



Reform of the United Nations Security Council: A Comparative Study

Kathrine Holmgaard Stagstrup

Study number: 20182650

31/05-2023

Master thesis

Culture, Communication and Globalisation, 10th Semester

Supervisor: Robert Christian Thomsen

Number of characters (pages): 120161 (50,1)

Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to research whether reform experiences in the Economic and Social Council can provide valuable suggestions for solving the gridlock of reform of the United Nations Security Council. Reform of the United Nations Security Council is a fairly researched topic, however, not much research focuses on how reform processes in other international organisations (IOs) might shed light on new perspectives to reform of the United Nations Security Council. This thesis uses the case of reform in the United Nations Security Council as Case I and the Economic and Social Council as Case II. To analyse the two cases, the thesis uses theories of legitimacy and effectiveness, international relations theory, and three models of change in IOs. For legitimacy and effectiveness theory and international relations theory, several different scholars' perspectives are used. Ernst B. Haas (1990) has described the three models of change in IOs which consists of the incremental growth model, the turbulent non-growth model, and the model of managed interdependence. The theory unfolds the analysis that is based upon the "What-is-the-problem-represented-to-be" - approach. This thesis retrieves its data from official records from meetings in the United Nations General Assembly, from United Nations resolutions, and letters from the Intergovernmental Negotiations. In this thesis, I analyse and discuss the different data in order to understand the reform processes in the two cases and discuss whether processes from ECOSOC can be applied to the reform of the United Nations Security Council.

The thesis concludes that while the two organisations share similarities, the analysis showed that the reform processes are different and that the specific processes revealed in the Economic and Social Council do not correlate with the processes of the United Nations Security Council. It is evident that the Economic and Social Council show patterns of the incremental growth model and the model of managed interdependence. Whereas, the United Nations Security Council portrays patterns of the model of turbulent non-growth. However, the data used is from 2005-2006 and from 2015-2016, therefore, the processes and positions of the countries might have changed over the last couple of years. Comparative studies, such as this thesis, of reform processes in other IOs can prove beneficial to solve the gridlock of the United Nations Security Council reform.

Table of Contents

1.0 INTRODUCTION.....	1
2.0 THEORY AND CONCEPTS.....	5
2.1 LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS.....	5
2.2 NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM	8
2.3 THREE MODELS OF CHANGE	9
3.0 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS	15
3.1 COMPARATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN	15
3.2 DATA SELECTION.....	19
3.3 ANALYTICAL STRATEGY.....	21
<i>Selection of theory.....</i>	<i>21</i>
<i>What's the Problem Represented to be?.....</i>	<i>22</i>
<i>Three models of change.....</i>	<i>25</i>
4.0 ANALYTICAL DISCUSSION.....	27
4.1 REFORM PROCESSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL	28
<i>China, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr Sam Kutesa (Appendix A).....</i>	<i>28</i>
<i>The Russian Federation, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr Sam Kutesa (Appendix B)</i>	<i>29</i>
<i>The United States of America, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr Sam Kutesa (Appendix C).....</i>	<i>31</i>
<i>A/71/PV.42 (Appendix D).....</i>	<i>32</i>
<i>Sub-conclusion.....</i>	<i>34</i>
4.2 REFORM PROCESSES OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL	36
<i>A/RES/60/1, paragraphs 155 and 156 (Appendix E)</i>	<i>36</i>
<i>Breakfast meeting of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Bureau at the Head of State and Government Level (Appendix F).....</i>	<i>38</i>
<i>A/RES/61/16 (Appendix G)</i>	<i>40</i>
<i>Sub-conclusion.....</i>	<i>43</i>
4.3 COMPARISON.....	43
5.0 CONCLUSION	45
6.0 REFERENCE LIST	46
7.0 LIST OF APPENDICES.....	52

1.0 Introduction

As the world becomes increasingly globalised, complex global issues have arisen which require global governance. The United Nations (UN) has, since its formation in 1945 (United Nations, n.d. a), been a forefront organisation in practising global governance. Through this governance they have spread certain norms associated with the liberal international order (LIO) (Seaman, 2014, pp. 1-2; Langmore & Thakur, 2016). When the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was created in 1945, it reflected the position of global powers at the time. Consequently, the permanent seats were occupied by the United States, the Soviet Union (later this seat was taken over by Russia), Great Britain, France, and the Republic of China (later this seat was taken over by The People's Republic of China). The UN Charter identifies the UNSC as the main body for international peace and security. The UN Charter entitles the UNSC to take actions against threats to international peace and security. Furthermore, it is only the UNSC, within the UN, that has the mandate to use enforcement measures to maintain international peace and security. The UNSC is, thus, a prominent and important institution within the UN (Bourantonis, 2005, p. 3-7). This is also the reason why my thesis focuses specifically on the UNSC instead of any other institution within the UN. Since the UNSC is such a prominent and integral part of the UN, the perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of the UNSC are also reflected in the UN. If the UN wants to continue to be a forefront organisation, it must continue to be viewed as efficient and legitimate in its actions through the UNSC (Bourantonis, 2005, p. 3-7). The reform of the UNSC is not a new topic, since it is argued that it has existed since the formation of the UN (Winther, 2020). Stephan M. Walt (2015) has described one of the arguments as to why a reform of the UNSC is necessary:

We all know why the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China are permanent members with veto rights on the Security Council: The first four won World War II (well, France helped) and China has nearly a quarter of the world's population. But the present structure is one of the world's great anachronisms: Germany is now more important than either Britain or France and states such as India, Brazil, Japan, or South Africa (and some others) would be plausible contenders for permanent status too. Plenty of people – including former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan – have tried to do something about this obvious absurdity, but efforts at reform are repeatedly stymied by a

collective inability to agree on how the Security Council should be altered and by the P5's disinterest in diluting their own special status. But make no mistake: The present structure makes no sense.

The only UNSC reform was implemented in the mid-1960's. The number of members in the UNSC increased from eleven – five permanent and six elected non-permanent – to fifteen – five permanent and ten elected non-permanent (Langmore & Thakur, 2016, p. 102). The focus of the reform debate has remained, overall, the same; how to enhance the legitimacy and efficiency of the UNSC. Much of the reform debate in existing academia focuses on the two groups of 'structural reformists' and 'working method reformists' (Winther, 2020). Roughly, structural reform consists of amendments to the charter, such as changes in the right to veto or the structure of membership. Charter amendments require two-thirds of the votes in the General Assembly (GA). On the contrary, working method reform does not need charter amendments, but are internally agreed upon amongst members of the UNSC (Winther, 2020)¹.

John Langmore and Ramesh Thakur (2016) have proposed a structural reform that focuses on the enlargement of the elected non-permanent members from 10 to 18 of the UNSC. They have argued that the reform debate has a lack of focus on the elected non-permanent members, and how an enlargement of the non-permanent members can influence the legitimacy and efficiency of the UNSC positively. They argue that reform is needed since the normative beliefs, such as those of the UN and the UNSC are challenged by the changing power relations within the UNSC. This – it is said – leads to the inability to confront threats to international peace and security, such as the case of Syria (Langmore & Thakur, 2016, p. 100). In their article, they have presented an argument of how various elected members have had immense influence on decisions and resolutions taken in the Council. Thus, an enlargement of the elected non-permanent members is meant to portray the UN membership more effectively, thereby heightening the legitimacy of the UN.. Moreover, they have claimed that by including more of the UN members in the UNSC, through an enlargement of the elected non-permanent members, it will create a higher sense of accountability and responsibility for the success of the resolutions among all UN members (Langmore & Thakur, 2016).

Another scholar who has focused on structural reform is W. Andy Knight (2001). His focus lies on creating a more representative UNSC, including better representation of the

¹ The difference between structural reform and working method reform will be described further on in the introduction.

southern hemisphere. He have argued that since the UNSC is mandated by its authority from the UN Charter as well as from the members of the GA, it is important for the UNSC to remain legitimate in order to maintain its mandate. Thus, Knight (2001) is of the opinion that a considerable factor of the lack of legitimisation of the UNSC occurred because it does not represent the whole UN (p. 24). He argues that the UNSC is unrepresentative both from a geopolitical point of view as well as from a perspective of percentage of world population. He promotes an increase in the number of the non-permanent seats, claiming that such a reform can improve democracy and transparency in the UNSC (Knight, 2001, p. 33-34).

Peter Nadin (2016) has argued in his book that the need for working method reform stems from various reasons. Primarily, the responsiveness to conflicts must be more accurate. Secondly, according to Nadin, the nature of the responses should be reevaluated. Arguably, there is a gap between the means of the responses and the objectives of the responses. This gap can be closed either by additional funding or by reducing the ambitions of the responses. Lastly, the UNSC is not effective enough. Nadin (2016) has argued that the Council should use every opportunity to create political will and funds for responses that promote international peace and security (p. 133). His argument is for a working method reform through informal agreements within the Council. Much of his argument is furthermore based on how he have argued that a new permanent member will not be beneficial to the efficiency of the Council. This is because a new member will be subject to the old practices of the P5 and thus have the power of a veto which will only lead to higher chances of a veto vote (Nadin, 2016, p. 134). However, he has argued that a reform of the working methods of the Council can lead to "... a more inclusive and consultative council..." (Nadin, 2016, p. 135).

Thomas G. Weiss (2011) has argued that the main problem for the UNSC, and the reason why reform is required, is that it "...too often suffers paralysis" (Weiss, 2011, p. 49). However, this problem is said to stem from several smaller problems. The international system is controlled by sovereign states. The power relations between these states benefit the great powers, creating a gap between the industrial Global North and the developing Global South. Moreover, Weiss (2011) has argued that the structure of the whole UN system plays into the paralysis of the UNSC as well. Overlapping among the different UN bodies, and not an overarching financial structure limits the effectiveness of the whole UN, including the UNSC. He has argued that if it is not politically reachable to bring structural change to the Council, then it could be possible to make changes that alleviate some of the problems the UNSC is experiencing. One of his biggest claims is that it is a necessity to move beyond the 'Global North-Global South' dilemma and work towards groups of interest and issues instead. His main

solution to this is the G20² and how they can assist the UNSC to reflect "...the political dynamics of contemporary global power" (Weiss, 2011, pp. 51-52).

Despite the extensive research into the reform of the UNSC, and arguably also because of it, the reform of the UNSC remains a topic of relevance. As long as reform of the UNSC is debated and discussed but not properly implemented the legitimacy of the UNSC will continue to be questioned (Bourantonnis, 2005, p. 9). While the reform debate is prominently represented and debated in academia, not many scholars have focussed on how the debate regarding the reform of the UNSC resemble or differs from reforms of other UN institutions. Moreover, as it can be seen from the existing literature, the reform of the UNSC is in a gridlock and there are many perspectives on the purpose and objective of the reform. While the topic is heavily researched already, it has been important for me to find a new way of researching the reform issue in order to bring light to new aspects that could possibly alleviate this so-called gridlock. Therefore, my thesis will focus on whether reform experiences in another United Nations institution can provide valuable suggestions for solving the gridlock of reform of the United Nations Security Council. The thesis will be based on the following research question:

- RQ1: What reform processes are prominent in the debate of reform of the United Nations Security Council?
- RQ2: What reform processes were prominent in the reform of another United Nations institution?
- RQ3: How might experience from / procedures of reform processes in another United Nations institution be fruitfully applied to UNSC reform?

