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**Strategic Immobility: Hamas and Its Alternative Contemporary
Insurgency Strategy and Methods within the Gaza Strip**

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Abstract

The conflict between Hamas, Palestinians, and Israel is complex and ongoing, dating back to the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948. It re-emerged in the media after Hamas' Al-Aqsa Flood operation on October 7th, 2023, and subsequent support for Palestinians and Israelis is ambiguous and divided.

To analyze and understand the complexities of the conflict, this thesis utilizes a theoretically eclectic approach, constituted by Mary Kaldor's theory on old- and new wars, Norman Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and his three-dimensional model, and lastly David Galula's theory on (Counter)insurgency. Methodologically, this thesis draws inspiration from the Grounded Theory Method (GTM) in a qualitative desktop approach, based on Hamas' 2017 Charter including secondary sources.

The Palestinians engaged in old warfare against Israel from the latter's establishment in 1948 until the advent of the first intifada in 1987. The intifadas marked a transitional phase from old wars to new wars, characterized by a shift in actors, goals, methods, and forms of financing. Hamas strategically utilized its Charter to articulate its perspective on the conflict, framing Israel as an illegitimate state occupying Palestinian territory, determining that its cause revolves around liberation through resistance. The responsibility of resistance is primarily placed on Palestinians and Muslims; thus, the Charter serves as an attempt to establish new social practices through legitimizing resistance within Islam rather than international legal paradigms.

We argue that Hamas applied an alternative insurgency strategy exploiting Palestinian immobility, facilitated by closed borders, due to unfavorable insurgency conditions according to the conventional insurgency theory. The objective of the strategy is to obtain political and moral outside support by exposing the violations of human rights perpetrated by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in response to the October 7th attack. To ensure continued adherence to the responsibilities retracted from the Charter - namely, endurance, persistence, and armed resistance - Hamas employs a resistance-against-resistance method to suppress civilian opposition. The method attempts to ensure internal cohesion around the strategy by presenting a unified front and mitigating potential external interpretations of strategic ambiguity, thereby fortifying Hamas' resistance capabilities against Israel. However, the immobility strategy and its inherent method of internal resistance risks reaching a tipping point. Hamas mitigates this risk through political negotiations and ceasefire agreements with the newly acquired outside support. Galula's theory was inadequate to explain the strategy applied by Hamas. To contextualize, the theory states that moral support is passively acquired, whereas we argue that Hamas deliberately facilitates a strategy to force moral outside support. Similarly, we contend that communication technology is used to showcase Palestinian suffering and casualties inflicted by Israel to gain outside support, as opposed to Kaldor arguing that it is solely used to spread fear through acts of terror.

Keywords: Hamas, Insurgency, Resistance, Immobility strategy, Old and New Wars, Resistance-against-resistance, Persistence, Communication Technology, Moral support

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CHAPTER ONE

1. Introduction: Understanding Exighophobia and the Insurgent Nature of Hamas in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

1.1 Exighophobia in Western Academia

The thesis is inspired by Ghassan Hage's theoretical concept of 'Exighophobia,' which refers to a prevailing trend in Western spheres where a holistic condemnation censors the sociological comprehension of organizations and actions associated with non-Western values, such as terror-listed factions like Hamas and suicide bombings (Hage, 2003, p. 67). Hage developed this term by studying Palestinian suicide bombers and was informed that 'absolute condemnation' was required to avoid being perceived as a morally suspicious person by his peers (Hage, 2003, p. 66). This fear of being perceived as supportive by merely seeking to understand and research terror-listed organizations like Hamas has penetrated Western academic circles, effectively limiting terrorist subjects from the scientific field. Similarly, we, as authors, have faced moral concerns and questions related to conducting a study of Hamas, given its latest Al-Aqsa Flood operation on October 7th, 2023. We believe that there is a logical rationale behind most behavior, and as social science scholars, our main objective is to comprehend the social world. This understanding is hindered if we submit ourselves to the narrative, thus omitting the reasoning behind the actions of the Al-Aqsa operation, as well as historical insurgency strategies and methods. Insurgency and revolutionary theory suggest that extreme circumstances require extreme measures. Historically, the international community salutes insurgent groups (post-gaining independence) that resisted colonial oppressors by applying brutal tactics, even when these tactics violated international law, as in the case of the African National Congress party from 1976-1990 (Lodge, 1982, p. 7). However, this perspective has transitioned significantly in the aftermath of 9/11 and the War on Terror.

1.1.2 The Strategic Nexus of Insurgency and Stasis

The concept of Exighophobia and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict sparked an interest in the stagnation of Palestinians within the Gaza Strip, and its impact on the conflict. In contemporary times, conventional warfare strategies and methods are being challenged by emerging resistance patterns, as state actors increasingly leverage displacement and mobility for geopolitical interests (Kaldor, 2013, p. 3). While warfare has historically catalyzed migration, recent cases suggest that war can also result in stasis. Research indicates that stasis and migration are used as political tools to apply pressure through blackmailing, and back-scratching strategies (Tsourapas, 2019, p. 1). Despite extensive theoretical research on concepts such as stuckness, confinement (Jefferson, Turner, Jensen, 2019, p. 1), and immobility (Carling, 2002, p. 1), and their use to advance geopolitical interests, stasis as a strategic warfare component remains largely unexplored. Identifying this theoretical gap, this thesis argues for a comprehensive examination of the nexus between immobility and insurgency strategy. By focusing on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a prominent case study, this thesis explores how

Hamas develops its insurgency strategy and methods to liberate its population and territory. We explore how Hamas develops its insurgency strategy and methods by posing the following research question:

How has the Palestinian-Israeli conflict evolved historically to facilitate the emergence of Hamas, and how has Hamas developed its insurgency strategy and methods to achieve its liberation cause?

1.1.3 The Analytical Framework

To answer the research question, an evaluation of the applicability of conventional insurgency theories is necessary. This evaluation is conducted by identifying anomalies between Hamas' current insurgency practices and conventional approaches. The analysis will produce theoretical concepts that highlight modern strategies and methods not detectable in conventional theories, thereby enriching the theoretical field of insurgency. By critically examining the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly through the framework of David Galula's (Counter)insurgency theory, this study aims to integrate new elements into the existing body of insurgency theory.

Methodologically, this thesis adopts inspiration from GTM. This approach is inductive and iterative, remaining open to the application of new theories and concepts. GTM influenced the final theoretical framework, coding process, and lastly the data gathering. Data gathering was conducted through a qualitative desktop approach, meaning that all empirical data was collected, coded, and analyzed from academic and public databases. Additionally, this chapter addresses the ethical considerations of researching organizations like Hamas, acknowledging the sensitivity of information depending on how the findings are used. The methodological approach is further explained and rationalized on pages 19-23.

To analyze and answer the research question, a theoretical framework was developed based on an eclectic approach. This involves combining three theories to create a comprehensive foundation for the analysis. The eclectic approach is inspired by coding efforts, GTM, theoretical brainstorming, and discussions. The coding indicated a necessity for a theoretical approach applying multiple theories. The theories and analytical structure are outlined below.

The analysis is structured into three analytical sections. The first section utilizes Mary Kaldor's theory on old and new wars to contextualize the Palestinian-Israeli conflict since the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948. The historical analysis is divided into three subsections: old war, transition to new war, and new war. This analysis addresses the initial part of the research question concerning how the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has evolved to facilitate the emergence of Hamas. It focuses on the distinction between old and new wars through its goals, actors, methods, and forms of finance to determine the characteristics of the conflict at each stage. However, Kaldor's theory can be criticized for its lack of strategic focus in explaining the rationale behind warfare methods, as it primarily presents a conceptual

understanding. To cover the theoretical gap, we supplement it by incorporating military theorist David Galula's (Counter)insurgency theory, as it provides strategic and tactical focus.

After establishing an analytical understanding of the conflict and its historical development, the second analysis applies Norman Fairclough's CDA methodology and its inherent three-dimensional model. This analysis is divided into two subsections. The first subsection examines the linguistic strategies employed by Hamas in its 2017 Charter to understand its cause, as well as how it defends it and attracts people to it. The second subsection delves into the discursive elements utilized by Hamas to legitimize its geopolitical position and resistance efforts. This analysis reveals how Hamas has developed an insurgency strategy and methods to achieve its cause of liberation. However, focusing solely on the Charter and current insurgency related to the current situation would overlook the broader context of the conflict. According to Fairclough, understanding this context is crucial as it constitutes new social practices and discourses (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 3). Therefore, the analysis is supplemented by researching the evolution of the conflict through Mary Kaldor's distinction between old and new wars. The discursive analysis, combined with the social constructivist philosophy that discourse influences social practice embedded in the CDA, facilitates the application of the third theoretical approach: (Counter)insurgency as presented by David Galula. Galula's theory provides a tangible foundation for analyzing how discursive practices influence social practices by comparing Hamas' strategy and methods to traditional insurgency strategies while simultaneously analyzing the implications for Palestinians through the lens of Hamas' new strategy. Kaldor and Galula's positivist approaches neglect the significance of discourse in constituting social practice, a gap that Fairclough's theory effectively covers.

The last analytical section utilizes David Galula's theory of (Counter)insurgency to analyze the prerequisites of successful insurgency from a classical perspective. This analysis is structured into two subsections. The first assesses Hamas' conditions for successful insurgency within the framework outlined by Galula's theory. The second analyzes the insurgency strategy and underlying methods applied by Hamas, reasoned within the context of classical insurgency conditions. Combined, these analyses answer the question presented in this thesis: How has the Palestinian-Israeli conflict evolved historically to facilitate the emergence of Hamas, and how has Hamas developed its insurgency strategy and methods to achieve its liberation cause? All analytical sections occur in Chapters Two, Three, and Four.

In summary, Mary Kaldor's theory enables targeted historical analysis of the conflict and Hamas' emergence, which impacts its future Charter. Fairclough prescribes that discourse both affects social practice and is affected by it (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 3). Therefore, we will rhetorically analyze the Charter to understand how insurgency efforts are conveyed through its discursive use and how it constitutes social practices. Lastly, Galula's theory allows us to strategically understand Hamas' actions from an insurgency perspective, which can help derive an alternative insurgency strategy that constitutes an altered social practice. The following section introduces Mary Kaldor's theory, distinguishing between old and new wars, to analyze how the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has historically evolved, facilitating the emergence of Hamas as posed in the research question.

1.2 Mary Kaldor - Old and New Wars

Mary Kaldor's warfare development theory transformed the perspective in which wars can be analyzed, by delineating between 'old wars' and 'new wars', emphasizing the evolution in actors, goals, methods, and forms of financing from a historical perspective (Kaldor, 2005, p. 492). Kaldor contends that there is a prevalent international inclination to perceive contemporary conflicts through the lens of old war paradigms, which she argues impedes effective resolution and may even exacerbate conflicts (Kaldor, 2005, p. 491). The following section explains how Kaldor differentiates between old and new wars.

1.2.1 Characteristics of old- and new wars

Kaldor has derived the distinctions between old and new wars based on variations in the participating actors, goals, methods, and forms of financing. Old wars epitomize a traditional form of warfare typically fought by nation-states on conventional battlefields through uniformed armed forces, aimed at enhancing national interests (Kaldor, 2005, p. 492). Moreover, these types of wars theoretically were conducted adhering to international law, such as the Geneva and Hague Conventions, mandating specific rules for minimizing civilian casualties. Consequently, states engaged in warfare were compelled to mitigate civilian casualties, thereby restricting the warfare methods (Kaldor, 2005, p. 492). In addition to the objective of building and enhancing states through war, Kaldor argues that old wars were often fought and motivated by geopolitical interests or ideological imperatives, such as nationalism and communism (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2). The predominant methods employed in old wars comprised conventional military combat, with financing typically sourced from states through taxation or by lending from allies (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2-3).

New wars are characterized oppositely from old wars, the focus shifts from state-building to state disintegration (Kaldor, 2013, p. 3). Unlike old wars, which are often fought based on ideological principles, new wars are distinctly fought based on identity politics, particularly ethnic and religious identities (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2), exemplified in the case of Hamas. Consequently, the actors engaged in new wars extend beyond conventional military forces, to include both state and non-state actors who align with the war's cause such as jihadists (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2). With non-state actors participating in new wars, it increasingly becomes difficult for the parties to distinguish between enemies and civilians, leading to an increase in civilian casualties (Kaldor, 2005, p. 497). This predicament is enhanced by the strategies employed in new wars, wherein territory is often secured through the displacement of populations with different ethnic or religious identities (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2-3). A notable difference between old and new wars lies in their respective orientations toward endurance and persistence rather than victory by military means (Kaldor, 2013, p. 3).

In new wars, involved actors aim to prolong the wars to gain from the political violence inflicted upon them (Kaldor, 2013, p. 4). These "new wars" are financed through what Kaldor describes as "Predatory private finance," due to the reduced revenue from taxation as the participating states become weakened, diverging from the taxation-based revenue system of

old wars. Predatory private finance involves various practices, such as taxing humanitarian aid, diaspora support, and the pillaging, looting, and smuggling of various goods (Kaldor, 2013, p. 3). The perpetuation of violence is integral to sustaining the war economy, given its dependence on decentralized entities like diasporas, which reflects its role in the globalized economy, as opposed to old wars (Kaldor, 2013, p. 3).

A characteristic element of contemporary wars is the role that technology plays (Kaldor, 2013, p. 4). Kaldor argues that advancements in communication technology have significantly influenced the conduct of modern warfare. One notable impact is the expedited mobilization around human rights causes, facilitated by the rapid dissemination of information (Kaldor, 2013, p. 4). Additionally, Kaldor argues that the advancements in communication technology are increasingly utilized as instruments of warfare to instill panic and fear in populations (Kaldor, 2013, p. 4). Despite the distinct categorizations of old and new wars, Kaldor argues that a rigid understanding of the terminologies may not be beneficial, as elements of new wars can be detected within old wars, and vice versa (Kaldor, 2005, p. 493).

To analyze the evolution of the conflict from Mary Kaldor's theoretical perspective, the following question has been posed:

- How has the conflict evolved historically to facilitate the emergence of Hamas considering its goals, actors, and methods including international law and communication technology, and financing?

1.3 Norman Fairclough Epistemology & Methodology

As Mary Kaldor's theory on old and new wars was described in the previous section, the focus now shifts to Fairclough. This is justified by Fairclough's epistemology, which posits that discourse is constituted by social practices. While Kaldor's theory and the historical context provide insight into the social practices that have constituted Hamas' Charter, Fairclough's framework allows for a comprehensive textual and discourse analysis. This approach examines how the Charter influences future social practices, addressing the second part of the research question: how Hamas has developed its insurgency strategy and methods to achieve its liberation cause.

1.3.1 The epistemology of CDA

Norman Fairclough developed the CDA based on the central premise that discourse is both constitutive and constituted, meaning it is a form of social practice that both constitutes the social world while simultaneously being constituted by social practices (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 3). This implies that when analyzing how discursive practices in the Charter shape new forms of insurgency methods, it is essential to recognize that both the Charter and Hamas are influenced by historical events. As discourse is also constitutive, the Charter constitutes a new social practice. The new social practice is analyzed through the lens of David Galula's (Counter)insurgency theory, which enables the identification of how the applied discourse alters social practice by highlighting suggestions and indications of new alternative insurgency methods, thereby impacting the conflict and the social sphere in the Gaza Strip according to Fairclough (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 3). Additionally, the CDA states that the discursive practices in which text is produced and received contribute to the creation of social identities and relations (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 2). Further, the CDA prescribes that discourse functions ideologically, contributing to and challenging the unequal power relations between social groups (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 4). In the context of this thesis on Hamas and its insurgency efforts, this theoretical understanding correlates directly to any form of insurgency and armed resistance, as these actions can be interpreted as attempts to challenge Israeli hegemony.

1.3.2 The three-dimensional model

Fairclough's CDA methodology presents a three-dimensional model for analyzing a communicative event (Hamas 2017 Charter), which, in the context of this thesis, is Hamas' Charter. The three dimensions are categorized as follows: 1) text, 2) discursive practice, and 3) social practice (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 10). For the textual dimension, Fairclough advocates analyzing the language of the text using linguistic tools such as ethos, modality (truth & permission), and wording in terms of floating signifiers (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 25). When analyzing the discursive practice, the purpose is to analyze beyond the linguistics of the text to understand how the discourse connects to broader social or historical discourses. This involves concepts such as interdiscursivity, intertextuality, hegemony, and ideologies (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 24). The social practice dimension focuses on how discourse constitutes new realities through social actions, relations, ideologies, and hegemony (Jørgensen

& Phillips, 2011, p. 28). All mentioned linguistic tools and discursive elements related to Fairclough's three-dimensional model will be further explained in forthcoming sections.

Despite the utility of Fairclough's three-dimensional model and its concepts for facilitating an analysis of the Charter, Fairclough argues that the model itself is insufficient because text cannot be fully understood in isolation (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 12). He asserts that text must be analyzed in relation to the social context, from which it arises (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 12). Given this reasoning, the analytical sufficiency of the text depends on its relation to other social contexts. Therefore, to comprehensively understand the text, this thesis draws on the theory of David Galula to analyze the insurgency strategy and methods applied. The three-dimensional methodological model, including its analytical factors, is described and contextualized in the sections below.

