# RUMBLE IN THE JUNGLE

# The ‘Blessing’ and ‘Curse’ of Mineral Wealth in the Congo

**[[1]](#footnote--1)

*We are fighting and killing ourselves over what*

*God gave to make us happy and comfortable.*

*I sometimes wonder whether it would not*

*be better if God takes away the endowment, and by*

*so doing, spare us the tragedy it has brought to our life.[[2]](#footnote-0)*

# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABAKO Association des Bakongo pour l’Unification, la Conservation, le Perfectionnement et l’Expansion de la Langue Kikongo

AFDL Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-

Zaïre

AMF America’s Mineral Fields

CNS Sovereign National Conference

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

FAZ Forces Armées Zaïroises

FSI Failed State Index

FP Force Publique

GDP Gross Domestic Product

HDI Human Development Index

HDR Human Development Report

HIID Harvard Institute for International Development

ICD Inter-Congolese Dialogue

IMF International Monetary Fund

KIET Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade

MNC Mouvement National Congolais

MPR Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution

RCD-G Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie/Goma

RCD-K-ML RCD-Kisangani-Mouvement de liberation

TWC Third World Countries

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNU-UNESCO United Nations University/United Nations Educational Scientific and

Cultural Organization

WB World Bank

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# 1.0 Introduction

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one of the world’s richest territorial states in regards to its natural resources. These resources include copper, cobalt, zinc, diamonds, oil, timber, uranium, tantalum, columbium, gold and tin. The sheer volume of natural resource abundance should, at least in theory, provide the state with enormous revenues for redistribution among its citizens. Yet, almost 60 percent of its 73.500.000[[3]](#footnote-1) people live on less than $1.25 a day.[[4]](#footnote-2) Poverty is not the only problem facing the population of the DRC. The state has been in almost constant conflict since 1998, both internal and external, resulting in the deaths of at least 4 million people and causing massive declines in economic growth and contributing widely to political instability.[[5]](#footnote-3) The Human Development Report (HDR) of 2011 has ranked the DRC in the bottom of the table. Out of 187 countries the DRC currently occupies the 187th seat in the Human Development Index (HDI).[[6]](#footnote-4) As the HDI is based on criteria such as health, education, level of freedom, gender equality, poverty, political participation, economic growth and environmental development, the DRC scores an all-time low in almost every single category.

The DRC is categorised as ‘not free’ by Freedom House, an internationally recognized organisation dedicated to promoting freedom and human rights worldwide[[7]](#footnote-5), while the Failed States Index (FSI) has ranked the DRC as the 4th-most unstable political government in the world. The FSI ranks countries based on human flight, economic decline, delegitimization of the state, human rights, public services, security, corruption, and external intervention.[[8]](#footnote-6) In terms of political transparency the DRC is ranked at 168th out of 183 countries, all categorised according to rule of law, financial secrecy, voice and accountability, control of corruption, press freedom, and judicial independence.[[9]](#footnote-7) All four indexes combined reveal an image of the DRC as a state experiencing severe difficulties in terms of state functioning and societal development. These four indexes indicate what state the DRC is currently in – or as one author has described it: *“Empirically speaking, the Democratic Republic of Congo has virtually ceased to exist as a state”* [[10]](#footnote-8) – however, they do not reveal how or why the DRC got there in the first place.

In July this year the DRC can celebrate 52 years of independence after enduring 75 years of colonial rule by King Leopold II of Belgium and the Belgian state respectively. During these 52 years of independence, the DRC has experienced authoritarian rule, dictatorships, civil war, economic deterioration, secession, ethnic violence, racisms, mineral exploitation and political instability. Ever since its discovery, the DRC has been subject of both internal and external exploitation of its natural resources to the detriment of its people. The Congolese people have suffered unnameable atrocities dedicated to the exploitation, extraction, export and financial benefits of its ‘fruit of the land’.

This project sets out to determine some of the causal factors for the conditions of contemporary Congolese state, economy and society.

## 1.1 Research Question

Why has the DRC not been able to transform its natural resource curse into a blessing and change its fortunes from a country of instability and economic downfall to a prosperous nation of national unity?

What are the underlying premises for instability, violence and economic deterioration and in what ways do the mineral wealth of the DRC play a role?

## 1.2 Overview of the Project

### 1.2.1 First Part: Methodology, theories and historical introduction.

In the first part of the project I will elaborate upon the methodological assessment of the project, the theories chosen for this project and present the history of the DRC. The methodology will explain the dynamic process of theoretical perspectives on empirical data, while relating to the core research question of the project and the analysis. The theoretical section contains several different theories that all present a distinct image of the DRC, both past and present. These theories will be discussed according to their value in this project, both strengths and weaknesses. The historical outline presents the reader with an easy digestible overview of the events surrounding the making of contemporary DRC.

### 1.2.2 Second Part: Analysis

In the second part of the project I will analyse upon the empirical material using all chosen theories. The theories will be used to form a coherent image of the problems with the DRC while highlighting certain historical periods and events as instigators according to each theoretical perspective. The analysis will present the reader with a thorough discussion of the problems in the DRC by using the historical outline as the framework onto which the theories provide the lens needed to locate particular difficulties, tendencies and problems.

### 1.2.3 Third Part: Conclusion

The third and final part of the project is the conclusion. In the conclusion I will assess the analysis, highlighting identifiable trends that can present explanations on the misfortune of the DRC.

Adding to this, I will present suggestions for further research/the making of policies suitable to address contemporary problems in the DRC.

# 2.0 Methodology

## 2.1 Delimitation

The sole focus in this project is the DRC. Although the themes explored here perhaps resemble similar experiences in other African countries and henceforth basing my analysis on more than one case would offer validity to my choice of theories, spatial restraints restrict me from exhaustive analysis of more than one country. Nevertheless, the theories I have chosen to use cover much ground in correlation with my three hypotheses of politics, economics and (post-) colonial African identity. The theories used contribute fragments of the entire image I am presenting and I offer no extensive introduction into the historical contingencies and genesis of each theory. Instead I present what explanatory tool each theory can offer to the understanding and analysis of the difficulties and anomalies in the DRC today. The three hypotheses serve as guides into the different spheres of problematic issues concerning contemporary DRC and as limited perspectives, ensuring a stay-in-bounds analysis. The historical section dates back to the Berlin Conference of 1885 to present day. Exploring pre-colonial DRC offers little explanatory impetus in regards to the problem formulation of the project. Hence, I will focus mainly on the colonial and post-colonial history of the DRC.

It must be stressed that the DRC is only one country on the African continent and the research and analysis done here only reflects certain aspects of the DRC and is not representative of the entire African continent. The findings here do not necessarily reflect typical African issues but are merely a result of the clash between the theories and the written material chosen for this project. It must be stressed that the theories chosen offer no final solution or represent the only perspective on the problematic issues surrounding the DRC. Any shortcomings in this project are not due to faults in the material, but are solely my own.

## 2.2 Hypothesis

A hypothesis serves the purpose of identifying a distinct perspective that correlates with the problem formulation. This will allow me to manoeuvre within different, yet coherent areas of interest while applying the theoretical material to each hypothesis. The hypothesis will assist in structuring the analysis while functioning as a catalyst in the dynamic process of analysing relevant empirical material. I have chosen to focus on three spheres of societal development in the hypothesis.

### 2.2.1 Hypothesis 1: The political system of the DRC is flawed due to the historical legacy of colonial rule, while the impact of conflict has produced a power vacuum.

I will argue here that the contemporary political system of the DRC suffers from a systemic ‘virus’ caused by the implementation of the colonial administrative system put in place somewhat 127 years ago. Historical experiences have contributed largely to the political atmosphere that surrounds the DRC today. The violent conflict that persists has had damaging effects on the internal political climate and has ‘trapped’ the country in a cycle of deprivation it cannot escape from.

### 2.2.2 Hypothesis 2: The economic development of the DRC has been crippled due to a continuous dependence and emphasis on raw materials and the interference of non-Congolese actors in state financial affairs.

The raw materials of the DRC have resulted in economic decline and internal and external conflicts. The performance of the DRC in terms of economic development does not correlate with the country’s massive raw minerals in terms of output and financial stability. The DRC’s financial affairs are still very much influenced and, in some cases, dictated by external actors.

### 2.2.3 Hypothesis 3: The discourse of colonial racial and cultural superiority of the white man vs. the inferiority of the black man still persists in contemporary Congolese identity and consciousness.

The feeling of inferiority caused by the presence and rule of the white man in the DRC play a vital role in contemporary Congolese identity. The experiences of being colonized and ruled without consent still permeate African Congolese public discourse and identity.

## 2.3 Project assessment

I have chosen a social science approach, which in this project will be understood as the scientific subjects that seek to understand the societal development and the power that drives these changes. Society will in this context be understood as the human made structures and processes within the state, economic growth, social conflicts and the political execution. People are all attached to these processes and structures, thus they have the power to influence them. In a more narrow definition social science is about the relationship between the individual and the institutions and processes of society.[[11]](#footnote-9)

This project is based on historical elements, highlighting the experiences of the DRC in terms of its political, economical and societal development from colonial rule to independence. As the historical evolution has been presented, I will incorporate theoretical material destined to explain the complexity surrounding the current state of affairs in the DRC. This is done to illustrate the importance of historical elements combined with theoretical perspectives, as theories alone cannot present valid results.

## 2.4 Sources

The data used in this project is mainly second hand data in the form of academic publications, reports, articles, books and the Internet. Statistics from the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the HDI are used as these quantitative data offer a solid foundation when addressing the developmental process of the DRC. Additionally there is an element of first hand sources as some of the books used in this project are written both before, during and after the period of decolonization in the DRC by Africans and Europeans alike.

### 2.4.1 Empirical Data

The empirical data used in this project is that of the WB, the HDI and the IMF. The following section will introduce all three sources.

### 2.4.2 The World Bank

The WB was established in 1944 and is situated in Washington D.C., USA.[[12]](#footnote-10)

The first thing one encounters in the WB website is their mission statement: ‘Help reduce poverty’.[[13]](#footnote-11) The WB is not a bank in the traditional sense. The WB directs its investments in areas such as education, health, public administration, infrastructure, agriculture, and financial and private sector development. This is done through low-interest loans, interest-free credits and grants to the developing countries.[[14]](#footnote-12)

### 2.4.3 The Human Development Index

The Pakistani economist, Mahbub Ul Haq and the Indian economist Amartya Sen, among others, created the HDI as a part of the HDR. The growing criticism of the prevalent economic approach to development in the 1980’s resulted in the new paradigm of human development theory. The HDI will assist in demonstrating different statistical data, illustrating the levels of development within key areas such as education, life expectancy, HDI value, and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in almost all countries of the world.[[15]](#footnote-13)

### 2.4.4 The International Monetary Fund

The IMF is an organization of 188 countries working to facilitate ‘global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty around the world’.[[16]](#footnote-14)

## 2.5 Critical assessment of the theories

When assessing the validity of a given theory to any topic it is important to value its strengths and weaknesses. In this project I have chosen several different theories that all offer a perspective on issues surrounding the DRC.

Nkrumah’s neo-colonialism and the writings of Frantz Fanon are first hand theoretical perspectives written in a time that differs much from our contemporary world. These theories address certain views of the world, as it were during the immediate years of the post-WWII political climate and henceforth they operate within a paradigm that can be argued to no longer exist. Therefore the main obstacle regarding the implementation of these two theories is to make them fit into contemporary DRC. They offer a critique of a world system that once in place oppressed the African continent via different means of ‘persuasion’ or downright coercion. I cannot argue fully that these theories represent contemporary mechanisms of both the Western World and the African continent but nevertheless they do represent an era in African history that antedates contemporary Africa thus they have contributed vastly to the Africa we know today. They may not be so easily unfolded and used as analytical tools when addressing present issues in the DRC but their value to African history and especially the period of de-colonization cannot be ignored. To be sure, there are elements in both presentations that are still valid today, but as these writings are biased due to their African outlook – both Nkrumah and Fanon were anti-colonialists – it is important to carefully choose what elements are applicable.

The other four theories chosen here represent a more up-to-date perspective. When analyzing upon societal development in Africa – politics, economics, cultural, educational etc. – the theories of dependency, resource curse, conflict theory and the nexus between socio-economic development and democracy, all present views that are sensible to include in this project. It is very difficult to argue that dependency and conflict play no role on the African continent. Dependency can be demonstrated via development aid, technology and commerce stemming from the more developed and advanced Western Hemisphere. Dependency is not an exclusive African trait as the world has become ever more intertwined, globalised and co-dependent. Dependency theory may illustrate a relationship of dependence upon certain interchangeable items of various sorts but what it lacks – in this project – is action to change this relationship thus other directions may be necessary. The resource curse offers an explanatory device for the uneven economic development between underdeveloped countries rich in resources and underdeveloped countries where resources are scarce. Again, we can explain part of the ‘why’ but not much concerning the ‘what then’. This is not to illustrate that these two theories offer little conclusion when used as an analytical feature but it is important to ‘handle with care’ when deploying them. For the sake of this project they can offer analytical tools to explain the current situation in the DRC. As the African continent, and the DRC in particular, have experienced several violent conflicts the use of conflict theory seems unavoidable. Conflict theory can contribute to the analysis via part of its focus on values and interest. Its strength is in its explanatory mechanisms concerning violent conflicts vis-à-vis the DRC’s history of conflicts. Where it comes up short is perhaps in times of relative peace where economic instability and political unrest permeate the DRC. In times of peace, other theories may present themselves as having greater value in terms of explaining vital issues of development/underdevelopment. The theory presented by Diamond offers an explanation for the rise of authoritarian regimes in Africa followed by the restraints in terms of developing democracy. The induction of a nexus between low growth and the chances for democracy establishes the need for a strong middle class to participate in politics. Although Diamond’s thesis presents variables that induce oppressive regimes and also offers a solution to the problem, he does not state how this middle class can, should or would emerge in states where it is not present. Nevertheless, he offers valuable perspectives in regards to the failure of democracy development in the DRC.

All theories share one common feature: none of them can solely address or explain the current situation in the DRC. All contribute in presenting a wholesome image of what the DRC was, is and perhaps can be.

## 2.6 Historical Considerations

The choice of author reflects the historical emphasis I have chosen for this paper. The history of the DRC as presented here enables the reader to gain a thorough perspective on political development and events that contributed to the shaping of the DRC we know today. Gondola focuses mainly on political and socio-economic development. It is impossible to write objective ‘pure’ history; once the author sets out to write a historical narrative, that narrative will almost always reflect a certain ‘mood’ or temperament that is illustrated by his or her choice of presenting historical events. What will feature in the historical narrative is entirely up to the author at hand. It must be stressed that the historical narrative given here only reflects certain sides of the DRC’s history and should another author choose to focus on economics, culture, ethnicity, etc. the outcome might be different. The author will always depict a subjective (his)story.

# 3.0 Theoretical Approach

The field of development studies contains various directions, areas of focus and theoretical perspectives. I have chosen six different, yet somewhat compatible theories that will be used to analyze the situation of DRC – both past and present. These theories will reflect several paths that illustrate the complexity of Congolese instability and offer perspectives on issues such as colonialism/neo-colonialism, economic deterioration and performance, political instability, democracy, conflict and minerals, and post-colonial African mentality.

## 3.1 Colonialism and Neo-colonialism

In order to understand neo-colonialism, it is important to conceptualize colonialism first. According to the Oxford Online Dictionary, colonialism refers to *“[…] the policy or practice of acquiring full or partial political control over another country, occupying it with settlers, and exploiting it financially”*.[[17]](#footnote-15) The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy describes colonialism as *“[…] a practice of domination, which involves the subjugation of one people to another”*.[[18]](#footnote-16) In its purest form, colonialism derives from the Latin word, *colonus*, which means farmer. In essence a colonist or farmer is a permanent settler in a different territory than that of origin while maintaining political allegiance to his homeland.[[19]](#footnote-17)

### 3.1.1 Kwame Nkrumah on Neo-Colonialism

Kwame Nkrumah (1909-72) was a politician of Ghanaian origin and throughout the 1950’s he led his country to independence while assuming the title of President in 1960. He is considered one of the greatest writers of African colonialism in the 20th century. He has written extensively on the African experience of colonialism.[[20]](#footnote-18)

In his book, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*, Kwame Nkrumah analyzes the mechanisms of neo-colonialism. Nkrumah inserts that *“[…] the essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside”*.[[21]](#footnote-19)

According to Nkrumah, neo-colonialism operates in fields such as economy, politics, religion, ideology and culture.[[22]](#footnote-20) Nkrumah suggests that neo-colonialism is imperialism; it has just switched tactics.[[23]](#footnote-21) Whereas imperialism incorporated rule by military might and a strong authoritative administration, neo-colonialism governs by means of diplomacy, politics, cultural, ideological and economical measures. This entails that by ‘granting’ independence to former colonies, and then followed by ‘aid’ for development, neo-colonialism maintains a firm grip of societal administration through non-psychical methods of ‘persuasion’.[[24]](#footnote-22) Nkrumah highlights that under the guise of such phrases *“[…] it (neo-colonialism) devises innumerable ways to accomplish objectives formerly achieved by naked colonialism. It is this sum total of these modern attempts to perpetuate colonialism while at the same time talking about ‘freedom’, which has come to be known as neo-colonialism”*.[[25]](#footnote-23) The U.S. is used most frequently as an example of neo-colonialist methods practised in Third World countries (TWC) in the post-WWII era and during the early years of the Cold War. The economic sphere is used most vividly as a means to an end vis-à-vis neo-colonialism. A high rate of interest on loans taken by a TWC from Western countries, especially the U.S. is used to gain a foothold in internal financial management of TWC’s. Economic aid transferred into TWC’s in regions such as Africa has also been used as a ‘neo-colonial trap’.[[26]](#footnote-24) What came into being during the aftermath of WWII was the practice of ‘multi-lateral aid’ through international organisations such as the IMF and the WB.[[27]](#footnote-25) Both financial institutions are backed by U.S. capital and according to Nkrumah, *“[T]hese agencies have the habit of forcing would-be borrowers to submit to various offensive conditions, such as supplying information about their economies, submitting their policy and plans to review by the World Bank and accepting agency supervision of their use of loans”*.[[28]](#footnote-26) This description of loan vs. debt illustrates an image of exploiting abundant financial resources of mainly Western financial institutions to ensure a say in the economic decision-making procedures of a low-development country in question. The Communist Bloc also provided for loans to TWC’s, albeit to a lower rate of interest than that of its counterpart.[[29]](#footnote-27)

The inflows of aid from First and Second World countries often contained several conditional ties, such as the setting up of military bases, exclusive mineral extraction rights and reduced autonomy in domestic finances etc.[[30]](#footnote-28)

Adding insult to injury, independence from the colonial metropolis often included various kinds of privileges to the detriment of newfound sovereignty and freedom. Nkrumah identifies several ‘rights’ demanded by the former colonialists such as;

*[…] land concessions, prospecting rights for minerals and/or oil; the ‘right’ to collect customs, to carry out administration, to issue paper money; to be exempt from customs duties and/or taxes for expatriate enterprises; and, above all, the ‘right’ to provide ‘aid’.* [[31]](#footnote-29)

These demands that came with development aid and/or credit in terms of loans ensured the continued dominance of former colonizers over former colonized.[[32]](#footnote-30)

In sum, Nkrumah seeks to evidence the all-encompassing essence of neo-colonialism mostly embodied by the U.S. All aspects of society are penetrated via means of economic incitements so desperately needed by many former colonies. Nkrumah emphasizes two features of neo-colonialism; first, the particular historic and political period of the Cold War along with decolonization and second, the oldest trait of mankind; sheer interest.

