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The EU as a global security actor post-Lisbon

Institutionalising liberal norms in a multipolar global order

Student: John Callow
Supervisor: Søren Dosenrode

Abstract

International relations are a key area of concern for the European Union (EU). The Lisbon Treaty makes a number of institutional changes in regard to this. This thesis argues that it should continue to build on these. This requires Member States overcoming intergovernmental handicaps to define the EU institutionally. It also means taking seriously the Lisbon innovation, the External Action Service (EEAS). This can act as a bridge, coordinating Member States and National power strands into a larger whole, and setting a permanent framework for policy initiative and diplomatic relations. It further demands that the newly defined positions of High Representative and President of the Council are constructed innovatively and experimentally, in relation to other global actors.

Formulating a global strategy is a primary area that the EU might focus on. In the current interconnected global space, international law and institutions (multilateralism) bind actors together like never before. This is an area in which he EU has demonstrated some regional proficiency in, in the past. This expertise should be applied beyond the borders that the EU operates from.

As a global military actor, the EU is currently just mediocre. But the NATO structure under which it has understood its military identity, is weakening. To mitigate this, and in order to take care of problems in its own neighbourhood, new ways of thinking are required. The new Permanent Structured Cooperation and Defence (PSCD) framework is a mechanism from which the EU might achieve the type of normative ends that Lisbon indicates are sought. But Members with the right capacities must take advantage of that framework. Attention should also be given to the European Defence Agency (EDA) structure, which needs to be adapted to cope in the emerging world.

In a globalised sphere, security threats spill over borders. Tackling many requires a multilateral inter-institutional response. To achieve this end, the EU needs to embed itself and help anchor rising powers, within internationally governing institutions. An intentional goal for the EU should be promoting management of the international order, and with reference to international law. It should seek to assist in reforming some of the institutions that govern, so that they better represent democratic principles, and the distribution of power, within a multipolar system.
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The EU as a global security actor

Institutionalising liberal norms in a multipolar global order
(1) Introduction

Foreign policy is a central tenet of a nation’s global identity. From the EU’s perspective, however, it is a Union of 27-Member States, and might be seen to lack the autonomy in foreign affairs that Members possess independently of it. This was particularly so when all of CFSP was dealt with in pillar-2 of the 3-pillar system.

In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty was agreed by Members. This moves CFSP into the realm of ‘shared competence’, and gives the EU a number of improvements which set the scene for it to be a more effective global actor. Improvements to its competences include: (1) A long-term President of the European Council; (2) new types of responsibilities for its High Representative, creating what could be termed a de facto Foreign Minister; (3) a new External Action Service (EEAS), which is effectively a de facto diplomacy service; and (4) a new potential in its military through the creation of the PSCD.

This thesis will address how these changes affect the EU as a global actor, in particular relating to security strategies. A secondary aim investigates the intergovernmental characteristics of policy output, and the degree to which internal influences interrupt external output, particularly in CSDP. A third aim is to address whether institutions, regionally and globally, are the future for the EU in terms of addressing the type of security issues identified by the European Security Strategy (ESS), and reiterated by the European Council five years later, as urgent problems of our time. This is set against a backdrop of the shift in global power relations, from unipolarity to multipolarity.

(1.1) Problem formulation and research questions

The following study uses a central problem formulation and related research questions. Each research question is answered in its own section (sections 2-7). At the end, the problem formulation is answered based on the findings related to the research questions (see (8.1)).

(1.1.1) Problem formulation

In the wake of the ratification of Lisbon, is the EU a stronger foreign and security actor (PF1)? What barriers are there to it being able to promote liberal international norms (PF2)? Are institutions the future in a multipolar world (PF3)?
(1.1.2) Research Questions

*RQ1* (S2) What can be said of the Lisbon innovations in terms of the type of toolbox they provide the EU?

*RQ2* (S3) With respect to security and defence, to what extent do Member States define the EU as a global actor in the post-Lisbon period? How far can it be argued power has shifted to Brussels? Are theoretical models useful in defining our understanding?

*RQ3a/b/c* (S4/5/6) Post-Lisbon, is the EU’s toolbox sufficient so it can strategise effectively in a current geo-legal/political/institutional context?

*RQ4* (S7) What strengths does the EU bring to the emerging multipolar global order? Are there areas it could improve itself in, in order to cope over the coming decades?

(1.2) Scope and delimitations

The thrust of this thesis regards the EU as a CFSP/CSDP actor post-Lisbon. The perspective taken focuses around the decision-making process within regional and global institutions. Attention is also given to the current state of the EU’s military capacities.

(1.2.1) Scope and delimitations: The EU as an economic global actor

Little is said in this thesis regarding the EU’s economic global footprint, and its relations in financial organisations like the World Trade Organisation (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) or Groups of 8/20 (G8/20). In an interconnected world, a stable economic order is component of maintaining stability. A security issue that could have been addressed is how the EU assisted in stabilising its own economies in response to the economic crisis. One area of particular interest is the multilateral approach taken by the EU, IMF and WB to the EU-10.¹ Financial packages were awarded to stabilise these under the logic that the financial crisis could be a significant test of democracy within EU borders.²

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¹ The EU-10 are former Communist states, which consist of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia

² Foreign Policy Research Institute, *Project on Democratic Transitions*, ‘EU Ten and the Global Economic Crisis’
(1.2.2) Scope and delimitations: The EU and demography

Another security issue which was contemplated but left out, is demographic decline in Europe.³ ⁴ At the current rate, the average age of Europeans will be 49-years by the middle of the century. If this is linked with a low birth-rate, there might be severe effects for the economy, and the potential for increasing rates of conflict within EU borders. With lower tax-receipts, less people of working age, growing welfare costs, a higher ratio of spenders to savers, the EU could face a century of austerity.⁵ The only obvious way the EU can tackle this is to increase immigration to it.⁶ Although Zakaria is perhaps overly-pessimistic when he claims Europe is unable to assimilate immigrants from ‘strange and unfamiliar cultures’, he nonetheless has a point regarding the inability of Europeans to presently absorb new cultures into their communities. Europe has seen an upsurge in nationalist movements which make stopping immigration their sole concern. The Think Tank Demos reports an increase in these retrograde movements in their thousands.⁷

Continued immigration to the US is argued as one factor that will tip the economic balance in the US’s favour, compared to the EU. Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute forecasts US population growth to increase by 65-million by 2030. He claims that unlike Europe, which will have twice as many over-65s than under-15s, the population of children in the US will continue to be proportionally higher than those over 65.⁸

Demographic decline can also have severe global institutional ramifications. It is predicted that by 2025, only 6.5% of the population will be resident of the EU.⁹ This small population could have marked effect on the potential for the EU to have the ability to act as a main agent of change in a multilateral institutional environment.¹⁰ If global institutions become more democratic, then the EU would have a smaller demography to represent.

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³ The European Parliament, ‘As Europe ages – how can we tackle its demographic decline’
⁵ The European Parliament, Op. Cit
⁶ Zakaria, F, Op. Cit
⁸ Ibid
(1.2.3) Scope and delimitations: The EU and foreign aid

Lastly, tackling issues such as global poverty through aid and trade, could also have demonstrated the type of causal link the EU has as a global actor in promoting security globally, and in its own neighbourhood, using economic resources. The scheme Aid for Trade offers financial assistance to developing countries in order that infrastructures are developed, and capacity to trade fairly with others enhanced. There is a pre-emptive logic to this, given that conflicts often originate in countries locked into poverty. But to have taken on this in addition to the material would have meant investigating, not just of what the scheme wants to achieve in principle, but to what it could achieve in practice. Collier suggests countries locked into cycles of poverty often have issues that cannot be tackled simply by aid and increased trade. Aid requires long-term planning, and a focus on types of traps that some countries are unable to escape from, such as resource curses, being landlocked with bad neighbours, conflict traps and bad government.

(1.3) Theoretical perspectives

A number of theoretical perspectives are used in this thesis, none of which dominate wholly. Combined they provide a more convincing theoretical case to understand the integration process regionally and globally.

(1.3.1) Theoretical perspectives: European integration

Sections 2-3 focus on how the EU operates from its regional base. There is emphasis on what type of thinking drives European integration, and the basis this provides for policy output.

Intergovernmentalism

The first view used is the traditional intergovernmental one. According to this, Member States are the main vehicles for change regarding foreign policy. There is much evidence to support this view in regard to CFSP and CSDP in particular. Lisbon might have wiped out the old pillar system, but it did not place pillar-2 issues into the hands of the Community, but instead moved them to the realm of ‘shared competence’.

11 European Commission, Aid for Trade
The issues being dealt with in this thesis remain a part of the mandate of an intergovernmental order. As is shown in the next section (see (2)), even the appointments of the new President and High Representative were arguably the result of compromise made by Member States, who did not want to appoint more influential figures to the posts. Lastly, the policy process from start to finish retains an intergovernmental flavour. The agencies formulating CFSP/CSDP options are intergovernmental at the top echelons, and the people that decide on what policy to adopt are European Foreign Ministers and leaders.

**Sociological institutionalism**

It is tempting to temper the above with the observation that the institutions in which people act, socialise them into acting differently than they otherwise would. Intergovernmentalism fails as a theoretical standpoint because it does not take into account the EU institutions in which values are constructed. To take constructivism to its extreme like this, however, is pushing boundaries. Governments *do* influence policy, and *do* promote or retard the integration process. But governments are not the *only* drivers of change, and the agencies in which policy is formulated also have an effect on it. In section-3 it is shown regarding CSDP output, that up to 80% of it is formulated by intergovernmental agencies in European settings. Empirical evidence suggests high ranking officials, appointed by National capitals, often see themselves in European *and* National political and cultural terms.

Institutional settings are important in setting the scene for eventual policy output. These institutions are crafted by Member States, but the norms that exist in them, do not conform to an intergovernmental model.

**Combining intergovernmentalism and sociological institutionalism (a bit on rational choice theory and neo-functionalism)**

The theoretical crux of sections 2-3 is to combine two schools of thought. Neither standpoint explains the process alone, but when combined they offer insight into what is going on. This is not to say every other view on European integration is defunct. There is reason to believe *rational choice theory* describes the behaviour of officials when they are faced with a choice of whether to promote National or European interests. The studies addressed in section-3

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show that officials are sometimes game-players, and can act in ways that will provide sum-
value to either Europe or their capitals.

The steady spread of the process of integration from mild beginnings some decades
ago as a coal/steel community, to the one in the post-Lisbon period, also fits in well with a
neo-functionalist view,\(^\text{15}\) in which intergovernmental areas have gradually spilled over to
Community or shared competences. Neo-functionalism, when it was conceived, would also
have been able to correctly predict the movement in loyalty of officials in the agencies
discussed in section-3, from capital cities to Brussels.

\(\text{(1.3.2) Theoretical perspectives: International relations (IR)}\)

Sections 4-7 have a large focus on how the EU operates internationally, from a military and
institutional perspective. There is much focus on the relations it has with other global actors.
Again, it is difficult to take one theoretical view in \textit{ideal type} terms,\(^\text{16}\) and claim it alone
describes the processes being discussed, or at least describes potential processes that could
occur under specific circumstances.

\textbf{Complex interdependence}

Keohane and Nye’s view of complex interdependence is itself a synthesis of other views in
IR. Realism is an important aspect of it, as is liberal institutionalism. It argues relations
between states have been transformed to be characterised by increasing political, economic
and even cultural exchanges across territories, with a corresponding decline in the use of
military force as a solution to settle disputes (see also (3.1.1)).\(^\text{17}\) Keohane and Nye view the
theory in liberal-institutionalist terms. It is an epistemology that assumes actors calculate
means and ends in institutional settings. The role of the treaties/laws (see (5)), and of
international organisations (see (6)) are central tenets of the way actors operate in this world.
\textit{A key area of concern} for any actor, then, \textit{is that of strategy}, and there is certain game-
playing logic to acting in this world. In the final section it is suggested that, as a strategy, the
EU needs to ‘plays its hand’ carefully with the emerging powers, in order to get to promote
the types of liberal norms it is known for.

\(^{15}\) Haas, E, \textit{The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957}, republished by
University of Notre Dame Press, 2004


The EU is more in tune with this form of supranationalism than any other global actor. Being an effective actor in this world, would mean being integrated enough internationally to negotiate with others. To study the EU in this context, then, is to study the types of inter-institutional relations it possesses, and the way it acts within institutions.

**Sociological institutionalism (again)**

International organisations, and those that operate collectively through them also define issues, and independently of the strongest (see (4.3.1)). While complex interdependence, with its focus on interconnections, competition and game-playing, is relevant from a strategic standpoint, it is less able to explain the background to the values which pervade institutions.

The foundationalist UN Declaration of Human Rights, for example, is a prime example of natural rights theory. Very much like the EU, it imagines global governance in terms of promoting *inviolable* and *inalienable human rights*. There is a liberal internationalist ethic behind both this and the EU’s foreign policy. Institutionalising this further is a job the EU can focus on. This takes us away from complex interdependence towards focusing on the background to why liberal values and democracy, within institutions like the UN, might be worth promoting over a long period of time (see (6)).

It is difficult to draw a line and say this is where strategy ends and this is where norm promotion begins. But it can be argued that a strategy is a short term commitment to a goal which may change should the game change. Promotion of values is a *life-long commitment to natural rights principles and ways of being*. The hope for a liberal actor like the EU, is that some point the other-regarding values it promotes reach a tipping point and cascade through the institutions it is present in.

**Realism (the spectre of)**

Particularly in section-7, realism features prominently. The view offered is that although complex interdependence describes well the world order in which the EU acts, it is not necessarily always going to be the case. Historically speaking, there have been periods in which the world, or large regions within it, were distinctly anarchic in character. But peace treaties are signed, regional organisations come into existence, international organisations

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18 Natural rights, or the view that all possess with certain unalienable rights, appears to fuse into many modern liberal cosmopolitan declarations, including the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, the American Declaration of Independence, and the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights
promote law over disorder, and we suddenly arrive at Keohane and Nye’s conception of IR. But it should be noted that there is no reason to assume IR is fixed for an eternity. War; a badly managed world; or even a catastrophe such as climate change, could conceivably push IR back to a more anarchic nature. Moreover, the rise of a number of new powers in the international system alters the world in which we reside (see (7)). As the ESS and others point out, this ‘new’ world is a multipolar one, and multipolarity is arguably the state of affairs that is most likely to promote anarchy over order.

It is unlikely, however, that there exists a law of nature which determines a world system with more than one or two great powers, automatically leads to anarchy. But it might, nonetheless, have a propensity to do so, which is why so much focus is given in this thesis to the management of global institutions, and to promoting the multilateral approach as superior.

Combining complex interdependence and sociological institutionalism

As a view of IR, then, aspects of complex interdependence and sociological institutionalism are applied to the second part of this thesis. The view is that the EU operates in a world which is largely characterised by increasing political and economic exchanges across territories, and that there is a decline in the need to use military force to settle disputes on a nation-to-nation basis. The roles of laws and of international organisations are important in this world. But in addition, and beyond the strategies a player in this world would deploy to achieve an end, there is a principled depth to EU foreign policy. There is a normative dimension to the EU as a global actor, and institutionalising this should be a central EU goal.

(1.3.3) Theoretical perspectives: Liberal internationalism as a foreign policy doctrine

This thesis approaches the EU as a global actor from a liberal internationalist perspective. As a mode of foreign policy, liberal internationalism supposes that social liberal norms such as human rights and democracy, should be promoted across borders. Its focus is to use a multilateral approach to achieving this state of affairs. In contrast to the isolationist school of foreign policy, which would eschew intervening militarily in a sovereign state’s affairs in order to achieve a good end, liberal internationalists are ready to use force, or apply economic
pressure, should it be deemed a means to achieving a good end. The ultimate goal is a society of liberal states connected via international law and characterised by peace and trade.\textsuperscript{20}

In contrast to the realist school of thought, liberal internationalism does not assume the world is always governed by the deterrent threat of the strongest nation. If governed carefully, the world can be a community, in the same way that a country or region can be a community; comprising multiple actors whose interests are fused together. To do this, a liberal internationalist actor would normally heed the various conventions, protocols and legal structures of a multilateral order, such as through mechanisms like the UN.

\textbf{(1.3.4) Theoretical Perspectives: EU declaratory foreign policy}

EU declaratory foreign policy is predominately liberal internationalist. As noted by the ESS, \textit{international crisis management} is a key area of IR for it. Lisbon itself reaffirms a commitment to establishing liberal internationalist foreign policy by establishing international law, democracy, international security and the reduction of human rights abuses.\textsuperscript{21} Everything that the EU as a global security actor does internationally, claims the European Council, can be linked, not just to regional objectives, but to UN objectives, too.\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{(1.4) Literature and sources}

A wide range of sources have been used for this project, and these can be ranked into three separate areas.

\textit{EU sources}

As the main focus is on the EU as a global actor in the post-Lisbon period, the Treaty of Lisbon was of course consulted.\textsuperscript{23} The main website of the Commission, \textit{Europa}, was also used throughout.\textsuperscript{24} Given the prominence placed on the EEAS, a number of documents from that service were similarly looked at.\textsuperscript{25} Due to the security issues dealt with, the ESS

\textsuperscript{20} Krauthammer, C, ‘Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World, November 20th 2004
\textsuperscript{21} Article 21, TEU
\textsuperscript{23} Lisbon Treaty, ‘Official Journal of the European Union’
\textsuperscript{24} Europa, ‘The website of the EU’ (ran by the Commission)
\textsuperscript{25} European External Action Service, ‘The fight against proliferation of WMD’
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid, ‘Emerging from the shadows: Libya takes its future in its own hands’
Journals and books

Most academic sources used are from political science journals, and covered a range of theoretical ground. Special attention is noted regarding the four separate sources of Howorth. Not only were some of his ideas expanded on, but his writing provided links to further works that were used. If any criticism can be made of Howorth’s IR approach, it is that he has a tendency to over dramatize strategy within a complex interconnected world, and under dramatize the norms and values underpinning it. This is odd, given he seems to upgrade the importance of sociological institutionalism when dealing with the goings on in EU defence agencies. He seems to treat the international environment as largely Hobbesian, but the regional one as potentially very much a process of constructivism (albeit this is tempered by the machinations of national governments). Although this thesis agrees in the potential of IR to be anarchic in nature in a multipolar world, it also suggests this can be mitigated to a degree by developing interpolar management techniques, and by focusing on embedding poles within a multilateral system of governance.

A special mention can also be made regarding the sociological inspired literature, particularly Chekel’s institutionalist model, which define section-3. These studies were vital

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27 Ibid, ‘Overview of the missions and operations of the EU April 2012’
28 Ibid, ‘What we do’
31 European Defence Agency, ‘European Armaments Cooperation Strategy’
32 Ibid, ‘Missions and Functions’
33 Ibid ‘Strategies Overview’
34 Gnesotto, N and Grevi, G (directors), Op. Cit
36 Howorth, J, ‘Strategy and the Importance of Defence Cooperation among EU Member States’, Security Policy Brief, Egmont Institute, September 2010
in underpinning the view that EU institutions, and the norms that can pervade them, can be a central component of policy output within an intergovernmental order.41 42 43 44 45 46 47

Think Tanks

Particularly in section-7, some of the views of Think Tanks are incorporated in this thesis. The primary one is the EU semi-autonomous body, the ISS.48 Also, the US predicated National Intelligence Council (NIC) is included.49 In addition, the Berlin based Global Public Policy Institute (GPP) features, as does the Brooking Institution (BI) of Washington.50 51 These are involved in the business of prediction, based on what they think are global security dangers. Interestingly, they tend to agree that the world will become multipolar soon (or already is), and if this is not managed institutionally, problems will ensue.

