Aalborg University

Faculty of Social Science

Department of Culture and Global Studies

**The causal mechanism of Taliban**

**Resurgence in Afghanistan**



Supervisor: Søren Schmidt

Submitted by: Areva Paronjana

Submitted on: 29th of June 2012

**Contents**

Glossary…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...3

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………...............................................................4

Methodology……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…..8

1. Civil war concept in the political science……………………………………………………………………………………15
   1. Defining civil war…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………16
   2. Violence in civil war………………………………………………………………………………………………..…………..17
   3. Different schools of civil war…………………………………………………………………………………………..…..19
   4. Classification of civil wars………...............................................................................................20
   5. Theoretical divide between greed and grievance in civil war……………………………….……………..21
   6. Local and rural dimension in civil war……………………………………………………………………………….…23
   7. Duration of civil war………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…25
   8. Applying civil war theory to the case study of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan………….27
2. Taliban in Afghanistan……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….29
   1. Taliban defeat……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..30
   2. Re-emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan: chronological timeline…………………………………………31
3. Causal mechanisms behind Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan after their defeat in 2001…….35
   1. Ethnic heterogeneity as a causal mechanism for Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan………35
   2. Weak state as a causal mechanism for Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan………..……………42
   3. External support as a causal mechanism for Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan……………..49

Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………..……………………………………………55

Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….……….60

Abstract.....................................................................................................................................................65

**Glossary**

**ANSF –** Afghan National Security Forces

**CIA –** Central Intelligence Agency

**GDP –** Gross Domestic Product

**HiG –** Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin

**ICG –** International Crisis Group

**IED –** Improvised Explosive Device

**ISAF –** International Security Assistance Force

**ISI –** Inter-Service Intelligence

**NATO –** The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**OEF-A** – Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan

**PRT –** Provincial Reconstruction Team

**UK –** The United Kingdom

**UN –** The United Nations

**U.S. –** The United States

**WMD –** Weapons of Mass Destruction

**Introduction**

More than ten years have passed since the war in Afghanistan has begun, but not many positive developments have happened in this matter. On the contrary, it is commonly agreed by the majority of academia, analysts, regional specialists and practitioners that situation in Afghanistan, except of education and woman rights has worsened. Not only Taliban has become more active, violent and spread once again to the territories where they were present before, but as well President Karzai’s government seems to be losing legitimacy in the eyes of most Afghan people with its corruption. Both, Afghan people and international community, see little hope for improvement and conflict settlement. The conflict has turned out to be a great loss in human and financial terms.

Afghanistan has been in the center of international political debate for more than a decade, since the “war on terror” was proclaimed by U.S. in the October of 2001 and with the initial support of UK, Canada and Australia, and later also of other ISAF counties the war began. Those 11 years of fighting have been hard and with a changing success. The war began with a hope and promises that it will be quick and victorious. Taliban, the main target of the “war on terror”, together with al-Qaeda was thought to be destroyed and defeated in a quick victory by the end of 2001.

As the war on Taliban was thought to be won, in 2003 the attention of international community shifted towards the war in Iraq. However, this was the moment very crucial for the remaining Taliban elite, including its leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, who together with his supporters had managed to escape, mainly to Pakistan. They had a time to recover, re-think and retaliate with a new force and strength. When they did so, there was already a full scale war in Iraq and ISAF had to reorganize its resources in order to fight in two wars simultaneously.

The main target and the most wanted individuals of the “war on terror” were infamous Osama bin Laden, the head of al-Qaeda, which was enjoying the support of Taliban, and Saddam Hussein, who thought to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Getting Saddam Hussein was faster and easier “win”. He was captured in 2003, to be hanged tree years later in 2006. Catching Osama bin Laden turned out to be more complicated.

Bin Laden’s first foray into politics is widely agreed to have happened in 1980, when he left Saudi Arabia (his homeland) to support the mujahidin[[1]](#footnote-1) in Afghanistan. That time he is though having received a critical military assistance from the U.S., however there is no hard evidence of Bin Laden’s direct cooperation with U.S.[[2]](#footnote-2) After the attacks on the World Trade Center on 9th September 2001, Taliban and al-Qaeda was increasingly viewed as an entity, which soon ended the lingering debate of “whom to strike”. Taliban had provided Bin Laden a sanctuary in 1996, when he was expelled from Sudan, as well as protected him after 1998 strikes on the U.S. embassies in the East Africa. In addition Taliban also gave him communications equipment and security guards. For exchange, Bin Laden helped the Taliban to train its military and expand political control in Afghanistan, as well as provided with financial assistance.[[3]](#footnote-3) He was terminated after years of surveillance and finally determined in 2011 in Pakistan. When the two main targets were eliminated the obvious thing to do was to create an order in both Iraq and Afghanistan and to leave with the feeling of having won these wars.

Leaving aside the case of Iraq, which is not the subject of this study, Afghanistan turned out to be a real challenge for ISAF countries. Even after Osama bin Laden’s death Taliban is everything but dead. Afghanistan has stepped back from a tipping point of defeating Taliban. The Taliban-led insurgency is still active on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border, and the frontier region has once again become a refuge for “terrorist groups of global reach”.[[4]](#footnote-4) Not to mention the failure of the initial plan of beat the Taliban being a root of international terrorism, there have been other obvious failures and mismanagements which have been mentioned less seldom and only recently.

Now when it would be about the time to start withdrawing from Afghanistan there is a concern, among many others: in the period of transition, which is still ongoing, the main idea is to shift responsibilities of leading and ruling Afghanistan from the ISAF, which in many cases have played a much broader and more diverse role than that of Taliban counterinsurgency, to the hands of Afghans themselves. Namely, the Afghan government and institutions (including Afghan National Security Force (ANSF)) would be governing Afghanistan, with international community playing only consultative role in that. However, now more than ever, before it was decided to withdraw troops until 2014 or earlier, it is getting clear that Afghan government does not have the capabilities and resources to govern Afghanistan and the attempts of the international community to change Afghanistan’s politics, government and institutions have turned to be inefficient. More than that, after more than ten years of war, Taliban is far from being defeated, which has led to overall disappointment in the international community and triggered the debate of *what* went wrong and what could have been changed.

It has been widely agreed now by academia and experts on Afghanistan, that already from the beginning of intervention in Afghanistan, the ultimate end-goal of the international community should have been political and peace settlement, alongside with military operations and counterinsurgency. Instead of focusing solely on a technical defeat of Taliban, the efforts had to be more balanced and diverse, including paying more attention to nation-building and state-building in Afghanistan. The ultimate goal here should have been reaching unity and trust amongst Afghan people, creating sense of belonging to one state and nation. But this can be achieved only through strengthening state institutions (including Afghan army and police units) and cooperating with Karzai’s government in order to make it more transparent and trustable, rebuilding the justice system, improving the rule of law, and fighting against drug trade, which is fueling corruption in the country.[[5]](#footnote-5) The enforcement of all the above mentioned has been and still is Afghan civil society’s, as well as and international community’s responsibility.

On the way of negotiating political and peace settlement in Afghanistan, criteria and conditions of negotiations become crucial. Rather than diplomats determining red lines for negotiations on human rights and woman’s rights issues, the Afghan public should have voice in establishing the parameters of an acceptable settlement ahead of any negotiations with the Taliban.[[6]](#footnote-6) International community should not act as a liberator and push any “universal values” upon Afghan people, but let them decide their future themselves, since they are the ones who know what they need and want best of all. International community should instead more address to Karzai government weakness and inefficiencies, which are leading the country to growing misery.

An important aspect on the way of solving the Afghan conflict is the division of resources and efforts. A comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy should be pursued in Pashtun Afghanistan (country’s South and East), while nation-building oriented strategy should be more exercised in Non-Pashtun Afghanistan (country’s North and West). International community and Afghan government should learn how to negotiate compromise and work together with Taliban, since it is inevitable that Taliban will control most of the Pashtun South.[[7]](#footnote-7) The politics of a potential grand bargain between Karzai and the Taliban, underwritten by Pakistan, are decisive.[[8]](#footnote-8) In other words, all the involved parties in the Afghan conflict should learn how to use a word instead of a gun, in order to achieve their goals.

Having briefly described some of the crucial aspects of past, as well as current concerns of Afghanistan, in order to get a slight insight in the diversity of the issues, it is now a turn to outline a particular aspect and reveal the problem-question that this study will be dealing with. The initial aim and the ultimate end-goal of international community’s intervention in Afghanistan was the “war on terror” which entailed a defeat of Taliban. Having in mind the superiority of international community’s military capabilities and financial resources it seems out of logic that Taliban has not been defeated. Leaving aside a somewhat cynical argument that “U.S. should have invaded Pakistan, instead of Afghanistan”, this study will not deal with probability, but rather reality. And the reality is that in spite of all the military, financial and human resources, involved to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan, it has not been eradicated and has re-emerged.

Assessing the real time situation on the ground, one sees the increase of Taliban activities over the last years. International community is often regarded as the one to be blamed for this situation because of overinvestment in military operations and underinvestment in the development of Afghanistan, without which no durable security is possible. There are also accusations to the international community of putting too much of focus and effort to the war in Iraq. Lots of analysis has been made regarding these points and aspects of the war in Afghanistan. However, the aim of this study is to search for the underlying, fundamental causal mechanisms of what made it possible for Taliban to re-emerge in Afghanistan after their defeat in 2001. From there comes the problem-question, or a puzzle of this study: *why was it possible for Taliban to re-emerge in Afghanistan after their defeat in 2001?*

The next chapter will deal with the methodology of this study in which steps taken in this research will be explained, starting with the choice of theories and finishing with the study design. Then there will be chapters dealing with theoretical base of this study, introducing the concepts which will be further applied in the empirical part of the study. In the empirical part the possible answers to the above-stated problem-question will be searched and explained by applying theoretical concepts, described in the theoretical framework of the study. As a result of theoretical deliberation, hypotheses of the study will be developed and thoroughly examined. Finally, conclusions will be made, assessing the validity of these hypotheses and revealing causal mechanisms of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan.

**Methodology**

The purpose of the following chapter is to outline the structure of the study, as well as to explain several considerations for the research. Before engaging in the theoretical and empirical levels of this study, there is a need first to create a referential framework for the study. Therefore, various aspects will be taken into consideration such as research design, time-frame and location, research strategy concerning the empirical data, choice of theories, as well as methodological considerations for collecting data and methods of analysis. These are all crucial components for conducting a successful research.

After main theoretical concepts and ideas will be introduced, the empirical part will begin with a short outline of Taliban defeat and their re-emergence. Following that, criteria will be set for the analysis based on the theoretical input of this study. As a result of a theoretical debate, possible explanations of Taliban re-emergence will be offered, according to the theoretical framework created in the scope of this study. They will be then examined with the help of different empirical data and facts. Out of theoretical deliberations of this study, hypotheses will be formed in order to explain Taliban re-emergence after 2001. Some hypotheses of Taliban re-emergence might prove not to be applicable in this case study, some might be partially applicable, and others might be valid in answering problem-question.

*Research design*

For a purpose of this study, a qualitative case study has been chosen as a type of research. The most important aspect for any possible approach is the choice and use of theories. The link between theory and the empirical part of the study determine whether the empirical data has been collected in order to test a certain theory or to create a new one. Thus, “research can be theory-guided, i.e. employing a deductive approach, or, on the contrary, the theory can be an outcome of the research, meaning that an inductive approach is applied.”[[9]](#footnote-9) This study does not generate any theories, therefore can be considered theory-guided and deductive. In the scope of this study, theory has been used in order to find a causal mechanism behind Taliban to re-emerge in Afghanistan after their defeat in 2001 by forces of international community. This study will be both – descriptive and explanatory.

It is important to note that by saying “re-emergence” of Taliban it has been acknowledged that they had been never completely eradicated or cracked down completely. They have existed in some form or another, throughout their defeat 2001. The focus of this study is to find an answer to *why* was it possible for them to re-emerge despite of military presence and superiority of international community in Afghanistan. “Re-emergence” in this context means the increase of Taliban activities and offensives in Afghanistan. Since all data has been collected regarding Taliban in Afghanistan, it is a unit of analysis in this study, and thus, also a topic of this research. The focal point of this study represents the author’s objective to explain the circumstances behind re-emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan after their defeat in 2001.

*Choice of theories*

The choice of theories is of an utmost importance when searching for an answer to the problem question. Therefore, the referential theoretical framework will be developed and used to conduct the research. In order to answer the problem-question of this study, civil war theory will be used. Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan corresponds to the characteristics of civil war pattern, which are discussed in more detail in the theoretical part of this study. Thus, the author has chosen to use this theory to answer the problem-question and in doing so, to test the validity of civil war theory in this case. In the case of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan, resurgence is intimately linked to the concept of civil war, therefore the author of this study finds theory of civil war to be appropriate to use in order to explain causal mechanism of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan. Civil war is defined as “a war between opposing groups of citizens of the same country”[[10]](#footnote-10). Taliban can be defined as an opposing group operating in the same country and although, as it will be discussed later, having external connections, the essence of the conflict is in the striving of Taliban to restore their power in Afghanistan using forceful means, thus to be described as a civil war.

Civil war theory precedes other existing theories, since it is striving to explain the reasons of why civil wars begin and the patterns of their continuation. Alternative theory often used for the case study of Taliban in Afghanistan is that of insurgency and counterinsurgency. By definition insurgency “is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion or armed conflict.”[[11]](#footnote-11) While those theories explain perfectly the phases of insurgency and the ways of gaining power, as well as the patterns of counterinsurgency they fall short in describing why insurgency is possible in the first place.

As another alternative for the theoretical basis of this study, theories of terrorism could be used. The broad definition of terrorism is “the systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion to be used.”[[12]](#footnote-12) In the political science, terrorism has two explanations for the patterns of behaviour of terrorists. The first is that terrorism is “a response to external stimuli, particularly government actions.”[[13]](#footnote-13) The second is that terrorism is “a result of the organization’s struggle for survival, usually in the competitive environment.”[[14]](#footnote-14) Although Taliban activities can be described as terroristic, referring to them in purely terrorist terms seems inappropriate. Theories of terrorism are dealing more with the instrumental and organizational aspects of terrorist organizations and the activities, rather than with the causes of the emergence of terrorism and terrorists as such. As a result, since the civil war theory deals primarily with the causes of the emergence of the conflict, the author has found the civil war theory to be the most suitable for finding an answer to why was it possible for Taliban to re-emerge in Afghanistan after their defeat in 2001.

Civil war theory offers different causal mechanisms of civil wars, different types of them, different ways to classify them, as well as analysis of different dimensions in civil war (e.g. local and rural dimension, which is of a particular interest of this study). Civil war studies can be roughly divided between three sectors of interest or approaches: economic, international relations and comparativist approach to civil wars. The main focus of this study will be on international relations and comparativist approaches to civil war studies, since former of them focuses on ethnic problems as a catalyst of civil war and the latter, on weak state institutions as a cause of civil war, both of which to some extent exist in Afghanistan.[[15]](#footnote-15) Although, briefly described in the theoretical part of this study, the economic approach of researching civil war will be left out in this case study, since Afghanistan does not have significant natural resources and does not suffer from *a resource curse*, which is a pre-requisite for using this approach.[[16]](#footnote-16) The role of opium trade cannot be neglected or ignored when examining the onset of civil war in Afghanistan’s, however, while not being a natural resource but a cultivated plant, this aspect will be included under comparativist approach, since it could contribute to a weak state phenomena in Afghanistan.

As for the causal mechanisms of civil war, scholars are divided regarding whether *greed* or *grievance* is the main cause of civil wars. While one group of scholars focus on the former one, denouncing latter, other group of scholars focus on the latter one, denouncing the former.[[17]](#footnote-17) This divide is explained in more detail in the theoretical part of this study. As it will be further described, in order to classify civil wars there is a tendency in to use master cleavages (e.g. ethnic vs non-ethnic war). However, there is a problem of such classification. Sure, there are cases of civil wars where it is possible to draw a clear division line between different cleavages. However, more often than not civil wars turn into lengthy and complex processes, where all of the division lines of classifications and types are blurred. Therefore, although main types of classification and examples of master cleavages will be introduced, an alternative way of classification of civil wars will be used: *alliance*.[[18]](#footnote-18) A concept, which examines the probability of multiple master cleavages, factors and circumstances, be the catalysts of civil war. This understanding puts more focus on local dimension and role of local actors in the civil war (*cf*. p. 24 – 25).

In the scope of this study there will be a focus on rural and local dimension in the civil wars, since it is a very crucial and actual in Afghanistan civil war onset. Taliban re-emergence started from Durand Line (Afghanistan-Pakistan border), not from the capital or big cities. Therefore, it is necessary to closely analyse rural Afghanistan, in order to understand the re-emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan.

*Core Concepts*

In every study there is a necessity to define core concepts used in the study, in order to specify the approach and focus of the study. Core concepts lay the foundation and need to be defined, since they are used extensively in the study. These concepts need defining not because of their complexity, but rather because the general and common meaning of these terms may sometimes differ from the way the same concepts are used and referred to in this study.