## 3.2 The Resource Curse Thesis

Richard M. Auty is a British economist working at Lancaster University. As a former consultant to the WB, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID), and the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET) he has done a lot of research into the elements of the resource curse theory.[[33]](#footnote-31)

As a basic premise of economic development it has long been withheld that resource endowment is most critical during the early low-income stages of the development process.[[34]](#footnote-32) This conventional view inserts that *“[…] as development proceeds and a population acquires more and more skills, those skills are deployed with increasing effectiveness to counteract any resource deficiency”*.[[35]](#footnote-33) Richard M. Auty suggests that new evidence may lead us in another direction. According to Auty, *“[…] favourable natural resource endowment may be less beneficial to countries at low- and mid-income level of development than the conventional wisdom might suppose”*.[[36]](#footnote-34) The post-war industrialization efforts of developing countries and the management of natural resources by mineral-rich developing countries since the 1960’s are the main evidence for making traditional perspectives obsolete.[[37]](#footnote-35) Furthermore, Auty states that, *“[…] not only may resource-rich countries fail to benefit from a favourable endowment, they may actually perform worse than less well-endowed countries”*.[[38]](#footnote-36) According to Auty, the fact that many resource-rich developing countries perform worse than non-resource-rich developing countries in terms of economic development, is the heart of the resource curse theory.[[39]](#footnote-37) The following data will illustrate Auty’s point:

Hard-mineral exporters Other low-income countries

**1971-83** **1971-83**

Investment-to-GDP 23 17.2

Growth of GDP per capita (%) -1.0 0.7

Number of Countries 10 20[[40]](#footnote-38)

What this table illustrates is that although foreign investment capital were more intensive in the resource-rich developing countries during the 1970’s/early 1980’s, low-income developing countries performed better economically in terms of GDP growth. At the root of these contradicting numbers are the hard-mineral exporters’ functions of mining production, domestic linkages and deployment of mineral rents.[[41]](#footnote-39) According to Auty, *“[…] mineral production is strongly capital intensive and employs a very small fraction of the total national workforce, with large inputs of capital from foreign sources”*.[[42]](#footnote-40) Consequently, this model yields little or no production linkages with the local labour force since factories are situated outside the host country. Furthermore, Auty states that this generates low revenue retention due to the fact that *“[…] a large fraction of export earnings flow immediately overseas to service the foreign capital investment”*.[[43]](#footnote-41) In other words, as large sums are invested in the extraction of raw minerals, even larger sums are generated and mainly benefit the foreign investors.[[44]](#footnote-42) Part of the problem in regards to economic development within resource-rich developing countries is that the revenues (can be very high depending on the market) made from exporting raw minerals is based on the exchange rates of the international market.[[45]](#footnote-43) Since the extraction and export of minerals can yield enormous sums when the market is at its highest, the national economy takes a huge plunge downwards if (when) the market changes. The emphasis on mineral exportation and technological development thereof has been, in many cases, at the expense of under-developing other areas of production and potential revenue, e.g. agriculture. Since little is done to develop upon non-mining production, it can be difficult to compete with manufactured goods on the international market.[[46]](#footnote-44)

In sum Auty asserts that being endowed with a wide spectre of raw minerals is not necessarily, and in many cases not, beneficiary to the host country. The reliance on mineral export can be very harmful to national economies of the developing world since production and technological advancement is usually halted in other areas of production and due to the fact that in many cases the financial gains of raw minerals hardly befalls on the resource endowed state.

## 3.3 Dependency Theory

Theotonio Dos Santos (1936-) is a Brazilian economist and political scientist writing on the elements of the dependency theory. He is Coordinator and Chair of the United Nations University and United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNU-UNESCO) Network of Global Economy and Sustainable Development.[[47]](#footnote-45)

In essence dependency is *“a state of relying on somebody/something for something”*.[[48]](#footnote-46) In Seligson and Passé-Smith’s, *Development and Underdevelopment*, Theotonio Dos Santos utilizes dependency in terms of an economic interdependent relationship of development.[[49]](#footnote-47) Dependency here is used as a theoretical tool to analyze the unequal economic relations between ‘rich and poor’ countries in terms of development, trade, export and financial advancement. Dos Santos inserts that dependence is *“[…] a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected”*.[[50]](#footnote-48)

### 3.3.1 Dependence Occurs Threefold

Dos Santos works with three basic forms of dependence that is connected to traditional Marxian theory: (1) colonial, (2) financial-industrial, and (3) multi-national corporations that maintain operations in developing countries.[[51]](#footnote-49) These three forms of dependence have replaced one another as time has progressed and kept in check the balance-of-power in favour of the developed countries (dominant) to that of the underdeveloped countries (dependent).[[52]](#footnote-50) In the first two types of dependence, production is based on products destined for export e.g. gold, silver, copper, diamonds, timber, rubber etc. These products were dominant in the colonial era while the industrial-financial epoch witnessed the export of agricultural products and raw materials to be processed in the dominant countries. Both eras symbolize that production was decided according to demand from hegemonic centres.[[53]](#footnote-51) In these export economies, the internal market most often experienced a standstill or setback since most economic efforts are diverted towards building up and maintaining a solid export-oriented market of production.[[54]](#footnote-52)

The latest form of dependence, performed by multinational corporations, institute new mechanisms of dependence. According to Dos Santos there are two factors that inhibit development in dependent economies: First, resources generated by the export sector are limited; second, a monopoly of patented technology offers little room for manoeuvrability for dependent countries desiring technological equipment required for the internal industrial sector.[[55]](#footnote-53) Dos Santos holds that industrial development is highly dependent upon an export sector that in turn generates the foreign currency needed to buy inputs to be utilized by the industrial sector.[[56]](#footnote-54) Additionally, Dos Santos argues that,

*[…] the first consequence of this dependence is the need to preserve the traditional export sector, which limits economically the development of the internal market by the conservation of backward relations of production and signifies, politically, the maintenance of power by traditional decadent oligarchies*.[[57]](#footnote-55)

Furthermore, trade relations are usually conducted in a highly monopolized international market that carries a tendency to lower prices on raw materials while raising prices of industrial products.[[58]](#footnote-56) According to Dos Santos, the amount of capital that leaves dependent countries in favour of dominant countries are much higher than the inflow of capital by the same actors. Evidently, foreign financing becomes a necessary evil in those dependent countries that are highly reliant on patented technological equipment for the development of their domestic industrial sector.[[59]](#footnote-57) In most cases, multinational corporations do not sell machinery, but use it as a currency, thus establishing two important factors: total reliance on foreign personnel to service the equipment (since dependent countries do not own the industrial material); and, if machinery is not sold, it is regarded as an investment that will yield some kind of economic profit for the multinational.[[60]](#footnote-58) Foreign aid is also used as a means of creating an interdependent relationship between dominant/multinational and the dependent country. Despite aid’s apparent economic boost to any given societal sector, Dos Santos affirms that although foreign aid is seemingly benevolent and unconditional on paper, reality is quite different. Dos Santos states that, in spite of the generous gestures and pro bono beneficiaries, *“[…] the hard truth is that the underdeveloped countries have to pay for all of the ‘aid’ they receive”*.[[61]](#footnote-59) The economic gaps that foreign aid is destined to fill are, to Dos Santos, de facto created by foreign capital in the first place.[[62]](#footnote-60) Multinational corporations use foreign capital as investment in the export sector; extract raw materials for further processing outside domestic markets of dependent countries; use patented highly technological equipment as a tool for the establishment of continued advantageous economic output since domestic and local businesses and industrial producers cannot buy the much needed machinery without the strategically outlined conditionalities mentioned above. Dos Santos thus illustrates the complexity and perpetual self-sustaining circle of the interdependent relationship between dominant and dependent as dominated, run and dictated by ‘big business’.

## 3.4 Frantz Fanon: Black Consciousness; Perspective of the Colonized

Frantz Fanon (1925-61) was a writer, psychiatrist and political theorist born in French speaking Martinique. Fanon has written 3 books in which he criticizes European colonialism and its effort to de-personalize African subjects. Fanon is perhaps the most influential writer ever on colonial African consciousness and its effects on the subdued and colonized African.[[63]](#footnote-61)

In his book, *Black Skin, White Masks*, Frantz Fanon depicts the psyche of the colonized African born out of the exogenesis of white colonization. According to Fanon, the black man experiences his ‘blackness’ as an inferior racial group through interaction with white Europeans.[[64]](#footnote-62) Fanon, himself a colonized African from Martinique, writes extensively on both scholarly work regarding African mentality as well as he uses his own reflections on the world he perceives himself to be living in. Fanon writes: *“All I wanted was to be a man among other men”*.[[65]](#footnote-63) What he means is that he wants to be regarded as a man on similar terms as other men, an equal on this earth. Equal to not just any other men, but the *white* man. Being African, Fanon found himself excluded from the societal structures imposed on him by colonial white masters; *“The white world, the only honourable one, barred me from all participation. A man was expected to behave like a man. I was expected to behave like a black man – or at least like a nigger [...] I was told to stay within bounds, to go back where I belonged”*.[[66]](#footnote-64) Regardless of his education, his knowledge of ‘white’ literature, economics etc., Fanon detested being judged merely by the colour of his skin. Fanon cannot escape racial prejudice. It becomes a point to make when making both positive and negative acquaintances: *“When people like me, they tell me it is in spite of my color. When they dislike me, they point out that it is not because of my color. Either way, I am locked into the infernal circle”*.[[67]](#footnote-65) Colour prejudice was and is still being used by one racial group to exert dominance over another, physically as well as psychologically;

*It was hate; I was hated, despised, detested, not by the neighbor across the street or my cousin on my mother’s side, but an entire race. I was up against something unreasoned. The psychoanalysts say that nothing is more traumatizing for the young child than his encounters with what is rational. I would personally say that for a man whose only weapon is reason there is nothing more neurotic than contact with unreason”.* [[68]](#footnote-66)

Fanon describes here the proportionally handicapped comparison of resentment by someone close to him, who knows him versus the resentment by an entire race of people who knows only the colour of his skin. Fanon pursues an effort to discover what black consciousness is in essence. He discards the contemporary belief of black consciousness as merely shaped and dominated by the white colonizers.[[69]](#footnote-67) Fanon is not satisfied with a discourse on black consciousness as generated via inter-social relations with the white European. Instead, Fanon finds in African history events that suggest pre-colonial black consciousness. Examples of Africans travelling to Mecca, studying the Koran and learned blacks that orchestrated the structural composition of society was found by Fanon and utilized to ‘find a valid historic place of origin’.[[70]](#footnote-68) Part of colonial discourse had been that Africans were lazy, violent, savages, cannibals and unintelligent.[[71]](#footnote-69) In history Fanon found an ancestral heritage vital for the rejection of the above-mentioned traits of African culture. Fanon writes: *“The white man was wrong, I was not primitive, not even a half-man, I belonged to a race that had already been working in gold and silver two thousand years ago”*.[[72]](#footnote-70) Fanon uses Aime Césaire to cement his position:

*What sort of men were these, then, who had been torn away from their families, their countries, their religions, with a savagery unparalleled in history? Gentle men, polite, considerate, unquestionably superior to those who tortured them-that collection of adventurers who slashed and violated and spat on Africa to make the stripping of her easier. The men they took away knew how to build houses, govern empires, erect cities, cultivate fields, mine for metals, weave cotton, forge steel. Their customs were pleasing, built on unity, kindness, respect for age*.[[73]](#footnote-71)

To that of black consciousness, Fanon inserts that it is rooted deep in history, unravelled through the experience of colonization, and that the black man has an ancestral heritage of rich endeavours.

## 3.5 Frantz Fanon: Inferiority Complex of Colonized Africans

Fanon discusses the work of a fellow psychoanalyst, M. Mannoni, who holds that the inferiority complex felt by Africans antedates colonialism.[[74]](#footnote-72) Adding to this, Mannoni asserts the following via studying societal Madagascar: *“The fact that when an adult Malagasy is isolated in a different environment he can become susceptible to the classical type of inferiority complex proves almost beyond doubt that the germ of the complex was latent in him from childhood”*.[[75]](#footnote-73) Fanon rejects the notion that anything resembling an inferiority complex in pre-colonial Madagascar had existed.[[76]](#footnote-74) In spite of Mannoni connecting the complex with an inherent Malagasy trait, he states that *“[…] the central of this idea is that the confrontation of ‘civilized’ and ‘primitive’ men creates a special situation-the colonial situation-and brings about the emergence of a mass of illusions and misunderstandings that only a psychological analysis can place and define”*.[[77]](#footnote-75) As far as Fanon is concerned, he fails in this endeavour. By stating that the complex precedes colonial experience – the meeting of the white and black man – Mannoni actually removes the consequences of racial discrimination in favour of the white man. He continues to state two main factors in his thesis; first, that, *“European civilization and its best representatives are not, for instance, responsible for colonial racialism”[[78]](#footnote-76)*; and second, that *“[…] in practice, therefore, an inferiority complex connected with the colour of the skin is found only among those who form a minority within a group of another colour”*.[[79]](#footnote-77)

Fanon rejects both statements and attempts to identify factors that lead in the opposite direction. In regards to ‘European civilization and its best representatives’, Fanon uses German Nazism as an example of European civilization. Nazism, in this case, was the product of European racial superiority and, accordingly Europeans tolerated it, at least until the Wehrmacht occupied European countries and persecuted non-Jewish peoples that is.[[80]](#footnote-78) Of course, colonialism preceded the Nazi ideology of Adolph Hitler and therefore Nazism is not responsible for the racial hierarchal system deployed by white colonialists, but as Nazism originated from Europe, same as colonialism, both are connected through European heritage.[[81]](#footnote-79) Nevertheless, Fanon intended to discard the grand notion of Europe’s finest having no hand in white racial supremacy, or the inferiority complex felt by colonized Africans. Fanon adds that every individual of a nation is responsible for and accountable to the atrocities committed by few in the name of that nation:

*And if, apparently, you succeed in keeping yourselves unsullied, it is because others dirty themselves in your place. You hire thugs, and, balancing the accounts, it is you who are the real criminals: for without you, without your blind indifference, such men could never carry out deeds that damn you as much as they shame those men*.[[82]](#footnote-80)

Fanon holds that you cannot escape accountability, regardless of where you are geographically situated. The people in France are just as much to blame for the wrongdoings and atrocities committed by French colonialists in Africa.[[83]](#footnote-81) Consequently, the Europeans cannot, in Fanon’s reason, be exempt from having a hand the racial composition and attitude of white European colonialists in Africa.[[84]](#footnote-82)

The second thesis of Mannoni is easily countered. Fanon uses his native Martinique and South Africa as cases in point. To state that a minority develop a complex of inferiority is, in Fanon’s sense, truly false. Martinique, at the time of writing, had a population of 300.000 native Africans compared to white settlers that counted only about 200 people.[[85]](#footnote-83) In this case, Fanon writes: *“The colonial, even though he is ‘in the minority’, does not feel that this makes him inferior”*.[[86]](#footnote-84) In theory, it makes much sense to talk of inferiority complexes among minorities of skin colour in any given geopolitical space, but in reality and in the case of the white European in Africa, it makes little sense. The very fact that these Europeans have settled in Africa can de facto be ascribed to the ideological discourse of colonialism that permeated European colonial and imperialistic history. One need only to read Joseph Conrad or Rudyard Kipling to see the world as looked upon by the white man.[[87]](#footnote-85) To speak of whites feeling inferior towards blacks is - based on Afro-European history - ridiculous.

South Africa provides Fanon with another example since there are 13 million black Africans and only 2 million whites. What can be said of South Africa is that the white South Africans, comprising no more than a mere 15 per cent of the population, have managed to dominate the remaining 85 per cent of the population politically, economically and culturally.[[88]](#footnote-86) As these two cases demonstrate, Mannoni’s theory of minorities feeling inferior can be cast aside.

Fanon argues that; *“It is the racist who creates his inferior”*.[[89]](#footnote-87) One need only read small portion of the massive colonial literature dating from the late 19th century to find that the black man was held in no high regard. Evidently, Fanon asserts that the inferiority complex felt by Africans is thus the result of the white man’s racial structure being imposed on a society that did not base human worth according to skin colour. In essence, Fanon discards any notion of inferiority as a black pre-colonial heritage and ascribes such a complex to the nature of white colonial attitude and discourse.