Related to this, although not regarding security per se is the Bertelsmann Foundation’s research on the understanding of how citizens from the strongest states in the world view the relative strengths of all poles of a multipolar order. Some interesting and encouraging results can be seen in section-6 regarding this, from the EU’s perspective.52

News sources

A number of media sources are used to report facts of the matter, and for commentary regarding events related to this project. All opinion made from these is marked, and only

47 Cross, M. K, ‘Cooperation by Committee: The EU Military Committee and the Committee for Civilian Crisis Management’, Occasional Paper No. 82, EU-ISS
49 National Intelligence Council, ‘Global Trends 2025: The National Intelligence Council’s 2025 Project’
50 The Global Public Policy Institute
51 The Brooking Institute, A Plan for Action: A New Era of International Co-operation for a Changed World, 2009, 2010 and Beyond’
52 Bertelsmann Foundation, ‘Who Rules the World 2007’
broadsheet publications are used. Insofar as reports regarding events occurring in the world, the primary source is the BBC World News.

(1.5) Structure of study

The study is structured in 6-sections (2-7), and in each of these, separate research questions are answered.

Defining the EU institutionally in the wake of Lisbon
Section-2 relates to what can be said of the Lisbon innovations in terms of the type of toolbox they provide the EU. This is a general section, which deals with how the EU has been redefined by Lisbon. This will be achieved by looking at the institutional changes which set out to make the EU a more structured actor, including the innovations of the EEAS, and the new competences regarding the roles of President and High Representative.

Institutionalising European values in an intergovernmental system (theories of European integration)
In section-3 there is more of a theoretical feel to things. This looks at some of the constraints imposed on the EU as a CFSP/CSDP actor by Member States, and how European values might be imposed within a system that retains intergovernmental characteristics. This will be demonstrated institutionally speaking by reference to the CSDP policymaking process.

A number of things will also be said regarding the EU’s record in defence matters, and this will be compared with that of other global actors. From a theoretical standpoint, some of the tensions between intergovernmentalism and federal aspects of the EU are explored. This will be done through a fused model combining intergovernmentalism with sociological institutionalism.

Strategising effectively within a globally interdependent world (theories of international relations)
In the next 3-sections (4-6), the EU as a global actor in strategic terms is looked at. Instead of theorising from the perspective of European integration, an IR approach is taken. Something will be said about complex interdependence, which is tied in with a sociological institutional approach. These sections will also place the EU in a global context, investigating its relations with other global actors from a geo-legal, geo-political and geo-institutional context.
Challenges for a multipolar global order
The final section takes everything from above and relates this to the strengths the EU brings to an emerging multipolar order. As a theory of IR, the possibilities of realism are brought up, and it will be wondered whether the EU, as one pole in a multipolar order, can help bring order, multilaterally and militarily, to this new type of world. Potential threats to peace are also dealt with in this section.
SECTION 2 - THE LISBON INNOVATIONS AND NEW FACES OF THE EU

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(2) Lisbon Innovations

(RQ1) What can be said of the Lisbon innovations in terms of the type of toolbox they provide the EU?

Introductory Comments

This section sets out the innovations of Lisbon in terms of the EU as a global actor. It begins with an assessment of the new EEAS, and the extent to whether this constitutes the ‘Europeanisation’ of diplomacy. It will also be considered the degree to which power, in terms of diplomatic relations, has shifted from Member States to Brussels. Some attention is paid to the strategies necessary for the service to define its role properly during its infancy. The discussion then moves towards the CFSP Lisbon changes which received most coverage in the media. These are the creation of the permanent role for President of the European Council, and the newly defined HR/VP. As with the EEAS above, these relate to what they mean for the EU as a global actor, compared to it in the past. The institutional frameworks in which these posts exist are considered, as are the calibre of the people given the jobs. It will be asked whether they were the right people to define the roles. The section also uses theoretical models, namely institutionalism and intergovernmentalism, to assess potentials and barriers that exist to unifying CFSP output.

(2.1) The EEAS and other innovations

There are two innovations which alter the EU’s global potential. Firstly is the newly defined permanent role of the President of the European Council. The incumbent to this is appointed on a renewable two and half year basis. The President can also be re-elected a single time, which means he/she can create long-term strategic visions. According to Lisbon, the European Council also becomes a real European institution, rather than just a meeting of heads of states. Within this new institutional framework, the President presides over EU summits, organises the work of major ministerial meetings, and represents the EU at global events.

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53 Previously the Presidency rotated every 6-months
54 Europa, ‘The EU in the world’
The second innovation is the post of HR/VP. This co-ordinates EU external policies, ensuring consistency. The post should seek to strategise more effectively than was possible under the system. The new post-holder will act as the EU’s ‘single legal personality’, allowing for it to conclude global agreements and link itself to international organisations (see (6)). The EU is then able to take action as a single entity.\(^{55}\) The post functions as a \textit{combination} and upgrade of Solana’s old position as the Minister for Foreign Affairs; with the External Affairs Commissioner’s Ferrero-Waldner’s post.\(^{56}\) Although Lisbon leaves out such a reference, the post functions similarly to a Foreign Minister. The Treaty gives the new HR/VP a number of tasks, including, (1) ensuring unity, consistency and effectiveness of actions by the EU;\(^{57}\) (2) implementing CFSP using common and national resources;\(^{58}\) (3) using the right to initiate in the capacity of chair of the Foreign Affairs Council;\(^{59}\) (4) representing the EU regarding CFSP issues at global organisations;\(^{60}\) (5) supporting rapid decision-making in the case of a crises or emergency;\(^{61}\) and (6) ensuring CFSP is legitimised by liaising with Parliament and ensuring its input is considered.\(^{62,63}\)

The manifesto includes: (a) to take part in weekly appointments in the capacity as VP of the Commission; (b) to be involved in European Council meetings; (c) to act as President of the Foreign Affairs Council; (d) to act as President of the European Defence Agency; (e) to act as chair-person for the EU Institute for Security Studies; and (f) to act as head of the European External Action Service.

\textbf{(2.1.1) The EEAS: a new EU ‘diplomatic service’}

The aim of Lisbon as regards CFSP is for the EU to be a more effective, consistent actor in terms of diplomatic relations, security policy, trade, aid co-ordination and global negotiations, giving it a louder voice in relations with global partners. To co-ordinate this is

\(^{55}\) Ibid \\
\(^{56}\) BBC News, ‘EU reform treaty passes last test’, 3\textsuperscript{rd} November 2009 \\
\(^{57}\) Art. 26.2 TEU \\
\(^{58}\) Art. 26.3 TEU \\
\(^{59}\) Art. 27.1 TEU \\
\(^{60}\) Art. 27.2 TEU \\
\(^{61}\) Art. 32.2 TEU \\
\(^{62}\) Art. 36 TEU \\
the new EEAS, which is under the leadership of the new HR/VP. In short, the EEAS should provide a structure to help the HR/VP carry out his/her workload.

The EEAS mandate is huge, and it sees itself being involved in the Balkans; the Middle East; Afghanistan; the Israel/Palestine 2-state solution; the European Neighbourhood Policy; and climate change negotiations. It works with partners like the UN on many issues. It will help the Union run military missions, civilian missions (see (3.5.7)), and seeks to hold political dialogues with third countries. It is committed to acting in multiple environments to achieve social and economic development for all its partners.

The service is located in 136 locations globally, and is staffed by ‘Delegations of the European Union’. It acts as a diplomatic service, and builds on the old infrastructure of a number of globally situated Commission delegations. But in line with the Lisbon ethos of making the EU more co-ordinated, the EEAS is more ambitious than these, being responsible not just for the enactment of policies from single institutions, but being employed to enact and co-ordinate across the whole of foreign policy. Like any operational diplomatic service, the EEAS should be primed to make CFSP recommendations to its Minister (HR/VP). The final say on whether these are enacted as policy, however, remains intergovernmental, and in the hands of the European Council. Given that part of the HR/VP’s remit is to act as a participant at foreign policy meetings, it should be possible for this person to influence a course of events to a common position. Similarly, that the HR/VP is also President of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), President of EDA, and is Chair of the ISS, should suggest that, with the EEAS behind the incumbent, there is a potential to fuse right into the centre of CFSP output.

(2.1.2) The EEAS: Europeanisation of diplomacy?

That the service centralises diplomacy and foreign relations could be interpreted negatively from a nationalist perspective, given Members also possess their own diplomatic services. Centralising diplomacy and foreign and security policy within an EU institution, almost certainly signifies an alteration in power relations between Member States, the EU and non-European actors.

64 Europa, ‘The EU in the world’
66 The European External Action Service, ‘What we do’
67 BBC News, ‘Q&A: EU External Action Service’
68 Ibid
(2.1.3) The EEAS: A future ‘smart power’?

The degree to which power can be centralised within a framework like the EEAS is difficult to pontificate on, given the service is only 2-years old. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify potential within the structure, and to analyse what that might mean in relation to policy output. In fact (Davis) Cross ranks the EEAS as the clearest example of an EU global innovation for the post-Lisbon period. This, she claims, shows a strategic commitment to taking ‘smart power’ seriously. In the past, Members States have been the main users of hard power instruments, while the EU has been more of a ‘norms’ promoter. The EEAS, Cross thinks, has brought these two power-strands together further integrating CFSP, and setting the stage for more effective co-ordination of the different power instruments.

In theory the potential for the EU to grow in terms of its ability to act as a global diplomatic actor is enhanced. It is hardly worth mentioning that as an actor, the EU is often seen in normative terms; as a purveyor of values such as human rights, non-proliferation; democracy; rule of law; fundamental freedoms; and equality/solidarity. The setting up of this service should coordinate policy better than had been previously under the separate External Relations departments in the Commission and Council of the EU. It also seems to mirror other national diplomatic services, and can presumably only strengthen the EU’s hand. Moreover, with a projected budget of €3bn, one would expect some value for money as regards its effect on policy output. It would be odd for Member States to fund the service to this degree without any desire to see it become a formidable coordinator of power.

(2.1.4) The EEAS: Defining diplomacy institutionally

The EU could have the most coherent normative global agenda the world has ever seen, but without staffing the service with experts in their fields, it would be doubtful that policy would be as effective as it could be. A main criticism made against the EEAS so far is that it is bureaucratic, and its management is ineffective. This culminated, so it is claimed, in 60 staff leaving the service, rather than joining it. To be fair, it is early days, and one might

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70 Ibid
71 Lisbon, Art. 21
72 BBC News, ‘Q&A: EU External Action Service’
73 The EU Observer, ‘Ministers Identify Glitches in EU Diplomatic Service’, 6th January 2012,
74 The EU Observer, ‘Staff leaving EU diplomatic service amid bad working conditions’, 30th September 2011
expect ‘teething problems’ regarding staffing. Disgruntlement amongst some of the staff does not equate to poor quality output from the service. At least according to some sources, the EEAS has had some modest Neighbourhood Policy successes. Progress has been made in encouraging Serbia nearer to its eventual EU membership. The EU’s response to Libya, moreover, started with EEAS aid plans.\textsuperscript{75} 76

The EASS is still, however, largely undefined in terms of what it is expected to achieve. There could, of course, be uncertainty surrounding the role of it, and this could make Member States less likely to support its efforts. That its creation came during a time when leaders were focusing on internal strife in terms of the current economic crises in some Member States might also retard its initial growth, and how Europeans across the institutions choose to view its relative importance.\textsuperscript{77} Its current leader, Ashton, will of course be partly responsible for this definition, as will Member States that appoint their diplomats to it. How the EEAS is constructed internally, then, is of importance to its future potential to promote an EU agenda globally.\textsuperscript{78} Achieving this greatness, Cross argues, is possible, although it requires the EU’s own successful track record of promoting internal diplomacy is heeded. This means focusing on constructing an agency that places emphasis on recruiting and training diplomats, and on nurturing an \textit{esprit de corps}, as well as a high level of professionalism, knowledge, and flexibility (see (3.2.9.1)).\textsuperscript{79}

(2.1.5) The EEAS: Defining diplomacy with Member States

As just alluded to, the EEAS is handicapped to a degree by what Member States want it to be. Some might be keener than others, and it is pointed out that up until now, not all have given it their full support, despite supporting setting up of the service by ratifying Lisbon. This, think Kelly and Avery, might even be down to a base emotional reaction like jealousy, and a worry that other Member States could get more influence and better level positions within the service.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{76} EEAS, Europa, ‘Emerging from the shadows : Libya takes its future in its own hands’
\textsuperscript{77} Kelly, S & Avery, G, Op. Cit
\textsuperscript{80} Kelly, S & Avery, G, Op. Cit
It might even be wondered as to whether the EEAS will promote loyalty to the centralised vision of an EU ‘foreign office’, or if diplomatic appointees to it, will hold competing loyalties to their capitals? From an intergovernmentalist perspective, such an event would happen. But equally, from a constructivist/institutionalist or even neo-functionalist perspective, it could be that the EEAS environment shifts loyalty somewhat to its centre. Given the EEAS is still in its infancy, it is difficult to offer a theoretical commentary specific to it. In the next section, however, much is made of the institutionalisation of government appointees with the main CSDP agencies. The argument there, based on extensive interviews with high ranking officials, suggests most undergo a type of socialisation process. It is not suggested they ‘go native’, but they tend to take on European values that appear to sit well with their National ones. They are willing to push a European perspective to their respective Member States. The evidence is compelling, and there seems no reason to think that appointees in the EEAS would not eventually follow a similar institutional logic (see (3.2.9.1)).

(2.1.6) The EEAS: Institutionalising European values in the EEAS

With regard to the above, Cross suggests the EEAS, which has focused very much on building a staff of experts, also focuses on the creation of a single European Diplomatic Academy, in which EEAS diplomats are trained to maximise their potential to represent community interests. This, she thinks, will allow them to cultivate a firm European identity, which might then be projected globally.81 This idea of a central training body is not new and was discussed by the Galeote Reports. These criticised the system of training officials, presenting an alternative proposal for a College of European Diplomacy. Such a body could provide training in technical areas, diplomacy and in IR. In fact, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the last EU Commissioner for External Relations, also recommended a diplomatic academy that would better prepare diplomats to be dedicated to Europe, rather than just to their capitals.82

From a federalist perspective this would be all the better for further integration, given that national diplomats will not only be likely to ensure the EEAS is successful, but when they return to their Member States after a time at the EEAS, they are likely to take with them

82 Ibid
some of values they learnt in Brussels. It would suggest that their European experience will reinforce a European dimension at national policy-making.83

(2.1.7) The EEAS: A future potential power coordinator?

The potential for the EEAS can be considered in the long-term. That it will be able to speak as an administrative and diplomatic mouthpiece for EU on CFSP, does make it the type of administrative and diplomatic strategist which the EU needs to push its agenda forward. In this sense it might provide the EU with an increased ability to strategise more effectively, and to further integrate the policies of Member States.

(2.2) The ‘new faces’ of the EU

As noted above, the potential of the EEAS to be a formidable piece of foreign affairs administrative and diplomatic machinery is marked. This, in turn, would have a weighty effect on further integrating CFSP. But its creation was overshadowed in the media, with the constructed posts of HR/VP and President of the European Council, and their incumbents, capturing the imagination. The appointments of Herman Van Rompuy as President, and Catherine Ashton as HR/VP, however, have been described as some as a cautious start post-Lisbon. The former of these was termed a ‘consensus builder’; as someone that would not ‘upstage the leaders of the big powers who call the shots’.84 The latter’s credentials were also questioned, given her background in trade.85 The perceived signal their appointments made, moreover, was even mocked.86 Welt suggests it was the strategy of a power that was ‘Selbstverzwingung’,87 which is literally translated as ‘self-dwarfing’. The Boston Globe described the hiring of Van Rompuy as choosing a ‘conciliator’ rather than a ‘bold leader’. The calibre of the appointees, it argues, indicates there will be not be reason to expect much change in EU relations with its global partners. CFSP, it continues, will remain dominated by bilateral dealings with national governments.88

84 BBC News, ‘EU foreign head dismisses critics’ 19th November 2009
85 Ibid
87 Welt, ‘Europas Selbstverzwingung schockt die USA.’ 21st November 2011
88 Cody, E. ‘Belgium’s prime minister to lead EU.’ The Washington Post, 20th November 2009
(2.2.1) The new faces of the EU: On limiting authority or just a cautious start?

Much has been made regarding the amount of authority the new appointees would wield. Some commentators have suggested Van Rompuy’s job is really just a Chairmanship, rather than an executive function.\(^89\) Nonetheless, given that the appointees are the new global faces of the EU, the opportunity exists for both to show Europe and the world that their positions have potential,\(^90\) especially since the roles are largely undefined.\(^91\) If this is so, Ashton and Van Rompuy have the opportunity to demonstrate their abilities, and contribute innovatively and even experimentally, against other foreign policy actors. The danger in not defining roles properly, and in not pushing the boundaries of their remits, could have the effect of limiting expectations as to what can be expected from future incumbents.\(^92\) One of the criticisms made of Ashton later, is that she publically announced quite weak expectations regarding the EU as a military actor (see (5.1.4)).

(2.2.2) The new faces of the EU: A path dependence/historical institutionalism point

From a pro-integrationist perspective, the worry is that the definitions that appointees place on the positions now could be difficult to reverse and could determine how future appointees define the roles. From a path dependence perspective, this would set a specific path regarding the future of institutional development.\(^93\) If the roles are poorly defined now, what chances are there that they will be defined with precision by the next incumbents? The same issue can be levelled at the EEAS, in that if expectations become low in its first years, the potential for it to become a service that makes a big difference are lowered.

(2.2.3) The new faces of the EU: Catherine Ashton

Getting Member States to agree to CFSP preferences and thus facilitate a coherent foreign strategy, can often be made possible by having in strategic positions in Brussels, people with

\(^{89}\) Howorth, J, p. 321, ‘The New Faces’ of Lisbon

\(^{90}\) Howorth, p. 319 (New Faces) accuses Ashton of defining her position as that of a ‘secretary’ rather than a ‘general’

\(^{91}\) Civitas, ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’

\(^{92}\) Howorth, Op. Cit

John Callow, Section-2, *Lisbon innovations: The EEAS and the new faces of the EU*

distinction.\(^94\) And Ashton’s influence infiltrates virtually the whole of CFSP. A look at her mandate, shows a staggering amount of responsibility, ranging from taking part in weekly appointments as VP of the Commission; being involved in European Council meetings; acting as President of the FAC; acting as President of the EDA; acting as chair-person for the ISS; and acting as head of the EEAS.