This thesis will therefore aim to research what and how reform processes have played out in the reform of another UN institution, and how processes differ from and resemble those of the reform of UNSC. Furthermore, the thesis will discuss to what extent reform of another UN institution can serve as an inspiration and be beneficial to future UNSC reform processes.

As it will be discussed further in the chapter titled 'Methodological Considerations', I have chosen to focus on the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as the other UN

² The G20 is a group consisting of 19 countries and the EU. The countries are the leading industrial and developing countries, which "...represent around 85% of the global GDP, over 75% of the global trade, and about two-thirds of the world population." (G20, n.d.). The G20 consists of countries from both the Global North and the Global South. The members are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Türkiye, United Kingdom, United States, and the EU (G20, n.d.).

institution, whose reform process will be analysed in comparison. I have chosen the ECOSOC due to several factors. I will mention the ones I find most significant, while additional factors and elaborating discussions and reflections are taken into account in the chapter titled 'Methodological Considerations'. First of all, ECOSOC is one of the main bodies of the UN system, working alongside the UNSC (United Nations, n.d. c). Moreover, it can be argued that ECOSOC has experienced, somewhat, the same gridlock issues as the UNSC (Weiss, 2010). And finally, ECOSOC has been through reforms that extend greater than those the UNSC has been through to this date. Due to this choice of ECOSOC, this thesis will therefore focus on whether reform experiences in the Economic and Social Council can provide valuable suggestions for solving the gridlock of reform of the United Nations Security Council. The research question that the thesis will be based on, are:

RQ1: What reform processes are prominent in the debate of reform of the United Nations Security Council?

RQ2: What reform processes were prominent in the reform of the Economic and Social Council?

RQ3: How might experience from / procedures of reform processes in the Economic and Social Council be fruitfully applied to UNSC reform?

2.0 Theory and Concepts

In this chapter of the thesis, I will define and describe the various concepts and theories which I believe are relevant. How the theories and concepts will be used in my analysis will be described in the chapter titled 'Methodological considerations' (p. 15).

2.1 Legitimacy and Effectiveness

As it is evident from my literature review in the introduction, much of the reform debate revolves around ensuring higher legitimacy and/or efficiency of the UNSC. I have therefore chosen to include a section, where these two concepts will be defined, including my understanding of them for this specific thesis.

Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane (2006) have defined the meaning of legitimacy with regard to international organisations (IOs) as follows: An institution enjoys legitimacy if it has "...the right to rule..." (p. 405). In other words, legitimacy can be argued to exist when

members of the institution consent to granting the institution authority. Legitimacy for global governance institutions such as the UNSC is highly important since if it is viewed as legitimate, it is given authority to its actions and to act on behalf of the constituents. If it is not viewed as legitimate, it loses this authority. The perceived legitimacy of the institution is just as important due to the democratic nature of the world (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006, p. 407). Furthermore, Buchanan & Keohane (2006) have argued that in order for the institution to have legitimacy, specifically within global governance such as the UNSC, the institution must be morally capable to make rules and try to achieve compliance with these rules, while those under the institution should have moral reasons to follow and comply with the rules including not limiting others in their compliance with them (pp. 409-411). In addition, according to Lenz & Viola (2017) legitimacy is based on people's recognition of the institution's 'right to rule', thereby constituting a moral obligation (p. 942).

Ossewaarde, Nijhof & Heyse (2008) have described four dimensions in which international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) can ensure legitimacy. These dimensions can also be applied to global governance organisations, such as the UN, since the UN, like many INGOs, is based on a mission rooted in humanitarian aid, crisis prevention, and international peace. Ossewaarde et al. (2008) have argued that one dimension of legitimacy is not sufficient enough for the organisation to be legitimate, several dimensions should be present (p. 43).

The first dimension is based on normative legitimacy. Normative legitimacy is ensured through an organisation's mission statements that emphasise global human interest, rather than state interest (Ossewaarde et al., 2008, p. 43). This view of normative legitimacy can be argued to be connected with Buchanan & Keohane's (2006) view of justice of legitimacy, and how IOs must promote key values that underlie democracy (p. 417). The second dimension is regulatory legitimacy. IOs are legitimate if they are created with state consent. In other words, legitimacy is ensured through the legality of the IOs (Ossewaarde et al., 2008, p. 44; Buchanan & Keohane, 2006, p. 412). Moreover, Ossewaarde et al. (2008) have argued that within regulatory legitimacy, IOs "...not only owe their legitimacy to their normative claims but also to public recognition [to show] that they are morally entitled to inform and influence international legislators" (p. 44), which correlates with Buchanan & Keohane's (2006) view of morality mentioned earlier. Third is the dimension of cognitive legitimacy. Cognitive legitimacy refers to the IOs having technical expertise and intellectual knowledge that emphasise and reach goals. Output legitimacy is the fourth dimension that Ossewaarde et al. (2008) have mentioned. Output legitimacy relates to how transparent the IOs are in highlighting and portraying their

actions and results (pp. 45-46). This can be related to the perceived legitimacy as mentioned by Buchanan & Keohane (2006). The public will perceive the IOs as legitimate, or not, through what they are presented with. If the IOs are not transparent or not seen as effective in their actions, the perceived legitimacy can decline and thereby undermine the IOs and its effectiveness (p. 407). The dimensions are all connected and necessary for IOs. However, achieving all dimensions at the same time can be a challenge, yet, important for IOs. With regard to the UNSC, the literature review showed that the reform debate stems from whether the UNSC is perceived as legitimate and how to solve that issue.

As already mentioned above, effectiveness is somewhat connected to legitimacy, also in the reform debate of the UNSC. According to the Cambridge Dictionary, effectiveness is defined as "the degree to which something is effective" and "the ability to be successful and produce the intended results" (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.). The effectiveness argument for the reform is thus based on the fact that the UNSC was created to take rapid decisions when international peace was/is threatened. However, some argue that the UNSC is unable to take rapid decisions and is thus not effective (Bourantonis, 2005, p. 6). Chapter V, Article 24 of the UN Charter states: "In order to ensure prompt and *effective* [emphasis added] action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf" (United Nations, n.d. d). Slaughter (2005) has argued that one difficulty with the effectiveness of the UNSC is that it is complex to be proactive in its resolutions, while also effective, due to the sovereignty principle. The opinions of the states are needed to be taken into consideration and thereby are all decisions discussed in UNSC before they are voted through or declined. Furthermore, the mandates given by the UNSC are often not efficient enough and are seen as a result of inefficient decision-making in the UNSC (pp. 625-626). The concept of effectiveness is complemented by the concept of efficiency. Efficiency can be defined as "...the quality or degree of being efficient" (Merriam Webster, n.d.). In other words, how to take action in the best possible way, taking into account the available resources. While I argue, the main difficulty for UNSC is related to effectiveness, efficiency also plays a role. The budget for UN peacekeeping operations is funded by all member states of the UN (United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d.). Member state dissatisfaction can occur if the available financial resources are spent inefficiently, thereby highlighting the importance of efficiency in correlation with effectiveness.

Legitimacy and effectiveness are often seen as opposites in the reform debate. More members in the UNSC would lead to better representation of the global world, which would

lead to more legitimacy. On the other hand, effectiveness would decline, since there would be more member states which would take part in the decision making process (Bourantonis, 2005; Knight, 2001; Nadin, 2016). It is important to note that this thesis is not aiming to evaluate the legitimacy and effectiveness of the UNSC and how these are connected to the question of reform. However, the concepts of legitimacy and effectiveness are important to have distinguished since they play a vital role in the reform debate.

2.2 Neorealism and Neoliberalism

As the thesis revolves around the UNSC, I found it relevant to include theories of international relations at the beginning of my theory. I have decided to describe neorealism and neoliberalism since I would argue that these two are relevant for analysing the reform of the UNSC. I will focus on how the different theories of international relations see IOs.

Realism, in other words, 'power politics' can be argued to be one of the most well-known and prominent theories of international relations, mostly as a result of the central focus on power (Donnelly, 2013, p. 32). Neorealists argue that "...security competition, inter-state conflict, and the difficulties of achieving international cooperation..." (Dunne & Schmidt, 2017, p.108) come down to the absence of an overall authority. It is thereby the structure of the international society that influences international politics. Neorealism is therefore often also referred to as structural realism, yet, I will use the term neorealism in the rest of this paper. The structure of the international system is, according to neorealists, in three elements: "...organising principles, differentiation of units, distribution of capabilities" (Dunne & Schmidt, 2017, p.108). Primarily, there are two different organising principles, anarchy, which can be compared to the decentralised dimension of international politics, and hierarchy, which is "...the basis of the domestic order... (Dunne & Schmidt, 2017, p. 108). Secondly, the functioning of units is seen as sovereign states, that is, whether a state is a democracy or another form. Notably, neorealists argue that the differentiation of these units is not significant for the international system (Dunne & Schmidt, 2017, p.108). Lastly, the distribution of capabilities is seen as essential to the understanding of international politics. The gains of power, and related to that, the capabilities of states, influence the power relations among states in IOs. This provides a basis for a certain rank among states in international politics and IOs. From that it can be argued how many great powers there are at a certain time in history, and from that the structure of the international system can be concluded. Also related to gains is the concept of relative gains. Realists argue from the perspective of relative gains, that some states will benefit

more than others in cooperation through IOs and this is, thus, a reason for states not to participate in such cooperation or that the cooperation is difficult (Dunne & Schmidt, 2017, p. 113). Neorealists argue that power is a means to an end, and the end for states is security. Therefore, it can also be argued that states are “security maximisers” and not “power maximisers” (Dunne & Schmidt, 2017, p. 108).

Contrarily to neorealism is neoliberalism. A liberal theoretical approach to IOs is how IOs could be a way for individual "...prosperity and freedom" (Park, 2017, p. 322). Liberalists argued that IOs could secure prosperity and freedom by facilitating free trade and commerce through an international common understanding, as well as maintaining international peace. However, this liberal approach was discredited due to the two World Wars (Park, 2017, p. 322). Neoliberalists argue that the states, as the main actors, utilise IOs in advancing their own interests. In this, cooperation is beneficial for every state, since it is part of securing interests. However, because states have various different interests, states have to discuss in order to find agreeable solutions (Park, 2017, p. 323). The main difference between neoliberalism and neorealism is that for neoliberalists states are in IOs if gains are evenly distributed, also called absolute gains. Whereas, as mentioned previously, for neorealists gains are relative and therefore states might choose not to participate in cooperation through IOs or the cooperation is difficult to manage (Dunne, 2017, p. 123). Moreover, neoliberalists argue that free trade is beneficial for cooperation, but it does not equal peace. Peace and cooperation need negotiating. IOs facilitate a medium for cooperation, they emphasise reciprocity, and they legitimise certain norms and the upkeep of these (Dunne, 2017, p. 123).

The theories of neorealism and neoliberalism, will in this thesis, enable me to analyse and interpret the different perspectives of the nation-states and their views on reform. This is due to how the theories of international relations provide a perception of how the international society should work, and, additionally, the role of nation-states in the international society.