## 3.6 Conflict Theory

Bjørn Møller is a Danish Professor with an MA in history and a PhD in Political Science, working at Aalborg University, Denmark. His work is reflected through his teachings in Global Refugee Studies, Political Science and Development and International Relations.[[90]](#footnote-88)

In the book *Conflict Theory,* author Bjørn Møller offers a typology of conflict. Møller asserts that *“Conflicts occur at various levels, ranging from the international level of wars to the inter-personal level of marital disputes […]”.[[91]](#footnote-89)* The following table displays Møller’s distinction between various types of conflict depending on nature, attitude and outlook:

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Taxonomy of Conflicts** | **International** | **Transnational** | **Intra-State** | **Inter-Personal** |
| Violent | War  Other armed conflicts  Cold War | Military intervention  Support for armed insurgents | Civil Wars  Armed insurgencies  Genocide | Wife battering  Child abuse  Murder  Violent crime |
| Non-Violent | Political disputes  Trade wars | Sanctions  Diplomacy | Political struggle | Verbal disputes  Discrimination |

Table 1.[[92]](#footnote-90)

Both violent and non-violent types of conflict are interesting here as they are closely connected. No matter with which frame we concern ourselves, violent or non-violent, politics and economics play a crucial part. Møller argues that although it would be false to assume that conflicts always follow the same pattern, there is a structural similarity between violent and non-violent conflict.[[93]](#footnote-91) As war was traditionally the *“[…] rational endeavour of states opposing each other”[[94]](#footnote-92)*, Møller holds that the relationship between war and state can be viewed as a symbiosis *“[…] where the state is built on war, which in turn presupposes the state”.[[95]](#footnote-93)* Carl Von Clausewitz describes this model of war as *“[…] a continuation of politics by other means”[[96]](#footnote-94)*, thus reaffirming Møller’s connection of politics and violence.

According to Møller, *“Conflicts have both structural (“root”) and proximate causes (“triggers”), the former referring to the underlying problems and the latter to the triggering factors”.[[97]](#footnote-95)* Møller continues to state that, *“Fully fledged conflicts never spring out into the open without a combination of the two, i.e. neither can a single event precipitate an open conflict unless there are structural reasons for it, nor can structural causes create a crisis in the absence of a triggering factor”*.[[98]](#footnote-96) Root and trigger are thus closely connected, as one cannot evolve without the other.

### 3.6.1 Conflicts of Interest

Møller posits that conflict of interest is the antagonism between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’, while stipulating that absolute poverty does not cause conflict behaviour.[[99]](#footnote-97) Møller contends that, *“There is no strong correlation, if any, between violent behaviour and living standards”*.[[100]](#footnote-98) Nevertheless, Møller stresses that relative poverty or deprivation are the causal factors for conflict behaviour. Decline in living conditions or growth rates play a part in causing conflict, according to Møller, and these deteriorations *“[…] may frustrate overly optimistic expectations, thereby producing aggression and a propensity for direct violence […]”*.[[101]](#footnote-99) Møller thus acknowledge the strong correlation between issues of economic or societal nature as determining characteristics in catalysing violent/non-violent conflict.

### 3.6.2 Conflicts of Values

Conflicts of values differ somewhat from conflicts of interest. Møller asserts that these are much more observable *“[…] simply because values, beliefs and attitudes are, by their very nature, held consciously”*.[[102]](#footnote-100) Møller suggests that while any value or issue might evolve into a conflict, there are distinct factors that feature more than others. Ethnicity and religion are regarded here as the most vigorous ones.[[103]](#footnote-101) Ethnicity usually ties itself to race/psychical or linguistic features, while resting on a foundation of primordial claim to territory, culture, nationality etc. Once ethnic tensions have arisen within a society, they are difficult to restrain, in part due to their ‘natural’ obedience.[[104]](#footnote-102) Ethnicity, according to Anthony Smith, is *“[…] a named culture-community whose members have a myth of common origins, shared memories and cultural characteristics, a link with a homeland and a measure of solidarity”*.[[105]](#footnote-103) Møller continues to point out that closer analysis of the ethnic phenomenon reveals that it is a social construction, *“[…] as objective features sometimes, but not always, become points of identification”*.[[106]](#footnote-104) Furthermore Møller posits that: “*It is only when the feature in question becomes a matter of social identification (or discrimination) that the need for clear-cut definitions arise”*.[[107]](#footnote-105) In spite of ethnicity being a social construction, *“[…] socially constructed reality is a reality on par with psychical reality, only of a different kind”*.[[108]](#footnote-106)

As social constructions are perspectives on a perceived reality, they can easily be corrupted or used as tools for establishing popular xenophobia or radical racism that in some cases have led to atrocious events committed in the name of ethnic differentiation (extermination) – the 1990’s witnessing two such events in the Balkans and Rwanda respectively.[[109]](#footnote-107)

Regardless of the conflict, be it either of interest, value or both, fact remains that conflicts disrupt entire societies, damage economies, displace people, deteriorate living conditions and destroy lives. Møller has set up a framework into which conflict originates – the root and the trigger – while stressing some of the important features that usually play a decisive part in conflicts.

## 3.7 Democracy vs. Socio-Economic Development

Larry Diamond is a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University where he is a professor of political science and sociology. He is co-editor of the Journal of Democracy and has written extensively on the development of democracy throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.[[110]](#footnote-108)

Larry Diamond takes his point of departure in Lipset’s modernization theory, which argues *“[…] that democracy is related to the state of economic development. The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy”*.[[111]](#footnote-109) The basic idea is that if socio-economic development is on the rise, democracy will occur sooner or later. This is of course a simplification of the thesis but nevertheless Diamond seeks to substantiate Lipset’s point through way of historical events that correlates to Lipset’s thesis. Diamond holds that *“[…] a major reason why democracy is less viable in less developed societies is because the proportion of wealth that the government or local elective bodies absorb and distribute is greater, and therefore it becomes harder to secure an independent position and an honest living without relying in some respect or other upon public administration”*.[[112]](#footnote-110) While acknowledging that it may not be literally true that the state absorbs more wealth in less developed countries than industrialized countries, Diamond states *“[…] at low levels of development, swollen states control a vastly greater share of the most valued economic opportunities (jobs, contracts, licenses, scholarships, and development largesse) than they do at higher levels of development”*.[[113]](#footnote-111) He continues by stating that this is why a democracy requires *“[…] a large (middle) class people whose economic position is virtually independent of those who hold supreme power”*.[[114]](#footnote-112) Diamond argues that,

*In the post-World War II era, the pressures and prevailing models in the world system and the insecurities of peripheral status in that system, have induced new nations to build centralized, resource-intensive states. As a result of this state expansion in the quest for rapid development, control of the state itself has become the principal means of personal accumulation and hence the principal determinant of class formation*.[[115]](#footnote-113)

This new class has been labelled the ‘political class’ given that *“[…] political power is the primary force that creates economic opportunity and determines the pattern of social stratification”*.[[116]](#footnote-114) Diamond holds that this relationship between state and civil society is among the main causal factors for the shortcomings of democracy in Africa following the period of decolonization.[[117]](#footnote-115) According to Diamond what persists in this distorted relationship is the negative effects of corruption, rent-seeking, economic stagnation, ethnic conflict, abuse of power and political violence.[[118]](#footnote-116) Statism, in Diamond’s regard, has contributed heavily to the development of post-colonial states in Africa. To alter the state of things in such an environment, Diamond argues for the further development of civil society as *“[…] a strong civil society may provide an indispensable bulwark against the consolidation of authoritarian rule and a catalyst for its demise”*.[[119]](#footnote-117) Civil society thus holds the key to eliminate authoritarian rule by means of inclusion and popular demand for change and political participation. Given that the middle class would be part of economic development, the rise in wealth would also mean that the middle class would increase their demand for participation in income redistribution thus if the state seeks to expand on its financial endeavours it would ultimately require the assistance of private business owners. Diamond argues that socio-economic development fosters different legitimating effects for authoritarian regimes than for democratic ones. This leaves the authoritarian regime with an inescapable dilemma:

*“If authoritarian regimes do not perform, they lose legitimacy because performance is their only justification for holding power. However… if they do perform in delivering socioeconomic progress, they tend to refocus popular aspirations around political goals for voice and participation that they cannot satisfy without terminating their existence”.*[[120]](#footnote-118)

In essence, Diamond attempts to demonstrate the correlation between low levels of development and authoritarian dictatorships by illustrating distinct factors that contribute to the emergence of authoritative regimes, especially in post-colonial Africa.

# 4.0 Historical Outline

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## 4.1 Leopoldian Congo and Belgian Colonial Rule

In late 1884, the Chancellor of Germany, Otto Von Bismarck called in the European colonial powers to discuss the fate of not only Congo, but also Africa herself. The Berlin Conference featured 14 representatives of European states and zero representatives from Africa.[[122]](#footnote-120) Leopold’s claim to the Congo was hereby solidified and he was now the sole proprietor of a territory bigger than all of Western Europe and about 80 times the size of Belgium. The Scramble for Africa had begun, with Leopold taking a huge piece of the ‘magnificent cake’ that is Africa.[[123]](#footnote-121) Prior to the conference, Leopold had sent Scottish Henry Morton Stanley to Congo to secure somewhat 400 treaties granting the King absolute territorial power. The quest for glory, admiration and splendour in the eyes of the world, drove Leopold to colonize the Congo, not for the sake of the Congolese peoples, but for the sake of his own personal ambition.[[124]](#footnote-122)

### 4.1.1 ‘Red Rubber’

Due to the revolution of the automobile, international demand for rubber used in tires increased in the late 19th century.[[125]](#footnote-123) Rubber, a commodity of abundance in the Congo, became Leopold’s greatest obsession. The creation of the *Force Publique* (FP)*,* an army of 12.500 African soldiers and 350 European commanders, did their part to ensure a steady flow of ‘Red Rubber’ from the Congo onto the international market. When prices were at their highest, the profit from the rubber trade exceeded more than 700 percent![[126]](#footnote-124)

The administration for the extraction of rubber befell upon the FP.[[127]](#footnote-125) Via means of extreme violence, the FP terrorized the local population forcing them to gather wild rubber and cutting off hands when quotas where not met.[[128]](#footnote-126) At one point hands were cut off by such voluminous amounts that the severed limb took on a value of its own.[[129]](#footnote-127)

Reports of atrocities committed by the FP by means of collecting rubber throughout the Congo reached the international community in the late 1890’s. Leopold, never having set a foot on Congolese soil, finally ‘sold’ his Congo Free State to the Belgian government in 1908 after two years of harsh negotiations. The Belgian government paid Leopold somewhat 205 million Francs for the annexation of his ‘place in the sun’.[[130]](#footnote-128) Reportedly, Leopold’s ‘adventures’ in the Congo had filled his coffers with an amount of $1 billion in today’s terms.[[131]](#footnote-129) As Edmund D. Morel, one of the key vocalists of the anti-Leopoldian reign suggests, rubber in the Congo was *“[…] sown in blood, and harvested in secret”*.[[132]](#footnote-130) The scale of atrocities in the Congo during Leopold’s authoritative rule has been difficult to establish. As one author describes it, sifting through the demographic data of Leopoldian Congo, *“[…] is like sifting through the ruins of an Auschwitz crematorium. They do not tell you precise death tolls, but they reek of mass murder”*.[[133]](#footnote-131)

### 4.1.2 Belgian Congo

The Belgian state took over formal control of King Leopold II’s Congo in 1908 after almost 25 years of rule by the king and his men. The new colonial state ‘adopted’ much of the administration already in place, but with few minor alterations. The colonial administration enjoyed full sovereignty while the Catholic Church and the companies responsible for mineral extraction were endowed with state-like powers to assert influence.[[134]](#footnote-132)

The relationship between colonizer and colonized was of a paternalistic nature, much in line with dominant colonial discourse where the white man acted as father and the African subjects were children.[[135]](#footnote-133) The ‘divide and rule’ principle under which state, church and corporate enterprise ruled the Congo served the colonial administration well. All collaborated to ensure total dominance of their African subjects.[[136]](#footnote-134) Compulsory labour continued to be enforced on a massive scale throughout the Congo, in particular in the mining districts and the large cities. When the Belgian government assumed control of the Congo in 1908, *“[…] the colonial economy was already a brutal system of exploitation, one the distinctive features of Belgian colonization. This system of economic exploitation was based on compulsory labor”*.[[137]](#footnote-135)

The first 20 years of Belgian Congo shared similar features of its Leopoldian past. The entire economy was based on the extraction of raw minerals from Congolese mines that were then sent to Belgium for processing and manufacturing. Until the 1920’s, the most commonly exported natural resources from the Congo were ivory, wild rubber, cotton and palm oil.[[138]](#footnote-136)

Despite the Belgian government’s efforts to restrain an emerging middle class, this was a much-needed development for continued colonial revenue.[[139]](#footnote-137)

## 4.2 Decolonization and the Drive for Independence

After WWII the political climate in the Congo was tense. The experiences of WWII had had profound effects on Congolese society and now ushered for change in a relentless pace.

The years of decolonization witnessed the experience of massive changes in Congolese society in terms of both political and social rights. Several factors had contributed to the newly born dream of independence. The Belgian colony contributed to the Allied war effort via natural and human resources. Uranium, copper, cocoa, palm oil and tin were exported while Congolese soldiers were drafted to fight the Germans and Italians in Northern Africa.[[140]](#footnote-138) The encounter with other colonized Africans during the war – Africans who were living under better conditions – installed desires for independence in the war veterans used by the Belgian state.

### 4.2.1 The Forming of a Political Opposition

As mentioned earlier political participation in the colonial administration had been banned for the Congolese population. After the war the Belgian government continued to stifle political unison and the creation of political parties.[[141]](#footnote-139) In doing so, the Belgian government facilitated the rise of ethnic nationalisms, where soon-to-be political parties arose. Parties such as the *Association des Bakongo pour l’Unification, la Conservation, le Perfectionnement et l’Expansion de la Langue Kikongo* (ABAKO)[[142]](#footnote-140) and the *Mouvement National Congolais* (MNC)[[143]](#footnote-141) were non-political parties, but associations based on cultural, social and ethnic affiliations.[[144]](#footnote-142) These associations campaigned for greater political participation in Congolese state affairs and ultimately total independence from the Belgian state.[[145]](#footnote-143) As the era of decolonization took place throughout most of Africa, and as popular opinion demanded, the Belgian government finally ceded more than 75 years of Belgian influence in the Congo. Albeit many political leaders rejoiced at the opportunity to be granted independence, Patrice Lumumba, widely known as a staunch critic of the colonial regime, claimed that independence was not to be given; it was taken.[[146]](#footnote-144) When independence was finally achieved on July 30, 1960, the Congolese people rejoiced their newfound identity as free Africans. As the Belgian flag was taken down at the Residence of the Governor-General, an onlooker stated: *“That’s the end of colonialism”*.[[147]](#footnote-145) To that his companion stated: *“Let us hope, that’s not the end of Congo too”*.[[148]](#footnote-146)

### 4.2.2 Assuming Control of the Colonial Administration

After independence was won in July 1960, civil war soon broke out in the Congo. The newly appointed heads of state, President Joseph Kasavubu (ABAKO) and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba (MNC) were thrust into civil strife, army mutiny and regional secession that was to last until the coup d’état of General Joseph-Desiré Mobutu in 1965.

### 4.2.3 The Lack of an Educated Elite

A determining factor for the immediate instability was the absence of an educated professional Congolese elite.[[149]](#footnote-147) The Belgian government had not established universities on Congolese soil until the 1950’s. Unlike other African colonies such as British Nigeria, Uganda and South Africa and French Congo-Brazzaville, the Belgian colonial administration had done little to nothing to foster higher education among the Congolese population.[[150]](#footnote-148) The policy of non-inclusion of Congolese into state administration had severe consequences for the infant nation. In June 1960, a month before independence the following figures testify to the difficult situation of post-colonial administration:

**Ranks Europeans Africans**

**High-ranking functionaries 5.900 0**

**Mid-level functionaries**

**Office managers 1.690 9**

**Assistant managers 1.976 24**

**Clerks 774 726**

**Low-level functionaries 0 10.791**

**Total 10.340 11.550[[151]](#footnote-149)**

These numbers illustrate the profound paradox the new Congo state found itself in. An entire state administrative system and a prosperous business economy inherited by the Belgian colonialists, but no one to run it.

### 4.2.4 Civil War and Secession

Congolese soldiers mutinied against their white commanders in 1960 and began a relentless campaign targeting white Europeans that included rape of women, looting of properties and assaulting European officers and civilians alike.[[152]](#footnote-150) In order to protect its European citizens, the Belgian government sent in 2.500 Belgian troops to defeat the rampant riots that had occurred. Katanga, the region immensely blessed with Congo’s richest mineral deposits, seceded and declared independence a short while after the landing of Belgian troops on Congolese soil. Katanga’s secession was backed by the Belgian government in terms of military personnel, advisors, weapons and general funds for the upkeep of the newly created government apparatus.[[153]](#footnote-151) Meanwhile, Kasavubu and Lumumba had split ways in terms of dealing with foreign actors present in Congo, and eventually Lumumba was replaced as Prime Minister, in part due to his openly expressed desire to seek support with the Soviet Union, to end the ‘neo-colonial’ occupation that had taken place in Congo.[[154]](#footnote-152) Lumumba was assassinated in January 1961, by the Belgian secret service in cooperation with the head of the Katanga secession, Moïse Tshombe.[[155]](#footnote-153) The years 1961 to 1965 offered little hope for the unison of Congo. War, secession and political instability permeated Kasavubu’s crumbling control of state, population and territorial integrity and sovereignty.[[156]](#footnote-154) Lumumba’s death in 1961 occasionally paved the way for the rise of Mobutu who launched a successful coup d’état in 1965, deposed Kasavubu and assumed presidential power of a country long torn by civil war, political impotence and economic catastrophe.

