The Efficacy of Global Governance Processes

A Framework Analysis on the Basis of Sustainable Global Climate Policy

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CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
ASEAN	Association of Southeast- Asian Nations
COP	Conference of the Parties
CSD	Commission on Sustainable Development
EU	European Union
IBSA Forum	India, Brazil, South Africa Forum
IPCC	International Panel on Climate Change
LTCA	Long-term Cooperative Action
MEA	Multilateral Environmental Agreement
SADC	Southern African Development Community
MEM	Major Economies Meeting
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SBI	Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
UN	United Nations
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environmental Development
UNCHE	United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
UNDP	United Nations Development Policy
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Policy
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNMDG	United Nations Millennium Development Goals
USA	Unites States of America
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
WTO	World Trade Organisation

ABSTRACT

Over the last decades the international community of states has been joined by a variety of other stakeholders, including supernational institutions, regional organisations as well NGOs and private actors with respective political, social and economic backgrounds which shape and influence the implementation of international processes. Being confronted with global environmental challenges such as climate change and its growing impact on present and future developments, the international community has initially agreed on the necessity of common action, which finds its expression in a global governance architecture; yet the formulation and implementation of global policies seems to be hampered with regard to effective outcome. In light of international negotiations and global agreements like the Kyoto Protocol and Agenda 21, this paper thus analyses the efficiency of the current governance architecture by assessing and evaluating factors such as *inclusiveness, the network of interaction, coherence* and *mediation*, which are considered as important elements, contributing to a functioning global policy framework. However, the paper also argues for the still important role of strong states for global processes and points out the importance of norm-entrepreneurs as mediators. The paper concludes that the current global governance structure suffers from a lack of *de facto* inclusive cooperation between the different sectors and levels, which leads to insufficient mediation and implementation of norms and respective policies. Thereby it argues that the diverging conception of sustainable principles as a common framework and guideline for common policies and their restrictions by still present realist actions hinders effective global environmental governance processes.

1. INTRODUCTION

The dynamics of globalisation brings along profitable and reforming opportunities but also threats and challenges in areas of economy, technology, human development and the environment. Based on the problems' global and interconnected dimension, the international community shares the common interest to find solutions in the matters of security, prosperity and an outbalanced environment. Since single states and national governance seem to have restricted influence and thus reached their limits to regulate issues that cross national borders or have effect beyond these, a global governance architecture which creates room for cooperation seems to present an effective and efficient solution.

As consequence to the growing global dimension of issues, not only new fields of policy have emerged but also new organisations and institutions that gather a manifold of actors which specialise on certain issues only, have been established to provide information and support procedures. Next to the nation state, supernational- and regional institutions, non-governmental organisations, interest- based agencies and the media have taken their seat on the political stage and increasingly influence the development of politics and society in one way or the other.

With regard to the emergence of climate policy gaining attention on the stage of international politics and thus demanding for cooperation, the 1972 UN Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm assembled the international community to discuss environmental issues. This was followed by numerous conventions and the establishment of global environmental organisations and agencies, all bringing wider attention to the field and introducing a new urgency to the topic.

However, almost 40 years after Stockholm and 20 years after the Rio Earth Summit of 1992, where the international community was brought together under the framework of global governance, environmental policy still seems to be in its early stages. Starting out as a promising solution for increasingly global difficulties, global governance represents an all-inclusive and connecting architecture to tackle the challenges of the 21st century. Despite new developments to introduce and expand regional institutions as well as to organise international summits to discuss affairs and call for global and common solutions, it appears that genuine effort to react on these innovative global structures to meet the pressing

demands is lacking. This raises questions regarding the efficiency of current political structures as well as the matter of what is halting the processes.

It is the increasing interaction, due to developments in technology, economy and politics, as well as the thereof rising number of issues and goals that demand for global governance. The notion of *triple bottom line*, stipulating a concurrent and equal realisation of economic, ecological and social goals thus presents itself as a necessary tool to meet the challenges of the 21st century. However, a mismatch between the demand for governance and the actual formulation and implementation of policies seems to be present. Based on these considerations the following research question can be posed:

Given that global governance is the solution for a sustainable global climate policy, then what is halting this process?

First, the concept of global governance will be defined according to its normative claims; afterwards its key traits and elements will be underlined to establish a basis for later analysis. Secondly, the current status of climate change, its sources and impact will be shortly discussed and a historic overview on the past developments in the field of climate policy with regard to conferences and declarations will be given. Thirdly, possible shortcomings and sources of ineffectiveness in the global governance architecture will be traced and analysed as well as applied to the conditions and developments in climate policy. Eventually, future developments, possible changes and room for improvement will be discussed.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1. Approaches to research

The methodological approach used in this paper to determine what is halting the global environmental governance processes and thereby preventing successful and effective outcomes in climate policy is to apply an analytical framework as it is given by the architecture's normative concept of global governance. In order to trace the key elements of this analytical framework to answer the research question, a clear definition of the concept of global governance and its elements proves to be important to ensure relevant findings. Thereby, the normative claim of global governance comprises a manifold of different elements which are considered to constitute and contribute to an efficient framework to initiate and develop effective processes. Hence, the identification and outlining of the architecture's single structural elements help to establish an analytical framework, according to which possible shortcomings regarding the positive claim of global governance and within climate policy can be traced and thus be determined as halting implementation processes. Proposing these structural elements and their performance with regard to their function and quality as being decisive for the general process of global governance, it will help to identify problem areas, which eventually affect the performance in the field they are exerted on, i.e. climate policy. It follows that this paper uses the different structural elements as they are given by the concept of global governance in order to describe and determine the current international political environment with regard to climate policy, which will then serve as a tool to observe, analyse and evaluate current structures and its processes.

Proposing global governance architecture and its single elements as a factor which will help to answer the posed research question, it constitutes an independent variable 'to measure a certain phenomenon'. As Johnson and Reynolds claim, these independent variables cause, influence or effect in one way or the other another phenomenon, in this case global governance.[1] Consequently, the performance or output of global governance, in this case climate policy, represents the dependent variable as it is affected or dependent on the independent variables, i.e. its different elements that together constitute the political framework as determined by the concept of global governance. Yet, I am aware of the fact

[1] Johnson and Reynolds (2005) p.108

that a manifold of independent variables is responsible for the overall performance of the dependent variable. Therefore, I will concentrate my research on the structural elements, their purpose and implementation, which in their performance make for a functioning governance architecture. Further attention will be given to the interrelation of the different independent variables. Other factors such as the content and methods of the formulated policy proposals have its effect on the performance of the global architecture as well. However, this research paper will mainly deal with the structural elements and factors of the global environmental governance framework and less with content-related variables. Therefore, the results of the subsequent research should be considered to present only a structurally-based answer to the overall problem as formulated above. The analysis of possible additional factors such as treaty mechanisms or the distribution of emission targets will only be assessed when in relation to the performance of structural elements; their in-depth evaluation lies therefore beyond the scope of this research paper.

Having defined the elements that constitute the global structure, the two units of analysis will thus be global governance and climate policy. Whereas global governance is analysed as a political framework, climate policy serves as a means to analyse its effectiveness. Accordingly, the evaluation of the state of climate policy will make inferences on the functioning of global governance.[2] This cross-level analysis serves as a tool to clarify the formulated research question by analysing and evaluating the global governance structure when exerted in the field of climate policy. As indicated above, the concept of global governance serves as a framework to identify what is halting the processes in global climate politics, which reactively indicates the general state of global governance as a global political structure.

In the qualitative research on global governance, both an inductive as well as a deductive approach will be applied. Thereby, the evaluation of the concept of global governance serves as a means to determine what is halting the process with regard to global climate policy. Starting with a deductive approach, tracing the different independent variables that constitute global governance will make it possible to identify what constitutes effective processes. On the basis of their performance and implementation, the general effectiveness of global environmental governance processes will be determined. Accordingly, the

[2] Johnson and Reynolds (2005) p.120

observational part reflects on the current status of global climate policy, especially with regard to its international standing and developments. The examination of the empirical data is followed by the stage of analysis, in which the independent elements of global governance, as previously identified, serve as analytical tools and are then applied to global climate policy, its different agreements and institutions. Hereby, it will be evaluated whether the different independent variables of global governance are rightly applied or executed in order to determine possible shortcomings that cause a halting of processes. An inductive approach will then serve to give an outlook on climate policy within the framework of global governance and allows for general conclusions.[3] Consequently, the theoretical assessment of global governance and the empirical research on global climate policy enables to analyse the status quo of global governance processes.

2.2. Choice of empirical material

The empirical data used to answer the research question is based on desk research. Thereby, both primary and secondary sources will be taken into account. Primary sources consist of agreements, resolutions and other kinds of officially drafted documents and statements by organisations such as the UN, regional organisations as well as negotiation rounds and their representatives. Secondary sources include articles and excerpts authored by experts and renowned scholars which have been published in relevant political and environmental academic journals, books and periodicals. Considering the use of secondary sources, it is of great importance to ensure the material's validity and reliability and not least an overall relevance for the research. Hence, the literature in this paper has been chosen carefully, thereby taking into account and considering both critical and positive stances on the topic to come to an encompassing discussion and evaluation.