1.3.3 Dimension 1: Analytical linguistic tools

To theoretically analyze Hamas' development of its insurgency strategy and methods to achieve its liberation cause as stated in the second part of the research question, Fairclough's three-dimensional model is utilized. The first dimension consists of linguistic tools to analyze Hamas' Charter. Analyzing the Charter by using Fairclough's linguistic tools ensures a methodological and systematic approach to comprehending Hamas' insurgency strategy and methods applied to achieve their cause.

Ethos

The concept of ethos deviates from its Aristotelian origin, as it does not refer to credibility (Stucki & Sager, 2018, p. 1), instead focusing on how identities are constructed through language in a text (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 25). In the analysis of the Charter, ethos serves as a tool to analyze the identities that Hamas constructs to achieve its objectives, which is exemplified by Hamas' attempts to unify Palestinians as Muslims (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 3).

Pathos

In contrast to ethos, the use of pathos aligns with the Aristoteles description (Stucki & Sager, 2018, p. 1). However, deviation occurs from the textual instruments provided by Norman Fairclough in the CDA, as pathos is not included in his methodological framework (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011). The inclusion of an unconventional element like pathos in the textual analysis is justified by its significance in the communicative event. The Charter is embedded with pathos, which is integral to the message Hamas seeks to convey, as they aim to evoke emotional responses from the consumer of the text, exemplified when describing the Palestinians as suffering colonialism (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 13).

Modality

The concept of modality encompasses multiple meanings according to the CDA, as it refers to a general modality intended to analyze the degree of affinity between the speaker and a statement (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 26). This is exemplified in the statements within the

Charter where Hamas deliberately associates its name with a statement as opposed to statements where such is absent (Middle East Eye, 2017, points 8-9). Such a modality is used to understand the objectives and values of Hamas as they directly endorse the statement and its argument. Another type of modality is truth, signifying the degree of commitment to the statement and its argument (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 26). Lastly, permission represents a form of modality wherein the speaker grants the consumer authority to behave, act, and believe in a particular manner (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 26). Within the context of the Charter, such an example could be the permission to engage in resistance (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 23).

Floating signifiers

The critical discourse theorists Laclau and Mouffe introduce the concept of floating signifiers, which Jørgensen and Phillips advocate is beneficial when conducting a Fairclough-inspired CDA (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 36). Floating signifiers are “*Elements which are particularly open to different ascriptions of meaning*” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 4). An illustrative example of a floating signifier is the term ‘jihad’, in the Charter (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 23). The definition varies depending on the interpreter, encompassing both notions of internal struggle for improvement and justice, as well as armed resistance (Oxford Bibliographies, 2018).

1.3.4 Dimension 2: Discursive elements

As Fairclough’s linguistic tools utilized to analyze Hamas’ Charter were explained and contextualized above, the following section describes the discursive elements related to his second dimension also applied to analyze the Charter. Similarly to the linguistic tools, the discursive elements are used to analyze how Hamas challenges Israeli hegemony through discourse. The analysis of how Hamas discursively challenges Israeli hegemony reveals what prerequisites for insurgency Hamas anchors its resistance within, thereby granting an understanding of how Hamas has developed its insurgency strategy and methods to achieve its liberation cause.

Intertextuality

Intertextuality refers to the inherent connection between all spoken or written communication and previous instances of communication (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 19). It suggests that everything a person communicates is influenced by prior linguistic encounters. To illustrate intertextuality, consider the process of writing this thesis: the author’s utilization of words previously used by others shows how the authors have encountered and understood these words beforehand. Moreover, the incorporation of references to other scholars and statements from official representatives exemplifies intertextuality (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 15).

Interdiscursivity

The concept of interdiscursivity refers to the combination of various discourses and genres in a communicative event (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 9). Interdiscursivity functions as an element for challenging and transforming the established order of discourse associated with the text's objectives. Conversely, a lack of interdiscursivity can indicate that the text's producer aims to maintain the existing order of discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 15). For instance, consider Hamas' Charter, where multiple discourses, including religious and legal, are combined to legitimize certain perspectives and actions, as demonstrated in the following phrase: "*Palestine is a land whose status has been elevated by Islam, a faith that holds it in high esteem, that breathes through it its spirit and just values and that lays the foundation for the doctrine of defending and protecting it*" (Middle East Eye, 2017, Preamble, line 3-4).

Hegemony

Hegemony refers to the relations of power between social groups and discourses and attempts to maintain or challenge such (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 16). According to Fairclough, these power relations are inherently unstable and subject to continuous changes by the use of discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 17-18). In the context of this thesis, hegemony is employed to analyze how Hamas perceives the power relations between itself, Israel, and the international community, whether supportive or opposed to its cause (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 14). Additionally, the concept is used to understand how Hamas may attempt to challenge or disrupt the perceived power relations through discourse in the Charter.

Ideology

The concept of ideology is understood as '*Meaning in the service of power*' (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 10). Within the context of this thesis, ideology serves as a lens to analyze how ideological discourses can contribute to either maintaining or altering power relations between various entities, such as Hamas and Israel, Islam and Judaism, nationalism and Islamism, Israel and the international society and Hamas and the international society (Middle East Eye, 2017, Preamble, line 5). Fairclough prescribes that discourses can exhibit varying degrees of ideological inclination depending on the extent to which anyone attempts to change power relations (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 16).

Based on the tools and elements for the textual and discursive analysis described above, the forthcoming analytical Chapter Three analyzes and addresses the following question in the textual analysis:

- What linguistic tools and discursive elements does Hamas utilize to promote its cause, and why?

1.4 David Galula - (Counter)Insurgency Theory

The subsequent theoretical section outlines David Galula's framework for the prerequisites of a successful insurgency, which is divided into four phases. These phases will be outlined in the upcoming section and subsequently applied in the fourth analytical chapter to examine the social practices and insurgency strategy of Hamas. This analysis aims to determine whether Hamas must employ an alternative insurgency strategy and methods due to unfavorable conditions. Galula's framework complements Kaldor's theory on old and new wars by providing strategic and tactical insights into insurgency, thereby enhancing the conceptual understanding of different types of warfare. This theoretical approach enables the thesis to analyze Hamas' insurgency strategy and methods in the context of its liberation cause. It is important to note that Galula, a military theorist with extensive experience in the French colonial military, primarily focused on countering insurgents by understanding their conditions for success.

1.4.1 A cause

The first prerequisite for an insurgent group, such as Hamas, to successfully challenge a counterinsurgent, such as Israel, is to establish an appealing cause that attracts active support from the population (Galula, 2006, p. 13). Galula prescribes that an anti-colonial cause strengthens an insurgent because it combines political, social, economic, racial, religious, and cultural elements, thereby diversifying the attraction of supporters (Galula, 2006, p. 18). Once an insurgent group establishes an attractive cause, it automatically grows in strength due to the increasing number of supporters and their willingness to actively engage in the cause (Galula, 2006, p. 14). Additionally, the insurgent, its supporters, and their cause must be resilient, enabling the cause to grow despite any efforts by the counterinsurgent to weaken it (Galula, 2006, p. 15). If the insurgency group and its cause are resilient, the importance of the cause itself diminishes gradually over time, as the conflict compels individuals to pick a side. Consequently, the insurgent does not need to continually attract new support (Galula, 2006, p. 19).

1.4.2 Weakness of the counterinsurgent

In addition to possessing an attractive cause, such as anti-colonialism, the theory of insurgency further prescribes that the success of any insurgent is contingent upon identifying and exploiting weaknesses within the counterinsurgent (Galula, 2006, p. 19). This premise is based on the inherent asymmetry between insurgent and counterinsurgent capabilities, especially in the preliminary stages of the insurgent's existence. Typically, the counterinsurgent possesses a well-established military force with superior equipment, technology, and intelligence (Galula, 2006, p. 5). Galula identifies four factors that can indicate the presence or absence of weaknesses in a counterinsurgent. We present the three applied in this thesis. The first factor is the absence of problems. This refers to the fact that a nation with an absence of problems cannot be a victim of insurgency. Therefore, the mere existence of an insurgent proves the existence of problems related to the counterinsurgent (Galula, 2006, p. 19).

The second factor indicating a potential weakness in the counterinsurgent depends on the degree of national consensus towards its government and its efforts against the insurgents (Galula, 2006, p. 19). A strong national consensus among the counterinsurgent population diminishes potential weaknesses for insurgents to exploit, while a lack of consensus amplifies them. Additionally, Galula emphasizes that the counterinsurgent and its leader's knowledge and expertise in counterinsurgency warfare are crucial indicators of potential weakness (Galula, 2006, p. 20). Insufficient knowledge and experience in counterinsurgency create vulnerabilities that insurgents can exploit, whereas extensive knowledge and experience can significantly strengthen the counterinsurgent's position (Galula, 2006, p. 21 & 74).

1.4.3 Geographical conditions

Another prerequisite facilitating the likelihood of successful insurgency is the geographical conditions of the insurgent (Galula, 2006, p. 26). If an insurgent is located near countries that oppose its cause and efforts, the likelihood of success decreases. Conversely, proximity to supportive neighboring countries can enhance its prospects. Such support provides the insurgents with increased accessibility and opportunities to evade the counterinsurgent (Galula, 2006, p. 26). Oppositely, if neighboring countries are aligned with the counterinsurgent, the insurgents are more likely to become confined within their territory (Galula, 2006, p. 26). In the context of the conflict between Hamas and Israel, the thesis argues that the position of Egypt as a neighboring country is pivotal in influencing the conflict's outcome, derived by applying Galula's theory (Galula, 2006, p. 26). Galula argues that a high proportion of coastline relative to inland borders benefits the counterinsurgent due to the greater ease of controlling maritime traffic with fewer resources compared to managing land borders (Galula, 2006, p. 26).

Additionally, the terrain in which the insurgent operates significantly influences their possibility of success. Insurgents based in a country isolated by natural barriers such as deserts, mountain ranges, or seas face more challenges than those operating in more accessible terrain (Galula, 2006, p. 26). Similarly, the geographical size of the insurgent's country affects their possibility of success. Insurgents operating in large countries benefit from the greater difficulty the counterinsurgents face in maintaining control over large areas. Oppositely, insurgents in smaller countries have a disadvantage, as their activities are easier to monitor and control (Galula, 2006, p. 26).

The climate is an equally important factor for insurgents, as a diverse climate characterized by mountains, swamps, and dense vegetation increases the difficulty for counterinsurgents to locate and combat the insurgent, further enhanced if the insurgent operates in a harsh climate that the counterinsurgent forces are unfamiliar with (Galula, 2006, p. 26). The size of the population in the insurgent's country is another crucial factor influencing the potential for success. A larger population presents a greater challenge for the counterinsurgent to control (Galula, 2006, p. 26). Additionally, the rural-to-urban ratio within the country adds to the complexity of control from a counterinsurgent perspective, compared to densely populated urban countries (Galula, 2006, p. 27). However, in the context of the ongoing conflict between

Hamas and Israel, this thesis proposes an alternative perspective of the rural-to-urban ratio and its influence on successful insurgency. This proposition will be researched further in Chapter Four.

1.4.4 Outside support

The fourth prerequisite for a successful insurgency is the degree of outside support that the insurgents can acquire (Galula, 2006, p. 28-29). Galula identifies several types of beneficial outside support for insurgents. The first type is moral support, which insurgents receive without any effort on their part (Galula, 2006, p. 28). This support can manifest as international demonstrations in favor of the insurgents and opposition against the counterinsurgent. However, this thesis proposes an alternative interpretation of moral outside support, which will be analyzed in Chapter 4: “Contemporary Social Practice within the Gaza Strip: Insurgency Conditions, Strategy, and Methods.”

Furthermore, the insurgents can acquire political support, which can assert pressure on the counterinsurgent (Galula, 2006, p. 28-29). In the context of this thesis, such political support can be exemplified by accusations through international court systems, trade embargoes, and other restrictions upon Israel. Additionally, the insurgents can acquire technical support from external allies, including intelligence and guidance on insurgency tactics (Galula, 2006, p. 28). For instance, Hezbollah’s support of Hamas could involve sharing expertise on constructing underground tunnels.

Lastly, insurgents can acquire both financial and military support from supportive nations and insurgency groups. Financial outside support can both be overt and covert (Galula, 2006, p. 28), and ensures that the insurgents can invest in military equipment, finance the rebuilding of destroyed infrastructure, and keep the internal supporters engaged through the potential of income. Similarly, military support strengthens the insurgents by providing military equipment and training (Galula, 2006, p. 28-29). The described prerequisites for successful insurgency circumstances will be employed to analyze the conditions that Hamas operates within, serving as an argument as to why Hamas may require an alternative insurgency strategy.

The section above concludes the theoretical and methodological framework utilized in our analytical sections. Based on the presented theories and methodology, the authors have posed the following questions to be answered and analyzed throughout the three distinct analyses, thereby allowing for a comprehensive answer to the posed research question: How has the Palestinian-Israeli conflict evolved historically to facilitate the emergence of Hamas, and how has Hamas developed its insurgency strategy and methods to achieve its liberation cause? The questions are as follows:

Mary Kaldor - Old and New Wars:

- How has the conflict evolved historically to facilitate the emergence of Hamas considering its goals, actors, methods including international law and communication technology, and financing?

Norman Fairclough - Critical Discourse Analysis:

- What linguistic tools and discursive elements does Hamas utilize to promote its cause, and why?

David Galula - (Counter)insurgency

- What is Hamas' possibility of successful insurgency using conventional strategies and methods anchored in its cause, geographical conditions, weakness of counterinsurgent (Israel), and outside support?
- What alternative insurgency strategy and methods are applied by Hamas to achieve its cause, and how does it correlate to classical insurgency prerequisites?

To methodologically address the research question and the subsequent questions within a theoretical and methodological framework, this thesis employs a qualitative desktop approach inspired by GTM (Bryant & Charmaz 2007, p. 3). This methodological approach encompasses data gathering, coding processes (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007, p. 14-15), and ethical considerations. The qualitative desktop approach led to Hamas' Charter as the primary empirical data source, facilitating examination of the questions related to linguistics, discourse, and an alternative strategy and methods. Simultaneously, secondary sources provided a comprehensive understanding of the conflict's historical evolution to facilitate the emergence of Hamas and its possibility of successful insurgency. The following methodological sections aim to ensure transparency by detailing the guidelines adhered to in this thesis, given the controversial nature of the subject.

1.5 Analytical Methodology

This thesis adopts a qualitative research methodology. Qualitative studies arose in the historical context of colonization, with ethnographic studies emerging alongside the exploration and colonization of the New World from the 15th to the 19th centuries (Mills & Birks, 2014, p. 4). Similar to the motivations driving early explorers and conquistadors, the adoption of a qualitative approach in this thesis is driven by a desire to comprehend the “new”. In this context, ‘new’ refers to various phenomena such as new forms of warfare, new religiously motivated ideologies and identities, a new insurgency strategy and methods, and new ways to politically utilize stasis in the context of warfare.

Opting for a desktop approach facilitates the comprehension and analysis of Hamas’ insurgency strategy and methods, leading to the implementation of CDA methodology. This approach is anchored in the GTM, which serves as an inspiration for this thesis. The iterative nature of GTM initially prompted a theoretical expansion, leading to the incorporation of Mary Kaldor’s theory into the thesis (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007, p. 3). The integration of her theory necessitated secondary sources to address emerging questions, such as the evolution of financing throughout the conflict. Similarly, addressing questions based on David Galula’s theory required additional secondary sources to theoretically comprehend the identified strategy and methods occurring through the analysis. Furthermore, the linguistic tools used to analyze Hamas’ Charter were expanded based on the Charter’s characteristics, necessitating the inclusion of an additional linguistic tool as a result of the iterative GTM-inspired process.

The integration of Kaldor’s theory has been particularly significant, as applying insights from her theory on new wars to the analysis of social practice has deepened the understanding of how specific characteristics of new wars influenced Hamas’ development of its insurgency strategy and methods, which might have otherwise been neglected. The iterative approach derived from GTM was crucial in developing strategic and methodological concepts during the analysis (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007, p. 29), helping to contextualize anomalies in Hamas’ insurgency strategy and contributing to the theoretical understanding of insurgency. The qualitative desktop approach, combined with the GTM, guided the data gathering and coding processes. The considerations and reflections related to these processes are presented in the following section.

1.5.1 Data gathering and coding

To address the research question, the initial step involved gathering data through internet searches, focusing on statements and warfare activities associated with Hamas. This search identified two distinct Hamas Charters, published in 1988 and 2017, respectively. The latter was selected as the primary empirical source for this thesis due to its relevance to the current escalation of conflict in the Gaza Strip. A preliminary comparison of both Charters revealed notable similarities; however, the 2017 Charter provided more profound insights into Hamas' contemporary insurgency strategies. The main difference between the two documents is the 2017 Charter's recognition of the international community's pivotal role in achieving its liberation cause, in contrast to the 1988 Charter, which primarily appealed to the Palestinian population. In addition to the Charter, a broad range of secondary literature was identified and utilized. This literature facilitated an understanding of the historical context, statistical data on support for Palestinians, Hamas, and Israel, as well as NGO reports and statements related to the conflict.