2.3 Three Models of Change

Ernst B. Haas (1990) has proposed three models of change in IOs. He has argued, in his book *When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations*, that the models do not constitute a theory, but "... together they [the three models] constitute a typology for conceptualising organisational change, for summing up whether and how adaptation or learning occurs" (p. 9). However, even though he does not argue that it is a theory, I will utilise


some of the concepts he puts forward in order to analyse and discuss various dynamics seen in the reform debates of the cases chosen for my thesis. I believe this serves as an advantage, since I do not bind myself to a 'set-in-stone'-theory. Rather, I can utilise his concepts as they fit my thesis, thereby, enabling me to unfold the analysis in an unrestricted fashion.

The three models will be explained and described in the subsequent paragraphs. Before, however, I need to define the assumptions on which the typology is based, as well as dimensions, and descriptive and analytical variables used to identify the different models of change. The three models of change are based on the assumption that "...the knowledge available about 'the problem' at issue influences the way decision makers define the interest at stake in the solution to the problem; political objectives and technical knowledge are combined to arrive at the conception of what constitutes one's interest" (Haas, 1990, p. 9). In other words, that knowledge, and how knowledge is agreed upon, affect solutions to the problem and the interests. Another assumption the models are based on is that change in institutions over time is caused by how knowledge about society and nature interplays with political interests (Haas, 1990, p. 11). To understand the models further, it is necessary to explain Haas's view of knowledge, power, and learning and adaptation.

Haas (1990) has described knowledge from several different perspectives. Interest can be based on the knowledge available, however, it does not have to, thereby resulting in interest from various actors on different bases. Furthermore, new knowledge can both support interests, such as supporting the superior power's interest in an organisation, as well as, going against the interest of the opposing group(s) (pp. 12-13). Not only is knowledge and how knowledge affects interest relevant, but consensual knowledge also plays a role in analysing organisations in relation to the three models of change. Haas (1990) has defined consensual knowledge as "...generally accepted understandings about cause-and-effect linkages about any set of phenomena considered important by society..." (p. 21). Later on, each of the model's perspective on how consensual knowledge is explained. Haas (1990) identified three different approaches to power. The first is hegemonial power. Here, decisions are an expression of the influence of the dominant coalition, consisting of several states. The second approach believes power to be the view of the strongest and most powerful state in the organisation. Here, the most powerful and influential state dictates the organisation's actions. Finally, power can derive from a stable, non-hegemonial, coalition within the organisation that can impose action through voting or its ability to persuade the rest of the organisation (p. 13). This view of power is most likely to be found in UNSC and other IOs and results in policies being in the interest of the strongest coalition, while the rest of the organisation is being persuaded by knowledge, and in

some cases threats, according to Haas (1990). Learning and adaptation both relate to how organisations react to new knowledge, demands, and dissatisfaction. The incentive for learning often comes from outside the organisation, in other words, exogenous sources for change. As can be seen in Figure 1 below, feedback relating to the organisation's outputs, and the perceived legitimacy and efficiency of the organisation, come from outside the organisation such as from NGOs, the civil society, and governments (p. 19; p. 27). Adaption is, then, the capability to meet new demands through change without changing the basis on which the organisation's legitimacy is grounded (pp. 33-34).

Figure 1 - The core stages of organisational action



(Haas, 1990, p. 19)

Haas (1990) has defined three dimensions in which organisations and their process of change can be similar or different. These three dimensions are also those which are used to analyse organisations within the three models of change (p. 64). Not all variables and ranges of variation are relevant for my thesis. Therefore, I will limit my thesis and explain only those which are. Table 1 below visualises variables, I have identified to be relevant, as well as their ranges of variation. The reflections and thoughts behind this selection will be discussed in the chapter 'Methodological consideration' page 15. These are descriptive and analytical variables that are combined in different ways in the different models of change. The relevant variables will be explained in the chapters dedicated to the respective model.

Table 1: Descriptive variables and range of variation

Type	Variable	Range of variation
Setting	Ideological consensus	Neorealism Neoliberalism
	Representation	Equality of states Qualified by attribute of states Participation by NGOs
	Status of experts	Instructed by governments Independent
Behaviour	Voting	Simple majority Qualified majority Veto right Consensus
	Bargaining styles	Similar, dissimilar Intracoalition, intercoalition
Core concepts	Knowledge	Fragmented Consensual
	Learning and adaptation	

(Adapted from Haas, 1990, p. 64)

Before going in-depth with the explanation of the three models, it is worth mentioning that the three models can co-exist (p. 111). This is relevant for my thesis, since I will not be fully operationalizing all three models. Rather, I will highlight those concepts and aspects that will enable me to conduct an in-depth analysis. These choices will be discussed in detail in the chapter titled 'Methodological Considerations', page 15.

The first model of change is 'Incremental growth', which is how successive augmentation results in the addition of new tasks without a change of governance or decision-making process (Haas, 1990, p. 4). In incremental growth, change in an organisation or organisation's programme is a reaction to member state dissatisfaction. If the member state dissatisfaction is not met, then the organisation risks losing "...funds, personnel, prestige, and even their existence" (p. 98). If the main coalition is threatened, Haas (1990) has argued that a response in the incremental growth model is to enlarge the membership categories in order to divert some of the complaints. Adaptation in incremental growth is often primarily informal in the beginning, whereafter, they are made into formal rules and procedures. Adaptation in

incremental growth thus compares to working method reforms which over time transform into structural reforms. The incremental model can only function if the "...ideological conflict among member states is completely contained" (p. 99). Hence, incremental growth thrives if one ideology is more represented than the others. This is also related to how the representation of member states should portray the powerful states in any given issue (Haas, 1990, p. 100). When it comes to voting structures, voting related to fundamental issues requires unanimity among the dominant coalition, for example, the P5 in UNSC, however, qualified-majority is also seen in organisations with incremental growth. All variations of the roles of NGOs are consistent with incremental growth, as long as the NGOs' values and interests do not conflict with those of the dominant coalition. Within the model of incremental growth, knowledge about the problems exists, however, the knowledge does not necessarily become consensual throughout the organisation (p. 102). Additionally, bargaining is similar in intracoalition arenas of bargaining, while only slightly dissimilar in intercoalitions (p. 93). This means that bargaining styles within a coalition are similar, whereas bargaining styles between coalitions are somewhat dissimilar. The limits of the model of incremental growth have been reached if demands from several ideologies are competing. It is possible to enlarge the membership group, as long as the ideology is not threatened and if the new members are similar to the dominant coalition. However, as already mentioned, the limits of the model are met, if the new members are too different from the existing members. Adaptation within the model reaches the limit if the number and complexity of the demands are too great and many (pp. 105-107).

The second model is called 'turbulent non-growth', and relates to changes in the decision-making process, however, there is no overall consensus in the organisation and "ends and means disintegrate", creating turbulence and is often seen in social arenas with social complexity. In other words, the turbulence is not created by the IOs, they mimic it (Haas, 1990, p. 4; p. 109). Haas (1990) has argued that turbulence can be the result of the "... interaction of certain types of event: (1) a more complex task environment created by the multiplication of relevant actors; [and] (2) a more confused task domain caused by the unordered preferences of the actors informed, frightened, and tempted by rapid changes in scientific and technological knowledge..."(pp. 110-111). These types of events are also turbulent due to the complexity of the social arena of the organisation. This complexity is, furthermore, shown by how all ideologies, or at least several of them, are represented. If new members are added to the representation, they want equality, whereas the dominant coalition works towards a qualified representation of their 'kind' (p. 115). In the model of turbulent non-growth, voting is often towards consensus, involving exhaustive negotiations before any decision is taken. Consensus

in knowledge throughout the organisation does not happen, however, consensus within different groups, fragmented consensus, does. Fragmented consensus is when knowledge fosters consensual proposals within coalitions, however, this happens differently from coalition to coalition and is not consensual between the coalitions. This results in fragmented consensus (p. 118). Haas (1990) has argued that the world is made up by governments that are intertwined in a web of interdependencies that they cannot easily escape. Therefore, they project their frustration onto IOs. The turbulence of geopolitical fights is thereby also represented in IOs. Often organisational choices have to be made, even though there are no concrete or clearly understood issues that the choices should solve. These choices will not necessarily solve the issues, but they will give some satisfaction to members, even though it is not efficient (pp. 121-125).

The last model is that of 'managed interdependence'. This can be the model that follows either of the two others, as actors realising "... that life under conditions of turbulent non-growth is not satisfactory, that something ought to be done to overcome turbulence" (Haas, 1990, p. 127), or that the process of incremental growth is too slow and the problem definitions are not sufficient (p. 127). It is important to note that Haas (1990) has argued that the two first models are based on historical contexts and accounts, whereas managed interdependence is based on what might happen in the future. Furthermore, managed interdependence might happen in some of the organisation's programmes and not throughout the organisation (p. 128). The term managed interdependence comes from 'management' and derives from the leaders of the organisation which change their passive approach for a more active approach. 'Interdependence' represents a more ambitious definition of the problems aiming to identify a greater interdependence among "...trends, events, and consequences..." (p. 128). The dominant coalition needs to change in order for learning to exist. The new coalition will be made up of the ideological opposites from the old dominant coalition, however, all ideologies are still present but without dictating the states. Instead of large dominant coalitions, several coalitions emerge that are issue-dependent (p. 129). Due to these several issue-dependent coalitions, representation is based on the states that are most relevant for the different issues, and bargaining happens intercoalitional, thereby, knowledge also becomes consensual across the whole organisation to a greater sense than in the previous models (p. 135). This might lead to problems when it comes to voting. While decisions will be taken in consensus among the coalitions, the right to veto of the major powers remains. Lastly, the role of NGOs is substantially bigger than in the other two models.

For this thesis, I have chosen to focus on all three models, since they can co-exist. I argue that since the models can co-exist, all three of them provide interesting dimensions and perspectives to my analysis. Since the three models focus on change in IOs, I have found that they adopt ideas from the theories of international relations, and ideas from the concepts of legitimacy and effectiveness, which is why I argue that the three models will provide useful perspectives to this thesis. The variables from the three different models of knowledge, adaptation, ideology, representation, voting structure, and bargaining styles will be used in the analysis and will be operationalised in the following chapter.

3.0 Methodological considerations

In this section, I will present, discuss and reflect upon the choices taken in the different parts of the thesis. I will begin with the considerations regarding the choice of case II. I will continue with the reflections towards data collections, followed by a discussion, reflecting upon choices of theories and concepts. Finally, I will conclude by presenting my analytical strategy for the thesis.

3.1 Comparative research design

The overall research design of this thesis is based on a comparative research design. Simplified, a comparative research design consists of analysing two or more cases with the same methods. The cases compared can be of various different types, such as cultures, communities, nations, and organisations which is the case for this thesis (Bryman, 2016, p. 72). The comparative research design can be used for both quantitative and qualitative research strategies. This thesis has a qualitative research design, through a multiple-case study consisting of two cases. One of the benefits of a comparative multiple-case study research design is that it can provide a useful understanding of causality because a case study enables me to analyse causation in different organisations (Bryman, 2016, p. 74). This is valuable for this thesis since causation can highlight different aspects of the processes of reform.