Therefore, the following terms in the scope of this study will be defined in the following way. “Civil war” in this study is between Taliban from one side and Afghan government and its institutions, as well as international forces from the other side. Because it is “an armed combat taking place within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities,”[[19]](#footnote-19) it can therefore be defined as a civil war.

When mentioning “re-emergence of Taliban” in this study, it is being referred to the timeframe of early 2002 where the first confirmed activities of Taliban began after their defeat in late December 2001, throughout current days. “Re-emergence” in this particular study, as already mentioned before, is used regarding increased offensives and victories on Taliban against ISAF.

The usage of a concept Taliban “defeat” in this study means the overthrow of Taliban government by the international forces with the help of National Alliance in December 2001 and obtaining control over the provinces of Afghanistan. It does not at any place in the study mean the complete eradication of Taliban as such, rather the fall of Taliban government in Afghanistan.

It has to be noted that in the course of this research some terms will be used interchangeably, for the sake of a more diverse and fluent language. “Civil war” will be used interchangeably with “internal war” and “insurgence”, since in this study they refer to each other directly. The link between those terms has been explained in the study. Also the term “re-emergence” and “resurgence” will be used interchangeably, since they both refer to the same process – renewal of Taliban activities in Afghanistan.

*Time-frame and location*

It is necessary to set a time-frame of the study, in order to make it more focused and specific. A further analysis and research would be made according to this time-frame. The time-frame in the context of this study is early 2002 until current days. The historical background of defeat of Taliban by international community under cover of “war on terror” in 2001 will also be outlined in order for readers to gain a deeper understanding of the issue. However, since the aim of this study is to answer the question: why was it possible for Taliban to re-emerge in Afghanistan after their defeat in 2001, it makes sense to start the research from 2002, when the actual re-emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan began. The time-frame of the research will end by the day that the study is finished and handed in for evaluation. In order to make the study as objective as possible, there is a need to follow the pace of events until the end of the research. When it comes to the location of the study, it will be events and happenings taking place in Afghanistan, in the framework of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.

*Originality of theme*

The re-emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan has been widely discussed and monitored by media, academicians and policy makers, since their insurgence in the early 2002. It has been so because of the scale of event, financial and human resources involved, and ideational reasons, of course. However, the purpose of this study is to go beyond the conventional thinking in military and power terms, when looking on re-emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan and “go back to the beginnings” and try to explain the causal mechanisms of this civil war. The theme is also especially interesting because answers to *why* are not yet entirely found and understood and the consequences to Afghanistan of this civil war are yet to be seen.

The real value added of this study is the theoretical approach used to solve the puzzle and to answer the problem-question. Civil war theory being a midrange theory is of a necessary scope to be applied to this case study. It covers and strives to explain all the periods in civil war: starting from its emergence, its connection to the concept of violence, patterns of its duration and development, as well as possible scenarios of its ending. What is of a particular interest for this study are the causal mechanisms of the civil war, which are being described and explained better by the applied approaches than any other theory that could be used for this case. By using civil war theory for the theoretical framework of this study there is a possibility of getting a complete and comprehensive understanding of the causal mechanism behind the re-emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan.

*Tasks of the study*

It is necessary to describe and fulfill tasks of the study, in order to succeed in finding an answer the problem-question. Although the research consists of several interconnected parts, they all differ in their purpose for achieving the final goal. In the theoretical part the relevant terms and concepts for the purpose of this study need to be described and conceptualized, in order for them to be further applied in the empirical and analytical part of the study. It is important to explain the choice the re-emergence of Talban in Afghanistan as a case-study, as well as usage of certain theoretical concepts and the connection of them to the empirical part of the study. In the empirical part the analysis will be made regarding the possible reasons Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan. The possible reasons will be introduced in form of hypotheses that will be developed as a result of a theoretical discussion, and will be examined throughout this study.

*Research strategy*

There are two ways of studying empirical data: either undertaking quantitative research approach or a qualitative one.[[20]](#footnote-20) In the case-study of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan, there will be quantitative data applied to some extent. However, the main method of a research will be a qualitative research approach.

As briefly described in the introductory paragraph of the methodology chapter, the criteria for answering the problem-question will be drawn out from the theoretical framework created for the particular case study of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan. First, in the theoretical part different causes and causal mechanisms for the emergence of civil wars will be introduced. After that, those possible causes will be further implemented in the empirical part of the study in the form of hypotheses and tested with the help of academic and analytical literature, as well as factual information. As a result, these hypotheses will be either approved or disapproved. The outcome of the testing of these hypotheses will form the answer to the main problem-question of this study.

*Document analysis*

There are four characteristics of sources used in a research that need to be examined in order to ensure the validity of these sources. These characteristics are as follow:

* Authenticity: Can the source of the document be verified, and is it real or a forgery?
* Credibility: Does the document contain factual errors, or does it intentionally misinterpret facts to promote an agenda?
* Representativeness: Can it be said that the document is typical for the area of research? If that is not the case, how grave are the differences?
* Meaning: Is the source written clearly and in a manner that is comprehensive?[[21]](#footnote-21)

For the purposes of this study, these methods of source analysis will be used, to ensure the validity of it. Authenticity is the best achieved by data from reliable sources, meaning from reputable institutions and publishers or prestigious and well known academic journals. Credibility can be ensures in the same manner. However, of course, testing for factual errors is the most challenging when there is not an opportunity to reproduce the conditions for data collection. One more issue that needs to be taken into account is that differ authors might have different interpretations on the subject and, given the diverse literature on the subject of Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Therefore, checking for representativeness in this study is a process that takes place automatically as a research progresses, since in the course of this study numerous sources are being examined and discrepancies are being discovered.

*Study Design*

|  |
| --- |
| **Problem Formulation**  ***Why was it possible for Taliban to re-emerge in Afghanistan after their defeat in 2001?*** |

|  |
| --- |
| **Methodology**  **Research design** |

|  |
| --- |
| **Civil war theory** |

|  |
| --- |
| **Set of hypotheses on Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan** |

**The answer to the problem formulation**

1. **Civil war concept in the political science**

A purpose of the following theoretical chapter is to introduce the reader with the phenomena of civil war and to create a theoretical framework for this study on the basis of which the hypotheses will be introduced. Firstly, the civil war will be defined. Secondly, different approached of studying civil war will be outlined. Thirdly, civil war will be linked to the concept of violence. Fourthly, different ways of classifying civil war will be introduced. Fifthly, distinction between *greed and grievance* motivated civil wars will be explained. Sixthly, there will be a focus on rural and local dimension of theorizing on civil wars, which will be particularly important for this study. Finally, there will be a sub-chapter summarizing a theoretical discussion on civil war and creating a referential theoretical framework for this study. All of the above-mentioned will be used in order to explain the re-emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan after 2001.

* 1. **Defining civil war**

In order to fully acknowledge the nature and characteristic features of civil war it is of an utmost importance to define it. There exist several definitions of civil war some of which are broader, others more concentrated. In scope of this study, the author will use definitions introduced by civil war scholars, whose works form the theoretical base of this study. One of civil war definitions has been introduced by a scholar of political science Stathis N. Kalyvas, whose focus of research has been particularly on civil wars and political violence. He claims that: “When domestic political conflict takes the form of military confrontation or armed combat we speak of civil war.”[[22]](#footnote-22)

S. N. Kalyvas also offers another, slightly different definition in which he equals civil war to internal war concept and argues that, civil war can be otherwise referred to as *internal war* and it is “an armed combat taking place within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities.”[[23]](#footnote-23)

The major direct and indirect effects of civil war are tremendous, since except fatalities, civil war causes also indirect damage in form of mass dislocation, famines, epidemics, and degradation of the state. There are also enormous economic losses and costs. Economic development stalls or even reverses.[[24]](#footnote-24) If one has to shortly describe the condition of the country that is more likely to experience civil war, the description would go as follows:

Countries with low, stagnant, unequally distributed per capita incomes that have remained dependent on primary commodities for their exports face dangerously high risks of prolonged conflict. In the absence of economic development neither good political institutions, nor ethnic or religious homogeneity, nor high military spending provide significant defenses against large-scale violence. Once a country has stumbled into conflicting powerful forces – the conflict trap – tend to lock it into a syndrome of further conflict.[[25]](#footnote-25)

The scholars of civil wars Timothy J. Besley and Torsten Persson argue that there exist three key factors for understanding the occurrence of civil wars and to predict the break out of a civil war. The first factor is the opportunity cost of a civil war. When the income is higher, so is the cost of insurgency. The second factor is related to the nature of the prize won if insurgency is successful. The key element here is institutional constraints of the government. Constraints reduce the incentives for insurgency. The third factor is in regards to the technology of fighting, as well as the allocation of political power (in terms of center-periphery relations.) The combination and variation of these factors are to determine whether the civil war or insurgency is likely to occur.[[26]](#footnote-26)

Two other prominent scholars of civil war, Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, claim that civil wars occur through the following sequence of circumstances: in the countries with low income, there is a decline in the investment to build institutions. Accordingly, the conflict equilibrium of overly high military spending is likely to occur. The higher is the number of actors, the lower the investment in institutions, and thus, the higher expenditure on the military spending. Following his argument, “a low income country with many ethnic groups willing to consider the conflict option, would according to the model, have a markedly lower chance of reaching and maintaining a negotiated settlement of conflict.”[[27]](#footnote-27)This pattern showsthat low income almost surely mean that less money will go into strengthening the state institutions and almost all of that money will go to military spending in order for the elite to hold on to power. This pattern already has a potential of a civil war. However, if the society in such a country is heterogeneous, or the higher the number of different actors involved, the bigger the risk of “explosion”.

* 1. **Violence in civil war**

From the previous sub-chapter on the definitions of civil war it can be noticed that civil war is intimately linked with the violence. Possibly if one understands better the causes of emerging violence; one can as well understand underlying causes of civil war. However, when creating an understanding about these issues, one has to remember, that the causes of the observed conflict are not always a synonym to motivation, since motive may or may not be stronger and more decisive than simply an opportunity for action. In other words, what distinguishes between rebellious societies from non- rebellious ones cannot be a mare motivation, rather an opportunity that makes conflict profitable in some societies.

Economic, social and cultural issues related to violence, whether it is in external or internal war, demand serious efforts of integration. This is the idea that has been so passionately rejected both by the fatalistic theorists of civilization clash and by the advocates of economic reductionism. Cultural and social factors, as well as features of political economy must be taken into account in order to understand civil wars and violence in general. However, those factors, as previously stated, do not work in isolation from each other. One must avoid using shortcuts to deliver insight through his/her single-minded focus on one factor or another, ignoring the importance of other central features of the big picture.[[28]](#footnote-28)

True, very much favored identity politics can certainly be well used in order to explain violence in some cases. However, it also contradicts a broader understanding of the richness of humans and their identities. There are multiple identities and various affiliations for every human, that rejects isolationist demands of singular division, no matter how lionized that division might be in some particular versions of identity politics. The process of such cultivated violence cannot be readily translated into the unfolding of something like human destiny. Along with the identity divisions or religious differences that are very commonly used in order to explain violence, there are also other divisions that have just as big potential for creating strife and carnage. The violence of solidarist identity has also caused numerous mass bloodsheds in the past.The obsession with religions and so-called civilizations in contemporary global politics has made scholars to neglect other lines of identity divisions, which, not so long ago, have been strong enough to cause millions of deaths.[[29]](#footnote-29)

Because of the divisions made between people with distinct race and ethnicity or other non-economic identities, some of these divisions have become more important that the others because of their association with poverty and inequality. It is usually through these associations (or misperceptions) that social humiliation and economic deprivation become a lethal cause of violence and lead to the emergence of civil wars. There is a need of close examination of the connection of violence with poverty and inequality works. It is also important to understand why have non-economic aspects of social deprivation to be taken into account in order to explain the process of violence. In order to understand violence in general, but also in external and internal wars in particular, one needs to avoid isolationist approaches by explaining violence through purely economic deprivation or exclusively through cultural and identity factors. None of these factors taken separately provide an adequate understanding of the spread of violence. Interconnecting is just as important as elements that have to be connected.[[30]](#footnote-30)

Although, generalizations are needed in order to create a theoretical framework on any phenomena, to which civil war is no exception, one has to be careful when examining and evaluating criteria for civil war analysis. There is a danger of putting too much of an emphasis of certain aspects while ignoring others, of the same importance. When analyzing civil wars, there is a need to take as much of explanatory aspects into account as possible and then check their validity accordingly.

* 1. **Different schools of civil war**

There exist three “sources” of interest in civil war and they correspond to three styles of research: economic, international relations, and comparativist. However, because of the complexity of the issues related to civil war phenomena, it is usually difficult to draw a strict divide between these three styles of research. Nevertheless, economists primarily focus on the impact of natural resources, international relations scholars on ethnic antagonism, comparativists - on state.[[31]](#footnote-31)

According to first version, civil war is more likely to occur in countries suffering from the *resource curse[[32]](#footnote-32)*; the second version points to nationalistic aspirations and ethnic disputes as a root of civil war, and the third one claims that weak states are the main cause of civil war.[[33]](#footnote-33) Although it is extremely difficult to identify causal mechanisms of civil war, the most important and commonly agreed of them is poverty, since poverty causes a situation when and where opportunities and intentions to rebel are high.[[34]](#footnote-34)

There are at least three stylized stories representing international relations approach to civil war. First story tells, that state collapse creates “security dilemma”. Since neither group in the state knows of each other’s intentions that serves as an incentive of building up defensive capabilities, that may easily be transformed into offensive capabilities. According to second story, civil war is caused by a “commitment problem”, when there is no third party that could guarantee agreements between two groups. Finally, the third story argues, that civil war occur when ethnic secessionists are willing to create their own separate state.[[35]](#footnote-35)

Regarding the economic approach explaining civil war, there is a focus on examining the effect of abundant natural resources. “While poverty reduces opportunity costs for participation in rebellion, natural resources allow the financing of rebellion which may start with political aims, but eventually becomes criminal organization.”[[36]](#footnote-36) The economic approach to civil war is related to the idea of *resource curse.* The main argument of the economic approach is that, resource sure in combination with low opportunity costs of rebellion causes the emergence of civil war.

Comparativists point to state capacity or, more precisely, lack of it as a main determinant of civil war. Repressive state capacity here is GDP per capita along with conditions favoring rural insurgency, like rough (mountainous) terrain. The most well-known supporters of comparativist approach towards civil wars and deniers of ethnic aspirations being a causal mechanism of civil wars are scholars of international relations James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. They argue that conditions favorable for insurgency provided the higher risk for insurgency that the ethnical or religious characteristics of a state. They claim that factors like poverty, which is characteristic for weak states, as well as conditions for successful recruitment of insurgents, like rough terrain and political instability is of an utmost importance for a civil war onset. [[37]](#footnote-37) Governments that are organizationally, financially and institutionally weak create the necessary conditions for the insurgency and the occurrence of civil war, because of non-existent or weak local policing and corrupt counterinsurgency. This is all arguably proxied by low per capita income. Rebels and insurgents on the other hand favor rough terrain are usually posses local knowledge, this way gaining the upper hand over weak central governments. It can be argued that foreign support; both financial and technical also favor insurgency.[[38]](#footnote-38)

* 1. **Classification of civil wars**

There exist different ways to classify civil war. Some classifications are based on actors involved (e.g. international or domestic), some on their goals (e.g. offensive or defensive), and some on their views or intentions (“greed and grievance”) and so on. A popular way of classifying civil war is by finding war’s “master cleavage” (e.g. whether war is ethnic or non-ethnic).[[39]](#footnote-39) However this is easier said than done, because civil wars are highly complex processes, which usually hide multiple causes and cleavages.

The distinction between irregular and conventional civil war is the most widely used one. While conventional warfare requires a commonly shared perception of a balance of power between the two sides, irregular war requires a choice of a weaker side “to assume the tactical offensive in selected forms, times, and places”, in order not to match the stronger side’s expectations, contrary to conventional warfare.[[40]](#footnote-40) A stylized description of irregular war goes as follows:

the state (or incumbents) fields regular troops and is able to control urban and accessible terrain, while seeking to militarily engage its opponents in peripheral and rugged terrain; challengers (rebels or insurgents) hide and rely on harassment and surprise. Such wars often turn into wars of attrition, with insurgents seeking to win by not losing while imposing unbearable costs on their opponent. There are many variations to this stylized scenario, involving outside intervention or assistance that may lead the insurgents to gradually switch from irregular war to conventional war; conversely, the progressing deterioration of the state may force incumbents to opt for irregular war as well.[[41]](#footnote-41)

Some empiric findings suggest that the twofold power balance, between the peripheral group’s demographic sizes compared to the center, increases a probability of ethnic conflict. In similar way, dyads with groups far from the capital that are located in rough terrain tend to be more exposed to probability of a conflict. Commonly used measures of wealth that are measured at the national level turn out to unrelated for explaining the emergence of a conflict.[[42]](#footnote-42)

Civil wars can be divided into old and new type of civil wars. There are at least four main points that distinguish between old and new civil wars:

* Old civil wars were fought along well established and articulated ideological lines. New wars, on the contrary emerge because of ethnic/tribal conflict at best, or plundering at worst;
* Old civil wars erupted because of accumulation of genuine grievances, while new wars are motivated by greed and loot;
* Old wars had popular support for at least one side, while fighters of new civil wars have no popular support;
* Most of old civil wars were disciplined and in a way controlled. In new civil wars violence is gratuitous, purely wanton and senseless. In short, old civil wars were fought in a centralized and disciplined manner (and could be won), while new civil wars are fought by undisciplined militia and warlords in decentralized way (and tend to linger on forever).[[43]](#footnote-43)
  1. **Theoretical divide between greed and grievance in civil war**

In the theoretical literature available on civil wars there is a common division of thought among scholars regarding the causal mechanisms of civil war phenomena. In short, while on side of scholarly argue that the main cause of civil war is *grievance*; the other side claims that the main cause of civil wars is always *greed*.