In addition to the data collection methods, online scholarly search engines such as Google Scholar and Aalborg University Library were utilized to identify relevant scientific literature. This process followed an iterative approach, involving frequent visits to the databases throughout the study, given the eclectic theoretical approach. Finally, journalistic reports from reputable media outlets such as Al-Jazeera, BBC, and Reuters were used to obtain quantitative data on the ongoing conflict, as well as statements from relevant political figures. Sources from reputable organizations like the United Nations (UN) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provided factual information for the thesis.

The coding process was a pivotal aspect of this thesis, given its importance in GTM and its capacity to organize and systemize empirical data, thereby ensuring a comprehensive understanding of the empirical material (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007, p. 14-15). A substantial amount of time, approximately three work weeks, was dedicated to analyzing the Charter's Preamble and its 42 statements using a double coding technique. This involved individual coding by both authors, followed by a comparison of the findings to identify the most recurring and significant themes. During the coding process, numerous references to historical events, legal disputes, and conventions such as the Oslo Accords emerged, highlighting the necessity for a theoretical framework that encompasses the evolution of warfare, as provided by Mary Kaldor's theory on old and new wars (Kaldor, 2005). Additionally, a recurrent discourse on resistance indicated the demand for a strategic warfare theory related to insurgency, as provided by David Galula. Consequently, the coding efforts directed the thesis towards an eclectic approach, underscoring the necessity for a multiple theoretical approach.

To comprehend the coding process, thematic clusters were formed to identify the most significant issues for Hamas in the Charter. These thematic clusters were instrumental in developing categories within the social practice analysis, subsequently facilitating the development of the methodological concepts (Stern, 2007, p. 8). Initially, the Charter was coded using the factors prescribed in the three dimensions of Fairclough's methodological

framework, as described previously on pages 12-14. Based on the coding of the elements in the first dimension in Fairclough's three-dimensional model, the category of pathos was included as a prevalent form of appeal used extensively in the Charter, despite not being included in the model originally. Conversely, certain linguistic tools suggested by Fairclough were omitted, either due to minimal usage or absence in the Charter altogether. By coding the Charter using Fairclough's linguistic tools, we can systematically identify key sections where Hamas emphasizes its statements.

Based on Fairclough's methodology and his three-dimensional model, the coding for the second dimension adhered to the discursive elements of intertextuality, interdiscursivity, ideology, and hegemony. The coding focuses on discursive elements to identify relevant paragraphs for discursive analysis. For example, coding for intertextuality helped detect references to religious texts, enabling the authors to identify the use of religious discourse with references to the Quran and Surahs. These discursive elements are methodologically and systematically utilized to analyze how Hamas challenges Israeli hegemony through discourse in its Charter. This ensures that the sections of the Charter are analyzed based on their methodological relevance rather than personal bias (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007, p. 16). Upon conducting the coding process, it became evident that the introduction of additional external categories was unnecessary. In the coding efforts of the third dimension, the intention was to identify theoretical themes within the Charter indicative of an alternative insurgency strategy and methods. This iterative coding process, characterized by the identification of patterns and anomalies (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007, p. 15-16), involved the addition and removal of theoretical categories, as visualized in Figure 1. As illustrated in the figure, theoretical and methodological coding inspired by Mary Kaldor, David Galula, and Norman Fairclough was incorporated. The coding of the social practice dimension entailed examining the evident actions and circumstances after the October 7th attack, followed by a comparison with Hamas' Charter. This analysis aimed to determine whether the social practice could be correlated with certain elements of the Charter, to determine which aspects of the contemporary social practice Hamas has attempted to constitute. Figure 1 delineates the theoretical and methodological concepts, tools, and elements that were coded. The coding table is aligned with our analytical structure, starting with the contextualization of warfare through Kaldor's theory, progressing to a textual analysis of the Charter, and concluding with an analysis of the social practice following Galula's theory. The final column on the right highlights additional categories coded based on Hamas' Charter and its social practice. This comprehensive approach ensures coherence between theories, methodology, and analysis, thereby mitigating personal biases and ensuring a systematic approach.

Final coding categories				
Mary Kaldor - old/new wars	Fairclough 1. dimension	Fairclough 2. dimension	David Galula (Counter) insurgency	3. dimension - social practice
Actors	Ethos	Interdiscursivity	A cause	Engagement of the Palestinian population
Objectives/ Goals	Pathos	Intertextuality	Weakness of counterinsurgent (Israel)	Engagement of international society
Methods	Modality - truth & permission	Hegemony	Geographical conditions	Immobility, sacrifice, endurance, persistence
Finance	Floating signifiers	Ideology	Outside support	Resistance-against-resistance
				Communication technology

Figure 1: Table - Coding categories

Through systematic comparison, the coding resulted in the detection of several patterns and anomalies in the Charter. By carefully examining different elements, comparing them with others, and thus ultimately pinpointing the most noteworthy anomalies - or what Star aptly terms "Out of bounce" moments - the thesis was guided to explore the unexpected (Star, 2007, p. 8). This is particularly relevant when conducting inductive research with an ambition to create theoretical concepts (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007, p. 27 & 29). The anomalies were discovered through statements entailing arguments or perceptions that were 'Out of bounce' concerning the Charter's general discourse, such as the identified anomaly of Palestinian sacrifice, and its significance for Hamas to achieve its liberation cause.

1.5.2 Ethical considerations

Given the sensitive nature of the topic, the controversial aspects of conflict, and the potentially provocative scope of the study, it is necessary to include a section on ethical considerations. This section aims to ensure transparency and provide clarification on the ethical implications of the research.

While watching the news on the Danish television channel TV 2, the authors were confronted with the considerations faced by other Westerners, particularly journalists, when attempting to understand Hamas. The news anchor presented a feature on an exclusive interview with a Hamas leader residing in exile in Beirut, noting that the news station had considered whether to conduct or publicize the interview, due to Hamas' designation as a terror organization. The

authors experienced similar considerations when embarking on this thesis. The news station concluded that it was a journalistic duty to convey the perspectives of both sides of the conflict to the Danish public. Similarly, we believe that such duties are imperative in the field of social science. Ignoring or censoring Hamas out of fear of being canceled would be hypocritical and counterproductive. As Mao Tse-Tung stated “*The laws of revolutionary war is a problem that anyone directing a revolutionary war must study and solve.*” (Galula 2006, p. 9). Revolutionary war encompasses both insurgency and counterinsurgency, indicating that strategic leaders of counterinsurgency efforts must study and understand insurgents, and vice versa (Galula, 2006, p. 9). The argument serves to justify the importance of studying organizations like Hamas, despite their controversial nature. Understanding such groups is essential and contributes to the broader field of social sciences. The ethical paradox is justified by Ghassan Hage stating “*A university is a place of understanding and not condemning*”, which supports our argument for the ethical validity of this thesis (Hage, 2003, p. 67).

Another ethical consideration encountered is the potential usefulness of the thesis results for both insurgents and counterinsurgents. By revealing Hamas’ alternative and new insurgency strategy and methods, there is a slight possibility that other insurgent groups operating in similar conditions could draw inspiration from these findings and apply them in different contexts. Fairclough warns researchers about the risk of their results being used for social engineering; in this thesis, the concern is with the results being used for reverse engineering (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 30). Simultaneously, there is the possibility that exposing Hamas’ strategy could be utilized by Israel to tailor its counterinsurgent strategy, potentially exacerbating Israeli hegemony over Palestinians. Unfortunately, mitigating these possible issues seems impossible.

This concludes Chapter One, which specifies the underlying academic research gap and interests, as well as the posed research question: How has the Palestinian-Israeli conflict evolved historically to facilitate the emergence of Hamas, and how has Hamas developed its insurgency strategy and methods to achieve its liberation cause?

To theoretically address the research question, this thesis employs theories and methodological frameworks from Kaldor, Fairclough, and Galula. Methodologically, the main empirical source is Hamas’ Charter, published in 2017, with findings supported by secondary literature identified iteratively through the GTM approach. Fairclough’s methodological linguistic tools and discursive elements are used to analyze the Charter. The historical analysis of Hamas’ emergence and the social practice analysis are based on the theoretical concepts from Mary Kaldor and David Galula, supplemented by secondary literature.

CHAPTER TWO

2. Analysis

The following analysis of the posed research question is divided into three sections. To understand who Hamas is and how it is developing its insurgency efforts, it is essential to consider the evolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from a Palestinian perspective. The first section provides a historical analysis of how the Palestinian-Israeli conflict evolved to facilitate the emergence of Hamas, drawing on Mary Kaldor's theoretical framework of old and new wars, which is essential for interpreting current events. The history of the conflict has shaped the present situation, and it is challenging to explain contemporary strategies and methods without contextualizing them. The second analytical section offers a discursive analysis, enabling interpretation of how Hamas has developed its insurgency strategy and methods to achieve its liberation cause. Understanding its rhetoric is insufficient; it is crucial to understand how and why Hamas operates as it does in practice. Given the limitations of linguistics in revealing social practices, the focus of the third analytical section shifts accordingly. This section examines how social practices are evolving by Hamas developing strategy and methods for insurgency efforts, based on how social practices are constructed through Hamas' use of various discourses.

2.1 Understanding the Historical Emergence of Hamas

This section provides an analysis of the development of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, clarifying its role in the emergence of Hamas and its political influence. The analysis encompasses an examination of the Palestinian's goals, actors, methods, and forms of financing. It identifies pivotal historical events that have fueled the conflicts. To comprehend the relationship between the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the emergence of Hamas, the subsequent analysis categorizes the conflict into three distinct epochs. The initial epoch, coined 'Old Wars,' contextualizes the conflict before Hamas' inception in 1987. It is coined 'Old wars' due to the characteristics of the wars during this time. The second epoch, labeled 'Transition from old wars to new wars' spans the period from 1987 to 2005, encompassing the two intifadas and the first emergence of Hamas in the conflict. This epoch represents the transition in Palestinian characteristics from old to new wars. The final epoch, 'new war,' focuses on the period from 2005 to 2017, marking the end of the transitional period and the predominance of new war characteristics and contains a period in which Hamas managed to gain political power. These three epochs provide a targeted analysis of the historical development, facilitating an understanding of the evolution of Palestinians and Hamas warfare strategies. Concerning the research question, this analysis helps uncover how Palestinian warfare has evolved during the conflict to allow Hamas a place in the conflict.

2.1.2 Old war

The establishment of Israel & the Nakba

Palestine was under British Military occupation following the end of World War 1, and in 1922, the British Empire was granted a League of Nations mandate (Tessler, 2007, p. 34). The British mandate continued until 1947 when it was terminated to implement a partition plan for Palestine as outlined in UN Resolution 181 (Adem, 2019, p. 20). The plan proposed a two-state solution, dividing mandated Palestine into a Jewish and Arab state with Jerusalem designated as a 'corpus separatum,' to be administered internationally (Adem, 2019, p. 20). According to the plan, 56% of the territory was allocated to the Jewish state, while 43% was designated for the Arab state. Areas such as the Gaza Strip and the West Bank were to be administered by the Arab state, whereas most of the Northwestern, Northeastern, and Southern regions were to be administered by the Jewish state. For illustrative purposes, see Figure 2.




Figure 2: Geographical map after the Partition Plan in 1947.

The Partition Plan was immediately rejected by the Arab population and welcomed by the Jewish population. Following the approval of UN Resolution 181 by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on November 29, 1947, Zionist forces intensified the appropriation scheme to expel Palestinians before the Partition Plan was implemented (Spangler, 2019, p. 135; Ben-Dror, 2007, p. 1). These mass expulsions marked the inception of the 'Nakba' (The catastrophe) for the Arabs, while the 1948 Arab-Israeli war was coined "The War of Independence" by the Israelis (Mock, Obeidi, Zeleznikow, 2012, p. 1252). During the initial phase of the Nakba, Jewish militias forcibly expelled Palestinians from their land. The Palestinians, having lost most of their military resources after the Arab revolt in the late 1930s, were unable to mount significant resistance (Spangler, 2019, p. 136). The Zionist strategy aimed to secure control of

key assets essential for the development of the future Israeli state. By appropriating Palestinian territory, the Zionists ensured control over vital resources such as water and fertile land, laying the foundation for a prosperous agricultural sector. Additionally, they secured access to important transportation routes to facilitate future logistics (Spangler, 2019, p. 136).

After the adoption of the Partition Plan and the subsequent withdrawal of the United Kingdom, the state of Israel was officially established on May 14, 1948 (Adem, 2019, p. 20). The establishment immediately triggered neighboring Arab nations to deploy Lebanese, Jordanian, Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi forces to invade Israel, resulting in the second phase of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Consequently, the war transformed from a civil to a regional war. The war mirrored Israeli folklore as a David versus Goliath struggle, with the newly established Jewish state symbolized as David, against the coalition of Arab forces as Goliath. However, this analogy was somewhat exaggerated, as the Arab nations only deployed small battalions, and never unified them under a single command (Spangler, 2019, p. 137). By the end of the war in 1949, the Arab coalition's military efforts had failed, and the 44% of the land designated for the Palestinian state under UN Resolution 181 was significantly reduced. Israel now controlled 78% of the formerly mandated Palestine, while the remaining territories of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank were left under Egyptian and Jordanian control, respectively, leaving the Palestinians without sovereignty over the territory allocated to them (Tessler, 2007, p. 42). By the summer of 1949, more than 50 governments worldwide, led by the United States (US), and quickly followed by the Soviet Union, had recognized the Israeli state. Israel had joined the United Nations and gained sovereignty of 8,000 square miles of the formerly mandated Palestine (Adem, 2019, p. 20-21). The participating actors in this war were military battalions engaged in conventional battles (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2). The war was fought with the objective of territorial acquisition, with both Egypt and Jordan gaining control over parts of the formerly mandated Palestine, while Israel fought to gain control over its newly established state. Thus, the war predominantly exhibited characteristics of old warfare (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2). For illustrative purposes, see Figure 3 for a geographical map post the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.



Figure 3: Post 1948 Arab-Israeli war

The war led to the widespread destruction of Palestinian cities and villages, resulting in a significant exodus of Arab Palestinians (Adem, 2019, p. 22). More than half of the Palestinian population was expelled from their homes (Spangler, 2019, p. 10), became internally displaced persons (IDPs), or sought refuge in camps located in countries such as Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan (Adem, 2019, p. 22). Others fled to different areas within Palestine, including Nazareth, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. According to the UNCCP, between 800,000 and 900,000 Arab Palestinians either fled or were expelled from their homes (UNCCP 1961, p. 12). As the Jewish population embarked on mass immigration into Israel, Prime Minister Ben Gurion estimated that 800,000 Jewish immigrants would arrive in the country within the first four years of its existence (Spangler, 2015, p. 111). This projection is closely aligned with records indicating that approximately 700,000 Jews immigrated during this period (Spangler, 2019, p. 147). The influx of these immigrants, known as the 'new Yishuv' (Jewish immigrants past 1882), largely originated from neighboring Arab nations. According to Israeli narratives, many arrived due to perceived hostility towards Jews in these countries (Tessler, 2007, p. 34). However, alternative sources argue that particularly affluent Jewish communities, such as Iraqi Jews, were compelled to emigrate due to targeted campaigns by Israel, such as bombings in Jewish cafes in Baghdad, orchestrated to persuade them that remaining in Baghdad was unsafe (Spangler, 2019, p. 149). Zionists argue that the right to return for Arab Palestinians expelled from Israel is negated by the greater number of Arab Jews who immigrated to Israel. Similarly, they contend that Arab Jews suffered more property losses than Arab Palestinians, thus justifying their stance on matters of compensation (Spangler, 2019, p. 150). The decision to annul refugees' inherent right of return reflects a characteristic of new wars (Kaldor, 2013, p. 12).

The Palestinian defeat in the war and the Nakba stirred unrest among citizens in neighboring countries, and further conflicts seemed inevitable. Military coups took place in Syria and Egypt, contributing to political turmoil across the region (Spangler, 2019, p. 155). By 1956, tensions between Egypt and the Western powers escalated when President Nasser of Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, impacting the trading capabilities of European superpowers. Consequently, tensions grew as Egypt had previously turned to communist nations, prompting France, England, and Israel to invade Egypt (Mock et al., 2012, p. 1254). However, the allies abandoned the mission due to political pressure from the US, leading to the cessation of the conflict. Egypt regained control of the canal and reopened it for international use by 1957 (Spangler, 2019, p. 156).

The 1948 Arab-Israeli war created an opportunity for Israel to assert control over the newly established state by reducing Arab presence in the territory and securing access to land and water resources. Prime Minister Ben Gurion established the Custodian Absentee Property Department to identify and declare absentee landowners, intending to appropriate their land and assume custody over it (Spangler, 2015, p. 119). The burden of proof fell on the property owner (Spangler, 2015, p. 119, who often could not provide evidence of ownership as they had fled the area due to the Israeli appropriation initiatives. Through this scheme, Israel successfully seized 94% of involuntary abandoned property, subsequently passing or selling it to Jewish Israelis (Spangler, 2015, p. 119). This strategy achieved two of their main objectives:

the de-Arabization of the Israeli state, and the acquisition of fertile land and water resources (Spangler, 2019, p. 157-158). These objectives align with Kaldor's theory on old wars, arguing that state-building is a central objective (Kaldor, 2013, p. 3). Additionally, Israel's declaration of a 'State of Emergency' in 1948 granted it the authority to implement exceptional measures (Mehozay, 2012, p. 1). This demonstrates ambiguity in the adherence to international law, as they act in accordance, but with a self-serving twist aimed at controlling Palestinians residing in Israel without being bound by certain human rights obligations, such as fair trials (Spangler, 2019, p. 158-159). According to Kaldor, these actions indicate both respect for International Law and norms associated with old wars, as well as an attempt to circumvent obligations, characteristic of new wars (Kaldor, 2013, p. 12).