## 4.3 The Rise of Mobutu and Authoritarian Dictatorship

The First Republic immediately came to an end when Mobutu staged a successful coup d’état in November 1965.[[157]](#footnote-155) Many believed that Mobutu’s ascendance to power would usher in a new era of political stability and end the economic turmoil the country had found itself in since independence.[[158]](#footnote-156)

### 4.3.1 Consolidating Political Power

Mobutu assumed control of state and government at a time when rebel forces had little or real clemency as to pose a threat to the central government. He changed the name of the state from Congo to the Democratic Republic of Congo in order to distance the country from its colonial past. The DRC under Mobutu’s rule experienced major setbacks in regards to political, social and economic ventures. Mobutu received vast support from foreign governments, especially the U.S., in terms of military equipment and financial funding.[[159]](#footnote-157) On the presupposition of only a 5-year transitional government, Mobutu went to work. Due to his non-existent ethnic-based constituency, Mobutu organised an ethnic-inclusive government, at first built upon existing institutions of the First Republic. Each of the twenty-two provinces of the DRC was to be represented in government by a local official, signalling national ethnic unity.[[160]](#footnote-158) As for political opposition, Mobutu furthered his tight control of the political apparatus by way of either co-optation or ruthless repression via means of violence. Evidently, co-optation proved to be very successful, at least in the early years of Mobutu’s regime. *“Co-optation, a device used with remarkable effect through the Mobutu era, was early developed into a fine art, as the far-flung apparatus of the state offered a large reservoir of positions for those wiling to pledge faithful service”.*[[161]](#footnote-159) Those that would not follow the line laid out by Mobutu were imprisoned, exiled or executed. The loyalty of the army proved most valuable as Mobutu enforced his rule of law through mechanisms of violence, resembling those of King Leopold II’s FP.[[162]](#footnote-160)

In 1967, Mobutu created his own personal political party, the *Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution* (MPR). All other political parties were subsequently banned.[[163]](#footnote-161) In an attempt to create national political unity, the MPR held no particular ethnic loyalty and was thus a national party. By 1970, Mobutu’s power was absolute. He had successfully repressed vocal sentiments of secession and regionalism, along with the brutal extermination of armed guerrilla forces in peripheral DRC, ruling through legitimacy, the legacy of Leopold.

### 4.3.2 From the DRC to Zaire

In 1971, President Mobutu mobilized a succession of political programs that were aimed at ‘decolonizing’ the DRC. This entailed a societal transformation in which all colonial ties were cut by means of ‘Africanizing’ the DRC.[[164]](#footnote-162) Starting with the change of the country’s name from the DRC to Zaire[[165]](#footnote-163), and then the changing of city names from Leopoldville to Kinshasa, Mobutu encouraged the Congolese people to change their names as well. Leading the way, Joseph-Désiré Mobutu became Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu wa za Banga.[[166]](#footnote-164) From here followed what signalled Mobutu’s determination to rid the country of foreign influence. All foreign companies big or small, including several that had existed since Leopold’s reign, were nationalized. Mobutu wanted to control the extraction of raw minerals and resources from the rich Katanga region, at the expense of foreign investors.[[167]](#footnote-165) Small foreign business owners were also forced to give up their enterprise to Mobutu’s men who were, to say the least, not qualified or able to continue running a profitable business. The nationalization of Zaire’s foreign business ventures marked the rapid deterioration of the national economy.[[168]](#footnote-166) From the early 1970’s and onwards, the national economy took a plunge so deep, that it has not yet recovered fully.[[169]](#footnote-167) Zaireanization, as it was called, ushered in the dominance of what was already problems in state administration: corruption and nepotism. Corruption in Zaire reached a level where it meant, that *“[…] any sort of economic or legal service, including obtaining common-place legal documents such as driver’s licenses, birth certificates, or passports, requires a bribe. Rarely anything can be obtained from legal authorities through legitimate procedures”*.[[170]](#footnote-168) Ultimately civil society began voicing concerns and dissatisfaction with Mobutu’s regime.[[171]](#footnote-169)

## 4.4 Towards the New Millennium: Same Dreams, Same Story

The 1990’s provided little hope for change in Zaire. The country still suffered from devastating economic deterioration and political instability.[[172]](#footnote-170) External actors with an interest and influence in Zaire included the U.S., France, Belgium, Angola, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Central African Republic, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Zaire’s management or mismanagement of its mineral resources has been the catalyst for the chaos and political turmoil that prevails today.[[173]](#footnote-171) The transition to democracy, as forcefully orchestrated by Mobutu offered little change. In April 1990, Mobutu had ended single-party rule and set up the Sovereign National Conference (CNS) that held the position of establishing a new government and a new constitution for Zaire.[[174]](#footnote-172) The CNS convened in August and 2,850 delegates from entire Zaire, including the representatives from more than 200 political parties, attended the conference. Mobutu had filled the conference with staunch supporters of his regime to argue his case against a loose organisation of political opposition.[[175]](#footnote-173) As the political opponents debated on the future of Zaire, the Zairian army went rampage in the capital of Kinshasa. The army, *Forces Armées Zaïroises* (FAZ), had not been paid wages in several months, thus looting of stores and private homes were the order of the day. Joined by civilian crowds in several major cities, 3 days of looting and rioting cost the state approximately $700 million to $1 billion in damage.[[176]](#footnote-174) The event that changed the landscape of Zaire and subsequently led to the downfall of Mobutu was the Rwandan Civil War that erupted in 1994.[[177]](#footnote-175) The Hutu genocide of the Tutsi population of Rwanda seriously affected Zaire’s socio-political climate. Hutu’s and Tutsi’s alike flooded across the border into Eastern Zaire, creating refugee camps the size of major Zairian cities. Some of these people fleeing had fought on either side of the Rwandan Civil War and created armed groups on Zairian soil. Backed by several foreign states, Hutu and Tutsi’s both fought each other and the FAZ in an attempt to gain a foothold in some of Zaire’s wealthiest provinces in the south eastern part of the country.[[178]](#footnote-176) Mobutu, who at the time found himself in Europe receiving medical treatment, had lost the support of his own army. Faced with rebel groups, in particular the organised military and political unit of the *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre* (AFDL), led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the FAZ was outmanoeuvred, outnumbered and eventually outfought.[[179]](#footnote-177) Entering Kinshasa on May 17th, 1997, Kabila enjoyed the support of the people long-tired of Mobutu’s dictatorial regime. The inauguration of Kabila to presidency signalled the end of what is now known as First Congo War.[[180]](#footnote-178)

### 4.4.1 Kabila Senior Takes Control of Zaire

Kabila’s regime was short-lived. After ousting Mobutu from power in Zaire, Kabila attained full control of Zaire and for many Zairians, this new regime supposedly offered a change of fate.[[181]](#footnote-179) After more than 30 years of Mobutism in Zaire, Zairians were hoping for economic recovery and increased inclusive political participation of civil society.[[182]](#footnote-180) Their hopes were utterly shattered. Kabila had no intentions of creating an ethnic all-inclusive government in Zaire. After a few cosmetic changes – the country changed its name back to the DRC – Kabila practically picked up where Mobutu had left off.[[183]](#footnote-181) ‘Mobutism without Mobutu’ was widely used to conceptualize Kabila’s reign.[[184]](#footnote-182) The financial situation deteriorated even further, nepotism reached unseen heights and political as well as civilian oppression continued unabated.[[185]](#footnote-183) Kabila, who had at first been received by most of the Congolese population as a saviour, soon found his popularity disappear. In 1998 the Second Congo War began. Armed groups of Congolese nationality along with army factions of neighbouring countries attacked Kabila’s regime.[[186]](#footnote-184) Forces of Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Angola, Namibia, Chad, Sudan, Uganda, and Burundi all took part on either side of the war. This war eventually led to the downfall of Kabila as government control waned in the Northern and Western part of the DRC.[[187]](#footnote-185) Ethnic violence was vivid throughout most of the country and Kabila’s usage of non-Congolese citizens in government did not sit well with the people. His alliance with the Ugandan and Rwandan governments during his military campaign against Mobutu had become strained at best. Imprisonments of political opponents, arbitrary arrests of civilian protesters and massive violence committed against civilians happened on a daily basis.[[188]](#footnote-186)

At the time of Kabila’s assassination[[189]](#footnote-187) in January 2001, the country was highly fragmented and decentralized.[[190]](#footnote-188) Kabila’s military campaign in the late 1990’s as well as his regime afterwards had been backed by several neighbouring African states. All states sharing national boundaries with the DRC had an interest in maintaining stability alongside their respective territorial boundaries. This stability was maintained by the presence of soldiers in Congolese areas of conflict, but the presence of soldiers also served another feature of foreign state involvement; high interest in raw minerals.[[191]](#footnote-189) Between 1999 and 2003 as many as 14 different foreign armies fought actively on Congolese soil.[[192]](#footnote-190) In 1999 Kabila and the other heads of state sat down and reached a peace agreement in Lusaka, Zambia.[[193]](#footnote-191) The Lusaka peace agreement only existed on paper. Reality on the ground witnessed the continued insatiable drive for the exploitation of Congo’s abundant mineral wealth by all parties.[[194]](#footnote-192)

### 4.4.2 2001 to Present

Kabila’s adopted son, Joseph Kabila was appointed as President of the DRC following his father’s assassination in 2001. Entrusted by several Western governments, Joseph Kabila along with other heads of state finally implemented vital measures of the Lusaka Accord, which resulted in the retreat, and withdrawal of all armed forces to 15 kilometres behind the cease-fire line and thus catalyzing the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD).[[195]](#footnote-193) This dialogue of warring factions paved the way for the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC in 2003, enforcing the withdrawal of most foreign soldiers from Congolese territory.[[196]](#footnote-194) Some of the main goals in the agreement were the reunification of the DRC and the organizing of general elections.[[197]](#footnote-195)

The government of Kabila actually succeeded in most of its endeavours and held general elections in 2006 where Kabila was once again elected president with new ministries, parliament and other administrative capacities. Despite the apparent successes of the new cabinet, the DRC still suffers from a long line of serious defaults, threatening to throw the country into another civil war.[[198]](#footnote-196) Kabila was elected for another presidential term in 2011 after securing more than 50%+ of the electoral votes.[[199]](#footnote-197)

Today, Joseph Kabila maintains presidential powers over a highly fragmented country long torn by violence, imperialism and colonialism, ethnic hostility, decentralization, political impotence, a host of exploitative mining organisations and economic bankruptcy. Several neighbouring African countries still have soldiers stationed along the borders of the DRC, engaged in both security and financial activities in some of the DRC’s richest mineral regions. Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian forces support the rebel forces around the eastern provinces of the DRC while the Kabila government enjoys the support of Angola and Zimbabwe. President Kabila has made several attempts to restore peace in the DRC by attempting to bring all warring parties to the negotiation table, but he has not yet been successful in that endeavour. He has gained widespread support both nationally and internationally for his actions that have perhaps brought more stability to the DRC than witnessed since independence in 1960.[[200]](#footnote-198) Still, ethnic conflict persists while external military personnel have not left Congolese soil. The Lusaka accord has yet to be fully implemented, and more importantly, respected.[[201]](#footnote-199)

# 5.0 Analysis

## 5.1 Hypothesis 1: The political system of the DRC is flawed due to the historical legacy of colonial rule, while the impact of conflict has produced a power vacuum.

### 5.1.1 Democratic Republic of Congo Anno 2012

The political system of the DRC today carries with it a wide range of issues that hinders further development. Corruption, ethnic rivalry, nepotism, electoral fraud, abuse of power, political violence and economic mismanagement are all part of the mosaic of contemporary DRC politics. This political system along with many of its malfunctioning mechanisms is not a product of typical African political behaviour. Its roots are to be found in its historical past where the first steps to create a political system and state bureaucracy took place.

### 5.1.2 Colonial Legacy – From Leopold to Mobutu and Kabila

*History lies heavy on Africa: the long decades of colonialism, several hundred years of the Atlantic and Arab world slave trade, and – all too often ignored – countless centuries of indigenous slavery before that. From the colonial era, the major legacy Europe left to Africa was not democracy as it is practised today in countries like England, France, and Belgium; it was authoritarian rule and plunder. On the whole continent, perhaps no nation has had a harder time than the Congo in emerging from the shadow of its past.[[202]](#footnote-200)*

Adam Hochschild has conceptualized the European legacy left to Africans as that of authoritarian rule and plunder. In the case of the DRC, perhaps this is true. When Joseph Kabila assumed the presidency of the DRC in 2001 following his father’s assassination he took control of a state that had its birth by the time King Leopold II sent Stanley to obtain treaties of granting sovereignty to the Belgian King.

### 5.1.3 Colonial Legacy

During the colonial era of the DRC’s history, both the Belgian King Leopold and the Belgian colonial administration oppressed the emergence and development of civil society. King Leopold deployed violent means to ensure that his subjects were kept in check and placed no emphasis upon developing the country. Besides from creating a colonial apparatus that foresaw the stable extraction and export of raw minerals not much was done to develop the DRC in terms of socio-economic issues. The indigenous people were used as ‘cattle’ to extract minerals and secure the King and his men high yielding profits on the international market. Society was arranged along paternalistic measures where the white colonizer acted as the King’s representative ensuring complete control and domination of the black Africans. During Leopold’s reign Congolese society was completed drained in terms of both material and physical matters. When the Belgian state assumed control of the Congo, King Leopold had extracted enormous surpluses of wealth from the rich mineral region of the Congo Basin.

The Belgian state continued along a similar path to that of Leopold. Forced labour was the order of the day, while Congolese society was kept in check. No formal education existed, political parties were banned and the rich mineral deposits of the Congo were exploited to the benefit of a few individual business entrepreneurs and the coffers of the Belgian state.[[203]](#footnote-201) The army was still used as a means to ensure complete domination and obedience in the Congolese public sphere. Throughout the period of Belgian colonial administration, the Congo developed little. Congolese civil society was given little if any say in the running of the colony. Any attempts to orchestrate public debate or civil disobedience were ruthlessly kept down by the FP. White Europeans occupied next to all public office positions and it was extremely difficult for any Congolese to gain access to public office or administration since higher education was not possible in the Congo until the 1950’s where the first universities were built. The lack of education among the Congolese population due to the non-existence of national possibilities ensured the Belgian administration that only educated white Europeans occupied public office furthering the distance of participation by the Congolese public in state affairs. When the Congolese people attained independence in 1960 they took control of a country long run via a systemic oppressive state apparatus that would no longer ‘fit’ the newborn country’s social composition. If the colonial system is dead, there is no need to run the country as a colony; hence the state system already in place was obsolete, leaving the uneducated and perhaps unprepared Congolese emerging middle-class with the impossible task of creating an entire new state system overnight. They utterly failed in doing so.

### 5.1.4 Living the Legacy

*“Independence did not result in the radical transformation of the Zairian society. The postcolonial state was not a people’s state but a neocolonial one”*.[[204]](#footnote-202) The colonial state had been based upon the domination of a few over many. Economic and political power was in the hands of wealthy European colonizers, who used the state as a means of securing the interests of the Belgian state and their own. The inclusion of the colonial state into the international capitalist system organized the economy as best suited for the Belgian homeland.[[205]](#footnote-203) Thus as Mobutu took charge, the economic and political system already fostered a certain state administration into which Mobutu did not change much. One-party rule, oppressing the masses, diverting economic surplus into his own pockets along with the top administrative personnel became a model adopted by Mobutu, not invented.

Both Mobutu and Kabila Sr. took control of a state with a latent promise for chaos. In 1965 the newly independent Congo found itself in a world of troubles that it could not escape from. Mobutu took control after a series of devastating events that shook the fragile foundations of the new state.[[206]](#footnote-204) When looking objectively at the situation it is easy to argue that what happened was an African enterprise since Mobutu is Congolese and therefore Europeans had no hand in the matter. On the contrary, the legacy left by Europeans, as Hochschild had put it, was that of authoritative rule and plunder. Hence, what Mobutu engaged in was nothing more than a ‘game’ played by the Europeans since their arrival. As already stated, the lack of an educated Congolese civil society posed major administrative problems for the new government as there were no civil servants to take effective control of the public administration that covered vital areas such as issues of health, education, the police department, taxation, the judiciary, the financial sector, in essence the entire bureaucracy.[[207]](#footnote-205) As Diamond has suggested, a strong middle class will in most cases assist in the development of democracy. But the DRC had no strong middle class to assist in running the country efficiently and hence Mobutu met little opposition.[[208]](#footnote-206) Now, faced with running a country that has never run itself before, what do you do? Mobutu chose what he knew, oppression and rule by force. King Leopold and the Belgian colonial administration had left a state bureaucracy that existed only through the exploitation and oppression of the population and so Mobutu chose to follow in their footsteps. The country was in chaos after 5 years of turmoil following independence and the forces that had once kept the checks and balances of the country in a stalemate were no longer present. Mobutu’s regime did not establish a new oppressive state apparatus or authoritarian dictatorship, he simply picked up where the Belgians left off. Mobutu quickly adopted the paternalistic structure of the Belgian administration and he established a cult persona to legitimize his control of the state.

In a similar way as the Belgians had run the political scene of the DRC, Mobutu banned all political parties except for his own. To be a member of the political administration during the colonial period you would have to be white European, while during Mobutu’s regime you would have to commit to the only political party available. As Diamond has argued, in cases of low-level development where authoritarian regimes evolved, corruption and kleptocracy persisted, so too was the case of Mobutu’s DRC. The only way to gain wealth was through the state and through the state ultimately meant via Mobutu and his close network of family, friends and allies. The description of the ‘political class’ Diamond referred to fits well onto the political stratification of high-ranking officials within the DRC. These people enjoyed close to full autonomy in state matters when it came to collecting taxes and receiving bribes for services they were actually paid for by the state. Right until his death in 1997, Mobutu ran the DRC as a state where everything was for sale and everything was sold.

### 5.1.5 Transitional Tendencies

It is possible to detect certain tendencies regarding the transition of power in both 1965 and 1997. During both transitions the DRC found itself in an internal political stalemate that could no longer afford to transpire.

In both 1965 and 1997 the Congolese people had had enough of violence, conflict, economic stagnation, corruption and ethnic tensions. The Cold War had ushered in a new era of international political and ideological conflict that allowed for Mobutu – with the help of the U.S. administration – to gain power and sustain it for some 30-odd years.