As the research design of this thesis is based on a comparative study, I needed to investigate what other organisation or UN institution would prove fruitful for comparing with reform in the UNSC. I considered to include either an institution also within the UN framework, an IO separate from the UN, or to include one from each group. However, when doing a comparative study, I needed to be aware that the cases should have significant similarities, such

as structure and governance, while the cases must also contain differences. These similarities and differences are both important, since in order to fully discuss if and how procedures can be applied to the UNSC, the other case needs to be different in the aspects I am going to discuss, but similar in other variables which makes the basis for me to compare them. If the other case is completely different from the UNSC, the discussion of whether reform processes from the other case will not be relevant, since the two cases will be too different to compare (Lamont, 2015). Furthermore, another aspect that is highly important for my thesis, is that of reform. Case II should therefore also have an aspect of reform, since my thesis revolves around whether reform experiences in other United Nations institutions can be fruitful in solving the gridlock of reform of the UNSC.

I went through various bodies and institutions of the UN in order to find the one that would be the most favourable case II. One of the UN institutions I decided to look further into was the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). UNESCO is part of the UN specialised agencies, which is the term for organisations that were created by the UN, simultaneously with the UN, or existed before the creation of the UN, but they are all working with or in the framework of the UN (United Nations, n.d. e). UNESCO promotes international peace through education for citizens and children across the globe, through cultural heritage, and through scientific programs (UNESCO, n.d. b). UNESCO has been successful in a number of cases. It has, for example, gathered scientists of conflicting countries, given “...World Heritage status to more than 1,100 important historical sites..” (Nature, 2020), secured education for children all over the world, and managed ocean resources sustainably across borders (Nature, 2020). However, UNESCO has suffered a funding crisis which started in 2011, when the United States suspended their payments in protest to the inclusion of the Palestinian Authority in UNESCO. Moreover, a returning issue is how member states treat UNESCO, leaving the institution as they please, thereby cutting funding and limiting UNESCO in their efficiency of programmes and projects (Nature, 2020). I chose not to go with UNESCO due to several considerations. First, the procedures for being a member of UNESCO are quite different from that of the UNSC. If a country is a member of the UN, it is automatically granted member states status in UNESCO, thereby, UNESCO consists of 193 member states. This also enables countries to withdraw their member state status from UNESCO, such as the example of the United States mentioned further above (UNESCO, n.d. a). The aforementioned highlights a significant difference between the UNSC and UNESCO. Whereas non-permanent members are elected in UNSC, the members of UNESCO are automatically members. Moreover, the geopolitical advantages that come with being a member

of the UNSC versus UNESCO are also evident in the process of becoming a member state. In UNESCO everyone is a member, if they have chosen to be, thereby decisions are taken by all countries. In UNSC, you must be a P5 member, or be an elected non-permanent member in order to have influence on the resolutions. I have therefore decided that the differences between the UNSC and UNESCO are too substantial for them to be compared in the context of my problem formulation and research questions.

While researching UNESCO and its relevance as case II, I came across the UN system chart, see appendix H. From the chart it is evident that UNESCO is a specialised agency that works under the GA and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), whereas, other institutions I also considered, such as UNHCR and UNICEF, are governed by the GA and ECOSOC. This means that their executive boards are decided by the GA and ECOSOC, and thereby for the scope of this thesis, choosing an institution under GA or ECOSOC instead or additionally to ECOSOC would not significantly add to my analysis, which is why I did not choose to go with any of the subsidiary institutions. I have, therefore, chosen to focus on ECOSOC.

As ECOSOC is an institution within the UN, this ensures that both cases are within the UN framework and therefore share significant similarities, which will be discussed further on. I have chosen to refer to the reform of the UNSC as ‘Case I’, and the case of ECOSOC as ‘Case II’. This is both to simplify my overview of data, as well as the distinction between the two cases in the analysis. The purpose remains, however, on how the case of ECOSOC can provide new aspects and perspectives to the reform of the UNSC.

I decided to use ECOSOC as case II for my analysis since it has experienced somewhat similar gridlock issues as the UNSC has experienced and is experiencing. Thomas G. Weiss (2010) has argued that even though the reform debate started back in 1946, with structural changes implemented in 1965 and 1973 (an increase in member states from 18 to 54), ECOSOC lacks the wherewithal to guarantee backing in their recommendations (p. 1). Several resolutions have been implemented in relation to the reform of ECOSOC. GA resolutions 32/197 and 50/227 have focussed on heightening the effectiveness of ECOSOC, as well as resolution 57/270B at the 57th GA (United Nations, Office for ECOSOC Support and Coordination, n.d.). Paragraphs from the 2005 World Summit called for “...further strengthening of ECOSOC’s existing functions and strengthening ECOSOC by entrusting it with important new functions” (United Nations, Office for ECOSOC Support and Coordination, n.d.). These different resolutions regarding ECOSOC’s various reform processes could unveil dynamics which could be helpful for the reform process of the UNSC.

ECOSOC is, together with the UNSC, part of the six main organs of the UN established in 1945 (United Nations Economic and Social Council, n.d. a). ECOSOC is the key body in the UN for policy discussions and recommendations on "...economic, social and environmental issues, as well as the implementation of internationally agreed development goals" (United Nations, n.d. c), as well as the mediator between the General Assembly (GA) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Thereby, ECOSOC has a prominent role within the UN. This can be argued to be a similarity between the UNSC and ECOSOC. Even though their focus areas are not the same, both organisations have prominent responsibilities within the UN. Over the years after the establishment of ECOSOC, the number of NGOs and the UN's interest in them has grown significantly, which also means that the tasks of ECOSOC have become more (Fasulo, 2004, p. 157). There are 54 members of ECOSOC, and they are elected for overlapping three-year terms. The seats are elected by the GA based on geographical representation: "...fourteen allocated to African States, eleven to Asian States, six to Eastern European States, ten to Latin American and Caribbean States, and thirteen to Western European and other States" (United Nations Economic and Social Council, n.d. b). The president of the ECOSOC is elected every year among the member states, by rotation among the groups of "... African states, Asian states, Eastern European states, Latin American and Caribbean states, and the Western European and other states" (Economic and Social Council, 1992). ECOSOC and UNSC members are both made up of nation-states, however, where UNSC has five permanent members, ECOSOC's members are non-permanent, like the non-permanent members of the UNSC. The two organisations also share similarities in the geographical representation of the non-permanent members. However, it should be mentioned that since there are no permanent members in the ECOSOC, there are no right to veto either. This difference is also very relevant in relation to the reform processes since the right to veto can be used to hinder a reform of the UNSC.

In conclusion, I set various criteria to identify the best possible case for comparison for this thesis, bearing in mind the specific research questions. The criteria relate to former reforms, whether the other institution operates within the UN framework, and whether it consists of member states. I studied UN institutions based on these criteria, whereafter, I came to the conclusion that ECOSOC would serve as a fruitful case II. I will now discuss various reflections and considerations to the process of data collection.

3.2 Data selection

I will now present the data for my analysis, as well as reflect on and discuss the choices I made when selecting the chosen data. The case of reform of the UNSC is generally discussed in informal discussions, it would prove difficult for me to get access to these documents. However, I have been able to find official records from plenary meetings in the GA related to the reform debate. Additionally, Bardo Fassbender (2020) has, in his book *Key Documents on the Reform of the UN Security Council 1991-2019*, collected statements from UN organs and officials. Through this book, I was able to find letters from member states related to Intergovernmental Negotiations on the reform of the UNSC. In relation to the data for ECOSOC, I have chosen data that enable me to conduct a longitudinal analysis. I have chosen data consisting of resolutions from the World Summit Outcome, discussions at a breakfast meeting of the ECOSOC Bureau at the Head of State and Government Level, a non-paper from Russia after the World Summit, and finally a resolution the following year. This provides me with data related to the reform of ECOSOC over a year. This data allows me to analyse what processes were evident in the discussion reform of ECOSOC, and what steps were taken in order to adapt a reform of ECOSOC.

To get an overview of my data, and the corresponding appendix number, I have made a table of data below. The data is included in the reference list, but in the rest of the thesis, I will refer to the specific names of the data when citing.

Table 2: Overview of data

UNSC				ECOSOC			
Name	Type	Date	Appendix	Name	Type	Date	Appendix
China, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr Sam Kutesa	Letter	8 April 2015	Appendix A	A/RES/60/1	World Summit Outcome, Economic and Social Council section.	16 September 2005	Appendix E

The Russian Federation, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr Sam Kutesa	Letter	14 April 2015	Appendix B	Breakfast meeting of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Bureau at the Head of State and Government Level	Report	30 September 2005	Appendix F
The United States of America, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr Sam Kutesa	Letter	16 April 2015	Appendix C	A/RES/61/16	Resolution	20 November 2006	Appendix G
A/71/PV.42	Official Records	7 November 2016	Appendix D				

The data I have chosen should provide me with a basis for the analysis that covers different aspects in and of the reform debates of both cases. Even though some of my data is full records, I have only included the statements from the P3 members (specifically the statements from the United States, China, and Russia), since these are the ones I have chosen to focus on. I have chosen to focus on these three since these are the three members, out of the five permanent members, that practise the right to veto (Security Council Report, 2020). Additionally, these three countries are the most influential geopolitically. I argue this since historically the United States of America has been the superpower as the LIO gained more momentum after the Cold War. However, within the last decade, it can be argued that the power of the United States of America has declined, which provides the opportunity for other countries to influence the global world order, such as China and Russia (Ikenberry, 2018). I have chosen to focus on fewer actors, because it will allow me to go deeper in the analysis,

rather than presenting a broad analysis of all members. For the data from ECOSOC, I have also chosen to focus on China, Russia, and the United States of America in the data where statements of member states are made. This is a choice I have made, in order to limit the variables between the case of UNSC and the case of ECOSOC. The choices of having focussed only on the three countries, as well as the time period for the two cases include various limitations. Due to the choice of focusing only on the three countries, there are automatically countries, perspectives and positions I have excluded. Furthermore, the time period for UNSC data is from 2015-2016. It should therefore be noted that the position of the states might have changed in the last seven years. However, I have chosen to specifically focus on the data, presented above, from 2015 and 2016, since this is in the middle of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, and I believed this might portray interesting positions and perspectives on reform. Additionally, the data from ECOSOC is from 2005-2006. This choice has been made since ECOSOC was reformed in relation to the UN World Summit in 2005. However, as with the choice of the time period with data for UNSC, this choice of time period includes similar limitations. ECOSOC might have gone through further reform since 2006, and the positions of the states have likely changed.

In an ideal constellation, the best data would of course be if I could conduct interviews with diplomats, managers and staff from both organisations, as this would provide me with insider information. However, due to my position as a student, this option was not possible, and I believe that the choice I have made by including both various types of data is a way of getting as many different perspectives, without having direct access to the relevant people. Moreover, throughout the analytical discussion, I will draw on academic sources to elaborate on arguments. Since both reform of ECOSOC and, especially, the reform of the UNSC is highly discussed in the academic environment, I believe these additional sources will shed light on additional perspectives that can prove beneficial to a more in-depth analytical discussion.