Six-Day War

At this point, a Palestinian nationalist identity was a relatively new concept, given that they had never established and governed a state. The term 'Palestinian' was primarily used by external actors to describe the inhabitants of the geographical region of Palestine and was not widely embraced by Arabs before World War 1 (Kimmerling & Migdal, 2003, p. 27). However, the term gained prominence in Arab Palestinian discourse following the UN Resolution of 1948 and the events of the Six-Day War in 1967. The flourishing of nationalist discourse extended beyond the borders of Palestine, spurred by the emergence of the diaspora consciousness, apathy, and lack of agency derived from displacement, which in turn catalyzed the emergence of new Palestinian political leadership. Fatah, a left-wing political entity, emerged within the Gaza Strip, receiving support from Syria (Spangler, 2015, p. 122), which had reignited their previous rivalry with Egypt following the dissolution of their short-lived coalition state (Spangler, 2015, p. 122). Fatah engaged in attacks against the Israeli military and civilians, justifying civilian casualties as necessary in resisting a military occupation. The UNGA endorsed these actions as a '*Legitimate struggle or forcible self-help of colonized people*' (Adem, 2019, p. 25), indicating that Palestinian resistance operated within the scope of international law, granting them certain exemptions. This warfare method aligns with the characteristics of old wars (Kaldor, 2013, p. 4). Furthermore, the war was fought based on a nationalistic ideology, with secular factions such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Fatah primarily focused on the unity and liberation of Palestinians, illustrating an additional trait of old wars.

Nasser was less inclined than the Syrians to initiate a war with Israel but remained supportive of the Palestinian cause (Spangler, 2015, p. 122). As a result, he sponsored an alternative to Fatah at the 1964 Arab League summit in Cairo, leading to the establishment of the PLO (Spangler, 2019, p. 161-162). The primary objective of the PLO was to establish an independent state, liberate Palestine, and destroy the state of Israel. Serving as an umbrella organization, the PLO comprised various military factions, including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) (Phinney, 2007, p. 50). This marked the inception of modern Palestinian armed resistance. In 1969, the PLO and Fatah merged, with Yasser Arafat assuming leadership (Spangler, 2019, p. 162). Both organizations were grounded in nationalist ideals, operating as secular organizations driven by

a nationalistic ideology aimed at establishing and developing an independent state. Consequently, their resistance efforts exhibit significant traits of old wars (Kaldor, 2013, p. 3). This argument is supported by the fact that both the PLO and Fatah received financial support from external states, a common feature in old wars (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2-3).

In 1967, tensions increased between Israel and Arab nations due to a series of events. These included the formation of defense agreements among Arab nations, the expulsion of UN forces from the Sinai Peninsula, Israel's obstruction of maritime shipping routes in the Strait of Tiran, and kindled by statements from regional leaders, including Nasser, calling for the destruction of Israel. These circumstances ultimately sparked the Six-Day War (Mock et al., 2012, p. 1254). Israel initiated combat by neutralizing the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian air forces within a matter of hours (Mock et al., 2012 p. 1258). The involvement of conventional actors employing conventional military tactics throughout the war indicates characteristics of old wars (Kaldor, 2013, 2). Despite Israel launching the first strike, its actions were framed as defensive responses to Egyptian and Syrian threats of Israeli destruction due to them mobilizing troops near the Israeli border (Spangler, 2019, p. 162). Consequently, Israel seized territory in Gaza, the West Bank, and the Syrian-controlled Golan Heights as part of its ongoing state-building and territorial expansion efforts, resulting in an additional exodus of 250,000 Palestinians and Israel's governance over the entirety of the formerly mandated Palestine (Spangler, 2019, p. 164). For illustrative purposes, see the geographical map after the Six-Day War below (Tessler, 2007, p. 43):



Figure 4: Landscape post the Six-Day War

The military triumph of Israel in the Six-Day War marked another catastrophic event for the Palestinians, who afterward resided in the territory of their ancestors while being governed by their oppressors. Despite this, the situation for Arab Palestinians remained stagnant for a period. However, dissatisfaction with Israeli occupation persisted among Palestinians, prompting a shift in the characteristics of the resistance as secularist Palestinian organizations became integral actors.

PLO and the post-war resistance

Following the Six-Day War, Jerusalem was declared the capital of Israel within the initial two weeks (Spangler, 2019, p. 174). The post-war period witnessed a continuation of colonization efforts, which led to a revolt like the reactions of the Nakba and the Six-Day War. Yasser Arafat and his secular organization PLO gained credibility in the Arab world following the success of the mythical Battle of Karameh in Jordan in 1968 (Spangler, 2015, p. 136). By this point in time, numerous Palestinian factions, including those led by Arafat, had situated themselves in Jordan due to the massive exodus following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and the Six-Day War. The presence of the PLO in Jordanian refugee camps led to periodic incursions into Israel, prompting retaliation by the IDF on guerilla camps in Karameh. Despite being outnumbered three-to-one, Arafat and his forces managed to force the Israeli military to withdraw, marking an unprecedented achievement - winning a military interaction against the IDF (Spangler, 2019, p. 178). The Battle of Karameh was fought to prevent the IDF from invading Jordan by ground forces, thus opposing the expansion of the Israeli state, which according to Kaldor indicates an old-war paradigm (Kaldor, 2013, p. 3). While the battle itself did not significantly alter the general conflict or Israeli hegemony over the Palestinians (Spangler, 2015, p. 136), it served as a pivotal event for Arafat, enabling him to acquire political and military momentum. Within a few weeks, Arafat was able to increase his forces from 300 Palestinians to 15,000 (Spangler, 2019, p. 178). Despite the absence of foreign sovereignty over the historically mandated Palestine, the PLO emerged as the political authority within the Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan and Lebanon, exemplifying their evolving role as a quasi-state actor, with similarities to conventional state actors, who are typical in old wars cf. Kaldor's theory (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2).

The authority came with significant challenges for the PLO due to their distrust of King Hussein of Jordan because he had previously controlled the West Bank. The PLO was convinced that King Hussein did not intend to support Palestinian independence but instead had intentions of regaining control of the West Bank. Conversely, King Hussein feared that the PLO aimed to overthrow his monarchy (Spangler, 2019, p. 180). The mutual distrust culminated in King Hussein launching attacks against the Palestinians, an event known as Black September, which resulted in approximately 30,000 Palestinian casualties and the expulsion of the PLO to Lebanon (Spangler, 2019, p. 180). From their refugee camps based in Southern Lebanon, the PLO continued to conduct raids into Israel, which resulted in Israel invading Lebanon in 1982 (Spangler, 2015, p. 138). Consequently, the PLO went into exile and moved its headquarters to Tunis (Tessler, 2007, p. 50). Taking advantage of this situation, Israel advanced its military operations to Beirut, targeting the Palestinian refugee camps in Sabra and Shatila (Tessler, 2007, p. 50). Israel organized the entry of Lebanese Christian

militias into these camps, the militias were fighting to uphold the sovereignty of Christianity within Lebanon, where a massacre of the Palestinian Muslims occurred, primarily killing women and children due to the PLO's departure from the camps (Spangler, 2015, p. 138). The Red Cross reported that 2,750 refugees were killed, and Israeli investigations later held General Ariel Sharon, who subsequently became Prime Minister of Israel, indirectly responsible (Spangler, 2019, p. 181). Israel's invasion of Lebanon had unintended consequences, including the radicalization of Lebanon's Shia Muslim population. With assistance from Iran, they formed Hezbollah, an Islamic resistance organization (Mock et al., 2012, p. 1257). This organization later developed close ties with a radical Palestinian organization yet to be established at this point.

The Arab summit and Israeli-Arab relations

The Arab summit in Rabat, Morocco, in 1974, recognized the PLO as "*The sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people*," thereby eliminating King Hussein's hopes of regaining any sovereignty of the West Bank (Spangler, 2015, p. 139). Subsequently, the UNGA admitted the PLO as an 'Observer entity,' manifesting its characteristic as a state actor sparked by the Battle of Karameh (Spangler, 2015, p. 139). In subsequent peace negotiations, Syria attempted to recognize Resolution 242 to reclaim the Golan Heights, a move denied by Israel. Instead, Israel continually attempted to force Palestinians and surrounding states to officially accept the Jewish state (Spangler, 2019, p. 183). Due to domestic political difficulties, Anwar Sadat, the successor of Nasser and the new president of Egypt, initiated efforts to secure the return of the Sinai Peninsula by engaging in cooperation with Israel to solidify his position in power (Spangler, 2015, p. 140). In 1979, Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty, resulting in Egypt regaining sovereignty over the Sinai Peninsula and formally recognizing Israel as a legitimate state (Spangler, 2019, p. 183). This peace treaty with Egypt marked another success in Israel's strategy to pacify neighboring Arab nations. Israel's continuous attempts to secure recognition from regional states exemplify its focus on state-building, which according to Kaldor is a trait of old war (Kaldor, 2005, p. 492).

To summarize the section on old war, the analysis identified key characteristics of old warfare from 1947 to 1987 (Kaldor, 2005: Kaldor, 2013). During this period, both Israeli and Palestinian entities, including coalition forces, engaged in traditional military confrontations with conventional military actors aimed at territorial expansion and state-building (Kaldor, 2013, p. 3). Generally, Israel emerged victorious, while Palestinian entities and coalition forces, except for the Battle of Karameh, faced continuous defeats, casualties, and displacement (Adem, 2019, p. 22). Palestinian secular organizations received financial support from regional nation-states, and the PLO sought to establish itself as a nation-state in the waiting, by governing refugee camps and gaining official recognition as the representative of the Palestinian people and an observer entity by the UN (Spangler, 2015, p. 139). Most of the battles during this period adhered to international law, with few exceptions. Geographical mappings showed that Israel successfully expanded its territorial sovereignty (Tessler, 2007, p. 43). These characteristics of Palestinian warfare strategies were predominantly aligned with old war paradigms. In Lebanon, Hezbollah emerged as a significant non-state actor rooted in Islamic resistance, setting precedents for the ideological and operational transition in

Palestinian resistance factions (Mock, et al., 2012, p. 1257). This evolution marks the transition from old war to new forms of resistance, leading into the epoch of the intifada, which will be the focus of the subsequent analysis, covering the period from 1987 to 2005.

2.1.3 Transition from old wars to new wars

Hamas' Background

By 1987, increased frustration due to intensification in land expropriation and settlement construction in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, led Palestinians to initiate riots, demonstrations, and violence against Israelis. The unrest began after an Israeli military vehicle collided with two vans carrying Palestinian workers in the Jabalia refugee camp in Gaza, resulting in four Palestinian fatalities (Abu-Amr, 1993, p. 10). These riots, known as the first intifada, lasted over five years and ceased with the signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993 (Mock et al., 2012, p. 1258). In Gaza, Hamas emerged as a direct consequence of the initiation of the first intifada, forming six days after the uprising began, (Norton, 2010, p. 452), to lead the intifada's administration (Mock et al., 2012). Hamas, an acronym for the Islamic resistance movement (Abu-Amr, 1993, p. 11), originated from the Muslim Brotherhood and religious factions within the PLO, driven by the demand for armed resistance and jihad (Spangler, 2015, p. 156). Before the intifadas, the Muslim Brotherhood refrained from armed resistance against Israelis (Abu-Amr, 1993, p. 5). The movement sought to establish an Islamic state governed by the principles in the Quran, focusing primarily on civil society work. They founded religious schools, universities, charitable organizations, and social institutions to nurture an Islamic generation. Despite these efforts, nationalistic organizations involved in resistance gained more support from Palestinians (Abu-Amr, 1993, p. 7). Strengthened by Shaykh Ahmad Yasin who founded the Islamic center (al-Mujamma' al-Islami), the Brotherhood aimed to centralize control of religious organizations and institutions within the Center (Abu-Amr, 1993, p. 7). They supported Palestinians with loans and land leasing, and, through their control of the Waqf (an Islamic trust owning 10% of property within Gaza), they gained support by leasing agricultural land and property to Palestinians (Abu-Amr, 1993, p. 8). However, the social services provided by the Brotherhood were insufficient to circumvent public dissatisfaction due to their insistence on restraining armed resistance. The Brotherhood served as the central society of the Islamic movements until the emergence of the Islamic Jihad Movement, a faction that split from the Brotherhood due to disagreement over the non-armed strategy (Abu-Amr, 1993, p. 6). Its pacifistic tactics changed as they constructed Hamas, marking the Muslim Brotherhood's first active participation in armed resistance (Abu-Amr, 1993, p. 5). It faced an ideological dilemma: Refraining from resistance would allow the PLO to gain momentum during the intifada, reducing the Brotherhood's influence. Conversely, participating in the resistance risked accusations of hypocrisy and endangering their existence. The solution was to create Hamas as an ostensibly separate organization, allowing the Brotherhood to deny any connection if Israel retaliated, leaving Hamas as their scapegoat. If Hamas succeeded and gained support, the Brotherhood could later claim affiliation (Abu-Amr, 1993, p. 11).

Hamas, in sharp contrast to the original Muslim Brotherhood, was fundamentally violent and unwilling to recognize the Israeli state's right to exist, a stance the PLO adopted in 1988 (Spangler, 2019, p. 183). This highlights the polarized Islamic and nationalist political perspectives. Hamas' primary aim of disintegration of the Israeli state indicates its adoption of new war characteristics (Kaldor, 2013, p. 3). The evolution of Hamas, along with Hezbollah in Lebanon, marked a transition from secular state actors to theocratic non-state actors, framing their resistance in terms of Islamic identity, which according to Kaldor indicates new war characteristics (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2).

Hamas' economy relied on and still relies heavily on support from foreign entities and states to advance its mission, primarily due to the limited opportunities for income generation in a declining colonized state. Matthew Levitt, a former U.S. official who specialized in counterterrorism, estimated that the majority of Hamas' budget is derived from taxation and assistance from countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf countries (Levitt, 2023). Improved relations with Iran can be attributed to Hamas' role in the intifada and, significantly, to the growing ties between Iran and the Brotherhood in Jordan (Abu-Amr, 1993, p. 16), which implicitly had close connections with Hamas. The Brotherhood in Jordan provided material and political support to Hamas. Currently, it is estimated that Iran annually supports Hamas with upwards of 100 million USD (Sayegh, O'Donnel, Howcroft, 2023).

In addition to state support, individual donations were received from various countries worldwide that sympathize with Hamas' cause, as well as contributions from international Islamic movements in Arab countries such as Jordan, Egypt, the Gulf countries, Sudan, and Iran, and the Palestinian diaspora (Abu-Amr, 1993, p. 17). The diversification of donors supporting Hamas reflects a shift from relying solely on external states, such as Egypt and Syria, which initially financed Fatah and the PLO during their development. This transformation suggests a transition from old to new warfare, as indicated by the emergence of what Kaldor coined a predatory private financing system (e.g., NGOs and diaspora networks) (Kaldor, 2013, p. 3). In modern times, technological advancements, particularly in cryptocurrency, have facilitated financial support to insurgent groups and non-state actors, including Hamas (Sayegh et al., 2023). Kaldor identifies technology as one of two overarching elements symbolic of new wars, wherein economic technology facilitates financial transfers, impacting the conflict's continuity and supporting the argument that Palestinian-Israeli warfare has transitioned into a new war paradigm (Kaldor, 2013, p. 4).

The first intifada

The riots of the intifada quickly assumed a less violent character deliberately. Instead of using deadly weapons, the Palestinians used slingshots to target Israeli military tanks, evoking the reverse imagery of David versus Goliath that Zionists had posted during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war (Spangler, 2019, p. 187). This strategic choice allowed Palestinians to utilize media platforms to expose the inequality in the military power between the two parties, portraying young civilians armed with medieval weaponry against a technologically advanced army. The evolution of non-state actors in the resistance marked an initial indication of the resistance efforts transitioning from old war towards new war tendencies (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2). In contrast

to the Palestinians' tactics, the IDF responded differently. By 1989, the intifada had resulted in 626 Palestinian casualties, 43 Israeli casualties, and over 37,000 wounded Palestinians (Spangler, 2019, p. 188). These tactics deviated from the Palestinians' historical reliance on coalition efforts and conventional military means. Palestinians no longer relied upon neighboring Arab nations, possibly due to these countries being gradually inclined to oppose them, such as the Jordanians during the Black September events and Nasser's establishment of political relations with Israel. Instead, Palestinians relied more on internal resistance, exemplified by the intifada. The prolonged duration of the intifada illustrates a tactical shift, indicating that Palestinians no longer pursued victory through military means but instead adopted a more patient approach focused on enduring and persisting aligned with Kaldor's theory on new wars (Kaldor, 2013, p. 3). The intifada did not result in Palestinian sovereignty over any part of the formerly mandated Palestine; however, it catalyzed the Oslo Accords peace negotiations.