By examining and analysing the chosen topic, I hope to get a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of global governance and its prerequisites for an effective and progressive global architecture. Finally, following the methodological outline as explained above will help to answer the research question: *Given that global governance is the solution for a sustainable global climate policy, then what is halting this process?*

[3] Bryman (2008) p.11

3. THE CONCEPT OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Globalisation describes the increase in worldwide interdependence in areas such as economics, technology, environment, finance and culture. The impact of international relations can be traced not only at the state level, but also at regional or supernational levels, thereby affecting individuals and whole societies likewise. Based on the developments in the different sectors, politics has undergone a transformation as well, suddenly faced with challenges that are of relevance to all of the international community; the expansion of trade and finance, migration flows and security risks, developments at the cost of the environment. However, even if wanted, it seems unlikely if not impossible to stop globalisation or erase its negative side effects.[4] In the light of these developments, political structures and notions, some dating back as far as the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 laying the ground for state sovereignty, do not seem to fit the international dimension of issues anymore. Challenges and problems that surpass national borders demand for a reconsideration of political frameworks and means of regulation in form of stronger cooperation and deep integration on all levels and in all areas. Over the past decades, a rising amount of international agreements and treaties have been contracted, while the number of governmental as well as non-governmental agencies and organisations has increased and a civil society with a growing interest in global affairs seems to have formed. Thus, a transformation of politics seems to take place that adds a new approach to political concepts and current international relations theories. By incorporating non-governmental actors and thereby adding a more dynamic approach to institutionalism, global governance constitutes a holistic, overlapping governance structure aiming at the common solution of transborder problems, which moreover opposes the rather state-centred and interest-based understandings of realism.[5]

Under the overall term of global governance, scholars and scientists describe an architecture of global politics, away from the former unilateralism towards a structure of multilateral actions. However, as the political scientist Thomas Weiss underlines, within academic discourse many different definitions and perceptions of global governance have been used to determine current structures in international relations, which relates to the still evolving

[4] Rosenberg (2005) pp.36-37
[5] Najam et al (2004) p.25

concept of global governance, its architecture and processes. Based on these approaches global governance will be defined as a normative perspective, describing a political programme, and as a conceptual framework which constitutes a tool for further analysis.[6] In the course of this research paper, these two definitions help to analyse and evaluate the 'construction' of global climate policy- structures and to answer the research question of what is halting the processes. However, it should be noted that a clear distinction between the two approaches cannot always be made.

3.1. Normative claim

Living in a world of constant and increasing transitions, the concept of global governance constitutes a structure or political programme that is designed to meet the challenging demands of the 21st century; a world that is caught in "the clash between globalization, centralization and integration on the one hand, and localization, decentralization and fragmentation on the other." [7] The political scientist James Rosenau's rather lose description captures the ambiguous state of international affairs; calling it governance instead of the more clear-cut term government further underlines this perception of dynamic structures. Contrary to the idea of a world or global government, the term global governance does not relate to a formal hierarchy and the interplay between conventional regimes and institutions, but builds on the collective regulation of issues, i.e. the common and multilateral construction of globalisation and its effects towards positive outcomes. With this regard, Rosenau perceives global governance to "include systems of rule at all levels of human activity - from the family to the international organization - in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions." This definition underlines the different aspects of global governance that should assure efficient processes of global politics. As Rosenau suggests, global governance compasses a set of rules, i.e. a certain structure and perception of norms which, in its regulative function, encompasses all levels. Thereby, the relations and interaction between these different levels need to be overseen. Through the 'exercise of control', the architecture of global governance should not

[6] Weiss (2000) p.795
[7] Rosenau (1995) p.70

only provide for and guide multilateral relations but also ensure for their intentional positive effectiveness.[8]

At the same time, this global architecture implies a common understanding of the importance to act collectively for the common good. Thereby, it is not only nation states that voluntarily agree to cooperate on global issues. What distinguishes global governance from former perceptions of international relations is the increase of the variety of other actors that recognise common aims and issues and therefore interact at the global level as well. The concept envisions the interaction of nation states, international regimes, UN organisations, regional integration projects as well as local politics, NGOs and civil society, which are all related and interact at the different levels. Thus, global governance describes the compression of all kinds of actors in order to overcome global problems in finding common solutions. Through the integration of non-governmental actors, a more efficient and all encompassing approach to global problems is tried to be established. The diversity of actors, which finds its expression in its diverging structures, compositions, purposes and interests, is meant to facilitate and allow for the assessment and tackling of problems from different angles and levels. The cooperation between and within regional organisations is encouraged the same way as is the implementation of international decisions at the local level.[9] As shown in the graphic below, the scope of actions and regulations by one actor effect and intervene with the spheres of other actors, regardless of their formal structure and position. Moreover, the overlapping entities consist of lower levels, which are influenced and directed by the respective higher but from which new incentives for regulations can derive as well. Hence, global governance architecture provides for multilateral connections at all times.

[8] Rosenau (2004) p.13
[9] Ibid pp.14-15



Actors and levels of action in global governance structure (fig.1)[10]

Based on these characteristics, global governance constitutes a very dynamic political programme, which is steadily shaped and changed by its altering focus points and interests, norms and values, but which revolves around questions of prosperity and human survival at any given time; a cooperation of states and non-governmental actors from the local up to the global level.

3.2. Analytical framework

Next to the increasing presence and influence of international institutions and organisations, the concept of global governance confronts the international community with new political environments, in which sources of authority can be rather informal and not as clear cut as they used to be in the traditional framework of sovereign states as realist actors, therefore demanding for modified means of implementation.[11] In order to assess and determine a functioning architecture, the two political scientists Messner and Nuscheler define effective global governance as "the creation of networks, from the local to the global level, based on a shared problem-solving orientation, a fair balance of interests and a workable canon of shared norms and values as a basis for institutional structures for the handling of problems

[10] based on Messner & Nuscheler (1997) p.5
[11] Biermann et al (2009) p.2

and conflicts."[12] The analytical framework of global governance thus serves to analyse the actual function or processes and the implementation of the 'programme' of global governance in this new political context. In reference to the normative approach of global governance, certain features can be attributed to the concept, which constitute a basis for its analysis and distinguishes it from other conventional international relations theories. The framing of global regulatory agreements and the implementation of changing norms thus seems to be the major aspect of global governance in current politics. In an arena in which nation states and legal norms as well as non-state actors and innovative ideas are represented and have some sort of standing, developed means and processes ought to ensure the workings of global governance.[13] Breaking down this framework to the different elements or independent variables which together are perceived to construct a functioning global governance architecture, one can trace the following variables.

According to the global governance concept, the actors in a global political framework are numerous and diverse in their size, power and legitimacy, which demands for sub-systems and relations between the various levels and institutions (see fig.1). However, in order to ensure these 'systems of the system' to work properly and efficient, a *mediation* between the highest global and norm- defining level down to the executive and local levels needs to take place. This mediation, however, foregoes a *network of interaction*. This includes not only interconnectedness between the global and the local, but between the different strands as well. Whether an issue is of direct concern of a small or powerful state or institution, a non-profit organisation or the business sector, only an *inclusive architecture* can have global effect and offer suitable solutions. Eventually, a globally inclusive network, i.e. global governance, generates *coherent action* and *frames regulatory agreements* based on common norms and interests, but is at the same time aware of the different needs and mechanisms of implementation. The analytical framework thus deals with the question of how the ideas formulated at the supranational level are transmitted and implemented at the lower level, thereby evaluating the interaction of the different levels. Governance means governing, the practice of the programme as determined by the architecture, i.e. with a global scope. It is therefore not only concerned with the formation of global structures and

[12] Messner & Nuscheler (1997) p.36
[13] Dingwerth & Pattberg (2006) p.194

their formulation of decisions and rules to begin with but also their consequences, hence the effectiveness of global processes which is as important to analyse.[14]

4. EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND

4.1. The climate change

The consequences and impacts of climate change become increasingly visible not only to scientists but in the daily lives of the almost seven billion citizens of the earth. Extreme changes in weather with hot spells, droughts and flooding seem to occur in regular return, the polar caps are melting and not only animals are threatened to lose their habitat. Changes in climate can furthermore cause epidemics effecting people, animals or the fauna, as well as limit essential resources. It appears that climate change constitutes both a humanitarian and ecological challenge. Some consequences might be less dangerous, obvious or pressing than others, however climate change is happening and will eventually lead to insurmountable challenges.

The CO^2 concentration is as high as never before during the past 650,000 years and emissions are still increasing.[15] Since the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century, today's leading developed nations, such as the USA, Western Europe and the former Soviet states, have made unlimited use of fossil fuels and emitted large amounts of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Latest assessments have shown that emerging market states like China, Brazil or India, which are presently in their industrialising phase, already contribute a big share to the overall emissions and which will further increase in the near future.[16] Yet other states, often developing and poor countries see themselves confronted with the mostly negative effects of globalisation without having greatly contributed to the changes of the atmosphere and moreover lacking the means to react and adapt to the challenges.[17]

Research has shown that climate change is man-made and that intervention is necessary to prevent drastic changes in the atmosphere. Almost 2/3 of all CO^2 emissions are caused by the combustion of fossil fuels like oil, gas and coal mainly used for energy production for

[14] Finkelstein (1995) p.369
[15] Dow & Downing (2007) p.9
[16] see Appendix A
[17] Dow & Downing (2007) p.42

heating and cooling, in traffic and industrial production. While many industrialised countries have started to reduce their overall emissions through means of renewable energy sources, a more responsible handling of fuels or the slowing down of economic prosperity, industrialising states' emissions still increase, since their current prosperity is strongly connected to the use of fossil fuels.[18]

Considering the differences in the states' level of industrial development and their respective contribution to climate change and the increasing CO^2 emissions into the atmosphere over the past hundred years, commonly acceptable agreements on environmental action are difficult to negotiate. Due to the complex causes, relative liability, economic reasons, potentials of advantage and disadvantage, states take over diverging positions on how to cure the problem. However, there is the general common agreement that climate change presents an imminent threat to the international community. To begin with, this has lead to the emergence of global negotiations in different settings and on various levels in the field of climate policy, while its efficiency still needs to be assessed.