But does Catherine Ashton have the kind of pedigree that would best define the role of HR/VP? The best Merkel could muster up on her appointment is ‘characters can grow into their jobs’.\(^95\) Indeed, only recently, Merkel addressed the *perceived* poor performance of Ashton by stating ‘[She] has been in the job a year. We have to strengthen her. It’s not easy. We all like our own foreign policies. But we need to have a visible face that represents us. And it’s up to us to strengthen her position’.\(^96\) Similarly, Belgian foreign minister, Vanackere, describes Ashton as slow off the mark in reacting to events, and that she appears to be unable to demonstrate she is working in the medium or long-term on important issues.\(^97\) Members such as France, Austria and Belgium have claimed that she has failed to unify policy under her authority at the EEAS, and that she ‘dithered’\(^98\) and failed to respond coherently to the events during the Arab Spring.\(^99\) As Howorth points out, Ashton’s response to Libya was poor during a time when a number of European leaders made strong calls for action, She was about the last to demand sanctions; the final person to make a call for Gaddafi to leave office; and the last to get behind the idea of a military operation. Even then, she had opposed pushing multilaterally for intervention until it was sanctioned by the UN Security Council. (see (5.1.5)).\(^100\)

Similarly, as the Economist’s *Charlemagne’s Notebook* wonders, the issue of whether Ashton wants to provide leadership, rather than act mostly as a consensus-broker among Foreign Ministers, could be an issue of concern. During the crisis in Egypt, and when the British, French and Germans had issued a joint letter calling for elections, Ashton remained silent. It is suggested this is because she had not yet conferred with the FAC. But was this entirely necessary? Ashton should, of course, want to respect the positions of the smaller

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\(^{96}\) Howorth, J, p. 321, ‘The New Faces’ of Lisbon

\(^{97}\) Quoted by Beesley, A, ‘Ashton under close watch from those within and further afield’, *Irish Times*, 10\(^{th}\) May 2011

\(^{98}\) Beesley, A, ‘Ashton struggling to hold reins of a many-headed EU beast’, *Irish Times*, 15\(^{th}\) February 2011


\(^{100}\) Howorth, J, p. 320, Op. Cit
states that had yet to comment, but does she really need to consult it on each statement she makes?101

Lastly, an embarrassing clip on You Tube from December 2012, shows Ms Claude-France Arnould, the EDA Executive Director, in the uncomfortable position of having to avoid answering Campbell-Bannerman MEP’s question as to whether Ashton, in her role as head of the agency, had ever visited it (Ashton was appointed in November 2009).102

Barber claims that Ashton’s (and Van Rompuy’s) appointment left member-state leaders open to the criticism that they had been uninspiring in their choice, and had engaged in a game of ‘political horse trading’.103 In agreement, Howorth argues that the appointee initially found herself ‘vulnerable’ and ‘hesitant’. As with Barber, he accuses Members of taking ‘the path of minimal effectiveness’. Moreover, Ashton, he thinks, has made categorical mistakes in her first months, including: (1) transferring her own, inexperienced staff from her trade position to her new office (rejecting more qualified staff that were capable of advising); (2) failing to attend the first meeting of the Lisbon rules of the Council of Defence; and (3) not cutting short her weekend off in response to the Haiti earthquake.104 With regard the latter, and on excusing herself from visiting the zone, Ashton’s spokesman stated that she decided not to go in order that she did not ‘block airspace’.105

In consequence to much public criticism, Ashton and her supporters engaged in a public damage limitation exercise, culminating in appealing for an end to ‘personal attacks’.106 In Ashton’s defence, one might expect a settling-in period. Given her background in trade, one would not expect her to hit the ground running, and she will require considerable intelligence and the right people beside her to get to grips with her broad mandate. There are also signs that Ashton possesses ‘people skills’, and she has developed a good relationship with US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, as well as a solid working relationship with China.107 Of course, diplomacy is key to the job and it is in the EU’s interests that it has cordial relations with global actors of the calibre of the US and China. Moreover, and as alluded to above, there remains the question of whether some Member States will allow Ashton the autonomy to get on with the job in the way she sees fit.108

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101 Charlemagne’s Notebook, ‘The test for Ashton and Europe’, The Economist, 1st February 2011
102 YouTube, ‘Chief of EDA fails to deny that Ashton has never visited the EDA
103 Barber, T, p. 56, Op. Cit
104 Howorth, J, p. 315, ‘The New Faces’ of Lisbon
The biggest criticism so far regarding Van Rompuy’s position does not concern his competence, but that his potential to perform as a determining leader is constrained. In respect to his work, he appears to have managed his position well. Berlusconi, who once said Van Rompuy was a ‘weak second choice’, described the President’s performance to date as a success, in which Van Rompuy had displayed ‘wisdom and balance’. Although EU sceptic Nigel Farage described the newly appointed Van Rompuy as having the ‘charisma of a damp rag and appearance of a low-grade bank clerk’, there appears to be consensus that he has been quietly successful in a difficult period for Europe. He has developed cordial relations with much of the media, and acted soundly during the Greek crisis. Nonetheless, whether a Blair type character might have fulfilled the role better is debateable. Key, perhaps, is how a more dynamic character might have fared in the role of General Secretary to the Member States? The leaders of these establish foreign policy objectives consensually, and it is the job of Van Rompuy to negotiate that. As Kramer wonders, would the end results of this year’s European Council have been different if a more dynamic, visionary person had been appointed instead of Van Rompuy?

The debate regarding the quality of current post-holders, however, is not a barrier to the potential of the EU to appoint agenda-setters and initiators in the future. It is the claim of this thesis that future appointees, backed by Member States, are key to the EU’s ambitions to be a coherent global actor. But of course, one must expect EU Member States to gain the desire to ensure that, institutionally speaking, the remit of both positions is as Lisbon suggests. There is not a reason to assume, therefore, that future job-holders will always be of the same unassuming quality as Van Rompuy or hold the same inexperience as Ashton. Indeed, initially the desirability of candidates for the Political and Security Committee (PSC)

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110 Quoted in Ibid, p. 318
111 Farage, N, ‘Who is Herman Van Rompuy’?
112 Kramer, P, ‘Herman Van Rompuy, one year EU President’, European Business Review, 2nd December 2010
were a mixed-bag, but in recent years, PSC posts have been institutionalised as key posting, which has been contributory in advancing CFSP/CSDP (see (3.2.6)).

Merkel’s comments (above) that Ashton’s position needs to be ‘strengthened’ is indicative that at least to some of the larger members, the post of HR/VP is seen as holding more potential than it currently shows (the acknowledgement is there even if the will is yet to transpire). As such, if the EU’s foreign policy becomes more integrated and institutionalised and this is, of course, to be facilitated by good leadership by the President and HR/VP, other future appointees might further define the positions in the terms being discussed.

It might be suggested, then, that despite the inroads made by Lisbon into creating two posts that possess the potential to make Europe into a more forceful global actor, that some of the complexities of the intergovernmental order meant the EU had to make do with a likeable, unpretentious consensus-builder, and a slow-starting non-expert, that dwelt too much on consensus, and not enough on providing leadership. Neither of these characters was likely to oppose with great vigour, the elements of intergovernmentalism that remains within the EU decision-making process. The attempt to unify EU foreign policy, and overcome some of the former handicaps of pillar-2 by creating the two new posts has seen that very same pillar-2 mentality characterise their formation. This, of course, may suit Member States who may wish to retain supremacy in CFSP affairs, but it contradicts the Lisbon objective that the EU should be speaking with a single voice.

Recap: The Lisbon innovations and the new faces of the EU

This section set the ground with respect to the EU as a global actor post-Lisbon. The question answered regarded what can be said of the Lisbon innovations in terms of the type of toolbox they provide the EU?

The newly defined role of President of the European Council, which itself is now an institution and the role of HR/VP, show the EU in a new light. If nothing else, the former gives longevity (potentially 5-years) in strategy terms to the European Council, creating potential for the leader to set a long-term vision. A familiar European face heading the meetings of European leaders over such a long time must surely have a chance of promoting further integration and consensus within CFSP.

113 Howorth, J, p. 457, The EU as a Global Actor
115 Barber, T, p. 65, Op. Cit
Regarding the HR/VP, the new responsibilities, which are arguably *far too broad for a single person*, creates a sustainable framework from which to coordinate policy. It further says something about Member States in that it is some achievement that these institutional arrangements were agreed to, even if they were constrained by the type of person that would head it. It might be true that there were better people for the job, and the appointment of Ashton is arguably a consequence of the intergovernmentalism which still characterises CFSP thinking, but she is not lifetime appointee.

It is still hoped that Ashton and Van Rompuy will have more successes in further defining their roles, so future incumbents have hefty mandates from which to work towards. The last point was also made regarding the EEAS. If it cannot define itself properly now, while it is in its infancy, the danger inherent is that it creates a small mandate for further institutional development. This is important because the setting up of the EEAS does appear to be the smart innovation so far discussed. In fact, one might see the EEAS as *the* Lisbon innovation that takes the EU to a new level. Teething problems aside, it sets a permanent framework for policy initiative, which can speak on behalf of the EU as a whole concerning CFSP, thereby helping to unify a central EU position. The proposal looked at by (Davis) Cross, that having a central training body could better coordinate and ‘Europeanise’ diplomats recruited to the service, is an issue that deserves further attention. But it is agreed, that the setting up of bodies that can augment better inter-institutional arrangements, providing training in technical, diplomatic and international relations, is a step in the right direction.
SECTION 3 - TENSIONS BETWEEN NATIONAL AND FEDERAL/EUROPEANISING CSDP

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(3) Tensions between the national and federal

(RQ2) With respect to security and defence, to what extent do Member States define the EU as a global actor in the post-Lisbon period? How far can it be argued that power has shifted to Brussels? Are theoretical models useful in defining our understanding?

Introductory Comments

In the previous section, some of the institutional changes after the ratification of Lisbon were dealt with. These related to the forming of the EEAS, and the newly defined positions of President of the European Council and the HR/VP. These created frameworks from which the EU could further define itself. From a theoretical perspective, *institutionalising positions within structures* was argued as key to this.

It was also noted that although Lisbon made a difference to the EU regarding its ability to act globally, there remained an issue regarding that the EU is not identical to others. It is not a sovereign nation, and relies on seeking consensus with its Members, particularly in CFSP/CSDP. This might confuse inter-global relations, and in its worst case scenarios, handicap promoting EU agendas. It means priorities of governments could be an ingredient of the EU character. These could conflict with the EU’s overall foreign policy. If it cannot be shown the EU can get its act together, then the changes regarding CFSP discussed above would appear to be symbolic. It needs to be shown; therefore, to what degree the EU is hampered by its Members. One area in which the EU has been considered to be characterised by a difference of approach by Member States, is CSDP.\(^{116}\)

The first part of section-3 deals with defence from a Member State and EU perspective. This will be compared against other global actors. The global distribution of *military expenditure* is looked at, as is the *military capacities* of other players. This leads to a discussion on the EU as a military actor compared to its Members. Some of the main strategic obstacles to the EU are also considered.

In the second part, the bodies that deal with CSDP are looked at. These include the Commission/Council Secretariat Working Groups (CWGs); the European Union Military Committee (EUMC); the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM); the Political and Security Committee (PSC); Committee of Permanent Representatives

\(^{116}\) Formally ESDP
(COREPER) and the European Defence Agency (EDA). These will be theorised through Chekel’s fused model of constructivism, institutionalism and rational choice theory.

(3.1) Tensions between the national and federal: The case of defence

The ratification of Lisbon suggests that the EU’s toolbox has improved. Like any other global actor, the Union intends to internationally pursue a number of policies similarly to a sovereign state. According to Lisbon, it will work to cooperate in all areas of international relations, so that it will protect its values, interests, security, independence and integrity. It will promote democracy, international law and human rights. It intends to keep peace, allay conflicts and strengthen international security via the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and according to the Charter of Paris.

The EU is not, however, a sovereign power in the traditional sense. It is regional body consisting of a union of 27 Member States. It is difficult for many to decide on how to treat it in relation to other powerful actors. Unlike big states such as the US, China, Russia and India, it possesses no constitutional unity; is hampered by tensions between Members; does not possess a UN seat (see (6) and (7)) and does not have its own unique army (see (5)) and (7)). Regarding the latter of these, this would be enough for some to question that the EU could be considered equipped to be a successful long-term strategist against the biggest and best nations.

The EU is not militarily sterile, however, and possesses the Helsinki Force Catalogue, which is a pooling of a selection of some its Members’ military resources. It also possesses a new potential after Lisbon via the PSCD, which states Members with sufficient capabilities, have the possibility to establish permanent structured co-operation. (see (3.1.2, Ob. 4)) Nonetheless, the military backbones in the EU are the two-players that possess a nuclear deterrent; which are the UK and France. Arguably, it is these countries that will define the continent’s propensity to have reasonable military capabilities in the future.117

How seriously some take national defence is outlined markedly by spending. The UK and France are active spenders, accounting for 3.7% and 3.6% of total world expenditure. Germany and Italy are just below that level, and all 4 are amongst the world’s top-10 spenders.118 119

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118 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
For nationalists in places like the UK and France this not a problem at all. For integrationists, there could be a problem, at least if viewed from a realist perspective. The underlying assumption might be that a military defence capacity is a necessary ingredient for any power that can stand on its own two feet. Certainly it could be pointed out within the EU, exist 4 of the highest spenders on defence in the world. This indicates a potential for the EU in defence matters. Furthermore, at least in principle, the EU has access to NATO assets. It is similarly part of the NATO agreement, and could expect help from the US in a time of crisis (or perhaps not (see (7.2.4)). Moreover, if we take EU spending collectively, the figures take

119 The US heads the list of spenders, spending 43% of total global spending. China is in second place, spending 7% of total global spending (Ibid)
on new life, with Europeans spending 20% ($289bn) of global expenditure on their hard power capacity. This places it as second in the international order in spending terms. It dwarfs the next higher spender, China, by over 100%.\textsuperscript{121} 122

\textsuperscript{121} Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
\textsuperscript{122} Current spending is, of course, only one indicator of the potential of a nation or region to conduct itself in war. Russia is currently spending about 10% of that spent by the US. Nonetheless, Russia has spent considerably in the past. So much so, that it possesses considerably more active nuclear weapons than the US.
(3.1.1) Tensions between the national and federal: The ‘whole is weaker than the parts?’

The response outlined above, though, would be stretching the truth of the EU’s defence capabilities. Members’ resources are potentially the EU’s resources (if they agree to ‘catalogue’ them). But when the UK and France spend on their own military capacity, they do so because of the benefits they perceive will be felt nationally.

The above really begs the question as to whether we could then consider the EU as being a military weakling? Looked at through the lens of realism, and judged against some of its own Members, it is. The old cliché, ‘the whole is greater than the sum of its parts’, does
not seem to apply. The opposite appears true, and ‘the whole is \textit{weaker} than the sum of its parts’.

The assumption made by realism is that military strength, not liberal multilateralism, defines power relations in an anarchic world. Such an explanation is not absurd historically speaking. Two world wars and a scramble to colonise the global south did not occur in a world which was governed by binding laws, at least not laws that were followed. During the Cold War, moreover, and the threat of nuclear catastrophe, the idea of entering a period of proliferation held a defensive logic to it. It might not have been in the best interests of anyone to have a scramble for WMDs if this led to a nuclear war, but if X did the ‘moral’ thing and chose not to arm because of that, and Y, being entirely rational, did arm, then X was at a distinct strategic disadvantage. So of course, X (and Y) chose the rational proliferation path.

But the international order today seems \textit{comparatively} peaceful, and appears to be taking a more interconnected shape (see (4.3)). There are many international institutions backed by international law, through which affairs are governed. One of these, the UN, might not be the strong institution some desire, but it is more than the ill-fated League of Nations was. It is true threats exist, but these appear, as the ESS notes, not so much about the potential for nation-to-nation or World War, but to things like terrorism; regional conflicts; state failure and organised crime. Additionally, while the EU might be weak in defence terms, this is an area which is still the responsibility of NATO (see (7.2.4)).

It is not, then, as if Europe is defenceless, particularly when taking account of NATO and Members’ capacities. \textit{Wholesale} military superiority, then, is \textit{probably less} of a strategic advantage in Europe than it once was. The priority for the EU would not be a weapons scramble in order to pre-empt others, but would be combating the type of ‘smaller’ threats identified by the ESS (see (5.1) and (7)).

\textbf{(3.1.2) Tensions between the national and federal: On using its assets toolbox smartly}

The challenge for the EU, then, is not whether it can beat X or Y in a war. It is to use its human and institutional assets smartly (see also (5.1)). Lisbon shows a number of innovations made regarding this, including the EEAS, and the coordinating posts of President of the EU (see (2.2.4)) and the HR/VP (see (2.2.3)). It is still early days as to comment on the degree to

\footnote{123 European Security Strategy (ESS), pp. 3-4, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, 2003}
which these will redefine the EU. This is dependent on how all parties concerned are able to define themselves in relation to others (see (2.2.5)).

But in terms of the EU being militarily competent now, there is reason to suggest handicaps exist. From a positive European perspective, many below can be tackled by smart thinking, diplomacy, coordination and money. The last of these encompasses all of the obstacles, and is the EU’s biggest handicap of all.

**Obstacle 1 (Wasted resources)**
About half of Members’ expenditure relates to personal costs such civilian employees and military personnel (compared to a third in the US).\(^{124}\)

**Obstacle 2 (Using defence as an industry)**
The national character of spending on defence and security within the EU is particularly noticeable when one considers that a number of Member States use defence as an industry, or as a sector to stimulate employment.

**Obstacle 3 (Duplication of equipment or efforts)**
Duplication of efforts and equipment is a reoccurring criticism of the joint efforts of Members.\(^{125}\)\(^{126}\) Europe might collectively be the second highest spender on defence in the world, but this does not transpire into an economy of scale. Members are paying for 27-armies, 23-air forces, 19-navies and all the equipment entailed\(^{127}\) The EDA has made the issue of ‘pooling and sharing’ a priority. Initiatives such as *The European Armaments Cooperation* strategy is focussed entirely on promoting more effective armaments cooperation regarding CSDP capability needs.\(^{128}\)

**Obstacle 4 (Poor coordination/cooperation)**
The issue of how much Members are able to cooperate is a reoccurring theme. The British/German/Italian/Spanish project to make a Eurofighter (the A400M) ended up billions

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\(^{124}\) UPI, ‘Europe outlines defence spending gap’


\(^{126}\) As Quille points out (p. 68, Op. Cit), an informal meeting of defence ministers in Ghent (September 2010) tasked High Representative Ashton (as head of the EDA) to come up with strategies for member states to better pool their resources for ‘defence capability deployment’

\(^{127}\) Howorth, J, ‘Strategy and the Importance of Defence Cooperation among Member States’, Security Policy Brief, Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, September 2010

\(^{128}\) European Defence Agency, European Armaments Cooperation Strategy
above budget and delayed for years. In response to this, the EDA is currently working on a European Defence Research and Technology, which aims to enhance research and technology in regard of military capabilities.

Additionally, the EU’s military capacity is further to be addressed via the Lisbon innovation, and within the EDA, by PSCD. This envisions Members with sufficient capabilities have the possibility to establish permanent structured co-operation within an EU framework. Stronger members would co-operate and pool resources, defence equipment and research. They should have the potential to deploy combat units, and the infrastructure which is necessary for these. They will be qualified via the HR/VP and the Council, to carrying out the necessary ingredients of CSDP military missions, such as decommissioning, humanitarian responsibilities, rescue tasks, offering assistance, preventing conflicts and peacekeeping (see (5.1.5)).