Oslo accords

The Oslo Accords delivered signed documents by both parties, prescribing the development of a Palestinian state by 1999 (Spangler, 2019, p. 202-203). Throughout the negotiation, Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and acknowledged their right to self-determination, thereby abandoning the perspective that the PLO was a terrorist organization (Spangler, 2015, p. 162). Conversely, the PLO endorsed the two-state solution and recognized Israel's right to exist, indicating prospects for a resolution to the conflict (Tessler, 2007, p. 52). Consequently, the Oslo Accords represented a Palestinian initiative to establish the Palestinian state by gaining sovereignty of territory, while simultaneously seeking to partially dismantle the Israeli state through political and legal ways aligned with international law. The pursuit of territorial acquisition reflects characteristics of old warfare objectives, while the objective of the partial disintegration of the Israeli state signifies characteristics of new warfare (Kaldor, 2013, p. 3). Three elements were to be executed in the time between the peace negotiations and the implementation of the Palestinian state in 1999; firstly, Israel was to withdraw its military presence from select areas of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Tessler, 2007, p. 53). Secondly, the Palestinians were to establish an authority (Tessler, 2007, p. 53). Yasser Arafat left his life in exile in Tunis and returned to the formerly mandated Palestine to undertake this responsibility (Tessler, 2007, p. 53). Finally, further negotiations were required to address unsolved issues, such as establishing border lines, addressing settlements in the occupied territories, determining governance over Jerusalem, and addressing the refugees in exile (Tessler, 2007, p. 53).

However, the peace agreements failed to deliver the desired outcomes, as Israel continued their settlement endeavors. In 1993, when the Oslo Accords were signed, the number of Jewish settlers in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and the Gaza Strip, had reached 281,000, indicating Israel's lack of commitment to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state while simultaneously expanding their territory (Spangler, 2019, p. 198). Palestinians, who had expected stagnation in settlements until the finalization of negotiations, were disappointed by the continued settlements. Moreover, Palestinians continued their armed resistance against Israel, leading to Israeli disappointment with the Palestinian authorities'

incapabilities to control new warfare methods such as terrorism, which fueled further agitation (Tessler, 2007, p. 54). An incident in 1994 exemplifies the escalating tensions. A settler entered a mosque in Hebron and killed 29 Palestinians during prayer, prompting a Palestinian riot in which an additional 25 Palestinians were fatally shot by the IDF (Spangler, 2019, p. 203). In 1995, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated at a peace rally due to political discrepancies between the Israeli shooter and the minister (Spangler, 2019, p. 203). Palestinians resorted to suicide bombings further exacerbating polarization between the two entities, highlighting the involvement of various non-state actors on both sides of the conflict, further enhancing the indication of a transition towards a new war (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2). The 1999 Israeli elections represented a final effort to revive peace negotiations and honor the negotiations of the Oslo Accords. Ehud Barak of the Labor Party defeated Netanyahu and Likud (Tessler, 2007, p. 55). Barak campaigned on advancing peace talks to their final stages, a commitment he continued to conduct as Prime Minister. With the support of US President Bill Clinton, the Camp David Summit was established in July 2000 (Tessler, 2007, p. 55). However, the offer presented to Arafat and the PLO by Barak was rejected, leading to the breakdown of negotiations (Tessler, 2007, p. 55). The prominent level of agitation on both sides made it evident that the terms of the Oslo Accords could not be reached.

Second intifada (Al-Aqsa)

By the year 2000, the second intifada emerged, proving to be significantly more violent than its predecessor. Over its five-year duration, the death toll amounted to 4,300 casualties, with Palestinian fatalities outnumbering Israeli casualties by a ratio of three to one (Araj & Brym, 2024). As in the case of the first intifada, a single event caused the riots, fueled by underlying tensions caused by the events surrounding the Oslo Accords. Amidst these tensions, Ariel Sharon's decision to 'visit' the Al-Aqsa Mosque, ostensibly to investigate allegations of Muslim authorities destroying archeological sites antagonized the eruption of violence (Tessler, 2007, p. 56; Mock et al., 2012, p. 1259). The immediate response to Sharon's visit was similar to that of the first intifada, with Palestinians resorting to throwing rocks. However, the intensification of counteractions by the IDF escalated the violence beyond the levels of the first intifada (Spangler, 2015, p. 157). The participation of civilians and grassroots organizations further blurred the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, a distinction confirmed by the significant numbers of civilian casualties (Spangler, 2015, p. 157). Consequently, the line between legitimate violence and criminality became increasingly ambiguous, as the intentions of the participants were difficult to differentiate due to the lack of visible distinction separating combatants from civilians, indicating new war circumstances (Kaldor, 2005, p. 492).

During these years, Palestinian suicide bombings reached their peak (Spangler, 2015, p. 156), while the Israelis resorted to the assassination of several Palestinian figures, and obstructing food, water, and power supplies. Israeli soldiers were additionally subjected to lynching by Palestinians (Spangler, 2019, p. 205). Neither side exhibited considerations of upholding international laws during this period, emphasizing the transition toward new warfare according to Kaldor's theory (Kaldor, 2013, p. 12). In addition to the Laissez-faire approach to human rights conventions, the jihadist involvement in the intifada exemplifies characteristics of new

warfare, as it demonstrates an increase in non-state actors' participation within a resistance movement. When combined with the increasing disregard for international law, these developments suggest a gradual transition of this conflict into a new war (Kaldor, 2013, p. 4). The suicide bombings provided Israel was yet another opportunity to further expropriate Palestinian land justified under the act of national security to protect against Palestinian terrorism (Anderson, 2018, p, 7). The initiation of the separation barrier in 2002, aimed at appropriating 10% of the West Bank into Israeli territory, serves as a tangible manifestation of Israel's efforts to expand its territorial control (Spangler, 2019, p. 204). The effectiveness of the barrier in facilitating appropriation supplies is yet another example of Israel's ongoing attempts to expand its territory, aligning with Kaldor's theory on old war characteristics (Kaldor, 2013, p. 3).

To summarize the analytical sections related to the two intifadas including the Oslo Accords, reveal a gradual transition from old to new warfare paradigms. This transition is exemplified by the shift from state actors to non-state actors, with Hamas emerging as an Islamic theocratic militia conducting terrorist attacks, notably through suicide bombings (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2). Additionally, the analysis unravels a transformation in Palestinian political dynamics from predominantly secularist-nationalistic approaches to the inclusion of Islamic identity politics due to the emergence of Hamas (Spangler 2015, p. 156). Furthermore, Palestinian civilians increasingly engaged in resistance against Israeli authorities through acts of endurance, persistence, and symbolic actions such as rock-throwing, affirming the hegemony between Palestine and Israel by turning the previously framed David versus Goliath analogy upside down (Spangler 2019, p. 187). However, this civilian engagement often resulted in greater civilian casualties due to the difficulty in distinguishing between combatants and civilians, affirming Hamas' adoption of new war characteristics (Kaldor, 2005, p. 492). The Oslo Accords initially aimed to uphold an old-war paradigm by empowering the PLO through international legal mechanisms to construct viable states for both parties, thereby attempting to end the conflict while simultaneously partially attempting to disintegrate the Israeli state by obtaining territory. This objective indicates PLO has undergone a transition towards new war characteristics through their increased focus on state disintegration (Kaldor, 2013, p. 4). Overall, Palestinian factions moved away from depending on assistance from neighboring states, instead, relying on Palestinians to engage in resistance. Considering this transition, the subsequent analytical section provides a presentation of Hamas' trajectory to power, as well as an analysis of the conflict post the 2005 withdrawal of Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip.

2.1.4 New war

Hamas' trajectory to power

At the time, Palestinians had lost support and trust in their authorities due to allegations of corruption, nepotism, and the failure to achieve progress through peace agreements (Abu-Sway, 2019, p. 354). The loss of lives, deteriorating living conditions, continuous Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank, and restriction of Palestinian mobility further decreased trust in Palestinian authorities (Khalidi, 2007, p. 284). These circumstances paved the way for Hamas' victory in the 2006 elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), defeating its main political rival, Fatah (Spangler, 2015, p. 166). With the electoral win, Hamas transitioned into a political entity, placing them in a nexus between state- and non-state actors. Internally, Hamas was recognized as a quasi-government, while internationally, it faced condemnation and lacked recognition by the UN. Ultimately, Hamas symbolizes a theoretical liminal limbo of new and old wars as they are at the forefront of political- and legal agreements whilst conducting asymmetrical warfare. The election confirms the political shift among Palestinians, reflecting a growing confidence in resistance movements guided by Islamic values rather than secularist-nationalistic ideologies, characterizing new wars (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2). This transition towards Palestinian identity politics anchored in Islamic values represents an indication of new wars, as *"Political mobilization around identity is the aim of war rather than an instrument of war"* (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2). The election outcome, with Hamas receiving 44% of the votes compared to Fatah's 41% (PCPSR, 2006), highlights the ideological transition. According to Kaldor, a key aspect of new wars is that *"They construct sectarian identities that undermine the sense of a shared political community"* (Kaldor, 2005, p. 493). Hamas' emphasis on Islamic values over secular nationalistic ideology contributes to the transition towards new war characteristics. By prioritizing Islamic identity, it becomes transparent how the sectarian identities utilized and partly developed by Hamas undermine the sense of a shared political community. Thus, the 2006 elections serve as a clear manifestation of this transition, highlighting how Hamas' cultivation of sectarian identities aligns with the dynamics of new wars.

In 2010, the Arab Spring arose in neighboring countries in the Middle East, leading to Revolutionary uprisings and the overthrow of governments in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia (Spangler, 2015, p. 154). These events ignited nationalist feelings across the region, which posed a risk to Israel's interests. Within Gaza, where Hamas and Fatah had a conflict since the 2006 elections, the Arab Spring prompted the two factions to sign a reconciliation agreement, effectively ending their dispute (Mock et al., 2012, p. 1261). By 2012, the UNGA granted Palestine the status of a 'Non-member observer state' marking the first official recognition of Palestine as a state by the UN (Spangler, 2015, p. 167). This newfound status enabled Palestinians to leverage international legal mechanisms, such as the International Criminal Court, in their efforts against Israel and provided alternative resistance possibilities (Anderson, 2018, p. 10). However, it is important to note that this recognition was extended solely to the PLO through the Arab summit in Rabat, with the UN maintaining the PLO and the Palestinian Authority as the sole representatives of the Palestinians (Spangler, 2015, p.

139). Hamas, despite its electoral win in 2006, was excluded from its recognition, highlighting the international condemnation and the quasi-governmental status they face. While the independence cause is central, certain tactics, such as the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement initiated in 2005, indicate a shift towards new war characteristics, as it serves to dismantle the Israeli state by lobbying foreign governments to impose sanctions on companies supporting Israel (Spangler, 2015, p. 165 & 240). This modern strategy demonstrates how Palestinians are employing tactics that align with the dynamics of new wars, as outlined by Kaldor (2013, p. 3).

Post-election military operations

Following Hamas gaining authority in the Gaza Strip, the conflict escalated again, prompting Israel to intensify its military operations against the Islamic militant faction. These operations had devastating consequences, resulting in a significant increase in civilian casualties. Israel justified its actions as necessary counter-reactions to Hamas' strategy of launching rockets into Israeli territory (Adem, 2019, p. 35). The following sections will delve into some of the most significant Israeli-led operations in later times, providing valuable insights into the characteristics of warfare in the modern era.

Operation Cast Lead began on December 27, 2008, employing a two-step military approach. Initially, a naval and aerial bombardment of the Gaza Strip by the Israeli forces, lasted seven days within the overall 22-day operation (Adem, 2019, p. 35). The following tactical step was to deploy ground troops coordinated with naval and aerial support, targeting not only Hamas but various armed groups operating in the Gaza Strip (Adem, 2019, p. 35-36). According to a report from Amnesty International, Operation Cast Lead resulted in approximately 1,400 Palestinian casualties, with hundreds of them being civilians, including 300 children and 115 women (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 1). Amnesty International criticized Israel's operation, highlighting its disregard for International Law. The report noted that high-tech military weapons capable of precise strikes were used, suggesting that civilian casualties could have been minimized (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 1). This implies that civilians were deliberately targeted by the IDF, further indicating the disregard for international law, and exemplifying the characteristics of contemporary warfare (Kaldor, 2013, p. 4).

In 2014, the IDF launched Operation Protective Edge, prompted by the abduction and execution of three teenage Israelis, for which Israel accused Hamas. This operation escalated after Israel responded with arrests and harassment, followed by Palestinians conducting violent demonstrations, resulting in militant factions firing rockets into Israel (Adem, 2019, p. 37-38). Israel framed its actions as a defense of national security, in response to these attacks (Adem, 2019, p. 37-38). IDF conducted over 6,000 airstrikes during this operation, resulting in 2,134 Palestinian fatalities, including 1,473 civilians. Meanwhile, Palestinian armed groups fired 3,659 rockets, killing 6 Israelis (Adem, 2019, p. 37-38). These Palestinian rockets were unguided and failed to differentiate between civilians and combatants (Adem, 2019, p. 38), a violation of Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (Red Cross, 2011). Hamas' tactics, such as launching indiscriminate rockets into Israel and employing suicide bombers during the

second intifada, suggest a deliberate targeting of civilians, indicating a transition from old war focused on compliance with international laws as historically observed with Fatah and the PLO, toward new war characteristics where actors like Hamas are less concerned with conventions and protocols (Kaldor, 2013, p. 4).

To summarize the analysis of the ‘new war’ section, it becomes evident that Hamas’ emergence played a pivotal role in the transition from the Palestinian warfare approach from old to new war. Elected in 2006 based on its Islamic political identity, Hamas represents a shift from secular nationalism to Islamism, indicating a broader national consensus toward the ideological transition. However, despite its electoral victory, Hamas operates as a quasi-government due to external condemnation and lack of recognition from international bodies like the UN (Spangler, 2015, p. 139). Simultaneously, Israel adopted a new warfare approach characterized by a disregard for international laws, as illustrated by the increased number of Palestinian casualties during the conflicts (Kaldor, 2013, p. 12). Hamas continues its state-disintegration efforts through tactics such as BDS, further exemplifying the characteristics of new wars (Kaldor, 2013, p. 4). Given the status of the conflict, which shows no signs of resolution, both parties continue to engage in new warfare. These findings discovered Hamas’ emergence in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the early stages of the intifadas and indicate that it successfully managed to maintain its political position ever since, by changing the characteristics from old to new wars and maintaining the paradigm (Kaldor, 2005: Kaldor, 2013). The electoral win and the subsequent resistance efforts cement their political position as a representative of the Palestinians within the Gaza Strip and the main military faction in the continuous conflict. These historical events, including the resistance to the IDF-led operations and the electoral win, facilitated Hamas’ position of power, and thus serve as a partial answer to how the Palestinian-Israeli conflict evolved historically to facilitate the emergence of Hamas, with the new war characteristics in mind, a closer examination of Hamas Charter’ may provide insights into its future objectives, strategies, and methods.

CHAPTER THREE

3. The Hamas Discourse of Resistance

The following section provides an analysis of Hamas' Charter. The Charter helps understand Hamas and serves as a unique document that outlines how Hamas formulate its cause, defend it, and attract supporters. This thesis employs Fairclough's methodological linguistic tools related to the first dimension of the three-dimensional model to analyze the Charter. These tools include the use of pathos, ethos, floating signifiers, and the modality of truth and permission (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 16), which Hamas uses to frame and achieve its goals. Concerning the research question, this analysis helps uncover how Hamas intends to engage in an alternative insurgency against Israel, based on the epistemological understanding that text constitutes social practices.

3.1 Liberation of Palestine through the legitimization of diverse Islamic resistance practices

Hamas' Charter outlines its cause, mission, and beliefs. The main objective of the Charter is the liberation of the Palestinian people and territory through resistance against the Israeli entity referred to as the Zionist project. This objective is explicitly stated in the opening point of the Charter:

“The Islamic Resistance Movement “Hamas” is a Palestinian Islamic national liberation and resistance movement. Its goal is to liberate Palestine and confront the Zionist project. Its frame of reference is Islam, which determines its principles, objectives, and means.”
(Middle East Eye, 2017, point 1).

The quote affirms that Hamas' cause and objectives as the governing entity of Gaza are to liberate and resist. Liberation and resistance appear 16 and 14 times respectively in the Charter, emphasizing its centrality (Middle East Eye, 2017). By utilizing the words 'liberation' and 'resistance' at the beginning of the Charter, Hamas uses the terms without specification, which, aside from their political connotation, do not specify the methods used to either liberate or resist. Without context, these terms frame Hamas positively by the use of pathos, portraying them as fighting for a demographic that needs liberation from an oppressor, thus evoking emotions of empathy towards its cause. Subsequently, Hamas states that its frame of reference is Islam, suggesting that their resistance is guided by Islamic principles, possibly drawing from holy texts such as the Quran. This context shifts the resistance terminology into a floating signifier cf. Laclau and Mouffe (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 4), due to the resistance being anchored in Islam illustrated by statement 23 in the Charter:

“ Hamas stresses that transgression against the Palestinian people, usurping their land and banishing them from their homeland cannot be called peace. Any settlements reached on this basis will not lead to peace. Resistance and jihad for the liberation of Palestine will remain a legitimate right, a duty, and an honor for all the sons and daughters of our people and our Ummah.” (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 23).