When Kabila Sr. took power, Mobutu had long since fallen from glory in the eyes of the Congolese public. His state was deteriorating due to mismanagement of the country’s financial budgets while the support from the U.S. had disappeared around the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The economic situation was terrible and Mobutu had lost the support of his long trusted army due to non-payment of services.[[209]](#footnote-207) Kabila had organized staunch support for his claim to the ‘throne’ via financial and military backing from neighbouring African countries that sought to take advantage from Mobutu’s decline in power.

In 1965 and 1997 the situation in the DRC was somewhat similar. The economy had been run to the point of state bankruptcy, the external political climate favoured the ‘new son’ since the former could no longer guarantee security in terms of mineral export that many foreign countries relied heavily upon – e.g. columbium, tantalum, copper, zinc and uranium. The Congolese people had grown tired of living in extreme poverty with little hopes for the future while secessionist and ethnic tensions abated the public discourse.[[210]](#footnote-208) Kabila and Mobutu both seized the time to take control when the opportunity presented itself. Both ‘strongmen’ turned the situation from bad to worse in terms of running the state apparatus. Both men organized the state bureaucracy along family lines, installing trusted men to high-rankings positions of government regardless of their ability to administer their posts.[[211]](#footnote-209) Both men continued along the path presented to them by the already-in-place state system of oppression and exploitation.[[212]](#footnote-210) Due to somewhat similar interests in regards to the DRC’s natural resources, Kabila and Mobutu easily found foreign backers in terms of funding and soldiers to overthrow contemporary regimes in both 1965 and 1997.[[213]](#footnote-211)

### 5.1.6 Escaping the Legacy

There have been several attempts to escape the colonial legacy left by the Belgians and the Belgian King, perhaps none more infamous than that of Patrice Lumumba.

Lumumba, who had been at the heart of the drive for independence in the late 1950’s, was a product of the colonial system.[[214]](#footnote-212) He was born in 1925 into a family of peasants and at the age of 20 he moved from the rural outskirts of the Kasai region to the capital of Kinshasa (then Leopoldville). He worked as a clerk in a European owned company in Kinshasa before turning to politics. Lumumba was the embodiment of the newly emerging Congolese *évolué* which was a social class artificially created by the Belgian administration. As an évolué Lumumba received a ‘registration card’ allowing him to enter social forums where other blacks were not permitted. Albeit this card granted Lumumba with certain benefits it kept him in check in the social stratosphere created by the Belgians.[[215]](#footnote-213) Being an évolué meant that Lumumba was higher in the social hierarchy than other blacks but still below the white man. In fact, despite his advancement career wise, a white European clerk with similar educational traits earned more than double Lumumba’s salary, illustrating that whatever he could do, he could never rise to a position above that of the white man.[[216]](#footnote-214) Lumumba became one of the leading figures in the quest for independence, but ultimately failed in achieving his goals. He wanted to create an independent Congo, free from colonial rule and consisting of one coherent national unit. Up until the declaration of independence, everything went according to plan. Lumumba represented both the rural and urban populations through his experiences in life. Immediately after independence Lumumba was elected Prime Minister and presided over government along with ABAKO leader Kasavubu. Lumumba quickly lost support both home and abroad. He failed at home when trying to unite a country fragmented by ethnic loyalties he could not control and by not averting the secessionist movement in the rich Katanga region that broke out in the early days of independence. Lumumba had tried to gain support among Western countries to end the latent conflict embedded in the Congolese ethno-genesis, but with little success. When he then spoke of calling in support from the Soviet Union he lost all support from the Western countries, especially the U.S. Fearing the influence of the Communist Bloc in the DRC, the Western countries gave support to Lumumba’s political adversaries – e.g. Mobutu.[[217]](#footnote-215) Lumumba was assassinated after having been arrested and then transported to the Katanga region where secession leader Tshombe along with support of the Belgian government executed him. Lumumba had genuinely wished to establish a country that rose above ethnic and colonial ties.[[218]](#footnote-216) Part of the legacy Lumumba tried to escape was the ethnic tensions latent during colonial rule.[[219]](#footnote-217) Political parties were banned by the colonial authorities resulting in the creation of cultural organizations along ethnic lines. When independence was achieved, these organizations attempted to develop a political programme, but due to their origins ethnicity dominated the policies developed.[[220]](#footnote-218) As many parties were ethnic in nature, ethnic exclusion was the rule rather than the exception. As these parties began to strive for power, the political debate centred more on ethnicity than actual policies for the new state. Only Lumumba’s party was ethnic inclusive but his political thoughts were too radical for both internal as well as external foes.[[221]](#footnote-219) Although the legacy of colonial rule is easier to depict from Mobutu’s regime, Lumumba had tried to escape this colonial legacy before it began.

### 5.1.7 Failure of Democracy

To state that everything wrong with the system in the DRC today is due to colonial exploits is perhaps a bit drastic. Events and individuals have long since independence played a part in shaping contemporary DRC’s political outlook. Inherited by the system of colonial exploitation and oppression, the chances for achieving democracy after gaining independence was not in favour of the Congolese people.

Diamond has argued that the existence of a vibrant middle class will lead to more democracy given that there is a rise in socio-economic development. As we have seen there was no immediate or clear-cut middle class in the DRC when independence was achieved. As the colonial administration left the DRC along with many European business owners, the economy came to a standstill and only went one way: down. Capital owned by European businesses left the country quickly after independence, causing major blows to the national economy.[[222]](#footnote-220) Since socio-economic development had been halted and no middle class existed independently of the state, the conditions for establishing democratic rule were, in Diamond’s sense, non-existing. The notion that the more well-to-do a nation is, the more likely it will become democratic, actually, does not correlate with the socio-economic development of the DRC during Mobutu’s rule. The following index will demonstrate this:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Zaire/Dem. Rep. Congo | 1980’s (Rank 110 out of 130) | 1997 (Rank 141 out of 174) |
| Life expectancy at birth (years) | 53.0 (1987) | 50.8 |
| Adult literacy rate (%) | 62.0 (1985) | 77.0 |
| Real GDP per Capita (PPP$) | 220 (1987) | 880 |

Table 2.[[223]](#footnote-221)

From these figures it is possible to argue that the increase in literacy and real GDP per capita would illustrate the advancement of socio-economic development. Simplistic put, according to Diamond the DRC would turn into a more democratic state. Obviously these are just 2 development indicators that point upwards and any real conclusion regarding the development of democracy cannot be based on these 2 figures alone. Nevertheless, GDP and the adult literacy rate indicate two things: First, GDP suggests a higher level of wealth distributed among the average Congolese, and second, that education had become more widespread. If you follow along the line laid out by Diamond, more democratic elements should ensue a development such as this. In 1997 there was actually a transition of power, but not something that involved the middle class in the DRC. Instead, Mobutu was ousted not by the people wanting more democratic reforms – albeit these desires were genuine at the time – but by a new dictator, Kabila Sr. The failure of democracy in 1965 can in some sense be ascribed to the fact that no real Congolese middle class had arisen to take part and claim political representation along with several other factors and events that transpired immediately after independence. In 1997 when Mobutu was overthrown, the DRC suffered somewhat from the same problem. There was no real political opposition to Mobutu present. The middle class that was supposed to be financially independent of the state was non-present. Mobutu had nationalized almost all foreign enterprises, especially within the mining sector where profits were the highest. Since the state now controlled much of the mining sector, all profits went to Mobutu and those close to him as he installed family members and other loyal servants to high public offices overseeing the extraction and export of raw minerals. Although Mobutu had abandoned his one party rule in 1990 he kept any political opposition in check by orchestrating ethnic rivalry and tensions within newly established political parties. Thus when Kabila Sr. took power in 1997 there was little opposition politically to his claim of power since it had been stifled during Mobutu’s reign. Besides, who could rightfully offer an alternative to Kabila Sr.? Mobutu’s cabinet and ministers? Public officials? They belonged to his family and ethnic group and had enriched themselves for more than 30 years of authoritarian rule and could not legitimize any real claims to represent the Congolese public. As for democracy in contemporary DRC, President Kabila has shown somewhat signs of ‘good governance’, albeit this can always be contended. The fact that he has held fair and legal elections twice since he took office while also demonstrating a will to restore peace to Central Africa, time has yet to tell whether or not the DRC will transcend into a ‘real’ democracy.[[224]](#footnote-222)

### 5.1.8 Political Conflict and Economic Incentives: Roots and Triggers

The political system of contemporary DRC is built upon the already-in-place colonial system of economic exploitation left by King Leopold and the Belgian colonial administration: *“[…] economic development in the DRC has a legacy of exploitation, theft, and plunder from King Leopold II to the present, which has been spurred by geo-strategic and economic interests”*.[[225]](#footnote-223) As I have tried to illustrate, the political deficiencies experienced today are well connected to the historical past of colonialism. Although colonialism and the system it created share a great deal of the political hardships encountered in the DRC today, it is only one part of the story. The political turmoil, rebellions and civil wars unfolded in the DRC are not necessarily due to its colonial past. Granted, societal stratification and development in post-colonial DRC have been shaped in turn by the colonial exploits of the Belgians, but that does not entirely explain the current situation in the DRC. The country is poor, underdeveloped, non-sovereign, corrupt and perhaps lack all necessary conditions to be termed a state. The Lusaka accord has not yet been implemented to a successful degree and peace, stability and national sovereignty has yet to be attained. The ongoing conflict in the DRC is as much about politics as it is economics.

Paul Collier, a worldwide respected Professor of Economics at Oxford University, has done extensive research in his book, *The Bottom Billion*, on the relationship between conflict and development.[[226]](#footnote-224)

*ALL SOCIETIES HAVE CONFLICT; it is inherent to politics. The problem that is pretty distinctive to the bottom billion is not political conflict but its form. Some of them are stuck in a pattern of violent internal challenges to government. Sometimes the violence is prolonged, a civil war; sometimes it is all over swiftly, a coup d’état. These two forms of political conflict both are costly and can be repetitive. They can trap a country in poverty.*[[227]](#footnote-225)

Poverty is a key word in the quotation above. Collier asserts that civil wars and coup d’état’s are much more likely to occur within the group of the *bottom billion*.[[228]](#footnote-226) There is a strong correlation between countries experiencing difficulties in terms of economic growth and development and according to Collier by cutting the starting income of a country in halve, the risk of civil war doubles.[[229]](#footnote-227) By looking at the HDI of the DRC in the 1980’s and in 1997, this is perhaps not the case. War did not erupt merely based on economic data but economy played a large part. Collier explains that it is no wonder that the economy will deteriorate once war has broken out since many foreign and local investors tend to flee the country and he further states that it is a matter of war causing poverty *and* poverty that makes a country prone to war.[[230]](#footnote-228) Immediately after independence in 1960 the economy of the DRC plummeted and drove the country into full-scale conflict but that was not the case in 1997, as the HDI would indicate. Despite the apparent increase income during the period from 1985 to 1997, the country was still poor. Collier argues that *“[…] if the economy is weak, the state is also likely to be weak, and so rebellion is not difficult”*.[[231]](#footnote-229) Since the state is economically weak, it is more difficult to contain rebellious activity since the state needs funding to pay for the army while poverty among the population might attract poor people into joining rebel groups with a prospect of attaining a more decent living. In 1997 when Kabila was marching towards the capital city of Kinshasa he reportedly told a journalist that *“[…] in Zaire, rebellion was easy: all you needed was $10.000 and a satellite phone”*.[[232]](#footnote-230) Accordingly, people were thought to be so poor that you could buy an army with a relatively small amount of U.S. dollars while the satellite phone was used to make deals with foreign companies regarding mining rights, the so-called ‘Future Rights to War Booty’.[[233]](#footnote-231) This takes us back to the original starting point of the DRC’s encounter with the Belgian King Leopold: natural resources. The quest for resources and the profits made by export from the DRC is what drove Leopold to establish his colony and it is what made the civil war during the 1990’s possible. Kabila is said to have struck deals regarding future rights to war booty amounting to $500 million before ever having reached Kinshasa.[[234]](#footnote-232) Naturally, in the case of the DRC in 1997 there is a strong correlation between the economy and political conflict/violence since both reinforce each other, especially in countries that are experiencing low/slow development, stagnation or decline.[[235]](#footnote-233) In countries where dependence on primary commodity exports – oil, diamonds, columbium, tantalum etc. – the risk of civil war is increasingly dangerous.[[236]](#footnote-234) Since many minerals – especially in the DRC – is found in the periphery the capital city, state control in these rural districts is scarce. The rich south eastern province of Katanga is one such example. Here, thousands of miles from the capital, government control has been diminishing somewhat ever since the secessionist movement spearheaded by Tshombe in the 1960’s. Along the borders of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, the Katanga region have been exploited for the sake of its large mineral sector, both by internal Congolese militias and the governments of neighbouring countries as well. Rebel financing is easy given the right circumstances, and in the DRC, conditions have been exceptionally good. In Collier’s words *“[…] natural resources help to finance conflict and sometimes even motivate it”*.[[237]](#footnote-235) Kabila was most definitely both financed and motivated by the vast mineral reserve found in the eastern parts of the DRC, henceforth part of the civil war that erupted prior to Mobutu’s demise was not built upon political differences as in regards to the system of colonial administration adopted by Mobutu, but motivated by economic factors. As Collier describes it: *“There is basically no relationship between political repression and the risk of civil war”*.[[238]](#footnote-236) Of course civil wars have erupted based on political rights among other things, but the war in the DRC during Kabila’s rise to power was not motivated by politics. The conflict still in place in the DRC is not one based solely on malfunctions within the political system. There are strong incentives that point to the fact that many of the events that has transpired in the DRC are due to the oppressive nature of colonial rule, but that it only one perspective of the conflict. As demonstrated via Collier’s connection of economy and conflict, the economic status of the DRC is surely to have contributed to the current situation as much as the political outlook of a post-colonial African state.

### 5.1.9 Typology of Conflict

The ongoing conflict in the DRC is caused by several instigating factors, causing violence to erupt and war to progress. In Møller’s definitions of conflict, both violent and non-violent conflicts occur in the DRC. In regards to the perspectives held by Collier on the relationship between socio-economic development and conflict, Møller takes a different stand. He argues that economics only play a small part when conflicts arise, putting more emphasis on value and interest. In conflicts of interest, it all comes down to the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. As the current conflict in the DRC is a bi-product of the transitional period of Kabila Sr., the interest here is that of natural resources. As already mentioned, Kabila made several contracts of future rights to war booty to foreign companies during his campaign against Mobutu. Although the issue at the time of the war between Kabila and Mobutu was not solely based on the matter of controlling the DRC’s mineral resources, it became vital for both men to control the areas of mineral wealth in order to finance war, thus part of the conflict relied on the interest and profit of mineral export.[[239]](#footnote-237) Although the conflict, once started, demonstrated the necessity to control the rich mineral regions of the DRC, it was not entirely, to the disappointment of Møller’s theory, due to the simple matter of ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. Nevertheless, interest has played a part in the conflict, but this is not clearly identified as the instigating factor for conflict, but this may be reduced to consequential result of the conflict. Value, in terms of ethnicity and/or religion can be seen as somewhat part of the current conflict. When Kabila Sr. marched on Kinshasa in 1997 he did so with the financial and military support of both the Rwandan and Ugandan governments. These two governments had keen economic interests in the eastern region of the DRC bordering up to their respective countries. Although economic interests in regards to mineral exploitation and export was part of the motivation for supporting Kabila, what transpired after his ascend to power in the DRC was of a different nature. Kabila soon found the public discourse turning against him due to the massive presence of foreign soldiers on DRC soil, hence after which he broke with the Rwandan and Ugandan governments resulting in an internal split within Kabila’s AFDL forces – *Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie/Goma* (RCD-G) and the *RCD-Kisangani-Mouvement de liberation* (RCD-K-ML). Having broke off, soldiers from Rwanda and Uganda formed ethnically based rebel groups that took control of most of the mineral-rich eastern provinces of the DRC.[[240]](#footnote-238) Ethnic affiliations thus played a part in the outbreak of war, but conflict was not based entirely on ethnic issues such as exclusion, xenophobia and discrimination. Rather, ethnicity became the identifiable trait of whose side to join as conflict amassed to full-scale war. In a country such as the DRC, with its mosaic composition of ethnic ties, it can be difficult to determine precisely whether or not ethnic tension played a decisive part in the escalating situation in the late 1990’s. To state that ethnic hatred or rivalry was the instigator of war is definitely a simplification of the events leading up to the current conflict.

### 5.1.10 Summary

The political system of the DRC has and is experiencing a wide range of difficulties hindering further development and reconciliation. The political legacy created by the colonial administration paved the way for an exploitative system built upon the foundations of King Leopold II’s insatiable quest for profit. The political situation in the DRC today is mirrored in its historical past of colonial rule coupled with the kleptocracy and corruption that perspired within the regimes of Mobutu and Kabila Sr. Escaping the legacy founded by more than 75 years of colonial oppression was unsuccessful and has yet to come. The civil wars experienced in the country’s 52 years of independence have had catastrophic consequences for the stability and perhaps future of the state. The inability of the state to remain sovereign and the presence of both internal rebellious groups and external state-led armies have created a power vacuum, enabling contractors of war to finance further instability and to extract huge profits from the DRC’s vast natural resources. The conflict in the DRC is based on political as well as economic interests that continue to reinforce one another as long as the state remains weak and in a cyclical pattern of low/declining development.

## 5.2 Hypothesis 2: The economic development of the DRC has been crippled due to a continuous dependence and emphasis on raw materials and the interference of non-Congolese actors in state financial affairs.

In the following section I will discuss the applicability of the resource curse thesis to the economic development of the DRC. As economic development is hindered by the ongoing conflict, especially in the mineral-rich provinces of the eastern DRC, I will look into the connection between natural resources, economy and conflict.