Obstacle 5 (Differing national visions)
Members are still able to pursue conflicting foreign policy. This was seen when some joined the US-led invasion of Iraq, despite that others objected. This would signify some Members view their own foreign policy as important enough to trump a common position.

Differing national visions can also be detrimental to the EU’s commitment to multilateralism (see (4.2)). With regard the occupation of Iraq, for instance, that the US and its European allies failed to get a UN Security Council resolution does no favours for an organisation like the EU, which might still be seen by other global actors as being weak, and incapable of influencing its own Members into integrating their national policy, into EU policy (see (7.2.1/2)).

Obstacle 6 (Intergovernmentalism)
It seems fair to suggest all the above exist due to the fractious nature between larger Members and the EU, and the ability of some of these to steer EU policy away from further integration (perhaps due to a fear that a common position reduces their own policy autonomy).

129 Apps, P, ‘EU faces defence challenge as US looks to Asia’, Reuters 12th January 2012
130 European Defence Agency, ‘Strategies Overview’
(3.2) The Europeanisation of CSDP: intergovernmental/supranational tensions?

One of the challenges the EEAS faces, is being able to balance different intergovernmental CSDP structures within wider European foreign policy output. From an intergovernmental perspective, this might be a difficult task. Intergovernmentalism would predict that unless coerced, governments’ will give up what they think is in their interests, and not a thing more. Perhaps in hard power military terms, this is true. As just shown, the national spending of the larger Member States on their own defence, and the sometimes conflict in differing foreign policy approaches (e.g. Iraq), is indicative that some Members are more than happy for national security strategies to trump European ones.

One of the paradoxes of CSDP is that while it is administered and planned centrally, it has no military backbone without support of Members. From an intergovernmentalist perspective, no more is necessary to say. The argument would be that despite the Lisbon changes, and an important one of these was the demise of the pillar system, not much has changed in terms of the nationalist attitudes to defence. Decisions concerning CSDP are still taken by European Foreign Ministers, not in pillar-2, but in the FAC or by European leaders in the European Council.131 132 133 134

But it would be simplistic to propose, therefore, EU Foreign Ministers and leaders are the only ones driving policy output. As Howorth points out, much of the work regarding its direction takes place in bodies such as the EUMC, and CIVCOM. Experts in these formulate advice, and from that point bodies like the PSC and COREPER II turn that into the policy options the FAC and the European Council agree to follow.135 136

We can also add to the above, the many working groups (CWGs), of which a few hundred are in existence, in the Council Secretariat, the Commission and national capitals, which compliment the technical expertise of the EUMC, CIVCOM, PSC and COREPER.137 138 139

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131 FAC is headed by the HR/VP (currently Ashton)
132 In such an event, the HR/VP is key to coordinating military and civilian instruments
133 Quille, G, Op. Cit
134 Quille, G, Ibid, p. 66
136 EUMC is headed by the HR/VP (currently Ashton)
137 PSC is chaired by the EEAS (currently Olof Skoog)
138 COREPER is chaired by the Presidency of the European Union (currently Denmark)
139 Howorth, J, Op. Cit
140 Ibid, pp. 4-5
In fact, in older studies, commentators have estimated CWGs are responsible for between 70-80% of the decisions finally made at the end of the CSDP chain of command. \(^{141}\)

(3.2.1) The Europeanisation of CSDP: A very basic CSDP intergovernmental model

The staffing of all discussed above is arrived at through intergovernmental processes. At least a single representative is appointed from each Member within bodies that support the CSDP

structure. From an intergovernmentalist theoretical perspective, policy planning and recommendations might be made within EU institutions and the bodies that support them, but these cannot be viewed as separate from the governmental order that exists within the EU.

(3.2.2) The Europeanisation of CSDP: ‘Epistemic communities’

The EU as a global actor is enhanced by Lisbon innovations like the new EEAS and the appointments of the HR/VP and President of the European Council, but also lives under constraints of the integovernmentalist system. Regarding the latter, however, decision-making regarding taking actions in this realm is more complicated than being as a result of intergovernmental bargaining within the FAC or European Council. In fact the many bodies, beginning with the CWG’s (not shown on map) up to bodies like the EUMC and CIVCOM, and then onto the policy advisors in the PSC and COREPER, gives a more multi-layered flavour to policy output, even if the multi-layered aspects of it are initiated from capital cities.

(3.2.3) The Europeanisation of CSDP: Type-1 and Type-2 socialisation/internalisation

Intergovernmentalism exists in CSDP decision-making, and it would be forward to dispense with its effect on policy output. Nonetheless, much empirically derived literature, based on interviews with Member State representatives, points towards a process of European socialisation within the decision-making process, occurring in all of the bodies discussed above. Chekel’s model of socialisation is a synthesis of constructivism/institutionalism and rational choice theory, in which he focuses on the relations between Member States and European institutions. Institutional settings, he thinks, are extremely important when determining overall policy output.

Chekel distinguishes between Type-1 socialisation, and Type-2 internalisation. The first of these, it is claimed, occurs when actors go past ‘conscious strategic calculation’ to ‘role playing’ within an institution. Actors move to the second stage of the model, Type-2 internalisation, when they come to accept the collective ‘norms’ of the group as being the proper behaviour of the institution. There are two settings in which Chekel thinks the process is accelerated: (1) Actors should be in a setting in which they have long contracts; and (2) they should have much prior experience within other international institutional settings. Cross thinks similarly, suggesting shared attributes like expertise and culture could also be included with Chekel’s analysis.

© W.J. Callow, Aalborg, March 2012

143 List from Howorth, J, ‘Decision-making in European Security and Defence Policy’
145 Howorth, J, Op. Cit, pp. 6-7
146 Cross, M, Cooperation by Committee: the EU Military Committee and the Committee for Civilian Crisis Management Paris, EU-ISS, Occasional Paper 82, 2010
(3.2.4) The Europeanisation of CSDP: Institutionalising behaviour in CWGs

Studies have focused on this phenomenon at different levels. These include Wessels, who looked at the proportion of decisions adopted as policy that were made at the beginning of the chain, within the Council Secretariat and Commission CWGs. Wessels’ study claims 80%, and the Hayes-Renshaw/Wallace one, suggests 70% of all final decisions could be traced to these bodies. In Beyers’ study, it is suggested that CWG agents go beyond defence of National or European interests, employing behaviour similar to Chekel’s Type-1 model. Interestingly, Beyers’ view is that domestic factors, rather than European ones, affect positively the adoption of supranational role conceptions.

Howorth points to his research regarding the Committee on the Western Balkans (COWEB). In interviews with officials, he confirms the existence of a desire for actors to work together for common solutions. As Howorth implies, this could be due to familiarity, with meetings taking place up to 5-times weekly.

(3.2.5) The Europeanisation of CSDP: Institutionalising behaviour in the EUMC and CIVCOM (technical advisors)

Moving up the chain to Cross’ research on the EUMC and CIVCOM (the civilian equivalent of EUMC), a similar result is seen. Cross argues that common expertise, culture and professional values contribute to getting past any impediments to a common position that stem from Members States. She notes that the EUMC is better able than CIVCOM to reach compromise. CIVCOM, which is the newer innovation, has a larger reliance on domestic structures, and has less opportunity for members to meet informally. Nonetheless, both, she finds, are ‘embedded’ in a complicated structure between Member States and the EU, and

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149 Howorth, p. 6, ‘Decision-making in European Security and Defence Policy’
151 Ibid
152 Howorth, pp. 7-8, ‘Decision-making in European Security and Defence Policy’
153 EUMC composed of EU Chiefs of Defence
154 Cross, M, p. 37, ‘Cooperation by Committee’
both emphasise resolving obstacles that exist to a common approach.\textsuperscript{155} Again, this behaviour seems to correspond to Chekel’s Type-1 model, in that the actors go beyond ‘conscious instrumental calculation’ (in nationalist terms) towards ‘conscious role playing’. The agents concerned would not qualify as Type-2 candidates, be that from an intergovernmental or European perspective, because they have not adopted wholesale either set of values, to the detriment of the other side’s.

\textbf{(3.2.6) The Europeanisation of CSDP: Institutionalising behaviour in the COREPER II\textsuperscript{156} and PSC\textsuperscript{157} (policy advisors)}

In terms of authority, the COREPER II\textsuperscript{158} and PSC\textsuperscript{159} are nearer to the end of the chain of command than the bodies discussed above. Both are able to formulate the advice and technical expertise that the FAC and the Council might adopt. With regard COREPER, Lewis’ studies conclude that the distinction between the European and the National is blurred. COREPER officials were likely to take care to convince governments of the benefits of any consensus reached. Lewis claims officials in this body adopted an adherence to ‘norm-guided rules’ and collective decision-making. The group would even go so far as to adopt joint arguments to use to their capitals in order to make the case for a collective position.\textsuperscript{160} This appears to go beyond Chekel’s Type-1 model, towards Type-2,\textsuperscript{161} when the collective ‘norms’ of the group become the proper behaviour of the institution. Lewis describes this as behaviour based on the ‘logic of appropriateness’. National identity is not replaced, but it is subsumed within a system that has validated the decision-making process within the institution.\textsuperscript{162}

Cross broadly agrees with the above, adding a further four features that bind COREPER members into an epistemic community. To begin with, ambassadors are often homogeneous, sharing similar social and educational backgrounds. Typically they are

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid
\textsuperscript{156} COREPER II made up of Heads of Mission from Member States
\textsuperscript{157} The PSC consists of Ambassadorial level representatives from the EU member states
\textsuperscript{158} Chaired by the Presidency of the Council of the EU (currently Denmark)
\textsuperscript{159} Chaired by an EEAS official (currently Olaf Skoog)
\textsuperscript{161} Howorth, p. 16, ‘Decision-making in European Security and Defence Policy’
\textsuperscript{162} Lewis, J, p. 963, Op. Cit
\end{flushright}
recruited from Europe’s top universities and undergo similar training programmes.\textsuperscript{163} Secondly, because formal meetings do not give enough time for all to have their voices heard, informal meetings are common. They develop ‘shared professional norms’, and have adopted a professional approach in terms of the product they deliver up the chain of command (often negotiating with the CWGs below them).\textsuperscript{164} Thirdly, they possess a common culture and mutual solidarity, and are committed to furthering European integration.\textsuperscript{165} Lastly, one of the primary ways in which they try to influence policy, is by persuading their capitals of their policy aims.\textsuperscript{166} In interviews, COREPER officials ranked that negotiating with their governments was as common as negotiating amongst themselves.\textsuperscript{167}

Juncos and Reynolds’ study takes seriously the notion that the PSC effectively acts in a governance role. There is also, they claim, a parallel between better policy output in CSDP, and the creation of the PSC as a functioning body. This is seen markedly given that Member States appoint high-level diplomats to the service, and leave them there for long periods. Again, the notion of informality and norm acceptance plays a key role to the institutionalisation of the decision-making process in PSC.\textsuperscript{168}

In agreement, Howorth’s research notes the homogeneity of the PSC ambassadors. All have degrees in Political Science, History or Law. Many have postgraduate qualifications in the same subjects. All are fluent in English and French, and all declare an attachment to a European identity. The majority (90\%) believe CSDP is hugely important in the construction of European identity. The ambassadors felt they were representing Member States, but none felt this was incompatible with representing European interests. Lastly, and in terms of the role they perceived themselves as playing, only one third felt they were employed in ‘rational bargaining’, with two thirds stating they were engaged in ‘cooperative […] consensus seeking’.\textsuperscript{169}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\begin{itemize}
\item Cross, M, pp. 88-89, \textit{Security Integration in the European Union}
\item Ibid
\item Ibid
\item Ibid
\item Ibid
\item Ibid
\item Howorth, p. 22, ‘Decision-making in European Security and Defence Policy’
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
(3.2.7) The Europeanisation of CSDP: On drawing distinctions between intergovernmentalism and institutional supranational practices

Specifically in terms of the EU in defence matters, it would be pushing things to suggest that the institutionalisation of many key areas in the decision-making process made the EU resemble a federal, rather than intergovernmental body. But the reverse is also true, using intergovernmentalism as an explanation for what the EU is as a CSDP actor, would not describe the realities. There is a movement towards ‘consensus-seeking’ throughout the chain of command, much of which appears to suit Cherkel’s Type-1 socialisation model.

The argument, then, that Lisbon does not erode the intergovernmentalism that has dominated CSDP (and CFSP) since it was placed in pillar-2 at Maastricht, is to a large degree a ‘red herring’. It is true that pillar-2 issues with regards to CSDP are dealt with now by intergovernmental bodies like the FAC and the European Council, but the intergovernmental character of CFSP/CSDP has gradually subsided anyway, as the bodies tasked with formulating policy recommendations have taken on supranational characteristics. This is not to say national governments are not powerful actors. The fact some of the above see themselves as negotiators with their states indicates national agendas remain influential in shaping policy output. But on the other hand, the complicated relationship between government appointees acting as researchers, technical advisors, scientific experts and policy advisors that work in European, not national, institutional environments, lends a more supranational flavour to an intergovernmental process.

(3.2.8) The Europeanisation of CSDP: The European Defence Agency (EDA): unadulterated intergovernmentalism?

Even intergovernmental agencies are comprised of various actors, including government appointees, acting as researchers, technical advisors, scientific expert, and policy advisors. It was suggested this resembles a ‘melting pot’ of interests and motives, and that the end product creates, at least to a degree, a Europeanisation of intergovernmental CSDP agencies.

But one further body does not entirely follow the model of institutionalisation discussed above. The EDA is made up of Defence Ministers of Member States (headed by the HR/VP). Its remit is to assist Members and the Council in attempts to improve EU defence capacity, particularly in crisis management, and in maintaining and developing CSDP. The EDA claims it is a ‘catalyst [that] promotes collaborations, launches new initiatives and
introduces solutions to improve defence capabilities’. But it notes it will only achieve this if Members decide to deliver these capabilities (see (3.1.2, Ob. 4)).

The four functions of the EDA are: (1) to develop defence capabilities; (2) to promote defence research and technology (R&T); (3) to promote armaments co-operation; and (4) to create a competitive European defence equipment market and to support the European defence, technological and industrial base. 170

The EDA differs from most EU agencies in that only Defence Ministers and a representative of the Commission (without voting rights) sit at Steering Boards. This makes these affairs distinctly intergovernmental procedures. Additionally, and again as opposed to other agencies, directors appointed to the agency are not made by the Commission. In this case, a Chief Executive and two deputies are appointed by Member States’ Defence Ministers in conjunction with the HR/VP. This, thinks Bátora, gives the agency a degree of authority that is rarely seen in other bodies, making it fully dependent on its Members to support enterprises. 171

(3.2.9) The Europeanisation of CSDP: A stepping stone to further integration?

According to Bátora, the tension between Europeanisation of defence versus the role NATO creates a ‘tension of logics’ (see (7.2.4 on thinking outside the NATO box)). Until the EDA embraces either to the detriment of the other, Member States will, he thinks, continue to define themselves based on party-political attachments to either European or Euro-Atlanticist logic. 172 Bátora’s analysis generates an interesting conclusion. It is claimed that due to the EDA’s intergovernmental character, it might have a short future, and could be a stepping stone to further integration of EU defence. A feasible upgrade could, as outlined by Howorth, mean that sitting alongside an upgraded EDA could be something like a European Security Council, which would be a type of formal institution of Defence Ministers with a White Book on security and defence issues; an integrated intelligence agency, and its own permanent operational headquarters. 173

Secondly, and although perhaps not quite yet up to Level-1 of Chekel’s model, the rules and norms set up by the agency to bring about better military coordination of Member

170 The European Defence Agency, ‘Missions and Functions’
172 Ibid
173 Howorth, J, SPB, p. 3
States, particularly regarding liberalisation of defence procurement, indicates the beginnings of a socialisation among these, and potentially the possibility of a ‘transcendence’ of the intergovernmental character of this agency.\textsuperscript{174}

Howorth’s research on this also seems to signify at least some type of socialisation process. In discussions with the CEO of the agency, Nick White, White reports a distinct ‘supranational spirit’, with staff being committed to the EU, and unwilling to be used by their capitals as ‘inside agents’ in Europe. Nonetheless, he \textit{bitterly} notes while a ‘European answer’ was often sought, that whenever there was a need for anyone to \textit{do} anything or \textit{pay} for anything, nationalism ‘was unashamedly at the fore’.\textsuperscript{175}

\textbf{(3.2.9.1) The Europeanisation of CSDP: A quick note on the EEAS}

In the previous section the discussion touched on the EEAS regarding its potential to nurture an \textit{esprit de corps} (see (2.1.4)). It was stated it is early days, and was difficult to ascertain the extent to which this mentality will pervade the service. One of the methods Cross thought would help produce this was by introducing a \textit{European Diplomatic Academy} (see (2.1.6)), in which EEAS diplomats are trained to maximise their potential to represent the community. It was suggested such an idea was a good one. But even without it, the evidence appears to

\textsuperscript{174} Batora, J, p. Op. Cit

\textsuperscript{175} Howorth, p. 13, ‘Decision-making in European Security and Defence Policy’
imply that the chances of the EEAS gaining a touch of *esprit de corps* are good. It is hard to predict the future, so the point will not be laboured. But that National and European values could sit well with appointed agents in the bodies discussed, is encouraging (or not, if one is a nationalist). It would not be a leap of the imagination, therefore, to ‘guess’ that a similar institutional pattern will occur in the EEAS.

**Recap: Tensions between the national and federal and the Europeanisation of CSDP**

In the previous section, the discussion related to some of the institutional changes after the ratification of Lisbon. These noted the forming of the EEAS, and the newly defined positions of President of the European Council and the HR/VP. It was suggested these created frameworks from which the EU could further define itself. It was argued that from a theoretical perspective, institutionalising positions within structures is vital. With respect to security and defence, it was contended that the EU still possesses handicaps which might constrain its ability to act. The intergovernmental aspects of CFSP/CSDP thus constituted the groundwork for this section. The questions asked at the beginning of this were: *With respect to security and defence, to what extent do Member States define the EU as a global actor in the post-Lisbon period? How far can it be argued that power has shifted to Brussels? Are theoretical models useful in defining our understanding?*

It could *firstly* be noted that Member States do help define the EU position, or even lack thereof, on security and defence. As far as being considered a serious military actor in international terms, the EU lacks the military toolbox and consensus in order to be equated even with some of its own Member States. It was argued this is not necessarily a handicap, and military superiority is less advantageous strategically speaking in Europe, than previously. The threats facing the EU come from issues like terrorism; regional conflicts; state failures and organised crime. But Member States still thwart the EU in its ability to use the military toolbox that it has, smartly. Some of the obstacles to it were noted, including wasting resources; using defence as an industry; duplicating efforts and equipment; poor coordination and potentially damaging differing national visions. It was suggested these could be lumped together and defined by the intergovernmental characteristics at play in CSDP. But under the supervision of the EDA, if Member States can get their act together, much can be achieved. One Lisbon innovation worth noting is the EU’s capability is enhanced via the PSCD. This envisions that militarily strong Members have the possibility to
establish together permanent structured co-operation. For it to work, those qualified to join must take advantage of framework.