As the term ‘resistance’ becomes associated with jihad, it functions as a floating signifier utilized to facilitate the liberation of the Palestinian people and land (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 36). From a Western perspective, jihad is predominantly linked to armed resistance through acts of terror (European Parliament, 2015, p. 1). However, in Islamic definition, the word has two distinct meanings: ‘*a struggle or fight against the enemies of Islam,*’ and ‘*the spiritual struggle within oneself against sin*’ (Oxford Bibliographies, 2018). According to its Islamic definition, Hamas expects the Palestinians to engage in jihad in both definitions, implying that Hamas grants permission through armed resistance while also promoting other forms of resistance (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 16; Middle East Eye, 2017, points 9 & 23). These include persistence and endurance as established as a new war characteristic of Kaldor’s theory (Kaldor, 2013, p. 3), which is applied by Hamas and Palestinians in the historical analysis of Hamas’ emergence. This interpretation is supported by the fact that Hamas only utilizes the words “jihad” and “armed resistance” once separated from each other in points 23 and 25 of its Charter, thereby allowing readers to interpret individual engagement in the cause (Middle East Eye, 2017, points 23 & 25). The strategy of broadening the scope of engagement aligns with Hamas’ efforts to establish and maintain shared identities among Palestinians and the Islamic Ummah through the usage of ethos (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 25). Establishing shared identities was affirmed in the historical analysis of Hamas’ emergence as a key objective in new warfare employed by Hamas. To validate Hamas’ permission of resistance through endurance and persistence, refer to its Charter, point 9:

“[...] It is the religion that inculcates in its followers the value of standing up to aggression and of supporting the oppressed; it motivates them to give generously and make sacrifices in defense of their dignity, their land, their peoples, and their holy places.”
(Middle East Eye, 2017, point 9).

The religious characteristics position Islam above the individual, thereby facilitating Hamas’ construction of shared identities, as their shared religion triumphs over individual preferences or beliefs, showcasing ethos according to Fairclough (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 25). Furthermore, by expecting Palestinians to engage in resistance, making sacrifices, and giving generously as an Islamic duty, Hamas attempts to persuade Muslims that they have an active religious obligation to participate in resistance. The word ‘sacrifice’ in its Islamic context is defined as ‘*The willingness to accept death and/or losing one’s interest and desires in the cause of truth*’ (Al-Adahi). This definition also encompasses resistance through enduring and persistence against the consequences of Israeli occupation, regardless of how extreme these consequences may be. To eliminate any doubt that Hamas permits a broad spectrum of resistance methods, they state that resisting the occupation by all means and methods is a legitimate right, guaranteed by divine laws and by international norms and laws:

“Resisting the occupation with all means and methods is a legitimate right guaranteed by divine laws and by international norms and laws. At the heart of these lies armed resistance, which is regarded as the strategic choice for protecting the principles and the rights of the Palestinian people.” (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 25).

The statement does not restrict the forms of resistance, giving consumers of the text permission to develop and implement their methods of resisting the occupation without fear of repercussions from Hamas, granted that these actions align with Islamic principles. This way of giving the consumer of the text permission to certain acts corresponds to Fairclough’s understanding of modality (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 26). Moreover, the statement suggests that resistance efforts related to occupation are described factually as both protected by divine- and international laws, presenting this as an uncontested truth according to the methodological understanding of Fairclough (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 26). Hamas’ appeal to the shared identity extends beyond the Palestinians residing within the Gaza Strip and other Arab Islamic countries, targeting all Palestinians globally to unify Palestinians and Arabs, according to Fairclough’s definition of ethos (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 25). This definition of Palestinian identity is portrayed by Hamas assertively and factually as *“Authentic and timeless; it is passed from generation to generation [...] and cannot be erased”* by any Israeli attempt to expropriate Palestinians outside their country of origin (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 5). Emphasizing the importance of a shared identity among Palestinians, Hamas also expresses concerns about Israeli initiatives aimed at resettling Palestinian refugees outside of Palestine and through projects of the alternative homeland:

“Hamas rejects all attempts to erase the rights of the refugees, including the attempts to settle them outside Palestine and through the projects of the alternative homeland.” (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 13).

Despite that the statement addresses Hamas’ legal concerns regarding Palestinian refugees, it can also be interpreted as limiting its resistance capacities if Palestinians are settled outside the Gaza Strip. This interpretation derives from Hamas’ insistence on the Palestinian’s responsibility to engage in resistance. However, Hamas may successfully mask such concerns by using a high degree of modality and asserting its name in front of the statement alongside the word ‘reject’, suggesting no possibility of negotiation regarding refugee resettlement, correlating with Fairclough’s understanding of modality (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 26). A recent example of resettlement attempts occurred after Hamas attacked Israel on October 7th, 2023, when the Israeli government proposed its “voluntary migration” strategy to settle internally displaced Palestinians in other countries, such as Congo (Yerushalmi, 2024). These concerns about resettling IDPs in an alternative homeland are further validated by statements from Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who declared that *“Voluntary migration is the right humanitarian solution”* and *“All Gazans must evict their homes”* (Al-Jazeera, 2023).

Given Hamas' reliance on the Palestinian population to conduct resistance against the Israeli occupation, it is evident that any resettlement would reduce its resistance capabilities. To elaborate on why Hamas would reject any alternative resettlement, they also state that they "*Reject any attempts to undermine the resistance and its arms*" (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 26). Having revealed Hamas' attempt to mask its dependence on the population for its resistance strategy behind legal concerns, it provides an analytical opportunity to uncover similar instances. Notably, Hamas uses sections of its Charter to frame its cause of liberation through resistance as a humanitarian, legal, and international concern. This is derived as Hamas employs ethos to create a shared international identity, by framing the Zionist project as racist, aggressive, colonial, and expansionist, emphasizing the seizure of Palestinian properties (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 25). This portrayal positions the Zionist project as antagonistic to the Palestinian people's aspirations for freedom, liberation, return, and self-determination (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 14). Hamas enhances this shared international identity by appealing to emotions through pathos, aiming to align international individuals, organizations, and states with the values of supporting freedom, liberation, and self-determination over racism, aggression, and colonialism. The description of the Zionist project and the Palestinian issue is presented assertively as an absolute truth, with no room for doubt or uncertainty regarding the narrative of the Zionist project as racist and aggressive, correlating with Fairclough's understanding of modality (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 26). By framing their narrative as undeniably true, Hamas may be more successful in persuading the international society that their narrative is accurate and representative of the ongoing conflict, thereby reducing both internal and external resistance against Hamas.

To summarize the textual analysis of Hamas' Charter, it is evident that resistance is a central objective of Hamas' liberation cause. All forms of resistance grounded in Islamic beliefs are permitted, fostering a shared identity among Palestinians and the broader Islamic Ummah in Arab countries (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 25). Hamas expects both the Palestinian people and the Islamic Ummah to engage in resistance and jihad, considering these actions as a legitimate right, a duty, and an honor (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 23). This engagement includes armed resistance as well as persisting and enduring the consequences imposed by Israel. Hamas emphasizes that Islam encourages its followers to make significant sacrifices for the greater good (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 9). Through the lens of Kaldor's theory, the thesis argues that sacrifice is a central component of Hamas' insurgency strategy, involving Palestinian endurance and persistence (Kaldor, 2013, p. 3). Additionally, Hamas seeks to mask its resistance efforts behind legal and humanitarian concerns, framing Israel as an entity obstructing Palestinian freedom and liberation. By portraying Israel in this manner, Hamas aims to attract Western support by contrasting itself with Zionism. The impact of endurance and persistence as part of Hamas' insurgency strategy is evident in both the historical analysis of Hamas' emergence and the text analysis. Consequently, this aspect will be further examined through social practices in Chapter Four.

3.2 Challenging Israeli hegemony through strategic use of discourses

The following section contains an analysis of the discursive practices in the Charter to analyze how Hamas develops its insurgency strategy and methods to achieve its liberation cause. The Charter is structured with specific titles addressing various aspects of Hamas' ideology and objectives. The analytical interest lies in instances where the order of discourse deviates from the norm, meaning that Hamas combines alternative discourses not usually intertwined, thus attempting to challenge the current order of discourse and social practice. The analysis utilizes Fairclough's methodological elements related to the second dimension of his three-dimensional model. This includes the use of intertextuality, interdiscursivity, and ideology to understand how Hamas challenges Israeli hegemony, through various discourses (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 15-18).

3.2.1 The resistance and religious nexus: Framing Islamic scripture to encourage resistance

The analysis will take its outset in the religious discourse that is embedded in the Charter. As previously stated, Hamas is an Islamic resistance movement with Islam as its frame of reference (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 1). The consumer of the text is made aware of the religious importance concerning Hamas' governance of the Gaza Strip. To emphasize the prominence of Islam, 18 references to denominations, gods, prophets, and sacred monuments, including those in the Preamble have been identified (Middle East Eye, 2017). An empirical example of this is illustrated in the Preamble of the Charter, as shown below:

“Praise be to Allah, the Lord of all worlds. May the peace and blessings of Allah be upon Muhammad, the Master of Messengers and the Leader of the mujahidin, and upon his household and all his companions.” (Middle East Eye, 2017, line 1).

By praising Allah as the Lord of all worlds, Hamas emphasizes its Islamic foundation to the reader of the text, asserting the monotheistic principle of Islam. This discourse draws on intertextuality to the Quran and the five pillars of Islam, particularly the first pillar, the confession of faith or 'shahada', which declares that there is no god, but Allah and that Muhammad is his messenger (Global Center for Adventist-Muslim relations, 2015; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 15). Moreover, the phrase '*Praise be to Allah, the Lord of all worlds*' is directly quoted from Surah Al-Fatihah, characterized as an Islamic holy text (Khattab). Similarly, the phrase '*May the peace and blessings of Allah be upon Muhammad, the Master of Messengers*' is a common expression in Islamic prayers, known as 'Duaa,' and relates to the second pillar of Islam (Global Center for Adventist-Muslim relations, 2015). However, the expression of the prophet Muhammad being the leader of the Mujahidin appears to be a unique addition by Hamas. This modification to include the jihadist's activities with religious legitimacy may intend to ensure religious support to those engaging in its cause of liberation through armed resistance. This interpretation is supported by the absence of similar

constructions in the Quran or other Islamic holy texts that explicitly connect the prophet Muhammad with the mujahidin as Hamas does.

This analytical finding serves as an empirical example of Hamas' use of interdiscursivity, where religious- and resistance discourses are intertwined (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 15). This merging of religion and resistance may not be uncommon for an Islamic resistance movement, as the Quran contains references to resistance and jihad (Mostfa, 2021, p. 1). However, the unique aspect of Hamas' use of interdiscursivity lies in the modification of a fixed religious discourse by including the mujahidin (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 15), thereby directly aligning with their cause and calling for engagement in resistance and jihad by the Palestinian population and the Islamic Ummah as highlighted in the text analysis point 23 of the Charter (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 23). This modification of a fixed religious order of discourse suggests Hamas' attempt to challenge the hegemonic state between Israel and Hamas through a self-established religious and resistance discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 18), aiming to recruit individuals willing to engage in armed resistance and jihad. This argument is supported by previous findings in the text analysis, which emphasized the use of ethos and the importance for Hamas in establishing and maintaining a shared Palestinian and Islamic identity among Arab nations (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 16). The following statement from the Charter further illustrates the significance of Islam concerning Palestine and Hamas' cause:

“Hamas believes that the message of Islam upholds the values of truth, justice, freedom, and dignity and prohibits all forms of injustice and incriminates oppressors irrespective of their religion, race, gender, or nationality. Islam is against all forms of religious, ethnic, or sectarian extremism and bigotry.” (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 9).

Hamas further establishes interdiscursivity by integrating religious, political, and legal discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 9-10), asserting that Islam upholds the values of truth, justice, freedom, and dignity while prohibiting injustice and incriminating oppressors. This statement challenges the secular order of discourse, by advocating for an Islamic theocracy in an independent Palestinian state, using religion as a governing tool. This finding of interdiscursivity aligns with the historical analysis of the emergence of Hamas indicating a transition from secularism to religious identity typical in new wars (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2). The emphasis on Islam's condemnation of oppressors suggests a religion-based justice system. By challenging the secularist order of discourse, Hamas appeals to the Islamic Ummah and the Arab World, integrating Islam into political discourse to align its religious and political beliefs with other Islamic theocratic states (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 9-10). This religious and political interdiscursivity is not a strategy Israel can adopt to counter Hamas and maintain hegemony, as approximately 23% of the world's population are Muslims, compared to the 0,2% that believe in Judaism (Pew Research Center, 2012). Consequently, Hamas positions itself to leverage outside support from Islamic countries to balance the hegemonic position between itself and Israel. Similar interdiscursivity of religion and politics are utilized in the following point in the Charter stating:

“The expulsion and banishment of the Palestinian people from their land and the establishment of the Zionist entity therein do not annul the right of the Palestinian people to their entire land and do not entrench any rights therein for the usurping Zionist entity.”

(Middle East Eye, 2017, point 2).

3.2.2 Framing Zionism: The opposition to liberation, freedom, and human rights - igniting international support

In addition to the religious discourse embedded in the Charter, Hamas employs an anti-Zionist discourse by consistently referring to Israel as a Zionist entity using negative connotations. This strategy attempts to align Hamas' political aspirations with Western values while framing Israel as a colonial state (Middle East Eye, 2017, points 27-34). Furthermore, Hamas states that the Zionists intend to impose hegemony on the Palestinian people. This claim is illustrated in the following statement, where political, legal, and humanitarian discourses are intertwined in an order of discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 9-10), portraying Zionism as anti-humanitarian and deviating from Western values:

“The Zionist project is a racist, aggressive, colonial and expansionist project based on seizing the properties of others; it is hostile to the Palestinian people and to their aspiration for freedom, liberation, return and self-determination.” (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 14).

The statement frames Zionism as holding ideological values that are opposite to those of postmodern Western values, such as anti-racism (Ruzza, 2007, p. 145). The interdiscursive use of an anti-Zionist discourse, often in the political domain and frequently associated with legal discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 9-10), aims to portray the Zionist entity as an antagonistic oppressor that disregards international jurisdiction. Additionally, Hamas asserts that the very foundation of Zionism is illegal:

“Palestine is a land that was seized by a racist, anti-human and colonial Zionist project that was founded on a false promise (the Balfour Declaration), on recognition of a usurping entity and on imposing a fait accompli by force.” (Middle East Eye, 2017, line 9).

Hamas references the Balfour Declaration in the Preamble of the Charter to cast doubt on Israel's legitimacy. This serves to frame subsequent Israeli settlements as inherently racist, anti-human, and colonial. By employing intertextuality, Hamas seeks to kindle a perception that Israel's establishment was based on a false promise, thus challenging the prevailing legal and political discourse that recognizes Israel as a legitimate state (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 9-10). Secondly, Hamas uses interdiscursivity by combining political, legal, and humanitarian discourses (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 9-10). Combining the discourses presents an argument that Israel was founded on a false promise, thereby challenging the legal order of discourse acknowledging Israel as a legitimate state. The delicate maneuver and attempt to challenge the order of discourse is particularly notable given Hamas' designation as a terror organization by international organizations like the EU (European Council - Sanctions against terrorism, 2024). To navigate this challenge, Hamas allocates one-fifth of the Charter

describing its ideological aspirations in democracy, pluralism, and acceptance of “the other” (Middle East Eye, 2017, points 27-34). By doing so, Hamas aims to contrast itself with Israeli’s intentions and practices, potentially increasing its chances of changing the international consensus on Israel as the sole legitimate state by recognizing Palestine as well, thus changing the international order of discourse on the sovereignty of the formerly mandated Palestine. This positioning aligns Hamas to receive outside support by presenting itself as an entity committed to ideological principles that resonate with Western values. The extensive focus on receiving outside support is a central component in insurgency theory (Galula, 2006, p. 28-29), which indicates that the anti-Zionist discourse is central to Hamas’ insurgency strategy.

Considering Hamas’ use of intertextuality, referencing the Balfour Declaration serves to emphasize the hegemonic dominance of the Zionist entity over Palestinians (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 10-11). This portrayal frames Zionism as a hegemonic ideology with political power that overrules the international legal system. Hamas opposes such circumstances in the Charter by stating that “*Rights never lapse*” (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 19). Consequently, while emphasizing the hegemony of the Zionists within an international context, Hamas simultaneously affirms the hegemonic struggle of the Palestinian people. As international rights are deprived through “*False promises*” like the Balfour declaration (Middle East Eye, 2017, Preamble line 7-9), Hamas manifests Israel’s international hegemonic stance (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 9-10). Furthermore, the anti-Zionist discourse is merged with religious discourse to attract attention from the Islamic world by portraying the Zionists as enemies of the entire Muslim world “*The Zionist project does not target the Palestinian people alone; it is the enemy of the Arab and Islamic Ummah posing a grave threat to its security and interests.*” (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 15). The anti-Zionist discourse is elevated and presented as a threat to the entire international society serving as an attempt to acquire support regardless of religious beliefs: “*The Zionist project also poses a danger to international security and peace and to mankind and its interests and stability.*” (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 15). Having analyzed the anti-Zionist and religious discourse embedded in Hamas’ Charter, the analytical focus shifts to the resistance discourse.