There is a claim between a group of scholars that grievance-based issues is the primary cause of the process that leads to civil conflict, however ‘greed’ becomes salient if the rebel leadership face hard times of motivating soldiers. If ‘grievance’ leads to collective behavior, then ‘greed’ for selective benefits from leaders can transform this collective behavior into self-interested behavior (e.g. opiate trade in Asia clearly shows how exploitable resources can fuel civil war). While income and distributional issues, as well as repressive state policies together with access to exploitable resources are associated with onset of protest and civil war, ethnicity and regime type is not always.[[44]](#footnote-44)

In order to clearly illustrate the way of thought of both approaches to the issue some of contrasting argumentation is being outlined bellow:

In their oft-cited study of civil wars, Fearon and Laitin (2003) also conceptualize their theory of insurgent challenges to state power in terms of center-periphery dyads. Their theory emphasizes infrastructural factors and techniques of counter-insurgency campaigns. However, because these authors attempt to reject ethnicity as a cause of civil wars, they interpret both central and peripheral actors in purely non-ethnic terms.[[45]](#footnote-45)

From the following citation there can be observed an obvious split on theoretical literature on civil wars between scholars who consider ethnicity being a main cause of civil wars, and the ones who consider weak state in combination with economic hardships to be an initiator of civil war. This disagreement is also clearly portrayed in following statements: “

(..) that ethnic diversity is the root cause of civil conflict when they observe insurgents in a poor country who mobilize fighters along ethnic lines. Instead, the civil wars of the period have structural roots, in the combination of a simple, robust military technology and decolonization, which created an international system numerically dominated by fragile states with limited administrative control of their peripheries.[[46]](#footnote-46)

The counter-argument to this has been expressed by the “other camp” of scholars, who argue that:

In our view, the political economists’ temptation to “cleanse” their models of ethnicity reflects ideological and meta-theoretical prejudices that lack solid empirical foundations. While we do not purport to have found the ultimate model of ethno-nationalist conflict, we do think that our results are promising enough to inspire future research on how cultural and logistical mechanisms interact to produce political violence.[[47]](#footnote-47)

From the abovementioned citations it can be concluded that by far scholars of civil wars have not been able to reach an agreement on the universal initiator of civil war. Maybe this is a matter of time and effort to find one, but maybe this is due to the fact that there really is none and that civil wars, being a highly complex processes have multiple causes and explanations that cannot be looked upon separately. None of these approaches can be denied or neglected when analyzing the civil war occurrence in general, since civil wars are diverse and multilayered process, there is a danger of missing out important aspects in the research. However, when examining concrete cases of civil war the applicability of *greed or grievance* changes from case to case.

* 1. **Local and rural dimension of civil war**

For the specific case study of this research local and rural dimension and aspects of civil wars are particularly important, therefore, some of the main features and characteristics of this perspective will be outlined below and later examined in the empirical part of the study, when being applied to the case of civil war in Afghanistan after Taliban re-emergence. Afghanistan by no doubt is rural, its politics local and it is by far a weak state of a very low income. As it has been described by S.N. Kalyvas, Afghanistan is “a world where local rivalries and global aims seem to feed off each other” and where “politics are intensely local, with many warlords swapping sides in alliances of convenience that have shifted with the changing fortunes of the decades of civil war that.”[[48]](#footnote-48)

According to him, weak states that are poorly administrated and policed in the mountainous peripheries have a high risk of rebellions. There is a danger that if the limited rebellion erupts and the state responds violently, it may feed, rather than stop the rebellion.[[49]](#footnote-49) “Poor societies tend to be rural and insurgencies tend to begin and are fought primarily in the rural countryside.”[[50]](#footnote-50) S.N. Kalyvas approves the importance of a rural setting for an insurgency and the emergence of a civil war, by arguing:

(…) rural dimension is simultaneously consistent with several causal mechanisms of civil war onset, including grievances resulting from unequal land distribution, worsening land distribution, or crop failure; the ability of insurgents to hide among rural populations without being denounced because of local norms of solidarity and honor; higher levels of tolerance among rural people to threats of violence; a tradition of peripheral rebellion reinforced by norms of reciprocity which leads to mass participation in anti-state activities ranging from contraband smuggling and banditry to full-fledged rebellion; the fact that an economy based on subsistence farming tends to favor armed resistance more than one based on wage labor, and a pattern of human ecology whereby the dispersion of population settlements in rural environments impedes policing: it is easier to enforce a curfew in a town than in a large rural area because taxing and monitoring hundreds, or even thousands, of hamlets exposes small army detachments to ambush.[[51]](#footnote-51)

The logic behind the argument that insurgency is more likely to occur in the rural areas of poor and weak states, is that rural areas in such kind of states are usually worse policed and controlled. The existence of external support for insurgents coupled with rough terrain and proximity to boarders increases the likeliness of insurgent control – especially ethnic one.[[52]](#footnote-52)

As has been outlined above, one way how to look on and explain civil war is through *master cleavages*. And this is how it is still being commonly done. Namely, civil wars are usually being explained through binary perspective and viewed through a certain prism. It is usually classified and understood through only one dimension, aspect or cleavage: may it be ethnic, religious, ideological, or class wars. In the similar way we label political actors in these civil wars (e.g. ethnic civil wars are fought by ethnic actors or the violence of ethnic wars is ethnic violence etc.). Yet, civil wars are more complicated than that, because “civil wars usually entail a perplexing combination of identities and actions.”[[53]](#footnote-53)

For this reason S. N. Kalyvas in his article *“The Ontology of Political Violence”* argues, that it is important to understand civil wars through local cleavages, since master cleavages tend to fail to explain the complexity and diversity of civil wars which sometimes is not related to the dominant discourse or master cleavage. It could be that “civil wars are imperfect and fluid aggregations of multiple, more or less overlapping, smaller, diverse, and localized civil wars.”[[54]](#footnote-54) It is important to understand the how the local issues, perceptions and problems influence and form the national perspective. After it has been understood it is necessary and reflects on how that generality, which is an important part in shaping the national perspective, has been transferred and translated back into the local politics.[[55]](#footnote-55)

As already mentioned before, one way how to link central actors of civil war with the actual action on the ground is through mechanism of cleavage. In order to do so, various underlying micro-foundations are being used (e.g. centralized organization, fear, common preferences, or coordination around focal points). However, one more alternative of micro-foundation linking center and periphery is *alliance*. There is one major theoretical advantage of using alliance in explaining civil wars over all the other micro-foundations: namely, it allows multiple instead of unitary actors, agency that is located in center and in periphery instead of only in one of them, as well as various preferences and identities instead of one common and overreaching. The concept of alliance allows an interaction between supralocal and local actors, in which the former supply the latter with external muscle, in that way allowing them to win decisive local advantage; whereas the former use local conflicts in order to recruit and motivate supporters, as well as obtain local control, resources, and information. And that is even if ideological agenda is opposed to localism.

Looked from this perspective, violence (which operates as a resource leading to mobilization rather than an instrument of coercion) is the benefit that produces collective action and support. Thus, it can be argued that “civil war is transforming into a joint process the collective actors’ quest for power and the local actors’ quest for local advantage.”[[56]](#footnote-56)

Civil war fosters interaction among actors with distinct identities and interests. It is the convergence of local motives and supralocal imperatives that endows civil war with its particular character and leads to joint violence that straddles the divide between the political and the private, the collective and the individual.[[57]](#footnote-57)

In order to gain a full understanding of a nature of a particular civil war or insurgence it is necessary to include all the levels (local – supralocal; center – periphery), as well as actors (individual – collective; political – private) in the analysis. It is also essential to address all the approaches to civil war and examine different possible causal mechanisms to civil war and accept the probability of having multiple inter-connected causes, in order to gain a broad understanding of a particular case of a civil war.

* 1. **Duration of civil war**

Whether conflicts transform into large-scale violence and civil wars may depend on opportunities, as well as the perception of the amount of grievance, but also on the presence or absence of charismatic leader, financial situation, and the military weakness or strength of the government.[[58]](#footnote-58) So, as it follows from here, the possibility of relatively small conflicts to turn into civil wars depend on various, interconnected factors, that all need to be taken into account when analyzing the nature of a particular civil war.

When it comes to the duration of a civil war, once started, conflict can endure because of misperceptions of about the strength of the other side. Similarly, it might be a result of the information failure. Alternatively, wars may endure because of difficulties or lack of opportunities to reach a settlement. Last, but not least the enduring conflict may be a result of irreconcible preferences and in this case hatred and ideology may be the reason to use violence even if this is costly for all. It has been empirically proven that one once the violence has been initiated there is a danger of path-dependency. Namely, risk of war recurrence is much greater in post-war societies, than the ones that have no prior war history. “Civil wars generate a conflict trap,” [[59]](#footnote-59) as already mentioned before. If one has to mention structural characteristics that determine the length of a civil war, then those are – low per capita income, moderate degree of ethnic division, as well as high inequality.[[60]](#footnote-60)

As for interventions in civil wars, they usually prolong them, however, only interventions that are supportive towards government, have a potential to shorten conflict.[[61]](#footnote-61) Viability of the rebel group is the main factor in civil war. Ability to recruit members and prevent their defection is in turn the key component of organization’s viability. The rebel is more likely to defect because of the growing distance from the leader. The distance here means cultural, ideological, as well as geographical.[[62]](#footnote-62)

It has been empirically proven by scholar of civil wars, James D. Fearon, that while civil wars emerging from coups and revolutions tend to be short, civil wars in former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as anti-colonial wars tend to be relatively brief; ‘sons of the soil’wars[[63]](#footnote-63)are on average quite long-lived. In similar way quite long are conﬂicts in which a rebel group derives major funding from contraband (e.g. opium, diamonds, or coca).

The main question here is what holds back the parties involved in the civil war from the negotiated settlement and political solution to the long-running, destructive civil war? J. D. Fearon has given a comprehensive answer for this question by arguing:

Regional deal solutions may be unreachable when ﬂuctuations in state strength undermine the government’s ability to commit. The commitment problem binds harder when the center has an enduring political or economic interest in expansion into the periphery, as in ‘sons of the soil’ wars, and when either government or rebels are able to earn some income during a conﬂict despite the costs of ﬁghting, as in the case of contraband funding.[[64]](#footnote-64)

From this quote it can be understood that even if some civil wars seems irrational to fight and the military spending exceeds all the expectations and creates “lose-lose” situation for both sides, if there exist a commitment problem doubled with profit gained from contraband funding.

It has been noted in the theoretical literature that there is one case when ethnic and religious heterogeneity significantly increases the risk of civil war and one emerged tends to prolong its duration. That is when a substantial majority of one ethnicity is living alongside with a substantial minority. The risk of civil war emergence doubles in this case and can be even higher if there are two or more dominant ethnic groups in that country.[[65]](#footnote-65)

**1.8. Applying civil war theory to the case study of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan**

The debate on civil war is diverse and is divided along the different approaches. The main divide is regarding the master cleavage of *greed and grievance*. Often the supporters of one approach deny the ideas of the other approach and generalize their theoretical considerations to all the cases of civil wars and the ultimate causal mechanism for civil war emergence.[[66]](#footnote-66) The scholars of civil war that focus on alternative explanations of civil wars, other than greed or grievance, constructivists, focus on the role of a weak state, and rough terrain and high economic inequality as a main cause of civil wars.[[67]](#footnote-67) However, may the cause of civil war be ethnic grievances and aspirations or efforts to gain control over natural resources, or a weak state, the scholars of all of these schools agree upon one argument: civil war and insurgency is more likely to occur and it is fostered by the conditions of stagnant poverty and low per capita income. Also, the existence of foreign support to rebels and insurgents not only increases the probability of civil war emergence, but also prolongs the duration of civil war.

The rural dimension of civil war studies applied to the case study of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan is of a special importance, because it reveals the local level of a civil war, as well as the center-periphery relation, the imbalance of which are possible reason for civil war emergence. The rural parts of the country also tend to be the poorest, most underdeveloped and the furthest from the government, thus the examination of them might reveal a lot about the nature of the civil war.

As a result of the above mentioned theoretical deliberations and in order to find an answer for the above stated problem-question, three hypotheses will be formed. Those hypotheses can be proved right, wrong or partly true. There can be multiple hypotheses proved to be right or wrong. The hypotheses are formed following the theoretical framework of the study.

In the case of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan all of the basic theoretical arguments of civil war are worth examining, except of a greed argument. Although recently significant mine reserves have been discovered in Afghanistan (*cf*. p. 10.; ref. 16.), by the time of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan from the early 2002 there were no source of natural resources important enough to consider it as a possible causal mechanism for Taliban re-emergence. The argument of grievance seems appropriate to examine, since Afghanistan is ethnically highly heterogeneous country and Taliban re-emergence could possibly be explained as aspirations of one ethnical group to re-gain the lost power and obtain influence. Thus the first hypothesis of the study, following theoretical considerations is:

1. *Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan was possibly due to the ethnic heterogeneity and incompatibility of those ethnicities in one sovereign territory.*

A purpose of the first hypothesis is to test one of two general theories on civil war and insurgency applied to the case of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan – that of grievance. The supporters of this approach in the civil war studies, as already mentioned in the theoretical chapter of this study, argue that the core of every civil war and insurgence can be found in the ethnic conflicts and disputes. Knowing that Afghanistan is highly heterogeneous country, it seems reasonable to investigate this factor being a causal mechanism for Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan. Therefore, in the subchapter *3.1* of this study, the analysis of the first hypothesis, will be conducted. In order to examine the first hypothesis the ethnical background of Afghanistan will be outlined, then the power relationships between different ethnic communities will be analyzed. Finally, there will be a detailed examination of ethnical composure of Taliban in order to understand what has been the role of ethnicity in the re-emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan. After having accomplished all of these tasks the validity of the first hypothesis will be assessed.

Following theoretical considerations of civil war, after having examined the argument of ethnic grievance argument in the case of Taliban re-emergence, comparativist assumption on civil wars will be examined in the subchapter *3.2*. A purpose of the second hypothesis is to examine the validity of the argument that in the case of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan the core of civil war is of a structural nature and can be explained by the existence of a weak state. Thus, the second hypothesis of the study is:

1. *Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan was possibly due to the weak state and overly-centralized government.*

In order to analyze the second hypothesis criteria of a weak state ought to be set. In the scope of this study, weak state is being characterized by high level of poverty (including low per capita income), weak state institutions, corruption and weak center – periphery relations. Each of these criteria, as well as consequences of the will be adjusted to this case study, in order to examine the validity of the second hypothesis and the assumption that Taliban re-emerged because of weak state existence in Afghanistan.

Finally, a purpose of the third hypothesis is to examine the validity of the assumption that there have been external influences and causes for the ability of Taliban to re-emerge. This hypothesis has been elaborated in order to see if in the case study of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan there are other aspects that are not covered by the conventional approach to civil wars. The third hypothesis of the study is:

1. *Taliban re-emergence was possibly due to the factors of external nature.*

To analyze the possible existence of external influences to Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan, in the subchapter *3.3* of this study, the author will analyze interests that other powers might have in supporting Taliban. After having done that, the examination and assessment of the existence and amount of financial, technical and ideological support for Taliban, that could have helped to trigger the re-emergence will follow. The next chapters of this study have been built in accordance with the hypotheses.

1. **Taliban in Afghanistan**

In the following chapter a brief outline of Taliban defeat and their immediate re-emergence will be provided, in order to support the study with the background information, needed to gain an in-depth understanding of causes behind Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan. After the background chapter on Taliban in Afghanistan, each hypothesis of the study will form a separate chapter. The outcomes of each analysis will be summed up in the conclusions of the study.

* 1. **Taliban defeat**

Before looking on to the re-emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan and examining the causes behind their re-emergence, a brief outlook on the on the first months of Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan (OEF-A) will be describes and initial outcomes of it will be briefly outlined.

As already mentioned in the introductory part of this study, the U.S. led intervention in Afghanistan, OEF-A, began on October 7th, 2001. It was triggered by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11th, 2001, days after which now former U.S. President G.W. Bush proclaimed “War on Terror”. Because of the ties between al-Qaeda and Taliban and Taliban’s refusal to give out a leader and high-ranking members of al-Qaeda, came the decision to attack Afghanistan and its Taliban government. The aims and the end goals of this intervention were thought to be destruction of al-Qaeda and Taliban, which provided a safe haven for the former one.