3.3 Analytical strategy

Selection of theory

Since my thesis deals with the issue of reform of the UNSC and reform of other IOs, I found it necessary to include theories of international relations. I have chosen to use neorealism and neoliberalism since these become tools for my analysis, which allows me to discuss and understand the reasonings behind certain actions of the countries in the organisations that I am

analysing. The theories of international relations give a perception of the workings of the international environment and the countries' role in that environment. It will, furthermore, enable me to analyse and understand to what extent various countries believe it is beneficial to cooperate through IOs, and how the gains should be distributed in order to cooperate. As mentioned in the chapter titled 'Theory and Concepts' (p. 8), neorealism and neoliberalism can be argued to be competing views on how the international society is and should be built. This provides two perspectives which will further my analytical discussion because they can help me interpret the standpoints of the countries. Besides neorealism and neoliberalism, I considered whether to include social constructivism as an additional third international relation theory, to shed light on the aspects of norms and ideas in international relations. However, after having read and returned to my problem formulation, I have decided not to include social constructivism. This is due to how social constructivism has a focus on how the role of discourse and language is part of shaping IOs (Christiansen, Jørgensen, & Wiener, 2001, p. 12). And while that is an interesting aspect as well, this thesis focuses on the processes. Discourses and language are not the main focus of this thesis, and therefore, social constructivism would not provide me with a necessary new perspective. As for the aspects of ideas, the three models of change in IOs provide me with an interesting perspective on this.

In addition to the theories of international relations, I have chosen to include Ernst B. Haas's (1990) three models of change in IOs. I have done this because I believe there needs to be some sort of understanding of change in IOs for understanding the different processes present in the reform debate. The three models of change provide insight into how countries' ideologies, actions, and ideas affect change in IOs. In addition, the models include concepts, such as power, knowledge, and problems, which interplay with both the theories of international relations and the analytical strategy of "What-is-the-problem-represented-to-be"-approach, which will be explained in the subsequent section. Furthermore, I found it necessary to combine theories of international relations with concepts of organisational change in IOs, such as the UN, as these fields complement each other in the case of researching reform in IOs. I will explain how I will operationalise the three models of change further on in the chapter titled analytical strategy (see page 21).

What's the Problem Represented to be?

This thesis aims to discuss whether experiences and dynamics from the reform of another UN institution can be fruitful for solving the gridlock of the reform debate surrounding the UNSC.

In order to answer the research questions, I have chosen to base the analytical strategy of this thesis on Carol Bacchi's and Susan Goodwin's (2016) "What-is-the-problem-represented-to-be"-approach (WPR-approach) to policy analysis. Additionally, I will include Ernst B. Haas' (1990) three models of change in IOs. Structurally, the analysis will follow the WPR-approach. Through the analysis, however, I will add the concepts from the models of change. It should also be noted that question six of the WPR-approach will not be discussed in each sub-analysis, however, it will be used in the comparison.

The WPR-approach directs critical attention to what is produced in policies, and how policies produce certain kinds of problems, while the policy was made to solve problems. This approach to analysing policies is a valuable tool for understanding how policies are influenced by power relations and social realities (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 14). An important distinction to make is that even though my thesis does not directly deal with specific policies, Bacchi & Goodwin (2016) have argued that policy texts can include various different kinds of texts, "...such as organizational files and records, legislation, judicial decisions, [...] media statements, organisational charts, [...], research reports.." (p. 18). Even though my data does not consist of policies, it still deals with the issue of problematization and that something with the UNSC and ECOSOC needs/needed a change. Or on the other hand, countries believe that there is no need for change. The focus of the WPR-approach is on discourses and assumptions, seeking to uncover underlying power relations and ideologies that shape policy issues. This, however, is not to be compared to critical discourse analysis, since WPR does not study rhetoric or modes of language, thereby distancing itself from the 'linguistic turn', which turned the focus from socio-historical to the linguistic construction of texts (Fynsk, 2001; Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 18). In WPR the constitution of the problem in certain texts is a tool that enables greater reflection on the governing and associated effects of the texts (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 18).

The WPR-approach works backwards from the policy, to open up the underlying assumptions and history behind the policy, with the key term being problematization (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 16). "Problem representation" has been defined as "...the form of a problematization or the problematized phenomenon in a specific site" (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 17). WPR-approach to policy analysis allows me to critically examine and reflect on the assumptions lying behind the reform debate and the problem representations. It is relevant to understand the underlying assumptions since this will suggest what processes and assumptions that might hinder reform. The WPR-approach is based on six questions that serve as the framework for the analysis, see Table 3 below. These questions will henceforth be

referred to as “question + number”. The questions work as building blocks, enabling one to build on each question based on the previous question. Hence, the questions should be followed numerically (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 20).

Table 3: The six questions of the WPR-approach

The six questions of the WPR-approach	
Question one	What’s the problem represented to be in a specific policy or policies?
Question two	What deep-seated presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the “problem”?
Question three	How has this representation of the “problem” come about?
Question four	What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the “problem” be conceptualised differently?
Question five	What effects are produced by this representation of the “problem”?
Question six	How and where has this representation of the “problem” been produced, disseminated and defended? How has it been and/or how can it be disrupted and replaced?

(Adapted from Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 20)

Question one and question two will in my analysis be merged within one chapter, focusing on the identification of the problem representation(s), as well as the underlying backgrounds, presuppositions, and assumptions expressed in the various data. Question one aims to identify the problem representation(s) and, thereby, the starting point and basis of the analysis. Question two focuses on three parts. Firstly it investigates presuppositions, assumptions, discourses³ in the policy text that enables the problem representation. Furthermore, question two aims to unveil the concepts and binaries which construct the problem representation. Lastly, it “...identify[s] and reflect[s] upon possible patterns in

³ In this case, the focus of discourse is on knowledge and not language.

problematizations that might signal the operation of a particular political or governmental rationality” (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 21).

The goal of question three is to analyse how the problem representation came to be, through an analysis of the practices that construct the problem representation(s). Power relations and discursive practices for knowledge authority play a big role in this part of the analysis (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 22). In the data of my thesis, the focus of the power relations lay in the structure of the organisations, as well as the geopolitical realities and the perception of those realities by nation-state governments. This is one aspect where the theories of international relations will come into play. Question four promotes critical thinking, by focusing on what has been silenced and the hidden agendas in the problem representation. The knowledge uncovered and the focus on power relations in questions one, two, and three will serve as a basis to identify and investigate any limitations or missing components of the problem representation (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, pp. 22-23).

Question five opens up for reflections on the effect of the policy in relation to: “...discursive effects, [and] subjectification effects...” (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 23). Firstly, discursive effects refer to how the problem representation sets boundaries for what can be said, thought, and agreed to, in my case in terms of reform. Secondly, subjectification effects refer to how “subjects” are constructed in specific ways in the problem representation (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 23). In the case of my thesis, this relate to how the different groups classify themselves and their interests when it comes to the reform debate. Finally, question six looks for contestation to the problem representation, it enables room for reflection of resistance and counter problem representations. In this part of the analysis, I will be able to investigate and discuss the various different perspectives on the problem representation within the two different reform debates and analyse how conflicting interests can meet in compromise and consensus (Bacchi and Goodwin, 2016, p. 24). As mentioned previously, question six will not be applied to each sub-analysis, but operationalised in the comparison of the two organisations. This is a choice I have made, since I believe this is the part of the analysis, where I will reflect, discuss and compare the results from the two organisations.

Three models of change


Supplementing the WPR-approach, Haas’ (1990) three models of change in IOs will also be used in my analytical strategy. I argue that these two, the WPR-approach and the models of change, shed light on different aspects of my data, while still relating to each other. As

mentioned in my theory section, knowledge, awareness, and agreement about what problems are playing a key role in the three models of change, which correlates with the problem representation of WPR.

For the analytical discussion, I will focus on the three models, adaptation through incremental growth, adaptation through turbulent non-growth, and learning to manage interdependence (see theory, page 9). To analyse whether one or more of these different models are present in any IO, Haas (1990) has provided three dimensions that include variables and the different degrees of variation in those variables. I have chosen to include all three models, since they can co-exist as also mentioned in the theory chapter, however, I have decided not to include all variables and their different degrees of variation. I have chosen to focus on the variables of ideology, representation, the status of NGOs and experts, voting, bargaining styles, knowledge, and adaptation and learning. I have chosen to focus on these variables since I would argue these are the ones that can shed light on the processes of reform within the two cases. Some of the variables are included due to how they, from the literature review in my introduction, are prominent parts of the current reform debate of the UNSC, such as the question of representation and voting. The variables of ideology, the status of NGOs, and knowledge have all been chosen since I argue that these are interconnected with ideas from the theories of international relations. Bargaining styles have been included since this variable allows me to analyse how knowledge is, or is not, consensual and how the different actors bargain. This could also prove to uncover reform processes within both cases. Lastly, adaptation and learning are very prominent aspects of all three models, which is why they have been selected as well. I argue this since it can be argued that they form the basis of which model a given organisation can be argued to be in. By choosing the variables mentioned above, I have also discarded other variables. This is a choice I have made, since I would argue, from the literature review and after having written the other theories as well as looking at the data I have chosen, that the variables chosen are the ones which are the best tools for the analytical discussion of this thesis.

Having chosen this type of organisational change, I have automatically chosen to exclude other possible organisational theories. However, this is a conscious choice I have made, because I find the constellation between the WPR-approach and the three models a really good fit. They enable me to build on each other while shedding light on different perspectives of the reform in both cases. In Figure 2 below, I have made a visualisation of the connections between the components of my analytical strategy.

Figure 2: Visual of the interplay between components of the analysis



4.0 Analytical Discussion

The structure of the analysis will follow the research questions, as well as the analytical strategy described in the chapter 'Methodological considerations'. Therefore, the analysis will consist of several sub-analyses. Subsequently, the findings will be compared. The structure of the sub-analyses will be based on the WPR-approach while integrating and operationalising the concepts and ideas of neorealism, neoliberalism, legitimacy, effectiveness, and the three models of change. It should be noted that the data called 'Country, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr Sam Kutesa' include the countries' responses to a previous letter from the Chair. These responses are included as annexes to a new letter from the Chair. It is, however, still the countries' statements and perspectives.

4.1 Reform processes of the United Nations Security Council

China, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr Sam Kutesa (Appendix A)

The main problem representation, in China, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr Sam Kutesa, is that the former framework document, which this annex is a response to, presented from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations does not reflect China's position or the principles agreed to regarding reform. This is evident when it is stated: "... these principles and consensus are not reflected in your framework document and the broad approach" (China, Annex to a letter, ll. 12-13). This document assumes that all member states are interested in reforming the UNSC as it states "... the common interests of all Member States..." (China, Annex to a letter, l. 14). This assumption can to some degree be true enough. However, it can be discussed to what degree the interests are 'common' due to the time period of reform debate of the UNSC. Furthermore, it presupposes that the five clusters of key issues concerning the Security Council reform are interrelated. Again, it can be questioned whether they are. And since this document is an internal letter it is also assumed that readers of the letter know what the five clusters are, and it is, therefore, not necessary for China to elaborate on them.

As WPR question three revolves around how the problem representation came to be, it is relevant that the letter is an answer to the informal briefing session on 26 March 2015. At the informal briefing, a framework document was presented. These framework documents are part of determining the principles of the Intergovernmental Negotiations (Fassbender, 2020, p. 8). Furthermore, Fassbender (2020) has described how the framework document works as kind of a questionnaire for the member states to fill in. This was supposedly done to start the discussion from anew (Fassbender, 2020, p. 30). However, as it can be seen from this main problem representation, this plan did not prove to be successful, due to China's reaction. Additionally, Russia and the United States of America whose letters will be analysed later on, also objected to the process and added their positions as letters and not in the framework document as it was intended (Fassbender, 2020, p. 30).