3.2.3 The complexity of insurgency resistance: International law versus Islam

A general search reveals that the term “resist(ance)” appears 14 times throughout the document, despite only occurring once in the headings. This discrepancy indicates that Hamas has employed interdiscursivity to integrate its resistance discourse with other discourses (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 9-10). The word “resistance” highlights a situation where one entity imposes hegemony over another, a dynamic that Hamas’ resistance discourse aims to illustrate and challenge. Within the political domain, resistance is a common discourse in international law constituted by social practices. By interdiscursively linking resistance with religion, Hamas legitimizes its methods (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 9-10). This can be exemplified by point 23 of the Charter:

“Resistance and jihad for the liberation of Palestine will remain a legitimate right, a duty, and an honor for all the sons and daughters of our people and our Ummah” (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 23).

The statement intertwines the concepts of resistance and jihad with the notion of legitimate rights typically protected within political and legal contexts, thereby establishing a right to engage in resistance based on religious grounds rather than relying solely on international law. By employing interdiscursivity between religion and resistance, Hamas seeks to challenge the political order of discourse, by using a discourse that legitimizes resistance efforts through religion, thereby appealing to and attempting to oblige all Muslims to partake in its cause (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 9-11). The rationale behind Hamas’ utilization of interdiscursivity discovered in the formulations of international law particularly the right of self-defense as outlined in Article 51 of the UN Charter: *“Any UN member country has the right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against them”* (UN, Article 51). However, Hamas’ warfare tactics may not strictly align with the criteria for self-defense, as they engage in both defensive and offensive actions, exemplified by operations such as the October 7th Al-Aqsa Flood operation. In such cases, Islam and its holy scriptures offer a broader and more interpretive basis for justifying resistance efforts. Some scholars interpret the notion of struggle in jihad as the sixth pillar of Islam, which could entail both defensive- and offensive resistance (Esposito, 2002, p. 1). This interpretation challenges the classical religious order of discourse anchored in more pacifistic connotations, thereby contradicting its stance in point 8 stating that *“Islam is a religion of peace and tolerance”* (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 8). By framing resistance efforts within religion, Hamas seeks to legitimize politically illegitimate means through Islamic justification. This shift in the resistance order of discourse aims to gain outside support from Muslims, encouraging active participation in the resistance which is encapsulated by the following statement:

“Resisting the occupation with all means and methods is a legitimate right guaranteed by divine laws and by international norms and laws. At the heart of these lies armed resistance, which is regarded as the strategic choice for protecting the principles and the rights of the Palestinian people.” (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 25)

In addition to attracting outside support and legitimizing illegitimate resistance measures, interdiscursivity serves another significant purpose by linking resistance efforts with Islam. This linkage creates a cause that transcends mere resistance to occupation, colonization, and statelessness by grounding the resistance in theology. By anchoring resistance in Islam, Hamas aims to establish a foundation for the Palestinian population to endure and persist struggles. This is further illustrated by points 23 and 7:

“[...] It is the land of people who are determined to defend the truth – within Jerusalem and its surroundings – who are not deterred or intimidated by those who oppose them and by those who betray them, and they will continue their mission until the Promise of Allah is fulfilled.” (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 7).

To summarize the discursive analytical section, the analysis identified religious, anti-Zionist, and resistance discourses as the primary themes in the Charter (Middle East Eye, 2017). The analysis of the religious discourse revealed Hamas' strategic use of interdiscursivity and intertextuality to mobilize support for the cause of liberation through resistance (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 15-16). By interdiscursively combining religious and resistance discourses, Hamas seeks to frame Islamic holy texts, in a way that encourages Mujahidin to engage in armed resistance and jihad to challenge Israeli hegemony. Additionally, Hamas challenges the secularist order of discourse by portraying Islam as a religion that incriminates injustice and oppression (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 9). This strategy aims to appeal to like-minded Islamic theocratic states for outside support to challenge Israeli hegemony, aligning with Galula's theory that outside support is a prerequisite for successful insurgency (Galula, 2006, p. 28).

The analysis of the anti-Zionist discourse found that Hamas strategically employs interdiscursivity by intertwining anti-Zionist discourse with political, legal, and humanitarian discourses to establish an order of discourse framing Zionism as anti-Western due to its colonial and racist character (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 15-16). This strategy aims to obtain outside political and moral support internationally as a prerequisite for successful insurgency according to Galula's theory (Galula, 2006, p. 28), by exposing Israeli violations of international law and human rights, thereby challenging Israeli hegemony over Palestinians (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 17). By framing the Palestinian struggle as a resistance against Zionist oppression and colonialism, Hamas seeks to rally global sympathy towards itself and condemnation against Israel's actions through relatable political ideologies such as democratism and pluralism.

The analysis of the resistance discourse established that Hamas strategically employs interdiscursivity to anchor and legitimize its resistance efforts within Islam rather than international law (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 15-16). This strategic choice derives from the fact that Hamas' offensive resistance lacks international legal backing but finds validation through Islam (Esposito, 2002, p. 1). Ultimately, Hamas challenges the classical order of discourse and establishes its own through the interdiscursivity of resistance and religious discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2011, p. 9). By doing so, Hamas appeals for outside support through similar theocratic entities and individuals as a prerequisite for successful insurgency according to Galula's theory (Galula, 2006, p. 28). Furthermore, it was established that Hamas suggests its resistance method of endurance and persistence of suffering and vulnerability, to leverage international political pressure and gain outside support, utilizing communication technology mentioned as a new war characteristic in Kaldor's theory (Kaldor, 2013, p. 4).

CHAPTER FOUR

4. Contemporary Social Practice Within the Gaza Strip: Insurgency Conditions, Strategy and Methods

As shown in Chapters Two and Three, the Palestinian population has had a central role and responsibility in resisting occupation and engaging themselves in conflicts since the intifadas to facilitate the possibility of a sovereign Palestinian state. Further, it was established that Hamas utilized the Charter to manifest the Palestinian people's role in resisting Israeli occupation. Hamas anchors its expectations toward the Palestinian people in modified and interpreted Islamic divinity, describing resistance and jihad as a duty and honor, combined with the Islamic expectation for them to make sacrifices and give generously. Hamas continues the people-centric strategy anchored around persistence, endurance, and armed resistance to achieve its cause of liberation. The following section will analyze how Hamas' continuous people-centric strategy emerges through new social practices as an alternative insurgency strategy. Applying the lens of social practice and the new order of discourse intertwining resistance and religion, the struggles of the Palestinian people can be interpreted as a deliberate strategy applied by Hamas. Based on this interpretation, this thesis suggests that if Palestinians persist and endure the struggles perpetrated by Israel, Hamas can leverage international political pressure by exposing Palestinian suffering to gain support. This perspective finds support in Kaldor's theory on new wars, which emphasizes the role of communication technology used to spread fear through acts of terror. However, we propose a shift in this argument, suggesting that communication technology is instead used to broadcast persistence and endurance of suffering and vulnerability. However, before analyzing the usage of an alternative insurgency strategy and methods, we start by analyzing if such is necessary by accounting for Hamas' possible success through classical insurgency strategies prescribed by Galula's theory as an attractive cause, favorable geographical conditions, a weakness in the counterinsurgent, and outside support.

4.1 Hamas' insurgency conditions


The analysis reveals Hamas' insurgency conditions through the lens of the classical insurgency theory provided by Galula (Galula, 2006). The section starts with an analysis of the geographical conditions, as these may be particularly important considering that Hamas cannot change the landscape, its borders, and the terrain in which they are forced to operate. Subsequently, attention shifts to an analysis of Hamas' cause, followed by an analysis of the weakness of Israel in countering insurgency. Lastly, the section delves into the dynamics of outside support.

The location from which Hamas operates is a crucial factor in determining its likelihood of success against Israel (Galula, 2006, p. 26). Situated in the Gaza Strip, bordering Israel, Hamas faces exposure to counterinsurgency as opposed to bordering countries that sympathize and support Hamas' cause. Additionally, Hamas' geographical weakness is further enhanced by the

fact that the Gaza Strip borders the Mediterranean Sea, as maritime borders are easier for Israel to control compared to a land border (Galula, 2006, p. 26). Conversely, the Gaza Strip shares a border with Egypt, serving as an advantage for Hamas given Egypt's historical support towards its cause of liberation, with few exceptions. However, the Palestinian-Egyptian border spans only 13 kilometers (cia.gov, 2024), making it easier for Israel to monitor compared to a longer border, which reduces its strategic value for Hamas cf. Galula's theory (Galula, 2006, p. 26).

The spatial constraints within the Gaza Strip present significant challenges for Hamas, hindering the likelihood of successful insurgency. Occupying an area of only 360 square kilometers (cia.gov, 2024), Hamas' operations are confined within a limited territory, making it easier for Israeli authorities to locate and combat them (Galula, 2006, p. 26). For further illustration of the country sizes, see Appendix 1. The climate proves to be unfavorable for Hamas as well, as it is neither characterized by swamps, mountains, or dense vegetation that could challenge Israeli forces cf. Galula's theory (Galula, 2006, p. 26). To make geographical circumstances worse, the Gaza Strip has a small population of 2,100,000 Palestinians with 77,6% concentrated in urban areas (cia.gov, 2024), as opposed to favorable conditions if it was a large country with a large population scattered in rural areas (Galula, 2006, p. 27-28), thereby making it easier for Israel to locate and combat Hamas and its insurgents.

As geographical conditions prove unfavorable for Hamas to succeed in its insurgency cf. Galula, the analytical focus shifts to its cause and a potential weakness in the counterinsurgent. The theory prescribes that an anti-colonial cause can strengthen the insurgent, as it encompasses a combination of political, social, economic, racial, religious, and cultural factors that diversify the attraction of supporters (Galula, 2006, p. 18). As revealed in the text analysis of the Charter, Hamas' cause is to liberate Palestine and confront the Zionist project through resistance, proving an anti-colonial cause (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 1). However, the perception of this anti-colonial cause is a matter of perspective. While some Arab and Muslim nations may sympathize with Hamas' perspective, other international actors may view Israel as the legitimate sovereign state of the formerly mandated Palestine. Examining the recognition of Palestine and Israel by various states in the international community highlights Hamas' different levels of support. While Hamas may receive support from Arab countries, they encounter opposition in the Western world. If Hamas had support and recognition from key members in the UN Security Council with veto power, one could argue for a strong anti-colonial cause backed by political influence. Figure 5 illustrates the countries that recognize Hamas, Israel, or both to indicate the international consensus or lack thereof regarding Hamas' anti-colonial cause (Dickert, 2024).



Galula's insurgency theory further prescribes that the success of Hamas depends on the weaknesses of Israel (Galula, 2006, p. 19). However, applying this theory to Hamas' situation reveals certain complexities. On one hand, Hamas has demonstrated an ability to attract and mobilize support from various Muslim and Arab nations. According to Galula's theory, the prolonged existence of Hamas, with a cause attracting supporters indicates a weakness of the counterinsurgent (Galula, 2006, p. 13-14). This suggests a potential weakness of Israel, as Hamas garners widespread solidarity among populations who view the Palestinian cause as just and legitimate. Conversely, opposition to Hamas' belief that the Palestinians are the rightful owners of the territory, from other states and international actors, mitigates the perceived weakness of Israel.

Following the theoretical prerequisites for a weakness of the counterinsurgent, the theory prescribes that such a weakness is contingent upon national consensus regarding Israeli military actions against Hamas (Galula, 2006, p. 19). A survey recently published by the newspaper 'The Times of Israel' revealed that over 80% of respondents stated that the IDF had done a 'good job' in their war against Hamas (Staff, 2024). Given the prominent level of national consensus at the current moment in time, it is difficult to argue for a weakness on the part of Israel. Similarly, this argument extends to the Israeli leader's knowledge of counterinsurgency warfare (Galula, 2006, p. 29). Israel has extensive experience in combating insurgents throughout history, as presented in the analysis of the historical emergence of Hamas.

Regarding outside support as a prerequisite for successful insurgency, Hamas has primarily relied on financial, military, and technical support from other Arab Muslim countries recognizing its anti-colonial cause, such as Iran and Lebanon. However, such support has not been sufficient to sway the conflict in favor of Hamas and Palestinians throughout history. Thus, we contend that this level of outside support is insufficient for Hamas to succeed in its insurgency against Israel in contemporary times. This serves as an argument for Hamas to adapt

its approach by focusing on a broader spectrum of outside support. This approach was illustrated in the textual analysis, with Hamas' emphasis on the Palestinian's responsibility to endure and persist consequences to facilitate outside moral support.

As established, the conditions for Hamas are inadequate to successful insurgency according to Galula's theory. No geographical factor favors Hamas except for the 13-kilometer border stretch with Egypt (Galula, 2006, p. 26-27). Moreover, Hamas lacks universal backing for its anti-colonial cause, and there are no significant weaknesses detected in Israel. Lastly, the acquired outside support has been insufficient in swaying the conflict in favor of Hamas. This serves as an argument for the necessity of Hamas to employ an alternative insurgency strategy and methods. Despite the challenges, Hamas has been able to gain momentum in its insurgency against Israel in recent times, illustrated by increased international criticism and condemnation. This indicates that Hamas has applied an alternative strategy and methods, which the following analytical section intends to unravel.

4.1.2 The immobility strategy

Despite the inability to identify circumstances facilitating successful insurgency for Hamas according to Galula's theory, recent events, such as the October 7th attack, have prompted numerous states to condemn and criticize Israel for what they perceive as genocidal and disproportionate measures (Al-Jazeera, 2023). This international condemnation serves as a weakness for Israel. Galula's theory prescribes that a counterinsurgent can be weakened due to internal factors such as lack of national unity and knowledge on counterinsurgency (Galula, 2006, p. 19), while failing to explain how an external insurgent can enforce a weakness upon it as shown through international condemnation and criticism.

This analysis argues that such weakness stems from Hamas' alternative insurgency strategy, which utilizes Palestinian immobility as a strategy to facilitate accusations of genocide against Israel. The initial step to manifest condemnation and criticism toward Israel's response was to instigate a military conflict. Through the Al-Aqsa Flood operation on October 7th, Hamas achieved the highest Israeli casualty count in a single attack throughout the conflict. The strategy implies that Hamas anticipated that Israel would opt to defend itself, as permitted by UN Article 51 and as experienced throughout its historical conflicts (UN, Article 51). However, this is when the unfavorable geographical conditions became cynically favorable. Given its limited spatial area and high urbanization ratio, Israel's retaliatory response against Hamas inevitably resulted in civilian casualties among Palestinians. Since October 7th, Israel has been responsible for the estimated deaths of 32,552 Palestinians (Tanios, 2024), prompting international condemnation, criticism, and accuse of genocide. Had geographical conditions been favorable according to Galula's theory, the Gaza Strip would be a larger country and possess a greater ratio of rurality (Galula, 2006, p. 27). Had such been the case, Israel's response would have resulted in fewer Palestinian casualties, potentially mitigating criticism, condemnation, and accusations of genocide. However, the unfavorable geographical conditions, as perceived in classical insurgency theory, paradoxically favor Hamas' alternative insurgency strategy and pursuit of outside support. High casualty figures alone are insufficient;

documentation and exposure of atrocities are also essential. Thus, Kaldor's emphasis on communication technology as a prerequisite for new wars becomes important. Here, communication technology serves as a potent tool to expose the vulnerabilities inflicted by Israel as human rights violations, thereby effectively mobilizing outside moral and political support from the international community.

As established in the analysis of the historical emergence of Hamas, its (and the Palestinian) cause has traditionally relied on outside support, in the form of financial, technical, and military resources primarily from countries like Iran and Lebanon. However, following Israel's response to the October 7th attack, Palestinians received not only their usual support but also newfound moral outside support from North American and European nations, which had previously failed to recognize Palestine. The evolution of outside support is attributed to the effect of communication technologies combined with the utilized immobility strategy facilitated by Gaza's high ratio of urbanization and closed borders. According to Galula, this diminishes the importance of a cause as people are forced to pick sides (Galula, 2006, p. 19). Hence, Hamas managed to diminish the weakness in its anti-colonial cause not being perceived similarly in the Western World as it is in the Islamic. While insurgency theory suggests that insurgent groups receive moral support without asserted effort (Galula, 2006, p. 28), this thesis argues that Hamas actively cultivated moral outside support deliberately by exploiting Palestinian immobility and the inflicted consequences that were effectively publicized through modern communication technology and resulted in widespread pro-Palestinian demonstrations worldwide.