OEF-A began with airstrikes on the capital Kabul, city of Jalalabad and Kandahar province.[[68]](#footnote-68) With a strong support of the Northern Alliance is less than a month Taliban regime was overthrown. First was the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif, the fourth largest city in Afghanistan and significant strategic importance because its capture opened supply routes and provided an airstrip inside the country for U.S. aircrafts.[[69]](#footnote-69) On the November 12th Herat, the third largest city in Afghanistan with a significant cultural and religious importance was captured by the Northern Alliance[[70]](#footnote-70), Special Forces of U.S. and United Kingdom.[[71]](#footnote-71) Next came the fall of Kabul, which was unexpectedly quick and easy, because most of Taliban forces had already left the capital, when the Northern Alliance together with U.S. led forces arrived.[[72]](#footnote-72) The fall of Kabul marked the beginning of a collapse of Taliban positions across the map. As Jalalabad also fell in the following 24 hours the main challenge now for the international forces was a siege of Kunduz, city where Taliban holdouts had fallen back to make a stand, fall of Kandahar, last remaining stronghold of Taliban and fight in Tora Bora mountains, where Taliban had regrouped.

By December 17th, the last cave complex in Tora Bora had been taken and their defenders overrun.[[73]](#footnote-73) Kunduz city was taken by the Northern Alliance on November 26th, after 9 days of heavy fighting and aerial bombardment.[[74]](#footnote-74) By the end of November and with the fall of Kunduz, Taliban controlled only 4 of 30 Afghanistan provinces. On early December 2001 the leader of Taliban Mullah Mohammed Omar together with a group of loyalists slipped out of Kandahar and up to the date has not been captured. Other remaining Taliban leaders and members fled to Pakistan through provinces of Paktia and Paktika southeast from Kabul. This marked the end of Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

After the fall of Kabul in November 2001, the UN invited major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern Alliance and a group led by the former king, to a conference in Bonn, Germany. On December 5th, 2001, the factions signed the Bonn Agreement, endorsed by UN Security Council. The agreement, reportedly was reached with substantial Iranian diplomatic help because of Iran's support for the Northern Alliance faction, installed Hamid Karzai as interim administration head, and created an international peacekeeping force to maintain security in Kabul. The Bonn Agreement was followed by UN Security Council Resolution 1386 on December 20, which established the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF.[[75]](#footnote-75)

It can be seen from the above written the defeat of Taliban had been fast and surprising for the international community who did not expect to hold a victory in two months. However, as it is known now the follow up events proved that Taliban was far from being defeated, never gave up and were planning a comeback to revenge. Probably a satisfying feeling of “a quick victory”, worked as a catalyst for the following sequence of events that led to the re-emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan.

**2.2. Re-emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan: chronologic timeline**

In the immediate aftermath of the international community’s victory over Taliban in Afghanistan, Afghan government under Hamid Karzai was established. This was done following a Loya Jirga[[76]](#footnote-76) and with an acceptance and approval of Western counties. From then on it was expected that Afghanistan will experience a stable period of prosperity and well-being of Afghans, since the main obstacle, terrorism, had been eradicated. However, it took only a month or so, until first signs of re-emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan were detected.

The following chapter of the study will provide a factual information and timeline of Taliban insurgence. It is needed to further elaborate of *why* was it possible for it to happen, despite of the initial defeat of them.

The truth is, that Taliban actually had never stopped reforming and regrouping, and it gained force in late February 2002. During the defeat of Taliban, although as many as 15,000 members were killed the leaders managed to escape to Pakistan. This made it possible to fully rebuild the movement two years later in 2003.[[77]](#footnote-77) On March 2nd, 2002, U.S. led and pro Afghan government militia supported operation against Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents in the Shahi-Koy Valley and Arma Mountains in Paktia province. The battle that lasted for 17 days and ended on March 18th is commonly referred to as “Operation Anaconda” and was the second largest offensive by the international community after the battle of Tora Bora in December 2001.

Although officially being considered as a victory of coalition forces, the operation has debatable outcome and has been criticized for numerous military and planning failures, avoidable deaths of coalition soldiers and Afghans militias, as well as for the fact that although as much as 500 – 800[[78]](#footnote-78) Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents were thought to be killed, operation did not result in the capture of the key leaders of both groupings and many of them still managed to escape to Pakistan.[[79]](#footnote-79)

Having managed to evade from coalition forces, the remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents were gradually gaining confidence and preparing to launch insurgency. Throughout mid-2002 and 2003, Taliban was recruiting new members, mainly close to the Afghan – Pakistan border on the Pakistan side, with the help of *madrassas*, religious schools, where most of new members were recruited from. On top of it pamphlets being distributed in secret during the night also began to appear in many villages in the former Taliban heartland in southeastern Afghanistan, mainly Pashtun areas that called for jihad – a holy war.[[80]](#footnote-80) A major concern was also the emergence of alternative and extremely dangerous fighting techniques that Taliban fighters had not used before – improvised explosive devices (IED’s).

There was no doubt left about Taliban re-emergence on January 27th, 2003 during Operation Mongoose, when a band of fighters allied with the Taliban were discovered by U.S. forces at the Adi Ghar cave complex. Also the first isolated attacks by comparatively large Taliban bands on Afghan targets appeared around that time.[[81]](#footnote-81) The fighting gradually increased throughout the summer of 2003 and during following years.

Unprecedented increase of suicide attacks was experienced during 2006. The number increased from 27 in 2005 to 139 in 2006. That was an alarming and dangerous trend that had not been so vivid before. Remotely detonated bombings more than doubled, reaching 1.677 in 2006. This happened in spite of recent successful elections in Afghanistan. In fact, some experts blame exactly Afghan government for the increase of attacks, claiming that, "as with most insurgencies, the critical precondition [to the Afghan insurgency] is the collapse of governance."[[82]](#footnote-82) Afghanistan expert Seth G. Jones and others stress on lack of basic services in Afghanistan, as well as the government's difficulties with setting police forces, and the need of more international force to assist with security.[[83]](#footnote-83)Along with offensives targeted to rebel groups, by 2006 coalition forces started the creating of provincial reconstruction teams (PRT), the main purpose of which was the supervision of the provincial development. In the same year Afghanistan experienced major peak of violence in southern Afghanistan since Taliban defeat in late 2001, as NATO troops battled resurgent militants.


By 2008, after continuous fighting with Taliban and changing success, it was decided that a significant increase of troops is needed. As a result in the first half of 2008 U.S. troops in Afghanistan were increased by 80% with a surge of 21,643[[84]](#footnote-84) and additional 4.500[[85]](#footnote-85) troops in the second half of the same year. Other ISAF countries also increased their troops on the ground however this increase was not as significant as that of U.S. The increase of the troops continued also in 2009, as Barack Obama planned to send 17.000 additional troops to Afghanistan. Reinforcements mainly focused on countering "resurgent" Taliban, as well as guarding the Afghan-Pakistan border in the south.[[86]](#footnote-86)

By the 2010 along with the fluctuating resurgence and offensive of Taliban NATO member countries decided to hand over the security issues of Afghanistan to Afghan forces by the end of 2014. The process itself was coined transition and was due to begin in July 2011 when local security forces would take over the most stable and secure provinces. The transition process was set to begin in July 2011, with local security forces taking over control in relatively stable provinces and cities. However, in spite of the good intentions there is a concern that Afghanistan is being abandoned out of helplessness of the situation with Taliban and that the transition process has been set too soon. There are concerns also regarding the ability and readiness of Afghan security forces to take over the control of security in Afghanistan.[[87]](#footnote-87)

Regarding the attacks of Taliban in Afghanistan it can be seen from the first graph (see graph Nr.1) that although minor fluctuations, the overall tendency is that the number of attacks has steadily increased.

*Graph Nr.1*

*Monthly Attacks by Armed Opposition Groups, 2006 – 2010.*

[[88]](#footnote-88)

The periods of 2009 and 2010 have been particularly violent and experienced dramatic increase of attacks in comparison with years 2006 – 2008. And although the attacks have started fluctuating and decreasing occasionally, probably due to the additional deployment of ISAF troops in 2010, Taliban is far from being eradicated. Moreover now, when the ISAF is due to withdraw, Taliban is “growing muscles” and almost without any doubt waiting to retaliate. The question here is, why is that a case and why has this been possible in the first place? The next chapters will deal with finding an answer to that, by investigating three hypotheses of this study.

1. **Casual mechanisms behind Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan after their defeat in 2001**
   1. **Ethnic heterogeneity as a causal mechanism for Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan**


Following the international relations approach in the civil war studies, one might argue that civil war occurred and Taliban re-emerged in Afghanistan because of the grievances connected to ethnic issues. Ethnicity is formed by various ever-changing variables. The basic ones of them are thought to be language, religion and descent. However, things usually are not that simple in practice as in theory, thus in the case of Afghanistan not only these three factors determine a particular ethnicity, but as well other identities play crucial role in distinguishing ethnic identity. In Afghanistan it is historical importance and significance of tribes, regions and smaller sub-groups to basic ethnic communities. Not only this matter, when describing ethnic groups in Afghanistan, but as well urban-rural divide and also literate and illiterate part of the population. Although, identities are multiple, various and ever changing for each individual, in the conflicts that coincide with ethnic boundaries, ethnic identities prevail. Ethnicity is conventionally seen as a fixed identity; however, even ethnic identities are in the constant process of transformation and are being influenced.[[89]](#footnote-89) What complicates Afghanistan’s case even more is the fact that has been noted by scholars of Afghanistan Andresas Wimmer and Conrad Schetter: “Ethno-religious groups in Afghanistan only appear as clear bounded units on the maps of Western policy-makers.”[[90]](#footnote-90) This seriously reduces the opportunities for multiple identities or loyalties of the identities that are fluid by nature.[[91]](#footnote-91)

Numbers about overall population in Afghanistan differ slightly. While data taken from The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates as of July 2012 claim to be 30.4 million, Index Mundi estimates 29.8 million as of July 2011.[[92]](#footnote-92) It has to be noted that this is a significantly revised figure, since the previously estimated figure of 33.6 million was extrapolated from the last Afghan census held in 1979, which was never completed because of the Soviet invasion.[[93]](#footnote-93)

The largest community is that of Pashtuns, and although they do not comprise a majority, Pashtuns are a plurality of population – 42%. They mainly inhabit South, South-East and South-West regions of Afghanistan. The second largest community in Afghanistan is Tajiks which comprise 27% of population and inhabit mainly North-East and North-West of Afghanistan (see map Nr.1). Hazaras and Uzbeks constitute 9% of population each. Hazaras are located mainly in central Afghanistan, while Uzbeks inhabit North of Afghanistan. The remaining 13% of population is divided among communities like Baloch, Turkmen, Pashai, Nuristani and others (see map Nr.1). As one can clearly see, Afghanistan is highly ethnically diverse and heterogeneous society.

*Map Nr.1*

*The Ethnic Breakdown of Afghanistan*

[[94]](#footnote-94)

After the fall of Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan’s new political elites had an opportunity to create an ethnically inclusive state.[[95]](#footnote-95) The choices were mostly concerned regarding whether Afghanistan should be a federation or unitary state; presidential or parliamentary democracy; and “whether or whether not consociational forms of power sharing in elected and non-elected institutions of the state should be adopted.”[[96]](#footnote-96) When making those decisions it had to be taken into consideration that ethnical communities in Afghanistan are not fully homogenous and are often divided not only along regional lines, but as well tribal lines.[[97]](#footnote-97)

Afghans are more homogenous if divided by religious and sectarian lines. 99% of them are Muslim, 80% of who are Sunnis. From here it can be seen that community cleavages in Afghanistan are numerous, but in addition to that in fact some of them are conterminous, while others cross-cutting – for example, majority of Hazaras are Shia, while Pashtuns are divided along regional and tribal lines. This in combination with a cross boarder linkages with communities in Pakistan poses an ever greater challenge to Afghanistan and creates a complex ethnical, religious, regional and tribal landscape that poses a potential danger of the conflict situations and emergence of civil war. And although diversity itself cannot explain or create instability *per se*, it is indeed a promoting factor of it.[[98]](#footnote-98)

In the case of Afghanistan, one can clearly see the potential of civil war, since ethnical differences among different communities are coupled with sectarian differences and combined with multiple other identities, such as tribal belonging. This is even more dangerous and potentially explosive than simply ethnic differences among different communities.

One would think that ethnic identity loses its importance during the Jihad, the holy war, when different forces regardless of their ethnic identities unite in the name of Islam, but it is a false assumption. Apart from the division among Sunni and Shi’ite line, also ethnic identities play a significant role during Jihad. For example primarily Shi’ite Hazaras did not get a support from U.S. or Pakistan, because of U.S. rivalry with Iran, which is Shi’ite Muslim country. As it can be seen from the abovementioned ethnic identity is not static and does not lose its importance neither in everyday life, not Jihad or civil war. It is ever-present, even if combined with other identities or overshadowed by Shi’ite/Sunni dichotomy.

Although ethnically very mixed as mentioned before, Afghanistan has one core group and it is Pashtun. Even the word *Afghan* is nothing more than a variation of a word *Pashtun*, which literally mean “land of the Pashtun.”[[99]](#footnote-99) Taliban movement is known to have emerged in the refugee camps along with the Durand line in the beginning of nineties and it was composed (and still is) mainly by Pashtuns. Afghanistan was pulled in a new civil war as during OEF-A, U.S. decided to co-operate with Northern Alliance, whose armies and militias are non-Pashtun part of Afghan population. Quite naturally this decision was not supported and backed by Pashtun population. This discontent could not be entirely changed even by Pashtun Karzai or the inclusion of Pashtuns in the newly established institutions right after 2001. Already in 2003 there were first serious warnings coming from International Crisis Group (ICG) about the alienation of Pashtuns from the Karzai’s government, as well as the whole nation-building process. In the territory of Afghanistan known as Pashtun belt there is an overwhelming notion of the occupation of Afghanistan by foreign forces and this creates hyper-nationalistic feelings among Pashtuns. This in combination with the fear of being dominated by other groups, like Hazaras or Tajiks, can explain the increasing recruits of Taliban and the rise of its strength.[[100]](#footnote-100) This, in relation to the theory of civil war can be referred to as a primary *grievance* in the case of Afghanistan, which on the background of ethnic differences has led to the re-emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan after 2001 and thus the re-emergence of civil war in Afghanistan as such.

However a *grievance* from the part of Pashtuns is not so typical as usually described in theory. In this case, the revolt and insurgency itself is not about demanding a power that a certain ethnic group has been deprived from in the past, but its more about regaining the power and the strength that a certain ethnic group has held the power in the past and wants to get it back. After the fall of Taliban in Afghanistan, although represented in the newly formed Karzai’s government, Pashtun community felt the loss of power. Afghanistan since 2001 is in unprecedented situation where Pashtuns are no longer running state institutions. Striving to renew the historical dominance of Pashtuns seems natural and understandable, only the way of doing it led to the return of civil war in Afghanistan. And by saying this it has to be noted that, of course, not all Pashtuns are Taliban, or not all Sunni Muslims are Taliban, but the overwhelming majority of Taliban recruits are from Pashtun ethnic group and happen to be mainly Sunni Islam followers. To complicate the matters even more, there is a need to distinguish between different sub-groups of Pashtuns. Pashtuns are not only further divided in two main sub-groups, Durrani and Ghilzai, but also on other levels, in which tribes are of an upmost importance. And it would be a false assumption to think that all Pashtuns have friendly and brotherly relationships among those sub-groups. There is in fact rivalry among them.[[101]](#footnote-101) This is further outlined below, when examining Taliban movement in more detail.

Historically inter-ethnic relations in Afghanistan can be described as tolerant, of good coexistence and pride of diversity, but as well of unequal opportunities, conflict and civil wars. However, it is interesting that there is a general trend among Afghans to deny that the cause of these conflicts can be found in ethnic disputes. They tend to describe it differently, distinguishing between ordinary Afghans and high political level, which despite of non-existent ethnic conflict *per se,* ethnicise the issues in this way manipulating with ordinary Afghans. Although in some aspects such a portrayal might be accurate, in others it is too positive.[[102]](#footnote-102) Since the essence of every conflict if either the race to power or search of justice (which does not necessarily mean justice in objective terms), it has to be noted again that historically most of the periods Pashtun community has been the dominant one in Afghanistan, during Taliban rule, as well as in previous periods of history. It can be argued that the cause behind Taliban re-emergence is attempts of certain ethnic community, Pashtun, to obtain power again.

When examining the re-emergence of Taliban after their defeat, it is important to note that the insurgency that has taken place since early 2001, up to current days and the civil war that it has created as a result, is different and more complex than the one that we used to know before 2001. In fact, when we talk about insurgency after 2001, we have to talk not only about re-emergence of Taliban, but as well another terrorist organization – Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), led by former Pashtun warlord Hekmatyar Gulbuddin. HiG was not acknowledged to be a terrorist organization by the international community up until 2006 and by the time of renewed insurgency in Afghanistan in 2002 was only in a ‘group of concern’. Its fighting strength is sometimes estimated to number in thousands, which makes HiG the second and/or third largest insurgent group in Afghanistan after Taliban.[[103]](#footnote-103)

There is also Haqqani Network, which is also led by former warlord Siraj Haqqani, allies with Taliban and is known to operate on Afghanistan-Pakistan border, as well as Waziristan’s tribal frontline in Pakistan. Its strength is estimated to be couple of thousands making it the second or/and the third largest insurgent group after Taliban. The figures on the strength and capacity of HiG and Haqqani Network differ from source to source and precise numbers are not available, however it is commonly agreed that we can talk about couple of thousands when both combined.