Secondly, the extent to which power has shifted to Brussels was partly answered in Section-2. The HR/VP, as head of the FAC, the EDA and the ESS, and with the EEAS behind her, has a role in integrating CSDP. In fact, and with regard the PSC, meetings of these are chaired by an EEA official. Similarly, the permanent President of the EU, sits at the end of the decision-making chain regarding taking CSDP actions.

Despite the above, it was noted that the agencies dealing with CSDP, beginning with the CWGs, onto the experts at EUMC and CIVCOM, and to the policy advisors at the PSC and COREPER, were characterised by intergovernmentalism. The same applies to the two end chain outfits, the FAC and European Council. Intergovernmentalism does play a part in the policy process. However, there are signs that staff in agencies do identify with the EU as well as with their capitals, and there appears to be consensus seeking within these institutions. This seems to go beyond normal diplomacy towards integrating further a community ideal. It is no longer suitable, then, to use an intergovernmental model to describe what occurs. Even with the EDA, there seems evidence that further EU integration is considered by many actors as a desirable state of affairs, and this is worked for, even if it is not always achieved.

Lastly, it was suggested that this phenomenon could be understood theoretically by applying a model that synthesises (1) constructivism; (2) institutionalism; and (3) rational choice theory. With regard the first of these, actors would have gone past acting as conscious strategists for their Member States to also adopting a ‘role’ within the organisation they inhabit. It was suggested that a homogeneous group of actors, with shared attributes and long contracts, would be bound to ‘go native’ to a degree. Concerning the second, the existence of bodies with their shared norms would, arguably, structure political outcomes. As was pointed out, national identity is not normally lost in these, but it is subsumed within institutions that have legitimised the decision-making process. Finally, and concerning the last of these theoretical inputs, the evidence discussed indicates actors were not wholly integrated in either Nationalist or European camps. The use of diplomacy, informality, and in seeking consensus with Member States and actors in their European agencies, signifies people rationalise carefully at times, the conflicting positions they are in. Actors are socialised within two camps, and these can sometimes have separate and conflicting view on the right way to go about things. This requires actors to exhibit careful deliberation and diplomacy across the board, in order to achieve suitable outcomes.
SECTION 4 - THE GEO-LEGAL/POLITICAL/INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

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(4) The geo-political/legal and institutional context (international law and complex interdependence)

(RQ3a). Post-Lisbon, is the EU’s toolbox sufficient so that it can strategise effectively in the current geo-legal context? How beneficial is it that the EU integrates further into this world? Does it legitimise the EU as a global actor?

Introductory Comments

Previously some practical/theoretical elements of the post-Lisbon EU were discussed. A handicap noted was the intergovernmentalism characterising policy. But as was shown, this is not ‘terminal’, and it is argued the EU can still achieve much using the toolbox it possesses.

In the following 3-sections (4-6), the focus shifts to the EU as a strategist within a geo-legal/political/institutional context. In this section, the EU’s as a legal actor is considered, and the extent to which this is a launch-pad from which the EU can achieve the normative ends Lisbon indicates. After that, the extent to which the EU and others are embedded within a series of inter-institutional interdependencies is deliberated on. This will be contrasted with a traditional realist view of IR.

The discussion is continued in section-5, but this time to understanding the EU in military terms. The soft/hard power distinction is reflected on, and the degree to which this reflects on the image of the EU as a civilian power. Some CSDP missions are looked at, and it will be asked which types of theoretical models can be applied to these.

Lastly, in section-6, the EU’s actions as a strategist in inter-institutional settings are measured. This will be related to the competences it holds in international organisations. There will also be comments made regarding the desirability of the EU in partnership terms, made from the perspective of citizens of the world’s leading states.

(4.1) The EU and the rise of the rest: Operating from a zone of peace

For a short period of time, the international order has been dominated militarily by one nation. The end of the Cold War, and of a period of global tension, left the US as the only hegemonic force (see (3.1)). Quite recently commentators began to discuss the emergence of

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John Callow, Section-4, The geo-political/legal/institutional context (international law/complex interdependence)

...a new type of global order. Most do not doubt the US will remain a key player; if not the key player, but an emerging consensus suggests things will be different now. This might mean the world is about to enter a bipolar period, with the US and China jostling for number-1 spot, or even colluding to remain the only (regional) hegemons.177 Others suggest the emergence of a multipolar world; with at least 3-great powers.178 A third opinion suggests an interpolar period, in which global interdependence in trade and security, means all poles see the benefits of obeying the ‘rules of the game’ (see (7.1)).179 Regardless of which (if any) are correct, the feeling appears to be that change is afoot; that the relative calm that we have felt, at least in Europe, is under threat.

It is probably fair to say that US hegemony has been to Europe’s advantage in security terms. It is doubtful that had the US not ratified The North Atlantic Treaty, which created NATO, and had taken an isolationist approach to international relations, that westward expansion of the Soviet Union would not have been more of a worry for the Europeans. In fact, the ESS credits the US and NATO with providing a ‘critical role in European integration’, establishing a zone of peace, which is conducive to legal, political and economic integration 180 The Cold War is over, and Europeans no longer worry about the ideological struggle that divided East and West, but are concerned about their economic future, and, to a lesser degree, security issues like border control and the ‘war on terror’.181

(4.1.1) The EU and the rise of the rest: The deterritorialisation of world affairs (exporting the EU model?)

According to much IR literature, relations between nations are more complicated than who possess the best military. In the last section it was suggested that while military superiority was advantageous for some in the Cold-War period, it had ceased to be so beneficial after that (see (3.1.1)). This view holds even for those that are sympathetic to the main tenets of realism. Keohane and Nye, for example, described an emerging world in 1977 as one of complex interdependence (CI), which is a world characterised not just by military superiority, but also by a range of complex relations and common interests across territories.182

181 The European Commission, The European Citizens and the Future of Europe: A Qualitative Study, pp. 7-8
According to them, while realism has its structural place, it is often an inadequate mode of explanation to analyse the ‘politics of interdependence’, such as regarding the array of international organisations which often act as centrepieces for nation-to-nation relations.

A glance at the international order shows that from the post-war period, an accumulation of institutions, such as the UN, WB, IMF, WTO, G8/20 and a host of regional unions have accumulated legal powers. Rodrik claims this is the start of the emergence of a ‘global federalism’, and the alignment of world markets with international politics, which incorporate globally recognised rules and regulations. National governments do not disappear in Rodrik’s future, but ‘their powers are circumscribed’. One of the early examples and models Rodrik sees for this global federalism, is the EU.

To be critical of the above, it could be said the EU is hardly a perfect model. A series of economic crises in have probably affected just how integrated some Europeans would like to be. Are, for example, the Germans responsible for the economic future of Greece? The disinterest of many European citizens in the EU, moreover, and their lack of knowledge related to basic institutions, suggests that the EU has work to do to broaden its appeal, even within its own borders, before it can congratulate itself as being an ideal model to emulate.

But without overinflating EU pride, the model in terms of its commitment to multilateralism and supporting the institutions that govern relations between others is a great peace-time accomplishment and, perhaps, the type of model that really could be cautiously exported globally. The example above of popular discontent regarding Germans (and others) paying for the Greek mismanagement of their economy, can be tempered with the observation that Members understood precisely that Greece could not be ‘hung out to dry’. The last thing Europe needs is for a Member to go bankrupt. This would be a catastrophe, not only economically speaking, but socially and politically too.

It is controversial to suggest that the EU model could be emulated internationally. But the assertion is not made in moral terms; as if Europe is superior to the rest. It is a political statement, and despite the faults of the Union, its cosmopolitan character is one that has largely superseded petty nationalism, and has created a framework in which violence between once competing states has vanished.

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183 Ibid, p. 77
185 Ibid, p. 182
186 Ibid
Since the mid-1950s, the continent has set up an example of how once disparate nations can work together and contribute for a continent’s good, rather than merely their own good. In fact, and according to the rhetoric of Lisbon, the EU is now probably meant to be emulated abroad. It has gone beyond a European arrangement meant to create an arena in which States peacefully coexist and trade freely with one another. The EU’s actions on the international scene are to be guided by the same principles that stimulated its own creation, development and enlargement. It seeks to promote abroad some of the bedrocks of EU integration, be that human rights, fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the UN Charter and international law.\footnote{Lisbon, Article 21 (1)}
(4.1.2) The EU and the rise of the rest: On facing threats on a multilateral basis

There does appear to be the potential and legal framework for different national and regional bodies to co-exist in an economic liberal global order without resorting to war.\(^{188}\) There is, after all, nothing innately special about Europe and Europeans. Europe’s past has as much conflict and bloodshed in it as anyone else’s. So if Europe can manage to set aside the past, and bind nations together through supranational institutions and law, so can the world.

It has been noted that the world of today has a different ingredient compared to the one of some years ago. That is, it has moved to one of interconnectedness, and regulations play a part in governing these. Rodrik’s model suggests this is due to the alignment of world markets with international politics. Grevi similarly suggests an emerging world in which legal and institutional interconnections bind actors together. The potential of this world to allay conflict, he thinks, is great.\(^{189}\) In today’s world, it does appear trade, not war, is the entity which glues states to one another. In the post-Cold War era, there has been a decline of 60% in the number of armed conflicts between nations, with reductions throughout the 1990s and 2000s.\(^{190}\) The post-Cold War environment, claims the ESS, is one of open borders; flows of trade and investment; technology development and growth of democracy. The security threats to these are not wars, but are terrorism; proliferation of WMD; regional conflicts; state failure and organised crime.\(^{191}\)

(4.2) The use of international law and treaties (the case of a non-proliferation regime)

As was just clarified, there are signs that the global space is becoming increasingly regulated. As the largest and most integrated regional political body, the EU is not a stranger to promoting and obeying the types of principles which forge development through common law. Article 21 (1) of Lisbon specifies exactly that the EU desires this regional state of affairs is carried over into the international realm, with attention paid to promoting a range of universal goods under the rule of international law.

\(^{188}\) Grevi (Op. Cit) suggests that interpolarity and the global interconnectedness of all policy areas will constrain multipolarity and the potential for aggressive actions by competing states, leading to more co-operation and multilateralism in global governance. As such, there is the potential for ‘opposing’ actors to compliment one another rather than just be competitors


\(^{190}\) CSP, Global Conflict Trends

\(^{191}\) European Security Strategy, pp. 3-4, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’
It should be reiterated that the EU sees global integration and respect for international law as vital components from which to promote its agenda. As the ESS states, it is through global institutions that common problems can be tackled.\textsuperscript{192} In this sense, the EU as a global agenda-setter is apparent, with it showing willingness to progress supranationalist structures. European integration itself, at least in part, came about because of a desire to anchor Germany, and to keep it from taking violent action against its European neighbours. The Community’s early remit was to recognise there is strength in unity with others, and that pursuit of regional objectives necessitated this course of action.

International regulations are increasingly relevant in the modern world. Incidents such as the legal arguments regarding the Iraq War, for example, and the formation of the International Criminal Court, show the connection between international politics and international law.\textsuperscript{193} They show governance in global rather than regional or just national terms. Similarly, the EU’s commitment with others to non-proliferation, an urgent problem of our time,\textsuperscript{194} illustrates what the EU brings as a multilateral partner, with the Council of Ministers suggesting only international treaties will suffice to effectively implement a globally recognised non-proliferation regime.\textsuperscript{195,196} Of course, a non-proliferation regime is not merely to concentrate on rogue states potentially possessing nuclear WMDs. Terrorist organisations, which are one of the main worries of the ESS report, could do much damage should they get hold of biological or chemical weapons. The Aum sect in Japan, for instance, gained access to Sarin gas in 1995, killing a dozen people and injuring thousands in the Tokyo underground. Previously it had sprayed Anthrax in a Tokyo suburb.\textsuperscript{197} The terrorist bombings in the mid-2000s in Spain and England also demonstrate the challenge of adopting a WMD strategy that understands the risks posed by non-state actors. In the post-911 world, a more terrifying development would be for an international terrorist group to gain access to nuclear material, and to discover the knowledge of how to use it.

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid, p. 1
\textsuperscript{193} Armstrong, D, Farrell, T, Lambert, H, \textit{International Law and International Relations},
\textsuperscript{195} The Council of the European Union
\textsuperscript{196} Meier of the Arms Control Association claims that as a strategy, the EU’s ability to grow as an international actor in terms of its approach to non-proliferation depends on it developing a reduction of nuclear deterrence as a mode of security as well as undertaking joint arms controls with Russia and the US (Meier, O, ‘The EU’s Nonproliferation Efforts: Limited Success’, May 2008)
(4.2.1) The use of international law and treaties: The EU’s strategy on non-proliferation

The EU WMD strategy consists of three principles: (1) effective multilateralism; (2) prevention; and (3) cooperation. According to it, WMDs are an international security risk, not just a regional or national one. The EU acknowledges the various laws and treaties that contribute to a non-proliferation regime. It supports the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The NPT is a mainstay of the international response to proliferation, and the EU has highlighted the importance of strengthening it. For over a quarter of a decade, the EU Commission (formally EC) has been collaborating with the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) to effect safeguards against proliferation by attempting to ensure nuclear material and technology do not get into the ‘wrong’ hands. The EU has further bettered Member States’ harmonisation of the NPT by implementing a common position. It has also adopted the UN Security Council’s Resolution-1540, which acts as the first international instrument dealing in an integrated manner with WMDs. In order to assist other countries in implementing Resolution-1540, circa €1bn has been contributed to the G8 Global Partnership Programme, which takes part in the work of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

Recently, the European Council, headed by Ashton, expressed a ‘common position’ for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. This prioritises eliminating all non-strategic nuclear weapons. It seeks a universal CTBT ratification and a lawful suspension on global production and distribution of fissile material.

(4.2.2) The use of international law and treaties: The EEAS and non-proliferation

In 2006, the Council approved a ‘concept paper’ with a strategy to keep abreast of a reliable application of the EU WMD Strategy. After the Lisbon ratification, the uniformity of EU

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201 Remarks by the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, at the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit
action in this area is guaranteed by the EEAS. A syndicate of non-proliferation Think Tanks was established in 2010 to augment academic guidance and advice to the EEAS. 

(4.3) Complex Interdependence: More on non-proliferation

The role of the treaties/laws of international organisations is a central tenet of the way the EU operates. Although this thesis does not dismiss the influential role played by the strongest in affecting international law, it does not suggest it is only these that set the legal agenda from which IR is conducted. International organisations, and those that operate collectively through them, also define issues (see (4.3.1)).

Using Keohane and Nye’s synthesis of realism and liberal institutionalism, CI argues that IR between states have been transformed to be characterised by increasing political, economic and even cultural exchanges across territories, with a decline in the use of military force as a solution to settle disputes (see also (3.1.1)). The view that politics is a complex affair with numerous interconnected players is hardly a new one, but the framework used by Keohane and Nye possesses explanatory power. It draws attention away from the anarchic aspects of the international order, in which players are involved in zero-sum games, to one that also focuses on the interdependencies which are often intermediated on in international organisations. These supply a common legal framework under which states operate. From an EU perspective, this bodes well, given the prominence afforded to the importance of the politics of integration and law. Assuming CI is correct, this would make the potential for diplomatic power as a mechanism to get one’s way, manifold. To set the EU into this context, and to study where it fits in as a global actor, then, would be to study the

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202 EEAS, ‘The fight against proliferation of WMD’
203 The notion of complex interdependence can perhaps be carried a step further. The use of channels of communication between national, regional and global institutions, has multiplied considerably in just a decade. The emergence of modern modes of communication such as Blogging, Facebook and YouTube can now be used to broadcast, for good or ill, to potentially billions of global citizens, giving anyone, even in some of the least advantaged regions in the world, the opportunity to comment on, or tackle, all the issues of the day. In fact, from an EU perspective, all the institutions of the EU are using these ‘soft power’ modes of communication to influence regional, and indeed global, audiences. The history and future strategies of the EU’s institutions can be found at YouTube, all of which have been uploaded by the corresponding institution. On Facebook, moreover, one can subscribe to updates from the Commission, the Parliament, the European Council, and Council of Ministers. From the entire perspective of CFSP, the EEAS also has its own page, as does the president of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy. With the exception of the European Council’s page (and rather lacklustre effort), and the complete lack of a site specific to Ashton as the HR/VP, these are not just about policy updates, but seek to gauge public opinion and reaction on various regional and global topics that any of the above could in theory be involved in.
205 Nye, J, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics
types of inter-institutional relations it possesses and the way that it, or even to a degree the way its Members collectively, act within global institutions (see (6)). This would be opposed to studying the EU in military terms. As already discussed, the EU is not a military weakling when allowances are made for the partnership it has with NATO, and when including the capacities of some Members. But it would be wrong to claim that the EU is a global power simply because of its military capacities (see (3.1)).

(4.3.1) Complex interdependence: Empowering the weak (the case of the UN)?

The most stark difference between a theory such as CI and a realist theory, is that the weak in a globally interconnected world might sometimes be empowered, rather than always disempowered. For example, a small nation might have the same voting rights in the UN or the WTO as a much larger, more powerful nation. The consequence of this is that the small can influence events, and a stronger actor can be subjugated by this (a David and Goliath situation). The attempt by the EU to enhance its status at the UN in 2010, for example, had to be initially abandoned, not because strong nations ‘ganged up’ on it, but because a coalition of nations from the developing world (Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean) opposed an upgrade in the EU status. It took negotiation and the setting up of a consultation body before the EU could convince otherwise weaker nations, that it might be in their interests to accept an improvement in EU modalities (see (6.1)).

This would seem at odds with the realist view that these weak players should be dominated. It would also explain how actors can pursue good ends via international governance, and achieve those, even if it is not in the interests of the most powerful for those ends to be met. Environmental treaties; landmine treaties; nuclear test ban treaties and others, all might hamper the interests of the largest players, yet, under some circumstances, the strongest do agree to international pressure to sign legal documents which act to constrain future actions.

Whether one is sympathetic to the main tenets of realism, constructivism or liberalism in terms of IR, it can still be accepted that globalisation has changed the relations that states have with one another. Whether this has led to weaker states using international governance in defence terms; as a mechanism to pool their common interests in order to survive against bigger states, or whether the new order arose gradually; and as the consequence of the

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absorption of the types of liberal norms and values which characterise international organisations like the UN; or whether it is just a consequence of game-players calculating more can be gained by adopting relationships with others, is perhaps beside the point.

(4.3.2) Complex interdependence: Institutionalising interests?

But to take an institutionalist/constructivist interpretation one step further, if we assume a state’s or regional body’s interests are not fixed over a longer period of time, but that they develop in response to various factors, it seems likely that future interests are dependent on how players are able to interact and construct together, the international landscape. The further that multilateralism becomes a legal factor, the more global actors are likely to seek to find solutions to challenges within that institutional order. The same issue was touched on in the previous section, where it was shown that nationally appointed actors in defence agencies very often took on a number of European characteristics, which led to them going beyond fighting for national interests, to them fighting for European interests too (see (3.2)).

If the EU can be one of the main multilateral actors, the chances are that it will be able to pursue some aspects of its own normative agenda. One advantage it possesses as a global actor is that it has already committed itself to multilateralism, through international law and through institutions like the UN. Add to that the EU’s excellent record in terms of forging integration on a whole region, and the Lisbon innovations discussed (see (2)), would indicate that the EU is primed to be a ‘mover and shaker’ in helping to promote future global legal integration.