4.2. Sustainable global climate policy

The issue of climate change shows that a holistic and integral approach is needed to face the problem in its entirety, since changes in the atmosphere and resulting impacts on nature and the daily life do not stop at national borders or affect the producer of emissions only. Although some countries or regions might be more directly affected by the results of climate change than others, the global dependency makes the climate crises of everyone's concern.

A country's ability to adapt to and cope with the burden and dangers that climate change brings with it strongly depends on the state's prosperity as well as its resources and political system. Especially with regard to the former two, a sustainable approach to climate change is considered to be inevitable. Fundamental changes in areas of energy production and consumption, traffic-systems, prosperity and the economy in general need to be pursued. This can only be guaranteed through long-term, sustainable conceptions, cooperation, innovation and investment from the public and the private, companies and the states, at the local and the global level.[19] Despite the apparent importance of individual action, an all-

[18] Dow & Downing (2007) p.42
[19] Lemos & Agrawal (2009) pp.78-79

encompassing and inclusive solution to climate change is thus needed. In that sense, the architecture of global governance serves as a framework to provide room for the structures and links for sustainable and integral common action.

Renewable energies, in form of wind, solar, water power and biomass energy present one sustainable solution to the reduction of greenhouse gases worldwide. So far, only 4% of worldwide energy is gained from emission-free resources. Yet, new developments in technologies and high investments by the OECD states predict an increase up to 30% in 2035. So-called clean economies would thus emit less CO^2 into the atmosphere. During the beginning of the industrialisation of most western countries, the economy in general and prosperity heavily relied on steal and production industries, which emitted large amounts of CO^2. Only since the development of hi-tech industries and the more efficient processing of natural resources, a high CO^2 intensity does not constitute a prerequisite for economic prosperity anymore. Policies that pursue ecological minded, sustainable investments in the energy sector and infrastructure of developing countries like China and India therefore become one of the more crucial elements to cut emissions within the next years.[20]

The *triple bottom line* of sustainable development offers a holistic approach to these challenges, as it embeds the realisation of ecological, social and economic goals in equal shares, with the aim to secure efficacy and prosperity in all three sectors.[21] The approach foresees the cooperative engagement of all three sectors with each other. Thereby, a collaboration does not constitute a win at another sectors loss, but tries to balance the measures to create a win-win situation, where results are viable, bearable and equitable at the same time in a sustainable manner (see fig.2).

[20] Dow & Downing (2007) p.80
[21] Young (2009) p.19

Triple bottom line to capture sustainable measures (fig.2) [22]

"Sustainability is about much more than just the environment."[23] The principle of sustainability not only takes into account the environmental aspects of actions but is furthermore socially and economically sensible. It is about weighing up the various actions and their impacts on the different sectors, which requires next to good networking a high degree of transparency in all considerations and final choices.[24] A sustainable approach to climate change thus relies on investments that will mainly show its effect in the long-term. This makes it especially difficult for poor and developing countries to adapt to the changes and invest in for example clean energy, when prosperity is needed right now and short term investment and results seem more pressing. Yet, this only underlines the importance of the development of a system that globally supports and invests in sustainable solutions to avert climate crises and simultaneously offers economic and social help to the less and least developed states. As Dow and Downing argue, the earlier investments are made the lower are the costs in the long run, which only underlines once more the demand for an immediate and effective supply of global governance.[25]

4.3. From Rio via Kyoto to Cancùn

Being the first UN conference dealing with environmental issues only, the UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm in 1972 set the foundation for the establishment of further environmental programmes, institutions and agreements, thus the starting point for a global environmental policy. Since then, the UN Environment Programme

[22] Sustainability Partners International (2010)
[23] Coenegracht (2011) p.18
[24] Ibid p.18
[25] Dow & Downing (2007) p.84

(UNEP) operates as the UN's 'voice of the environment' raising awareness and communicating on topics concerning the environment and sustainable development. Since 1988, the then established Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) makes aware of climate risks and serves as an expert body, evaluating new trends and gathering innovative approaches to fight a global climate crisis. However, it is the succeeding 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also known as the Rio Conference or Earth summit, which is oftentimes considered as the benchmark in environmental politics, setting out guidelines for global sustainable development. Back then, 172 governments took part at the global conference and more than 2400 representatives from non-governmental organisations participated to be joined by even more activists who had consultative status.[26] Among the most important and influential agreements resulting from the Rio Conference, the participants agreed on the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), later producing the legally binding Kyoto Protocol, as well as the UN action plan Agenda 21 for sustainable development. [27]

The UNFCCC, entering into force in 1994 and enjoying a membership of all 192 UN member states[28], lays out a clear and collectively agreed definition of climate change "meaning a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods"[29] and has as its major aim the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere. The Convention's two Subsidiary Bodies for Scientific and Technological Advise (SBSTA) as well as for Implementation (SBI) serve as advisory bodies and offer expert knowledge at the various Conferences of the Parties (COP) meetings in their respective field of scientific and methodological issues or effective implementation of measures and policies.[30] Having been passed at the Rio Conference in 1992 as well, the action plan Agenda 21 serves as a guideline for sustainable development in the 21st century. It is understood as a package of measures involving the adaption of policies in sectors such as economy, energy or trade, thus mainly directed at international organisations and national governments. However as decided for in 2002, to meet local

[26] UNEP (n.d.)
[27] Rio Declaration (1992)
[28] Number counts for all current states, excluding The Vatican, Kosovo and South Sudan
[29] UNFCCC (1992) Art.1(2)
[30] UNFCCC b. (n.d.)

demands and support a better and more effective implementation of measures, a Local Agenda 21 with local action campaigns was formulated.[31]

Although not being legally binding in itself but being considered as a key element for the implementation of CO^2 mitigation processes, the Kyoto Protocol represents a highly discussed measure in global environmental governance. Initiated in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997 and entering into force in 2005, the Kyoto Protocol so far has been ratified by 191 countries (as of July 2011). Acknowledging the historically determined differences in responsibility for the current level of greenhouse gases based on the level of industrialisation, the Protocol distinguishes between the group of industrialised and transforming states as well as emerging market states and developing countries. Accordingly, only the first group of states commits themselves to reduce their emissions to an individually assigned amount to be reached mainly through national measures and to offer support to developing countries in their adaptation to the climate change, while all other signatories agree to make efforts to cut emissions but are not obliged to comply and act in accordance with any binding commitments.[32]

In the meantime, annual COPs have been held to assess the trends of possible processes in emission cuts as well as to agree on a follow-up agreement for the time after 2012, when the Kyoto Protocol will expire. More recently, the 2009 climate change conference in Copenhagen and the Cancún conference held one year later could not agree to adopt a new protocol with binding regulations but renewed the recognition of long-term cooperation as a means to act against the changes in climate as assessed by the IPCC. The non-binding Copenhagen Accord reinforced the Protocol's aim to keep the global increase in temperature below 2° Celsius. In Mexico, it was further decided to establish a Green Climate Fund to support developing countries as well as a Climate Technology Centre, providing for a better network of global exchange. The task to formulate concrete goals and to agree on a follow-up protocol has once more been put on the next COP agenda at Durban, South Africa, in November 2011.[33]

[31] Division for Sustainable Development (n.d.)
[32] Kyoto Protocol (1997)
[33] COP 16 (2010)

5. ANALYSIS

Given the conceptual framework of global governance, three major areas for analysis can be identified as being relevant in tracing possible obstacles to global climate policy processes. First fields of analysis are the policy arrangements with regard to new actors and levels of action, which are concerned with new roles and responsibilities as well as innovative means of cooperation. This, however, opens up another field of discussion on the role of the state and the therewith connected concept of sovereignty. A third room for analysis is constituted by the normative function of the conceptual framework of global governance, creating and framing norms and areas of interest. In trying to find out what is halting the process in global climate policy, the succeeding analysis is conducted on the basis of the three aspects as mentioned above.

5.1. Structural policy arrangements

As described earlier, the structure or framework of global governance embeds the presence of certain elements, i.e. *inclusiveness, a network of interaction, coherence* and *mediation*, which in its exercise are meant to bring about the best possible outcomes for global scenarios, such as effective policies on the subject of global climate change. Since its recognition as a global and urgent problem by the global community, states and organisations have taken action to come together and discuss the matter on an international level by calling in conferences and formulating statements that express the need for action. (see 3.3.) While the preceding Rio Conference in 1992 had the amount of 172 governments participating and approximately 2400 representatives of worldwide NGOs being present at the summit, the resulting UNFCCC was signed by 166 states when entering into force in 1994. Up until today, 192 governments and the European Union as regional economic integration organisation have approved of and ratified the convention's main goal to restrict and reduce the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere by implementing innovative means and policies, thereby "acknowledging that change in the Earth's climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of humankind".[34] Seen from this perspective and over the years, the UNFCCC has gathered an inclusive global basis of states for further action and which recognises the problems of climate change. Since a global problem like climate change demands for a global and hence inclusive approach with everyone's contribution

[34] UNFCCC (1992) Preamble

necessary, notwithstanding their initial responsibility and their consequential binding or voluntary commitments, it follows that inclusiveness has to be assured *de jure* as well as *de facto*. With the UNFCCC currently hosting all states, a *de jure* inclusive global forum with matching guidelines seems to be given. From a positive outlook, it can thus be argued that the drafted agreements, guidelines and recommendations underline the international community's perception of the necessity for action and to adapt to environmental conditions.[35]

Widening the spectrum for actors and action, the UNFCCC as the UN secretariat to prepare and organise their annual conferences does not only invite its member states, but also reaches out to non-state actors to attend the conventions. Breaking new ground, the UN and its environmental programmes include and welcome non-state actors at international conferences. This comprises next to NGOs, intergovernmental and regional organisations also representatives of the private sectors.[36] The high degree of inclusiveness contributes to a wider picture of the issue and grants the possibility to rely on a diversity of resources with regard to technical and scientific expertise as well as financial support. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon calls this a new global leadership, defining it as "a new constellation of international cooperation - governments, civil society and the private sector, working together for a collective global good".[37] Resulting out of these developments, agencies like the IPCC closely work with scientific experts and organisations in formulating their advisory documents. Yet, it should be noted that these actors do not possess any formal power. Regarding this matter, the inclusiveness of global governance is limited to inclusive presence, while inclusiveness with regard to factual decision-making power or the determining vote remains with the states.