Although worth mentioning and describing this study will not deal with those two groups of insurgency in more detail. The main focus of the study is on Taliban, which is the largest insurgent group in Afghanistan since 2002 up to the date. Taliban heavily outnumber HiG and Haqqani groups with approx. 40000 fighters. And even in 2002 when the insurgency was still relatively small they already outnumbered the rest of the insurgent groups which can be more described as allies of Taliban.

In order to understand Taliban, one needs to abandon a simplified view on this organization. Popular Western view on Taliban goes as follows:

Taliban movement is driven by images of robed, bearded men toting Qurans and guns and instituting draconian social policies while harboring global jihadists.[[104]](#footnote-104)

However true and simple this might look on the surface, a credible analysis of Taliban require a thorough examination of Islamic traditions, ethno-linguistic links and tribal phenomena, as well as the situation in frontier border areas with Pakistan and the circumstances under which Taliban rose to power.

The success of Taliban can be described by several major and minor factors, but by summing them up one can come to the conclusion that it is due to the tribal dynamics, Pakistan’s support and charisma of Taliban leader Mohammed Omar, that Taliban became so powerful. As mentioned before Taliban is primarily Pashtun movement and primarily attracting Sunni Muslims. However, this oversimplified look on Taliban is of no use if trying to understand ethnic dynamics of Taliban and the reasons behind their re-emergence.

If examined more in detail, it becomes clear that Taliban is not simply a Pashtun movement, but Pashtun movement of Ghilzai sub-group. Moreover, it is largely led by a single tribe of Pashtuns – Hotaki. This is what forms the tribal politics of Taliban movement. Seven out of eleven senior leaders of Taliban are from Ghilzai Hotaki tribe and one more of them is Ghilzai without affiliation to Hotaki tribe (see table Nr.1).

*Table Nr. 1*

*Senior Taliban Leaders*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Name** | **Position** | **Tribal Affiliation** |
| Mullah Muhammad Omar | Movement Leader | Hotaki Ghilzai |
| Mullah Berader | Deputy Movement Leader | Ghilzai |
| Mullah Dadullah Kakar | Senior Military Commander | Kakar Ghurghusht |
| Mullah Mohammad Hassan | Foreign Minister after 1997 | Hotaki Ghilzai |
| Nuruddin Turabi | Minister of Justice | Hotaki Ghilzai |
| Alla Dad Akhund | Minister of Communications | Hotaki Ghilzai |
| Mohamed Essa | Minister of Water and Power | Hotaki Ghilzai |
| Wakil Ahmed | Personal Secretary to Mullah Omar | Kakar Ghurghusht |
| Sadeq Akhond | Minister of Commerce | Hotaki Ghilzai |
| Mohammed Rabbani | Chairman of Kabul Shura | Kakar Ghurghusht |
| Mullah Obaidullah | Minister of Defense | Hotaki Ghilzai |

A rivalry between Ghilzai and Durrani sub-group of Pashtuns, serves as an explanation of why they are not focus on bringing down Kabul, but are first establishing political dominance in Kandahar and Helmand provinces – both Durrani lands.[[105]](#footnote-105) So, concluding from this, one might argue, that the re-emergence of Taliban is not simply an attempt of one ethnic group to obtain the power that it has been deprived for. It is an attempt to regain the power that it has had obtained in the past. Moreover, it is not an attempt of one single ethnic group, but an attempt supervised and fueled by the representatives of one single tribe, Hotaki, of one single ethnical sub-group, Ghilzai, that is in constant rivalry for power with the other ethnical sub-group Durrani, both of which belong to Pashtun community. One can clearly see that it is not simply ethnical differences that serve as a precondition of the re-emergence of Taliban and thus a civil war in Afghanistan, but as well ethnic sub-group rivalry, together with tribal differences and influence of religious ideology.

Because Taliban is considered to be mainly a Pashtun movement and is mobilized in order to regain the lost power, but in the meantime there is an existence of sub-group and tribal dynamics in these ethnic groups, the first hypothesis is proved to be partly valid. However this hypothesis only explains and describes the sentiments of Taliban and the ideological seeds of their activities, but not how was it possible for them to spring again in the political reality where Karzai’s Afghanistan has been backed by the international community. Therefore, in the next chapter the second hypothesis is being introduced: “Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan was possibly due to the weak state institutions and overly-centralized government.”

* 1. **Weak state as a causal mechanism for Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan**

When examining weak state phenomena as a causal mechanism of Taliban re-emergence one leans towards comparativist approach in civil war analysis. The argument supporting the validity of the second hypothesis would be that the weak government and institutions in Afghanistan, as well as high levels of corruption, drug production and trafficking are a real cause for Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan. The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether it is the case. The first thing that needs to be done in order to examine the second hypothesis is to set the criteria for a weak state. In the scope of this study weak state will be characterized by high level of poverty, weak state institutions, corruption and weak center – periphery relations. Following the description for each of these criteria, the analysis of them will be made in the case of Afghanistan, in order to examine the validity of the second hypothesis and the assumption that Taliban re-emerged because of weak state existence in Afghanistan. The following chapter deals with these criteria in more detail.

Many separate and interlinked factors can cause the existence of the weak state and that in turn – potential of civil war. In the case of Afghanistan weak state has been caused by weak institutions, overly-centralized government, strict division between urban – rural areas and central – peripheral areas, economic deprivation and corruption. All of these problems taken together have created a existence of weak state in Afghanistan. The question is whether the weak state has served as a causal mechanism for the re-emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan and renewal of civil war? In the following chapter different aspects of weak state in the case of Afghanistan will be examined and adjusted to the process of Taliban re-emergence.

As a theory goes, the government and the governance (former referring to a set of state institution and the latter to the way that they have been run) that is illegitimate is thus inherently unstable. This in turn means that when the government loses coercive power, this result in disobedience of the population which creates a breakdown of order.[[106]](#footnote-106) Related to counterinsurgency, this means that no permanent success can be reached without achieving government’s legitimacy.[[107]](#footnote-107) There are six indicators that describe legitimate governance and thus determine the strength of a state: firstly, it is an ability of the government to provide security for its people; secondly, the selection and election process of the state leaders has to be frequent and considered to be just and fair by the population; thirdly, the level of corruption needs to be in the culturally acceptable proportion;fourthly, an overall support for the political process in the state and relatively high level of participation; fifthly, economic, political and social development in the state that is culturally acceptable; finally, the regime needs to be accepted by major institutions. There are several aspects that make one to question the legitimacy of current Afghan government.[[108]](#footnote-108)

The real time situation is Afghanistan, similar to that of in 2002 when Taliban re-emerged is high levels of corruption, slow development, manipulated elections, rampant violence, shattered rule of law, as well as weak leadership skills of Karzai, has created a situation when the government and the governance itself cannot be considered to be legitimate.[[109]](#footnote-109) While some argue that weak state phenomena has to be blamed for the errors and failures of counterinsurgency, the author of this study makes the point that it is to be blamed for the insurgency itself. As the ordinary Afghan sees and explains it: “there were no police here and no Afghan army,” he continues, “so the Taliban saw their chance and came in.”[[110]](#footnote-110)And as a famous Afghanistan expert Thomas Barfield put it:

Had Karzai been able to establish security and extend his government’s control throughout the country, he would have met the basic premodern test of legitimacy. Holding elections did not compensate for his government’s failure to meet this bedrock benchmark. [[111]](#footnote-111)

As just mentioned, one of the factors that create weak state is weak government and state institutions. Karzai’s government by no doubt can be described as weak. Its weakness can be illustrated through variety of aspects. Excluding Karzai’s own personality from the analysis of the functioning of his government, one stumbles upon the problems of unbalanced center – periphery governance, fractioned government, unsuitable appointments, large-scale corruption, slow progress in strengthening ANSF and proceeding with reconstruction works, as well as problem of drug production. Right after the defeat of Taliban government and even now one cannot talk about a fully functioning Afghan state, instead there is a weak and divided government run from Kabul. By the time of Taliban re-emergence also the national army was almost non-existent and very small in numbers. The warlords had possesed a control over some provinces in Afghanistan and Afghanistan once again become the world’s first opium producer.[[112]](#footnote-112)

One of the major problems emerged with a newly formed government itself. What was thought to be a benefit for dealing with an ethnic issue and create a representable government, was the fact that Karzai is Pashtun. However, this has not been the case. While Karzai himself is a Pashtun, he was not able to create a balance in his cabinet. The appointed government members from Northern Alliance were constantly having arguments with Pashtun government members. As Karzai tried to correct the situation by changing the ethnic proportions in the cabinet, he was seen as being anti-Mujahedeen by Northern Alliance and marginalizing other ethnic communities. Problems sprung not only in the cabinet, but as well various ministries and municipalities, where appointments were made not on the merit, but affiliation to a particular ethnic group. Those events not only damaged the legitimacy of Karzai’s government, but as well fueled the corruption and affected the performance of the government.[[113]](#footnote-113) One would think that Karzai is probably popular among Pashtuns, this however is a false assumption. Karzai has long discredited himself with the lack of independence and autonomy by the fact that he has been backed by Western counties and is “un-Islamic”. It would not take much to transform the rhetoric and start referring to him as “infidel”. All of these inherit problems of Karzai’s government and president Karzai himself have contributed to the weak state phenomena in Afghanistan.

While a lot of attention was put on conducting provincial and parliamentary elections and making appointments, often accompanied with corrupt activities, there was a little focus on strengthening state institutions. What was urgently needed back in 2001 to avoid the emergence of weak state was investment (fiscal as well as technical) in the key institutions. The lack of such commitment, meant that institution-building and strengthening, as well as democracy-building as such, has went astray. As it has been noted by the political philosopher Stephen Holmes, “liberal values are threatened just as throughout by state incapacity as by despotic power.”[[114]](#footnote-114) In the case of Afghanistan the former is as much of a danger as a latter.

Probably even bigger criticism than the way and manner of how the government has been run should be addressed to type of government itself. In such a heterogeneous society as in Afghanistan, having 34 provinces and vast diversity of not only in regional and ethnic, but as well tribal affiliation, centralized form of government is probably the worst form of governance that could have been established. If one should combine all the criticism regarding the overly-centralized government of Afghanistan, it could be said, that the state power simply does not reach the periphery of the country. When looking back to Afghanistan’s history, one sees that the most successful governments have been the ones in which the central authorities directly control urban areas, but have indirect and limited control over the periphery. The history also shows that the governments that have tried to rule Afghanistan with the help of centralized system, starting with King Amanullah finishing with the Communist Government and even Taliban, have failed. That is a worrisome trend showing the high probability of Karzai’s government to fail as well.[[115]](#footnote-115)

If analyzed from the rural dimension of a weak state, then already back in the beginning of 2002 and in some ways even today Afghanistan has had all the preconditions of the Taliban re-emergence and occurrence of civil war. The overly centralized government created a situation where rural areas were especially weak and vulnerable. An important reality of rural Afghanistan was left out when planning the government structure. In Afghanistan, especially in the rural and peripheral areas, the population is willing to choose their own people to solve and mediate their daily issues and concerns. Successful regimes in Afghanistan have been the ones which have found the way of empowering local communities for certain amount of informal decision-making. In return, local communities are not challenging the sovereignity of the state and legitimacy of a government.Unsuccessful regimes in Afghanistan, however, have chosen to favor the use of force when dealing with local communities.This in turn has created a backlash in the form of rebellions and insurgencies, that in all cases have challenged the legitimacy of the government and the sovereignity of the state.[[116]](#footnote-116) There is also a clear linkage between the poverty and rural insurgency. Rural areas, especially the ones that are mountainous, in weak and poor states, such as Afghanistan, are usually worse policed and controlled, therefore the bigger risk of insurgency.

Theoretically, as already mentioned in the study, the emergence of civil war starting from rural insurgency is highly likely, firstly because insurgents are able to hide and mix with local population, since local norms of honor and solidarity disapproves denouncing. Also the relatively high levels of tolerance regarding threats of violence among rural people, contributes to the danger of insurgency. The catalyst for rural insurgency could also be that an economy based on farming tends to support the idea armed resistance more than the one that is based on wage labor. Finally, dispersion of population in rural area impedes policing, which leads the possibility of insurgency (*cf*. p. 23). All of these theoretical preconditions for the emergence of insurgency in rural areas are existent in the case of Afghanistan and the re-emergence of Taliban insurgency. As a result the fact that the Taliban re-emergence sprung from the rural and peripheral areas of Afghanistan coincides with the theoretical explanation of the study the insurgencies and civil wars are likely to emerge in the rural and mountainous areas of poor states with weak institutions.

A weak state phenomena in Afghanistan has also created a situation of slow development and reconstruction of rural areas of Afghanistan, which has lead the country to extreme poverty, corruption and the situation where one third of Afghanistan’s GDP is made from drug trafficking.A research conducted by *UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights*, has discovered that there are more deaths in Afghanistan that result from poverty, than the ones that result from the armed conflict, accidental or inevitable. The things that have contributes to the expansion of the poverty in Afghanistan include: “(..) patronage, corruption, impunity and over-emphasis on short-term goals rather than targeted long-term development are exacerbating a situation of dire poverty that is the condition of an overwhelming majority of Afghans.”[[117]](#footnote-117) According to the same report, as well as data from *The World Bank*, 36% (9 million) Afghans live below national poverty line, that is – in absolute poverty. Another 37% live slightly above the poverty line. This is all in spite of the continuous injections of development aid and assistance flowing into Afghan economy, composed of $ 5,476 million in official grants in 2010, $ 78 million coming from official creditors and $ 76 million in foreign direct investment in Afghanistan.[[118]](#footnote-118)This tells something of the current state of corruption in Afghanistan.

When analyzing data of corruption in Afghanistan, the situation is just as bleak as with the poverty. Data provided by *Transparency International* show that by corruption perception Index Afghanistan had showed the result as a 180th country out of 183 countries that were included in the analysis. It scored 1.5 in the scale of 1-10, one being the lowest possible score. As for the control of corruption the percentile rank is only 1% out of 100. In the ‘Global Corruption Barometer’ conducted by *Transparency International* in 2010, 61% of Afghans have reported of paying a bribe in that year. When it comes to the question of the effectiveness of the government of fighting the corruption, 39% of Afghans think that the government has been ineffective in fighting the corruption, 26% think that the government has not been neither effective nor ineffective, but 35% think that the government has been effective in fighting corruption. From the above-mentioned numbers one can see that overall population in Afghanistan find their government fight against corruption as being ineffective or do not think that there have been any efforts at all. Data on corruption clearly proves Afghanistan being a weak state.[[119]](#footnote-119)

One of the major factors weakening Afghanistan and fostering corruption is drug trafficking. For already more than a decade Afghanistan has dominated the global opium market. Afghanistan is a global leader in illegal opium production and accounts for roughly 90% of global supply. Most of the profits from illegal trade are made outside Afghanistan and the market worth for Afghan heroin comprises $ 55 million per annum.[[120]](#footnote-120) Eradication of illegal drug cultivation, which remains to be the main financial source of Taliban, should be a number one priority for Afghan government. It would also help to lower the level corruption, improve livelihoods of ordinary Afghans and strengthen Afghanistan; however the policy on eradication has not yielded positive results due to the mass peasants’ revolts of dissatisfaction, since the fields are usually considered to be the main source of livelihood for the Afghan villagers in rural Afghanistan. This strategy has proved to be not productive due to multiple implications, one among which is considered to be the historical experience.

In the mid-80s the Soviet government has tried to do the same in Afghanistan by applying the policy of destroying the agricultural resources. This led to the complete collapse of the agricultural production of Afghanistan: the destruction of orchards and irrigation canals.[[121]](#footnote-121) In reality illegal drug cultivation remains the most profitable mean of living for the poor in the countryside. As for now, no development aid or grants for crop cultivation come even close to the profit from illegal drug production. It is known that Taliban benefit enormously in financial terms and from drug trade. The revenue is used to buy weaponry, recruit new members, barter of consumer goods and sponsoring *madrasas[[122]](#footnote-122)* in Pakistan. Poppy growing and trafficking is one of the most crucial financial sources of Taliban. Already since the year 2000 the business partnership between Taliban and drug traffickers has become deeper and stronger. What gives the opium the added value is also the lack of confidence in Afghan government. A lack of confidence and trust in the Afghan government also gives opium an added value. It has been argued that in case Taliban’s financing through poppy cultivation are cut off, they will experience a blow, however there is also fear that Taliban is capable of transforming into completely new and unknown way.[[123]](#footnote-123)

One more major concern in regards to weak government and state institutions is Afghan army and police, combined under ANSF. Initially, building Afghanistan's own capacity to provide for its security was a major goal of the international community in Afghanistan, following the ouster of the Taliban in 2002. Along with the efforts to defeat the Taliban insurgency, as well as to provide reconstruction and development to Afghan people, the international community and the government of Afghanistan were focused on developing and sustaining ANSF. Afghan National Army is under the supervision of the Ministry of Defense, while Afghan National Police is under the supervision of the ministry of Interior. ANSF is thought to guarantee security and stability in Afghanistan. The long-term goal of the functioning of ANSF was for it to be “nationally respected; professional; ethnically balanced; democratically accountable; organized, trained, and equipped to meet the security needs of the country and increasingly funded from Afghanistan’s revenue.”[[124]](#footnote-124)

Although looking good and promising on paper, ANSF have had number problems that have weakened the institution over time and made the insurgence easier to accomplish. Although the initial forecasts regarding the quantity for ANSF recruits were optimistic in general, over the time the predictions have become more realistic. Also the quality lags back from the expected. There are number of reasons for that. First is the feeling of loyalty of ANSF recruits to the institution and Afghan state in general, secondly it is a corruption problem in ANSF and Afghanistan in general, and then comes drug problem, finally the ineffective functioning of judiciary system in Afghanistan also plays a role in weakening of ANSF. As one can see from the above-mentioned all the problems of ANSF are interconnected and linked with the major problems of a weak Afghan state and its institutions. Corruption, drug production and trafficking problem, ineffective state institutions, especially judiciary, naturally creates weakness of ANSF. Despite of the efforts of the ISAF forces to properly train and equip ANSF, they are still operating under the supervision of the foreign troops and are not capable to take a full responsibility of Afghanistan on themselves yet. The major danger is in the fact that this is not the case because of the unprofessionalism of ISAF personnel, but rather because all these enrooted problems of a weak state.

