved within the entirety of the international system (see f.x., Watson, 1982), and that they instead reflect a culture derived from dynastic Europe. Diplomacy's modern customs and norms reflect those

of the European diplomatic society which non-European states have been – sometimes forcibly – incorporated into over the past centuries (Russell, 2004, p. 397). As Flockhart points out, the multipower order of the late eighteenth century was characterized by a shared European identity, including great power management and diplomacy, which, with the bipolar system of the 20th century, remained the dominant identity through the conception of the 'Western identity' (2016, p. 19–20, 23). Indeed, the European emphasis on emotional control, primarily of negative emotions, has come to dominate modern diplomatic practices (Russell, 2004, p. 398).

Nevertheless, the international system is not solely made up of 'Western' entities, nor are Western entities devoid of emotion, despite their best efforts. Moreover, even those such as Locke, Bentham, and Kant, who anticipated a reason-based transnational consensus of interest, acknowledged that 'passions', or emotions, were inherently present (see Russell, 2004, p. 391). As Nicolson observes, the technical phrases inherent to diplomatic vocabulary enable diplomats to exhibit emotion, such as the use of sharp language, without becoming provocative or impolite (1969, p. 122). Russell adds to this observation by pointing out that these phrases and principles act as proof of a distinctive diplomatic 'emotion culture' (2004, p. 395).

Following this line of thought, emotion constitutes a valuable variable in studying diplomatic processes. The most basic constructivist view on emotions understands language as the key in which access to emotion is gained, as well as their constitutive social functions (Heller, 2018, p. 75). Such a view inherently views public diplomacy as the arena in which international actors portray their emotional reactions to certain stimuli. Diplomats, through their ability to speak in the name of states, thus "serve as embodiments of some of the most highly emotionally charged political entities in the modern world" (Russell, 2004, p. 394). Additionally, diplomacy is one of the most significant factors within global power relations, as keeping the communication lines open between actors is not only important in everyday discussions, but of utmost importance in times of crisis, threat, or war.

3.4 Emotional Diplomacy: Affective or Strategic?

Emotional diplomacy as a conceptual tool represents the official behavior, or emotion, that a state or institution projects towards others as a political, or diplomatic, strategy. For analyzing emotions in international relations, the most important observation, as stated by Mercer, is that "emotion and cognition meet in beliefs and that this rendezvous is necessary for rationality", allowing us to better understand emotion as not a mysterious, irrational force, but as a consistent variable with predictable effects (2010, p. 25). In this sense, foreign policy actors behave rationally *because* they are emotional actors, not despite it (Koschut, 2022a, p. 169).

The decision-making process in the EU is often portrayed as a rational process, where decision-makers reach decisions after weighing costs and benefits, as well as considering which norms should be followed in specific situations (Smith, 2021, p. 291). Yet, it has been pointed out that with EU diplomats working together for decades, this socialization has produced coordination reflexes (de Schoutheete, 1980, p. 118–120), common interests (Jørgensen, 1997), and collective identification (Tonra, 2001, p. 19) among representatives. Identification as a group for the EU as an international actor becomes important, as this can determine joint emotional

reactions and behavior. For instance, anger towards an outgroup increases the desire of the ingroup to confront, or even attack, the outgroup in some way (Mackie, Smith and Ray, 2008, p. 1874). In this sense, anger or fear present in statements made, or documents released, by the EU Foreign Affairs Council towards a non-EU member state, or outgroup, can be traced to a response action that was taken, meaning that emotions indeed affect EU foreign policy decision-making (Smith, 2021, p. 292).

Indeed, actors are not always rational in the unemotional way supposed by most international relations' theories, but they are not necessarily irrational either if they do not display rationality in a classical sense: humans have the unique ability to make decisions that are "always both classically self-interested and emotional" (Crawford, 2000, p. 156). As mentioned, emotional reactions seen in foreign policy statements can be the product of 'knee-jerk' reactions, where the reaction is expressive – what is often referred to as 'emotional', in the sense of being outside of 'normal' emotional conduct. On the other hand, they can also be sustained reactions, where the reaction is expressed and then continues to be portrayed at the same level. These processes can be considered as affective and strategic, respectively.

Affective Emotional Reaction

Example A can be used to help visualize an affective response to an INV from the EU. Along the x-axis, time is plotted, corresponding to the given emotion's scores on the y-axis; the green dotted line corresponds to February 24, 2022, which is the date of the Russian invasion. The example is a distinct affective response: the emotion 'jumps' – either up or down – in response to the invasion, and then returns to a baseline over time.



Example **A**. Affective emotional reaction displayed by the EU

Affective reactions, in simple terms, can be described as "immediate reactions to the perceived goodness/badness of stimuli" (Lench and Bench, 2015, p. 220). There are generally two identifiable roles of affective emotion: affect as a summary judgement which is stored in our memory, and affect as a contemporary response to real-time circumstances (Marcus, 2000, p. 228). The latter is what this thesis will concern itself with. These responses can take form as positive emotions such as approval or optimism, elicited by imagined success, or as negative emotions such as anger and disappointment, elicited by aversive stimuli (Slovic and Peters, 2006).

Perhaps the key defining feature that sets an affective reaction apart from a strategic reaction is *intentionality*. In an affective reaction, the reaction to the stimulus is not performed on the offending actor, but upon the reacting actor themselves (Kantor, 1923, p. 433). Rather than producing a reaction for an intended outcome, the actor themselves is affected. When we deal with a genuine emotional response, one of *true emotion*, the active changes we experience when adapting to the stimulus are localized to our own selves, which can then change our posture or attitude toward the stimulus (Kantor, 1923, pp. 433–434).

Yet, this does not necessarily mean that an affective response does not initiate a response from the actor receiving the reaction. While affective responses are often viewed as disruptors of decision-making, theories of emotion posit that these reactions are functional, meaning that they often facilitate efficient responses and even decisions (Lench and Bench, 2015, p. 220). Indeed, several studies have shown that affective emotional reactions do indeed motivate behavior from others, even when not intended. Nevertheless, when the EU displays a high level of emotion in response to the invasion date, and then the emotion returns to a baseline over time, this constitutes an affective response.

Strategic Emotional Reaction

Just as Example A represents an affective emotional response, Example B represents a strategic emotional response. There is an emotional reaction at the invasion point, and this reaction is relatively sustained over time.



Example **B**. Strategic emotional reaction displayed by the EU

Corresponding with the constructivist lens of emotion, human emotion is a highly social phenomenon, in which actors not only experience and express emotions, but they often express their emotions for the sake of evoking feelings and perceptions within others (Goffman, 1959). In the most simple sense, a frown suggests to another the need for behavioral adjustment and a smile solicits affiliation – both of which show how emotional reactions can be strategic displays intended to influence the receiver (Liu et al., 2012, p. 519).

While affective emotional reactions have been much researched in fields such as psychology, strategic emotional reactions have gained traction in fields such as economics and law, support

therapy, and indeed, international relations. While Rafaeli and Sutton studied the use of emotional reactions by criminal litigators to induce compliance of suspects (1991), Thoits investigated the strategies that encounter groups use to help their members open up to be able to provide emotional support services (1996). Within public diplomacy specifically, an actor can use emotions as 'cues' that inform another of its internal state, and these communicated cues can influence the receiver's reactions and behaviors (Van Kleef, 2009).

The strategic display of emotion therefore refers to an emotional reaction that is *intentionally* expressed by an actor to attain a desired outcome (Kopelman et al., 2006, p. 82). Therefore, when the EU displays a certain level of emotion in response to the invasion date, and then continues or sustains this level of emotional response, this constitutes a strategic response.

It is important to note that both affective and strategic reactions entail an emotional reaction *defined by emotionality*: an affective reaction is not void of cognitive processing of the emotion felt, nor is a strategic reaction void of the 'true emotion' felt in response to a stimuli. A 'feeling' is often considered to be the non-reflective sensation that is situated before and beyond consciousness (Ross, 2006; Hutchison and Bleiker, 2007). Yet, everything an actor does can be considered to be embedded in terms of what they 'feel' (Ringmar, 2018, p. 33), including the reactions it chooses to exhibit. Instead, the difference between an affective and strategic reaction lies in the reaction itself, not in the emotion felt; it is assumed that an INV will induce an emotional reaction *regardless* of how the actor decides to exhibit the reaction.

4. METHODOLOGY

4.1 Case study

The presented research question represents an investigation into how the EU reacts to an INV using emotional communications through its public diplomacy. Here, while looking at the EU as the actor, Russia's invasion of Ukraine represents the case. The EU was chosen as the actor to analyze for this thesis for several reasons. As seen above, the EU's foreign policy is regularly seen as 'emotionless', while the contrary can be argued. Indeed, considering the 2008 financial crisis, 2015 so-called migration crisis, Brexit, and most recently, the COVID-19 crisis, scholars in the field of European Studies have developed a burning interest in emotions, searching for alternative explanations to the many unprecedented challenges the EU has faced in the last decade, and perhaps more importantly, how the EU has reacted to these challenges (see Capelos and Katsanidou, 2018; Curtis and Nielsen, 2018; Manners, 2018).

Moreover, another key aspect for this discussion is that of the EU as a normative power, including whether this is a self-identification, or a perception from other actors. There has been extensive research on the EU's ability to "shape conceptions of what is normal" (Terzi, Palm and Gürkan, 2021), allowing the EU power to set societal norms. While the EU's norm-setting power has been routinely discussed in relation to enlargement, the promotion of human rights, and environmental policies, the emotional underpinnings of the EU as a normative power have been largely undiscussed. Norms undoubtedly play a large role in the 'feeling rules' of international actors, as the constructivist lens points out. Therefore, the EU as a normative power invokes questions of how emotion plays a role in its normative actions within foreign

policy decision-making processes. Under the assumption that emotions are normatively displayed through discourse within EU foreign policy, the EU and its actions become an "interesting laboratory for studying emotions" (Terzi, Palm and Gürkan, 2021).

This emphasis on norms explains why the Russian invasion of Ukraine was chosen as the case, or rather, the emotional stimulus to investigate. Indeed, there are several other countries and conflicts that could hypothetically yield a distinct emotional reaction from the EU. Yet, this thesis, as mentioned in the introduction, is focused on examining the reaction to an international norm violation – a violation of a fundamental aspect of the international system's stability, in which the violation is deemed by the EU to be unacceptable according to international law. As Mercer (2006) notes, because norms play an important role in the relations between states, the violation of these norms is expected to trigger emotional reactions that manifest in emotional language.

Here, when considering the core beliefs and fundamental qualities that the EU advocates for, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is an event that is not only an INV, but one that expectedly would trigger a visible emotional reaction in the EU's public diplomacy. Indeed, emotions are crucial features of the politics of security within the international system (Rythoven, 2015, p. 459), which initiate judgements and responses to the offending action from an adversary. Because of this emotional reaction, across several different emotion categories, the question of how the EU reacts to an INV can be investigated.

4.2 Fine-Grained Emotional Content Analysis

As mentioned previously, the primary method in researching emotions is often that of a discourse analysis, which can be subject to time-constraints, as well as possible bias. However, what if we could systematically identify emotional instances within a significant number of sources, thus quantifying emotion? This thesis aims to introduce a novel method of quantitative text analysis for public diplomatic communication. In order to identify emotion, emotion must first be conceptualized as its own variable. As discussed in the theoretical section, emotion must not be assumed to be the *product* of an interaction, but as a *variable* that itself can be used to analyze an interaction.

This thesis will be analyzing emotions within EU foreign policy statements and documents. Admittedly, these data are not natural human reactions, reactions where emotion is easily identifiable. Indeed, these statements and documents are written by teams of people over the course of hours and sometimes days, which are then cross-checked by others. It would be easy to argue, here, that it is thus not possible to identify 'true emotion' from these data. Yet, this argumentation would hold that any emotion identified outside of a 'real-world' context – any data that is not visual – cannot be 'true emotion' either, which is indeed a slippery slope to venture down. This would discount all written documents, speeches, or letters, and perhaps even audio recordings. Because emotions are "inner feelings, subjective, intangible sentiments that cannot be measured" (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2017), they become observable only through their utterances (Terzi, Palm and Gürkan, 2021), verbally, audibly, and in this case, on paper.

The time period analyzed will be from February 24, 2021 to March 7, 2024 – one year prior to the date of invasion and the date of data acquisition, respectively. Here, the data are tracked for before and after the invasion, shedding light on how emotionality changed, or did not change, in response to the INV. The analysis is therefore two-fold: first, emotion will be tracked over the entire time period, analyzing the significance of time in general on emotion. Second, the emotional change of the given emotion will be specifically analyzed at the invasion date, illustrating possible changes that occurred specific to the INV.

4.2.1 Data Acquisition: Accessing HTML Data and Extracting Text

The data acquisition, processing, and statistical analyses were performed using Python, and the code can be accessed in the supplementary document, as well as its GitHub repository: https://github.com/sasni27/MSc.Thesis.EU_Emotional_Diplomacy/tree/main. The data were pulled from the given time period, collected from the webpage of the European Council's 'Press releases and statements': https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/. The webpage, with filters for the needed time period and for the keyword "Russia", yields media advisories, press releases, speeches, and statements from the following: European Council; International ministerial meetings; International Summits; Eurogroup; and Euro Summit. All of these EU bodies are considered important indicators for the data because they deal with, and set, EU foreign policy.

An amount of 336 press releases and statements were available from using the applied search criteria. When searched, the webpage displays the documents in a list format, which can then each be clicked on to access the text. To acquire the text from all 336 documents, a combination of web scraping and data collection techniques were used. Using the URL mentioned above, the Python package Requests was used to gather the initial HTML content of the webpage (Chandra and Varanasi, 2015). Then, using the package BeautifulSoup (Richardson, 2017), the HTML data was parsed into a format that could be easily navigated to extract the needed information.

A package called Selenium was used as an automated web browser to interact with the URL, the same as an average user would (Huggins, 2004). Using Selenium, the specific elements of the website could be navigated so that each individual source was identified. Then, the URLs of each source were added to a list containing all the URLs of interest. Selenium was once more used to automatically navigate to each page of results in order to repeat the process for all seventeen pages.

Once Selenium extracted all the URLs and deposited them in the list, a loop was initiated in order to extract the text data from each press release and statement. The process was performed as follows: for each initiation, meaning each URL in the list, a new Chrome browser window was launched. The information of title, date, and the included press release or statement was extracted using Requests and Selenium – similar to the URLs. It must be noted that pauses of a random length were included at multiple locations in the code to ensure that the webpage did not identify bot-activity. The information gathered from the URLs was compiled into a new text file (.txt) for each source, which was saved for the analysis. Thus, the process was repeated

until all 336 files were converted into text files. Each file was labeled uniquely, by number 1–336, to ensure no duplications.

4.2.2 EmoRoBERTa

The fine-grained emotional content analysis, the method used in this thesis, is a method that identifies emotion within text and then assigns 'emotion labels', or emotion scores, for the overall document. In recent years, language representation models have achieved great advancements, especially with the introduction of Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT), which is designed to pre-train deep bidirectional representations from unlabeled text, resulting in models that can be used for a wide range of tasks, such as language inference, when adding an output layer (Devlin *et al.*, 2019). Thus, this thesis will specifically use the coding algorithm EmoRoBERTa, an optimized BERT model which combines the two concepts of RoBERTa (Liu *et al.*, 2019) and GoEmotions (Demszky *et al.*, 2020). The basis for the model is RoBERTa, a robustly optimized BERT that uses BERT's strategies of masked language modelling (MLM) with some key modifications (Liu *et al.*, 2019). Moreover, RoBERTa was trained using a significantly larger amount of data, as well as over a longer time period, compared to BERT, meaning that it can better be applied to more-effectively downstream tasks. RoBERTa was fine-tuned with GoEmotions, which is a dataset of 58,000 Reddit comments that were categorized by humans into one of twenty-seven categories (Demszky *et al.*, 2020). What makes GoEmotions so effective at identifying subtle differences between forms of emotional expression is that it includes emotion labels of the following: 12 positive, 11 negative, 4 ambiguous, and 1 'neutral'. Currently, GoEmotions remains the largest fully annotated dataset for fine-grained emotion-based content analyses.