It can be discussed whether a hidden agenda of this problem representation is that China has an interest in keeping the reform debate at status quo. This is argued because, as it can be seen in this document, China wants all member states to agree on the type of reform. However, as it can be seen from my literature review, the reform debate has been going on for several

decades. It can, thereby, be argued that getting all member states to agree might prove very difficult. Therefore, by China stating that all member states should agree it can result in how the reform debate stays at a status quo. Additionally, Fassbender (2020) has argued that some states prefer the status quo instead of additional permanent or semi-permanent members since the states do not know what consequences follow such an addition. From the perspective of neorealism, it can be argued that these unforeseeable consequences and thereby the preferred status quo, are related to the self-interest of one's own state. In other words, China believes that they will automatically lose some power if additional permanent members were added and can not foresee which consequences that would bring. It is therefore better for the survival of China as a state to try to keep the UNSC at status quo. Furthermore, in relation to the theories of international relations, it is evident that from China's perspective, the member states play a significant role in the reform process of the UNSC. This perspective of how the Intergovernmental Negotiations should be controlled by the member states portrays a neorealist angle. By the states controlling the negotiations, they are in charge of securing most gains for themselves and can maintain the power they already have, for example in case of the right to veto.

There is a very direct discursive effect developing from China's statement. "We expect the Chair of this mechanism to earnestly uphold the membership-driven principle and to work in an open, inclusive, and transparent manner" (China, Annex to a letter, ll. 22-24). This quote showcases the discursive effect produced by the whole statement. By this statement, and the aforementioned quote, China enforces a constraint on what can be said in terms of China's position on the reform debate, and to what degree and what proposals China supports. It also implies an effect on the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations that he can only act, if he wants the support of China, in line with "the membership-driven principle and to work in an open, inclusive, and transparent manner" (China, Annex to a letter, l. 23).

The Russian Federation, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr Sam Kutesa (Appendix B)

The main problem representation in the Russian statement is related to how the issues relating to the reform of the UNSC are all interlinked and should be considered together. This is a problem representation since it highlights a very plausible reason for the difficulties of the reform debate. Additionally, the urgency of these interlinked issues is emphasized in how it is

stated that “the reform of the UN Security Council is one of the most important issues on the agenda of this world organization” (The Russian Federation, Annex to a letter, ll. 8-9).

It can be argued that an assumption in the Russian statement is related to effectiveness. It is stated that “it is important to maintain *a compact composition* [added emphasis] of the Security Council in order for it to provide *an adequate and prompt reaction* [added emphasis] to new challenges" (The Russian Federation, Annex to a letter, ll.17-18). From this quote and the added emphasis, it can be argued that it is believed that a UNSC with a limited number of members is more effective in their reactions and in taking rapid decisions. However, one of the reasons for why the UNSC should be reformed is because it struggles to make rapid decisions and because the mandates it is giving often are not broad enough. On the other hand, Russia has stated that they support a bigger representation of developing countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa, which does not correlate with the compact composition. Furthermore, from the three models of change, it can be argued that Russia highlights two different coalitions in the reform debate of the UNSC. "In the situation when positions of the main groups of states - those who support the idea of the UN Security Council's expansion in both categories and those who do not - remain polar, one can advance in the negotiating process only by searching for a compromise" (The Russian Federation, Annex to a letter, ll. 10-12). It can be argued that within these two coalitions, fragmented knowledge occurs. This is due to how the different coalitions advocate for two different approaches on how to reform the UNSC. Fragmented knowledge is often seen in the model of 'turbulent non-growth'.

As it is analysed from the Chinese statement, the Russian statement is also an answer to the informal briefing session. Therefore, it is, similar to the Chinese statement, a response to the framework document. Unlike China, Russia manages to express their opinion on most of the issues related to UNSC reform, which can showcase how they are interested to have their opinion heard about as many issues as possible.

It can be argued that the Russian statement is one of the few statements that actually manages to touch upon several of the issues of the reform debate. It can therefore be argued that nothing is silenced, however, not much time is spent elaborating on their arguments. This does result in very thin argumentation, which can seem as Russia silencing if they believe reform can be achieved. I argue this because Russia states both that they support a bigger representation of countries from the 'Global South', while straight after emphasising the importance of a compact UNSC (The Russian Federation, Annex to a letter, ll. 15-19). These statements are working in opposite directions, which showcases how Russia touches upon many issues related to reform of the UNSC, without elaborative argumentation. Furthermore,

what the Russian statement does not portray, but what Fassbender (2020) has shown is that over the years the Russian position has shifted back and forth on many of the subjects, only being consistent on the issue of the right to veto (pp. 1274-1275). As also mentioned in the Russian statement, they strongly advocate that the right to veto should not be reformed under any circumstances (The Russian Federation, Annex to a letter, ll. 24-26). Seen from the perspective of neo-realism this could be a portrayal of how Russia is trying to maintain their power in the UNSC, while also ensuring that no additional new permanent members are given the right to veto. Thereby, maintaining more gains for themselves.

A discursive effect produced by the problem representation of the Russian statement is that it is stated that "the number of members in an enlarged Security Council should not exceed a reasonable level of low twenties" (The Russian Federation, Annex to a letter, ll. 18-19). This is a discursive effect since Russia through their statements implies that an enlarged UNSC with more members than the low twenties is not reasonable, and indirectly this would lead to an ineffective UNSC. This can result in portraying countries that argue for a UNSC with more members than the low twenties as not reasonable, and that are not interested in an UNSC that is effective.

The United States of America, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr Sam Kutesa (Appendix C)

The statement from the United States of America is very short and precise in its formulation. It can be argued that the problem is that, in the process of reform of the UNSC in relation to additional permanent members, there is a need for each individual country to be considered (The United States of America, Annex to a letter). Therefore, it can be argued that the problem lies in the extent of work that needs to be put into considering each country. This is evident in how the United States of America states that: "...any consideration of an expansion of permanent members must take into account the ability and willingness of countries to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security..." (The United States of America, Annex to a letter, ll. 10-12).

As already mentioned in the analysis of China, Annex to letter (Appendix A), the United States of America's statement is also a response to the informal briefing session on the 26th of March 2015. However, it is noteworthy to highlight the difference in the length of the statements and what the reason for this might be. It could be argued that the geopolitical situation in 2014 and 2015 showed that China and Russia found the need to express their views

more in-depth than the United States of America since especially Russia were oppressed in other arenas of international cooperation, due to Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Bremmer, 2015).

Since the statement is fairly short, it could be argued that many topics are silenced. However, it can also be argued that, in this statement, the United States of America is not interested in other ways to reform the UNSC, only focussed on an enlargement of member states, both permanent and non-permanent. If this is the case, then it can be argued that the focus on the "...country-specific nature..." (The United States of America, Annex to a letter, l. 13) is silenced in relation to the non-permanent members, since it is only mentioned in relation to the permanent members. This leaves questions of whether an enlargement of non-permanent members should be based on their willingness to secure international peace, or what position the United States of America have regarding non-permanent members.

A quite prominent discursive effect from the short statement from the United States of America is related to this quote: "...any consideration of an expansion of permanent members must take into account the ability and willingness of countries to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security..." (The United States of America, Annex to a letter, ll. 10-12). This sets boundaries for what the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations and other actors can say in the debate regarding additional permanent members. Furthermore, it puts the countries interested in a permanent seat under investigation in relation to their capability to contribute to the maintenance of international peace. From the perspective of neoliberalism, this can be argued to portray a notion of how the United States of America sees the UNSC as an arena through which it is important to maintain international peace through cooperation. Furthermore, it can be argued that through their problem representation, they discursively try to impose boundaries on how the maintenance of international peace effectively still should be the main focus of the UNSC.

A/71/PV.42 (Appendix D)

The main problem representation in all three countries' statements in A/71/PV.42 can be argued to be fairly similar. They all revolve around how reform of the UNSC is a complex problem within the UN system. In the Russian statements, it said that "Security Council reform is one of the most complex issues on the agenda of the United Nations" (A/71/PV.42, ll. 6-7). While Russia argues that it is a complex issue, they also highlight the importance of the member states, and as broad a consensus as possible. This problem representation is also portrayed in

China's statement. It states that negotiations should be controlled by member states' interests to secure the broadest possible agreement on a package solution to the issue of reform. This is evident as "China hopes that Member States will continue to work constructively in the intergovernmental negotiations and, on the basis of extensive and democratic consultations, will arrive at the broadest possible consensus on the five groups of issues as one package" (A/71/PV.42, ll. 83-85). The statement from the United States of America is slightly different. They have a greater focus on the goals of reform in that "...we must ensure that they enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the Security Council and allow us to more effectively address the pressing challenges to international peace and security" (A/71/PV.42, ll. 114-116). Yet, the United States of America still focuses on securing the broadest support possible, similar to the statement from Russia and China.

It can be argued that China believes that one of the main tasks of the co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations is to aid the member states in reaching a consensus since it is stated that "China supports the work of the co-Chairs, which [...] is aimed at facilitating the efforts of Member States to gradually bridge their differences on the reform of the Council and to steadily move closer towards each other's positions" (A/71/PV.42, ll. 79-82). In relation to the three models of change, this view sees the Chair as the driving force in transforming the organisation from the model of 'turbulent non-growth' to the model 'managed interdependence'. In this representation of the co-Chairs, it is their responsibility to foster consensual knowledge and provide places for the member states to bargain. By doing this, China is renouncing responsibility from the member states, since they assume that the responsibility lies with the co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations. Another assumption that is apparent in the statement from China, is that they assume the right and correct way in the process to reform is that it should "...be membership-led and should be based on the proposals and recommendations of Member States" (A/71/PV.42, ll. 78-79). They assume that the only way to achieve reform of the UNSC is by letting the member states decide how to reform.

It can be argued that an assumption in the statement from Russia, is that they do not explain what "the principle of 'do no harm!...' (A/71/PV.42, l. 12) is, even though they argue that it is of relevance in the case of Intergovernmental Negotiations for reform of the UNSC. This is an assumption since Russia assumes that the participants of the meeting know what the principle is and it is, thereby, not necessary to elaborate on its meaning. However, it can also be discussed whether the lack of elaboration is a conscious choice. If this is the case, it is an active silencing from Russia. This would result in a gap between those participants of the plenary meeting who understand the meaning and those who do not.. This gap could result in

fragmented knowledge and different bargaining styles that could lead to a slower reform process. Furthermore, it is assumed that “its [the UNSC] optimum size should not exceed the low twenties” (A/71/PV.42) for it to be able to act promptly to challenges and issues.

It can be argued that there is a hidden agenda in the statement from Russia. It is stated that "we must all clearly understand that this is a task where there is no place for deadlines or attempts to address this complex problem with a simple stroke of a pen" (A/71/PV.42, ll. 47-48). In this statement, it is indirectly written that reform cannot be achieved through short framework documents. Thereby, there is a hidden agenda in how they try to avoid deadlines or simple strokes of a pen, and through that, perhaps prolong the reform process to maintain a status quo. They reiterate their problem representation of how reform is a complex issue that must have complex negotiations and solutions. Furthermore, it can be discussed whether an additional hidden agenda can be found in the Russian statement. Since they, directly and indirectly, advocate for a long process with no deadlines, it can be argued that they try to prolong the process to keep the status quo on the reform debate, simply because they are not interested in a reform of the UNSC. Throughout their statements, they, somewhat, contradict themselves, which can be argued to highlight how they on the one hand have to be part of the discussions, while on the other hand have an interest in keeping UNSC as it is. This is also seen in the statement from China, as they also advocate for "no artificial deadlines should be set on reform, nor should any immature proposals be imposed" (A/71/PV.42, ll. 85-86).