Taliban re-emerged in Afghanistan in 2002 on the background of fighting warlords and militias that were controlling opium production in the country. In the similar way as in 1994, they promised to bring in order, lawfulness and justice, as well as fighting corruption and end what they saw as “foreign occupation”. And again they filled the vacuum of power, by providing the basic services to people and bringing in justice by Sharia law. They also protected farmers growing poppy from the government officials. They found supporters and like-minded in the regions and provinces of Afghanistan that were more remote, rural, mountainous, poor, conservative and religious. For them the foreign presence equated the occupation and dominance of a foreign force and eradication of poppy fields meant even greater poverty and despair. Those people were the core supporters of Taliban and turned to them for dispute settlement and for the establishment of the justice and order.[[125]](#footnote-125)

Weak government, governance and state institutions, overly centralized government, as well as poverty and corruption, have formed weak Afghanistan that has been an easy and tempting target for Taliban re-emergence. Being sponsored by the drug trade and operating in the vast mountainous territories that are hardly ever policed, it was easier for Taliban to re-emerge than in the absence of these circumstances. Therefore, the second hypothesis of this study has proven to be valid.

However, nether an argument of ethnic grievance an tribal dynamics of Taliban described while examining the validity of first hypothesis nor the evidence of the weak government in Afghanistan and it’s disability of dealing with Taliban re-emergence does not fully explain the financial, technical and ideological sufficiency for the enduring existence of Taliban. There might possibly be some external factors that need examination. Because, it is now known that the training and ideological education of new recruits of Taliban took place in *madrasas* along the Durand Line on Pakistan’s side, it is important to assess possibility and probability of an external influence and external causal mechanisms that could have fostered Taliban re-emergence. Therefore, in the next chapter the author elaborates on the possible external support for Taliban, while examining validity of the third and final hypothesis of the study: “Taliban re-emergence was possible due to the factors of external nature.”

* 1. **External support as a causal mechanism for Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan**

In the theoretical chapter of this study there was a brief mention of the role of external forces, either positive or negative. The main idea regarding the foreign intervention is (*cf*. p. 26):

As for interventions in civil wars, they usually prolong them, however, only interventions that are very supportive towards government, have a potential to shorten conflict.[[126]](#footnote-126)

A purpose of the third hypothesis is to examine the validity of the assumption that there have been external influences and causes for the ability of Taliban to re-emerge. This hypothesis has been created in order to examine if in the case study of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan there has been significant external support for their activities, may it be financial, technical or ideological. To analyze the possible existence of external influences to Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan, firstly the interests that other powers might have in supporting Taliban will be analyzed. Then the examination and assessment of the existence and amount of financial, technical and ideological support for Taliban that could have helped to trigger the re-emergence will follow.

Although the U.S.-led intervention is the one most widely spoken about and discussed, there are other just as important external actors in the case of Taliban re-emergence. These are Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. In the scope of this study only Pakistan’s role as a causal mechanism of re-emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan will be discussed. Because Taliban is indeed mainly centered in the border region in Pakistan, and since this country is blamed for providing safe haven for Taliban, it is of an utmost importance to consider this country and its relation to Taliban as a possible catalyst of the re-emergence of civil war in Afghanistan.

In the beginnings of the formation of Taliban after the collapse of Soviet Union and their withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan was the country that supported Taliban both diplomatically and financially, in addition to harboring Osama bin Laden himself.[[127]](#footnote-127) Already since the beginnings of the 90ies Pakistan has had twofold interests in Afghanistan: firstly, it has been willing get the control over trading routes to Central Asia, which would mean favorable strategic position in comparison with India – a country that still is a major security concern to Pakistan. In order to achieve this, Pakistan intended “to turn Afghanistan into a vassal country by playing on the Pushtun ethnic group and on fundamentalism”.[[128]](#footnote-128) Taliban seemed to be suitable for this purpose, because of Pashtun and fundamentalist characteristics in it.Accordingly, Taliban has been tied with Pakistan since its emergence.[[129]](#footnote-129)

As mentioned before the Taliban, are the students of *madrasas*. They were and still are situated mainly on the Pakistan side of Durand Line and the recruits of them were mostly refugees escaping to Pakistan from post-Soviet Afghanistan and coming from Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. It has been commonly agreed now that those religious seminaries were established with the help of intelligence agencies of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, as well as U.S. They also assisted in developing a special curriculum of ideological indoctrination meant to create a mindset of jihad in the refugees from Afghanistan.[[130]](#footnote-130)Currently *madrasas* in Pakistan produce around 250 000 student and future recruits for Taliban anually. Taking into account the grim situation in the educational sector in Pakistan, as well as in Afghanistan there is no easy way out of this situation. No matter how the official government in Pakistan would adress this problem, as for now the situation along the Duranad Line is out of reach for central governments of both countries, at least when it comes to the tribal area.[[131]](#footnote-131)

By the time of the first Taliban emergence in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s intent was to gain an influence over Afghanistan and Afghan policy. The primary interest of Pakistan by supporting Taliban at that time was trade interest. However, back then Taliban was not dependent merely on foreign support. As Norwegian sociologist Kristian Berg Herpviken puts it:

(..) Foreign support was not a sufficient condition for successful military mobilization. It was, rather, the Taliban ideology’s unique appeal and connection to the community through *madrasas* that differentiated the Taliban from other groups like the Hezb-e Islami who, despite financial and military superiority, were unable to mobilize broadly.[[132]](#footnote-132)

When it comes to Pakistan’s role in Taliban after its emergence, it was stronger.At that time Pakistan’s funding helped Taliban to pay off regional leaders. This together with image of invincibility and growing credibility explains Taliban success during their first emergence. As already mentioned before Pakistan’s support for Taliban was stronger after its initial emergence, namely, by the time it moved to take over Kabul.At this stage only Pakistan started openly sponsoring and funding Taliban. This support included radio communications, military advisers, as well as technical fields for training.[[133]](#footnote-133)The scholar on Afghanistan Citha Maass that Taliban taking over of Kabul “had obviously been masterminded with the assistance of external strategists.”[[134]](#footnote-134)It is also argued that Pakistan not only helped in recruiting *madrasa* students into Taliban, but as well was active in providing troops.

Although, officially Pakistan has decided to support U.S. efforts on eradicating Taliban rule and establishing peace in Afghanistan, there are also doubts in regards to whether Pakistan is sincere in its official commitments. There are three major areas of concern. The first is in regards to the various and extremely diverse warrior groups that where interlocked in the civil war. They were not reconciled or eradicated after Taliban defeat in 2001. Back then and now they still do depend on the economic and financial support from the external partners that all have their own different geo-political interests for the region. One of these states is thought to be Pakistan. In a politically and strategically so highly complex region, Pakistan is in constant rivalry with India and therefore needs a grip over Afghanistan and a possible way of achieving it is with the help of Taliban movement. Unfortunately, the post-Taliban Karzai’s government has not been able to provide its government with the significant and reliable means of fighting the undesirable insurgency and this stream from weak institutions. The second concern is related to the fact that religious fundamentalist, ideological and ethnic groups in the region have created and strengthened independent support network. Afghanistan and its neighbors find the task of fighting non-state actors that threaten traditional order challenging. Finally, Pakistan has exploited and continues to exploit Afghanistan’s vulnerabilities and weakness of the state to its advantage. This has formed the internal rivalries that seek to destabilize Afghanistan and that are extremely difficult to fight against (e.g. Taliban).[[135]](#footnote-135)

Although Taliban insurgency coming from Pakistan is the biggest one, there are other terrorist networks situated along the Durand Line and create a danger. As it can be seen in the map Nr. 2, together with Taliban, also Hizb-i-Islami, al-Qaeda and Jalaluddin Haqqani network forms the insurgency threat, since being located on the both sides of the Durand Line.

*Map Nr.2*

*Map of Taliban, Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, al-Qaeda and Jalaluddin Haqqani network insurgency*

**[[136]](#footnote-136)**

In short, during the re-emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan the most critical aspect of the insurgency onset was Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan. It was here where Taliban, as well as other smaller groups of insurgency were able to regain power and strength by developing new strategies, recruiting members, doing fund raising, and escaping from capture. U.S. forces did not try to catch the Taliban there. The sanctuary that they received in Pakistan along Afghanistan-Pakistan border allowed the recruitment of new members of Taliban, also referred to as “neo-Taliban”. Most of the recruits were from *madrasas* and refugee camps. Taliban was also successful in gaining support from elements of Pakistan’s government of extreme ideology. Now it is clear that Pakistan government has provided support and assistance to Taliban, as well as other extremist groups. Namely, officials involved in Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) and individuals from Frontier Corps gave support to Taliban.[[137]](#footnote-137)

Right after Taliban defeat and their re-emergence in 2003, the supporting and loyal forces to them, hid along the tribal borderlines of Pakistan. Although, influenced by the pressure of U.S., official government of Pakistan mobilized its troops to the area of the biggest concern, namely Northwest Frontier Province; they have had a limited ability of preventing Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan.The reasons for this disability might be lack of willingness to do so. Right after the defeat of Taliban in the end of 2001, militants in Pakistan sided with Taliban and when coming back home to Pakistan they experimented with their ideology and perceptions in the tribal hinterland and did so successfully. The extent of Taliban infiltration from Pakistan gained force by 2004 and 2005.[[138]](#footnote-138)

Taliban insurgency in Pakistan and further in Afghanistan, was spearheaded by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. From this it follows that on the contrary to what was thought before, it was not inspired by mare Pashtun ethno nationalism; rather, a unique religious identity. However, there is a tendency for Taliban to attract more Pashtuns, therefore in order to attract as well non-Pashtun *jihadis*, Taliban does not stress their ethnicity. Currently the insurgency continues, despite of the military presence along the Durand Line. All the attempts to reach a peace deal have failed. There are multiple sides and actors that have to take responsibility for the re-emergence of Taliban. From the side of Pakistan’s government it is responsible for the failure to develop tribal and rural regions, as well as its flawed Afghan policy. Finally, it is to be blamed for previously letting *mujahideen* activities in the country. The Afghan government, from the other side, is to be blamed for continuous civil war and for failing to hold the insurgents back by political or military means. The failure is as well on the side of the international community forces. The U.S. and its allies despite their enormous military presence have failed to bring about peace and stability in Afghanistan. The initial mistake has been ISAF’s idea and conviction that Taliban insurgency can be stopped by military means only. Also no foreign force can strengthen and effectively support any political leadership, if it lacks the support from the population, like in the case of Afghanistan. Also, continuous attacks on Afghanistan and Pakistan by U.S. and its allies have not eased the situation or helped foreign forces to make friends with Pashtuns. Quite the opposite – Taliban has used these attacks to continue jihad against U.S.-led intervention.[[139]](#footnote-139)

The influence of external factors to the re-emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan in doubtless. Excluding Saudi Arabia’s and Iran’s, as well as the influence of other external actors, one can surely claim that there has been and still is a significant support for Taliban activities, even if officially Pakistan condemns Taliban. In the similar way as it can be argued that the key of the success for counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is preventing Pakistan of being a safe haven for Taliban, it can be argued that Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan could have been avoided had the international community fought against Pakistan’s support to Taliban. Thus, the third hypothesis of this study has been proven to be valid.

**Conclusion**

The aim of this study was to find the answer to the question of why was it possible for Taliban to re-emerge in Afghanistan after their defeat in 2001? The research design of the study was built with the help of three hypotheses that were examined throughout the study. The hypotheses are as follows:

1. Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan was possibly due to the ethnic heterogeneity and incompatibility of those ethnicities in one sovereign territory.
2. Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan was possibly due to the weak state and overly-centralized government.
3. Taliban re-emergence was possibly due to the factors of external nature.

The methodology of the research was based on examining the validity of each of the hypotheses in the case of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan after 2001. In order to create internally and externally valid research a theoretical framework needed to be created. Civil war theory was found to be the most suitable because of its size and focus. It is a mid-range theory that strives to find common causal mechanisms for civil wars and insurgencies.

The conventional explanation of Taliban re-emergence would be provided by using the perspective of ‘grievance’ among ethnic groups, or ‘greed’, namely a rebellion to gain opportunity of controlling primary commodity exports. There are some problems with only using conventional approach to explain civil war. Firstly, ‘greed’ can be surely excluded from the analysis, since it is now clear that Taliban primary aim has never been to take control over commodity exports or control natural resources. It can be argued that poppy production and trafficking is of a concern in this matter, however, poppy cultivation itself has not been the reason for Taliban to re-emergence. It has more been of a side product to their re-emergence.

The ‘grievance’ argument is more applicable to this research. The argument of ethnic ‘grievance’ seems to be worth examining, since Afghanistan is highly heterogeneous country and Taliban is claimed to be primarily Pashtun movement. During the course of this study it was proven that in the case of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan, the international relations approach on civil wars is partly valid. Namely, ethnic ‘grievances’ only partly have served as a causal mechanism and explanation for Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan. It can be argued that after their initial defeat in 2001, Pashtuns felt grievance of their lost power and influence and therefore seek ways to return; and that Taliban was found to be the most suitable organization to unite under. In order to examine the validity of the argument of ethnic grievance among Pashtuns, the *3.1* sub-chapter of the study examines the validity of the assumption that Taliban re-emergence was caused by the ethnic heterogeneity and incompatibility. When looking deeper in the issue it revealed that Taliban is way more complex than that. Although, it is primarily a Pashtun movement, this perception overlooks other important aspects and issues related to ethnic composure of Taliban. The main findings are regarding the leadership of Taliban and their ethnic background. Taliban is not simply a Pashtun movement. It is a movement of a Ghilzai sub-group of Pashtuns. If examined in more detail, Taliban is led by a single tribe of Pashtuns – Hotaki. All of these details come well together, as there has always been a historic rivalry between Ghilzai and Durrani sub-group of Pashtuns. Contrary to the common assumption that Pashtuns are a very united and homogenous community, there is fact are differences among them. From here it can be argued that Taliban re-emergence is an attempt of a to regain power, supervised and fueled by the representatives of one single tribe, Hotaki, of one single ethnical sub-group, Ghilzai that is in constant rivalry for power with the other ethnical sub-group Durrani; both of which belong to Pashtun ethnicity. One can clearly see that it is not simply ethnical differences that serve as a precondition of the re-emergence of Taliban and thus a civil war in Afghanistan, but as well ethnical sub-group rivalry, together with tribal differences and influence of religious ideology. Therefore, the first hypothesis is proven to be partly valid.

Once having stepped out from the conventional dichotomy of *greed* and *grievance*, one can start seeking other causal mechanisms for Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan related to the civil war theory. The second hypothesis of this study is related to comparativist approach to civil war studies. Scholars of this approach argue that the cause of civil conflict hides in a weak state. This seems a plausible explanation, considering the failure of a state to provide basic services to its population, weaknesses of a government as such and of the institutions, as well as rampant corruption and poppy cultivation problem. Here comes in as well the rural dimension of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan. According to the theory, the insurgencies are most likely to emerge in the poor countries with weak, centralized government and vast mountainous rural areas, which is exactly the case of Afghanistan, since Taliban insurgence sprung exactly from the rural, mountainous areas close to the border with Pakistan. The reasoning behind this theoretical assumption is that in the weak states, the power does not reach to the peripheral areas and as a result it is much easier to organize insurgence from there. Also the mentality of people in the rural areas differs from the ones living in urban areas. People living in periphery more often than not feel left out and abandoned by the central government and as a result develop other loyalties to the groups offering solutions to their daily problems, as well as bringing in order and justice. This was exactly the case of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan. Not that the Afghans in the rural South East and South West areas necessarily share the same ideological stance or are Pashtuns by ethnicity, but they feel Taliban is closer to them and is more useful and helpful than the weak and distant Afghan government.