EmoRoBERTa, as a combination of the two, is an integral tool for identifying and classifying emotion within text. GoEmotions, as stated, is the largest manually annotated dataset of Reddit comments, which was used to train EmoRoBERTa (Demszky *et al.*, 2020). One limitation of the dataset is that the annotators were all native English speakers, as well as the inherent unconscious bias that may exist due to manual annotations, which likely affected the labeling, precision, and recall for EmoRoBERTa (ibid.). Though, with around 30,000 training Reddit comments used, these effects were hopefully mitigated.

Nevertheless, the model can acquire emotion scores for up to 27 emotions for each individual text. However, the model does have the limitation that it can only identify emotion in a text that is under 512 'tokens' – similar to characters. Because several of the texts were longer than 512 tokens, the relevant sources were chunked into portions of text of 500 tokens. For each chunk after the first, there was a 25-token overlap to ensure that no semantic information was missed by the model. The chunks were then individually scored using the initiated EmoRoBERTa pipeline. These scores were saved individually. The overlapping sections of text were averaged together so that overrepresentation did not occur. Lastly, each label score was averaged across all the chunks to create a single mean score for each emotion label. This process was done for each individual source, and the results were stored with the date of the source for further analysis.

4.2.3 Emotion Selection

EmoRoBERTa was programmed to extract the following eight emotion labels: approval, annoyance, disapproval, optimism, disappointment, anger, disgust, and fear. The six basic emotion categories – joy, anger, fear, sadness, disgust, and surprise – are often chosen along the affective dimensions of valence and arousal, which underpin the model of affect (see Buechel and Hahn, 2017; Ekman, 1992; Russell, 2003). Yet, advances in psychology have led to new methodological approaches in capturing the complex "semantic space" of emotion (Cowen *et al.*, 2019), going further than the six emotions listed above. Moreover, as explained, this thesis assumes emotion to be more than just affect. Thus, pulling from the twenty-seven emotions that are introduced by Demszky and their colleagues (2020), the eight emotions listed were chosen due to their importance concerning diplomacy. This importance will be discussed for each emotion in the following analysis.

In their paper, Demszky and their colleagues summarize the performance of the EmoRoBERTa model by comparing their GoEmotions dataset's emotion scores to scores retrieved from a test set, in order to test the validity and reliability of the model (2020). As seen in Table 4 of their paper, the F1 scores of the emotions – referring to the harmonic mean of precision and recall scores – give the following order of validity for the emotions used in this thesis: fear, optimism, disgust, disapproval, approval, annoyance, anger, and lastly, disappointment (ibid.). For the lower scoring emotions, it was found that these less frequent emotions tended to be confused with more frequent emotions in the model: for instance, grief was confused with sadness, or nervousness was confused with fear (ibid.). Nevertheless, this summary provides a validation of the EmoRoBERTa model, assuming both validity and reliability based on these outputs, as well as the scale of the model. The order of the emotions' F1 scores is something to keep in mind when considering the results found in this thesis' analysis.

4.3 Statistical Analyses

4.3.1 GGPlot with LOESS smoothing

For the main form of this thesis' analysis, the GGPLOT library in Python was used to create visualizations of the 'true' emotional impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the EU's emotional rhetoric. This library offers a "grammar of graphics approach to plotting", making it one of six most-popular data visualization libraries used in Python (Lavanya *et al.*, 2023).

Specifically, GGPLOT was utilized to generate line plots with LOESS smoothing – locally estimated scatterplot smoothing – which is a technique that applies locally weighted regression to smooth out fluctuations in the emotional scores over time. LOESS smoothing was chosen since the data is non-linear; LOESS is non-parametric, meaning that it does not require *a priori* specification of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables (Jacoby, 2000). Moreover, LOESS was also chosen because this method provided a more realistic description of time trends in relation to the emotion scores. Here, LOESS smoothing was able to capture local fluctuations in the data, displaying the 'true' emotional response from the EU based on the data from the emotion scores obtained.

With the x-axis representing time, the y-axis represents the emotion scores. Separate lines with different colors were plotted for the period before the invasion date and for the period after the invasion date. This was done to distinguish changes that occurred specifically due to the event of the invasion. The GGPlots with LOESS smoothing, Figures 1–8, were used to visualize trends in the data for each emotion. These visualizations investigate two questions: whether the invasion caused an emotional reaction; and whether it was strategic or affective.

4.3.2 OLS Regression

In addition to the GGPlots with LOESS smoothing, it was of interest to perform significance testing on the relationship between time and emotion scores. An Ordinary Least Squares, or OLS, regression was used to investigate whether the given emotion had a significant relationship to the time period as a whole. Regression analyses act as statistical tools that investigate the relationship between variables (Sykes, 1993). A significant result insinuated the probability that time was a defining factor in the level of emotional response. This testing was important to establish a baseline for further testing. In other words, the OLS regression showed whether time and emotion have a significant relationship, regardless of the invasion.

OLS regression works by calculating the distance between values, and then calculating the regression line based off of this; the distances are then squared, added together, and the sum of squared errors is calculated, with OLS minimizing the expression with linear operations (Prakash, Ruwali and Kanagachidambaresan, 2021). The OLS regression was performed using statsmodels.api in Python, which is a package that provides statistical computations for linear regression models, discrete models, time series analyses, multivariate analyses, etc. (PyPI, 2024).

The interpretation of the OLS regression results concerns the following factors: the coefficients are the estimated coefficients for the intercept – or constant – and the standardized date, representing the expected change in the dependent variable – the emotion score – for a one-unit change in the independent variable – time. Here, it must be noted that the dates were standardized using a 0 to 1 range. The 'P>|t| (p-values)' are the p-values associated with the coefficients, concerning the t-tests of the null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero. These values indicate the statistical significance of each coefficient estimate. For this thesis, the level of significance is equal to or less than 0.05. Moreover, the F-statistic tests the overall significance of the regression model, meaning that it tests whether the independent variable has a non-zero coefficient and produces its p-value as a result of this.

4.3.3 Interaction Effect Model

An interaction effect model was also performed on the data, specifically used for investigating the effect of the interaction variable – pre- and post- the Russian invasion of Ukraine – on the emotional change that occurred for the given emotion. To perform the test in Python, an interaction effect (IE) within the dataset of emotion scores and time was created as a variable. The package of sklearn.preprocessing was utilized for this analysis; the package provides utility functions that can change raw feature vectors into a representation that is more suitable for downstream estimators, with pre-processing referring to the transformations occurring before

the data is fed to the algorithm (Scikit Learn, no date). Here, PolynomialFeatures was downloaded and used to capture the more-complex relationships between the variables of time, which again was standardized (labelled as 'date_standardized'), the given emotion scores, and the interaction term of the invasion date.

Using these variables, the test investigated the impact of the variables on each other. The following coefficients were found for each emotion: 'const' refers to the coefficient of the intercept of the regression line when all other predictor variables are set to zero, indicating the level of the emotion without the IE. The 'date_standardized' coefficient represents the slope of the regression line for the standardized date variable, indicating the trend of the scores regardless of the IE. For the IE itself, the 'interaction' variable represents the effect of the interaction between the invasion date and the standardized date variable on the emotion scores. It indicates then the IE, which must be considered with the last coefficient: 'interaction_date'. This coefficient represents the effect of the interaction between the invasion date and the standardized date variable on the emotion scores and suggests what type of slope could be found post-invasion. These coefficients were presented, but also fitted for confidence intervals (CIs), indicating whether they have statistical significance.

Moreover, using matplotlib.pyplot in Python, figures plotting the IE regression pre- and post-invasion were given for each emotion. These figures therefore illustrate the overall trend of the IE on the emotion scores over time, specific to the invasion. The model plots the relationships between the variables presented above, forming the IE's regression line. The model visualizes both the IE at the invasion date, and the regression over time for both pre- and post-invasion to identify changes. The CI of the IE regression line is also plotted. Note here that the slope over time post-invasion will not be discussed in detail, as the GGPlots represent a more in-depth analysis of these trends and are therefore able to better capture the category of emotional reaction observed. Due to space constraints, the full results of the OLS regressions and the IE models can be found in the appendix in 'OLS Regression results by emotion' and 'Interaction Effect Regression results by emotion', respectively.

5. ANALYSIS

5.1 Results of EmoRoBERTa by Emotion

5.1.1 Approval



Figure 1: Impact of the INV on approval scores over time, elaborated by author using GGPLOT in Python with LOESS smoothing

Approval as an emotion is debated, primarily because unlike other emotions' forms as simple adjectives or adverbs, approval can become a verb: to approve. Stevenson recognizes approval as an attitude – an attitude that manifests as a "disposition to act in certain ways and to experience certain feelings, rather than itself a simple action or feeling" (1945, p. 90). This view is extended by Pitcher, who states that to experience approval is not to just experience the emotion of approval, but to experience approval in its verb form: to approve, or disapprove, of something (1958, p. 195). Here, because approval can take on many forms, it can be identified as both an emotion and an experience.

Figure 1 visualizes the trend of approval scores over time. As can be seen from the plot, a clear drop in approval scores can be seen on the invasion date. Interestingly, however, the scores seem to slightly increase for a few months before steadily decreasing for the remainder of the time period. There may be several reasons for this trend. One reason could be 'noise' within EU statements, in the sense that rhetoric showing approval was displayed by the EU to other actors that, for instance, joined with the EU in placing sanctions on Russia, or gave economic assistance or weapons to Ukraine (see European Commission, no date). Another reason could be that during negotiation efforts, the EU displayed approval of any diplomatic processes between Russia and Ukraine, encouraging diplomacy and keeping a 'level head'.

Shaftesbury introduces the concept of 'reflective affections' or 'rational affections', which are described as feelings of attention or inattention, corresponding to the emotions of approval or disapproval (Shaftesbury, 2000, p. 176). In other words, these reflective affections drive actors

towards what they approve of as good, and away from what they disapprove of as bad. As Husserl explains, the emotive appraisal or evaluation of the feelings of approval or disapproval are nothing but 'moral judgements' (see Carta, 2023, p. 5). Indeed, the 'approving' statements made by the EU on the invasion date are directed towards actions that the EU and like-minded partners took, or towards Ukraine, not Russia's actions: for instance, "[t]he EU's response will therefore include both sectoral and individual restrictive measures coordinated fully with our transatlantic and like-minded partners" (Council of the EU, 2022).

The statements also pertain to the EU's self-identity, using public diplomacy to display that the INV does not present a crisis for the EU itself. As President Michael and President von der Leyen stated on February 24th, 2022, "[w]e, the European Union, stand rock solid. United, firm and determined […] together with our allies" (European Council, 2022d). Therefore, approval is an important emotion when evaluating the EU's reaction to an emotional stimulus such as the INV, and how the actor responds to such. Yet, while statements with approving rhetoric can be found in the data, the results still show an overall decrease, as approval never reaches its pre-invasion levels. The drop on the invasion date in Figure 1 and its subsequent trend support the argumentation that the EU displayed less approval when faced with the INV which induced negative feelings.

At first glance, one might conclude that Figure 1 represents a strategic reaction by the EU. However, the reaction cannot be concluded as strategic because it fluctuates over time – it is not sustained. The reaction fluctuates between the levels of 0.3 and 0.4, which is quite substantial. Yet, the reaction is not affective either. There is no reactive response on the invasion date towards the INV that returns to a visualized baseline. In fact, the response even does the opposite, with the dip on the invasion date flipping afterwards to an increase. While we can conclude a decrease of approval scores due to the INV, we cannot conclude what reaction these scores yielded.

5.1.2 Optimism



Figure 2: Impact of the INV on optimism scores over time, elaborated by author using GGPLOT in Python with LOESS smoothing

One of the remarkable features of the human capacity is the ability to flexibly represent future events, positively or negatively, and act according to those representations (Bruininks and Malle, 2005, p. 327). Optimism is generally defined as a "stable, general individual difference factor that is comprised of positive mood, attitude, or opinion about future events" (Hirsch, Conner and Duberstein, 2007). In the succinct words of Scheier and Carver, it is the generalized expectancy that the future will be positive (1985).

Optimism represents an interesting emotion, particularly because it is often analyzed in *relation* to other emotions. Distinguishing between optimism and hope, people were found to be optimistic about situations with general outcomes, whereas hope was displayed for specific outcomes (Bruininks and Malle, 2005, p. 339). Additionally, individuals who are optimistic about a situation are able to more successfully regulate their emotions, meaning that they are less prone to negative interpretations of the situation even while experiencing emotions such as anger (Gordon et al., 2016). Interestingly enough, it has also been found that optimism is not a unique predictor during the reappraisal condition, but optimism does uniquely predict responses in the angry reappraise condition (ibid., p. 11). In other words, inherently being optimistic does not make a unique difference when we are going through the process of actively changing our perspective. Instead, optimism seems to only affect how we react when we reinterpret anger-inducing situations in a positive light.

The same as approval scores, an observable drop can be seen in Figure 2 on February 24, 2022 for optimism scores. While there was a slight rise after the invasion date, the optimism scores seem to be maintained, and then steadily decrease after about a year and a half. Such a trend could be explained by the EU remaining optimistic about efforts related to diplomatic negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, support from like-minded partners in economic deterrence and other areas, or even Ukrainian victories against Russia over time, but still experiencing decreased levels due to the INV itself. While optimism can be seen in the European Council conclusions on February 24, 2022 – "[t]he EU is united in its solidarity with Ukraine and will continue to support Ukraine and its people" (2022a) – as a reassurance of EU support towards Ukraine, the EU's statements can also be seen as a reassurance of hope. On the invasion date, the EU stated that they would "provide further political, financial and humanitarian assistance" (European Council, 2022c). One could even argue that this rhetoric is displayed for the purpose of convincing like-minded partners to do the same.

It remains that, regardless of the trend later on, the optimism scores faced an observable drop on the invasion date, one that never rose to its pre-invasion levels. One study interestingly found that optimism is specifically associated with increased time attending to positive information, highlighting this as a mechanism in which optimism acts as a buffer against psychological stress (Kelberer et al., 2017, p. 89). This is also supported by Bruininks and Malle, who point out that when people have a higher degree of personal control, they are able to experience optimism since the outcome is attainable (2005, p. 353). For the case of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the observed optimism scores can be perceived to represent, for instance, how much control over the situation the EU felt it had – perhaps very little.

The trend visualized for the optimism scores represents a strategic reaction by the EU. This is because the optimism scores undergo an obvious dip to the level of 0.025, a level which is sustained for a significant period of time. Indeed, on the anniversary of the invasion, one year later, optimism was seen when the EU issued a statement showing optimism for the Ukrainian people: "[a]midst Russia's assault, Ukrainians are more united, proud and determined than ever" (European Council, 2023). While the optimism scores start dipping around the summer of 2023, the INV cannot be concluded to be responsible for this change. Based on the observed reaction, the EU strategically maintained a decreased level of optimism for specific reasons: for instance, to show its discontent with the situation, but also its loss of control, while still issuing statements containing optimism for its like-minded partners and Ukraine.

5.1.3 Disapproval



Figure 3: Impact of the INV on disapproval scores over time, elaborated by author using GGPLOT in Python with LOESS smoothing

Disapproval represents the emotional antithesis to that of approval. As discussed, both approval and disapproval are not just emotions; they can become actions when an actor approves or disapproves of something. The reflective affection of disapproval is often a driver of this action, when an actor appraises the situation and finds that it goes against its moral judgements (see Carta, 2023).

In Figure 3, a significant jump in disapproval can be seen on the invasion date. Indeed, the jump extends beyond the highest levels seen prior to the invasion, going beyond the bounds of the 0.03 level. However, following the invasion date, the reaction trickles off over a period of about six months, returning to a 'baseline' that is relatively maintained from that point on. While disapproval begins to rise again over time, it does not rise to near the level it previously reached on the invasion date.