Considering the current global order and governing framework, however even within the international community of states and the UN, differences between their *de facto* influences can be traced. As the social scientist Jim Whitman argues, the institutional framework favours an order led and shaped by the wealthy and industrialised countries, calling its global dimension rather "exclusive and functionalist".[38] Hereby, he refers to the developed world

[35] Whitman (2009) p.32
[36] UNFCCC a (nd.)
[37] Ban (2009)
[38] Whitman (2009) p.46

as the political and technical elites, who create, shape and steer the functional agencies, i.e. international organisations. Developing countries would thus be excluded from constructively influencing global declarations and policies, as well as their coordination and administration. Wanting to make aware of these shortcomings, unions like the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), oftentimes in support of NGOs, hold alternative meetings and actions of protest which take place along the actual UN meetings. Rather recently, this was the case at the 2010 COP in Cancùn, where the spokespersons of AOSIS, currently representing 43 states like Tuvalu, the Cook Islands and the Maldives, rejected the target agreement of the world's major economies to reduce global warming to below 2° Celsius by 2050, which is considered as unacceptable and insufficient by the AOSIS states to prevent sea encroaching. As the alliance' science advisor Albert Binger argues, "We cannot compromise. But now the rich countries want us to be collateral damage".[39] Statements like these impair the general perception of an inclusive governance framework, but also agreements deriving from global processes and which aim for high inclusiveness have been criticised for its structure and translation.

Representing one such agreement, the Kyoto Protocol, signed in 1997 as a complement to the UNFCCC, has been celebrated as well as criticised for its attempt to create an inclusively global agreement to fight climate change. Having been signed and ratified by almost all UN member states so far, however lacking one significant ratification of one of the world's largest contributors to high CO^2 emissions, the USA, the Protocol further distinguishes between its signatories with regard to their level of economic development. Based on the Protocol's principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities"[40], the agreement has different ponderosity for its respective signatories. In this regard, countries gathered under Annex B[41], i.e. industrialised states and states in transition, bindingly commit to reduce their CO^2 emissions by an individually fixed target on the basis of the countries' respective economic development and abilities. With the overall reduction of greenhouse gases by an average 5.2% by 2012, the EU member states for example commonly commit to 8% thereby following the principle of burden-sharing, Japan and Canada commit to a 6% reduction, while Russia, considered as a transitory state, commits not to exceed its level of emissions of

[39] Oxfam (2010)
[40] Kyoto Protocol (1997) Art.10
[41] see Appendix B.3.

1990. Moreover, the group of Annex II countries[42], consisting of fully industrialised states that have ratified the Protocol, agrees to support the developing states in their adaption processes. As laid out under Art.10(c) of the Protocol, the states commit to "Cooperate in the promotion of effective modalities for the development, application and diffusion of, and take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies, know-how, practices and processes pertinent to climate change, in particular to developing countries".[43] The third group of non-Annex B states[44], i.e. developing states and emerging market states, are not restricted by any means but voluntarily agree to make effort to adapt to better environmental standards. It follows that the Kyoto Protocol sets binding targets on 36 industrialised and transition states to restrict their emissions and implement new policies, while the remaining signatory states voluntarily follow recommendations to contribute to a better climate, but which do not restrict them in their economic development.[45]

As can be argued, the differentiation of states along the lines of ability and responsibility measured against economic performance is set out to guarantee an inclusive and moreover fair framework. With the initial aim of ensuring coherence and inclusive action, the Kyoto Protocol thereby acknowledges the states' different possibilities and resources as well as their need for support to enable and implement means and guidelines for a better climate. Approaching climate change from an economic perspective, the Protocol thus bases present commitment as well as responsibility mainly on past economic performance. Only countries which have experienced prosperity and competitiveness already from an early stage onwards are therefore expected to take most responsibility by committing to binding restrictions of market-based mechanisms and offering support at the same time. Otherwise, especially developing countries are perceived to struggle with the implementation of global environmental guidelines.

It follows that although all nations are considered equal within the UN framework, the states not only greatly differ in their influence and power in international settings but also in their means to adhere to guidelines and implement agreements. Whitman points out that

[42] see Appendix B.2.
[43] Kyoto Protocol (1997) Art.10(c)
[44] see Appendix B.4.
[45] Dow & Downing (2007) p.72

"environmental problems are a matter of perception".[46] While the West and its industrialised states would consider something as a huge environmental burden, the same practices would provide a minimum living standard for other, less developed parts of the world. However, mitigations in CO^2 emissions by 36 of the most industrialised countries have *de facto* little net impact as long as inclusive, coherent action, i.e. genuine action by the entire international community, is lacking. [47] According to the Protocol's approach, the USA as an industrialised state and after China second largest producer of CO^2 worldwide would be categorised as Annex B state and as such be charged with binding regulations. Nevertheless, emerging market countries like India and China, hence gathered under non-Annex B without any binding obligations, registered an increase in the production of greenhouse gases with only the latter country emitting almost one quarter of total worldwide emissions, an increase of 10% in 2010, and which is predicted to further increase over the next years.[48] Therefore, the current challenge is to draw agreements that take into account the change in climate but also the rights of states to develop and to assure an acceptable standard of living to their populations. Hence, international demands and guidelines have to be coherent, thereby measured against regional needs. In its basic approach, international treaties like the Kyoto Protocol or the locally oriented Agenda 21 action plans acknowledge these differences in possibilities as well as responsibilities by providing support, distinguishing between states and their commitments and leaving room for local interpretation, as it is expressed under Art.2(1)(a) to "Implement and/or further elaborate policies and measures in accordance with its national circumstances".[49] However, their overall success in establishing coherence and ensuring actual compliance is less than certain. Since the USA as one major emitter of CO^2 has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol and emerging economies like China, India or Brazil are not restricted by binding regulations, the Protocol suffers a loss in coherence, which moreover causes a loss in credibility because the initial inclusiveness is not transferred into common, coherent action. Additionally, as Jones et al point out, the fact that all major emitters possess a 'veto' to a successful outcome does not only raise doubts on the general effectiveness of global processes but it furthermore demoralises commitment among those of the international community implementing

[46] Whitman (2009) pp.29-30
[47] Jones et al (2009) p.83
[48] Climate Spectator (2011)
[49] Kyoto Protocol (1997) Art. 2(1)(a)

regulations.[50] Russia, Japan and Canada already repeatedly rejected a continuation of the current Kyoto Protocol with its binding regulations as long as the USA refuses to go along and emerging nations like China are not increasingly incorporated. The failure to draw a follow-up agreement that will succeed the Kyoto Protocol in 2012 thus points at a decreasing willingness to commit to coherent action, although reinforcement of global action and innovative policies to mitigate CO^2 emissions and meet the rising demands are as urgent as ever. [51]

The UN conferences of Copenhagen in 2009 and Cancùn in 2010 called in to agree on a new framework did not bring new solutions and the success it was initially hoped for either. As it turned out at the two consecutive COP summits, the international community settled on declarations, repeating their recognition of the need to take action but without formulating a new binding agreement. The most recent developments include the agreement on Long-term Cooperative Action (LTCA), specifying the relationship between developed and developing countries in form of new funds and emergency aids as well as arranging for the reassessment of the states' current reduction rates to a higher percentage. However, none of the decisions have binding effect.[52] As Jones et al remark, statements for the statement's sake do not account for coherent and effective governance. The reasserted US refusal to commit to the protocol's binding restrictions, followed by the rejection by other states to further cooperate on binding agreements shows that neither the summit in Denmark nor in Mexico was able to draft a new effective global framework. Instead, it increasingly underlines the current reluctance to collaborate genuinely at the global level, thereby predicting a negative picture for negotiations at the next annual meeting in Durban in December 2011 to continue or even enforce the halting of governance processes.[53]

These developments show that despite the fact of the international community having commonly recognised climate change under the UNFCCC, it does not in itself constitute room for inclusive and moreover coherent cooperation. Rather, it can be perceived as a pre-condition for the actual negotiations and resulting agreements. As the Greenpeace energy expert John Coequyt criticises, a least common denominator approach to include all parties

[50] Jones et al (2009) p.84
[51] Ibid p.94
[52] Cancun Agreement (2010) Section II(22)
[53] Jones et al (2009) p.95

as pursued by the Kyoto Protocol in trying to incorporate reluctant states like the USA, decreases the overall effect of regulations. The element of inclusiveness thus seems to illustrate a dilemma in effective global governance.[54] Out of the wish for total inclusiveness, the resulting incoherence in the realisation of international guidelines seems to hamper global governance. In other words, the reluctant behaviour of some states to take action does not support or animate the compliance with voluntary agreements, especially among the transforming and developing countries and despite the initial inclusiveness. Inclusiveness in governance is thus closely connected to the factor of coherence since an inclusive framework should usually suggest a sense of coherence, leading to common and combined action rather than to unilateral and hence less effective action. Insufficient institutional interaction stands out as another crucial factor hampering coherent action. While not only states and the different environmental agencies have to come to agreement, a coherent agenda with other international institutions like the WTO proves to be of equal importance. Since trade agreements under the WTO enjoy global support irrespective of their environmental impact, trade-related obligations might overrule and undermine the implementation of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Whereas the WTO aims at a general liberalisation by protecting free trade, MEAs like the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer or many fishery agreements use trade restrictions as regulatory means. Following Eckersley's argumentation, the perceived conflict between WTO and trade-related environmental agreements needs to be overcome by deliberate and outbalanced coherent action.[55]