The fairly similar problem representations impose a discursive effect on how other member states should view the reform process. Because it is the three most influential countries in the UNSC, it can be difficult for other, less influential, countries to impose a different discursive effect of how the reform should be and how it should be debated. Furthermore, the problem representations can be a portrayal of fragmented knowledge within the coalitions, which could hint at how the UNSC can be put in the model of 'turbulent non-growth'. This is furthered by Russia stating that "the positions on reform of the main players continue to differ substantially and are sometimes diametrically opposed" (A/71/PV.42, ll. 16-18).

Sub-conclusion

It can be concluded from the analytical discussion of the data related to the reform of the UNSC that China, Russia, and the United States of America emphasise the importance of considering the opinions of the member states and that a possible solution for reform should have the support of all member states, or at least try to gather support from as many member states as

possible. Additionally to this, it can be argued that China and Russia use this argument as a way to slow down the reform process in UNSC since it is argued that they would like to keep UNSC at status quo. Member states' opinions on reform can be argued to be quite important since the reform proposals will have to be voted through, and if all member states are to unanimously vote for the reform it would require compromises. Furthermore, since I have analysed the statements from three of the permanent members, who have the right to veto, their opinions might carry additional weight because they have the opportunity to veto.

Another evident argument that can be concluded upon is how the interconnectedness of all five key issues of reform is highlighted several times in the analysis. The five key issues are "...(1) categories of membership; (2) the question if the veto; (3) regional representation; (4) size of an enlarged Security Council and working methods of the Council; and (5) the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly" (Fassbender, 2020, p. 28). It is believed that reform can only be achieved if all issues are addressed in a package solution to reform the UNSC. However, it should be mentioned that the United States of America does not focus on all five issues, they primarily focus on an enlargement of the non-permanent members and permanent members, thereby issues one, three, and four.

Finally, it can be noted that, as also mentioned in the analysis, it can be discussed whether reform is the common interest of all member states, including China, Russia and the United States of America which mention that reform is an interest of all member states. This is relevant, since it can be argued that if reform was the common interest of all member states a solution could have been found several years ago. Fassbender (2020) has argued that the most effective period of reform was in 1992-1997. In this period several steps were taken and reform seemed closer and closer. Therefore, it can be discussed that reform might not be the common interest of all member states, or at least not the same type of reform.

As all three countries have no wish of change in the prerogatives of the permanent members, it portrays a notion of how to maintain as much power as possible, which from neo-realism can be seen as a way to secure the self-interests of the state. It can also be argued that maintaining the right to veto, and ensuring that possible new permanent members do not receive the right, is a way to secure more gains. It can be argued that it is mostly within the statements from the United States of America that neo-liberalistic perspectives can be found, as they emphasise the maintenance of cooperation that ensures international peace and security, as Fassbender (2020) also have argued (p. 1286).

4.2 Reform processes of the Economic and Social Council

A/RES/60/1, paragraphs 155 and 156 (Appendix E)

Resolution A/RES/60/1, paragraphs 155 and 156 revolves around the decisions taken in regard to ECOSOC in the 2005 World Summit (Appendix E). Para. 155 reads as follows: “We [...] recognize the need for a more effective Economic and Social Council as a principal body for coordination, policy review, policy dialogue and recommendations on issues of economic and social development, as well as for implementation of the international development goals...” (A/RES/60/1, para. 155, ll. 6-10). From this, I argue that the main problem representation is the need for a more effective ECOSOC. This problem representation is reiterated in para. 156 as it states "we stress that in order to fully perform the above functions [...] the Economic and Social Council should be adapted" (ll. 37-38). I argue that this reiterates the problem representation since the word "stress" emphasises the importance and also somewhat urgency of the need to change in order to enhance the effectiveness of ECOSOC.

Furthermore, there are several assumptions behind this problem representation. An assumption can be seen in how ECOSOC is somewhat effective yet not effective enough since there is a need for “... a more effective...” (A/RES/60/1, para. 155, l. 7) ECOSOC. ECOSOC will become effective by reaching objectives through various processes mentioned in sections a to e in paragraph 155. Additionally, these sections contain assumptions. It can be assumed that these sections portray how ECOSOC contain the processes and cooperations mentioned in the sections. Yet, ECOSOC does not achieve results that are sufficient in the processes and cooperations since ECOSOC needs to be strengthened and more effective. However, the sections could also hint at an assumption that ECOSOC is actually lacking these processes and cooperations, and thereby, is not effective in its actions. Additionally, another assumption is seen in how it is evident that through ECOSOC convening “...biennial high-level Development Cooperation Forum...” (A/RES/60/1, para. 155; section b, l. 20) and “play[ing] a major role in the overall coordination...” (A/RES/60/1, para. 155; section e, l. 34) it “...promote[s] greater coherence..” (A/RES/60/1, para. 155; section b, l. 21) and “...ensure[s] coherence...” (A/RES/60/1, para. 155; section e, ll. 34-35). I argue that these are assumptions, due to how they are presented, that convening these meetings and playing the main role equals coherence amongst the relevant actors. This assumption ties in with some of the ideas and concepts from the 'managed interdependence' model from the three models of change. Knowledge in this model becomes consensual throughout the whole organisation. Furthermore, the model of

managed interdependence is based on how learning and adaptation lead to an organisation that manages issues and problems in the best possible way. This assumption of how to ensure and promote coherence can thereby be argued to show signs of reform processes within ECOSOC of the managed interdependence model.

When it comes to question three, how the representation of the problem has come to be, it is noteworthy to highlight that the resolution analysed is from the World Summit 2005 where several topics with the United Nations system were debated. A/RES/60/1 is the outcome of the World Summit, consisting of 178 paragraphs in total revolving around the different UN bodies and mandates. It can therefore be discussed how much focus the different diplomats had on specifically the need of making ECOSOC more effective. It can be argued that the 54 members of ECOSOC will further elaborate on the decision taken at the World Summit within ECOSOC meetings, as to discuss how to reach the goals set in paragraphs 155 and 156 of the World Summit Outcome Document.

Question four relates to what has been silenced and what is left unproblematic in the problem representation. This will, accordingly, be founded on the problem representation analysed in questions one to three above. None of the elected member states are mentioned, as well as, structural aspects of ECOSOC. A/RES/60/1 paragraphs 155 and 156 do not contain any objectives related to voting structures or representation of member states, which could showcase that the issue of change and the lack of effectiveness does not lie in the bureau, or at least that the GA does not believe or want the bureau to change. It is, furthermore, interesting that the section related to ECOSOC ends with para. 156: "We stress that in order to fully perform the above functions, the organisation of work, the agenda and the current methods of work of the Economic and Social Council should be adapted" (A/RES/60/1, ll. 37-38). Yet, no elaboration on how it should be adapted. It can be argued that this is a conscious choice, as this should be decided by the members of ECOSOC and not the GA. However, it could also indicate that the GA could not reach a consensus on how ECOSOC should be adapted within the framework of the World Summit.

The fifth question in the WPR-approach is related to the effects that are produced by the problem representation. Similar to question four, this will follow the above-mentioned questions and findings. Since the resolution was adopted, it can be argued that a discursive effect of the resolution is that one can only discuss how the need for a more effective ECOSOC is beneficial, and not discuss whether ECOSOC even needs or should be more effective. Moreover, by this focus on how and why ECOSOC needs to be more effective, the problem formulation portrays ECOSOC before the reform as not effective enough to live up to its tasks.

A discursive effect of this can be how the actions, historically, of ECOSOC are not seen as effective enough and thereby undermine the output legitimacy of those actions. Furthermore, it can be argued that the lived effects of A/RES/60/1 paragraphs 155 and 156, is that the 54 member states are getting more work since they have to implement the processes of paragraphs 155 and 156, sections a to e. Furthermore, this leads to how the number of tasks of ECOSOC grows, furthering the addition of work tasks. This can be argued not to make ECOSOC more effective, but actually the opposite, and make it less effective.

Breakfast meeting of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Bureau at the Head of State and Government Level (Appendix F)

At the breakfast meeting, as discussed and explained in the chapter titled 'Methodological Considerations, page 15, I have chosen to focus on the three main players China, Russia, and the United States of America. This analysis will therefore focus on these three countries' statements, as well as draw on findings from the previous analysis of A/RES/60/1.

There are several problem representations in the statements from the three countries. The main problem representation from China can be argued to be similar to the one of A/RES/60/1, that ECOSOC needs to become more effective and improve its working methods. This is evident from how H.E. Mr Tang Xiajuan has stated that ECOSOC should "better coordinate..." (Breakfast meeting, para. 23, section a, l. 38), "Reform institutional functions of ECOSOC and improve its capacity..." and "ECOSOC needs to improve..." (Breakfast meeting, para. 23, section c, ll. 58-59). It can be argued that there is a somewhat similar problem representation in the Russian statement. In this statement, the problem representation is related to how ECOSOC needs to be strengthened and more effective. This can be seen in how H.E. Alexander V. Yakovenko expresses that even though ECOSOC already has an important role, there is a need for ECOSOC to develop and be strengthened (Breakfast meeting, para. 30). This is reiterated in para. 32, "...the further strengthening of the political importance and role of the Council" (ll. 98-99) and in para. 34 "...the further strengthening..." (l. 123). However, different from the problem representations of China and Russia, which both relate to a more effective and strengthened ECOSOC, is the statement from the United States of America. This statement is fairly short compared to the others and mostly relates to economic development. The problem representation is, therefore, more in how to aid economic development, also in developing countries.

When it comes to the assumptions and/or presuppositions in the statements, it is evident

in China's statement that there is an assumption that ECOSOC does not use the resources efficiently, yet, if it began to use the resources efficiently, this would lead to "...better synergy" (Breakfast meeting, para. 23, section a, l. 40). This 'better synergy' can also be connected to Haas' notion of consensual knowledge. If the statement from China relates to how the resources are used inefficiently, and that this results in fragmented knowledge since the management of the resources is not creating coherence, it can be argued that using the resources efficiently creates synergy, and thereby, consensual knowledge. In the Russian statement, there is a presupposition that the "...current work format of ECOSOC..." (Breakfast meeting, para. 34, ll. 124-125) functions as it should and therefore does not need to be reformed. Additionally, Russia actually assumes that by reforming the working methods it will result in the "...most negative consequences for its political role and efficiency of..." ECOSOC's work (Breakfast meeting, para. 33, ll. 119-120). Not only does this emphasise how Russia believes that the working methods should not be reformed, but it also emphasises how Russia assumes and believes that the working methods and bureau are as strong and effective as they should be.