### 5.2.1 The Resource Thesis: True or False?

The main theoretical perspective of the resource curse thesis holds that countries in low-development with an abundance of natural resources perform worse in terms of growth than countries with little or none natural resources. Using an IMF report from 2000 that illustrates the growth rate from 1960-2000, the economic growth of the DRC has been divided into 5 sub periods: (a) 1960-65, (b) 1966-74, (c) 1975-82, (d) 1983-89 and (e) 1990-2000.[[241]](#footnote-239)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Dem. Rep. of Congo / Zaire | 1960-65 | 1966-74 | 1975-82 | 1983-89 | 1990-2000 | 2009 |
| Real GDP per Capita in Growth (%)[[242]](#footnote-240) | -4.0% | 5.1% | -12% | -0.5% | -38% | 2.8%[[243]](#footnote-241) |

Table 3.[[244]](#footnote-242)

As this table illustrates, the growth rate of the DRC since 1960 has experienced both increase and decline. To demonstrate the validity of the resource curse thesis in the DRC it is necessary to use another country for comparison in terms of growth rates. This country would have to be non-reliant on natural resources and on a similar level of low development as the DRC in order to make the comparison useful according to Auty’s thesis. It is impossible to falsify or validate the resource curse thesis by simply using two countries as evidence for either conclusion. Using just two countries cannot provide a justifiable result, as two countries cannot be set as general indicators for proving a thesis such as this. This would require a larger number of countries for comparison and even then it would be difficult to determine whether or not the DRC’s economic performance is a result of its abundance of natural resources. Instead, here it will suffice to use the figures above to illustrate that the Congolese economy has been underperforming, nothing more. The reasons for underperformance are to be found in a wide array of different issues concerning governance, politics, conflict, culture, education, economic policies, trade, import/export and many other areas that would play a part in affecting de facto growth. Auty’s thesis can as easily be validated as it can be rejected. Validation is found in the economic performance above and the DRC’s status as a country possessing large mineral deposits, while rejection is simply applied via sheer representation, also noted above. Instead, the resource curse can be used differently. By nullifying the notion that natural resource abundance leads to economic underperformance, regardless of other affecting issues, it would make more sense to discuss some of the difficulties experienced by the DRC connected to its natural resources and in what ways the economy is affected.

The five periods noted in the table above illustrate either decline or increase due to a number of reasons. In the first period of 1960-65 the DRC experienced economic decline due to political and economic unrest following the declaration of independence in 1960.[[245]](#footnote-243) This period was highly unstable and did not stabilize until Mobutu’s ascend to power in 1965. The following period of 1966-74 generated an increase in growth above the level of 1960. Mobutu somewhat stabilized the national economy and rid the country of its many deficiencies during the transitional period from independence to his inauguration as President in 1965.[[246]](#footnote-244) From 1975 to 1982 the DRC experienced a decline in growth in part due to problems on both the national and international level. On the national level, Mobutu’s Zaireanization had nationalized almost the entire mining sector, leaving large part of the extraction, management and export of raw minerals to his kinsmen in the state bureaucracy.[[247]](#footnote-245) These officials were largely incompetent as administrators while maintaining a high level of kleptocracy and rent-seeking ‘entrepreneurship’ that permeated state governance throughout Mobutu’s regime. On the international level the oil crisis in the 1970’s caused a rise in prices that affected much of the international market resulting in a higher expenditure in imports for the industrial sector in the DRC. One of the DRC’s main export raw materials, copper, saw a reversal in prices during this period, resulting in large revenues lost.[[248]](#footnote-246) During this period the DRC also stopped payments on its national debt resulting in an economic crisis and the intervention of the IMF.[[249]](#footnote-247) Assisted by the WB and the IMF, structural adjustments to the state’s financial position was implemented with somewhat large success. Albeit, the programmes implemented by the WB and the IMF for long-term sustainable growth generated some successes, they were eventually abandoned by the government as copper prices rose again, thus financial emphasis were put into the mining sector once again, resulting in the slow decline of growth measured by 1960’s standards but a general increase compared to the previous period.[[250]](#footnote-248) The DRC took a massive plunge in growth during the 1990’s. According to the IMF report, this was largely due to:

*[…] failed attempts at political liberalization, control over economic policies was lost, and the country fell into the grip of an unprecedented circle of hyperinflation, currency depreciation, increasing dollarization and financial intermediation, declining savings, deteriorating economic infrastructure, and broad-based output decline.*[[251]](#footnote-249)

The war that broke in 1998, following Kabila Sr. cutting ties with the Ugandan and Rwandan governments, completely shattered both the political and economic foundations of the DRC. In 2009, 11 years after the invasion of Ugandan and Rwandan forces in the eastern provinces of the DRC, ‘relative’ peace has been established due to international intermediaries and the transition of power from the deceased Kabila Sr. to his son Joseph Kabila. The small increase in growth does not necessarily reflect an image of stable and ongoing development but illustrate that the situation of the 1990’s had improved dramatically, albeit civil strife and conflict still persisted in the DRC. The performance of the DRC in terms of growth is not entirely based on its dependence on natural resources as politics, events and individuals also assist in creating the economic environment that has been almost consistent in the DRC since the 1960’s.

### 5.2.2 The Natural Resource Trap

As I have discussed in the previous section, determining whether or not natural resource abundance in countries with low development perform worse than low development countries with little or no natural resources has proven somewhat difficult. Auty’s thesis generally holds that the combination of low development and vast natural resources leads to slow growth, stagnation or decline. Due to spatial restraints it is not possible to depict de facto whether or not the DRC falls directly into this category. As the data in Table 3 indicates, the DRC has experienced both periods of growth, stagnation and decline. Henceforth, the resource curse thesis would suffice to explain that the DRC is ranked low in development and has lots of natural resources within its national boundaries. As dependence on primary commodities will generally reflect both booms and busts in terms of growth depending on the international market, the national economy of low development resource-rich countries will be highly influenced by fluctuations and volatility of the market.[[252]](#footnote-250) Simply stating that emphasis on developing the mineral sector in low development countries with abundance of natural resources causes slow growth, stagnation and/or decline is just one piece of the puzzle. As natural resources in general are thought to create surpluses by means of extraction and export, why does this surplus not generate economic growth in low development countries?

This is due to what Paul Collier has termed ‘the natural resource trap’.[[253]](#footnote-251) According to Collier, *“[…] about 29 percent of the people in the bottom billion live in countries in which resource wealth dominates the economy”.*[[254]](#footnote-252) Since almost one third of the world’s poorest live in countries that rely on the wealth of natural resources and since natural resources should generate wealth, why then, are people poor? Collier continues down the path laid out by Auty ascribing part of the problem to the ‘Dutch Disease’. Collier describes Dutch Disease like this: *“The resource exports cause the country’s currency to rise in value against other currencies. This makes the country’s other export activities uncompetitive. Yet these other activities might have been the best vehicles for technological progress”*.[[255]](#footnote-253) Dutch Disease is what has been accredited to the economic malfunctions of resource-rich/resource-dependent countries. This economic explanation has been used as an analytical tool for both low, middle and high development countries that have discovered valuable natural resources and incorporated these into the national economy. In any instance, Dutch Disease has had similar effects on the economy, regardless of the level of development – e.g. the rise in prices of valuable resources vs. the effect on other exporting sectors.[[256]](#footnote-254) Collier’s point of departure regards the different outcomes of Dutch Disease in all 3 levels of development, focusing on countries with low development. During the 1980’s economists somewhat rejected Dutch Disease as a sufficient explanatory model of the malfunctioning resource-rich economies and pointed to the catastrophic consequences of shocks – e.g. *“[…] natural resources revenues were volatile and this led to crises”*.[[257]](#footnote-255) However, in the 1990’s political scientists suggested that natural resource revenues worsen governance.[[258]](#footnote-256) Collier asserts here that the key problem to the deficiencies of low development countries with vast natural resources is in fact governance. Collier’s ‘survival of the fattest’ conceptualizes the systemic competition for state administration between an autocracy and a democracy. Political institutions play a decisive role in affecting the state’s economy when natural resources are available. In regards to the two political systems noted above, Collier argues that when natural resources are abundant, an autocracy outperforms a democracy in terms of growth. Where no natural resources are available, a democracy outperforms an autocracy.[[259]](#footnote-257) Collier inserts that, *“The most basic influence on economic growth is investment”*.[[260]](#footnote-258) Investment, according to Collier, is what differentiates the two systems. Where an autocracy will invest in long-term infrastructure and projects, a democracy will usually invest in short term planning, being fixated on winning the next election thus the horizon for investment follows the period of time the government has been elected for.[[261]](#footnote-259) What makes a country like the DRC unstable in terms of its economy, in Collier’s sense, is the usage of natural resource surpluses. These revenues tend to be used by autocracies to fund its prevalent structure of a patronage system. Corruption is widespread throughout the DRC’s administrative system where everything is for sale, including votes during elections. The more money you have, the more likely you are to win national elections as poverty stricken constituencies can be easily bought. According to Collier,

*An abundance of resource rents alters how electoral competition is conducted. Essentially it lets in the politics of patronage. Electoral competition forces political parties to attract votes in the most cost-effective manner. In normal circumstances this is done by delivering public services such as infrastructure and security more effectively than rivals can. The extreme alternative to public service politics is the politics of patronage: voters are bribed with public money*.[[262]](#footnote-260)

In such circumstances the survival of the fattest comes down to the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, to use Møller’s argument. To avert such situations restraints need to be present. Restraints come in the form of laws, regulations etc. Collier’s example of restraints is taken from the transitional period of democracy/autocracy in Nigeria, a country on similar terms as the DRC in regards to natural resource dependence. In Nigeria, an autocratic government was able to embezzle $600 million in a public investment project to fund the cost of buying votes.[[263]](#footnote-261) Years later when a democratically elected government was appointed, that same project cost 40% less after being submitted to competitive bidding by contractors. Resource revenues that circumvent traditional government income make it easier to fund bribes and fuel corruption while restraints would have made it more costly to finance the buying of votes. Countries in low development with plenty of natural resources suffer from malfunctioning bureaucratic mechanisms that in many cases make it easier to steal from the state. Collier argues that while autocratic states may perform better in terms of economic growth than democratic states, there are exceptions to ‘success’: ethnic diversity.[[264]](#footnote-262) Autocracy in states as ethnically diverse as the DRC *“[…] reduces growth, and the most likely reason is that diversity tends to narrow the support base of the autocrat”.[[265]](#footnote-263)* As both Mobutu and Kabila Sr. belonged to an ethnic minority group, their support base did not represent a majority of the population, and as Møller has argued, ethnic rivalries tend to evolve into conflict as we have seen when both men were removed from power. For a democracy to work in the DRC – where it has failed on several occasions as described in the previous hypothesis – restraints will have to be in place to overcome any abuses of political and economic power. As Collier argues:

*The sort of democracy that the resource-rich societies of the bottom billion are likely to get is itself dysfunctional for economic development. In the transition to democracy there are strong incentives for different groups to compete for election, but there are no corresponding incentives for them to build restraints. Restraints are a public good that is in nobody’s particular interest to supply*.[[266]](#footnote-264)

By Collier’s reason, the future indeed looks grim for a country like the DRC. Of course everything is not as bad a Collier makes it out to be, but looking at his depiction of the resource curse the odds are of course against the DRC.

### 5.2.3 External Actors – Actions, Consequences and Dependencies

Ever since Stanley set out to find Dr. David Livingstone, the Congo has attracted attention from other states, both regional and international. The natural resource potential in the DRC has been a source of conflict and instability in terms of political and economic development.

In the 1960’s the political climate, both national and international, allowed for Mobutu to take power by military force. Considered as a bulwark against rising socialist tendencies in Central Africa, several Western states backed Mobutu’s claim to power. The U.S. was one of the states that supported Mobutu via financing both his military campaign and his new government. Following the recommendations of U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan, ‘containment’ of the Soviet threat meant almost unrestricted support for Mobutu’s regime.[[267]](#footnote-265) Mobutu received financial aid from the U.S. for almost 30 years, contributing a great deal to his ability to remain in power. Mobutu’s authoritarian rule was made possible due to the continuous support of foreign backers. As mentioned in the previous section, Collier held that no autocracy will prevail in power when the autocrat does not represent the majority of the ethnic population, thus Mobutu’s cling to power for more than 30 years is not due ethnic representation but by mere effectiveness of keeping ethnic violence and uprising in check. When support from Western governments finally waded – in part due to the end of the Cold War – Mobutu no longer possessed the ability to effectively challenge Kabila’s rebel movement.

In 1997 when Kabila Sr. effectively took control of the DRC (then Zaire), he did so with the support of the Rwandan and Ugandan governments. Both governments had provided financing and rebel recruitment in exchange for vast fortunes to be made in exporting raw minerals such as copper, gold, diamonds and especially the rare but very vital minerals, columbium and tantalum.

The Rwandan and Ugandan government’s support for Kabila, although clearly motivated by economic incentives, ushered in the new reign of what was to be called ‘Mobutism without Mobutu’. Kabila’s rise to political power as President of the DRC resulted in things going from bad to worse when speaking in political, economic and social terms. Kabila, who was a part of the Rwandan minority group living in the DRC, *Banyamulenge*, was at first received well by the Congolese population. The political exclusiveness and economic kleptocracy of Mobutu had made the Congolese people politically impotent, divided and impoverished. The new era of politics and economics in the DRC proved to not be so new after all. Kabila’s reliance on foreign military personnel and government advisers created public unrest and resulted in the alliance being broken. Again, the strongman in power could not overcome the loss of support from those who installed him in the first place. The loss of resource revenue – as will demonstrated in the next section – had catastrophic consequences for Kabila’s fragile government. The Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers who had helped Kabila to power was then used to extract resources to the benefit of their respective governments, thus leaving Kabila with little control of the assets he had used to secure power in the first place. Kabila’s lack of diverse ethnic representation and loss of economic potential in the DRC’s now occupied mineral-rich eastern regions eventually led to his downfall. Joseph Kabila assumed control of the war-torn state after his father was assassinated by way of descent. Throughout the DRC’s post-colonial history apparently not much has been able to transpire that was not either condoned or condemned via external pressure or assistance. The events that have helped in creating the current political and economic situation in the DRC have been somewhat largely influenced by external rather than internal factors. The newly appointed President Kabila is yet again dependent on foreign backing as state sovereignty has been almost non-existent ever since the outbreak of war in 1998. The future will determine the outcome of his regime, although by way of reason, the HDI and FSI indicate that the current political and economic situation of the state leaves little chance of altering ‘natural’ events.

### 5.2.4 Dependency in the DRC

As Dos Santos has suggested, dependency occurs threefold; colonial, financial-industrial and multi-national corporations. The DRC has experienced all three throughout its history. Colonial dependence and financial-industrial dependence are characterized by an emphasis on building an export economy, where all generated surpluses first went to King Leopold II and then to the Belgian colonial administration.[[268]](#footnote-266) Also characterized by these dependencies are the monopolies of trade, land, mines and manpower as well as the domination of big capital in hegemonic centres. As we have seen, Leopold exploited both land and labour in his relentless efforts to extract high profits from the fruit of the land. Sovereignty of land was bestowed upon Leopold through treaties obtained by Stanley, ensuring that Leopold had legitimate claims to Congolese riches. Forced labour was used to procure essential raw mineral and resources, which, as Dos Santos points out, was then shipped to Europe for processing and manufactory. The same pattern was continued by the Belgian administration during the period 1908-45, after which a shift occurred.[[269]](#footnote-267) Prior to WWII domestically based companies conducted most of the industrial activities performed in the DRC, although these had strong ties with the international market. The post-war period ushered in the new paradigm of dependency, namely that of multi-national corporations involved in the economic structure post-colonial/post-war/post-independent DRC. Multiple companies were engaged in activities that Nkrumah has also labelled as neo-colonial ventures of dependence. The first two dependent structures encompassed the establishment of export-based economies where most of the commodities exported were processed outside the DRC. The multi-national dependence that has developed following WWII also relied upon the export of primary products but these corporations were now based outside the DRC. Industrial technology and know-how were thus imported from the outside making the industrial sector dependent on foreign actors it had no way of controlling. Dos Santos inserts that consequences hereof is that the technological equipment needed for the development of the industrial sector totally relied on external factors, inhibiting the industrial development of a dependent country. Mobutu’s nationalization/Zaireanization of the industrial sector resulted in major setbacks in the national economy as technological equipment now had to be ‘exchanged’ from multi-nationals holding monopolies – and not bought – giving multi-nationals the upper hand and ability to introduce conditionalities for exporting vital machinery. The DRC, today, is still highly dependent on foreign corporations for the extraction of minerals requiring advanced machinery, and where machinery is not required, many rebel groups hold large concessions of land with abundant natural resources as will be demonstrated in the next section. In 2008 the primary sector amounted to 39 percent of GDP indicating that mining – along with agriculture – is a dominant source of income for the DRC.[[270]](#footnote-268) Manufacturing of primary commodities such as raw minerals, only amounted to 1.5 percent of total GDP thus illustrating that most of the primary products are exported elsewhere for further processing, resulting in revenues lost in manufactured items.[[271]](#footnote-269) In the 1980’s during Mobutu’s regime, the mining sector accounted for almost 25 percent of GDP and about 70 percent of total export earnings.[[272]](#footnote-270) In 2000, the mining sector only amounted to about 6 percent of GDP in part due to the invading forces of Rwanda and Uganda along with many other rebel factions controlling the DRC’s rich eastern regions.[[273]](#footnote-271) During the 1980’s Zaire’s GDP growth was about -0.5 percent while in 2000 GDP growth was at an all time low of -38%. The ongoing conflict in the DRC demonstrates, among other things, that reliance on natural resources can be catastrophic as the 1980’s growth level was in a time of relative ‘peace’ while in 2000 the country was engaged in a full fledged civil war, devastating the economic performance of natural resource dependency. The DRC is still very much dependent upon its natural resources today and the growth level of 2.8 percent in 2009 indicates the somewhat successes in peace negotiations as the scale of war has declined since its outbreak in 1998. The continued work for peace is essential to the economic future of the DRC as dependence upon its vast mineral potential is unlikely to decline in the future.