There is a strong correlation between shame and disapproval, one that elucidates itself through the action of disapproval when an actor experiences shame, thus feeling the desire to protect themselves, or its social image (Mosquera et al., 2008, p. 1493). Among actors who are strongly

concerned with honor, or say, their normative power, this shame–disapproval conundrum is even more likely to occur (ibid.). Along the same vein, it has been shown that if one's counterpart is able to perceivably express disapproval, it will be increasingly difficult for the actor receiving the disapproving message to stay consistent with its self-serving beliefs, as political actors must often pursue disapproval avoidance (Xiao and Houser, 2009, p. 394).

This trend can be interpreted as the EU highly disapproving of the actions taken by Russia when it invaded Ukraine, but then leveling out its reaction for the sake of diplomatic or negotiating efforts. Indeed, on the invasion date, disapproval is seen in several statements. For instance, the European Council issued a joint statement on February 24, 2022 calling on "Russia and Russia-backed armed formations to respect international humanitarian law" (European Council, 2022c), insinuating that they were, or would not, do so. Similarly, the High Representative emitted disapproval by stating that the military attack violated "the core principles on which the international rules-based order is built" (Council of the EU, 2022).

Yet, a year or more later, it is no longer prevalent. Such a response could be related to the EU's diplomatic norms: because an INV took place, the EU was then justified to partake in a public reaction of disapproval towards the offending actor. Yet, because of the need to maintain the image of an actor who exhibits emotional control, the EU was only justified in making such a response for a given period of time. The EU's reaction for disapproval illustrates a precise use of an affective emotion. Disapproval experiences an obvious increase on February 24, 2022, above the level of 0.03, but then steadily declines almost immediately to return to the former levels, or the baseline. While it again increases around the summer of 2023, this increase does not increase above the level range of 0.00 and 0.02, nor can this increase be attributed to the initial point of contention.

5.1.4 Annoyance



Figure 4: Impact of the INV on approval scores over time, elaborated by author using GGPLOT in Python with LOESS smoothing

Research on annoyance is not hard to come by, but it is often focused on other aspects than annoyance as an emotion: for instance, noise annoyance or allergen annoyance. However, one study found that for speaking style features, raised voice is a helpful predictor for the emotion (Ang *et al.*, 2002). Annoyance is often perceived as one of the negative emotions, along with frustration and anger (Wass, Timmermans and McLean, 2018). What is often measured along with these emotions is escalation – the shift to more extreme tactics during a social conflict. As Pruitt and others point out, escalation is often a direct response to persistent annoyance, and as this annoyance continues, further extreme tactics are used because milder tactics have proven unsuccessful (1997, p. 252).

Yet, in statements and documents, raised voices and external tactics cannot be identified without process tracing, nor can escalation actions. Therefore, here, the type of language used becomes key in analyzing annoyance. While one study found that verbal escalation was only weakly related to anger and frustration, it was strongly related to negative perceptions of the other party (Pruitt et al., 1997, p. 267). This trend is important to keep in mind considering the EU's disposition towards Russia, historically and contemporarily.

On the invasion date in Figure 4, annoyance jumps to slightly above the level of 0.003, a level that is relatively maintained until around June of 2023. After June 2023, the scores steadily increase until the present day. The initial jump in annoyance in response to the invasion is relatively maintained, with a slight increase that can be explained by annoyance increasing as the war continues. Indeed, annoyance was present is statements from the invasion date as well. When mentioning the EU's efforts to reach a diplomatic solution that would have prevented the INV, the High Representative stated that "Russia has not reciprocated these efforts and instead opted unilaterally for a grave and premeditated escalation" (Council of the EU, 2022).

There are several possible reasons for the observable increase in Figure 4 after the summer of 2023; however, this increase cannot be attributed to the initial Russian invasion and is therefore outside of the scope of observation. Thus, the annoyance scores from the EU can be assessed as a strategic response. This is because there is an identifiable spike in annoyance which is maintained between the levels of 0.000 and 0.004 for over a year. Precisely, on the anniversary of the invasion, a statement was issued – "we remain ready to reach arrangements […] to secure [Ukraine's] free and democratic future, and deter future Russian aggression" (European Council, 2023) – with both 'remain' and 'deter future' implicating tones of annoyance.

5.1.5 Disappointment



Figure 5: Impact of the INV on disappointment scores over time, elaborated by author using GGPLOT in Python with LOESS smoothing

Like annoyance, disappointment is a negative emotion. In fact, it is the third most frequently experienced negative emotion after anxiety and anger (Schimmack and Diener, 1997). Based on a study done in 1998, disappointment was found to have a basis of five different response types: feeling powerless; a tendency to do nothing; a tendency to get away from the situation; actually turning away from the situation; and wanting to do nothing (Zeelenberg et al., 1998, p. 228). Yet, when another person, or actor, is responsible for the disappointing stimuli, this "may result in active attempts to overcome the disappointment" (Zeelenberg and Pieters, 1999). It must be mentioned that, at the same time, while a single experience of disappointment might be easier to overcome, a sequence of disappointing events can become extremely paralyzing, resulting in learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975).

What makes disappointment particularly interesting is that it captures two different emotional experiences: an event-based emotion, which is focused primarily on events and events' consequences, and an agent-based emotion, which has the focus on agents and their actions (van Dijk and Zeelenberg, 2002, p. 789). Here, regret and disappointment often become entangled. This can be explicitly seen in President Michel's remarks on the invasion date: "I do not believe that Russian people want war. You do not want to lose men to a senseless war with a brother nation, serving as cannon fodder for an unjustified, unlawful and foolish war" (European Council, 2022e). Moreover, disappointment can be considered a more general reaction to an unexpected unfavorable event or outcome than regret (Zeelenberg et al., 1998, p. 228). Directly addressing the INV, the joint statement of President Michel and President von der Leyen reads, "[s]uch use of force and coercion has no place in the 21st century" (European Council, 2022d).

These examples support the identifiable jump in disappointment scores on the invasion date within Figure 5. After the invasion date, the disappointment scores continue to rise,

interestingly, higher than the bounds of the previous pre-invasion trend. Around January of 2023, they decrease for a few months, but then increase steadily again after June of 2023. While the initial jump in disappointment is understandable, it also makes sense that the EU continued to feel increasing disappointment in response to the invasion as time progressed, as sanctions, military support, and economic support did little to sway the progression of the conflict. Yet, as with annoyance, the observable increase in the summer of 2023 cannot be attributed to the initial INV.

Similar to approval, disappointment is difficult to classify as either a strategic or affective response taken by the EU. With the fluctuations in the beginning of the plot in Figure 5, as well as the steady rise later on, disappointment cannot be classified as strategic, because the initial spike in disappointment was not sustained over time. However, disappointment cannot be classified as affective either because the emotional response seen is not due to the initial invasion, but due to other factors that affected the EU's emotional rhetoric.

In decision-making, negative emotions often occur when the current state of affairs is worse than what was expected, especially if a violated expectancy goes against fundamental values or beliefs. There are two ways in which these situations results in disappointment: the first is when the chosen option ends up being worse than the rejected options; the second is when the chosen option results in an outcome that is worse than expected (Zeelenberg et al., 2000, p. 522). The second gives rise to 'disconfirmed expectancies', directly related to disappointment (ibid.). While we cannot conclude an affective or strategic classification for disappointment, it remains that the emotion was observably present within EU foreign policy due to the INV.

5.1.6 Anger



Figure 6: Impact of the INV on anger scores over time, elaborated by author using GGPLOT in Python with LOESS smoothing

Anger is most often understood as a reactive attitude towards perceived deliberate harm, unfair treatment, or disrespect in defense of the self (Clément and Sangar, 2018). Anger perhaps

represents the most discussed and researched emotion in psychology, but also international relations. The institutionalization of anger as an emotion can easily be identified in interactive instances such as the Cold War, the nuclear arms race, or even the conflict between Israel and Palestine (Crawford, 2014, p. 553). In simple words, where there is a conflict between two or more actors, anger is usually involved.

Anger brings together the inner-individual emotional and cognitive dynamics and transfers them into highly diverse action tendencies (Novaco, 1986). Some studies have found that expressions of anger by leading officials can increase effort expenditure and the performance of followers (Sy, Côté and Saavedra, 2005; Van Kleef *et al.*, 2009). Actors have also been shown to use anger expressions as a signal of competence and the ability to wield power (Tiedens, 2001).

Reactions of anger remain prevalent, especially when an actor perceives that a wrong has been committed. This is particularly because anger is based on blaming others for a perceived wrong-doing, and is tied to the wish to punish, reprimand, or antagonize the wrong-doer (Mosquera et al., 2008, p. 1474). In the statements released by the EU on the invasion date, harsh rhetoric signifies the emotion of anger. In the joint statement of the European Council, anger can be identified in the following two examples: "[w]e condemn in the strongest possible terms Russia's unprecedented military aggression" and "[w]e demand that Russia immediately ceases military actions […]" (2022c).

Anger can often lead to coping mechanisms of physical or verbal aggression, displaced aggression, or non-hostile confrontation (Averill, 1982). Moreover, an aversive event is more likely to give rise to anger rather than sadness when there is the perceived ability to eliminate the unpleasantness situation and attain the wanted goal (Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones, 2004). Silva argues that because anger is such a strong emotion, it is essentially recognitional – meaning that its purpose is the recognition of harms done as opposed to simply the punishment of its targets (2021).

Yet, it must be noted that displaying anger can come at a cost. Expressions of such strong negative emotions like anger have been shown to only establish influence in limited conditions; there is a much greater chance that anger may cause harm to interpersonal relationships, or even cause the emotion receiver to experience anger as well, decreasing the actors' willingness to engage in future interactions (Friedman *et al.*, 2004; Van Kleef, De Dreu and Manstead, 2004; Kopelman, Rosette and Thompson, 2006).

Whether or not the actor experiencing anger feels the need to enact retribution, studies have found that suppression of anger was the least effective at regulating the emotion, with appraisal being the most effective (Szasz et al., 2011, p. 118). Considering all the facets of anger, it becomes apparent that diplomats walk a thin line when wishing to portray anger. While the diplomacy of anger is key to use when a salient issue has been violated, the rhetoric of anger and accompanying gestures of displeasure must not become too 'emotional' or 'explosive' that they disrupt the diplomatic process (Smith, 2021, p. 297). In this sense, anger should, by all assumptions, be evident when an international norm is violated. The question, then, is whether this reaction is sustained for strategic purposes.

Anger is quite a visceral emotion. Much of the time, when diplomats are advised not to show emotion, they are advised not to show anger. While there is an increase in anger on February 24, 2022, in Figure 6, it is not as pronounced as some of the other emotions. This increase was sustained at slightly above 0.00 for over a year. On the anniversary of the invasion, rhetoric of anger can still be found in the statements, for instance, when discussing further sanctions "decided in response to the gravity of the continued Russian full-scale invasion" (Council of the EU, 2023a). After the summer of 2023, the same as disappointment and annoyance, the anger scores increase steadily, although not due to the initial invasion action. Therefore, anger was 'managed' or kept in check better than other emotions within EU foreign policy statements responding to the invasion, although still observable. The trend for anger shown by the EU can be concluded as a strategic reaction. This is due to an initial increase in anger, smaller than the other emotions, which was sustained at that level for a significant amount of time.

5.1.7 Disgust



Figure 7: Impact of the INV on disgust scores over time, elaborated by author using GGPLOT in Python with LOESS smoothing

When we picture disgust, we often picture sensory disgust – the type that is a reaction to moldy food or something that we wished we had rather not seen. Indeed, sensory disgust is a "powerful affective feeling that is a genetically ingrained instinctual tool for survival" (Panksepp, 2007, p. 1819). There are many different stimulus triggers that can activate the emotion of disgust. These can range from extremely concrete, such as bad tastes or diseases, to extremely abstract, such as moral transgressions (Chapman and Anderson, 2012). Here, these abstract triggers of disgust are what this thesis will be focusing on.

Disgust triggered by the violation of social norms or moral values is the one form of disgust that seems to be unique to humans (Rozin, Haidt and McCauley, 2000). It has even been argued that this new form of disgust is part of an evolutionary process, where the new functional role of disgust as a tool for survival motivates the avoidance of individuals who violate social norms and therefore, may not be good partners for interaction (ibid.).

Regardless, disgust represents an interesting emotion. While anger may seem like the more natural response to a norm violation than disgust, anger strongly activates emotion. Disgust, on the other hand, has an intrinsic avoidance feature, perhaps offering a lower-cost strategy when responding to these transgressions (Hutcherson and Gross, 2011). However, disgust showed similarities to the reaction of anger. Indeed, the visualization of disgust scores in Figure 7 is quite similar to that of anger in Figure 6. While not large, there was an identifiable spike in disgust on February 24, 2022. Relatedly, the rhetoric in the statements supports this finding. For instance, President Michel and President von der Leyen jointly referred to the invasion as a "[b]rutal aggression triggered by Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin against human beings" (European Council, 2022e). Moreover, the European Council stated that they stood in solidarity with "the women, men and children whose lives have been affected" by the INV (2022a).

Disgust as an emotion can be argued as comparable to anger: its presence can be quite visceral. Figure 7 insinuates that the EU is more cautious about reacting to a stimulus with outright disgust. It would most likely be more acceptable for the EU to pass off its disgust as disappointment or disapproval. Moreover, the emotion of disgust clearly represents a strategic reaction by the EU. There is a slight spike in the emotion, and this spike is maintained up until the present with very little fluctuation. The scores after the invasion date until the present have not fluctuated between the levels of 0.000 and 0.001. Indeed, on the anniversary of the invasion, disgust was again identified: "Russia has destroyed hospitals, schools, and energy and critical infrastructure, and left historic cities in ruins" (European Council, 2023).

5.1.8 Fear



Figure 8: Impact of the INV on fear scores over time, elaborated by author using GGPLOT in Python with LOESS smoothing

Like disgust, fear is considered a biological emotional process, along with being an "intersubjectively mediated [reaction] to perceptions that depend on pre-existing social understandings and contexts" (Crawford, 2014, p. 538). While the natural fear cycle involves facing a threat, distinguishing threats from non-threats, and then shutting off the cycle when

the threat has retreated, long-term fear or repeated stress can reshape the brain at a biochemical level (McEwen, 2002). Thus, when the ability to turn off the fear cycle is no longer available, the ability to distinguish threats from non-threats becomes diminished.

Along these lines, fear changes "what we look for, what we see, and the way we think"; more so, fearful experiences or memories can prompt actors to constantly focus on potential threats (Crawford, 2014, p. 540). Fear is most often associated with higher risk perceptions, cautionary judgements, and pessimistic outlooks for the future (Pierce, 2021, p. 601). Therefore, fear is often the most 'visible' emotion, other than anger, on the scale of international relations. Not only is fear easily identifiable in militarization escalation from states, but it is also visible in soft power actions such as travel or immigration bans. Fear is institutionalized in the security sectors of actors, even when threat levels are low. This is because decision-makers assume that fear 'works'; that the deliberate production of fear in an adversary will coerce that actor to capitulate (Crawford, 2014, p. 550). As Crawford states, when fear is high and empathy is low, societies "may be locked in cycles of antipathy and aggression", and opportunities to increase the fear of an adversary are only increasingly institutionalized in military budgets, arms race dynamics, and border skirmishes (2014, p. 553).

Therefore, identifying fear reactions from EU foreign policy is two-fold: on one hand, the long-term fear that the EU holds towards Russia undoubtedly plays, and is playing, a role in the EU's emotions towards Russia. Indeed, on the invasion date, the EU stated its firm belief that "the use of force and coercion to change borders has no place in the 21st century" and that conflicts should be resolved only "through dialogue and democracy" (European Council, 2022a). On the other hand, this fear, at the same time, can cause the EU to become 'locked' in the cycles mentioned above, which may be evident in the increasing militarization of member states today, meaning that it may be less likely to actually display the emotion as a changed emotional reaction. Yet, like the emotions of approval and disappointment, the visualization of fear in Figure 8 is quite different than the other categorizable emotions. While there was a spike at the invasion, fear scores continued to rise, an increase that went beyond the bounds of the scores from prior to the invasion, before steadily decreasing to the present day.