The mechanism through which Hamas capitalizes on Palestinian immobility comprises political outside support and geographical conditions. As stated, Hamas' only geographical condition favoring them was its border with Egypt. For a demographic to be considered immobile, border closures preventing outward movement are imperative. In response to the October 7th attack by Hamas, Egypt opted to close its borders shortly thereafter (BBC, 2023). Egyptian president Abdel Fattah has opposed reopening its border, calling it a 'red line', that if crossed, would 'liquidate the Palestinian cause' (Kayal, 2024). Similarly, UNHCR has corroborated Egypt's stance, stating that it would be catastrophic for both Egypt and Palestinians, whom UNHCR insinuated would likely not be allowed to return (Kayal, 2024). The political decision to close the border serves as an Israeli weakness, as it forces a delicate balance between avoiding civilian casualties clustered in urban areas and pursuing Hamas militants responsible for the 7th of October attack. With Egypt's border being closed, attention turns to Israel's border as a potential outlet for Palestinian immobility. However, the prospect of opening the Israeli border to Palestinian emigration remains improbable, given concerns that sympathizers of Hamas' anti-colonial cause could pose security risks to Israel. A Reuters poll conducted three months after the October 7th attack revealed that 72% of respondents within the Gaza Strip and the West Bank believed Hamas' decision to launch the Al-Aqsa Flood operation was correct (PCPS, 2023, p. 4). Ultimately, all borders gating the Gaza Strip and the Palestinians remain closed, enforcing immobility upon the Palestinians. This leads to the question of whether Hamas, driven by desperation, would deliberately exploit Palestinian immobility to facilitate a threat of genocide to gain outside support.

Given the first two analyses, the representativity of the Palestinian population within the Charter, and the extensively applied resistance discourse, it is evident that their active involvement and support within Gaza is pivotal for Hamas to achieve its liberation cause. If a majority of Palestinians had fled the Gaza Strip, they would not be able to engage in resistance and endure the consequences inflicted by Israeli actions, and not be facilitative of outside moral and political support. Such a scenario would by default diminish Hamas' cause and hinder its immobility strategy. Israel has acknowledged Hamas' immobility leverage, as illustrated in Benjamin Netanyahu's statements urging civilians to leave the Gaza Strip, countered by Hamas' response telling them to remain:

"I regret, and the people of Israel regret any civilian casualty - even one. We target the rocketeers, we target Hamas and Islamic jihad, terrorists. [...] We want to go in there, and clean it up so that we are safe. In the course of doing that, we have to go into densely civilian populated areas. We ask the population - leave. We ask them again and again. We call them up, we text them messages - Hamas says 'Don't leave'. We forbid you to leave - so Hamas is using these people, these civilians as a human shield" (BBC, 2014).

The statement highlights the significant strategic advantage that Hamas has attained by capitalizing on Palestinian immobility. Despite a majority of surveyed Palestinians agreeing with Hamas' October 7th attack well knowing of its consequences, one might suspect that some Palestinians would not accept their current state as immobile targets until a political resolution is achieved due to the consequences inflicted by Israel. Nevertheless, given Hamas' reliance on Palestinian immobility, one could anticipate Hamas' readiness to resist internal resistance. With that in mind, the statements in the Charter can be analyzed through a new lens of social practices indicating the extreme measures Hamas might adopt to suppress any internal resistance to sustain its alternative insurgency strategy.

4.1.3 Resistance-against-resistance method

When considering Hamas' alternative insurgency strategy of Palestinian immobility, it becomes apparent that transgression against the Palestinian people does not occur in isolation at point 23 of the Charter. Instead, it is a combination of transgression, usurpation, and banishment that 'cannot be called peace':

"Any transgression against the Palestinian people, usurpation of their land, and banishment from their homeland cannot be called peace" (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 23).

The prospect of usurpation and banishment poses a challenge to the alternative insurgency strategy reliant on Palestinian immobility, as Palestinians would be unable to engage in resistance. The statement can be interpreted as any transgression upon the Palestinian people conducted by Hamas is not something that challenges its objective of liberation. Instead, it ensures that the Palestinians do not attempt to oppose Hamas, thus allowing the resistance against 'the Zionist entity' to continue. To contextualize the resistance-against-resistance

method used to maintain its insurgency strategy, various instances throughout Hamas' governance can be highlighted. Within its Charter, Hamas explicitly rejects any efforts that undermine its resistance capabilities (Middle East Eye, 2017, point 26). By this rationale, Hamas reserves the right to reject any Palestinian individual attempting to oppose it, as such actions would undermine its resistance capabilities, given its dependency on Palestinians. This interpretation is validated in an interview conducted by MEMRI, featuring Palestinian demonstrators protesting their living conditions:

“This is a revolution of the hungry, the revolution of the people of the Jabalya refugee camp, the revolution of the people of the northern Gaza Strip. [...] Someone from Hamas came to us.. You hear it? They are shooting at people.. Hamas are firing at hungry people who do not have food in their homes. Have they no shame? They got us into a war we do not want. We want peace. [...] Why is Hamas doing this? They are shooting at people. Why? Because they are hungry? [...] Sinwar, what gives you the right to kill your own people? Sinwar, it is you that is killing us, not the Israeli army. It is you who is killing us. Shame on you, Hamas. Listen to this. This is directly shooting. While I am talking to you, Hamas is shooting at hungry protesters.” (MEMRI, 2024).

The interviewee is concerned with Hamas' shooting at Palestinian protesters, raising the question of what gives Yahya Sinwar (the leader of Hamas) the right to kill his people. However, considering the previous analysis, any protest or objection inside the borders of the Gaza Strip towards Hamas could potentially be perceived by Hamas as an obstruction to its resistance efforts. Additionally, a report by Human Rights Watch titled ‘Two authorities, one way, zero dissent,’ documents 150 interviews and 86 cases of violent repression by Hamas against Palestinians protesting living conditions or expressing opinions against the ruling of Hamas (Human Rights Watch, 2018). The report includes accounts of arrests and physical abuse as punitive measures against demonstrators:

“In both the West Bank and Gaza, once people are placed in detention they are subjected to routine beatings, threats, taunting, coercion, and in many cases torture. The most common tactic used by Palestinian authorities is called ‘shabeh’ or positional torture.” (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

Overall, these reports indicate that Hamas operates as an authoritarian regime, suppressing Palestinians who resist Hamas' methods and actions. By protesting Hamas, Palestinians may signal a lack of unity in objectives between the Palestinian population and Hamas to the international community, which could reduce the moral support they have managed to acquire through Palestinian immobility. Further examination of Hamas' governance in the Gaza Strip since 2006 reveals instances of systematic violence against Palestinians, particularly concerning Hamas' resistance capabilities. Palestinians have been subjected to punishment, including execution, for providing intelligence to Israel (Al-Jazeera, 2022). As Hamas continues to leverage Palestinian immobility and suffering to acquire a wide spectrum of outside moral and political support while resisting internal resistance, we argue that the alternative insurgency strategy risks reaching a tipping point, potentially leading to increased

internal resistance against Hamas. The x-axis of the figure begins with the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, from which Palestinians have experienced Israeli-inflicted consequences. This marks the beginning line of internal resistance to immobility strategy hypothetically increasing, due to a combination of immobility and consequences experienced. The y-axis illustrates that internal resistance will increase gradually correlated to the evolvement of the conflict unless Hamas manages to ease either immobility or inflicted consequences. The model shows that Hamas agreeing to ceasefire negotiations with Israel, decreases internal resistance against Hamas, as Palestinians experience fewer consequences inflicted by Israel. For illustration, see Figure 6 below.




Figure 6: Illustration of the tipping point in Palestinian support of Hamas strategy and methods

In a hypothetical scenario where Hamas faces significant backlash from the Palestinian population due to its actions, its reliance on an insurgency strategy predicated on Palestinian immobility to exploit a perceived genocidal threat would likely diminish in effectiveness. This reasoning stems from the expectation that Palestinians, feeling oppressed by Hamas' leadership, would turn against both the organization and its strategy. To navigate the delicate balance between temporarily persisting Israeli-inflicted consequences to garner outside support through communication technology and reaching a tipping point, Hamas strategically leverages newly acquired outside moral and political support. This leverage is used to demonstrate a willingness to engage in negotiations for political solutions and ceasefires, ostensibly in a masked concern for the well-being of the Palestinian population. Such a move is likely aimed at mitigating the risk of escalating internal Palestinian resistance. For instance, on May 6, 2024, Hamas officially announced its acceptance of ceasefire proposals from Egypt and Qatar, which were celebrated by Palestinians (Salman, Edwards, Anderson, Diamond, 2024). However, Israel countered by stating that Hamas had not met the requirements of the ceasefire and

reiterated its commitment to its offense (Salman et al, 2024). Considering Hamas' potential concern of reaching a tipping point within the internal support, Hamas may seek to redirect internal Palestinian resistance and frustration towards the Israeli entity. Ultimately benefiting Hamas by reuniting Palestinian resistance through either endurance and persistence or armed resistance.

To summarize the social practice analysis and answer the research question of how Hamas has developed its insurgency strategy to achieve its liberation cause, this thesis suggests that Hamas utilizes an alternative insurgency strategy centered around Palestinian immobility. This strategy is an alternative approach to traditional insurgency tactics and is shaped by Hamas' unfavorable circumstances (Galula, 2006). These include geographical limitations, closed borders, and urbanization, which collectively provide a context wherein Hamas can leverage immobility to expose the suffering and consequences inflicted by Israel. The aim is to acquire moral and political support from external entities, including states and demographics that have previously failed to recognize the Palestinian cause, thus strengthening Hamas' geopolitical position. Moreover, Hamas encounters internal resistance to its people-centric strategy, leading to the emergence of a method called 'resistance-against-resistance.' This method aims to maintain internal cohesion and compliance while safeguarding Hamas' capacity for resistance. However, it is contended in this analysis that the immobility strategy, coupled with the resistance-against-resistance method might reach a tipping point which leads to increased internal resistance against Hamas. To mitigate this risk, Hamas utilizes outside moral and political support it has garnered to engage in political negotiations and ceasefire agreements, in a masked concern for its population's well-being. This strategic shift exploits Hamas' unfavorable conditions to its advantage, ultimately rendering them favorable. Hamas deliberately forces moral support through immobility and communication technology, despite the classical insurgency theory prescribing that moral support is granted without effort.

CHAPTER FIVE

5. Conclusion

The concluding section of this thesis addresses the research question posed in the introduction: How has the Palestinian-Israeli conflict evolved historically to facilitate the emergence of Hamas, and how has Hamas developed its insurgency strategy and methods to achieve its liberation cause?

To answer the research question, this thesis adopted an eclectic theoretical approach constituted by Mary Kaldor, Norman Fairclough, and David Galula's theories and methods. Methodologically, this thesis drew inspiration from GTM and its inductive and iterative approach which facilitated a qualitative desktop approach. Conclusively, the following answer to the posed research question is divided into two parts. Part one answers the initial part of the research question based on the analysis of the historical emergence of Hamas by utilizing Kaldor's theory, and part two answers the second part based on the discursive- and social practice analysis utilizing Fairclough methodology and Galula's theory.

- 1) How has the Palestinian-Israeli conflict evolved historically to facilitate the emergence of Hamas?

The evolution of Palestinian warfare from the establishment of the Israeli state until 1987 largely adhered to the characteristics of conventional warfare, associated with 'old wars' by Kaldor. The conclusion stemmed from the Palestinian cause being predominantly fought on nationalist ideology, with traditional military forces and support from coalition forces of neighboring Arab states. Additionally, the objective was state-building through territorial acquisition to achieve its cause of liberation financed through regular state support. The final argument for the old war paradigm is the Palestinian compliance with international law, as opposed to the modernized approach adopted by factions like Hamas.

The intifadas marked a pivotal transition in the Palestinian warfare tactics, facilitated by the emergence of Hamas symbolizing a divergence from the old war characteristics. This transition was emphasized by the rise of non-state actors central to the new insurgency tactics, which endorsed a theocratic ideology in contrast to the previously dominant secular approach. Furthermore, the conflict increasingly deviated from traditional combats on battlefields between conventional combatants, instead, tactical reliance on suicide bombers and civilian participation was observed. An identified strategic evolution was the transition from the attempts to defeat Israel using military force to a strategy encompassing endurance and persistence of the inflicted consequences. This transition emphasized the importance of obtaining moral support from international actors, indicating the first strategic pivot towards outside support. The strategic- and tactical prioritization of civilian engagement in the resistance during both intifadas led to a rise in civilian casualties, exacerbated by the blurred lines between combatants and non-combatants. Hamas' tactical approach, characterized by

deliberate attacks on Israeli civilians, signaled a lack of concern regarding adherence to international law.

The completion of this transition was finally supported by Palestinian efforts aimed at disintegrating the Israeli state, as exemplified by their involvement in the Oslo Accords peace negotiations. This tactical focus on disintegrating Israeli sovereignty in these regions through legal means reflected a departure from previous strategic objectives centered solely on state-building through the expansion of territory.

2) How has Hamas developed its insurgency strategy and methods to achieve its liberation cause?

Based on the textual analysis, it was concluded that Hamas perpetuated a historical people-centric strategy in its Charter. This conclusion stemmed from statements expecting Palestinians to engage in resistance permitted either through endurance and persistence, or armed resistance, justified by Islamic principles. This justification demonstrates Hamas' extensive efforts to establish and perpetuate a shared Palestinian identity in opposition to Israeli occupation. Utilizing assertive language and multiple modalities, Hamas aims to persuade readers that resistance represents the sole acceptable means of achieving liberation. The word 'resistance' functioned as a floating signifier throughout the Charter, enabling Palestinians to engage in resistance on Islamic terms. The overarching message is that Palestinians must partake in resistance due to the responsibility anchored in an Islamic duty. Drawing on the discursive analytical section, Hamas demonstrates the use of interdiscursivity and intertextuality by merging religious and resistance discourses to ground its resistance efforts in Islamic texts. By anchoring resistance in religious discourse, Hamas appeals to similar theocratic states and entities for outside support. Moreover, Hamas legitimizes its resistance through Islam rather than international law, as the latter does not encompass or legitimize its full spectrum of resistance tactics. Beyond resistance discourse, Hamas employed an overarching anti-Zionist discourse, utilizing interdiscursivity across political, legal, and humanitarian discourses to depict Zionist hegemony as anti-humanitarian and anti-Western. This strategic use of interdiscursivity aligns Hamas with Western values in contrast to Zionist values, making the organization more relatable and accessible to outside support. In conclusion, the linguistic tools and discursive elements of Hamas' strategy are anchored in outside support and facilitate new social practices by challenging pre-established orders of discourse.

In the context of Hamas' adoption of an alternative insurgency strategy, Palestinian immobility emerged as the pivotal strategic component. This strategic shift was prompted by unfavorable conditions for classical insurgency tactics. These conditions include geographical constraints such as climate, population density, urbanization, and limited spatial area. Furthermore, historical challenges in garnering widespread international political support for its cause, coupled with Israel's proficiency in and understanding of counterinsurgency, pose additional hurdles. These factors underscore why Hamas has opted for an alternative insurgency strategy and methods. This strategy is called the 'Immobility strategy' and was facilitated by Hamas' initiation of the attack on October 7th, 2023, compelling an Israeli military response due to its

impact which led to the closure of the neighboring Egyptian border. Consequently, Palestinians are forced to endure and persist the consequences of Israel's response or engage in armed resistance, benefiting Hamas' resistance capabilities either way.

The strategy capitalized on unfavorable insurgency conditions, such as the densely urbanized population, resulting in increased Palestinian civilian casualties. Consequently, this garnered outside moral and political support, facilitated by communication technology as a tool to expose atrocities and violations of international law to the international community. This finding suggests that communication technology serves not only to spread fear but also to acquire outside support. In contrast to Galula's positivist approach to the passive acquisition of moral outside support, this thesis argues that moral support is not solely passively acquired but rather a deliberate consequence of Hamas' strategy and subsequent actions. As a consequence of the alternative immobility strategy, internal resistance against Hamas' strategy emerges, as the Palestinians temporarily become immobile targets. Suppression of internal opposition is integral to Hamas' immobility strategy, as indications of internal discord decrease the likelihood of outside support. The core method integral to the strategy, encompassing the suppression of Palestinian opposition against Hamas' strategy, is termed 'resistance-against-resistance'. However, the immobility strategy is not without risk, as increased internal resistance may lead to its expiration due to reaching a tipping point. To mitigate this risk, Hamas engages in political negotiations and ceasefires, leveraging newfound moral and political support.

Closing remarks

With the conclusion of the thesis, we shift the focus with closing remarks on our general contributions provided by this thesis. We aspire to have motivated scholars to engage in studies that transcend controversy and inherent provocation, thus mitigating persistent polarization, particularly those advocating for censorship of contentious subjects. Even contemporary AI technologies exhibit integrated censorship mechanisms as seen in instances involving officially recognized terror organizations like Hamas preventing it from disclosing information (Ottman, Davis, Ottman, Morton, Lane, Shults, 2022, p. 8). The thesis has proposed an alternative insurgency strategy applied by Hamas, rationalized by the inadequacy of classical insurgency conditions to understand Hamas' momentum in outside support. We advocate for scholars inspired by our thesis to adopt a similar methodological approach, challenging established theoretical frameworks that underpin our understanding. Even the terminology 'insurgent' by its very definition refers to 'someone who is fighting against the government in their own country' (Cambridge Dictionary), which may seem incongruous when applied to an organization like Hamas, which has held elected governance in the Gaza Strip since 2006. We conclude our thesis by posing a fundamental question for further research: In what ways can the examination of Hamas' insurgency strategies contribute to broader theories of resistance and revolution in the 21st century?

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7. Appendixes

Appendix I - Israel & Gaza country size