(4.3.3) Complex interdependence: Liberal internationalism (legitimising multilateral actions)

Liberal internationalism, as a doctrine of foreign policy, often gets a bad press. It might be seen as being primarily about ‘passivity, acquiescence and anti-interventionism’.207 The truth is far from this, and while internationalists should be against using force as a foreign policy instrument for national interests, they ought not to resist it order to achieve good ends, such as in order to promote humanitarian intervention. Indeed, as Krauthammer points out, the liberal Clinton administration was (almost) ‘hyperinterventionist’ so eager was it to intervene

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207 Krauthammer, C, ‘Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World, November 20th 2004
as a peacemaker in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia and Haiti. \textsuperscript{208} A quick glance at Lisbon reiterates a similar mentality for the EU, with its actions on the international scene to be guided by advancing democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms, principles of equality and solidarity; all legitimised by the commonly approved principles of the UN Charter and international law. \textsuperscript{209}

The majority of the EU’s military and peacekeeping operations during the past decade (24 in total since 2003), have been characterised by these values, and were undertaken after due care and attention was paid to the various conventions, protocols and legal structures of the international order. One reason why the US led invasion of Iraq has proved so costly an exercise for the US, and indeed for Member States like the UK, Poland and Denmark, is that there was no permission granted by the UN’s Security Council. Even if it is true that a regime change was urgently needed, the Iraq invasion lacked international legitimacy.

Whether or not a conflict is driven by national interest is probably a moot point (different actors in the same organisations presumably have different motivations). But what is important is that the EU, and its Members when acting independently, seek international approval before applying a military solution to a problem. This attention to diplomacy is what should separate EU foreign policy output from the more aggressive foreign and domestic policy output of any regime it might intend to help topple.

(4.3.4) Complex interdependence: Multiple channels of communication and the case of Iran

Since 2003, global players have held recurrent talks with Iran regarding its nuclear programme. This procedure started with the E3 (UK, France and Germany). In 2006, other members of the UN Security Council (Russia, China and the US) joined to make the E3+3 (the E3+3 is now the entire Security Council plus Germany). Although some rounds of talks were moderately successful, they eventually collapsed. Recently there are signs that Iran is ready do business again, with Iranian officials now negotiating with HR/VP Ashton. \textsuperscript{210} What seems possible, is that while the threat of military force remains against Iran (should it seek to use nuclear material for illegal ends), \textsuperscript{211} the multilateral effort to get Iran to conform to

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\textsuperscript{208} Ibid
\textsuperscript{209} Lisbon, Art. 21 (1)
\textsuperscript{210} BBC News Middle East, 6\textsuperscript{th} March, 2012, ‘Fresh Iran nuclear talks agreed with world powers – EU’, 6\textsuperscript{th} March, 2012
\textsuperscript{211} President Obama has just expressed a preference for diplomacy in what he sees, in response to negotiations Ashton is partaking in with Iranian authorities, as a “window of opportunity”. This does not, of course, rule out a military offensive on Iranian soil (see: BBC News, Ibid)
international law, and to its own commitment to the NPT (signed in 1968), by using multiple channels of communication, indicates a willingness by opposing powers to act transgovernmentally, and by reference to international law, to gain an outcome that would be in the world’s interests. In fact today (13th April, 2012), it is reported on the EEAS’s Facebook page that talks between the E3+3 and Iran over Tehran’s Nuclear programme will be started again, and Ashton, as the E3+3 negotiator, will meet with her Iranian counterparts in Istanbul.212

212 The EEAS Facebook page, 13th April 2012
Recap: The geo-political/legal and institutional context (international law/complex interdependence)

Sections 4-6 of this thesis relate to the geo-political/legal/institutional context in which the EU operates. In this particular section, one of the questions dealt with regarded whether, *post-Lisbon, the EU’s toolbox is sufficient so that it can strategise effectively within the current geo-legal context?* It was also asked *to what degree the EU should further integrate into the supranational world?* It was argued the EU was primed to be an effective legal actor. It was suggested it would be advantageous to seek to integrate further into the heart of the legal order. These were contextualised by noting the post-Cold War shift in the geo-political landscape in which actors operate. It was argued that in a deterritorialised world, international organisations, through a complex web of interconnections, are more likely than war to link nations and regions together. The EU should be willing to deploy a range of instruments in an interconnected order, and international law is one of these tools.

The EU is the most integrated region in the world, and one that is used to operating supranationally. It is extremely well-placed to operate in this system. Two of the threats the EU is helping tackle in this context, namely terrorism and proliferation of WMDs were discussed. This led to the answer to the last question posed at the beginning of the section, which was *whether operating in this geo-legal order added legitimacy to the EU as a global actor.* It was contended that tackling the types of issues *multilaterally*, and by reference to international law, did legitimise the EU as a global actor.
SECTION 5 - THE GEO-LEGAL/POLITICAL/INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

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The geo-political/legal and institutional context (a military and civilian context)

(RQ3b) Post-Lisbon, is the EU’s toolbox sufficient so that it can strategise effectively within the current geo-political context? What can be said regarding the power the EU yields? Should the EU view itself in soft or hard power terms?

Introductory Comments

This is the second part of a collection of 3-sections (4-6) about the strategic context in which the EU operates. The first discussed the EU and its relations with international law, and the complicated interconnections that bind actors together through global governing institutions. It was suggested that the EU was primed as an effective actor in this world. It was stated it should seek to further integrate itself within this geo-legal order, not least because it legitimises the it as a global actor.

In this section, the geo-political context is related to the EU as a civilian and military actor. This will be related to power theory, and a discussion about what type of power the EU is. The soft/hard power distinction is deliberated on, and an attempt is made to apply this to EU military strategy. The discussion focuses on the distinction between ‘means’ and ‘ends’, and if it can be argued that an actor that uses violent means, could still be a civilian power, assuming it seeks civilian ends. Lastly, a few notes are made on whether we can combine aspects of EU foreign policy into a cross between a civilian/ethical theoretical model.

(5.1) When to apply military/civilian power: A duality of approach

In section-3, the EU as a military actor was assessed. It was shown that Member States and the intergovernmental characteristics of foreign policy define the EU, although these are not all-encompassing. In defence terms, the EU is not even the equal of some of its own Members (see (3.1.1)). It was argued that this is not a terminal problem. From a European perspective, being able to dominate others militarily is no longer the strategic advantage it was (see (3.1.1)). The world the EU operates in, is one in which it needs to utilise a variety of tools (e.g. diplomacy, law (see (4.2)) and in institutions see (6))). With that said, one means of power is realised by possessing a military capacity that can be used to pursue the type of ends one might seek. The EU can still act ‘smartly’ in this regard, making use of all the resources it possesses. The EU can apply a military response to a situation, and indeed does...
apply this under various situations (see (5.1.5)). Using military power might be a useful tool, particularly when used for humanitarian reasons such as with peacekeeping/making activities, and in order to ensure border regions are secure.

One of the early criticisms of the Community was its incapacity to act coherently in the Balkans. The Petersberg Tasks (PTs) were a Western European Union response to this, giving a modest ability, and the potential to respond to destabilisation by conducting peacekeeping, crisis management and humanitarian and rescue tasks.213

The adoption of the PTs, and later the Helsinki Headline Goals (2003, 2010), shows the duality of the EU approach, with it playing a civilian role, or at least seeking a civilian end, that potentially uses a hard power instrument. It could be suggested this blurs the view of the EU as a civilian power, with it as a hard power. It seems odd to describe oneself, as the HR/VP Ashton did, as being committed to promoting peaceful ends only by use of diplomatic means and the signing of free trade agreements,214 yet at the same time to be willing to apply a military solution when deemed necessary (see (5.1.5)).

(5.1.1) When to apply military/civilian power: Means and Ends

Understanding the paradox of a civilian power using military power can be understood better by following Maull’s distinction between ‘means’ and ‘ends’.215 As outlined above, the EU possesses the limited ‘means’ to conduct military action. But the ‘end’ it seeks is, arguably, ‘other regarding’, as is outlined by Lisbon in its commitment to establishing social liberal goods like international law, democracy, international security and the reduction of human rights abuses.216

It is questionable as to where to draw a line between civilian and hard power if it can be shown that a ‘civilian’ power does use hard capacities. Saying that one is a peace-loving power, of course, sounds much nicer than admitting your foreign policy possesses a violent edge. The ‘fluffy’ description was precisely the one used by the HR/VP in a speech in Budapest last year, when she stated that the EU was unable to push its weight around.217 But beyond the HR/VP’s rhetorical niceties, the EU does appear to embrace alternative methods of achieving peace before it might be tempted to deploy a military solution. It often resorts to

213 The PTs were officially incorporated within the EU at the Amsterdam Treaty
214 Catherine Ashton , Budapest, 25 February 2011
215 Quoted at Smith, K, ‘Still Civilian Power EU?’, European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper 2005
216 Article 21, TEU
217 Catherine Ashton , Corvinus University Budapest, 25 February
applying sanctions,218 to working to apply diplomatic pressure; or by offering its expertise to others, while they attempt to deal with a situation. Regarding the latter of these, the EU recently assisted the Arab League (AL) and UN in their attempts to deal with the upheavals in Syria.

(5.1.2) When to apply military/civilian power: The difficulties in assessing when to act (the case of Syria)

One can differentiate between the potential of using military apparatus to provide a good sum-value, in the event that other avenues of potential have been exhausted, and the use of such power as a *first response* to a challenge, or simply as a mode to gain a strategic advantage. The difficulty for civilian actors, though, is deciding on when avenues of diplomacy, sanctions, and international law have been exhausted, and when a military response is necessary.

Over the past year, violence in Syria has escalated to a pathological level.219 The EU’s strategy has included supporting the UN and the AL monitoring of the situation, using sanctions, and taking part in debates at the UN Security Council. It has not sought to launch a NATO mission. In fact, EU policy-makers have *ruled out* such an idea. But UN estimates suggest over 9,000 fatalities so far, and the situation appears close to state failure. The tools used so far have not worked, at least not in terms of ensuring Syria has a calm immediate future. The question is, should the EU admit defeat and leave things to the AL, or should it seek, in partnership with NATO, to use a hard power capacity to force peace in Syria?220

Particularly when combining the EU within a NATO framework, the EU possesses the means to make a statement of intent, and although progression of security and defence policy post-Saint-Malo, with the then joint French/British initiative to ensure a more European approach to security,221 has moved to one of a more civilian character,222 it should not be forgotten that through CSDP, it possesses a hard foreign policy instrument.223 Of

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218 *As Gowan points out, the EU currently applies sanctions against nearly 30 countries at time of writing.*

219 Ibid


222 Menon, A, p. 87, ‘Power, Institutions and the CSDP: The Promise of Institutionalist Theory’

223 Menon suggests that EU security and defence policies have undergone a process of continual adaptation since Saint Malo (see also Section-1). Originally, a largely military vision of ESDP was outlined, yet the nature of this has gradually moved towards the more civilian approach that we see today (Ibid)
course, and as already shown in section-3, the potential of this is constrained given that Members retain the right to veto policy they do not like.

(5.1.3) When to apply military/civilian power: Rejecting hard power?

Constrained militarily by Members or not, Smith thinks the EU’s hard power dimension carries a high price; potentially closes off full embracement of civilian power; and sends the message that military force could be used to further EU’s interests (rather than EU principles). Smith is perhaps right that the EU might not be averse to using its military for its own (economic) interests. The EU’s Operation off the coast of Somalia (Atalanta) is involved, as part of a larger global effort, in helping combat piracy. Piracy in the region is threatening to close down trade routes, and thus European and global trade interests. But it would seem a stretch to suggest that this somehow closes off the EU from the full embracement of civilian power. For one thing, we need to be sure that the EU is acting solely out of economic concerns. For that, we would need a statement which notes that the offensive in Somalia is based entirely on protecting business interests. This is unlikely to transpire, not because such motives are not there, but because other motives, such as a desire to promote safety for civilians that use the shipping lanes, probably sit quite happily at the side of any economic motive. It can even be said that the use of military force to defend an economic interest, is simply protecting another central goal (the right to free trade).

It is difficult, moreover, to think of historical examples in which any power has lacked a military dimension. As noted earlier, military power in defence terms might not be as important as it has previously been (see (3.1.1)), but it would be premature to think that it could be dispensed with entirely, and the EU should remodel itself as a global normative pacifist actor. In fact, the EU is receiving more requests for its crisis management skills than it can handle. It could be stated, especially given the declarations made by Lisbon in its commitment to promoting various freedoms, democracy and stability, that like it or not, the EU has a responsibility to use the types of tools necessary to achieve the ends it claims to seek.


225 Howorth, J, p. 3, ‘Strategy and the Importance of Defence Cooperation among EU Member States’
(5.1.4) When to apply military/civilian power: On the benefits of retaining/promoting a military capacity

The EU can be seen from a foreign policy perspective in civilian terms. But behind this, remains a necessary military dimension that can be used at times to promote good international ends. The rules of the game may be changing, and it is the contention of this project that in an increasingly interdependent world (see (4.3)) that the use of civilian power, international law (see (4.2)) and global governance (see (6.1)) will become more important in the future. But without any form of military structure behind it, it is doubtful the EU could always pursue the ends it might like to seek.

Given the above, it was perhaps disappointing that the HR/VP, in February of last year, claimed the EU ‘cannot deploy gunboats or bombers. It cannot invade or colonise […] The strength of the EU lies, paradoxically, in its inability to throw its weight around’. To a degree, of course, Ashton is right. The EU is not a traditional military strength (see (3.1)). It cannot, furthermore, just go around the world righting every wrong. Even on occasions when it can right a wrong, moreover, it usually needs a partner (e.g. NATO, the UN, the AU, the AL and so on). But as pointed out by one analyst, Ashton is pushing the truth somewhat, and is spectacularly out of line with much EU thinking in the light of its recent historical failures. At the time of making the speech, the EU was, in fact, deploying gunboats in the Gulf of Aden, in order to guard sea lanes against Somalian pirates. It would appear that the HR/VP also seems to be forgetting the EU’s weakness was exposed entirely in the Balkans, when it was unable to go beyond its diplomatic efforts and apply a hard military element to force peace to a situation that was out of control. Lastly, the same treaty which gave Ashton the influence her position possesses, also invented the PSCD (see (3.1.2)), which is designed precisely that the EU could coordinate effectively, so it could ‘push it weight around’, and so that it could deploy, quickly and effectively, the instruments of power (gunboats, bombers, combat forces) Ashton appears to deny the EU should want to use.

As was noted in section-2, one of the challenges the EU faces is becoming what Cross terms a ‘smart power’. It must sometimes combine hard and soft elements to ensure a strategic end. The difficulty it faces, as the situation in Syria outlines, is being able to

226 Catherine Ashton, Corvinus University Budapest, 25 February
227 Rogers, J, ‘The sly return of civilian power?’
228 Ibid
calculate when a situation is beyond remedy by soft power means; and, in such situations, whether it possesses the capacity to push for a military offensive. There are, of course, no easy answers to either of these questions. But it might be noted that the EU should not be afraid to push for action with its partners should a situation be threatening to spiral out of control. The way in which the EU, under Ashton’s leadership, took a back seat in many respects to other international players, some of which were the EU’s own Members, during the Libya crisis, probably did not show it in its best light with other global actors. As was noted, Ashton was about the last to demand sanctions; the final person to make a call for Gaddafi to leave office; and the last to get behind the idea of a military operation. Even then, she had opposed calling for an intervention until it was sanctioned by the UN Security Council (see (2.2.3)).

(5.1.5) *When to apply military/civilian power: Smart power (CSDP missions)*

According to EEAS, the EU has undertaken 24 ESDP/CSDP missions from 2003 up until March 2012. One third of these (8) are stated as ‘military operations’ while two thirds (16) are classed as civilian missions. Of missions that the EU is still involved in today, 10 are civilian, and 3 are military.

**On-going civilian missions**

On-going civilian missions range in nature from policing, civilian crisis management, stability monitoring and border assistance missions in Afghanistan (EUPOL); Palestine (EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM); Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH); Kosovo (EULEX); Georgia (EUMM); Iraq (EUJUST LEX); Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM); and the Congo (EUSEC RD and EUPOL RD). The most important of these is the *European Union Rule of Law Mission* in Kosovo (EULEX). It is the EU’s biggest CSDP civilian mission, with an aim of helping Kosovo authorities maintain law, particularly with reference to policing and the judiciary. The mission supplies technical expertise, mentoring, monitoring and advice. In line with EU foreign policy post-Lisbon, the hope is to establish a multi-ethnic, peaceful state, with full respect for law and neighbouring countries.

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230 European External Action Service
On-going military missions

From a hard power perspective, there is less report in terms of the amount of on-going missions. There are missions in (and near) Somalia (EUTM and Atalanta) and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA). While the number of civilian missions outnumber military ones by 3/1, the number of personnel employed does not. Military operations, at this time, use more manpower than civilian on a per-capita basis. There are currently a reported 3,636 people stationed in and around the Atlanata and the EUFOR ALTHEA missions, in Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (2,436 and 1,200 deployed). The only on-going civilian mission which comes near to these in numbers is the Kosovo (EULEX) one, which deploys 2,507 (marginally more than is deployed at Atlanata).
(5.2) Notes on a civilian/ethical EU (on setting a good example to others)

Although there is no overriding claim to the EU’s identity in terms of the type of power it is in ideal model terms, the central observation made in this thesis is that it is, in the main, a global actor that seeks civilian ends; and it normally achieves these by applying civilian means. Nonetheless, it not averse to using military strategies to secure civilian ends (33% of CSDP missions since 2003). This civilian character can be tempered with the observation that on occasion, the EU does appear to be willing to pursue an economic end by using military means. Mission Atalanta is one example in which it could be argued that the EU breaks with its otherwise predominately social pattern. But even here, it is not obvious the EU is acting solely out of economic concerns. Moreover, and according to Maull’s model below, a civilian power may very well use hard power to safeguard other values. The right to trade freely is, of course, a central EU goal. Given the EU’s attention to the use of softer types of power, and its commitment international law, it seems fair to judge it mainly under soft power terms.

According to Maull’s definition of what makes a civilian power, the EU ticks all the boxes: (1) It accepts it is necessary to co-operate with others to achieve global objectives; (2) it often uses economic means to secure national (or regional) goals (military power is used as safeguard to other goals); and (3) it shows a willingness to promote supranational structures to deal with issues relating to international management. On its own, however, Maull’s view is reductive, in it appears to see power in terms of rational agents calculating the best way to achieve an end (it is about the application of power). One needs to understand why an actor might be motivated to seek a certain end. It is useful, then, to follow Nye, and add another dimension, in terms that a global actor might simply want to set a good example. One such ‘good example’ would be promoting democracy. Another might be promoting ethnic pluralism. Other actors might emulate that ethic, or at least aspire to be like that actor. They might find the values and ways of the other actor an ethical way of conducting business.