At first glance, it seems quite confusing that fear spiked during the time it did, in the winter, rather than the initial invasion. A severe energy crisis, high inflation, as well as a progressively worsening war on its external borders may be possible contributors to the high levels of fear in the data during this time period. Indeed, this fear can already be seen on the invasion date, with the European Council conclusions calling for work on "preparedness and readiness at all levels […] in particular, to put forward contingency measures, including on energy" (2022a). Nevertheless, these scores represent a variable other than the INV being analyzed.

Due to this reason, the emotion of fear is the same as approval and disappointment – difficult to classify. It is not an affective reaction because while there is a spike in fear scores, this spike is not maintained over time. It is also not a strategic reaction because the spike in fear scores does not decrease following the initial INV; indeed, it does the opposite and increases due to different stimuli.

5.2 Usage Differences Between Positive and Negative Emotions

The emotional responses displayed for both positive and negative emotions are two dimensions that have been continuously identified in the research (Rafaeli and Sutton, 1991; Gibson and Schroeder, 2002; James and Miles, 2007). Both reactions of positive and negative emotions can have significant outcomes on a situation. We can hypothesize here that positive situations can yield positive emotions, and vice versa. When a negative situation occurs, it is deemed as a threat when the demands imposed are perceived to exceed the threatened actor's ability to cope with the situation, thus giving rise to a concomitant, often negative, emotional response (Cohen et al., 1995, p. 121).

Identifying patterns in the observed results for the two positive and six negative emotions analyzed could indeed elicit important findings into which emotions the EU chooses to wield, and how they choose to wield them. To do so, this thesis will utilize the three dimensions proposed by Liu and others: connecting, confronting, and concealing (Liu et al., 2012, p. 521), with *connecting* referring to positive emotions, and *confronting* and *concealing* referring to negative emotions.

5.2.1 Positive emotions: Connecting

Connecting entails the reaction of a positive emotion, with the "purpose of building interpersonal dynamics, including relationship building, interpersonal comforting, inspiration and encouragement" (Liu et al., 2012, p. 521). For instance, it has been found that leaders often use positive emotions to evoke similar positive reactions in their followers (Erez *et al.*, 2008).

The EU has often been characterized as an international foreign policy actor "laden with positive emotional undertones" (Smith, 2021, p. 297). In this sense, the EU is seen more positively – as more helpful – when its diplomatic actions are accompanied by a positive emotional display, most often concerning happiness or contentment, but also including approval or optimism (Ames and Johar, 2009, p. 587). Yet, does this trend continue when confronted with a 'negative' stimulus – the Russian invasion?

Approval was the first positive emotion analyzed, providing interesting results. The OLS regression did not find a statistically significant relationship between time and approval scores based on the given p-values, indicating that perhaps a variable other than time has a greater effect on approval scores displayed by the EU. The interaction effect results, however, found a positive constant coefficient, indicating a baseline of approval within EU foreign policy, as well as an increasing slope pre-invasion. Specific to the invasion of Ukraine, the results showed a negative impact of the IE – pre- and post-invasion – on approval scores, suggesting a change in the slope of the scores due to the invasion, which was also supported by the GGPlot (Figure 1). The confidence interval (CI) of the IE moreover suggested statistical significance. The plot of the IE regression only supported this finding, showing not only a decrease in approval scores on the invasion date, but a changed, decreasing slope after the invasion. These results all support the decrease that was seen in the GGPlot for approval.

The only positive emotion to be portrayed strategically, optimism, displayed similar results to approval. Again, the OLS regression found no significant relationship between optimism

scores and time. Yet, the IE results found that, based on the positive constant coefficient, there exists a baseline level of optimism in EU foreign policy, one that steadily increases over time pre-invasion. However, also the same as approval, optimism showed a negative impact of the IE, although less-so, suggesting a change in the scores' slope due to the invasion. Indeed, the IE regression plot showed both a decrease in optimism scores at the invasion date, and a decreasing slope post-invasion. However, because optimism's IE did not yield a statistically significance CI, we must be cautious of over-stating the importance of the IE on the observed results for optimism. Yet, a clear decrease in scores, and an overall directional change, can indeed be seen on the GGPlot for optimism (Figure 2) after the invasion date, supporting the negative impact of the IE and that the slope was changed, respectively.

It is unsurprising, given the event being analyzed, that the EU not only displayed observably different reactions post-invasion compared to pre-invasion, but that it also displayed decreased reactions for both positive emotions investigated, as could be seen from both the IE and slopes of the regression plot, as well as the GGPlots of Figure 1 and 2. As *connecting* emotions, it is understandable that the EU used less approval and optimism after the INV: there was no need to issue *connecting* emotions towards Russia. However, it is indeed interesting that the EU displays these two emotions similarly, which can be shown from the OLS regression results but more so from the same results and plots of the IE model. Here, two arguments can be made. First, the EU holds a baseline for both the positive emotions of approval and optimism, which both have increasing scores over time, according to their slopes. Second, however, both approval and optimism dropped after the invasion of Ukraine, where, additionally, the trajectory of the use of the two positive emotions was changed. This trend can be conceptualized in the sense that while the EU has a general trend of emitting positive emotions, a negative stimulus, such as the INV, can cause the disruption of this trend within EU foreign policy.

5.2.2 Negative emotions: Confronting

Confronting is the opposite to *connecting*; it is the emotional reaction of a negative emotion, with the purpose of establishing, or maintaining, a certain social standing through "intimidating, discouraging, or distancing from the target" (Liu et al., 2012, p. 521). Recalling the negative emotions that were portrayed, we can identify disapproval, annoyance, disappointment, and fear as 'confronting' emotions.

Disapproval is perhaps the most interesting negative emotion, as it represents the only negative emotion – or only emotion in general – to be portrayed affectively. The OLS regression showed no significance for time. However, the IE results showed that there exists a baseline level of disapproval within EU foreign policy, according to its constant coefficient, and that these levels show a decrease over time pre-invasion. For the invasion of Ukraine, the IE model found a positive impact of the invasion on disapproval scores. Interestingly, the slope for disapproval scores decreased after the invasion date – although non-significantly, leading to the same need for caution as with optimism. Still, the result supports the categorization of an affective reaction, based on the GGPlot for disapproval (Figure 3). The regression plot for disapproval's

IE only supports this. The plot shows an increase at the invasion date, visualizing the positive impact on increasing disapproval scores, and thereafter, the slope slowly decreases.

The results of the analyses for annoyance yielded similar results for the OLS regression: the test showed no statistical significance in the relationship between time and annoyance scores. For the IE, the positive, yet small, constant coefficient entailed that there is a present, but small, baseline of annoyance in EU foreign policy, which was decreasing over time pre-invasion. While also small, the coefficients for the interaction signified that the invasion also had a positive impact on annoyance scores, with its slope changing post-invasion. Moreover, the CI for the annoyance's IE was statistically significant. Indeed, from the IE regression plot, annoyance scores slightly increased at the invasion date, and there was a slightly increasing slope post-invasion, differing from the decreasing slope pre-invasion. The GGPlot for annoyance (Figure 4) showed a similar trend, supporting these results.

Like the emotions above, the OLS regression for disappointment found no statistically significant relationship between time and disappointment scores. Yet, the IE results for disappointment, based on the small constant coefficient, found a small baseline level of disappointment in the EU foreign policy statements, with a slightly decreasing trend. Like annoyance, the results found a small positive impact of the invasion on disappointment scores, with the scores increasing at the invasion date. However, like disapproval, the statistically insignificant CI warns of the need for caution in over-stating the importance of the IE on disappointment. Indeed, this can explain the results of the GGPlot (Figure 5), which identified other variables affecting disappointment scores over time, leading to an uncategorizable response. Nevertheless, the slope for disappointment post-invasion is slightly increasing, as opposed to its decreasing slope pre-invasion, signaling an increase in the emotion.

Lastly, for fear, the emotion yielded the same results for the OLS regression. The IE results found, again, a small constant coefficient, entailing a low baseline of fear within the EU's foreign policy statements, and a slightly decreasing trend of fear pre-invasion. For the IE, there was a slight positive impact on fear scores due to the invasion, with a very slightly decreasing slope post-invasion. The IE regression plot shows a slight increase at the invasion date, as well as the slightly increasing slope post-invasion, compared with the decreasing slope pre-invasion. Again, the insignificant CI warns of caution in over-stating the importance of the IE, which was also identified in the GGPlot's (Figure 8) uncategorizable results, implying that other possible interaction variables are affecting the data.

As discussed, disapproval, annoyance, disappointment, and fear yielded results that while showing no significance with time, displayed some level of impact from the invasion based on the results from the IE model. Disapproval can be argued to be the most *confronting* negative emotion, due to its affective reaction: of the four emotions labeled as *confronting,* disapproval was the only emotion where its slope decreased after the invasion, further supporting the claim of disapproval yielding an affective reaction. Moreover, annoyance, disappointment, and fear can also be considered *confronting* negative emotions, as they both yielded reactions that increased on the invasion date, supposedly to elicit negative feelings for Russia, identified by the IE model as well as the GGPlots. It is also interesting that all four of the *confronting*

emotions yielded some amount of a baseline level of the respective emotions within the EU foreign policy statements, without the affecting IE.

5.2.3 Negative emotions: Concealing

Lastly, we discuss concealing. Concealing is the "concealment of emotionally expressive cues", suppressing emotional reactions so that they are no longer experienced or observable to others (Liu et al., 2012, p. 522). This dimension has been labelled under terms such as emotional suppression, masking, or neutralization (see Andersen and Guerrero, 1998; Gibson and Schroeder, 2002). Concealing can be performed for several reasons, such as withholding information of what one is feeling so that it cannot be used strategically by others. Another reason could be to manipulate another actor to believe their actions have caused no emotional change. However, one reason that is specific to public diplomacy is using concealing to remain 'neutral' or 'diplomatic', even during extremely emotionally provoking events.

Concealing, due to their reactions being strategic but also initially low, as seen in the Figures 6 and 7 above, pertains to the emotions of anger and disgust. The overall results for anger represent what was anticipated. The OLS regression found no statistical relationship between anger scores and time. Yet, the IE results found a positive constant coefficient, indicating a baseline of anger that can be found in EU foreign policy, without regard to the IE, which was decreasing over time. The IE results, regarding the IE, found a positive impact of the invasion on anger scores, with the slope only slightly increasing post-invasion, also visualized in the GGPlot (Figure 6). Moreover, the CI for anger scores' IE showed statistical significance. Interestingly, the IE regression plot for anger shows that anger scores slightly drop at the invasion date, supporting its role as a *concealing* emotion.

Disgust exhibits very similar traits to anger, but albeit smaller coefficients. The OLS results show no significance of time on disgust, but the small, positive constant coefficient for anger implicates a low-level baseline of disgust within EU foreign policy, which has a slightly decreasing slope over time. The invasion also had a positive impact on disgust scores, seen in both the IE regression plot and the GGPlot for disgust (Figure 7). However, different from anger, the slope of the disgust scores decreased over time post-invasion instead of increasing over time. Yet, unlike anger, caution must be used to not over-state the importance of the disgust IE, due to the statistically insignificant CI. While the IE regression plot showed a similar drop in disgust scores as the anger scores on the invasion date, the visualized slope is moreover decreasing post-invasion, which also supports a *concealing* role.

Based on the results of both anger and disgust, which were similar, both emotions entail *concealing* a negative emotion. Because the EU displayed only small jumps in both emotions and small disruptions in the IE, it can be argued that anger and disgust were 'concealed'. Moreover, the low constant coefficients indicating low baselines of both emotions supports this claim. This could be because both negative emotions are quite visceral, and could possibly affect the diplomatic process, or it could be because the EU decided that a high display of these emotions would not be appropriate and chose to display other emotions instead. The only differing result was the post-invasion slope for disgust decreasing while anger's slope

increased. One could argue that this decreasing slope signifies that disgust is a more *concealing* emotion than anger – one that the EU goes through efforts to hide.

Concerning all three classifications, *connecting, confronting,* and *concealing* indeed illustrate the different uses of either positive or negative emotions. Some discernible patterns were found in the results. For one, none of the emotions, positive or negative, were found to have a significant relationship with time. Yet, all eight of the emotions were found to have some level of baseline of the given emotion within EU foreign policy statements, unimpacted by the IE.

Perhaps most interestingly, however, both positive emotions – approval and optimism – have negative impacts from the IE, as well as decreases after the invasion date in their IE plots. Alternatively, the remaining emotions, all negative, had positive impacts from the IE, meaning the invasion increased their IEs. However, while the *confronting* emotions increased on the invasion date according to the IE regression plots, the two *concealing* emotions differed, as anger increased but disgust decreased, which may be due to disgust needing to be 'concealed' more-so than anger. Nevertheless, the IE models' results of a negative impact for the positive emotions, and a positive impact of the negative emotions, aligns with the visualizations seen in the GGPlots, indicating accuracy.

Based on the results, it can be argued that the invasion as a 'negative' stimulus is more likely to produce negative emotions from the EU. While we already know from the observed GGPlots that the actual emotional reactions of the emotions differ from the 'positive' and 'negative' categories, these findings are fruitful in helping to understand the *types of emotions* that become activated in response to an INV. In other words, identifying the variances between displays of positive and negative emotions – the type of emotion used – provides a stepping stone to understanding *how* the EU reacts using these emotions in order to achieve certain means.

6. DISCUSSION

6.1 Affective, Strategic or Neither: Implications for the EU

6.1.1 The Politics of Emotion

If the EU utilizes its emotional reactions to pursue diplomatic means – persuasion and attraction – then it also cognitively processes which emotions to display and when. Along this line of thought, Gustafsson and Hall's (2021) "distributive politics of emotion" become a key identifier for distinguishing emotional tendencies. They introduce *entitlement*, the right to feel an emotion; *obligation*, the emotional duty to feel an emotion; and *deference*, concerning who is 'allowed' to feel an emotion (Gustafsson and Hall, 2021, p. 973).

The distinction between responses that align with these three categorizations implies that certain emotional reactions are considered legitimate, or 'allowed', while others are not (Shah, 2024, p. 9). These expectations of how or when emotional responses should be portrayed can influence how the EU either evokes or suppresses its emotions. These evocations or suppressions can themselves influence the policy-making process. Therefore, we should keep

these three 'politics of emotion' in mind when analyzing which emotions elicited affective or strategic reactions, or neither.

6.1.2 Affective Emotional Reactions

Admittedly, that only one emotion – disapproval – was found to display an affective emotional reaction from the EU foreign policy data was surprising. The affective response for disapproval insinuates that when the Russian invasion of Ukraine occurred, the EU elucidated a response that not only contained high levels of disapproving rhetoric, but that this level of disapproval was not sustained over time. Instead, it decreased as time increased.

Remembering that the expression of disapproval is considered a 'moral judgement' (Carta, 2023), the EU's reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine is definable. Indeed, all six of the press releases and statements released on February 24th, 2022 by the EU contain some form of rhetoric criticizing Russia's INV: for instance, "Russia is grossly violating international law" (European Council, 2022d); the invasion "constitutes a serious violation of international law" (European Council, 2022b); or that the invasion is "a flagrant violation of international law" (Council of the EU, 2022). The repetitiveness and strength of these statements portrays a strong sense of disapproval from the EU towards Russia's invasion. Another key example of disapproval on the invasion date can be seen in the first document released: "We deplore the loss of life and humanitarian suffering" (European Council, 2022d). Because 'deplore' is a particularly strong synonym of 'to disapprove of', the EU is directly portraying its disapproval of not only the violation of international law, but the violation of what it considers as an international norm – human rights.