The causes for this weakness are numerous, the main being overly centralized government, high levels of corruption, poppy cultivation and the problems of ANSF. Centralized government is probably the most unsuitable form of governance that could have been adjusted to such a diverse and heterogeneous country as Afghanistan. In combination with an uncharismatic president Karzai, that is seen by many as head of a puppet regime, this creates an explosive danger of insurgency. It is all made worse by high corruption in all levels, which not only creates mistrust among the population, but also slows down or even stops development of the peripheral areas of Afghanistan. Drug trafficking has also fostered the corruption and existence of a weak state in Afghanistan. Eradication of illegal drug cultivation should have been a number one priority for the Afghan government, since it is the main source of Taliban financing. However, this has been and still is also a very challenging task, since although it would also help to lower the level corruption, improve livelihoods of ordinary Afghans and strengthen Afghanistan; the poppy fields are usually considered to be the main source of livelihood for the Afghan villagers in rural Afghanistan. There have also been problems with the formation of ANSF, which were absolutely essential for a successful policing of the rural areas. In the beginning of the Taliban re-emergence the number of ANSF was couple of thousands, they were poorly equipped and were not sufficiently trained. They also had a loyalty, as well as corruption and drug problems. These are still the main challenges of the ANSF. All of the abovementioned features of a weak state of Afghanistan have served as a causal mechanism for Taliban re-emergence after 2001.

A broader view to the issue might make one to consider the examination of some other possible cause of a civil war emergence, since the two previous hypotheses do not provide an answer to the question of the origins for the financial, technical and ideological support that has made Taliban sufficient and prudent. If analyzed in more detail, such a cause exists, as well in the case of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan. This cause is of an external nature and therefore, the examination of an external cause is essential for creating a full understanding of the issue. In order to check the probability of an outside factors causing Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan, the third and final hypotheses was formed. The *3.3* sub-chapter chapter of this study examines the assumption that the external support has served as a causal mechanism for Taliban re-emergence. Focus of the study was put on Pakistan’s involvement in supporting Taliban activities in Afghanistan. Although officially Pakistan has condemned the recruitment of new students in *madrasas,* located in Pakistan, as well as all kinds of other ideological and financial support for Taliban, the support is still there, as it was in the beginning of 2002, when Taliban re-emerged. After the Taliban defeat in the late 2001, leaders and hard liners of Taliban managed to escape to safe haven of borderline regions of Pakistan. It was from there where they conducted the recruitment of new Taliban and made strategic planning and reorganization needed for re-emergence. When looking to the historical development of Pakistan’s support for Taliban and Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan as such, described in more detail in the chapter five of this study, one clearly sees that Pakistan has a lengthy record of supporting Taliban activities including the time of their first emergence in the beginning of the 90ies. So, their support at the time of Taliban re-emergence comes by no surprise. The matters get even more complex as the infamous Durand Line still does not have a properly functioning boarder control. This has made it easier for the insurgents to move freely between two countries unnoticed. All of the examined aspects of Pakistan’s relation to Taliban proved the third hypothesis to be valid.

Throughout this study the hypothesis that Taliban re-emergence was possible due to the ethnic heterogeneity and incompatibility was proven to be party valid, because Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan is something more than a mare ethnic divide. There is a tribal dynamics and ethnic sub-group rivalry involved. The second the hypothesis that Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan was possible due to the weak state and overly-centralized government was proven to be valid. It is the complex of overly centralized government, weak institutions, rampant corruption, neglect of rural areas, poppy cultivation and problems with ANSF, that has created a weak state phenomenon in Afghanistan and that in turn has made Taliban re-emergence possible. The third hypothesis that Taliban re-emergence was possible due to the factors of external nature was proven to be valid. Excluding the influence of Saudi Arabia, Iran and other countries, which by no doubt is taking place, but because of space limitations of this study was not taken into consideration, the influence of Pakistan to the re-emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan cannot be overestimated. Primarily with a support and backing of Tehrik-i-Taliban in Pakistan, the new recruits of Taliban got the ideological and financial resources for their activities.

In order to get the full understanding of the Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan and the causal mechanisms behind it is necessary to go beyond the master cleavages and use other approaches and tools related to civil war studies. As this study has tried to prove, in the complex case studies like this it is useful to adapt the *alliance* approach when applying civil war theory to the actual case, namely, analyze the local cleavage and bringing in rural dimension in the analysis. Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan is too complex and diverse to be analyzed only with a help of master cleavages. Therefore, when searching for causal mechanisms of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan, the combination of conventional civil war explanation of grievance must be combined with comparativist focus on a weak state, and external factors need to be added. The hypotheses were created as a result of theoretical deliberations and the examination of their validity was conducted through empirical analysis, therefore the author of this study finds them to be sufficient to explain Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan and only taken together served as a causal mechanism for the re-emergence. Thus, it can be concluded that Taliban re-emergence was possible because of ethnic – tribal dynamics in Afghanistan, weak state existence and external support for Taliban.

**Bibliography**

*Books, journals, reports*

1. Adeney, Katharine, “Constitutional Design and the Political Salience of ‘Community’ Identity in Afghanistan: prospects for the Emergence of Ethnic Conflicts in the Post-Taliban Era.” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 48., Nr. 4., 2008.
2. Akhtar, Nasreen, “Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Taliban.” *International Journal on the World Peace,* Vol. 25., Nr. 4., 2008.
3. Barfield, Thomas, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.
4. Barfield, Thomas and Nojumi Neamatollah, “Bringing More Effective Governance to Afghanistan: 10 Pathways to Stability.” *Middle East Policy,* Vol. 17., Nr. 4., 2010.
5. Barnett, Rubin R., “Saving Afghanistan.” *Foreign Affairs,* January/February, 2007.
6. Behuria, Ashok, “Fighting the Taliban: Pakistan at the War with Itself.” *Australian Journal of International Affairs,* Vol. 61., Nr. 4., 2007.
7. Besley, J. Timothy, Persson, Torsten, “The Incidence of Civil War.” *NBER Working Paper Series,* Working Paper 14585, Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008.
8. Blackwill, Robert, D., “Why a De Facto Partition Is the Least Bad Option.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90., Nr. 1., 2011.
9. Bryman, Alan, *Social Research Methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
10. Buhaug, H., Cederman, L.-E. and Rod, J. K., *Modeling ethnic conflict in center – periphery dyads*, 2006. http://www.prio.no/files/file47730\_buhaug\_cederman\_rod.pdf
11. Cederman, L.-E., Girardin, L., *Beyond fractionalization: mapping ethnicity onto nationalist insurgencies,* 2006. http://weber.ucsd.edu/~kgledits/igcc/dscwtv/cg\_igcc200.pdf
12. Collier, Paul and Anke Hoefﬂer, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”. *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 56., Nr. 4., 2004.
13. Collier, Paul and Nicholas Sambanis, “Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Vol. 46, No. 1, 2002.
14. Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anne and Mans Soderbom, “On the Duration of Civil War.” *Journal of Peace Research*, Nr. 41., 2004.
15. Collier, P., Elliot. V. L., Hegre, H., Hoeffler, A., Reynal-Querol, M. and Nicholas Sambanis, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy.* Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003.
16. Collier, Paul, “The Market for Civil War.” Foreign Policy, Nr. 136, 2003.
17. Coll, Steve, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to Afghanistan.* New York: Penguin Press HC, 2001.
18. Consolatore, Daniel, “The Pashtun Factor: Is Afghanistan Next in the Line for and Ethnic Civil War?” *The Humanist,* May-June, 2006.
19. Crenshaw, Martha, “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches.” In Rapoport, C., David (ed.), *From Inside Terrorist Organizations*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.
20. Dorronsoro, Gilles, “Afghanistan: The Delusions of Victory.” *IPG*, Nr. 2., 2003.
21. Fearon, J. D., Laitin, D. D.,“Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War.” *American Political Science Review,* Vol. 97., No. 1., 2003.
22. Fearon, J. D., “Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others?” *Journal of Peace Research,* Vol. 41., Nr. 3., 2004.
23. Fotini, Christia, “Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. A Book Review.” *Middle East Journal,* Vol. 64., Nr. 4., 2010.
24. Giddens, Anthony, *Social Theory and Modern Sociology.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987.
25. Ghufran, Nasreen, “Pashtun Ethnonationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan.” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 49., Nr. 6., 2009.
26. Giustozzi, Antonio, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop:* *The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.
27. Harpviken, Kristian B., “Transcending Traditionalism.” *Journal of Peace Research,* Vol. 34., Nr. 3., 1997.
28. Hendrickson, Ryan C., and Frederick Gaugon, “The United States versus Terrorism: Clinton, Bush, and Osama Bin Laden.” In Carter, Ralph G. (ed*.), Contemporary Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy: from Terrorism to Trade.* Washington: CQ Press, 2008.
29. Howell, Roger Jr., “Newcastle and the nation: The seventeenth-century experience.” In Richardson, R. C. (ed.), *The English Civil Wars: Local Aspects*. Phoenix Mill, U.K.: Sutton Publishing, 1997.
30. Jarvenpaa, Minna, “Making Peace in Afghanistan: The Missing Political Strategy*.” United States Institute of Peace,* Special Report 267, 2011.
31. Johnson, Thomas H., Mason, Chris M., “Understanding Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan.” *Orbis*, Winter 2007.
32. Jones, Seth, “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad.” *International Security,* Vol. 32., Nr. 4., 2008.
33. Kalyvas, Stathis N., “Chapter 18: Civil Wars.” In Boix and Stokes (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
34. Kalyvas, Stathis N., *The Logic of Violence in Civil War.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
35. Kalyvas, Stathis N., “New and old civil wars: a valid distinction?” *World Politics,* Vol. 54, 2001.
36. Kalyvas, Stathis N., “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars.” *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 1., No. 3., 2003.
37. Lafraire, Najibullah, “Resurgence of the Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan: How and Why?” *International Politics*, Vol. 46., Nr. 1., 2009.
38. Maass, Citha D., “The Afghanistan conflict: The External Involvement.” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 18., Nr. 1., 1999.
39. Miller, Paul, D., “Finish the job.” *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 90., Nr. 1., 2011.
40. Nagl, A., John, *The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, 2007.
41. Parenti, Christian, “Taliban Rising.” *The Nation,* 2006.
42. Qazi, Shehzad H., “The ‘Neo-Taliban’ and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.” *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 31., No. 3., 2010.
43. Rashid, Ahmet, “Prospects for Peace in Afghanistan.” *Asian Affairs,* Vol. 41., Nr. 3., 2010.
44. Regan, P. M., Norton, D., “Greed, grievance and mobilization in civil wars.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 49., 2005.
45. Roy, Olivier, “Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan?” In Maley, William (ed.), *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban.* New York: New York University Press, 1998.
46. Schmidt, Farhana, “From Islamic Warriors to Drug Lords: The Evolution of the Taliban Insurgency.” *Mediterranian Quaterly*, Vol. 21., Nr. 2., 2010.
47. Sen, Amartya, “Violence, Identity and Poverty.” *Journal of Peace Research,* Vol. 4., Nr. 5., 2008.
48. Serchuk, Vance, “Kabuled Together: Afghanistan Needs Durable Institutions” The Weekly Standard, Vol. 11., Nr. 1., 2005, p. 32.
49. Simons, A., “War: back to the future.” *Annual Reviews of Anthropology*, Vol. 28., 1999.
50. Simonsen, G. S., “Ethnicising Afghanistan? Inclusion and Exclusion in post-Bonn institution building.” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 25., Nr. 4., 2004.
51. Sullivan, Daniel P., “Tinder, Spark, Oxygen, and Fuel: The Mysterious Rise of the Taliban.” Vol. 44., Nr. 1., 2007.
52. Wimmer, Andreas and Conrad Shetter, “Putting State-Formattion First: Some Recommendations for Reconstruction and Peace-Making in Afghanistan.” *Journal of International Development*, Vol. 15., Nr. 5., 2003.

*Internet sources*

1. Cordesman, H. Anthony and Adam Mausner, “Agriculture, Food, and Poverty in Afghanistan,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies website,* <http://csis.org/publication/agriculture-food-and-poverty-afghanistan>
2. Dobbins, James, “Our Man in Kabul,” *Foreign Affairs website,* <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65669/james-dobbins/our-man-in-kabul?page=show>
3. Felbab-Brown, Vanda, “Why Eradication Won’t Solve Afghanistan’s Poppy Problem?” *Frontline website,* <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/afghanistan-pakistan/opium-brides/why-eradication-wont-solve-afghanistans-poppy-problem/>
4. Garamone, Jim, “12 Afghans Surrender After Firefight,” *Global Security website,* <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2003/02/mil-030211-afps01.htm>
5. George, Marcus, “Kunduz celebrates the end of saige,” *BBC website,* <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1677157.stm>
6. Jacoby, Mary, “Seymour Hersh’s alternative history of Bush’s war,” *Salon website*, <http://www.salon.com/2004/09/18/hersh_interview/>
7. Jones, Seth, “Getting Back on Track in Afghanistan,” *House Foreign Affairs Committee website,* <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/Jon04022008.pdf>
8. O’Bryant, JoAnne and Michael Waterhouse, “U.S. Forces in Afghanistan,” *Federation of American Science website*, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22633.pdf>
9. Shahid, Hussain, “Pro-Taliban fliers call for jihad against U.S.,” *Gulf News Online website,* <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/896521/posts>
10. The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, “ANSO Quarterly Data Report,” *Reliefweb website,* <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/F7EE02609B7F7A0F4925782200200E4D-Full_Report.pdf>
11. Tran, Mark, “Bush announces withdrawal of 8,000 troops from Iraq,” *The Guardian website,* <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/09/iraq.usa>
12. Tyson, Scott Ann, “A Sober Assessment of Afghanistan,” *The Washington Post website*, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/06/15/ST2008061500237.html>
13. (unknown author), “Afghanistan at a glance,” *The World Bank website,* <http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/afg_aag.pdf>
14. (unknown author), “Afghanistan: Country Profile,” *Central Intelligence Agency website,* <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html>
15. (unknown author), “Afghanistan Population,” *Index Mundi website,* <http://www.indexmundi.com/afghanistan/population.html>
16. (unknown author), “Afghan National Security Forces,” *Global Security website,* <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/ansf.htm>
17. (unknown author), “Civil war”, *Merriam Webster Dictionary*, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/civil%20war>
18. (unknown author), “Corruption by country: Afghanistan,” *Transparency International website,* <http://www.transparency.org/country#AFG_DataResearch> (unknown author),
19. (unknown author), “Drug trafficking: Central Asia,” *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime website,* <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/central-asia.html>
20. (unknown author), “Inside Tora Bora: the Final Hours,” *Time Magazine World website,* <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1001483,00.html>
21. (unknown author), “Insurgency: Theory and Practice”, *National Defence University website*, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/books/afghanistan/war-in-afghan_ch6.pdf>
22. (unknown author), “Operation Anaconda winds down,” *CNN World website*, <http://articles.cnn.com/2002-03-17/world/ret.afghan.fighting_1_coalition-forces-enemy-fighters-operation-anaconda?_s=PM:asiapcf>
23. (unknown author), “Rumsfeld: Operation aims to clear the skies,” *CNN U.S. website,* <http://articles.cnn.com/2001-10-07/us/ret.attack.pentagon_1_taliban-command-and-control-defense-secretary-donald-rumsfeld-rumsfeld-and-joint-chiefs?_s=PM:US>
24. (unknown author), “Terrorism”, *Merriam Webster Dictionary,* <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/terrorism>
25. (unknown author), “The Battle for Mazar-i-Sharif,” *The New York Times,* <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/10/opinion/the-battle-for-mazar-i-sharif.html>
26. (unknown author), “The ethnic breakdown of Afghanistan,” *Poets and Policymakers website,* <http://poetsandpolicymakers.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/The-ethnic-breakdown-of-Afghanistan_full_600.jpg>
27. (unknown author), “U.S War in Afghanistan,” *Council on Foreign Relations website,* <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/us-war-afghanistan/p20018>

**Abstract**

The study “The causal mechanism of Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan” examines and analyses the causal mechanisms of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan, by searching an answer to the problem question of *why was it possible for Taliban to re-emerge in Afghanistan after their defeat in 2001?* Afghanistan has been in the center of international political debate for more than a decade, since the “war on terror” was proclaimed by U.S. in the October of 2001 and with the initial support of U.K., Canada and Australia and later also of other ISAF counties, the war began. Those 11 years of fighting have been hard and with a changing success. The war began with a hope and promises that it will be quick and victorious. Taliban, the target of the “war on terror”, was thought to be destroyed and defeated in a quick victory by the end of 2001.However, this has not been the case. The focus of the majority academic and journalistic literature has been on explaining the reasons behind the failure of the international community to secure a victory over Taliban. This study will deal with the causal mechanisms of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan.

In order to find an answer to the problem question, a theoretical framework for conducting a research is created. In the scope of this study civil war theory is applied throughout the research. Civil war theory is first introduced, described and then certain aspects of it are being used for the purpose of this case study. Special focus has been put on the local and rural dimension in civil war theory and the argument of the emergence of civil war as a result of ethnic grievances. The theoretical assumption of civil war re-emergence as a result of weak state and the role of external support in civil war is also dealt in more detail in this study.