Further difficulties with coherence can be traced both at the global as well as at the national and local levels where policies and regulations need to be coordinated to come to full effect. Accordingly, it requires a well functioning network which connects the different sectors and agencies vertically as well as horizontally and beyond national borders.[56] An inclusive network of interaction and cooperation thus proves to be another crucial variable for a functioning global governance. Thereby, the scholars Jones et al distinguish between three main groups among which cooperation is considered a necessity. For once, the UN, its different agencies and international organisations as well as smaller unions present one

[54] Brummit (2007)
[55] Gehring & Oberthür (2008) p.189
[56] Whitman(2009) p.43

group. Next to intergovernmental assemblies, this also includes UN-bodies like the IPCC and several SBSTAs, which collect and provide international scientific data, give advice and assess future trends as basis for formulated guidelines. The second group within this global network is made up of private actors, which mainly provide for capital and technological resources, on which the international community strongly relies. At the same time, the private sector illustrates one part of the addressees of international regulations. Among these are major multinational companies and powerful corporations, such as GE, Shell or Walmart, which call for common global regulations to better predict impacts on market developments in order to reduce risks in investment and pricing.[57] The third group of actors is presented by the public and non-profit sector, taking over the role as watchdogs or whistleblowers. It is not only their task to provide information and raise awareness on the issue of climate crisis, but also to call for action among the international community. As part of the global governance framework, NGOs and other organisations make aware of non-compliance and other kinds of misbehaviour and thus take over a monitoring function. Recognising the need to not only bring together states to discuss on the pressing issues of a changing environment, it is moreover their interaction with corporations and representatives of the non-profit sector and the mobilisation of these to frame, mediate and eventually implement global regulations at the different levels. A well-functioning global network thus not only provides for expertise and capital, but serves as a crucial tool to realise set guidelines in all sectors.[58]

Especially the relatively high amount of organisations in the first group of international representatives however has sometimes been criticised as disadvantage. Although the UNFCCC has officially been designed and legitimised by its member states to organise conferences and regulate matters of climate change, many other yet much smaller groups have formed to discuss climate change and possible strategies on a rather exclusive base, thereby formulating various agreements on the different aspects of climate change and environmental issues. These include negotiations among G8 and the G8+5 countries, or assemblies such as the IBSA forum, the G20+ and the Major Economies Meetings (MEM). [59] Although these sub-groups prove to have a certain effect on international negotiations and

[57] Jones et al (2009) p.86
[58] Ibid p.90
[59] Ibid p.86

can be a helpful tool especially with regard to smaller and less influential states, its degree of constructive contribution and cooperation is rather indistinct, as was the case at the 2003 WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancùn on the Doha development agenda. While a group of developing states was able to express its discontent with the general decision-making of the bigger states by blocking negotiations, it had little productive impact on further developments and effective means in solving the actual issue of global trade. Similar can be said about the MEMs, also called Major Emitters Meetings, initiated by the Bush Administration in 2007 set to discuss strategies for major CO^2 emitters, but which was widely perceived as counter action to the inclusive efforts of the UNFCCC. Perceived as 'a charade' by parts of the international community, the MEMs have been dismissed as a substitution to distract from US reluctance to commit to binding regulations under the Kyoto Protocol. Consequently, one can observe a kind of regulatory competition between the different environmental regimes and sub-groups, which despite taking more or less genuine action to decrease environmental flaws fail to formulate common and thus more effective regulations.[60] Here again, the exchange of information and coherent action is hindered by limited cooperation. Instead of supporting global governance, the relatively high amount of agreements and meetings dealing with single aspects of environmental problems has contributed to an increasingly conceivable *negotiation fatigue*, which is furthermore fed by recurring disagreements and the amount of exclusive groups pursuing separate strategies, supporting their own, usually economic, interests thereby hindering global governance processes.

As it has been constituted under Art.1 of the UNFCCC, all 192 UN member states and signatories of the convention agree to exchange and gather all information and data on the climate crisis as well as to report on their practices, including the amount of emissions as well as the processes and trends of national polices. Moreover, the actors agree to assist developing and transforming states in their adjustment processes through technical and financial aid and the provision of expert knowledge.[61] It is therefore the "combination of inequities and interdependence"[62] demanding for a well-functioning global cooperation. As the UNFCCC recognises the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities and

[60] Gehring & Oberthür (2008) p.191-192
[61] UNFCCC (1992) Art.1
[62] Jones et al (2009) p.87

respective capabilities", it depicts not only a case for coherence but also for interaction between the representatives of industrialised and developing states. A good network among political, scientific and economic sectors and their agencies along the *triple bottom line* would ensure easy access to information and the transfer of technologies, which next to capital, are needed to successfully implement global guidelines in developing countries. The Convention thus calls for policies that are "appropriate for the specific conditions of each Party […] taking into account that economic development is essential for adopting measures to address climate change".[63] Yet, the translation of these principles into practice apparently proceeds rather reluctantly. Especially since the financial crisis of 2008, protective national economies and their rather domestic-oriented policies have taken priority over financial aid and foreign investments to meet environmental standards in developing countries. Instead of networking and creating a common approach to realise the global framework, states predominantly concentrate on their own performance, thereby hampering extensive developments in global governance.[64]

Despite current tendencies of reluctant cross-sector cooperation, a well-connected network is required for combining and interlinking the sectors of politics, technology, the economy and sciences to work on innovative methods that are acceptable, if not profitable to all parties. Additionally, innovative, scientific strategies and inventions have to be presented and discussed at the global political level to ponder, frame and implement these developments to be then passed on to national and regional levels as well as sectors providing capital and the means for pursuance.[65] A network thus provides a tool for mediation, an element which proves especially important in global climate policy.

Since measures to fight climate change are discussed and agreed upon at the global level and are therefore out of immediate touch of the local citizen, the importance of environmental regulations often remains unclear. For one thing, it proves difficult to convey a message of climate change when its impact and possible success in fighting it cannot be felt immediately. Another difficulty is the fact that some people are of more direct and imminent concern than others. However, a global approach to climate change foresees the incorporation and consideration of all individuals, where measures are directed at and of

[63] UNFCCC (1992) Art.3(4)
[64] Jones et al (2009) p.94
[65] Ibid p.106

concern to every citizen.[66] Restrictions are therefore oftentimes perceived as rather 'uncomfortable' and not welcomed by the people, who are, as Whitman points out, constituents in a political system. Popular politics mostly relies on short-term and tangible effects which can be felt by the wider population in the foreseeable future. As argued, however, the global approach to climate change is built on the principles of sustainable development, hence representing a rather long-term project.[67] This makes the mediation of globally formulated regulations, but which are to be addressed nationally, regionally and locally, a difficult yet crucial element for a well-functioning global governance in its approach to climate crisis.

It follows that global guidelines have to be communicated to lower levels to understand their importance of implementation. Jones argues that if the relevance of action is conceived and understood by the local levels, the realisation of these regulations would proceed much faster and with greater disposition. A 2007 survey conducted on the political importance of climate change among the citizens of developing and industrialised states revealed that while it was the top priority in developing countries, where the crisis' overall impacts are felt most, the climate crisis was ranked number three in concerns of most Europeans and placed fourth in the USA. 58% of Brazilians and 60% of Indians showed highest concern, while Germans (26%) and the UK (22%) were least concerned about the issue of a changing climate. The survey also yields a citizens' understanding of a governmental mandate to take first action. It suggests that individuals wait for or expect obligatory regulations, e.g. restrictions, from a higher level, hence rely on government action to intervene and implement the necessary means.[68] For the most part, it seems that NGOs and other non-profit organisations have taken over the role as mediator. However, despite their influence on citizen awareness, they do not possess the same power, authority and possibilities that states do to introduce guidelines. With reference to the survey however, it follows that the state should not necessarily wait for citizen approval and popular legitimacy to implement restricting actions but act on its given mandate and take over a leading and guiding role. According to this, global guidelines have to be communicated by the state to its national and

[66] Whitman (2009) p.30
[67] Ibid p.31
[68] HSBC Climate Confidence Index (2007)

local levels with regard to their importance for the environment and the common future, but also need to be mediated in terms of adjustment to local conditions and needs.[69]

In trying to address the problem of mediation, the action plan Agenda 21 comprises a set of guiding principles assessing environmental, as well as social and economic problems, to initiate and frame sustainable policies at the domestic levels. Initiated in 1992, the action plan includes the establishment of a Local Agenda 21, which refers and reacts more strongly to local conditions and requirements but within the globally formulated guidelines for sustainable development, "Promoting the inclusion of integrated environmental management into general local government activities", as formulated under Art.7.77(e).[70] Despite its documented intention to include and strengthen the role of local councils and communities, its realisation has often been criticised as controlling, undemocratic and lacking transparency in implementation processes. Statements of local representatives at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) underlined the rather moderate success of the agenda. In its aftermath, the formulated Aalborg Commitments at a 2004 meeting of European municipalities moreover demanded the improvement of common aims and their implementation as well as regular efficiency reviews. From today's assessment, the national and local implementation of Agenda 21 remains stagnant with a total number of around 6400 local processes in 113 states, thereby finding most expression in the already industrialised European states, (5300 of the total processes).[71] Thus, the difficult task for the state and its local representatives but also for the international community remains to find the proper expression and ways for the implementation of global guidelines at the local level worldwide, including intensified action in developing states, where implementation has been lowest.