While affective reactions are often thought to trigger additional emotional reactions from the actor receiving the emotion, affective reactions can also have moderating effects. These moderating effects occur because the display can either magnify or mitigate the inferences that the receiver draws from the reaction (Ames and Johar, 2009, p. 586). In other words, a moderating effect can occur because the receiver assumes that the affective displays are in reaction to a stimulus, and links this to the intentions and motives they have performed, which they can then adjust to avoid a further negative reaction (Higgins, 1998).

Yet, it remains important to note that an affective response is not displayed to, for example, dissuade Russia from further aggression. So *why* did the EU choose to display disapproval affectively? Here, the 'politics of emotion' can be applied. *Entitlement* offers a possible lens to view the EU's affective response, for this case and for others. The EU may have felt *entitled* to display its disapproval towards the Russian invasion because it was clearly an INV – an event where other actors would expect – and accept – an emotional response of disapproval from the EU. Because the invasion was clearly a violation of fundamental aspects of its values and beliefs as an institution, the EU was *entitled* to emit disapproval, showing itself and like-minded partners that the transgression occurred and that it was met with emotionality. It is in this way that disapproval can be considered a *confronting* emotion, as its purpose was to display disapproving rhetoric, simply because it felt that it was *entitled* to. Moreover, here, the EU's reaction may or may not have influenced Russia's behavior in response; any change in action on Russia's part is due to its own conception of the EU's disapproval.

6.1.3 Strategic Emotional Reactions

While some emotional reactions are not fully under one's control, many of them are (see Ekman, 1993; Frijda, 1986), opening up the possibility that these reactions are used strategically (Chen *et al.*, 2019). There are two fundamental assumptions when an actor displays emotions strategically: first, the actor can control its emotional reaction during the interaction to some extent; second, the displayed emotional reaction can be communicated convincingly to the other party (Kopelman et al., 2006, p. 82). Here, we are assuming that when the EU displays a strategic emotional reaction, they are controlling these emotions; whether they are communicated convincingly is a topic for an additional thesis.

As mentioned previously, strategic responses can concern both positive and negative emotions. The strategic reaction of a positive, or *connecting*, emotion concerned optimism. When looking at the statements, optimism is most often found not directed towards Russia, but when the EU is discussing fellow member states and international partners. For instance, during President Michel's remarks, he stated, "[we] stand shoulder to shoulder with all the countries across the world that want to uphold the rules-based international order for the sake of peace" (European Council, 2022d). This remark obviously shows no optimism towards Russia's invasion, but it does show optimism in spite of it.

Optimism can also be found in the remarks pertaining to Ukraine's sovereignty – a direct reference to the EU's view that an INV has occurred. In the European Council conclusions on February 24, 2022, they stated the following: "[t]he European Council reiterates its unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders" (2022a). Here, optimism is portrayed in connection with Ukraine maintaining its territorial integrity despite Russia's advancements.

Sustained over time, the EU's optimistic reaction can be captured in this quote from a full year after the invasion date: "[w]ith a view to a viable post-war peace settlement, we remain ready to reach arrangements together with Ukraine as well as interested countries and institutions on sustained security and other commitments to help Ukraine defend itself [...]" (European Council, 2023).

Moving to the negative emotions displayed strategically, annoyance had a large initial reaction, with statements even displaying annoyance for actions that led to the invasion: "[w]e condemn President Putin for his consistent refusal to engage in a diplomatic process to address questions pertaining to European security, despite our repeated offers" (European Council, 2022b). Annoyance was also observed in relation to the issues going forward that would result from the invasion: "Russia bears full responsibility for this act of aggression and all the destruction and loss of life it will cause" (Council of the EU, 2022). Both examples entail the EU *confronting* Russia: the rhetoric contains identifiable annoyance towards President Putin, in which the aim is to discourage the situation by showing annoyance, but also create distance from the problems that Russia's invasion caused.

The response being sustained, on the anniversary of the invasion, new sanctions were introduced with the following message: [o]n the sad commemoration of one year since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Council adopted today a tenth package of additional

restrictive measures giving another turn of the screw to the government of the Russian Federation" (Council of the EU, 2023b). Words such as 'additional' and 'another' display the EU's annoyance with the continued crisis, especially when used in the same instance, illustrating not only the discouraging language of *confronting*, but the maintained strategic response of annoyance.

Anger, as discussed previously, often includes rhetoric pertaining to retribution. This was indeed the case for statements issued on February 24, 2022. In the joint statement from the European Council, members stated to agree "on further restrictive measures that will impose massive and severe consequences on Russia for its action [...]" (2022c). Moreover, this response of anger was sustained, with the following statement on the one-year anniversary: "[w]e will continue to increase pressure on Russia - and we will do it for as long as needed, until Ukraine is liberated from the brutal Russian aggression" (Council of the EU, 2023b).

Nevertheless, considering the INV committed, it is surprising that the language displayed was not 'angrier'. It is probable that the EU felt that a reaction with higher levels of anger would be counterproductive in diplomatic processes moving forward, as anger represents *concealing*. As mentioned previously, it is 'safer' to portray emotions such as disapproval or disappointment instead – emotions that could initiate changes in the receiver's actions rather than incite reciprocal anger.

Disgust exhibits very similar traits to anger, in that it is quite apparent in the documents released on the invasion date: "Ukrainian cities have been hit, innocent people killed. Women, men, and children are fleeing for their lives" (European Council, 2022e). Again, this emotion was sustained over time, with an anniversary statement pointing out that "[i]n the past year Russian forces have killed thousands of Ukrainians, [...] there is evidence of mass graves, sexual violence, torture and other atrocities" (European Council, 2023). Both statements signify disgust with Russia's actions, particularly identifying violations of norms of human rights and non-civilian warfare.

Yet, as a *concealing* emotion, these statements show limited disgust than what would be expected from such a 'grave' violation. It can be hypothesized that outright disgust would have kept the EU away from the negotiating table and removed it from the situation – due to the inherent recoil reaction of disgust. It was therefore more acceptable to utilize other negative emotions to signal its aversion to the invasion.

Thus, for strategic reactions, the *why* can be explained by *obligation*. The EU portrayed strategic reactions that were not only different post-invasion, but also portrayed its normative obligation to feel and display these emotions in response to an INV. In order to achieve specific objectives or goals pertaining to the situation of the invasion of Ukraine, the EU felt 'obligated' to portray strategic reactions of these four emotions in their specific ways. More so, the lesser reactions of anger and disgust show the diplomatic *obligation* to keep certain emotions in check. While there is an inclination to emphasize compliance in the international system, placing strategic-rationality against obligation (Bayram, 2017), self-interest and obligation are not mutually exclusive (Fearon and Wendt, 2002). In the case of optimism, annoyance, anger, and disgust, it can be argued that the *obligation* of portraying a certain emotion can lead to the strategic sustainment of that emotional reaction over time.

6.1.4 Neither Affective nor Strategic Reactions

Three emotions were found to have no identifiable reaction – neither affective nor strategic: approval, disappointment, and fear. The absence of labels for these emotions *does not* indicate that these emotions were not present in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Indeed, for all three, there was an observed change in the emotion at the invasion date; however, these observed changes neither returned to their baselines nor were they sustained over time.

For the *connecting* emotion of approval, the EU's initial approval reaction decreased on February 24, 2024. The only instance of approval on the invasion date was aimed toward Ukraine: "[w]e stand by the people of Ukraine and its democratically elected institutions and representatives" (Council of the EU, 2022). After the invasion date, however, the approval scores jumped above pre-invasion levels, illustrating other factors affecting approval scores than solely the invasion, such as, perhaps, approval towards aid-efforts from other like-minded actors.

The *confronting* emotions in this category were different. On February 24, 2024, disappointment jumped, showing a clear increase. This is evident when the invasion was described as "a grave breach of the United Nations Charter and all commitments Russia entered in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris and its commitments in the Budapest Memorandum" (European Council, 2022b). However, this jump only continued to increase over time, again due to other factors than the invasion itself.

Fear also initially had a substantial increase on the invasion date. Indeed, President Michel remarked that the invasion was "unlike anything on European soil since the end of the Second World War" and that it was "[a]n attack on peace and security in Europe, it is also an attack on the foundations of our European Union, a project of peace and prosperity for all Europeans" (European Council, 2022e). Yet, this increase only escalated over time. Again, this effect was due to factors other than the invasion.

These interesting observations – of no categorizable reaction found – can implicate *deference*. The portrayal of a non-affective or non-strategic reaction illustrates the EU's choice that they were not the actor 'allowed' to portray these three emotions in response to the initial INV. This could be due to the nature of the emotions themselves or because the EU felt that a different actor – perhaps Ukraine – had more of a 'right' to portray these emotions, thus not wanting to impede the emotional persuasion process in diplomatic negotiations, and *deferred* the 'right' to feel certain emotions. The observance of possible other affecting factors – not the invasion itself – adds to this argument: perhaps the EU felt that they could not respond to the INV with these emotions, but that they could respond to other factors pertaining to Russia's invasion.

Whether they are integral or mindful – affective or strategic, or neither – emotions can have an essential *impact* on situational outcomes, and this impact can either be advantageous or counter-productive (Kopelman, Rosette and Thompson, 2006). On the one hand, displays of positive emotions can help the development of reciprocal relationships and increase the likelihood of closing a favorable deal (Kopelman, Gewurz and Sacharin, 2007). On the other hand, strong reactions of visceral negative emotions such as anger may cause the display to 'boomerang', where there is an increase in the chance that a spiteful response is initiated and

the relationship declines (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996; Kopelman, Rosette and Thompson, 2006). The way in which the EU chose to display certain emotions indeed presents interesting findings that support the identity of the EU as not only a normative power, but an emotional one.

6.2 Emotional Diplomacy Within the EU's Public Diplomacy

6.2.1 Gaining Insight to the EU's Perceptions Through Emotion

A diverse research agenda has emerged around public diplomacy, an agenda that has reflected the "growing importance of communicative practices in a world of deepening interdependence" (Graham, 2014, p. 522). In our interconnected world, actors increasingly achieve their goals through the coordination of action rather than compulsion. Emotions function as tools for negotiation between actors during diplomacy. Individual emotions transform into collective emotions through 'representation' (Gustafsson and Hall, 2021, p. 974). During this representation, we gain access to the emotions of a state as a collective experience – an experience that encompasses the feelings and discourse present in the reaction to stimuli. Politicians and diplomats often leverage emotions to not only ensure legitimacy for their actions, but to intertwine themselves as integral elements of the state – elements representing the state's disposition (Menshawy, 2021). An actor's use of emotions in their public diplomacy can elucidate its beliefs, desires, and goals.

There have been some advances in understanding how EU foreign policy-makers use emotions. European political psychology has covered topics of migration, multiculturism, fear, and insecurity when discussing European integration (for instance, see Manners, 2014 in Nesbitt-Larking et al., 2014). Other topics include territorial identity triggers and reactionary politics (Manners, 2018; Mitzen, 2018); EU foreign policy considering EU security agreements (Manners, 2013); trauma and emotions regarding EU foreign policy in the Middle East conflict (Pace and Bilgic, 2018); fear and insecurity in EU external and security relations (Kinnvall, Manners and Mitzen, 2018); and lastly, emotions within EU-given language pertaining to security and diplomacy (Lynggaard, 2019; Pace and Bilgic, 2019). Moreover, emotional contestations regarding the EU's external borders, considering the EU as an emotional security community, have also been examined (Palm, 2021).

Yet, what purpose does emotion within the EU's public diplomacy serve? Nye's concept of soft power continues to be the most applicable explanation. Soft power suggests that legitimacy and leadership, conveyed through diplomacy, are resources that actors wield in order to act efficiently, by encouraging the cooperation, or rather acquiescence, of their own public or other governments (Nye, 2008). Along this line, actors are able to 'shape' the preferences or viewpoints of other actors; in this case, using emotions to effectuate legitimacy.

Discussions about public diplomacy are often related to the action of persuasion. Indeed, for an actor to diplomatically appeal to another, they must be able to successfully persuade them of their goals. As Crawford points out, even the most practical appeal must be posed persuasively, since reasoning depends on judgements about the appropriate action; thus, the appeal must guide the receiving party to make the necessary judgements (2002). Yet, the

inclusion of soft power in public diplomacy also delimitates the concept of attraction, as soft power poses an 'underspecified' account of power (Graham, 2014, p. 523). Emotion represents a variable of both persuasion and attraction. This becomes true when emotions are "fundamentally implicated in the processes of argument and persuasion", in addition to being constituting factors that actors value and identify with, allowing for group identification (ibid.). Emotions, moreover, constitute 'bonds of affiliation' between actors, which are activated whenever public diplomacy addresses values, identities and international relationships (Sasley, 2011). Shared values, identities, and cultures are crucial for public diplomacy, as they shape the contexts in which both persuasion and attraction can occur in relationships between actors.

6.2.2 External Displays of Emotion for Diplomatic Means

Emotions are considered authentic, or 'real', when emotions align that are both internally experienced and externally displayed (Coté, 2005). Emotions in the 'micropolitical' world of international relations are often both ambivalent and complex (Schick, 2019; Gustafsson and Hall, 2021). This complexity is born from the generation of emotions, as well as their interplay within international political frameworks (Shah, 2024, p. 2). This interplay contributes to what Schick (2019) deems the formation of 'geopolitical subjects', or what Zhang (2022) refers to as 'geopolitical imaginaries'.

The formation of geopolitical imaginaries yields groups that function as categorizers for actors who do or do not function similarly on the diplomatic level. Politicians with high degrees of cosmopolitanism, as seen in the EU, are considered to be driven by a stronger sense of legal obligation, resulting in the social preference of compliance, compared to those with low degrees of cosmopolitanism which lack the same sense of normative respect (Bayram, 2017). Bayram views 'cosmopolitanism' as a collective identity that shapes beliefs and preferences regarding compliance, transcending national boundaries and tying oneself to the international community as a whole (ibid.). This may sound familiar. Indeed, we can identify the relation between this 'constructed' sense of cosmopolitan compliance with the 'constructed' emotional discourse that is emitted when this compliance is violated.

Along these lines, Russell points out that different cultures have different triggers for emotion, along with different rules that govern how an emotion can be expressed within the confines of 'normality' (2004, p. 391). Without these geopolitical imaginaries pertaining to emotions, an actor would not be able to convey to their audience which cultural meanings matter, and how they matter (Rythoven, 2015, p. 467). Here, emotion *works*, and it does so because it can resonate with pre-existing meanings. Using the example of fear, actors fear threats because these threats represent phenomena that they have been taught to fear, or that they foresee fearing in the future (ibid., p. 467).

Emotion *works* by resonating externally as well. It has been shown that non-monetary sanctions – particularly, expressions of negative emotions such as disapproval – have been of importance in enforcing norms and promoting both cooperation and fairness (Gächter and Fehr, 1999; Masclet *et al.*, 2003; Rege and Telle, 2004; Noussair and Tucker, 2005). It can be assumed that if an actor aims to avoid disapproval, for example, mechanisms can be established that are designed to discourage norm violations that would result in disapproval from other actors (Xiao

and Houser, 2009, p. 394). Thus, normative changes can be due to effective persuasion, which uses emotions to mobilize feelings of guilt or shame (Graham, 2014, p. 531). Crawford goes so far as to argue that these dispositions can sometimes be more inherently persuasive than even typical instrumental arguments (Crawford, 2002, p. 408).

6.2.3 Morality and Legality within Public Diplomacy

As mentioned, the EU holds the ability to set norms, norms which can concern both morals and legality. This becomes particularly applicable when considering the case at hand – an INV. Emotions tied to morality – such as moral disapproval – may sound like detached and unemotional facets of diplomacy; however, moral *indignation* is the *reason* for emotional responses that occur due to moral transgressions (Beardsley, 1970).

Morals or values have long been argued to be difficult to mobilize in public diplomacy initiatives; however, this may be due to emotional attachments themselves not being recognized to reside in value-based judgements (Graham, 2014, p. 532). When the EU prides itself on its ability to uphold the rule of law, ensure human rights, and respect the international system, it creates an emotional attachment with the ability to do so.