(5.2.1) Notes on a civilian/ethical EU: A good behaviour observation

Smith draws on a similar ‘good behaviour’ dimension, and makes the observation that the EU is not separate from its Members, Parliament and the opinion of Europeans. In this sense, the EU does not get to play power politics because it can be pushed by the above into pursuing

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232 Nye, J, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics
ethical foreign policy. One only has to glance at the Lisbon Treaty to note it is a document that not only makes references to legal ends and duties, but that it also uses moral terms in describing what it hopes to achieve (the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person). The normative framework that the EU operates from within, at least rhetorically speaking, is at least in part, an ethical framework, and like the UN Charter, reminiscent of natural rights theory, and the belief there exist, simply in virtue of being human, a right to specific freedoms, none of which should be curtailed by nationality or social position.

Recap: The geo-political/legal and institutional context (military/civilian context)

Section-5 is one of a cluster of 3-sections (4-6), which relate to the context in which the EU operates. The first of these discussed the EU and its relations with international law, and the complicated interconnections that bind states and regions together. It was suggested that the EU was primed to be an effective actor in this world. It was also argued it would be beneficial to seek further integration within the geo-legal order, as this would legitimise the EU as an international actor.

In this section, the geo-political context was related to the EU as a civilian and military actor, and this was related to power theory. One of the questions posed for this section was whether, post-Lisbon, the EU’s toolbox was sufficient so it can strategise effectively as a military actor? In simple terms, the EU is potentially a very effective actor within the current geo-political order. But it needs to establish more coherently, what sort of actor it is. It needs to further define itself in power terms, recognising its Lisbon goals are

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dependent on its military backbone. One area in which the EU could impose itself better is, is to take advantage of a framework like the PSCD, which would allow main Members to better co-ordinate strategies.

With reference to the second and third section questions, what can be said regarding the power the EU yields, and should the EU view itself as soft or hard actor, it was shown that the EU is not straightforwardly a soft or hard power actor in terms of how it applies its strategies. This was tempered by the observation that many of its actions are ‘other regarding’. A ‘means’ and ‘ends’ distinction was applied to show it is possible, and sometimes desirable, to pursue an end by a violent means, yet still remain a civilian soft-power actor. Thus, against the view that the EU should reject promoting good ends by using its military hard-power, it was stated there is much to lose should the EU remodel itself entirely as a diplomatic actor. The failures in the Balkans illustrates that the EU should want to possess the tools to take an active part in forcing peace should a situation spiral out of control. Potential problems in European border regions also require that the EU should be able to launch a military campaign should it be necessary. But it was admitted that there is no easy answer as to how to calculate when these situations have reached a point of no return.

Lastly, a few notes were made on the EU’s power capacity using a combined civilian/ethical model. The model would seek to distinguish the motivations behind foreign policy. It was noted that aspects of Lisbon are, at least rhetorically, moralistic in tone, which signifies there principled depth to EU foreign policy.
SECTION 6 - THE GEO-LEGAL/POLITICAL/INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

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(6) The geo-political/legal and institutional context (institutional/multilateral context)

(RQ3c) Post Lisbon, is the EU’s toolbox sufficient so that it can strategise effectively within the existing geo-institutional order? Can it improve its relations with others? Is it an attractive multilateral partner?

Introductory Comments

This is the last of 3-related sections (4-6) regarding the context in which the EU operates. The first discussed the EU and its relations with international law, and the interconnections that bind states and regions together. It was suggested that the EU is able to be an effective actor in this world. It was contended it should seek further integration in this system, which in turn offers the opportunity to legitimise itself as an international actor.

The second (5), deliberated on the EU as a civilian and military actor. It was argued the EU could be an effective actor in this world, but it needs to redefine itself and use all of the tools at its disposal. This means distinguishing its soft/hard power capacities, and deploying the necessary means to achieve the type of ends Lisbon indicates are sought.

In this section (6) the EU as a strategist within a geo-institutional context is discussed. To begin with, the upgrade in the EU representation at the UN Assembly and Security Council will be looked at. It will be asked if this enriches the EU, and whether it paves the way for a more multilateral approach at the UN regarding other regional unions. Next, it will be wondered if the EU should attempt to increase its competences in other foreign and security predicated international organisations. Lastly, the EU as an institutional actor from the perspective of global citizens will be looked at. This examines the way people see the EU in terms of whether it is the partner of choice for the world’s leading nations.

(6.1) The EU as an institutionalised actor: The case of the UN

The post-Lisbon attitude to the UN, suggests an effort between the EU and its Members to promote EU objectives via dialogue in New York. A number of reforms by Lisbon suggest a more strategic approach to providing leadership within the institution. 234 Although the EU

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234 Laatikainen, K, ’Multilateral Leadership at the UN after the Lisbon Treaty, European Foreign Affairs Review, 15: 475493, 2010
has had observer status since 1974, HR/VP Ashton negotiated an increase in the modalities of the EU.

Upgrade 1 (Security Council)
Central is its new right to have the HR/VP and a delegation be present at, and speak to, the Security Council whenever the EU has a position on a subject. On average, the EU has given two or more statements a month, which has established a new *modus operandi*. This shows the importance of having in place, a leader with the experience and bargaining skills necessary to promote the EU agenda (see criticism of Ashton (2.2.3)).

Upgrade 2 (General Assembly)
In May 2011, the EU took another step in establishing itself as an actor within the UN. Earning 180 votes in favour, the UN *General Assembly* implemented Resolution 65/276, which upgrades EU modalities. It may now interact with assembly constituents, present proposals, present amendments and has the right of reply. Institutionalising the EU as a body separate from its members is an achievement, particularly because it previously fought, but failed, to get a similar status. Convincing others it did not intend a change to the nature of the Assembly from a forum for nations, was a strategy used to convince others that intentions could be seen as a supplement to global governance.

(6.1.1) The EU as an institutionalised actor: Complex interdependence

Complex interdependence would predict that with a decline of military force as a tool of foreign policy, and an increase in interdependencies in institutional settings, that there will be an increase in cooperation between actors. Moreover, the rules that bind these together can shift the distribution of power from otherwise stronger actors, to weaker ones (see (4.4.1)). This would explain why the strongest sometimes give up interests, and sign away legal-rights by endorsing, for example, environmental treaties; landmine treaties; nuclear test ban treaties and others. With regards an institution like the UN Assembly, where authority is diffused, fostering multilateral relations is perhaps the only conceivable way to gain ability to push an agenda.

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236 Ibid
237 76 against, 21 abstentions
238 Grevi, G, p. 3, ‘From Lisbon to New York’
The consequence of this is that the small player(s) can influence events, and the more powerful can be suppressed. The attempt by the EU to enhance its status at the UN in 2010 had to be initially postponed because a collection of nations from the developing world decided to resist the proposal. It took a diplomatic effort before the EU could argue its case to these otherwise weaker nations.

(6.1.2) **The EU as an institutionalised actor: Lisbon at work**

The new status the EU enjoys does not pave the way for it being offered a seat and voting rights. According to Article-4 of the UN Charter, to join the UN in this way requires one to
be a ‘peace-loving state’. Nonetheless, the new resolution enriches the standing of the EU. It also opens the possibility of a more multilateral approach at the Assembly. The increase in EU modalities has set a precedent. If other regional bodies were to show the same desire, the UN could take on a more colourful identity. The European Council has intimated support for fostering regional integration within the future UN system, and should other regional organisations show desire to emulate it, they will, all things being equal, support them.

Given the EU affirmed its commitment to the UN at Lisbon, this could be seen as a victory in terms of the EU’s desire to be part of an institutionalised force. It legitimises the EU within the global community, given the increase in recognition it now has from the world’s sovereign states. Perhaps just as important, is it demonstrates the institutional importance of the EU through its own Members’ eyes. After the first attempt to increase the EU remit were thwarted, one of the strategies employed by the EU was for Member States to act in unison, so they could convince others of the potential of the 2nd EU proposal. As Grevi notes, this is a ‘significant […] example of how EU post-Lisbon policy is supposed to work’.

(6.1.3) The EU as an institutionalised actor: The UN today, the World tomorrow

The UN is just one of the international organisations the EU has a relationship with. The upgrading of its presence there is testament to the way in which the new Lisbon architecture has contributed to improving the EU’s global position. A key strategy might now be to now seek an elevation of its presence elsewhere. The EU/C possesses observer or partial member status in a host of other foreign, security and defence bodies. As Missiroli noted in 2010 (prior to the additional EU modalities), increasing EU status at the UN represents a test as to

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239 The UN Charter, Article-4
240 Of course, at some point in the future, the Charter may well be altered so that regions are allowed full membership
242 The EU, of course, is working with these regional organisations, especially the African Union. It partners this in a joint AU-EU Strategy, enabling improvements in African competences in crisis management (e.g. the use of regional stand-by forces and an early-warning capacity). It has similarly, according to the European Council, deepened links with Central Asian associates with increased political dialogue, and joint work on concerns such as water, energy, rule of law and security. Lastly, the EU has established dialogues with ASEAN concerning regional questions such as Burma (Ibid)
243 Grevi, G, p. 3, ‘From Lisbon to New York’
whether it is able to upgrade its international presence. That it did achieve this months later, shows the ability of actors to create a more determined presence internationally, and perhaps could give the impetus to seek to renegotiate its competences elsewhere.

(6.2) The EU as a multilateral partner: 1st division or 2nd division institutional actor (a brief assessment of the EU’s international reputation)?

The EU is not a sovereign state, and one method of overcoming that strategic handicap is to use its collective strength to deal with the coming challenges it will face over the next decades. After all, the other main global actors, such as the US, China, India, Russia (and

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245 Howorth, p. 464, ‘The EU as a Global Actor’
so on), are sovereign states, and are all entitled to full representation in many multilateral bodies.\footnote{Ibid}

Despite this handicap, the EU remains perceived as a desirable partner. Grevi and de Vasconcelos suggest ‘staggering’ numbers of people think their governments should be eager to deal with the EU in institutional partnerships.\footnote{Grevi, G and de Vasconcelos, p. 155, A, ‘Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism’, Chaillot paper No. 109, 2008} Respondents to the Bertelsmann Foundation’s study showed 98% of Chinese, 91% of Russians, 78% of North Americans, 70% of Brazilians and 68% of Indians, all favoured forging deeper ties with the EU.\footnote{The basic methodology was as follows. Interviews were conducted in Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia, UK and US. An average of 1,000 adults were interviewed in each country.} This suggests respondents see the EU as a legitimate, and important, player. The same respondents did not agree the EU could be considered a \textit{major} power, although its perceived significance has risen.\footnote{Ibid, p. 21} Nonetheless, the EU \textit{is} predicted to be a future second-division power, occupying a similar position as Russia, Japan and India (China and the US as the only first division players).\footnote{Ibid, p. 7} Interestingly, there appears little difference from the opinion of the EU as a global actor now, and it as global actor by 2020. It will not really lose/gain influence.\footnote{Ibid, p. 23}

The UN is perceived as becoming weaker than the EU will be. The paradox is that the EU as a global security actor, identifies itself wholly with the UN. Everything it does in relation to security, it claims, ‘has been linked to UN objectives’.\footnote{The European Council, p. 11, ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World’, 11th December 2008} Disappointingly, for nationalists in Europe, the EU’s perceived strongest state, which is marginally seen as the UK, is considered to be a declining global actor. It might be noted here that if European states are becoming more marginal, then a more powerful EU may be one effective body through which this decline can be mitigated. While it is true that many Western European states might still possess influence with old colonies, and Eastern Europeans might be influential diplomatically in Russia and the Balkans, in an institutionalised world, these relationships are small areas of a larger web of complex interconnections. If Member States want influence beyond their circle of associates and former colonies, all of which will be forging their own new ties, the EU is perhaps the vehicle from which this can be achieved.
Recap: The geo-political/legal/institutional context (institutional context)

This was the last of 3-related sections (4-6) which regarded the strategic context in which the EU operates. The first of these (4), considered the EU and its dealings with international law, and the intricate interconnections that attach states and regions together through international organisations. It was argued the EU was positioned to be an active player in this world. It was further contended that the EU should seek further integration in this system, which in turn offers the opportunity to legitimise itself as an international actor.

The second section (5), deliberated on the EU as a civilian and military actor. It was argued that the EU could be an effective actor in this world, but it was noted it needs to redefine itself in terms of seeking to use all of the tools at its disposal (see (7)). This means distinguishing soft/hard power capacities, and deploying whichever means are necessary to achieve the type of ends Lisbon indicates the EU seeks.

In this section (6) the EU as a strategist within a geo-institutional context was discussed. One question posed at the beginning was whether, post Lisbon, the EU’s toolbox was sufficient so it can strategise effectively within the existing geo-institutional order? A further question asked how far it can improve its status institutionally speaking?

The upgrade in the EU representation at the UN Assembly and Security Council was looked at. It was argued that this does enrich the EU as a global actor, and suggests a significant example of how post-Lisbon EU strategy should be working. That this was achieved with the assistance of Member States, in their own UN capacity, demonstrates an accomplishment in the EU’s own internal relations. From there, it was argued the EU should seek upgrades in status elsewhere. At the moment its competences constitutes a ‘hotchpotch’
of general agreements, many of which constrain what the EU can bring to the table. An
overriding strategy would be to take what was achieved at the UN, and try to achieve the
same elsewhere.

Lastly, the EU as an institutional actor from the perspective of global citizens was
looked at. It was asked to what degree the EU might appeal to others (citizens) as a
multilateral inter-institutional partner? It could be argued this is hardly relevant, given it is
their governments that will decide whether or not the EU is a suitable partner to liaise with.
But equally, the power to convince citizens of other countries that you are a desirable
working partner is a significant achievement. The consequence of this soft type of power
could “rub off” on the international players that do, or will, work with a future EU. It is also
testimony to the EU in that it is ranked as one of the world’s 5-great powers. There is no
indication that people think it will slip from that position in the future, even though these
same respondents were convinced Member States of the EU would lose influence. The
approach that the EU has to foreign and security policy, then, and specifically to conducting
itself in international institutions, is working to a degree. Member States looking in might be
advised to consider that their own influence on the foreign stage is waning. It was argued that
to retain strength, even strong Members ought to begin to adopt aspects of their policy to an
EU framework.
SECTION 7 – THE EU AND THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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(7) The EU and the evolution of international relations: Institutionalisation and conflict management

(RQ4) What strengths does the EU bring to the emerging multipolar global order? Are there areas it could improve itself in in order to cope over the coming decades?

Introductory Comments

In this final section the ground shifts from the strategic context in which the EU operates (see (4-6)) to the emerging global order and the EU’s place in it. The questions asked are: What strengths does the EU bring to the emerging multipolar global order; and are there areas it could improve itself in in order to cope over the coming decades?

These are dealt with in two parts. Firstly, something will be said about rising powers. This view posits that a new global order, and the power relations within it are being reconstructed. It will be asked what this means for the study of IR. Is this a return to realism and a system governed by anarchy, or will international organisations tip the balance towards order over chaos? Some of the dangers to a future stable order will be looked at, specifically security risks that Think Tanks predict may occur. It will be wondered whether the EU can assist in global management of these, by helping to bind the competing interests of newly empowered states together, in inter-institutional settings.

The second area looked at regards to what degree the EU should take more seriously, its responsibilities and capacities as a military actor. Some of the issues regarding the EU’s relations with NATO are looked at; and it will be asked whether the NATO framework is sustainable. If it is not, should the EU plan to become a military actor in its own right?

Throughout the section is a running commentary on realism as an explanation of IR. Given the emergence of multiple centres of power, it will be wondered whether the new international order will be an anarchic one, or whether the institutions that bind actors together can allay this state of affairs.

(7.1) The EU and the evolution of IR: A multipolar/interpolar interdependent world

The end of the Cold War left the US as the power in a system of international relations (see (3.1) and (4.1)). But with a rise of others, such as China, India, Brazil and, indeed, the
regional EU, there has been a redistribution of power, and a shift in the way IR is conducted globally (see (4) and (6.2)). Interdependency in institutional settings, not just military capacity, can define the global space. This is not to claim the power each holds in comparison to others, is not important in itself. But to merely focus on the hard powers of all of these, without focusing on the institutions in which relations often occur, would be to offer only a partial explanation of what is going on.\textsuperscript{254} We can measure power in realist or economic terms; on the relative power X holds against Y and Z, and we can also measure it in institutional terms; predicated on the interactions between actors in governing structures.

Keohane and Nye were early pioneers of a type of realism which combined itself with other theoretical viewpoints (see (4.2)). This ironed out one flaw that existed within realism. That was that realism often describes an older order of Westphalian states, playing zero-sum games in a world whose international character was fixed. Keohane and Nye would not go as far as to suggest this world, with multiple centres of power, will lead to realism, as a mode of explanation in IR, wholly behind. It is doubtful that we will enter a period, not of zero-sum games, but of positive sum games, in which every actor can win whatever it desires. But their view is that complex interdependencies have increased interactions across territories.\textsuperscript{255} This new form of IR, conducted institutionally, is a world in which others must engage in, in order to play any sort of game at all.

(7.1.1) The EU and the evolution of international relations: Keeping anarchy at bay

It might be wondered whether there is any need to even include realism in an analysis of the international order? This can be answered by reference to the rapid changes that have occurred over the past decades. Since the end the Cold War, the world shifted from one dominated by 2-nations, in which many others globally took sides with either; to a calm after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and a period of unipolarity, in which the rapid institutionalisation of international/regional politics occurred. But now it appears a third great shift is occurring, as the world moves into a system in which many states will have influence globally (see (4.1) and (6.2)). This ‘rise of the rest’ is a well-documented phenomenon. But the question it begs, is whether the calm we had under one global power is under threat? New powers will want more of a say on the global stage, and that will, at times, conflict with what an established power like the US might want. To think realism in IR is dead, therefore, is

\textsuperscript{254} Grevi, G, p. 23 ‘The Interpolar World: A New Scenario’, 2009

premature; and how actors react to one another could tip the balance to relative peace or anarchy. If the international order is not managed effectively within institutional settings, the future could be stark.

(7.1.2) The EU and the evolution of international relations: An anarchic future?

According to Walt, multipolarity is the most war-prone global state of all. Wivel similarly notes that it the most likely state of affairs to lead to non-integration and conflict. The EU’s Think Tank, the ISS, conducted an exercise in which it attempted to assess the long-term factors that will shape the coming years. It suggests a number of areas are key to the EU in learning to cope within a multipolar global order, including demography, the economy, energy, the environment and science and technology. In a bleak outlook, it predicts energy supply shocks, environmental catastrophes, a breakdown of order in the Middle East, and a confrontation between powers. The Report contends that the main challenge for the EU is to tackle, and unite, the developing multipolar global order by embedding multilateralism within international politics.

A similar future is painted by the US National Intelligence Council (NIC), according to which, the world is reconstructed with Brazil, Russia, India and China all feeding from the ‘international high table’. These will bring a new ethos to international governance, and the rules of the game will be transformed from those currently governing. The wealth transfer from West to East will intensify, and a growing population will put pressure on the Earth’s limited resources. As with the ISS, the potential for conflict in this multipolar world increases, especially in the Middle East.

(7.1.3) The EU and the evolution of international relations: Shocks!

According to Grevi, at the heart of international interdependence lie four issues: the economy; energy supply; the environment; and the fight against WMDs. These, he thinks, will test the international community to merge economic prosperity with political stability. If

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259 National Intelligence Council, ‘Global Trends 2025: The National Intelligence Council’s 2025 Project’
one adds the global threats identified by the ESS, which are terrorism; regional conflicts; state failure and organised crime, then the challenges for the international order are more apparent.