### 5.2.5 Columbium Tantalum

The precious mineral combination of columbium and tantalum or ‘coltan’ has played a significant part in the destabilization of the DRC’s political and economic system for the last 15 years. Columbium and tantalum are almost always found together, although columbium usually appears in greater abundance than tantalum. Despite both minerals sharing many similarities in terms of chemical composition, tantalum is much heavier than columbium, making it more resistant to high levels of heat.[[274]](#footnote-272) Coltan, once processed into capacitors, is used in almost every electronic equipment ranging from laptops and cell phones to aeroplane engines and advanced weapons systems.[[275]](#footnote-273) During the 1990’s the demand for coltan increased massively resulting in a profit of sale increase amounting to 300 percent for processed capacitors.[[276]](#footnote-274) Coltan is easily harnessed as minerals can be picked up from the soil with bare hands, which in turn reduces both the need for skilled labour and expensive machinery thus making trade in coltan a highly profitable and easy business. As *“[…] four fifths of the world’s tantalum is found in Africa, of which 80 percent is located in the DRC’s eastern region […]”*,[[277]](#footnote-275) it is fair to say that the eastern provinces of the DRC have received much attention from regional and international states along with lots of multinational mining companies. The DRC’s vast mineral reserves have come to play a large part in the ongoing conflict that has claimed the lives of several million people since the offset of war. At one point during the war, approximately 73.000 people died each month and in the mineral rich region of Katanga – where most of the conflict is situated – 75 percent of the children born during the conflict will not live to see their second birthday.[[278]](#footnote-276) The DRC’s natural resources have been an element of both root and trigger in the conflict to use Møller’s conflict typology. During Kabila’s rebellion against Mobutu in 1996/97, much of his funding came from rebel-controlled areas of the eastern DRC where resources such as coltan were easily sold onto the international market – e.g. the example of $10.000 and a cell phone. The Rwandan and Ugandan governments supported Kabila but most of his financing came from contracts regarding mining rights struck with western-owned companies. When Kabila broke his alliance with the Rwandan and Ugandan governments, both governments used already stationed soldiers to grab mineral territory in order to maintain profits. According to Rwandan President Paul Kagame, the cost of waging war against his former ally was ‘self-financing’.[[279]](#footnote-277) Allegedly, the Rwandan army responsible for extracting coltan among other minerals enjoyed revenues of as much as $20 million a month during the years 1998-2000.[[280]](#footnote-278) The Ugandan government also enjoyed the fruit of Congolese land as its export in coltan rose from 2.5 tons in 1997 to 70 tons in 1999[[281]](#footnote-279), in spite of data from the Ugandan Ministry of Energy reporting no domestic coltan production between 1998-2000.[[282]](#footnote-280) Coltan, as a valuable mineral, has been used both to finance rebellion and sustain it throughout most of the current conflict. Indeed *“[…] the prolonged exploitation of Congolese mineral wealth has helped establish tremendous vulnerability in the Congolese political, economic and social system”*.[[283]](#footnote-281) International attempts by the UN to put an end to the illegal trade in coltan have not yet been successful. International companies specializing in mineral extraction and processing continue to deal with rebel factions and the governments supporting them.[[284]](#footnote-282)

### 5.2.6 Summary

The DRC’s economy is highly influenced by its endowment in natural resources and the attraction felt towards these by external actors. The emphasis on natural resources in the national economy has dealt a harsh blow to the economic development of the DRC. The amount of natural resources combined with low development has cursed the DRC’s economic output and been a source of conflict since 1965. Dependencies on external technological development have created several problems for the DRC’s industrial sector. Relying on the import of technological equipment and know-how has decreased the manoeuvrability of developing the internal market and establish competitive prices in terms of finished products.

Natural resources and the political instability of the DRC have resulted in creating an atmosphere ideally suited for rent-seeking entrepreneurs of both internal and external origin. Minerals such as coltan have proved highly profitable for the financing of sustained conflict.

## 5.3 Hypothesis 3: The discourse of colonial racial and cultural superiority of the white man vs. the inferiority of the black man still persists in contemporary Congolese identity and consciousness.

In order to ideally depict distinct traces of prevailing colonial identity among the black Congolese population, a wide research into literature, public debate, newspaper articles and political and cultural inclinations is necessary. The spatial restraints for this section along with the scope of conducting representative research are not available. Instead, to provide an image of post-colonial identity in theory, a discussion of the experiences of colonial attitudes and their consequences will ensue.

### 5.3.1 Control the Mind, Control the Body; Colonizer and Colonized

*“The most powerful weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed”*.[[285]](#footnote-283) Colonization has left a permanent mark on the social construction of Congolese identity. The DRC experienced 75 years of colonial administration and the African population was subjected to both psychical as well as psychological oppression. Psychical in terms of violence conducted by Leopold’s FP and the Belgian colonial administration’s army and police force, and psychological in terms of the external influence on the creation of black Congolese identity – e.g. via racism and the social construction of collective, inferior black consciousness.

In *Black Skin, White Masks* Fanon connects the psychical oppression with the psychological. Once, as a passenger on a train a little white boy notices him and screams: *“Look, a Negro! Mama, see the Negro! I’m frightened. Frightened! Frightened!”*.[[286]](#footnote-284) Contrary to what fellow psychiatrist Mannoni regards an as inherent inferiority complex among colonized blacks, the little white boy actually turns it around by his exclamation. The little boy’s attitude and fear reflect the dominant psychological attribute of colonial racism: colour of skin. The boy does not first see a man, or a man dressed in a suit, but sees him as a *black* man. As such, the xenophobic creation of colour prejudice has been installed in the little boy from early age as his response to seeing a black man is fear. The ‘Dark Continent’ and the ‘Negro’ people who inhabit this world have mostly been portrayed as ‘animals, bad, ugly and mean’.[[287]](#footnote-285) The psychological racism, as experienced by Fanon on the train, easily turns into a psychical trauma of feeling *“[…] an amputation, an excision, a hemorrhage that spattered my whole body with black blood”*.[[288]](#footnote-286) The fact that a little boy’s words and subsequent reaction to Fanon’s colour of skin, testifies to the ramifying effects of racial prejudice. Much like Lumumba who was stuck in ‘no mans land’ of the colonial created class of évolués, so too Fanon struggles to overcome a conflict within. In Møller’s typology of conflict, this situation can be classified as inter-personal conflict, not only in terms of discrimination as the example of Fanon’s encounter with the little boy illustrate, but perhaps more in terms of an identity conflict.

Given that Fanon was writing in a particular historic period of decolonization and quest for a creation of a new identity, independent from its colonial past, this discourse perhaps belongs to that particular period, and does not represent contemporary black consciousness. Nevertheless, historical experiences have a way of finding new outlets, regardless of the shift in paradigms. Perhaps being black today does not differ much from when Fanon was writing about the psychological effects of white colonialism on black consciousness. At Fanon’s time escaping the feeling of being inferior to the white man was not an easy task. Africa in general, had been colonized for several hundred years and attitudes felt by both whites and blacks does not change overnight. Today’s world, in the eyes of many Africans would perhaps resemble certain trends from the past. Living in a colony, for many Africans, represented a feeling of not being able to determine one’s own destiny or place in society.[[289]](#footnote-287) Lumumba exemplifies the notion of not being able to escape the socially constructed class and racial hierarchy imposed by the white colonizers. Lumumba’s destiny relied heavily upon - at least until independence – the benevolence of the white man to include him into the highest social stratosphere possible; the world of the white man.[[290]](#footnote-288) Both Mobutu and Kabila Sr. were dependent upon the assistance of the outer world, in both cases the white world, in order to succeed in their endeavours. Mobutu relied heavily on the support of capitalist countries – first world countries – while Kabila used his satellite phone not to call African brothers in arms, but to strike mining concession deals with the private sector run by white Westerners.[[291]](#footnote-289) Of course they also relied on assistance from several African states, but neither men would have come to power and fulfilled their destinies, had it not been for the support of the white-dominated world.

As Biko remarked above, controlling the minds of the colonized was a very important weapon for the colonizers. The forced assimilation on behalf of the colonial discourse resulted in a feeling *“[…] of being the subject of cultural oppression/racism in which one is incessantly fed with cultural values and understandings which are hostile, devaluating of myself and my culture”*.[[292]](#footnote-290) Consequently,

*[…] the colonized subject [...] hence exists in […] a state of a ‘nervous condition’, an anxious and agitated state (speaking both politically and psychologically) in which one possess little or no cultural resources of one’s own, because they have been eradicated by the cultural imperialism of the colonizer*.[[293]](#footnote-291)

As Fanon argues, the black colonized subject’s world is a creation of the colonial class structure into which an African identity is difficult to obtain or sustain.

### 5.3.2 Post-Colonial State, Neo-Colonialism and Identity

Although colonialism is said to have died following the emancipation from colonial rule in 1960, neo-colonialism, according to Nkrumah, have taken its place. If colonialism can be acknowledged to have left a permanent mark on Congolese history and identity, neo-colonialism must, at least in theory, have kept the attitudes of a past era alive.

When the colonial state ceased to exist, along with the dominant discourse of whites vs. blacks, the Congolese people rejoiced thinking that that was the end of domination by foreigners.[[294]](#footnote-292) Now, in 1960, the Congolese people would run the state. History has demonstrated that this dream would not last: *“Under Mobutu’s leadership, the state […] became a neo-colonial one that served primarily the interests of externally based dominant classes and the interests of those who ran it”*.[[295]](#footnote-293) The new era did not introduce an abandonment of colonialism as hoped by the many Congolese people who had lived under oppressive and non-inclusive colonial rule. Instead, as Nkrumah has suggested, neo-colonialism entered the scene. The dependency of Mobutu upon foreign assistance coincides with Dos Santos’ dependency in terms of the importation of technological know-how and foreign aid. As foreign-based companies largely ran the most part of the mining sector in the DRC, Mobutu’s economic development was thus still dependent on external actors. Mobutu’s power in the DRC/Zaire relied heavily upon the benevolence and interests of the outside world.

Many have viewed the First Congo War from 1996-97 that ended with the removal of Mobutu from power by Kabila, as an African enterprise only:[[296]](#footnote-294) *“History will retain that, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, a crisis of a magnitude such as the civil war in Congo-Zaire was resolved by African peoples themselves”*.[[297]](#footnote-295) The coalition of rebel forces behind Kabila was supported by the Rwandan, Ugandan and to some extent the Burundian governments. Contrary to what many believed at the time, the military campaign and subsequent installation of Kabila as President was not an African intervention solely. Several non-African states, the U.S. in particular, had vital economic and strategic interests in the DRC that coincided with the military campaign of Kabila. Evidently *“[…] the US supported the rebellion to extend its influence in central Africa, to exploit its natural resources, filling the Congolese soil while containing Islamic fundamentalism in east Africa”*.[[298]](#footnote-296) As mentioned earlier, Kabila engaged himself in private enterprise via the signing of many contracts with Western mining companies during his campaign as a means to fund his military insurgency. U.S. based America’s Mineral Fields (AMF), among others, signed a contract worth $1 billion with Kabila’s ADFL forces during the war.[[299]](#footnote-297) The willingness of the U.S. administration to support Kabila’s ADFL *“[…] is seen as a culmination of a long stated ambition of American foreign policy, whose ultimate goal is to dismantle the monopoly of former colonial powers in Africa”*.[[300]](#footnote-298) The assistance of the U.S. in the civil war during 1996-97 is, according to Nkrumah’s perspective, neo-colonialism. Nkrumah suggests among others, that the securing of rights to extract valuable minerals and other natural resources through aid, military or non-military, is a way of quid pro quo.[[301]](#footnote-299) Aid in this context is not only materialised in terms of economic support, but also via military advice and diplomatic assistance. Indeed, part of the strategy during the early stages of the war, was for the rebel forces to conquer vital economic areas of Mobutu’s Zaire, a strategy deployed by the Eisenhower administration against the Axis forces during WWII.[[302]](#footnote-300) Of course, this is not to claim that the African states supporting Kabila had no economic interests of their own, but fact remains that via military guidance and economic ties, Kabila depended heavily upon non-African actors in securing power. Either way around, neo-colonial ventures included or not, Kabila did not gain or remain in power through his own volition.

### 5.3.3 An Architectural Heritage

*“Belgian colonisation has engendered a built legacy that until this day profoundly marks the Congo”*.[[303]](#footnote-301) Contemporary Congolese identity is a complex mix of colonial and post-colonial heritage. In Belgian Congo, as in many other colonies, the European colonizers engaged themselves in building grandeur monuments, parks and public buildings, reflecting the link between colony and homeland.[[304]](#footnote-302) This architecture of the colonial period was meant to create a unique identity, first and foremost among colonizers, but in the post-colonial era these architectural endeavours have also been implicit in creating the new national identity that arose from independence. Subsequently, *“[…] symbolic sites for the coloniser culture continued to maintain their significance in the post-colonial era as their capacity to change and acquire new meanings allowed them to act also as places of memory for the colonised”*.[[305]](#footnote-303) Many of the buildings erected during Belgian rule are still being used today and have had a profound influence on the creation of a national identity.[[306]](#footnote-304) The governor general’s residence, once inhabited by the highest-ranking colonial official and thus a symbol of colonial administration and oppression, was the place for Lumumba’s speech after independence. As this site became the focal point for the birth of a new nation *“[…] it is thus not only part of the history of Belgian colonisation, but also intrinsically linked with Congo’s post-colonial history”*.[[307]](#footnote-305) Such a building, as the governor general’s residence, now used for the seat of Parliament, is an expression of the conversion from ruled to ruler. The architectural heritage of the DRC’s colonial past still bears witness to the events unfolded from Leopold’s arrival to the Belgians exit and as such, fill the landscape of contemporary DRC with elements of a past not easily eradicated or forgotten. Given that not many Congolese who lived during Belgian rule are perhaps alive today, the psychical dimensions of urban livelihood remain in place, remembering a time not long ago and delivering notions of a distinct Congolese past and identity to future generations. Ultimately *“[…] heritage indeed is one of the ways in which the nation constructs for itself a sort of collective social memory”*.[[308]](#footnote-306)

### 5.3.4 Past and Present

There cannot be many people left who can actually recall what it meant to live under colonial rule in the DRC, being told who and what you are, what to think, how to feel, how to act. Nevertheless, history never forgets. I am 29 years old and I have grandparents who can still remember what it was like to live under German occupation for 5 years during WWII. The feeling of being oppressed, controlled and dominated by foreign forces does not dissolve easily. This is not to claim that 5 years of German occupation equals 75 years of colonial occupation but merely to suggest that if 5 years of occupation has left such a tremendous mark on the understanding of one’s self and one’s own history, what mark will 75 years have left? We do not forget who we are or where we came from, regardless of historical antecedents and events. We are taught in school from early on about the circumstances regarding German occupation and grow up resenting the Germans a bit, not enough to hold it against generations who had no hand in the matter but just enough to resent or perhaps protest when foreigners mistake our language and nationality for being German.[[309]](#footnote-307) We commemorate the date the Germans marched in and we honour the date the Germans were forced out every year. History never forgets, how can we? Oppression will eventually lead to revolt, as culture and history can never be fully denied, eradicated or absent.[[310]](#footnote-308) In the DRC, Congolese history and culture was oppressed and many, including the contested works of Mannoni, would have Africans believe that they had no culture, no history, and that their attitudes towards the white man was not due to his actions in Africa, but latent in the African himself. Fanon detests that the feeling of inferiority of blacks towards whites is an inherent trait of African heritage. How could it be? Pre-colonial Congolese society experienced major development during the Kongo Kingdom of the 15th, 16th and 17th century but eventually succumbed to Portuguese military prowess.[[311]](#footnote-309) The Congolese people have a rich history, one that antedates colonial expansion – contrary to popular opinion at the time of European conquest. The inferiority complex felt by Africans is, in Fanon’s sense, the bi-product of the historical contingency of white rule, rather than an inherent African trait. Today’s Africa has witnessed countless civil wars, genocides and political and economic instabilities. In 2001, 14 out of 20 violent conflicts around the world took place on the African continent.[[312]](#footnote-310) Many would perhaps insert that the events unfolded in the last century of African history are typical products of African behaviour – Africans kill each other, exploit their countries riches for personal benefit, rape, plunder and mistreat their people.[[313]](#footnote-311) I wonder if Fanon would not argue that the behavioural tendencies on the African continent are the bi-product of European presence too? After all, who do we learn from, those in power or those without? As a paternalistic system was put in place during colonial administration, society resembled the family unit – the patriarch being the white man and the black population as savage children.[[314]](#footnote-312) The colonization of Africa by Europeans inflicted racial prejudice, violent oppression, exploitation of peoples and natural resources, minority dominance etc. As argued earlier, the malfunction of the DRC, in terms of both political and economic structures are de facto inherited from colonial administration, and perhaps in some ways, colonial attitudes.

The last 52 years since independence has been a period of creating a new identity for the people of the DRC. It is not a matter of simply rejecting the entire colonial past, but a question of establishing a solid foundation for an African identity, and not just as a post-colonial society. Mobutu attempted to ‘Africanize’ the DRC via Zaireanization, changing European named cities and European names into African ones. Kinshasa and Kisangani has a more African ring to it than Léopoldville and Stanleyville. Again these city names were changed 10 years after independence and more than 85 years after the solidification of Leopold’s claim to power at the Berlin Conference. Not many who where alive during Leopold’s reign would have been alive at the time of Zaireanization, indicating that regardless of time passed, history remembers and plays a large part in the way we identify ourselves. If you come across meeting non-Danish peoples when travelling abroad most of the time people would perhaps connect Danish nationality with the Vikings. That was 1000 years ago! Nevertheless, as Danes, we take pride in our national history and heritage – and perhaps tend to forget the pillage, plunder and murder of the Viking era.[[315]](#footnote-313) The Viking era is not forgotten, neither are the countless conflicts our country has been in, invasions and occupations by external forces. The Congolese people have also experienced conflicts, occupation and invasion. Living as a colonial subject in the previous century is bound to hold more sway on national identity than events experienced a couple of hundred years ago. Perhaps today, especially when travelling in the Middle East and other countries with large Muslim populations, people will connect Denmark with the drawings of Muhammad that sprouted enormous protests in the *Ummah*.[[316]](#footnote-314) History never forgets, how can they? We are shaped and affected by a various array of – sometimes - conflicting identities. I am a man, a son, a father, a brother, a Dane, a Scandinavian, a European, a Westerner, a global citizen – not to mention including being Jewish, Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, Christian, Buddhist etc. What has happened in the history of our family, country, region, continent and world has shaped our entire perspectives, both inward and outward. You cannot escape history. The experiences of slavery, murder, rape, mutilation, exploitation, discrimination, racism, oppression, civil war, external military intervention, invasion, occupation, economic decline, political turmoil, ethnic hatred, tension and rivalry have had consequences for the Congolese people leading up to the point where we are today. These experiences are bound to have had an impact on the psyche of the average Congolese, contributing to the identity and self-understanding of contemporary Congolese people. History is both ever changing and constant at the same time.