5.2. The state and sovereignty

Throughout the past decades, the roles and responsibilities of states can be perceived to have widened and downsized at the same time. Nation states and its representatives find themselves increasingly challenged by a dilemma, which can be conceived as national identity vs. global responsibility. As sovereign actors, states answer to their population, their

[69] Jones (2002) p.398
[70] Agenda 21 (1992) Art.7.77(e)
[71] Das Österreichische Nachhaltigkeitsportal (n.d.)

demands and fears, which seem to become more complex in light of global developments, but also have to represent and defend their interests and positions on the international stage. Thereby, especially the strengthening of a common national identity seems to serve as a regulative tool for both the people in their wish for security, and the state in its constant efforts to maintain its legitimate powers. While domestic means seem most comprehensible and easiest to implement, they run the risk of denying international needs. Although multi-level and cross-border operations and policies can often be difficult to convey to the people at home, who mostly perceive themselves confronted with seemingly national problems but which increasingly derive from or have to be solved on a global level, the link between national and international issues and respective means needs to find greater expression. Since environmental problems like climate change depict an issue of an undeniably global dimension, national as well as global solutions to answer the demands are in focus of domestic as well as international politics. While states are still sovereign entities and enjoy full authority, a steadily increasing number of international institutional and private authorities as well as civil organisations have joined the state in political policy processes.[72] Global agreements that are drafted at supernational levels create frameworks and guidelines for states to adapt to and which shape local processes and conditions. Simultaneously, local and regional decisions have to take into account their global impact, thus a manifold of factors need to be considered in otherwise national policies.

As the two professors of international environmental politics Dimitris Stevis and Hans Bruyninckx argue against common belief, states are strongly embedded in both national as well as international policies and structures, with regard to agenda-setting and decision-making. It is the state and its agencies which possess the necessary means and authority to promote and implement policies, but also to undermine and prevent certain regulations. While under the Clinton administration, the American president showed himself committed to the Kyoto Protocol, its request for ratification however was never passed to the US Congress, since national consensus was expected to be impossible. Further changes in presidency did not bring a necessary American consensus either. This was different in Australia, a country with one of the highest CO^2 emissions per capita, where new national elections enabled the Protocol's ratification. Unlike in international trade under the

[72] Stevis & Bruyninckx (2006) p.131

oversight of the WTO and other regulatory economic bodies, there is no catalogue of binding supranational rules and rights that deals with environmental behaviour and sets imperative standards.[73] Being at the receiving end of complaints, it is also the state that possesses the means and the legitimacy to enforce rules and as such has coercive power towards private actors. The more important it thus seems to have strong states which cooperate at a supernational level and mediate the general environmental framework towards lower and cross national levels. This 'framed creativity' provides room for domestic policies which match local conditions but which are also in accordance with global regulations.[74] Hereby, the state is both a source of authority in the conventional sense but moreover an 'activator', i.e. facilitating the establishment of networks and collaboration, as was the case with initiatives like the Mediterranean Action Plan or emission-trading systems under the Kyoto Protocol, where governments created platforms which supported the direct exchange and cooperation of public and private actors.[75]

In light of the global dimension of climate change, the more important it seems that single *environmental states* shape and serve as examples for sustainable environmental policies. As brokers, *environmental states* should exert influential power to give an incentive to others to commonly manage ecological flaws to decrease the environmental burden. However, in order for a state to possess this influential power, it has to be reputable and credible for the rest of the international community to be acknowledged as an example or role model and to adopt and establish own environmental standards.[76] As an example for one pioneer state or group, Martin Jänicke refers to the EU, heavily driven by the German government, and its efforts in promoting global standards. Functioning as a 'push-factor', the EU joined by 90 other states agreed to support the use of renewable energies, a regulation which can be considered to exceed the minimum consensus as discussed at the 2002 Johannesburg Summit.[77] Stokke describes this ideational behaviour by few states as a 'process of learning' during which other regimes and institutions can observe and adapt to the innovative approaches. Thereby, a positive reputation or perception mainly measured against their economic standing or performance of the pioneer by the international community is of great

[73] Stevis & Bruyninckx (2006) p.117
[74] Galaz et al (2008) p.180
[75] Ibid pp.179-180
[76] Jänicke (2006) pp.88-89
[77] Ibid p.95

importance. The Danish and German attempts in fostering a greener economy can be seen as examples for national regulations triggering the development and implementation of new technologies. Not only does e.g. Germany serve as a positive example regarding its fast recovery and economic prosperity despite the financial and Euro crisis. Green technologies, e.g. wind and solar power as well as eco-friendly production processes, have made both countries more competitive, i.e. possess a comparative advantage in their respective fields.[78] As Jänicke reasons, the innovative technologies originate from national market-based developments, their funding as well as promotion. Hence, the initial formation of environmental policies is dependent on the state. As national economies are globally interlinked, domestically developed technologies and regulations have spill-over effects, thus shape regulatory approaches transnationally. At the same a dispersion of principles takes place.[79] It follows that despite the increasing amount of non-governmental stakeholders in international politics, as an initiator and promoter of innovative approaches and technologies the state remains one of its key players, which is why its governmental performance and behaviour is important for the effectiveness of global processes. It shows that productive international processes demand strong states.

In the end, however, the success or failure of a pioneer state to exert influence also strongly depends on the willingness and recognition by other states to adapt the new regulations. Despite environmental progress in global policy formation, countries like the USA and China still actively or passively exert a 'pull effect', thereby lowering the common denominator for the establishment of global environmental guidelines and decreasing their general effectiveness. These so-called 'critical countries' show resistance towards innovative developments and linked upcoming norms by attempting to deny their responsibilities as global powers and major emitters.[80] Consequently, an economically strong and prosperous country can both accelerate and slow down global environmental processes. This makes the creation and recognition of common global norms increasingly crucial for successful effective outcomes.

Addressing the *concept of spoilers* in international relations in the context of conflict studies, Stephen Stedman refers to the rather deconstructive behaviour of countries in certain

[78] Stokke (2001) p.10
[79] Jänicke (2007) p.55
[80] Tews (2007) p.110

settings and negotiations. Instead of engaging in common action, *spoiler states* try to undermine attempts for consensus because it "threatens their power, worldview and interest".[81] Approaching this concept from a global environmental angle, states like the USA, China or Russia have presented themselves as *inside spoilers*, which Stedman describes as actors that take part in negotiations or even actively participate, but in the end refuse to meet the demands to implement agreements to reach effective outcomes.[82] However, it should be noted that the classification of actors as *spoilers* is a rather subjective consideration since the declared aims are usually based on moral concepts, which project certain values and as such only express a subjective perception of the current situation and the thereof considered necessary means. While on the one hand this seems logical in peace negotiations and other forms of interstate settings, environmental problems and climate change on the other hand are facts and as such objective.[83] Yet, whereas the consequences of increasing CO^2 emissions and its global, i.e. universal, impact cannot be denied, it is the conception of responsibility and deriving suitable means that presents a rather subjective handling of the issue as such. This subjectivity is furthermore strengthened by the uneven concernment and perception of obvious and dramatic consequences. It follows that transitory or emerging states like Russia and China do not consider restrictive or precautious actions as their primary responsibility, while the USA perceives environmental issues as secondary issue. The reluctant willingness of some states to take part and actively contribute to effective outcomes of international environmental negotiations can be considered to hamper constructive developments of a global climate policy. However, seen from another perspective, Newman and Richmond argue that the classification of the USA as *spoiler* can be used as a political agenda for other states to excuse their own reluctant behaviour, (e.g. Russia, Japan and Canada). With regard to push and pull factors, the *concept of spoilers* as pull states is thus a rather contested conception as it allows for an oversimplification of slow implementation processes and the limited effectiveness of policies and other measures.[84]

Yet, the presence of *spoilers* also predicts a still realist approach to environmental politics and international policy formulation. As countries like the USA, China or Russia understand themselves as rational and unitary actors, thereby putting their own interests over the

[81] Stedman (1997) p.5
[82] Ibid p.8
[83] Newman & Richmond (2006) pp.3-4
[84] Ibid p.4

common good, these states deny the importance or necessity for common action. Their realist understanding of the constant struggle for power in a hegemonic sense prevents equal co-operation at the global level. A zero-sum perception with regard to economics as well as to politics and social ideas prevails over the possibility for win-win situations, in which a common and integral sustainable approach to global challenges is understood to be of mutual gain. In conclusion it can be said that in cases where states decline global co-operation and disallow consensus, short-term unitary interests seem to trump the formulation and implementation of sustainable norms, which rather concentrate on finding long-term solutions.

5.3. Global norm-entrepreneurs

Despite the contestable degree and conception of inclusiveness of global agreements like the Kyoto Protocol or the variety of different agreements and groupings formulated under MEAs, the international community shares the general and common interest in survival as condition *sine qua non.* Inherent to this is the recognition of the importance of stability regarding political, economic and social systems. Therefore, one can argue that global agreements or policies do not represent action on a zero-sum basis. In this light, as the Professor of Public Administration and expert on global governance Jan Kooimann points out, it is important to recognise that all co-operations and actions pursued within the framework of global governance are set out to "solve societal problems or creating social opportunities" internationally and at all levels.[85] Thereby, the establishment of global guidelines by international organisations meets the demands of current and future environmental problems to frame national action and furthermore break ground for innovative but necessary actors and operations. "Norms bring international law home", as the renowned scholar Harold Koh puts it.[86] Yet, a general agreement on these principles still needs to be achieved. As it already is the case with principles like sovereignty or human rights, the general global agreement on these principles as being universal and as such commonly recognised, provides for their high level of compliance. Although these basic principles usually constitute soft law and as such lack binding commitment, it is due to their

[85] Kooiman (2003) p.4
[86] Koh (1998) p.623

'self-evidence' that they 'harden' to be understood as almost mandatory to follow.[87] In case of non-compliance, states and other entities would stand to lose international acceptance and recognition. Despite their rather normative characters, if the international community were to agree upon a set of basic environmental principles, their incorporation in global treaties dealing with all kinds of matters would almost be guaranteed. This would facilitate further negotiations and agreements on environmental issues since basic principles had already been recognised as benchmark and common denominator, therefore serving as a general non-negotiable point to start from. As a consequence, the environment would enjoy the same standing as principles of human rights and the economy and as such be taken into account within newly established global regulations and frameworks.