To take Grevi’s example of economic interdependencies further, a series of financial crashes and crises have littered the international environment. These range from the Scandinavian banking crisis in the early ‘90s; the European Exchange Rate attacks; the Mexican Peso crisis; the Asian financial crisis; the Russian financial crisis; the Argentine crisis, up until the financial crisis of 2007 (still affecting us). The latter of these, which started with the crash of the US subprime mortgage market, has affected the EU as much as any other. A consequence of the US-born crisis, moreover, has been a speeding up in the movement of wealth from Western to Eastern regions. China is now officially the largest owner of US debt. Foreign debt in the Eurozone, and the potential for defaults on that is also high, with Member States like Greece, Italy, Portugal and Ireland all classed as ‘high risk’, and France and Spain as ‘medium risk’.

(7.1.4) The EU and the evolution of international relations: Beyond the sociology of institutions

With economic power can come further demand for further natural resources, and the wealth transfer from West to East will put pressure on the Earth’s resources, as newly enriched nations industrialise and consumption levels rise. According to the International Energy Agency, CO₂ output will grow by nearly 50% in the next quarter of a century. At that time, fossil fuels are estimated to account for 80% of the world’s energy use. The increase in demand for fossil fuels is headed by China and India (over 50%), and the increase in CO₂ output comes from the Middle East (75%). The consensus made by mainstream environmentalists is that this is unsustainable. The regions expected to be disproportionately affected by climate change are some of the poorest in the world.

The consequent security issues are twofold: (1) global warming causes depletion of the ozone layer which protects the health of humanity; and (2) global warming causes instability in some of the most fragile places on Earth.

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261 Ibid
263 National Intelligence Council, Op. Cit
265 Grevi, G, p. 25, ‘The interpolar world’
In fact, the UN suggested that all but one of the appeals made to it for emergency humanitarian aid in 2007, were climate change related.266 An EU Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change suggests that even if emissions are reduced by 2050 to 1990 levels, a temperature increase of 2°C more than pre-industrial levels, would be hard to circumvent. The consequences of this are grave security risks, and these will escalate if global warming carries on. Climate change above 2°C, it is suggested, will lead to a variety of ‘tipping points’ resulting in irreversible and unpredictable changes to the climate. To avoid such a scenario, mitigation should be seen as an urgent preventive security policy.267

Put into this context, global interdependence goes further than a study of the sociology of constructing norms within institutional settings. It goes to the centre of the potential for a segment of humanity to have an environment in which they can exist.

(7.2) The EU as a global actor in a multipolar order: Two challenges

The survival of the system is very much an international institutional affair. The EU is no more able to tackle climate change; failed states; proliferation of WMDs; international terrorism; the global economy and waning energy supplies alone, than any other global actor. The challenge it, and others have, is how to promote other-regarding multilateral cooperation in a multipolar world. As noted above, allowing for unrestrained conflict and competition between large global players would be potentially catastrophic.

There are two strategies the EU needs to concentrate on. The first, as just alluded to, is continuing to build partnerships and promoting multilateral decision-making in international inter-institutional settings. This, arguably, is the EU’s primary strength. If any actor has demonstrated an ability to balance the separate interests of once competing nations, it is the EU. The second is the EU taking seriously its responsibilities in raising its military profile. This could be a key ingredient in assisting in making some regions safer places (see (7.2.4))

(7.2.1) The EU as a global actor in a multipolar order: Challenge 1, Managing a cooperative form of multipolarity through partnerships in institutional settings

267 Ibid
The EU should remain committed to the liberal internationalism, but must not let its own normative commitments override the business of politics.\textsuperscript{268} It must pick ‘battles’ carefully, and fight those that can be won. Moreover, if the EU continues to be a purveyor of norms, it must get its own act in order, too. As was pointed out earlier (see (3.1.2, Ob. 5), (4.2) and (4.3.3)), a conflict of foreign policy between Members and the EU could destabilise what the EU stands for. The difference in approach to Iraq between the EU and the UK, for example, was damaging to Europe’s international reputation. When the EU lectures others in one of the many speeches it gives, it is no good that its own Members are pursuing a means of action that appears contrary to the ethics of EU foreign policy, international protocols and law.

A Member State like the UK would have objected at the time that it did anything wrong in following its own objectives. Given the current make-up of the UN Security Council, where political interests are often placed ahead of other interests, it is not surprising actors would think bypassing it is the only way to get anything done (see (7.2.2)). No comment is made here on whether that might be a legitimate \textit{modus operandi} under some circumstances, such as in a ‘ticking time-bomb’ scenario, when international clearance cannot be received, but X is certain that should action not to be taken, a catastrophe would unfold. This was the card played by the US and UK at the time of Iraq. It proved, however, to be a card based on faulty intelligence reports.

\textbf{(7.2.2) The EU as a global actor in a multipolar order: (C1) Improving procedures and prioritising institutional change (the UN again)}

The EU needs to focus energies on improving its own modalities and improving those of others in international governance. Embedding international democracy within the system of governance, and adapting international organisations that govern world affairs to accommodate rising powers is a vital strategy. It was touched on above that the Security Council is often ineffective, and tainted by nationalist interests. As part of an international organisation that represents the world, it is also undemocratic that there is not a permanent representative from Africa. The need for reforming the Security Council is favoured by the EU, although it has not voiced its opinion on which nations should be awarded permanent seats.\textsuperscript{269} It should be noted, given the importance the EU attaches to the UN, reforming its poor aspects should be a priority. The UN is one mechanism which thwarts an anarchic order,

\textsuperscript{268} Grevi, G, p. 30, ‘The interpolar world’, 2009  
\textsuperscript{269} Hannay, D, ‘UN Reforms: The EU to the rescue’, European Voice, 12\textsuperscript{th} May 2005
and is thus of importance to the EU in embedding multilateralism within the international order. It is probably not feasible to expect a quick fix regarding the reform being discussed, but there are steps the EU can take to quicken the process. One of these could be that the EU attempts to shape the agenda towards the Security Council adopting a policy of longer-term renewable members on it.270

(7.2.3) The EU as a global actor in a multipolar order: (C1) Institutionalising rising powers

Key, in international governance reform is agreeing objectives and enforceable rules. Sometimes small steps should be taken in order to craft the environment so it is conducive to larger steps being taken later. Observing progress in the enactment of these is also essential. But as pointed out by the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPI),271 reconstructing international institutions that can endure the disordered politics of multipolarity is not easy.272 For a start, it means co-opting rising powers, and making them into stakeholders within international governance. This was the issue that the NIC argued was an urgent one of our time (see (7.1.1)). It also means, as Grevi alludes to, promoting reform, or even the potential abandonment of institutions like the G8.273 Many actors whose problems are central to the G8 are not included in it.274 Pressing for change here, potentially to make, as suggested by the Brooking Institution (BI), a G16,275 could be a goal to work towards. This is not to claim the makes another speech and the rest follow, but it is to suggest that, with the experience it brings to IR, the EU possesses a comparative multilateral institutional advantage. It was the first actor to recognise interdependence as a mode of IR, and it has worked for decades on progressing international and regional law, which regulates multiple global power centres.

(7.2.4) Challenge 2, On living up to its military responsibilities

The second challenge noted above (see (7.2)), is for the EU to define itself better militarily. Officially NATO is key to the EU (see (4.1)). But NATO is not a unique European

270 Hannay, D, ‘Effectiveness and ineffectiveness of the UN security council in the last 20 years: A European perspective’, The EU and reform of the UN Security Council (Working Group) 12-13th November 2009
271 The Global Public Policy Institute (Berlin
273 The EU is represented at the G8, but not able to act as chair or host
274 Grevi, G, pp. 33-34, The interpolar world, 2009
innovation. It is a partnership, which is predicated on what the US will bring to the table in terms of spending, and in terms of its military.

But all is not well at NATO, and the Washington Post reports all members, including the US, are cutting their funding to it. A cut in spending from the Pentagon recently led to the abandonment of two of 4 US brigades stationed in Europe. This is no surprise, and Obama warned European members last year that the US would no longer pay a disproportionate amount of the budget.

Cuts to NATO handicap the EU’s propensity to act militarily to promote the types of normative ends so far discussed (see (5)). In Libya, European countries speedily ran out of their own munitions supplies, and these had to be quickly obtained from Washington. The Europeans also lacked basic strategic abilities, such as being able to conduct surveillance from the air. They even had difficulties refuelling their own aircraft. These limitations were described by US and NATO officials as demonstrating the limitations of players such as the UK, France and others, and indicative that they could not organise military action over a longer phase of time.

The austerity faced in Europe has a deep effect on military spending. But cuts made by Europeans to their budgets, coming at the same time as the US is cutting its support to the alliance, leaves gaps for Europe. EU policy, post-St Malo, has focused much on civilian capacity (see (5)), but it is probably time to take a step towards redefining policy so that the EU emerges as a credible military actor in its own right. This is not meant in terms of the EU emulating the US, Russia or China (see (3.1)). The EU is unable to become a global military power (see (3.1.1)). But as noted by the ESS (see (3.1.1)), international crisis management is a key area of IR for the EU. Not only is it important in terms of promoting the types norms the EU likes, it is an urgent security issue in some EU border regions. If the links to the US’s capacities within NATO are eroded, then the EU surely has no option but to seek to build its own autonomous policy.

Of course, a credible EU military actor existing in a multipolar world would still rely on the US as its main ally. But the EU should be ready to move beyond viewing the US as always its benefactor. Potential innovations discussed earlier for the EU, were that alongside

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276 US pays about 75% of budget
278 Ibid
279 DeYoung, K, and Jaffe, G, ‘NATO runs short on munitions in Libya’, The Washington Post, 16th April 2011
281 DeYoung, K, and Jaffe, G, ‘Op. Cit
John Callow, Section-7, *The evolution of IR: Multipolarity, institutionalisation, conflict management*

an *upgraded* EDA and the PSCD, could be something like a *European Security Council*, which would be a type of formal institution of Defence Ministers (3.2.9)).\(^{283}\) This would act in a similar way to the UN’s Security Council.

Channelling funding better is also an issue that needs tackling (see (3.1.2)), so that EU Members are not funding inefficient armies, navies and air forces that were incapable of responding coherently to a crisis like Libya, and to the crisis now unfolding in Syria.

With respect to Syria, the EU has observers in the country, working for the UN. In the past few days it has been reported by the UN that a series of murders and shellings conducted by Syrian security forces have taken place (60 reported dead on Monday 23rd April 2012). This was in response to people that have approached, and spoken with, UN observers.\(^{284}\)\(^{285}\) It could be said that a time to apply a more forceful strategy is nearing (see (5.1.2)).\(^{286}\) As pointed out by Dobbs, there are resemblances between the handling of Syria and the handling of Bosnia. An attempt there to stop attacks on civilians by deploying peacekeepers and observers did not stop the most terrible massacre in post-war Europe.\(^{287}\) The EU, which is itself committed to the UN R2P principle, could do worse than seek to gain international approval, and necessary partners, to tackle a potential state failure in its own neighbourhood.

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\(^{283}\) Howorth, J, p. 3, ‘Strategy and the Importance of Defence Cooperation among EU Member States’, 2010


\(^{285}\) France 24, ‘Nearly 60 killed in Syria despite ceasefire’, 24th April 2012

\(^{286}\) Gowan, R, ‘The EU and Syria: Everything but force?’, *The European Union Institute for Security*

\(^{287}\) Dobbs, M, ‘The feel good response to mass atrocity: From Srebrenica to Homs’, *Foreign Policy*, April 12th 2012
Recap: The EU and the evolution of international relations: Institutionalisation and conflict management

One of the questions asked at the beginning of this section was: What strengths does the EU bring to the emerging multipolar global order? It was suggested with the shift in IR from unipolarity to multipolarity, came a security need to anchor new powers into the international system of governance. It was argued that the EU could bring much to the table in this regard. It could focus on promoting reform of international organisations, such as the UN Security Council, and the G8, to better accommodate new players. The reason to bind newly empowered players rests on the view that multipolarity is potentially an anarchic and dangerous state of affairs. A number of possible future security ‘shocks’ cannot be dealt with without assistance from institutionally integrated actors. To avoid a potential catastrophic future scenario, institutionalising IR as far as possible is desirable. The most obvious example of an area in which all must pull in the same direction, is climate change. But tackling the global economic recession; proliferation; terrorism; failing states; energy supply, and so on, all require cross-border cooperation.

The second question asked was: Are there areas that the EU could improve itself in order to cope over the coming decades? It was argued the EU should take more seriously its capacities and responsibilities as a military actor. This was suggested to be due to security issues. A Europe that desires to act on the international stage, and one that wishes to be able to control issues just beyond its own borders, must be more pro-active in building the capacities for this. The US attitude to NATO has weakened, and Europe cannot expect the US to continue to be its benefactor in military terms. Although the EU should continue to see the US as an important friend, key to it emerging as a serious player is for it to be more autonomous in military affairs.

Final remark

Over the past six decades the EU (in its various guises) has been in a division of its own in its understanding of the necessity to institutionalise and bind together the interests and political identities of nation states. From a coal and steel coalition which fused Western European economies together, to the intensified present, and a union of 27 countries, many of which possess a single currency; and all of which operate under supranational law, the EU has embedded multilateral institutionalism within its own borders. It recognised interdependence
as a mode of regional and international affairs before any other body, and focused on the need to incorporate the competitive desires of separate actors within its own federal order. Now the EU should take what it has achieved in Europe, and apply a similar supranational, and interpolar ethos, to the emerging multipolar international order.
(8) Conclusion

Defining the EU institutionally in the wake of Lisbon

This thesis dealt with the EU as a post-Lisbon global actor. Section-2 investigated what can be said of the Lisbon innovations in terms of the type of toolbox they provide the EU? It was suggested that the change that made the EU a more structured international actor was the creation of the EEAS; which sets a permanent framework for policy initiative under the HR/VP, and for diplomatic relations with other actors. A suggestion made regarding this was it would be beneficial to centralise training of recruits in technical areas, diplomacy and IR.

Regarding the new roles of President and HR/VP, the appointees to them are disappointing. Lisbon sets the EU up as a global actor, yet at the same time Members rein it by not appointing the most gifted individuals. On a positive note, the posts send a signal about the EU’s potential, updating and simplifying its presence, and interlinking better the bodies in which both positions are involved

Institutionalising European values in an intergovernmental system

The issues dealt with in section-3 regarded the extent to which Member States define the EU as a global actor in the post-Lisbon period; how far power has shifted to Brussels; and whether theoretical models are useful in defining understanding.

Member States do have a large say in the way the EU develops. This is perhaps most so in CSDP terms. It is shown that Members are poor when it comes to constructing Europe in military terms. They waste resources; use defence as an industry; duplicate efforts and equipment; are poor coordinators and have differing national visions. Although it was suggested maintaining a large military is not necessary, it was also contended that in order to deal with the type of threats discussed, better coordination/organisation was needed. The Lisbon innovation most likely to see this occur is the invention of the PSCD. This requires Member States to integrate further in order to take advantage of the framework.

Although the intergovernmental character of CFSP/CSDP shapes how the EU acts abroad, it does not define it fully. Evidence suggests that within a range of agencies, exists an esprit de corps. This collective spirit is influential on policy output. The final say in policy is intergovernmental, but the process takes part in European institutional settings. These conform to Chekel’s model of constructivism/institutionalism and rational choice theory.
Strategising effectively within a globally interdependent world
Sections 4-6 looked at the shared question of whether the EU’s toolbox is sufficient so that it can strategise effectively in the current geo-legal/political/institutional contexts. These sections also introduced the IR viewpoint, complex interdependence, which posits that the world in which the EU and others operate, focuses around complicated inter-institutional interplay between various actors.

Section-4, considered the EU and its dealings with international law. It was suggested that the EU is used to operating under supranational law, and is well-placed in this system. Two examples looked at referred to what the EU contributes regarding WMDs and terrorism. By leading in these areas, it was argued this added international legitimacy to the EU.

Section-5 deliberated on the EU as a civilian/military actor in geo-political terms. It was argued that the EU could be an effective actor in this world, but it needs to redefine itself in terms of using all of the tools at its disposal. This means distinguishing soft/hard power capacities, and deploying whichever are necessary to achieve the type of ends Lisbon indicates are sought. The EU has a principled depth to its foreign policy objectives, and it should not be afraid to use military means to achieve good ends.

Section-6 looked at the EU as a strategist within a geo-institutional context. The upgrade in EU modalities at the UN’s Assembly and Security Council were noted. It was argued that this is a signifier of Lisbon at work, streamlining the EU as a global actor and adding legitimacy to it. This was all the more impressive given the assistance Member States gave to achieving that end. It was suggested that a new policy focus should be to work to increase EU competences in other organisations.

This section also looked at the EU in terms of how it was perceived by others. It appears global citizens from the strongest states view the EU as a desirable working partner for their own governments. This was in contrast to how Member States are perceived, who were seen as losing global influence.

Challenges for a multipolar global order
The final section dealt with the EU in IR terms, with attention paid to the global shift in power relations from unipolarity to multipolarity. The specific issues dealt with related to what strengths the EU brings to the emerging multipolar global order, and the areas the EU needs to focus on in order to cope over the coming decades.

A main suggestion made was that the emerging multipolar order presented a new type of international system of governance. Multipolarity is potentially more dangerous than
unipolarity. It is a system which could turn anarchic, should it not be managed. A number of potential shocks were addressed, and it was argued that a multilateral approach is the only way these can be tackled. It was argued the EU should be pro-active with others in attempting to bind new powers within global institutions. Given the redistribution of powers, it was contended that the EU should not expect emerging actors to fit in to institutional settings without compromise being made. Helping to reform institutions such as the UN and G8 (potentially abandon), which the EU has intimated it support for, is a key area to focus on.

A second suggestion for dealing with this world was for the EU to take more seriously its capacities and responsibilities as a military actor. The US attitude to NATO has weakened, and although the EU is unable to be a global military power in the same terms as the US or Russia, it can define itself better so it can take care of the types of problems identified in this section, many of which are neighbourhood issues. A more streamlined military capacity, building on the PSCD, combined with an upgraded EDA, could play an important part in the EU helping to create a more secure world order.

(8.1) Problem formulation revisited

The problem formulation at the beginning of this thesis was: *In the wake of the ratification of Lisbon, is the EU a stronger foreign and security actor (PF1)? What barriers are there to promoting liberal international norms (PF2)? Are institutions the future in a multipolar world (PF3)?*

It has been argued that the EU *is* a stronger actor in the wake of Lisbon. Innovations like the newly defined roles of President and HR/VP; the ridding of the pillar system; the newly created EEAS, and the invention of PSCD, streamline the EU into a more coherent actor, that possesses the capacity to achieve more than it could prior to Lisbon (PF1). One handicap that remains is the ability of Members to interrupt the flow of policy. This is mitigated to a degree by the European institutions in which policy is formulated. A second barrier to the EU promoting its agenda is its poor track record at being able to be an effective military actor. This has *not* been mitigated, but PSCD is a step in the right direction. A further step it could take is to seek to upgrade the modalities of the EDA (PF2). Lastly, institutions *are* the future. From a regional perspective, it is through these that European ideals are forged. From a global perspective, institutions in an interdependent world are organs which promote order over disorder and law over anarchy (PF3).
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