### 5.3.5 Summary

Congolese national identity has been permanently marked by the 75 years of colonial rule. The entire social system established by King Leopold II and the Belgian colonial administration was based on the non-inclusion of the Congolese public. The dominant European discourse reflecting attitudes of superiority towards the African population has left the colonized with a feeling of inferiority. Racism, both psychological and psychical permeated everyday life of the colonized African, leaving him with an internal conflict of being black in a white world. The architectural presence of the colonial past has contributed into creating a post-colonial identity of conflicting memories. It is difficult to escape the colonial past entirely as historical events have a way of inserting themselves into our minds as they were asserted to the bodies of colonial subjects. The history of a not so long ago past still lives on today.

# 6.0 Conclusion

This project set out to determine some of the causal factors for the current situation in the DRC today. The conclusions of the three hypotheses outlined in the analysis are as follows:

## 6.1 Hypothesis One

The political sphere of the DRC is experiencing severe difficulties in running the state. The foundations for the political instability today are not only recent phenomena. These foundations lie in the historical past of the DRC. The attitudes and model of state administration and political outlook was passed on to the Mobutu regime via the already-in-place colonial system. The oppression of political resistance and exploitation of the country’s vast natural resources during the somewhat 32 years Mobutu was in power resembled the policies of the pre-independent state. From Leopold to Joseph Kabila the DRC has been run by strongmen through force and violence contributing largely to the situation we have today. Since independence not many attempts have been made to escape the legacy of rule by force. Lumumba, the DRC’s only truly freely elected Prime Minister, attempted to create a different state during first couple of years of the post-colonial era. Lumumba did not succeed in his endeavours in part due to widespread ethnic tensions and secessionist tendencies that had been latent throughout the last stage of de-colonization. Once the Belgians in power disappeared, so too did the forces that kept these tensions in check. His vision of a unified DRC regardless of class, religion or ethnicity remains a distant dream today.

Part of the explanation for the failure of Lumumba’s democratic ideals lie in the lack of a middle class during the transition from colonial state to independence and the effect of rapid independence on socio-economic development. As Diamond argued, the establishment of democracy needs a vibrant middle class to take part in redistributing wealth and claim political rights in correlation to the economic contributions usually made by the middle class. As we have seen, no middle class had successfully emerged during colonization, as the closest –évolués – was an artificial social class, constructed within the colonial system. The events that transpired following independence – riots, capital flight and the persecution of the white population – thus resulted in an economic meltdown making Diamond’s argument plausible. In order for democracy to develop, a middle class and socio-economic development would have to be present, and as both were lacking in the 1960’s and 1990’s, the transitional periods of power in both instances was met with little opposition, creating nothing more than an authoritarian state once again.

The ongoing conflict is based on political as well as economic factors. Widespread poverty and the availability of natural resources have played an instigating catalyst for conflict. Collier’s notion of a nexus between poverty and conflict by using Kabila Sr. as an example hereof illustrates the point. Waging war in poor countries can be relatively easy, as not much capital is needed to buy an army, while natural resource abundance, as in the case of the DRC, makes an easy target for the financing of such an army. When conflict has erupted, it is easy to sustain it since the effects of war devastates national economy to a point where the state might not be able to pay its armed forces necessary for remaining in power – e.g. the First Congo War between Mobutu and Kabila Sr. Contrary to Collier’s connection between the economy and conflict, Møller’s conflict typology inserted that value and interest are key issues revolving around conflict. It becomes a clear-cut definition of ‘haves and have-nots’ where the main interest in the DRC is control of natural resources – e.g. First and Second Congo War. Value, as an ethnic identification played a part during the Second Congo War where warring sides included the governments of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi against the forces of Kabila Sr. Yet again, the eruption of the conflict was not based entirely upon ethnic faction rivalry as much as on interest of economic ambitions in regards to the three states mentioned above. Both external and internal actors along with the legacy of authoritarian rule thus dominate the political sphere as all have sought to control and to a much larger extent, exploit the DRC’s riches.

## 6.2 Hypothesis Two

The economic situation in contemporary DRC is afflicted by the political turmoil as noted above as well as the dominant role of natural resources in the DRC’s economic policies. The DRC is in many ways cursed by its natural resources, both in terms of economic development and as a root to its current situation. Auty’s thesis generates the view that low-development along with an abundance of natural resources are the main factors behind economic impotence. During the last 52 years, the DRC’s economic growth has been halted by its prevalent reliance on the export of primary products. The fluctuations on the international market in regards to prices on raw materials have made the economic performance of the DRC a rollercoaster ride, subject to shocks. Enjoying huge profits when prices are up, surpluses are generally used to further develop the mining sector, to the detriment of other financial sectors. When prices plummet, revenues disappear leaving the country in a state of economic despair. When measuring the economic growth today compared to the level of 1960, the DRC has experienced a somewhat increase, perhaps indicating that things are turning around. Nevertheless, the continued importance of primary products in the DRC has made the country highly vulnerable to external factors such as price fluctuations, and internal issues such as controlling regions of mineral wealth in times of violent conflict.

The natural resource trap, as advocated by Collier, borrows somewhat from Auty’s thesis, but indicates that the low or non-existent growth is due to governance. Corruption as well as patronage is highly persistent in countries such as the DRC, given its mismanagement of natural resources. These resources are easily used to fund illegal activities such as fixed elections in states based on autocratic models. Democracy on the other hand offers little relief as Collier suggests that economic surpluses are used for short-term planning only. In both cases, political restraints are needed to ensure valid public spending and economic transparency.

External actors have played a large part in determining the outcome of the DRC’s economic outlook. As the country possesses many vital and valuable minerals, many countries have an interest in the DRC. Both regional and international states have played a part in exploiting the DRC’s minerals where gold, copper, diamonds, rubber and coltan have dominated the scene. The First and Second Congo Wars featured high involvement from other states looking to gain economic profits from the conflict. Since independence the DRC has relied on external forces in terms of state power and state finance. Throughout the post-independence era, the political forces in the DRC have received massive assistance in terms of technological know-how, military advice and industrial investment. None of the subsequent regimes following the exodus of the Belgians would have been possible where it not for the reliance on other actors. Both Mobutu and Kabila Sr. relied heavily upon states and the private sector – states assisted militarily while the private sector handled mining rights – e.g. the case of coltan. This dependence upon foreign actors is unlikely to decrease in the future as the current conflict steps into year 14.

## 6.3 Hypothesis Three

The events unfolded during colonial administration have left a tremendous mark on the national identity of the contemporary Congolese people. As Fanon has argued, the identity and internal conflict of the African are not psychological deficiencies deeply rooted in African ethno-genesis. These are traits produced via the clash between colonizers and colonized. 75 years of racial prejudice and psychical as well as psychological oppression have contributed vastly to the national identity of today’s Congolese people. The post-independent era did not deliver what the Congolese people desired and what transpired instead was the birth of a neo-colonial state, as described by Nkrumah. The new era witnessed a return to foreign domination via neo-colonial activities performed by external actors along with the rise in dependency upon non-African states as advocated by Dos Santos. The collective memory of the colonial past conflicts on several issues. Today, the architectural heritage left by entrepreneurs and administrative construction agencies during the period 1885-1960, still affect Congolese national identity. The conversion and adoption of colonial buildings in the post-colonial era have created a new identity, built on old foundations. These buildings both conceptualize oppression and freedom at the same time and are bound to install an identity conflict on some level, as freedom and oppression are opposites. The memory of once being dominated by foreign powers is not erased from contemporary collective Congolese identity. 75 years of systematic oppression and racial hierarchical discourse will have taken its toll on the infant national history of post-colonial DRC. We all experience identity conflicts as we carry within multiple identities depending on the immediate circumstances and situation we find ourselves in. The past is destined to affect our future, regardless of us fighting it or not.

The DRC today has been shaped through the authority of white rule, the tumultuous transitional period of decolonization and the subsequent regimes of political kleptocracy and economic instability. The theories presented in this project cover some of the problematic aspects concerning the ‘state of the state’ in the DRC today. They encompass both old and new perspectives on the current situation, and seek to explain the devastating effects of certain tendencies in the political and economic spheres. Despite the DRC being one of the richest territories in the world based on its natural resources, it is one of the poorest in terms of economic and political development. There are many questions that can be answered via the contribution of this project. These answers alone do not offer the ultimate solution to the problems in the DRC but act as explanatory tools for the political and economic malfunctions of the current state. Seeking to explore the causal factors for the current situation we have arrived at our destination. Now, we have seen how the DRC came into what constitutes an unstable state, to say at least. Then, the question is: Where do we go from here?

# 7.0 Perspective/Further Research

## 7.1 The Consociational Model

The current economic and political problematic environment surrounding the DRC is both enhanced and sustained by the ongoing conflict that has ravaged the people and lands of the DRC since 1998. Formulated by Arend Lijphart in the 1970’s and reassessed by René Lemarchand in 2006, consociationalism as a system of governance perhaps offers the first step in reaching a conclusion to the hostilities and war in the DRC.[[317]](#footnote-315) This political theory suggests that,

*[…] rather than contemplate secession or partition, neither of which are without major drawbacks, or let conflicts burn themselves out, at great cost in human life, the aim is to bring about a major restructuring of power relations through a more inclusive participation in policy making, accompanied by corresponding spheres of autonomy for the groups concerned. Incorporation rather than exclusion is seen as the key to conflict resolution*.[[318]](#footnote-316)

Lijphart asserts the importance of sharing executive power between opposition and majority parties while also including the necessity for group autonomy, proportionality and minority veto.[[319]](#footnote-317) Group autonomy indicates that decisions on issues of common interest are made jointly, while issues concerning each specific community are decided within each group. Proportionality contends that political representation; public service appointments and the distribution of public funds are not biased, but allocated according to the ethnic composition of the state. Minority veto is proscribed as a necessary tool for minorities to ensure that their voices are heard and their vital interests are protected.[[320]](#footnote-318) To be sure, although this model has never been fully implemented on the African continent and efforts to adopt it have in many cases utterly failed[[321]](#footnote-319), the basic idea is optimistic. In the case of the DRC, in the light of the above-mentioned conditions incorporated into the consociational model, we can make the following assessment: as the ethnic composition in the DRC is a mosaic of hundreds of different groups, the instalment of the consociational model will surely be put to the ultimate test. The key to bringing political and military peace to the DRC is motivation. Fact remains, as we have seen in the project that waging war is a profitable business. If the rebel groups involved in the conflict are motivated by greed – e.g. control of mineral regions – it makes little sense to discuss a political settlement. On the other hand, if political goals are part of the struggle we are witnessing in the eastern regions of the DRC, why have we not seen an end to conflict, as warring factions have been brought to the negotiating table on numerous occasions? If the consociational model is to have any impact, in theory at least, economic incentives and profits connected to waging war will have to be removed. Once again, we find ourselves at the starting point of the project: the blessing and curse of natural resources.

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172. Ibid. pp. 156-162 [↑](#footnote-ref-170)
173. Ibid. p. 155 [↑](#footnote-ref-171)
174. Ibid. p. 154 [↑](#footnote-ref-172)
175. Ibid. p. 156 [↑](#footnote-ref-173)
176. Ibid. p. 157 [↑](#footnote-ref-174)
177. Ibid. pp. 158-159 [↑](#footnote-ref-175)
178. Ibid. pp. 160-161 [↑](#footnote-ref-176)
179. Ibid. p. 161 [↑](#footnote-ref-177)
180. Séverine Autesserre. *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*. New York: Cambridge University Press (2010) 48 [↑](#footnote-ref-178)
181. François Ngolet. ”African and American Connivance in Congo-Zaire”. *Africa Today*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter, 2000) 75 [↑](#footnote-ref-179)
182. Op. Cit., Gondola, 2002, p. 163 [↑](#footnote-ref-180)
183. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-181)
184. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-182)
185. Ibid. pp. 163-170 [↑](#footnote-ref-183)
186. Op. Cit., Autesserre, 2010, pp. 48-49 [↑](#footnote-ref-184)
187. Ibid. p. 52 [↑](#footnote-ref-185)
188. Op. Cit., Gondola, 2002, pp. 164-166 [↑](#footnote-ref-186)
189. Kabila was shot by one of his own bodyguards, allegedly due to the mistreatment of his personal staff. Theories of plots designed by external state actors are widely accepted. Ibid. pp. 172-173 [↑](#footnote-ref-187)
190. Ibid. p. 172 [↑](#footnote-ref-188)
191. Op. Cit., Ngolet, 2000 [↑](#footnote-ref-189)
192. Op. Cit., Autesserre, 2010, p. 49 [↑](#footnote-ref-190)
193. Op. Cit., Gondola, 2002, p. 171 [↑](#footnote-ref-191)
194. A case in point; Uganda’s export of coltan increased from 2.5 tons in 1997 to a staggering 70 tons in 1999. Ibid. p. 177 [↑](#footnote-ref-192)
195. Op. Cit., Autesserre, 2010, p. 51 [↑](#footnote-ref-193)
196. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-194)
197. Ibid. p. 53 [↑](#footnote-ref-195)
198. Ibid. pp. 53-54 [↑](#footnote-ref-196)
199. [www.cia.gov/index.html](http://www.cia.gov/index.html) (1) [↑](#footnote-ref-197)
200. Op. Cit., Reyntjens, 2007 [↑](#footnote-ref-198)
201. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-199)
202. Op. Cit., Hochschild, 1998, p. 301 [↑](#footnote-ref-200)
203. Mabiengwa Emmanuel Naniuzeyi. ”The State of the State in Congo-Zaire: A Survey of the Mobutu Regime”. *Journal of Black Studies*, 29:669 (1999) [↑](#footnote-ref-201)
204. Ibid. p. 677 [↑](#footnote-ref-202)
205. Ibid. pp. 673-677 [↑](#footnote-ref-203)
206. Rapid independence, seccesion, capital flight, armed rebellion, and political impotence are among the factors that played a part leading up to Mobutu’s seizure of power in 1965. [↑](#footnote-ref-204)
207. [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org) (4) [↑](#footnote-ref-205)
208. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-206)
209. Op. Cit., Ngolet, 2000 [↑](#footnote-ref-207)
210. Kevin C. Dunn. *Imagining the Congo: The International Relations of Identity*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan (2003) [↑](#footnote-ref-208)
211. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-209)
212. Op. Cit., Naniuzeyi, 1999 [↑](#footnote-ref-210)
213. Op. Cit., Dunn, 2003 [↑](#footnote-ref-211)
214. Jean-Paul Sartre. *Colonialism and Neocolonialism*. London: Routledge (2001) Originally published in Paris, France: Editions Gallimard (1964) [↑](#footnote-ref-212)
215. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-213)
216. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-214)
217. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-215)
218. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-216)
219. Op. Cit., Naniuzeyi, 1999 [↑](#footnote-ref-217)
220. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-218)
221. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-219)
222. [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org) (4) [↑](#footnote-ref-220)
223. [www.hdr.undp.org](http://www.hdr.undp.org) (3) [↑](#footnote-ref-221)
224. Op. Cit., Reyntjens, 2007 [↑](#footnote-ref-222)
225. Op. Cit., Montague, 2002, p. 108 [↑](#footnote-ref-223)
226. Dictionaries and Encyclopaedias Online Et. Al. (11) [↑](#footnote-ref-224)
227. Paul Collier. *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*. New York: Oxford University Press (2007) 17 [↑](#footnote-ref-225)
228. *Bottom billion* refers to the group of approximately 1 billion people living in extreme poverty and in states of low development. [↑](#footnote-ref-226)
229. Op. Cit., Collier, 2007, p. 19 [↑](#footnote-ref-227)
230. Ibid. p. 19 [↑](#footnote-ref-228)
231. Ibid. p. 21 [↑](#footnote-ref-229)
232. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-230)
233. Michael Ross. ”The Natural Resource Curse: How Wealth Can Make You Poor.” in Ian Bannon and Paul Collier. *Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions.* Washington, U.S.: The World Bank (2003) 32-33 [↑](#footnote-ref-231)
234. Op. Cit., Collier, 2007, p. 21 [↑](#footnote-ref-232)
235. Op. Cit., Ross, 2003, pp. 17-36 [↑](#footnote-ref-233)
236. Op. Cit., Collier, 2007, p. 21 [↑](#footnote-ref-234)
237. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-235)
238. Ibid. p. 23 [↑](#footnote-ref-236)
239. Op. Cit., Montague, 2002 [↑](#footnote-ref-237)
240. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-238)
241. [www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org) (2) [↑](#footnote-ref-239)
242. All figures are an estimated percentage of growth in either decline or increase of the level of growth in 1960. [↑](#footnote-ref-240)
243. [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org) (5) [↑](#footnote-ref-241)
244. [www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org) (2) pp. 6-8 [↑](#footnote-ref-242)
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249. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-247)
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253. Ibid. p. 38 [↑](#footnote-ref-251)
254. Ibid. p. 39 [↑](#footnote-ref-252)
255. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-253)
256. Ibid. pp. 38-52 [↑](#footnote-ref-254)
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308. Ibid. p. 187 [↑](#footnote-ref-306)
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321. Ibid. - The case of Rwanda during the 1990’s stands out as a prime example of the failure of the consociational model. [↑](#footnote-ref-319)