Going one step back, it is international organisations and their sub-groups, states, NGOs as well as private actors that have an impact on the formulation of common goals within international treaties, thereby functioning as norm-entrepreneurs. Coming together and finding expression under the UNFCCC framework, the norm contestation is based on the actors' different sources of expertise and knowledge paired with degrees of authority which imparts them a legitimately evaluative as well as regulative function to create a globally applicable framework. However, differences in their respective appearance and impact can be traced as well.

Especially NGOs with their strong focus on certain topics have the ability to persistently make aware of problems and to introduce innovative concepts and ideas. Being shaped by and shaping the interests and demands of the public, they contest for a normative foundation for further action. However, their status at international conferences as a decisive power in negotiations remains rather low. Even though NGOs enjoy the reputation of representing a global civil society, pursuing their interests and fighting for the realisation of common goals based on claimed moral obligations, the oftentimes internationally operating organisations do not possess any formal decision-making powers. Being unelected and oftentimes accused of lacking transparency, the rather informal body of NGOs seems to deny them any more power.[88] Instead, the political scientist Puetter claims that in the "absence of a rigid and unambiguous legal framework, effective decision-making essentially

[87] Najam et al (2004) p.31
[88] Slim (2002)

relies on the generation of self-commitment to common rules and guidelines on [the] part of national governments"[89], meaning that the normative concepts are sponsored and carried further mainly by the single states. This is what Lehtonen describes as diffusion, a process in which over time, countries adopt the newly designed policies. This horizontal process includes social learning, copying and emulation with an internalisation and adaption of global policies at its end.[90] Agreements like the Kyoto Protocol and an associated reluctance to commit to binding agreements however have shown that a diffusion with regard to principles and policies of sustainability has not been perceived and acquired *vogue* everywhere. Arguing along economic lines that environmental restrictions would have unbearable effects on the economy and therefore decrease competitiveness, states like the USA and China refuse to agree to regulations that might slow down short term gains however seem promising in the long run.[91] The conception of a win-win situation according to the motifs of sustainable development is thus not fully recognised as commonly agreed basic principle.

As one attempt to mediate and manifest sustainable norms, the in 2000 formulated UN Millennium Development Goals (UN MDG) gather and formulate the most pressing current and future issues, among which MDG 7 is directed at environmental sustainability, 7A in particular calling for the integration "of the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs".[92] Moreover, the UN goals which have been agreed upon by all 192 UN member states as well as other international organizations to be fulfilled in 2015, recognise the different problem areas as being interlinked, while it also depicts a common climate policy as one of the key solutions. As the Millennium Project task force underlines "A stable climate provides the critical regulating services on which all ecosystems depend, affecting weather, human health, agricultural and marine productivity, the distribution and health of species, and energy consumption", MDG 8B also addresses "the special needs of least developed countries", calling on the community's normative response.[93] However, the MDG review meeting of 2010 criticized the lack of formulated concrete objectives and concerted action. Furthermore, the uneven and slow progress with regard to the

[89] Puetter(2007) p.19
[90] Lehtonen (2009) pp.74-75
[91] Newman & Richmond (2006) p.4
[92] Millennium Development Goals (n.d.)
[93] Ibid

implementation of goals was pointed out.[94] Despite all the criticism, one needs to repeatedly acknowledge that diffusion and the internalisation of norms constitutes a process and is always dependent on other factors as well. As one of the two remaining states not having ratified the Kyoto Protocol, it was Australia in 2007, which passed the Protocol ten years after signing it, initiated by the election of a new prime minister. Not only does this development underline the still present sovereignty of states but also the strong effect and impact of domestic situations on the global agenda, where national conditions have to transform first to adjust to global demands as well. Accordingly, norms possess "dual quality"[95], where on the one hand they are designed at the global level to structure guidelines, but arise out of domestic context and local practices on the other hand.

The rather slow and towing adoption of sustainable principles however also hints that one should not mistake rhetoric with norm-consent and that a common interest does not automatically translate into a normative consensus on possible measures to take. Hence, if the international community agrees on the importance of climate change and the need for action, it expresses nothing more than the acceptance or presence of the problem.[96] The sole knowledge of what is best or should be done does not automatically provoke this exact behaviour. As the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said during a discussion at the 2011 World Economic Forum in Davos, "The sustainable development agenda is the growth agenda for the 21st century. To get there we need your participation and your initiatives."[97] The recognition of the importance of sustainable development for the global well-being and as the common conclusion of global governance, as well as global cooperation being a prerequisite to realise processes, is located at the centre of a well-functioning and effective global governance, yet still needs to find stronger and better implementation through individual initiative. As the closing statements of Copenhagen and Cancùn have shown, countries like the USA, Japan or European representatives like France, Germany and Denmark underline the matter's urgency, yet all parties have a different conception of what comes after. The general common understanding of the environment still leads to diverging conceptions of responsibility and conclusions on the appropriate means of action and their

[94] UNDP (n.d.)
[95] Wiener (2007) p.36
[96] Whitman (2009) p.88
[97] Ban (2011)

implementation, hence a different perception of norms. Another good example for the lacking translation of rhetoric into feasible action along agreed principles is the 2002 WSSD, which aimed at fostering sustainable development, especially through partnership initiatives between the different sectors. However, actual meetings have shown that despite the prescribed aim which foresaw a realisation of the *triple bottom line*, the delegates acknowledged the connection between the environmental, economic and social sectors yet preferred to work along a fragmented approach. One-dimensional panels, often taking place simultaneously, were held at different locations and with different representatives which made exchange and cooperation between the three sectors almost impossible. Not only did the WSSD suffer from its diverging and misguided approach to sustainable development, but moreover from *negotiation fatigue*. As a remedy, Najam et al argue, the creation of commonly agreed basic principles of sustainability would pool forces as well as reduce the amount of conferences and treaties to an efficient and comprehensible number, consequently increasing effectiveness and minimising *negotiation fatigue*.[98] A holistic approach as pursued by sustainable norms, recognising the coherence of the issues of e.g. health, biodiversity, emissions, would reduce rounds of negotiations significantly.[99]

Norms of sustainability, which recognise the importance of cross-sectoral cooperation as propagated by norm-entrepreneurs at global negotiations and conferences, need to find their path into the states' discourse to be adopted and mediated between the different levels to eventually find its expression in civil society and the daily political and economic business. As discussed earlier, strong environmental states which promote environmental norms, integrative cooperation as well as mediation are necessary tools in order for basic principles to be globally accepted and shape international policies. Against this background, the political scholar John Vasquez argues that norms and associated terms have "become one of the most used and abused terms of our contemporary vocabulary",[100] which often pay for justifications for policy decisions and responsive behaviour. He points out, that norms are far from being isolated entities, but are influenced and shaped by history and its events, thereby framed and pushed forward by the dominant powers. This goes along with Katzenstein's definition of norms as "collective expectations for the proper behaviour of

[98] Najam et al (2004) p.31
[99] Wapner (2003) pp.2-3
[100] Vasquez (2000) p.282

actors with a given identity […] evolving from social practice, strategies of interest promotion"[101], where the creation of norms stands in direct association with a certain paradigm, i.e. given identity. Thus, what is nowadays and commonly perceived and described as global norm or value is strongly shaped by a 'Western discourse', implying a universalism of Western beliefs. Consequently, the current model of sustainable development relies heavily on the Western point of view, therefore contemplating rather one-dimensional means and policy solutions, which follow views of the developed world. As Vasquez argues, an effective model needs to differ much more between the diverse local conditions with regard to the respective social, political, cultural and economic situation. A revision of the development discourse needs to take place, within which the local aspect of a common global framework with universal guidelines is stressed.

Vasquez however also underlines that norms rise to 'deal with new situations', thus norms arise to meet the demand. While realism and its unilateral approach sees discrepancies between norms and reality, it is considered as necessary to overcome these perceived differences through globally formulated common action. Contrary to a realist approach, domestic aspects need to be considered and incorporated into a global framework and vice versa. [102] This would mean that a critical assessment of sustainability and the model of development can bring forward appropriate principles but which also requires an inclusive co-operation of all actors, industrialised as well as developing states. Only norms that are developed and agreed upon on a multilateral basis, taking into account global needs and domestic conditions likewise, can effectively be mediated and internalised to come to full effect.