Moreover, morality is often intertwined with legality. Legal obligation entails that an actor holds a subjective belief in the legitimacy of international law – believing that international law maintains the right to rule over states, and therefore, must be obeyed (Tyler, 2006; Hurd, 2007; Brunnée and Toope, 2010). The legitimacy of international law represents a fundamental belief for the EU.

Moral judgement is not necessarily only an intellectual business, but is also an emotive one – which can instead be seen as moral *sentimentalism* (Carta, 2023). Thus, when a moral transgression is committed, violating the EU's belief in its abilities that it is emotionally attached to – or morally sentimental towards – it undoubtedly displays an emotional reaction towards the transgressor. Indeed, as seen with the emotional reactions from all eight emotions analyzed, we can conclude that not only did Russia's INV cause a significantly different emotional reaction from the EU, but we can also conclude that the EU viewed the invasion as a *moral transgression* and responded with emotions of *moral indignation.*

6.3 The EU as a Normative Power

6.3.1 The EU as an Emotional Power

Developed by Manners (2002), the EU is classified as a normative power – in that the EU, as a unique integration of states, holds an equally unique 'power' to influence, or sometimes even change, the international community's perception of the 'norm'. The idea of the EU as a normative power includes the EU's normative difference, its normative basis, and an explanation of how EU norms are diffused (ibid.). In many policies areas, such as regulatory policies, the EU has become more aware, and accepting, of its normative power within agenda-setting. While documents such as the 1985 white paper (European Commission and DG III - Industry, 1985) and the 1996 Commission communication (European Commission and DG

XV, 1996) reflect a primarily internal perspective, Commission documents emerging after 2007 begin to reference the Union's external effects (Bradford, 2020, p. 21).

Indeed, regulatory policies along with trade agreements, participation in international institutions, and transnational governmental networks are all areas in which the EU wields norm-setting power; for instance, many countries or other regional organizations engage in legislative borrowing, replicate EU institutions, cite legal concepts, or are influenced by focal points of regulatory convergence due to the EU's normative role (Bradford, 2020, p. 67). The EU's ability to set norms has moreover been investigated in several spheres of the EU's competencies: in the context of enlargement (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; Grabbe, 2014); the neighborhood policy (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2010); the promotion of human rights (Sjursen, 2017; Eldani, 2021); environmental negotiations (Poletti and Sicurelli, 2012); and external trade relations (Drieghe and Potjomkina, 2019). While scholars such as Zielonka (2006) and Pänke (2019) have argued that this ability turns the EU into an empire, this thesis instead aligns with the conceptualization of the EU as a normative power.

When it comes to the EU's ability to set norms regarding 'emotion rules', the EU may also see itself as an emotional power. The findings of this thesis only support this argument. As discussed by Terzi (2021), there is a conceptual difference between 'emotional norms', defined by Gürkan (2021), and 'emotion norms', defined by Koschut (2014). While emotional norms refer to norms that trigger emotional responses from the norm recipient, emotion norms refer to appropriate emotions and the expressions of these emotions (Terzi et al., 2021, p. 95).

Here, we focus specifically on the 'emotion norm'. An emotion norm is "an emotional state of being that is appropriate and actually even required to exist" in certain relationships (Terzi et al., 2021, p. 96). This conceptualization is particularly applicable to this case study. As Gürkan (2021), Palm (2021), and Tonra (2021) point out, an emotion norm concerns a norm in which its violation triggers an emotional reflex from an actor. Assuming that the EU functions along the lines of the emotional politics presented above – entitlement, obligation, and deference, portraying reactions that are affective, strategic, or neither, respectively – we can also assume that these reactions are disseminated to like-minded partners. With its normative power, it can only be assumed that other states and institutions fall in line with the emotional response that the EU emits through its public diplomacy.

Feelings of trust are fundamental for this relationship to develop. Trust is often born of feelings of similarity and collective experiences, increasing the likelihood of economic and social cooperation (Nielsen, 2021). Because of the EU's normative power, trust is regularly featured as an emotion norm when analyzing EU foreign policy decision-making (Juncos and Pomorska, 2014; Natorski and Pomorska, 2017). In other words, actors that perceive the EU to set the normative criteria of a reaction trust that this reaction fulfills the three politics of emotion – obligation, entitlement, and deference – and choose to follow the EU's example that it sets.

6.3.2 Tracking Emotions – Tracking Importance

Identifying the EU's reaction to Russia's invasion of Ukraine represents an insightful example of how emotions can be tracked to understand what is normatively important to the EU in an international system that is progressively being altered away from the past. One way in which

actors cope with uncertainty in the decision-making process is forming expectancies about possible outcomes of the different courses of action they are faced with; moreover, actors often form expectancies about how they would evaluate the outcome should it occur (Zeelenberg et al., 2000, p. 522). Yet is this applicable to the INV that the EU was faced with? Here, if not, it would have to be argued that the Russian invasion was an unexpected event, which is highly questionable. Thus, it can be assumed that the EU indeed held previous expectancies regarding the situation in Ukraine.

By studying trends of emotional rhetoric used in EU foreign policy, we not only understand how the EU responded to the contestation in its external relations, but we also further understand which norms actually matter for the EU (Terzi et al., 2021, p. 97). The results of each emotions' relationship to the invasion action all illustrate the importance of international rule of law and the right of state sovereignty for the EU. Moreover, emotionality as a claim in response to another's action is "clearly dependent on relations of power", thus endowing the 'other' with a specific meaning (Ahmed, 2012, p. 4). In other words, the EU's choice to display the emotional reactions it did represents a claim of endowing Russia's actions with these emotions. At the same time, with disapproval quickly decreasing after the initial invasion, or anger and disgust showing only small, sustained reactions, the EU also illustrated the importance of following the 'politics of emotion' and maintaining a diplomatic state of affairs.

While Russia is an important partner, geopolitically, economically, and regarding energy for the EU, there is no doubt that EU–Russia cooperation has been hampered by Russia's actions in Ukraine, along with the EU's responding actions of sanctions and overall tension-induced anxiety (Freire, 2017, p. 187). The EU's relationship with Russia is regularly seen as a relationship plagued by the past, not just the present. Looking at the legal basis of the EU–Russia relationship – the 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement –, the agreement foresaw sectorial agreements in several policy areas, which were extended in the four 'Common Spaces' in 2003 (Eur-Lex, 1997). However, the operationalization of these common spaces has proved difficult due to the absence of a common view on the future of the relationship, including the two's relationship towards the former Soviet republics (Hooijmaaijers and Keukeleire, 2020). Similarly, the EU's proposal of the EU–Russia Strategic Partnership in 2007 (European Parliament, 2007) and the launch of the EU–Russia Partnership for Modernization (European Parliament, 2010) did little to aid the relationship. Thus, the relationship was labelled as mainly 'a marriage of convenience' (Casier, 2014).

Since 2014, pro-EU protests, the EU's Association Agreement with Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea, and military insurgency in eastern Ukraine have only increased tensions between the EU and Russia (see Cross and Karolewski, 2017). As Schmidt-Felzmann argues, the Ukraine issue of 2014 was not the cause of EU–Russia issues but rather a symptom of deeply rooted problems in EU–Russian relations, including structural asymmetries and fundamentally different understandings of their roles in not only their partnership, but in the international system (2016). Now, with the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, this asynchrony, and anxiety, is only more observable.

Traumatizing experiences and memories often prompt actors to focus on potential future threats. As Jervis – another realist – points out, this conundrum is only exacerbated since it is

"particularly difficult and particularly important for the state to determine how the other sees it. This task is difficult because the evidence is not easy to obtain [...] and a state's self-image carries a heavy load of affect" (1985, p. 29). Along these lines, both beliefs and emotions structure how knowledge is organized by actors, including threat assessment, and can inform the development and the adoption of standard operating procedures for handling challenges (Crawford, 2014, p. 547).

Efforts of securitization do not succeed simply by invoking vague emotional appeals. Instead, they function by eliciting culturally specific fears, hinged on the appraisal of recognizable memories, identities, and images that can be used to construct both a plausible and anxiety-inducing future (Rythoven, 2015, p. 466). Indeed, European states contain a "culturally embedded memory of the Western imaginary where institutionalized historical narratives of Soviet/Russian 'aggression' [...] mingled with contemporary concerns over Europe's fiscal retrenchment and energy dependency" have resulted in the collective appraisal of several negative emotions by the European community (ibid., p. 461). This appraisal is one that the EU as an institution has come to portray. Considering the normative, and geopolitical, imperatives of the EU's foreign policy, as Beringer and others call for (2019), there is an increasing need for the re-evaluation of EU foreign policy, in both its objectives and its impact.

7. CONCLUSION

7.1 Concluding the Findings

Considering the increasing importance of recognizing the many facets that emotions provide when analyzing international relations, this thesis undertook the goal of investigating emotions that were displayed by EU foreign policy in response to an international norm violation (INV). To do so, EU foreign policy was investigated using statements and documents released by the European Council, international ministerial meetings, international summits, Eurogroup, and Euro Summit. The Russian invasion of Ukraine was chosen as the case to study, as it was considered an international norm violation by the EU.

The overarching question analyzed throughout the thesis was the following: *how does the EU use emotional reactions in its public diplomacy when responding to an international norm violation?* In order to answer the research question, the thesis was built upon existing literature that further defines what emotion is in international relations; exemplifies how emotion can be used for diplomatic uses; identifies the 'display rules' of emotional diplomacy; and discusses the differences of emotional diplomacy for Western and non-Western actors. However, a gap can be identified in the literature. Methodologically, there is little consensus – and even less 'creativity' – in how to go about emotion research within international relations. Moreover, emotion is rarely recognized as a driver of diplomacy – a variable in itself – rather than just a product of actor-to-actor relations. In this sense, highly emotion-invoking actions – such as international norm violations – are unique opportunities to investigate how actors use, and get used by, emotions.

Taking this review of the literature as a starting point, this thesis conceptualized emotion within public diplomacy – emotional diplomacy – through a constructivist lens, illustrating how

emotion as a socially constructed facet of expression and language can be used to track beliefs and values regarded as important for EU foreign policy. The importance of norms in shaping not only public diplomacy, but emotional diplomacy as well, was argued. Identifiable through emotion cultures, an actor signals their inherent values and beliefs – their norms – through the use of emotional diplomacy: choosing when to react, what to react to, and how to react to stimuli. In this sense, an actor's 'emotion norms' are inherent through their emotional reactions, which is precisely what this thesis investigated regarding the EU's reaction to the invasion of Ukraine.

Using EmoRoBERTa, a fine-grained emotional content analysis, emotion scores were obtained from 336 EU foreign policy documents from February 24, 2021 to March 7, 2024, tracking eight emotions: approval, annoyance, disapproval, optimism, disappointment, anger, disgust, and fear. GGPlots with LOESS smoothing were made using Python packages to plot the observed data for the given time period. These plots, supported by examples from within the EU's foreign policy statements, provided the key analysis of how the EU displayed the eight emotions in response to the invasion date – illustrating whether the displays were affective or strategic. Disapproval was the only affective reaction, showing a clear increase which returned to its baseline over time. Optimism, annoyance, anger, and disgust yielded strategic reactions, meaning that the displays were sustained over time. Approval, disappointment, and fear, however, could not be classified as strategic or affective, as the emotion scores were impacted to a greater extent by factors other than the INV.

Concerning whether patterns could be found regarding the reactions of either positive or negative emotions that the EU displayed, this thesis used both the OLS regressions and interaction effect (IE) models to investigate these patterns. The OLS regressions were performed to understand whether time was a significant indicator for each emotion. All eight emotions showed no significance of time on the emotion scores. However, all eight emotions' constant coefficients from the IE model showed, to some extent, a baseline level of the respective emotion in the EU foreign policy statements, despite the IE.

The positive emotions, approval and optimism, were discussed as *connecting* emotions. The negative emotions were discussed as either *confronting*: disapproval, annoyance, disappointment, and fear; or *concealing*: anger and disgust. Expectedly, the positive *connecting* emotions showed a negative impact from the IE, with a decreasing slope post-invasion. All of the negative emotions showed a positive impact from the IE, but differing slopes. In the negative *confronting* emotions, disapproval showed a decreasing slope post-invasion, supporting its categorization as an affective reaction. For the negative *concealing* emotions, disgust showed a slightly decreased slope post-invasion, supporting the arguments of a concealed emotion. It must be noted that while approval, annoyance, and anger yielded statistically significance confidence intervals, optimism, disapproval, disappointment, and disgust did not, implying that caution must be used to not over-state the importance of the IE on these emotions' results.

Nevertheless, while these classifications indeed described why these positive and negative are displayed differently, the statistical analyses showed results that were not the same between the positive and negative emotions. This entails that a negative stimulus such as the Russian

invasion of Ukraine could indeed have positive impacts on negative emotions, causing increases, and on the other hand, negative impacts on positive emotions, leading to decreases. This indicates the importance of understanding the *type* of emotions emitted by the EU, along with their categorizable reactions.

Following the conclusions gained from the analysis, the three categorizations – affective, strategic, or neither – were discussed regarding the politics of emotion – obligation, entitlement, and deference, respectively – to illustrate how EU foreign policy is able to dictate what emotions should be felt, when they should be felt, and who has the right to feel them. That only one affective reaction – disapproval – was observed was indeed surprising, meaning that the EU only felt *obligated* to display disapproval. But less surprising was that a majority of the reactions were classified as strategic: optimism, annoyance, anger, and disgust, which the EU felt *entitled* to display. The remaining three emotions – approval, disappointment, and fear – entail that the EU *deferred* these reactions to other actors. Conceptualizing the affective reaction as *entitlement*; the strategic reactions as *obligation*; and those that were neither as *deference*, it can be argued that the EU displaying the 'politics of emotion' towards Russia's invasion entails its ability to wield its emotions to achieve certain goals, but to also influence the emotions of other actors involved.

The findings were additionally discussed in relation to their portrayal of how the EU utilizes emotional diplomacy. The concept of soft power was suggested, arguing that the EU uses emotions to convey legitimacy and leadership on the diplomatic stage. It does so through both persuasion and attraction, exemplified in the choice of emotional (re)actions. Emotion 'works' for EU foreign policy because it is able to not only convey its emotions persuasively, but to also use emotions to attract other actors towards its intended goals. Because of this, we can argue the normative power of the EU as an emotional actor.

Concerning normative transgressions and their impact on actor's emotions, the results of the analysis clearly show that the EU viewed Russia's invasion of Ukraine as an international norm violation. Here, we can accept the premise that the action – a moral transgression according to the fundamental values that the EU holds emotional attachment towards – was met with moral indignation from EU foreign policy. This can be observed directly from statements made on the invasion date, but also from the categorical reactions displayed.

Closing this thesis, the discussion of the EU's normative power was opened to include different policy fields that have experienced recent change. For instance, when considering both the past and present of EU–Russian relations, emotions play a large role in defining the future, especially after the invasion of Ukraine. Highlighting the importance of emotions in EU foreign policy, the importance of re-evaluating EU foreign policy considering emotional impacts can be suggested.

7.2 Limitations

Despite the multitude of interesting findings, there remains some limitations of this thesis. Many of these limitations pertain to the model itself: EmoRoBERTa. First, as was stated in the methodological section, the dataset that the model was trained on was annotated manually, making way for possible bias in the assessment of which rhetoric insinuates which emotion

labels. Relatedly, because the model was trained on Reddit comments, these comments inherently use different rhetorical wordings than the diplomatic documents and statements use. However, the large amount of data used hopefully mitigated any specific rhetorical impact problems. Moreover, because the model is trained specifically on these comments, this represents one cultural way of interpreting emotional data. This interpretation may not identify, in totality, the certain nuances that may exist in diplomatic statements from an entity that arguably has (more than) twenty-seven distinct cultures, who each may have different culturally-distinct ways in which they view, and display, certain emotions or certain rhetoric.