Right before engaging into the examination of the hypotheses which form the empirical part of the study, chronological outline of Taliban defeat and their resurgence is provided. This section contains background information, needed for better understanding of empirical discussion of the study.

After the theoretical discussion on civil war, the connection to the empirical part has been made and three hypotheses have been created as a result of theoretical deliberations. The answer to the problem question is provided through the thorough investigation of these hypotheses and the final conclusions of the study depend on whether these hypotheses prove to be valid or not. The first hypothesis examines the assumption of civil war emergence as a result of ethnic grievances. The second hypothesis investigates the existence and a role of a weak state and structural problems in serving as a causal mechanism for the emergence of civil war. Finally, external factor and support is being considered as a possible factor for Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan.

1. Afghan fighters resisting Soviet occupation and takeover of Afghanistan. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Hendrickson, Ryan C., and Frederick Gaugon, “The United States versus Terrorism: Clinton, Bush, and Osama

   Bin Laden.” In Carter, Ralph G. (ed.), *Contemporary Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy: from Terrorism to Trade.* Washington: CQ Press, 2008, p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Ibid., p.15. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Barnett, Rubin R., “Saving Afghanistan.” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February, 2007, p. 57. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Miller, Paul, D., “Finish the job.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90, Nr. 1, 2011, p. 51 – 65. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Jarvenpaa, Minna, “Making Peace in Afghanistan: The Missing Political Strategy.” *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report 267, February 2011, p. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Blackwill, Robert, D., “Why a De Facto Partition Is the Least Bad Option.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90, Nr. 1, 2011, p. 44. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Jarvenpaa, Minna, “Making Peace in Afghanistan: The Missing Political Strategy.” *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report 267, February 2011, p. 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Bryman, Alan*, Social Research Methods.* Oxford: Oxford University Press*,* 2004, p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. “Civil war”, *Merriam Webster Dictionary*, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/civil%20war> [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. “Insurgency: Theory and Practice”, *National Defence University website,* <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/books/afghanistan/war-in-afghan_ch6.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. “Terrorism”, *Merriam Webster Dictionary,* <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/terrorism> [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Crenshaw, Martha, “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches.” In Rapoport, C., David (ed.), *From Inside Terrorist Organizations*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, p. 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Ibid*.* [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Collier, Paul and Anke Hoefﬂer, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”. *Oxford Economic Papers,* Vol.56., Nr. 4., 2004, p. 563. – 596. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. As for now, it is known that Afghanistan has significant mine reserves and might potentially lead to a resource curse in the future; however, this was not the case when Taliban re-emerged in Afghanistan after 2001. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Collier, Paul and Anke Hoefﬂer, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”. *Oxford Economic Papers,* Vol. 56., Nr. 4., 2004, p. 563. – 596. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. A term introduced by Stathis N. Kalyvas for analysis of civil wars. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Kalyvas, Stathis N., *The Logic of Violence in Civil War.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Bryman, Alan, *Social Research Methods.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p.13. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Bryman, Alan, *Social Research Methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Kalyvas, Stathis N., “Chapter 18: Civil Wars.” In Boix and Stokes (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2007, p. 416. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Kalyvas, Stathis N., *The Logic of Violence in Civil War.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Kalyvas, Stathis N., “Chapter 18: Civil Wars.” In Boix and Stokes (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 416. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Collier, P., Elliot. V. L., Hegre, H., Hoeffler, A., Reynal-Querol, M. and Nicholas Sambanis, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 53 – 54. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Besley, J. Timothy, Persson, Torsten, “The Incidence of Civil War.” *NBER Working Paper Series*, Working Paper 14585, Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008, p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Collier, Paul and Nicholas Sambanis, “Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2002, p. 10 – 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Sen, Amartya, “Violence, Identity and Poverty.” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 4., Nr. 5., 2008, p. 13 – 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Ibid.. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Kalyvas, Stathis N., “Chapter 18: Civil Wars.” In Boix and Stokes (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 417. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. A situation in which a country with an abundance of non-renewable resources experiences stagnant growth or economic contraction. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Ibid., p. 419. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Ibid., p. 420. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Fearon, J. D., Laitin, D. D.,“Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War.” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97., No. 1., 2003, p. 75. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Ibid., p. 75 – 76. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Kalyvas, Stathis N., “Chapter 18: Civil Wars.” In Boix and Stokes (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 425. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Simons, A., “War: back to the future.” *Annual Reviews of Anthropology*, Vol. 28., 1999, p. 84. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Kalyvas, Stathis. N., “Chapter 18: Civil Wars.” In Boix and Stokes (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 425. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Buhaug, H., Cederman, L.-E. and Rod, J. K., *Modeling ethnic conflict in center – periphery dyads*, 2006, p. 1. <http://www.prio.no/files/file47730_buhaug_cederman_rod.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Kalyvas, Stathis N., “New and old civil wars: a valid distinction?” *World Politics*, Vol. 54, 2001, p. 102. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Regan, P. M., Norton, D., “Greed, grievance and mobilization in civil wars.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Issue 49., 2005, p. 319 – 320. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Buhaug, H., Cederman, L.-E. and Rod, J. K., *Modeling ethnic conflict in center – periphery dyads,* 2006, p. 2. <http://www.prio.no/files/file47730_buhaug_cederman_rod.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Fearon, J. D., Laitin, D. D.,“Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War.” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97., Nr. 1., 2003, p. 88. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Cederman, L.-E., Girardin, L., *Beyond fractionalization: mapping ethnicity onto nationalist insurgencies,* 2006, p. 11. <http://weber.ucsd.edu/~kgledits/igcc/dscwtv/cg_igcc200.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Kalyvas, Stathis N., “The Ontology of “Politcal Violence”: Action and Identity in Civial Wars.” *Perspectives on Politics,* Vol. 1., No. 3., 2003, p 478. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Kalyvas, Stathis N., “Chapter 18: Civil Wars.” In Boix and Stokes (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 422. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Kalyvas, Stathis N., “Chapter 18: Civil Wars.” In Boix and Stokes (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 423. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Ibid., p. 425. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Kalyvas, Stathis N., “The Ontology of “Politcal Violence”: Action and Identity in Civial Wars.” *Perspectives on Politics,* Vol. 1., No. 3., 2003, p. 476. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Ibid., p 479. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Howell, Roger Jr., “Newcastle and the nation: The seventeenth-century experience.” InRichardson,R. C. (ed.), *The English Civil Wars: Local Aspects*. Phoenix Mill, U.K.: Sutton Publishing, 1997, p. 309. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Kalyvas, Stathis N., “The Ontology of “Politcal Violence”: Action and Identity in Civial Wars.” *Perspectives on Politics,* Vol. 1., No. 3., 2003, p 486. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Ibid., p 487. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Collier, Paul and Nicholas Sambanis, “Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 46., Nr. 1., 2002, p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Collier, Paul and Nicholas Sambanis, “Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 46., Nr. 1., 2002, p. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anne and Mans Soderbom, “On the Duration of Civil War.” *Journal of Peace Research*, Issue 41., 2004, p. 268. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Collier, Paul and Sambanis, Nicholas, “Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Vol. 46., Nr. 1., 2002, p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Ibid., p. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. “Sons of the soil” is the term related to wars, that typically involve land conﬂict between a peripheral ethnic minority and state-supported migrants of a dominant ethnic group. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Fearon, J. D., “Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others?” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 41., Nr. 3., 2004, p. 275. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Collier, Paul, “The Market for Civil War.” *Foreign Policy,* Issue 136., 2003, p. 40. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. See the writings of Halvard Buhaug, Lars-Erik Cederman and Luc Girardin for grievance approach in civil war studies. See the writings Paul Colliet, Anne Hoeffer and Nicolas Sambanis for greed approach in civil war studies. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Alternatively see the writings of James D. Fearon, David D. Laitin and Stathis H. Kalyvas on civil war. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. “Rumsfeld: Operation aims to clear the skies,” *CNN U.S. website,* <http://articles.cnn.com/2001-10-07/us/ret.attack.pentagon_1_taliban-command-and-control-defense-secretary-donald-rumsfeld-rumsfeld-and-joint-chiefs?_s=PM:US> [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. “The Battle for Mazar-i-Sharif,” *The New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/10/opinion/the-battle-for-mazar-i-sharif.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Also refered to as “The United Front”, is a military-political umbrella organization and a resistance force to Afghan Taliban. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Coll, Steve, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to* *Afghanistan.* New York: Penguin Press HC, 2001, p. 720. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Dobbins, James, “Our Man in Kabul,” *Foreign Affairs website,* <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65669/james-dobbins/our-man-in-kabul?page=show> [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. “Inside Tora Bora: the Final Hours,” *Time Magazine World website,* <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1001483,00.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. George, Marcus, “Kunduz celebrates the end of saige,” *BBC website,* <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1677157.stm> [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. “U.S War in Afghanistan,” *Council on Foreign Relations website,* <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/us-war-afghanistan/p20018> [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. A phrase in the Pashto language meaning "grand council". [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Rashid, Ahmed, “Prospects for Peace in Afghanistan.” *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 41., Nr. 3., 2010, p. 356. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. “Operation Anaconda winds down,” *CNN World website*, <http://articles.cnn.com/2002-03-17/world/ret.afghan.fighting_1_coalition-forces-enemy-fighters-operation-anaconda?_s=PM:asiapcf> [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Jacoby, Mary, “Seymour Hersh’s alternative history of Bush’s war,” *Salon website,*  <http://www.salon.com/2004/09/18/hersh_interview/> [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Shahid, Hussain, “Pro-Taliban fliers call for jihad against U.S.,” *Gulf News Online website,* <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/896521/posts> [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Garamone, Jim, “12 Afghans Surrender After Firefight,” *Global Security website,* <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2003/02/mil-030211-afps01.htm> [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Jones, Seth, “Getting Back on Track in Afghanistan,” *House Foreign Affairs Committee website,* <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/Jon04022008.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. “U.S War in Afghanistan,” *Council on Foreign Relations website,* <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/us-war-afghanistan/p20018> [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. O’Bryant, JoAnne and Michael Waterhouse, “U.S. Forces in Afghanistan,” *Federation of American Science website,* <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22633.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Tran, Mark, “Bush announces withdrawal of 8,000 troops from Iraq,” *The Guardian website*, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/09/iraq.usa> [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. “U.S War in Afghanistan,” *Council on Foreign Relations website*, <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/us-war-afghanistan/p20018> [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. “U.S War in Afghanistan,” *Council on Foreign Relations website,* <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/us-war-afghanistan/p20018> [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, “ANSO Quarterly Data Report,” *Reliefweb website,* <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/F7EE02609B7F7A0F4925782200200E4D-Full_Report.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. Simonsen, G. S., “Ethnicising Afghanistan? Inclusion and Exclusion in post-Bonn institution building.” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 25., Nr. 4., 2004, p. 707 – 708. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Wimmer, Andreas and Conrad Shetter, “Putting State-Formattion First: Some Recommendations for Reconstruction and Peace-Making in Afghanistan.” *Journal of International Development*, Vol. 15., Nr. 5., 2003, p. 535. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Adeney, Katharine, “Constitutional Design and the Political Salience of ‘Community’ Identity in Afghanistan: prospects for the Emergence of Ethnic Conflicts in the Post-Taliban Era.” *Asian Survey,* Vol. 48., Nr. 4., 2008, p. 537. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. “Afghanistan Population,” *Index Mundi website*, <http://www.indexmundi.com/afghanistan/population.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. “Afghanistan: Country Profile,” *Central Intelligence Agency website,* <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. “The ethnic breakdown of Afghanistan,” *Poets and Policymakers website,* <http://poetsandpolicymakers.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/The-ethnic-breakdown-of-Afghanistan_full_600.jpg> [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. Adeney, Katharine, “Constitutional Design and the Political Salience of ‘Community’ Identity in Afghanistan: prospects for the Emergence of Ethnic Conflicts in the Post-Taliban Era.” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 48., Nr. 4., 2008, p. 536. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. Ibid., p. 537. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. Adeney, Katharine, “Constitutional Design and the Political Salience of ‘Community’ Identity in Afghanistan: prospects for the Emergence of Ethnic Conflicts in the Post-Taliban Era.” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 48, Nr. 4., 2008, p. 537 [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. Consolatore, Daniel, “The Pashtun Factor: Is Afghanistan Next in the Line for and Ethnic Civil War?” *The Humanist*, May-June, 2006, p. 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. Ibid., p. 12 – 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Simonsen, G. S., “Ethnicising Afghanistan? Inclusion and Exclusion in post-Bonn institution building.” *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 25., Nr. 4., 2004, p. 708 – 709. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. Tyson, Scott Ann, “A Sober Assessment of Afghanistan,” *The Washington Post website*, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/06/15/ST2008061500237.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Johnson, Thomas H., Mason, Chris M., “Understanding Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan.” *Orbis*, Winter 2007, p. 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. Johnson, Thomas H., Mason, Chris M., “Understanding Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan.” *Orbis*, Winter 2007, p. 79. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. Qazi, Shehzad H., “The ‘Neo-Taliban’ and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 31., No. 3., 2010, p. 493. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. Nagl, A., John, *The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, 2007, p. 37–39. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. Qazi, Shehzad H., “The ‘Neo-Taliban’ and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 31., No. 3., 2010, p. 493. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. Qazi, Shehzad H., “The ‘Neo-Taliban’ and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 31., No. 3., 2010, p. 493. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. Parenti, Christian, “Taliban Rising.” *The Nation*, 2006, p. 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. Barfield, Thomas, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 341. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. Dorronsoro, Gilles, “Afghanistan: The Delusions of Victory.” *IPG*, Nr. 2., 2003. p. 116. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. Lafraire, Najibullah, “Resurgence of the Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan: How and Why?” *International Politics,* Vol. 46., Nr. 1., 2009, p. 107 – 108. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. Serchuk, Vance, “Kabuled Together: Afghanistan Needs Durable Institutions” *The Weekly Standard*, Vol. 11., Nr. 1., 2005, p. 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. Fotini, Christia, “Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. A Book Review.” Middle East Journal, Vol. 64., Nr. 4., 2010, p. 650 – 651. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. Barfield, Thomas and Nojumi Neamatollah, “Bringing More Effective Governance to Afghanistan: 10 Pathways to Stability.” *Middle East Policy,* Vol. 17., Nr. 4., 2010., p. 39 – 40. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. Cordesman, H. Anthony and Adam Mausner, “Agriculture, Food, and Poverty in Afghanistan,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies website,* <http://csis.org/publication/agriculture-food-and-poverty-afghanistan> [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. “Afghanistan at a glance,” *The World Bank website,* <http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/afg_aag.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. “Corruption by country: Afghanistan,” *Transparency International website*, <http://www.transparency.org/country#AFG_DataResearch> [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. “Drug trafficking: Central Asia,” *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime website,* <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/central-asia.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. Felbab-Brown, Vanda, “Why Eradication Won’t Solve Afghanistan’s Poppy Problem?” *Frontline website,* <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/afghanistan-pakistan/opium-brides/why-eradication-wont-solve-afghanistans-poppy-problem/> [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. The religious seminaries of deobandi sects. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. Schmidt, Farhana, “From Islamic Warriors to Drug Lords: The Evolution of the Taliban Insurgency.” *Mediterranian Quaterly*, Vol. 21., Nr. 2., 2010, p. 62. [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. “Afghan National Security Forces,” *Global Security website,* <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/ansf.htm> [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. Giustozzi, Antonio, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop:* *The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2008, p. 11 – 33. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. Collier, Paul and Nicholas Sambanis, “Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 46., Nr. 1., 2002, p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. Akhtar, Nasreen, “Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Taliban.” *International Journal on the World Peace*, Vol. 25., Nr. 4., 2008, p. 49. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. Roy, Olivier, “Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan?”, In Maley, William (ed.), *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban.* New York: New York University Press, 1998. p. 210. [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. Sullivan, Daniel P., “Tinder, Spark, Oxygen, and Fuel: The Mysterious Rise of the Taliban.” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 44., Nr. 1., 2007, p. 104. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. Dorronsoro, Gilles, “Afghanistan: The Delusions of Victory.” *IPG*, Nr. 2., 2003. p. 118. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. Harpviken, Kristian B., “Transcending Traditionalism.” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 34., Nr. 3., 1997, p. 283. [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. Sullivan, Daniel P., “Tinder, Spark, Oxygen, and Fuel: The Mysterious Rise of the Taliban.” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 44., Nr. 1., 2007, p. 105. [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. Maass, Citha D., “The Afghanistan conflict: The External Involvement.” *Asian Survey,* Vol. 18., Nr. 1., 1999. p. 65. [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. Akhtar, Nasreen, “Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Taliban.” *International Journal on the World Peace*, Vol. 25., Nr. 4., 2008, p. 50. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. Jones, Seth, “The Rise of Afghanistans Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad.” *International Security,* Vol. 32., Nr. 4., 2008, p. 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. Ibid., p. 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. Behuria, Ashok, “Fighting the Taliban: Pakistan at the War with Itself.” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 61., Nr. 4., 2007, p. 531 – 532. [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. Ghufran, Nasreen, “Pashtun Ethnonationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan.” *Asian Survey,* Vol. 49., Nr. 6., 2009, p. 1114. [↑](#footnote-ref-139)