[101] Katzenstein (1996) p.5
[102] Vasquez (2000) p.284

6. DISCUSSION

6.1. The status quo in global governance

The current framework of global governance depicts an architecture, which includes a manifold of actors, e.g. nation states, institutions and non-state actors, with however unequal powers and influence with regard to global policy-making. With the state still being the central actor in the current order, it represents the most crucial and determining body. However, in the attempt to find solutions to transnational problems, the governance through supernational, intergovernmental agencies and influence of non-state actors has increased. Over the past decades, various different regimes and institutions have been established that not only include nation states but which serve as a platform or forum for a manifold of stakeholders to discuss and create regulations and guidelines.[103] Addressing global demands, international environmental organisations such as the UNEP, the CSD and other MEA agencies possess global influence shaping state behaviour by formulating international guidelines, setting general goals and introducing binding regulations. Also represented at the global stage are other non-environmental yet related institutions like the UNDP, the WTO or the World Bank which enjoy considerable impact on world affairs. As a consequence, different types of collaborations can be traced, some of which bring together different groups and thereby encouraging and strengthening wider adaption, yet in a rather steady and slow process, while other often homogenous groups indeed foster own policies but at the same time discourage wider adaption by imposing constraining means.[104] Yet, an overall shift from a rather hierarchical and centralised governing system to increasingly network-based and decentralised governance has run its course. Furthermore, it has brought forward a political structure that relies much more on social responsibility and self-regulation than ever before, a perception which is also shaped and fostered by NGOs and an increasingly informed global civil society.[105] However, an effective yet all-encompassing sustainable way of 'bridging' and 'bonding' the different sectors and interest groups in accordance with a *triple bottom line* approach still needs to be outbalanced. The realist understanding of international politics and its effect on global policies and further related processes by a group of states cannot be denied either.

[103] Delmas & Young (2009) p.23
[104] Bodin and Norberg (2005) p.181
[105] Young et al (2008) p.177

On the one hand, these developments underline the vast formulation of a variety of international environmental treaties and agreements by different environmental institutions and working groups, backed by the international community of states throughout the past 40 years. Yet on the other hand, the reluctant commitment and implementation of treaties and policies as well as their seemingly limited effectiveness despite scientific knowledge and expert groups offers room for doubt and further discussion.[106] In juxtaposition, although the formal requirement of global governance' inclusiveness is met by the existence of these actors, a global and multilevel cooperation and network based on social responsibility and the principles of sustainability is not guaranteed. Based on the analysis of the different factors, one can see that all elements of global governance are inevitably interrelated and dependent on each other in order to establish a functioning and above all effective global governance framework. When trying to examine the effectiveness of global governance, it has been shown that both, the cooperation beyond individual environmental institutions and agreements as well as the vertical and non-state action and interaction contribute to efficient processes. While the basic architectural framework is given, it is the closer networking between the different sectors and levels which is necessary to make global environmental processes more effective. Moreover, it appears that the normative basis for interaction needs to be improved and globalised in order to enable stronger and more committed cooperation.

6.2. Fostering current processes

The analysis of global governance draws a picture of an incomplete framework, which leaves room for improvements and further modifications. Next to the still very much sector-centred and unilateral collaboration of the different actors, the insufficient mediation of norms seems to represent the main weakness or malfunction of the current framework thereby hindering the process of global environmental governance in its implementation of sustainable principles. The overall point that needs to be recognised is the need for inclusive networking, i.e. the states or the community of states alone cannot effectively act on their own. Global governance is not feasible without local action and successful local action is less or not effective without global and sectoral cooperation since it is the network and

[106] Najam et al (2004) p.26

cooperation of the economy, technology, scientists and other actors with different opinions and expertise that can contribute to a holistic understanding of the present and future challenges. Global politics are organic, something dynamic, and thus far from being mechanical.[107] Therefore, an inclusive, all-encompassing network, which draws from its many sources and acts in the different areas and on different levels, yet still with deliberation and in reference to other sectors, provides for a progressive, effective and thereby sustainable governance of issues.



Push and pull factors of a global architecture (fig.3)

Evaluating and based on previous analysis, one major element of a functioning global architecture is represented by *multidimensional cooperation between all sectors and levels, with strong cross-border operations and economic flows*. An integrative and all-encompassing approach seems necessary to realise not only important short-term and mid-term gains, but to consider and invest in the positive long-term strategies to guarantee progressive success also in the future. Therefore, a strengthening of collaboration of the economic, social and environmental sectors is inevitable and includes the integration of the public and the private as well as the scientific world. It follows that these developments need to be backed by *greater incorporation and investments in science and technologies* to assess current conditions in order to find the most suitable and sustainable solutions

[107] Kütting & Lipschutz (2009) p.211

through innovative approaches. The implementation of global policies can therefore be based on the latest expertise, according to which means with highest common gains and lowest negative side-effect can be designed. Last but not least important, *strong international institutions as well as systems of governance*, which enjoy the support of the community of states, protrude as crucial element to sustain the efficiency of global processes. These entities have to ensure a global framework where all strings come together to be then directed and mediated to all levels and sectors to ensure common and most efficient action. A concerted approach of international institutions, nation states and other stakeholders generates a holistic perspective and integrative solutions on the global problems of the 21st century, in which all actors, the industrialised, transitory as well as developing countries, act and support each other.

Yet, what restricts or hinders these developments is the *realist approach to international politics*. A political environment of single states which bases action on self-interest only and denies the gain of common action hampers effective global policies. Although a growing part of the international community acknowledges the need for integrative and concerted policies, especially with regard to the threat of climate change, by formulating common agreements and drafting global policies, the discussed set of problems requires a holistic approach. Argued on the basis of loss of economic prosperity, the struggle for responsibility or the general fear of losing powers of sovereignty, the impact of inactive or *spoiler states* remains high, thereby hindering effectiveness. In the following years and decades, the challenge will thus be to improve and transform the current governance framework by incorporating those still inactive in order to increase effectiveness and to decrease the impacts as well as sources of climate change. Thereby, the means to meet the demands of environmental challenges lie within the principles of sustainable development, which next to enhanced international co-operation needs national support as well, by governments and an informed civil society.

In order for environmental principles to get hold, the channels for cooperation and of implementation need to be widened. The role of states as frontrunners serves as one incentive for other states to adapt and adopt sustainable policies, thereby promoting and fostering behaviour change to improve global environmental performance. While the enforcement and implementation currently lies within the responsibility of states, a

widening of implementation would also mean the establishment of conditions which encourage and facilitate sustainable environmental actions of non-national actors.[108] Thus, not only global inter-state cooperation should be fostered but also transnational collaboration between businesses, NGOs and other stakeholders should be strengthened and expanded in form of 'mutual supportiveness', a sustainable and innovative civic entrepreneurism that combines business interests and civic engagement, whereby social capital is built and new systems, ideas and technologies are developed.[109] This stands against the still present realist conception of international politics and sovereignty, with its 'disbelieve' in international organisations and co-operation as well as the recognition of self-interest over norms.

It follows that the political concept of global governance is closely connected to other related concepts such as *authority*, *legitimacy* and *civil society*. Since both, legitimate action and the representation and integration of an informed public is part of the governmental framework, a re-thinking or re-conceptualisation of the three needs to take place. As international institutions like the IPCC or NGOs provide important knowledge, serve as monitoring bodies and represent the expertise and interest of the different sectors, their integration into the global architecture could for example be a significant development. It is for these reasons that their international standing needs to be reconsidered and consolidated to change their global status from being sole stakeholders to acknowledged and legitimised motors of global governance. Hence, the *concept of legitimacy* and *accountability* in the 21st century framework of global governance depicts a further essential area of research, but which exceeds the scope of this paper.

[108] Stokke (2001) p.10
[109] Sanwal (2004) p.8

7. CONCLUSION

In its process, a new global governance structure is promoting a paradigm of greater sustainable awareness, which is given further expression in the development of a common global environmental policy system. Global governance has introduced new issues and actors, established new networks and systems for cooperation as well as formulated global treaties and guidelines, which express innovative ideas and bring forward and support upcoming norms in order to meet the complexity of problems. At the same time, the rise in the amount of non-state actors serves as evidence for a political and social re-organisation of global affairs, a shift from central and state-based decision-making to more dynamic and global-bound arrangements and policy processes. Yet, the analysis of recent gatherings and their outcomes has shown that the sole number of global stakeholders alone does not provide for effective environmental governance processes. Since global governance does not constitute an end in itself but rather serves as a means to start and guide sustainable processes, the framework's single components need to be improved and better connected against the backdrop of a normative framework as an inclusive governance architecture is unlikely to meet environmental demands if it fails to create and recognise common normative principles. Neither can an environmental regime itself conclude successful processes if it lacks the integration of the decisive economic, political and social sectors. Therefore, only intensified and *de facto* inclusive cooperation along the principles of sustainability leads to effective mediation as well as implementation of necessary means.

In conclusion, norms serve as foundation for behaviour, while institutions which create and foster norms can influence processes and bring along behaviour change. Against the backdrop of sustainability, global environmental policies should be considered a social obligation and economic opportunity likewise. A global architecture, which incorporates and promotes the principles of sustainability encourages their effective implementation at all levels, from the local to the global, to meet the demands to cope with climate change and other challenges of the 21st century. Sustainable norms have to become part of the states' identity, hence shape all actions and behaviour. A global concert of states, institutions, non-governmental organisations and the economy, where the power of actors is balanced as well as guided by the respective other and common strategies prevail, is necessary to solve environmental problems and support global climate policy processes. An uncontested and

common understanding of sustainability as a significant global principle by an inclusive international community is thus essential for successful global environmental governance processes.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A. Projected world CO^2 emissions by region, 1990-2030



Source: Department of Energy's (DOE) Energy Information Administration (EIA)[110]

[110] Energy Information Administration, 2007

Appendix B. Listing of annexes to the Kyoto Protocol[111]

B.1. Annex I states to the Kyoto Protocol

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden , Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA

B.2. Annex II states to the Kyoto Protocol

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Island, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA

B.3. Annex B states to the Kyoto Protocol (and respective target reduction in % by 2012)

Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,	-8 %
USA*	-7%
Canada, Hungary, Japan, Poland	-6 %
Croatia	-5%
New Zealand, Russian Federation, Ukraine	0%
Norway	+1%
Australia	+8%
Iceland	+10%

*intention not to ratify

B.4. Non-Annex B states

Developing and emerging market states, i.e. UN member states not mentioned under Annex B

[111] UNFCCC c.(n.d.)