There is also the limitation of assuming the validity and reliability of the model, which was described in the methodological section through citing the performance tests that Demsky and their colleagues performed (2020). While the model was indeed valid for their dataset, it is a limitation that the same test was not performed on the dataset of this thesis. Validity was assumed because manually annotating even a subset of the 336 documents used, in order to compare these annotations with the predicted emotion scores found by the model, was not feasible due to time constraints. Doing so would indeed be fruitful in the future, however, to identify the robustness of the model.

Regarding the data chosen, there also exists the limitation that because the data was pulled from the EU's foreign policy database, the EU *chose* to release these statements. This inherently makes the statements analyzed distanced or mediated. However, it can be argued that analyzing diplomatic statements from any entity or source would produce the same limitation. Additionally, the documents and statements analyzed are indeed documents and statements: they are just words. The addition of tone of speech, body language, or even facial expressions would undoubtedly add to the interpretation of the displayed emotional reactions of the EU.

Lastly, the statistical analyses also hold some limitations, which entail caution when interpretating the results. For the OLS regressions, the small R-squared values identified indicate that variance in the data was not well-explained by the model. Further testing, such as non-linear testing, would most likely yield more specific results on whether time is significant for the emotions in general. For the IE models, that the regression lines in the plots of the IE regression differ from some of the emotions' lines in the GGPlots indicates that there may be other variables affecting the data, and that additional interaction variables should be added to further determine which variables are impacting each other.

7.3 Avenues of Further Research

Nevertheless, this thesis only illustrates the necessity of further understanding how the EU uses emotions within its public diplomacy. The first avenue of future research efforts is, of course, the development of novel methodological processes for investigating emotions within public diplomacy, but also within politics in general. While this thesis aims to present an important first step, combining traditional IR notions with humanities concepts such as emotions and psychology can only be improved by thinking 'outside the box' methodologically.

Within this particular case study, there have been patterns found between the emotions that indicate certain emotions affecting each other. It would therefore be fruitful to conduct a

regression analysis pairing certain emotions – approval and disapproval; disapproval and anger; or annoyance and optimism – to investigate if, perhaps, the display of one emotion entails the suppression of another. This would further continue the discussion of which emotions the EU feels obligated or entitled to display, and which emotions they tend to defer to other actors.

Outside of this case study, it would of great interest to investigate the EU's emotional reactions to an INV outside of Europe, comparing the two. The EU displayed a significant emotional reaction to an international norm violation within Europe's borders, but would it do the same for one committed elsewhere?

Lastly, analyzing how the EU uses emotions in its diplomatic relations in other policy areas, rather than just international norm violations, would be key to investigating how the EU utilizes emotions in persuasion and negotiation. Considering the EU's current relationship with China, for instance, process-tracing changes in emotional rhetoric with evident policy changes can illustrate policy areas in which the EU is more likely to insist on its normative values, and areas in which it is more likely to turn a blind eye due to strategic objectives.

No matter the case investigated, it becomes evident that studying EU foreign policy through the lens of emotional diplomacy is an undertaking that will only become more important as the EU faces the changes inherent to the future of the international system. No matter the role of the EU going forward, the function of its foreign policy will be at the forefront of its identity – and this identity will be portrayed through its displayed emotions. As Ringmar states, "take away the emotions and there will be little international politics left" (2018, p. 33).

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APPENDIX

GitHub Repository Link

https://github.com/sasni27/MSc.Thesis.EU_Emotional_Diplomacy/tree/main

OLS Regression Results by Emotion

1. Approval

OLS Regression Results

Dep. Variable:	approval_score	R-squared:	0.002
Model:	OLS	Adj. R-squared:	-0.001
Method:	Least Squares	F-statistic:	0.6614
Date:	Mon, 20 May 2024	Prob (F-statistic):	0.417
Time:	20:40:12	Log-Likelihood:	75.522
No. Observations:	336	AIC:	-147.0
Df Residuals:	334	BIC:	-139.4
Df Model:	1		
Covariance Type:	nonrobust		

	coef	std err	t	P>|t|	[0.025	0.975]
const	0.3964	0.023	17.060	0.000	0.351	0.442
date_standardized	-0.0324	0.040	-0.813	0.417	-0.111	0.046

Omnibus:	7.682	Durbin-Watson:	1.935
Prob(Omnibus):	0.021	Jarque-Bera (JB):	4.479
Skew:	0.059	Prob(JB):	0.107
Kurtosis:	2.447	Cond. No.	4.84

Table 1: OLS regression results for approval scores, elaborated by author using statsmodels.api in Python

An OLS regression was performed to measure whether time has a significant relationship with approval scores to provide a base for analyzing the significance of approval within EU foreign policy. As can be seen from the results, the coefficient for the standardized date is -0.0324. Because its p-value is 0.417, this indicates that the coefficient is not statistically significant. Moreover, the F-statistic of 0.6614 has a corresponding p-value of 0.417, again greater than the significance level of 0.05. Therefore, the results do not provide evidence that time has had a statistically significant impact on approval scores over the period.

Here, it must be noted that the p-values of both the F-statistic and the coefficient of the standardized date will be the same for all of the OLS regressions. This is because with the F-statistic testing the overall significance of the regression model, it is testing whether the independent variable – which in this case, is just the 'date_standardized' coefficient – has a non-zero coefficient. In other words, the null hypotheses being tested for each variable are the same.

2. Optimism

OLS Regression Results

Dep. Variable:	optimism_score	R-squared:	0.003
Model:	OLS	Adj. R-squared:	0.000
Method:	Least Squares	F-statistic:	1.078
Date:	Mon, 20 May 2024	Prob (F-statistic):	0.300
Time:	20:41:00	Log-Likelihood:	525.93
No. Observations:	336	AIC:	-1048.
Df Residuals:	334	BIC:	-1040.
Df Model:	1		
Covariance Type:	nonrobust		

	coef	std err	t	P>|t|	[0.025	0.975]
const	0.0371	0.006	6.109	0.000	0.025	0.049
date_standardized	-0.0108	0.010	-1.038	0.300	-0.031	0.010

Omnibus:	287.913	Durbin-Watson:	2.023
Prob(Omnibus):	0.000	Jarque-Bera (JB):	5435.098
Skew:	3.564	Prob(JB):	0.00
Kurtosis:	21.369	Cond. No.	4.84

Table 2: OLS regression results for optimism scores, elaborated by author using statsmodels.api in Python

The same as approval, the coefficient for the standardized date, -0.0108, had a p-value over the level of statistical significance: 0.300. The p-value for the F-statistic, which was 1.078, was the same. Based on the results, it appears that there is no significant relationship between time and optimism scores given from the data.

3. Disapproval

OLS Regression Results

Dep. Variable:	disapproval_score	R-squared:	0.007
Model:	OLS	Adj. R-squared:	0.004
Method:	Least Squares	F-statistic:	2.334
Date:	Mon, 20 May 2024	Prob (F-statistic):	0.128
Time:	20:40:45	Log-Likelihood:	557.83
No. Observations:	336	AIC:	-1112.
Df Residuals:	334	BIC:	-1104.
Df Model:	1		
Covariance Type:	nonrobust		

	coef	std err	t	P>|t|	[0.025	0.975]
const	0.0230	0.006	4.163	0.000	0.012	0.034
date_standardized	-0.0145	0.009	-1.528	0.128	-0.033	0.004

Omnibus:	359.169	Durbin-Watson:	1.993
Prob(Omnibus):	0.000	Jarque-Bera (JB):	11339.698
Skew:	4.801	Prob(JB):	0.00
Kurtosis:	29.791	Cond. No.	4.84

Table 3: OLS regression results for disapproval scores, elaborated by author using statsmodels.api in Python

From the OLS regression for disapproval, the coefficient for the standardized date is -0.0145. Its p-value of 0.128 indicates that the coefficient is not statistically significant. The p-value, 0.128, of the F-statistic, 2.334, also fails to reject the null hypothesis that the model's

coefficients are equal to zero. Although, it must be noted that the p-values are indeed lower than those found for most of the other emotions. Nevertheless, it cannot be concluded that there is a significant relationship between time and disapproval scores during the given period.

4. Annoyance

OLS Regression Results

Dep. Variable:	annoyance_score	R-squared:	0.004
Model:	OLS	Adj. R-squared:	0.001
Method:	Least Squares	F-statistic:	1.408
Date:	Mon, 20 May 2024	Prob (F-statistic):	0.236
Time:	20:40:29	Log-Likelihood:	1150.7
No. Observations:	336	AIC:	-2297.
Df Residuals:	334	BIC:	-2290.
Df Model:	1		
Covariance Type:	nonrobust		

	coef	std err	t	P>|t|	[0.025	0.975]
const	0.0020	0.001	2.148	0.032	0.000	0.004
date_standardized	0.0019	0.002	1.186	0.236	-0.001	0.005

Omnibus:	420.060	Durbin-Watson:	1.886
Prob(Omnibus):	0.000	Jarque-Bera (JB):	27697.355
Skew:	5.877	Prob(JB):	0.00
Kurtosis:	45.898	Cond. No.	4.84

Table 4: OLS regression results for annoyance scores, elaborated by author using statsmodels.api in Python

For the annoyance OLS regression results, the coefficient of the standardized date is 0.0019, which has a p-value of 0.236. Because the p-value is above the 0.05 significance level, there is no evidence to suggest statistical significance. Additionally, because the F-statistic of 1.408 has a p-value of 0.236, the model is not statistically significance. Therefore, it appears that there is no statistically significant relationship between time and annoyance scores over this period.

5. Disappointment

OLS Regression Results

Dep. Variable:	disappointment_score	R-squared:	0.002
Model:	OLS	Adj. R-squared:	-0.001
Method:	Least Squares	F-statistic:	0.6427
Date:	Mon, 20 May 2024	Prob (F-statistic):	0.423
Time:	20:42:52	Log-Likelihood:	1222.1
No. Observations:	336	AIC:	-2440.
Df Residuals:	334	BIC:	-2433.
Df Model:	1		
Covariance Type:	nonrobust		

	coef	std err	t	P>|t|	[0.025	0.975]
const	0.0016	0.001	2.142	0.033	0.000	0.003
date_standardized	0.0011	0.001	0.802	0.423	-0.002	0.004

Omnibus:	464.983	Durbin-Watson:	1.980
Prob(Omnibus):	0.000	Jarque-Bera (JB):	48916.452
Skew:	6.838	Prob(JB):	0.00
Kurtosis:	60.507	Cond. No.	4.84

Table 5: OLS regression results for disappointment scores, elaborated by author using statsmodels.api in Python

For disappointment's OLS regression results, the F-statistic is 0.6427 with a corresponding p-value of 0.423. Because the p-value is higher than the significance level, it fails to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal to zero. The p-value of 0.423 was obtained for the coefficient of the standardized date, which was 0.0011, which was also higher than the significance level. Thus, it appears that there is no significant relationship between time and the disappointment scores shown here.

6. Anger

OLS Regression Results

Dep. Variable:	anger_score	R-squared:	0.006
Model:	OLS	Adj. R-squared:	0.003
Method:	Least Squares	F-statistic:	1.951
Date:	Mon, 20 May 2024	Prob (F-statistic):	0.163
Time:	20:43:52	Log-Likelihood:	1040.3
No. Observations:	336	AIC:	-2077.
Df Residuals:	334	BIC:	-2069.
Df Model:	1		
Covariance Type:	nonrobust		

	coef	std err	t	P>|t|	[0.025	0.975]
const	0.0044	0.001	3.312	0.001	0.002	0.007
date_standardized	-0.0031	0.002	-1.397	0.163	-0.008	0.001

Omnibus:	534.096	Durbin-Watson:	1.909
Prob(Omnibus):	0.000	Jarque-Bera (JB):	124066.695
Skew:	8.507	Prob(JB):	0.00
Kurtosis:	95.588	Cond. No.	4.84

Table 6: OLS regression results for anger scores, elaborated by author using statsmodels.api in Python

From the OLS regression results, we can see that the p-value of 0.163 for the F-statistic of 1.951 means that it fails to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are all equal to zero. While one of the smaller p-values of the emotions analyzed, the 0.163 p-value for the coefficient of the standardized date, -0.0031, does not fulfill the significance level. Therefore, we cannot conclude that there is a significant relationship between time and anger scores from the data.

7. Disgust

OLS Regression Results

Dep. Variable:	disgust_score	R-squared:	0.009
Model:	OLS	Adj. R-squared:	0.006
Method:	Least Squares	F-statistic:	3.028
Date:	Mon, 20 May 2024	Prob (F-statistic):	0.0827
Time:	20:44:58	Log-Likelihood:	1665.8
No. Observations:	336	AIC:	-3328.
Df Residuals:	334	BIC:	-3320.
Df Model:	1		
Covariance Type:	nonrobust		

	coef	std err	t	P>|t|	[0.025	0.975]
const	0.0008	0.000	4.078	0.000	0.000	0.001
date_standardized	-0.0006	0.000	-1.740	0.083	-0.001	7.95e-05

Omnibus:	438.430	Durbin-Watson:	2.052
Prob(Omnibus):	0.000	Jarque-Bera (JB):	28388.035
Skew:	6.380	Prob(JB):	0.00
Kurtosis:	46.184	Cond. No.	4.84

Table 7: OLS regression results for disgust scores, elaborated by author using statsmodels.api in Python

From the OLS regression results, we can see that the coefficient for the standardized date is -0.0006. It has a p-value of 0.083, which is the lowest p-value seen from the set of emotions analyzed in the OLS regressions. Moreover, the F-statistic of 3.028 has the same p-value. While the p-values are slightly above the significance level, meaning that significance cannot be concluded, there is weak evidence to suggest a potential negative relationship between time and disgust scores.

8. Fear

OLS Regression Results

Dep. Variable:	fear_score	R-squared:	0.000
Model:	OLS	Adj. R-squared:	-0.003
Method:	Least Squares	F-statistic:	0.1628
Date:	Mon, 20 May 2024	Prob (F-statistic):	0.687
Time:	20:45:43	Log-Likelihood:	1114.7
No. Observations:	336	AIC:	-2225.
Df Residuals:	334	BIC:	-2218.
Df Model:	1		
Covariance Type:	nonrobust		

	coef	std err	t	P>|t|	[0.025	0.975]
const	0.0020	0.001	1.900	0.058	-7.11e-05	0.004
date_standardized	-0.0007	0.002	-0.403	0.687	-0.004	0.003

Omnibus:	564.145	Durbin-Watson:	1.488
Prob(Omnibus):	0.000	Jarque-Bera (JB):	165283.586
Skew:	9.399	Prob(JB):	0.00
Kurtosis:	110.017	Cond. No.	4.84

Table 8: OLS regression results for fear scores, elaborated by author using statsmodels.api in Python

The emotion of fear yielded similar results from the OLS regression as the other emotions. The p-values for fear – 0.687 – were the largest found for the OLS regressions. This p-value for the F-statistic of 0.1628 fails to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are all equal to zero. The p-value for the coefficient of the standardized date, which was -0.0007, also suggests that there is no significant relationship. Therefore, the model does not provide evidence that fear scores have changed during this period due to time.

Interaction Effect Regression Results by Emotion

1. Approval



Figure 1: Plot for interaction effect on approval scores over time, showing 95% confidence intervals, elaborated by author using matplotlib.pyplot in Python

```
Coefficients:
const                0.320993
date_standardized    0.356849
interaction          0.128146
interaction_date    -0.468197
dtype: float64

Confidence Intervals for Coefficients:
                             0         1
const                 0.245067  0.396918
date_standardized    -0.067924  0.781621
interaction           0.024514  0.231778
interaction_date     -0.907000 -0.029394
```

Table 1: Significant p-values of interaction effect results for approval scores, elaborated by author using PolynomialFeatures in Python

Analyzing the specific effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the IE is plotted as the regression line in Figure 1.1. Note that in the plots, those for approval as well as the emotions moving forward, the invasion date is numerical, and sits at around 0.325. A green dotted line is provided for visualization. Additionally, the confidence interval (CI) of 95% is included using opaque grey.

The IE results display the coefficients for the IE on approval. The ‘const’ coefficient represents the intercept of the regression line when the other predictor variables are set to zero, indicating the expected emotion score when both the date and interaction term are zero. Because the coefficient is positive, 0.320993, this suggests that before the invasion date, without any IE, there is a baseline of approval within EU foreign policy. The CI for ‘const’ is 0.245067 and 0.396918. This means that the true baseline approval score is likely to be between this range with 95% confidence. A relatively narrow interval, the CI indicates a reasonably precise estimate.

The ‘date_standardized’ coefficient represents the slope of the regression line for the standardized date variable. The positive coefficient of 0.356849 indicates that there is a positive relationship between the standardized date and approval. In other words, over time, there is a tendency for approval to increase. Note that this coefficient’s results are not affected by the invasion variable. The CI of ‘date_standardized’ is from -0.068 to 0.782, meaning the true effect of the standardized date on approval scores could be between this range. The wide interval suggests uncertainty in the trend. Additionally, because the interval includes zero, the positive trend observed might not be statistically significant.

The ‘interaction’ coefficient represents the effect of the interaction between the invasion date and the standardized date variable on approval. The positive coefficient of 0.128146 indicates a positive interaction effect. Based on the CI, the true effect of the post-invasion period on approval scores is likely between 0.025 and 0.232. Because it does not include zero, this indicates that the trend is statistically significant. To further interpret this, we need to consider the last coefficient: ‘interaction_date’. This coefficient represents the effect of the interaction between the invasion date and the standardized date variable on approval. Because the

coefficient is negative, -0.468197, this indicates that the interaction between the invasion date and the standardized date has a negative impact on approval scores, suggesting that the slope of approval scores will change after the invasion of Ukraine. The true IE is likely between the CI of -0.907 and -0.029. The interval does not include zero and therefore indicates that the IE is negative, and statistically significant.

The IE regression plot for approval scores only supports the findings from the above coefficients. As can be seen from the plot, the invasion date causes an observable drop in approval scores. Moreover, the slope of the line is no longer increasing, supporting the claim that approval scores after the invasion date have a negative slope. From these results, we can conclude not only that there is a baseline of approval within EU foreign policy, but also that the invasion had an observable negative impact on approval scores, leading to a change in the slope's direction to decrease.

2. Optimism



Figure 2: Plot for interaction effect on optimism scores over time, showing 95% confidence intervals, elaborated by author using matplotlib.pyplot in Python

```
Coefficients:
const                0.027906
date_standardized    0.075090
interaction          0.008234
interaction_date    -0.085226
dtype: float64

Confidence Intervals for Coefficients:
                           0         1
const               0.007925  0.047886
date_standardized  -0.036693  0.186873
interaction        -0.019037  0.035506
interaction_date   -0.200701  0.030249
```

Table 2: Significant p-values of interaction effect results for optimism scores, elaborated by author using PolynomialFeatures in Python

For optimism, the constant coefficient was positive: 0.027906. This suggests that prior to the invasion and without the IE, there is a baseline level of optimism in EU foreign policy. The CI of 0.0079 and 0.0479 is reasonably narrow, indicating a precise estimate of the baseline. Moreover, the positive coefficient of 0.075090 for the standardized date variable indicates a positive relationship between the standardized date and optimism scores, meaning that there is a tendency for optimism to increase, not affected by the invasion. However, the CI was wide, -0.0367 to 0.1869, suggesting uncertainty, and because it includes zero, it indicates that the trend may not be statistically significant.

The interaction coefficient was also positive, being 0.008234, indicating a positive interaction effect. Because the CI of -0.0190 and 0.355 includes zero, this trend may not be statistically significant. Considering the coefficient for the interaction between the invasion date and the standardized date, the coefficient is negative: -0.085226, indicating the variables' interaction has a negative effect on optimism scores. This suggests that the slope of the scores changed after the invasion of Ukraine. However, this CI also includes zero: -0.2007 to 0.0302, indicating that the IE on optimism scores may not be statistically significant.

Indeed, the plot illustrating the IE on optimism scores displays a clear decrease at the invasion date. It also displays a clear change in the direction of the slope: while pre-invasion the slope was increasing, post-invasion the slope is decreasing. The results of the IE model implicate two things: first, there exists a baseline of optimism within EU foreign policy. Second, the invasion of Ukraine had a negative impact on optimism scores, causing a change in the slope of optimism scores over time.

3. Disapproval



Figure 3: Plot for interaction effect on disapproval scores over time, showing 95% confidence intervals, elaborated by author using matplotlib.pyplot in Python

```
Coefficients:
const                0.027734
date_standardized   -0.064131
interaction         -0.003051
interaction_date     0.047720
dtype: float64

Confidence Intervals for Coefficients:
                            0         1
const               0.009525  0.045943
date_standardized  -0.166002  0.037739
interaction        -0.027904  0.021803
interaction_date   -0.057516  0.152955
```

Table 3: Significant p-values of interaction effect results for disapproval scores, elaborated by author using PolynomialFeatures in Python

For disapproval, the constant coefficient of 0.027734 suggests that before the invasion date and without the IE, there is a baseline of disapproval within EU foreign policy. This baseline is likely to be between 0.0095 and 0.0459 based on the CI, which is reasonably narrow, indicating a precise estimate. The negative coefficient of -0.064131 for the standardized date variable indicates a negative relationship between the standardized date and disapproval scores, meaning that over time, there is a tendency for disapproval scores to increase, separate from the invasion. The wide CI of -0.166 to 0.038 suggests uncertainty, with the inclusion of zero suggesting that the trend may not be statistically significant.

The interaction coefficient was negative, -0.003051, indicating a negative interaction effect. It had a CI of -0.028 and 0.022. Because the interval includes zero, this indicates that the trend is not statistically significant. Paired with the coefficient of the interaction between the invasion date and the standardized date variable on disapproval scores, which had a positive coefficient of 0.047720, the interaction between the invasion date and the standardized date had a positive effect on disapproval scores, meaning that the slope after the invasion date changed. Again, because the interval includes zero, between -0.058 and 0.153, the IE on disapproval scores may not be statistically significant.

As can be seen from the IE regression, disapproval scores jump on the invasion date, showing an observable impact of the invasion date. Moreover, the slope of the post-invasion regression line does indeed change, interestingly, to be less decreased over time. The findings indicate that not only is there a baseline level of disapproval in EU foreign policy, but that the invasion of Ukraine had a positive impact on disapproval, causing its slope to change post-invasion.

4. Annoyance



Figure 4: Plot for interaction effect on annoyance scores over time, showing 95% confidence intervals, elaborated by author using matplotlib.pyplot in Python

```
Coefficients:
const                0.005372
date_standardized   -0.014156
interaction         -0.005897
interaction_date     0.019889
dtype: float64

Confidence Intervals for Coefficients:
                           0         1
const               0.002284  0.008460
date_standardized  -0.031434  0.003121
interaction        -0.010113 -0.001682
interaction_date    0.002041  0.037737
```

Table 4: Significant p-values of interaction effect results for annoyance scores, elaborated by author using PolynomialFeatures in Python

The results of the IE model for annoyance scores contained the following. The constant coefficient was very close to zero: 0.005372, indicating that without the IE, there is a very low baseline level of annoyance in EU foreign policy. Its CI is between 0.0023 and 0.0085, which is a narrow interval, indicating a precise estimate of the baseline. The negative coefficient for the standardized date variable, -0.014156, indicates a negative relationship between the standardized date and annoyance scores, suggesting that annoyance has a tendency to decrease over time without the invasion effect. The large CI of -0.031 to 0.003 suggests uncertainty, and because the interval includes zero, the trend may not be statistically significant.

However, the interaction variable also had a negative coefficient, -0.005897, indicating a negative interaction effect. Because the CI of -0.0101 and -0.0017 does not include zero, this indicates a statistically significant trend. Considering the coefficient of the interaction between the invasion date and the standardized date variable, the positive coefficient of 0.019889 indicates that the interaction has a positive effect on annoyance scores, in which the slope of

the scores changes post-invasion. Again, the CI is 0.0020 and 0.0377 indicates a positive trend in annoyance scores that is statistically significant.

As can be seen in the IE plot, annoyance scores increase slightly at the invasion date. The slope moreover changes post-invasion to increase over time, supporting the results of the coefficients. From these results, while the baseline of annoyance is low in EU foreign policy, the invasion had a positive impact on annoyance scores, leading to a change in the slope post-invasion over time where annoyance scores increased.

5. Disappointment



Figure 5: Plot for interaction effect on disappointment scores over time, showing 95% confidence intervals, elaborated by author using matplotlib.pyplot in Python

```
Coefficients:
const                0.002408
date_standardized   -0.004637
interaction         -0.000968
interaction_date     0.006025
dtype: float64

Confidence Intervals for Coefficients:
                           0         1
const             -0.000115  0.004931
date_standardized -0.018752  0.009479
interaction       -0.004412  0.002476
interaction_date  -0.008557  0.020607
```

Table 5: Significant p-values of interaction effect results for disappointment scores, elaborated by author using PolynomialFeatures in Python

The constant coefficient for disappointment was very close to zero, with 0.002408. This suggests that without the IE, there is a very low baseline level of disappointment within EU foreign policy statements. Additionally, the CI for the baseline includes zero, between -0.0001 and 0.0049, indicating it may not be statistically significant. Not affected by the invasion of Ukraine, the negative coefficient for the standardized date variable, -0.004637, indicates a

negative relationship between the standardized date and disappointment scores. This entails a tendency for disappointment to decrease over time. The CI for the standardized date variable also includes zero: -0.0188 to 0.0095, indicating that it might not be statistically significant

The interaction coefficient was negative, being -0.000968, indicating a negative interaction effect. Its CI was -0.0044 to 0.0025, including zero, indicating no statistical significance. The positive coefficient of 0.006025 for the last coefficient indicates that the interaction between the invasion date and the standardized date has a positive effect on disappointment scores. In this sense, it can be suggested that the invasion of Ukraine caused the slope for disappointment scores to change. However, because the CI of the true interaction effect is between -0.0086 and 0.0206, including zero, the trend of disappointment scores is not statistically significant.

For the plot of the IE regression, there is a slight rise in disappointment at the invasion date. Moreover, in line with the above results, the slope, while only slightly, did indeed change at the invasion date. Prior to the invasion, disappointment scores were decreasing; however, post-invasion, they have a slightly increasing slope. The results of the IE model suggest a very low baseline level of disappointment in EU foreign policy, as well as a slight change in the slope of disappointment over time due to the invasion.

6. Anger



Figure 6: Plot for interaction effect on anger scores over time, showing 95% confidence intervals, elaborated by author using matplotlib.pyplot in Python

```
Coefficients:
const                0.009604
date_standardized   -0.023379
interaction         -0.010259
interaction_date     0.027586
dtype: float64

Confidence Intervals for Coefficients:
                            0         1
const                0.005343  0.013865
date_standardized   -0.047219  0.000461
interaction         -0.016076 -0.004443
interaction_date     0.002959  0.052214
```

Table 6: Significant p-values of interaction effect results for anger scores, elaborated by author using PolynomialFeatures in Python

The results of the IE for anger scores are the following. The constant coefficient indicates a baseline level of anger in EU foreign policy statements, since the coefficient is positive: 0.009604. The CI was narrow, with 0.0053 and 0.0139, and not including zero, indicating statistical significance. The coefficient of the standardized date variable is -0.023379. This negative coefficient indicates a negative relationship between the standardized date and anger scores, meaning that anger has a tendency to decrease over time without the IE. However, the trend was not statistically significant, as the CI of -0.0472 to 0.0005 included zero.

The coefficient for the interaction is -0.010259 which is negative, meaning there is a negative interaction effect. The CI of -0.0161 to -0.0044 did not include zero, indicating statistical significance. The last coefficient is positive, 0.027586, indicating that the interaction between the invasion date and the standardized date has a positive effect on anger scores. This suggests that the slope post-invasion has changed. This CI also indicated statistical significance, with zero not included in the interval of 0.0030 and 0.0522.

Indeed, the regression plot for the IE shows a small drop at the invasion date, illustrating the effect of the invasion date on anger scores. The slope of anger also changes, going from a decreasing slope prior to the invasion, to a slowly increasing slope after the invasion. These results show that there is a baseline level of anger within EU foreign policy, and that the invasion of Ukraine had a positive impact on anger, causing its slope to change to increasing.

7. Disgust



Figure 7: Plot for interaction effect on disgust scores over time, showing 95% confidence intervals, elaborated by author using matplotlib.pyplot in Python

```
Coefficients:
const                0.001055
date_standardized   -0.001236
interaction         -0.000477
interaction_date     0.000998
dtype: float64

Confidence Intervals for Coefficients:
                            0         1
const                0.000382  0.001728
date_standardized   -0.005003  0.002530
interaction         -0.001396  0.000442
interaction_date    -0.002893  0.004889
```

Table 7: Significant p-values of interaction effect results for disgust scores, elaborated by author using PolynomialFeatures in Python

The constant coefficient for disgust is very close to zero: 0.001055. This indicates that there is only a very low baseline level of disgust in EU foreign policy. The CI is 0.0004 and 0.0017, which does not include zero and therefore is statistically significant from zero. The negative coefficient of -0.001236 was also low, suggesting a very slight negative relationship between the standardized date and disgust scores. In other words, there is a tendency for disgust scores to decrease over time, independent of the IE, but the effect is very small. Moreover, the CI includes zero: -0.0050 to 0.0025, indicating that the trend may not be statistically significant.

The interaction coefficient is negative and its small value indicates a very slight negative interaction effect: -0.00047. Here, the CI includes zero: -0.0014 to 0.0004, indicating no statistical significance. The coefficient representing the interaction between the invasion date and the standardized date variable on disgust scores is positive but also very close to zero: 0.000998. This indicates a positive effect of the interaction, and a change of the slope, but the effect size is very small. The CI indicates no statistical significance for the IE on disgust scores, as it includes zero: -0.0029 to 0.0049.

Indeed, the plot for the interaction effect on disgust scores shows only a slight drop at the invasion date. Additionally, while the slope did change after the invasion date, it did not change as much as some of the other emotions analyzed. Based on these results, we can conclude a very low baseline level of disgust in EU foreign policy statements, as well as a small change on the slope of disgust scores due to the invasion.

8. Fear



Figure 8: Plot for interaction effect on fear scores over time, showing 95% confidence intervals, elaborated by author using matplotlib.pyplot in Python

```
Coefficients:
const                0.003315
date_standardized   -0.011134
interaction         -0.001521
interaction_date     0.010795
dtype: float64

Confidence Intervals for Coefficients:
                           0         1
const             -0.000156  0.006786
date_standardized -0.030553  0.008286
interaction       -0.006259  0.003217
interaction_date  -0.009265  0.030856
```

Table 8: Significant p-values of interaction effect results for fear scores, elaborated by author using PolynomialFeatures in Python

The constant coefficient for fear is relatively small but positive: 0.003315, indicating a low baseline level of fear in EU foreign policy. However, because the CI includes zero, -0.0002 and 0.0068, the baseline may not be statistically significant. The negative coefficient for the standardized date variable, -0.011134, indicates a negative relationship. This suggests that there is a tendency for fear scores to decrease over time, unrelated to the invasion. However, again, the CI of -0.0306 to 0.0083 includes zero, indicating no statistical significance.

The interaction coefficient found was negative, with -0.001521. This value indicates a slight negative interaction effect. Yet, the CI of -0.0063 to 0.0032 did not include zero, indicating no statistical significance. The last coefficient was positive, with 0.010795, indicating that the interaction between the invasion date and the standardized date has a positive effect on fear scores. This suggests that the slope of fear scores changed as a result of the invasion, increasing very slightly. Here, the CI also included zero, being -0.0093 to 0.0309, indicating no statistical significance of the IE on fear.

The IE regression plot for fear supports these findings. First, there is a very small increase in fear scores at the invasion date. Second, the slope did indeed change post-invasion compared to the pre-invasion slope. From the IE model for fear, we can conclude a low baseline level of fear in EU foreign policy statements, as well as a positive, but small, impact of the invasion on fear scores over time.