These problem representations can be argued to partly stem from the fact that the statements are from a meeting of the ECOSOC bureau at the state and government level not long after the World Summit Outcome (A/RES/60/1) analysed above. Therefore, the problem representation seen in the analysis of A/RES/60/1, and the problem representations seen in these statements correlate. It is also evident from the president's summary that the nation-states "...were unanimous in their support for the decisions made on the role and reform of ECOSOC in the outcome document..." (Breakfast meeting, para. 1-2, ll. 12-13). This furthers the understanding of why the problem representations are somewhat similar. Question three of the WPR-approach in this thesis also has a focus on the geopolitical realities and the perception of those realities by nation-state governments. It is evident from the statement from the United States of America that they have a neoliberal perspective on the cooperation in ECOSOC. H.E. Ambassador Sichan Siv states that "the United States of America is willing to assist developing countries through free trade by eliminating tariffs, subsidies and all other barriers to the free flow of goods and services, within a multilateral framework" (Breakfast meeting, para. 28, ll. 75-77). With regard to the three models of change in IOs, it can be argued that by all countries agreeing on the steps taken at the World Summit, the bargaining styles have been alike, as well as how it seems as most knowledge of how ECOSOC should reform is consensual. Furthermore, since the tasks of ECOSOC continue to grow, without changes to the working methods or bureau, it can be discussed that processes within ECOSOC are comparable with those of the incremental growth model.

As can be derived from the statement of China, sections a) to c) are the sections where they believe the ECOSOC should “...step up its work...” (Breakfast meeting, para. 23). Whether these are the only aspects and ways in which ECOSOC can become more effective within can be discussed. However, they are the only ones China mentions and thereby, it can be argued that they believe they are the only ones that should be focussed on. Whereas China focussed on what aspects ECOSOC should step up its work within, Russia focuses on what should not be done. Thereby, it can be argued that it sets up a discursive effect of how certain aspects of ECOSOC should not be reformed. In general, there is a more negative perspective in the Russian statement compared to the Chinese statement as well as the statement of the United States of America, and A/RES/60/1. Furthermore, the Russian statement, and to some degree the one from the United States of America, adds a subjectification effect of how the national level should be considered and are part of this debate as well. In relation to the three models of change, as already mentioned, it can be argued that ECOSOC is, from these statements, the model of 'incremental growth'. Within Russia's statement, a notion from the third model, 'managed interdependence', can be seen. It is stated that "Russia also urged participants to be cautious with regard to the ideas of creating within ECOSOC a variety of "executive committees” or “steering groups” of an uncertain composition and with unclear mandates...” (Breakfast meeting, para. 35, ll. 132-134). The model of managed interdependence focuses on how the organisation should be built around issues, and that decisions should be taken by the members who have the most expertise within the given issue. From the statement from Russia, it can be discussed whether Russia completely dismissed the idea of expertise groups, or if the reason for their cautiousness is that, it should be made clear what groups work with what and under what mandate. However, it cannot be argued that ECOSOC is in the model of 'managed interdependence' in this aspect since there is no mention of expertise group in A/RES/60/1.

A/RES/61/16 (Appendix G)

Similar to the other data analysed in relation to ECOSOC, the main problem representation in A/RES/61/16 is related to the need for a more effective and strengthened ECOSOC. This is first evident in the introduction to the resolution where it is stated that the GA is:

Reaffirming [original emphasis] the role that the Charter of the United National and the General Assembly has vested in the Economic and Social Council, and

recognizing the need for *a more effective* [added emphasis] Council as a principal body for coordination, policy review, policy dialogue and recommendations on issues of economic and social development...” (A/RES/61/16, ll. 14-17).

Additionally, also in the introduction, it is stated that the GA is “reiterating that the Economic and Social Council should continue to strengthen its role...” (A/RES/61/16, l. 28). The modal verb "should" emphasises the need for the strengthening of the ECOSOC. Furthermore, the terms "recalling", "reaffirming", and “continue” show that the problem representation is not a novel problem. Rather, this choice of words indicates that previous attempts to solve those problems have perhaps not been successful enough.

It can be argued that from this problem representation of the need for a more effective and a more strengthened ECOSOC, there is an assumption that resolutions, like A/RES/61/16, will result in an ECOSOC which is more effective due to the decisions taken in the resolution (para. 1; 2; 3; 4; 6; 8; 11 & 24) and the recommendations (para. 8, section a) & e)). Additionally, this indicates that it is assumed that by “review[ing] trends and progress in international development cooperation...” will result in the ability “...to promote more effective international development cooperation” (A/RES/61/16, para. 4, section a, ll. 64-65). By reviewing trends and progresses, A/RES/61/16 assumes that this equals the ability to provide more effective guidance on international development cooperation. It is thereby assumed that ECOSOC will learn from the review. Seen from the perspective of the three models of change, the incentive for learning often comes from exogenous sources. In this case, ECOSOC is supposed to review the international development cooperation, and in that process of reviewing they have to learn and adapt to the new knowledge inquired, thereafter use the new knowledge to promote more effective processes in the same arena of the international development cooperation. The quote above this quite complicated process has been boiled down to something that seems very attainable. However, from the concept of consensual knowledge also from the three models of change, it can be discussed to what degree different coalitions' knowledge are able to be consensual in order to have a coherent understanding and ability to promote. Another assumption is seen in para. 18, in that it is made explicit that due to “...insufficient provision of conference services and substantive support to the meetings of the Economic and Social Council...” (ll. 135-136), ECOSOC simply cannot fulfil its mandate, and be effective, because member states are not supporting the organisation sufficiently. The assumption in this is that, if member states supported ECOSOC sufficiently, supported the

meetings and the provision for the conference services, ECOSOC would be able to fulfil its mandate in a more effective and strengthened manner.

As A/RES/60/1 and the breakfast meeting, A/RES/61/16 stem from the World Summit 2005 and preceding resolutions (A/RES/61/16, ll. 8-13). It can also be argued that the problem representations are fairly similar, which is interesting since one could believe that changes within ECOSOC should have happened after the World Summit. Weiss (2012) has stated that "...ECOSOC lacks the wherewithal to secure compliance with its recommendations" (p. 117), since it does not have the same possibilities as the UNSC to secure compliance with its recommendations. However, this problem representation focuses on how to strengthen ECOSOC, but not in relation to securing compliance with its recommendations. The problem representation can also be argued to stem from the Russian statement at the breakfast meeting. From the previous analysis of the breakfast meeting, it was evident that Russia strongly believed that there should not be a change in the segment structure of ECOSOC. This stance is reiterated, not as Russia's opinion but as a decision from the member states, in A/RES/61/1, para. 1: "Decides to maintain the current segment structure of the substantive session of the Economic and Social Council" (ll. 45-46). Thereby, it is evident that an opinion of a singular member state can be accepted by several member states and result in that opinion being included in a resolution. Furthermore, it can be argued that the perspective on IOs from neoliberalists is evident in the resolution. Para. 2, sections a to c revolves around the issue of the role of the Economic and Social Council in relation to global financial institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and Bretton Woods institutions. I argue that this is a neoliberal perspective of cooperation in IOs since neoliberalists argue that the trade aspect is beneficial for international cooperation.

In relation to question 4 of the WPR-approach, which focuses on hidden agendas or issues that have been silenced, A/RES/61/16 touches on many themes, issues and topics however, there is no mention of decisions or changes to what Haas (1990) calls variables within setting or behaviour. That is, there is no mention of the structure of voting or representation of states within ECOSOC. This could be due to how member states believe that these aspects cannot be strengthened or that they are effective enough. This silence is also seen in the analysis of A/RES/60/1, however, Russia mentions it to a small degree in the breakfast meeting. It can be discussed whether these aspects are silenced because member states are scared of losing power if these aspects are changed. There are 54 members of ECOSOC, and geographically represented, however, Weiss (2012) has argued that the 'Global North-Global South' dilemma is evident in ECOSOC as it is in UNSC. He has argued that a solution for the 'Global North-

Global South' dilemma would be to increase the transparency of actions taken by the ECOSOC members (Weiss, 2012). This would perhaps not increase the effectiveness, but it could lead to a more legitimate ECOSOC.

A discursive effect of A/RES/61/16 can be how para. 18 is highlighting an illegitimate feature of the member states and their support of ECOSOC, even though it is the member states that are also part of adapting the resolution to their voting. By the GA presenting this concern, it can result in the member states being pressured to provide sufficient provision and support for the meetings in ECOSOC, since they are put under pressure to secure normative legitimacy.

Sub-conclusion

Overall, it can be concluded that there is a great deal of agreement on the fact that ECOSOC should be strengthened and made more effective through all three documents. This is an interesting notion since one would believe that there would be some sort of visible change in the problem representations. In other words, one could believe that due to the World Summit Outcome, ECOSOC would be strengthened. But as A/RES/61/16 portrays, there is still a need for a strengthened and more effective ECOSOC. It can therefore be discussed whether the resolutions are not reforming the right aspects of ECOSOC since they do not seem to be effective. Or, whether the support for them is not big enough. However, it can be concluded from the Chinese, Russian and American statements, that is an agreement on the need for a strengthened and more effective ECOSOC, so it can be argued that it does not seem to be the lack of agreement that hinders ECOSOC in being strengthened enough. Furthermore, Weiss (2012) has argued that "periodically a 'new' ECOSOC is announced, but the updated version invariably reproduces the weaknesses of previous ones" (p. 118), which supports the notion of how ECOSOC is reformed, but it does not seem to be enough.

4.3 Comparison

When looking at the two organisations, there are several interesting comparisons that can be made. Primarily, the role of the member states is much more prominent in the case of UNSC, than it is in relation to ECOSOC. In the UNSC, China, Russia and the United States of America, all emphasise the importance of the opinions of the member states and that they should all come to a consensus regarding the best solution for reform. In the case of ECOSOC, this is quite different. In the data I have analysed, there is not much focus on how the member states should

agree on reform, contrarily, China, Russia and the United States of America all argue that there is a need for a strengthened ECOSOC. This can be argued to show that there is consensual knowledge within ECOSOC since everyone believes that ECOSOC needs to be strengthened. There is also to some extent consensual knowledge within UNSC, however, only on the fact that reform should be talked about. When it comes to how reform is achieved most successfully, it can be argued that there is various knowledge, therefore, fragmented knowledge. Additionally, within the reform of ECOSOC, there is not much focus on the representation of states, the voting structures, or in general the bureaucratic features of ECOSOC. This is a quite prominent difference between the reform of the UNSC and ECOSOC since most of the five key issues of reform of the UNSC relate to the representation of states or the working methods of reform.

Secondly, in relation to question six of the WPR-approach, it is evident that the problem representations related to the reform of the UNSC that part of the problem representations are that there should be full support by all member states for the reform proposal. In this, there is no counter problem representation, however, it can be discussed whether other countries have different ideas on how to reach reform. It can therefore be discussed whether other member states would agree to the problem representations portrayed in relation to the reform of the UNSC and whether they also believe that agreement is necessary for a successful reform proposal. Since the reform debates have been through several stages and various different constellations of discussion, it can be argued that there is resistance to what reform should entail. In relation to reform in ECOSOC, it can be discussed whether there has been resistance to the problem representations since reform has been adapted. However, Weiss (2012) has argued that even though reform of ECOSOC has happened, they still do not seem strengthened enough. This could highlight that even though reforms happen it is the same problem representations of the need to strengthen ECOSOC and make it more effective that are seen.

Haas (1990) has argued that "the United Nations collective-security practices degenerated from incremental growth into the turbulent non-growth pattern..." (p. 5). This can also be argued to be evident from the analysis. On the other hand, it can be argued that ECOSOC is a combination of 'incremental growth' and 'managed interdependence'. This is due to how there is a greater sense of consensual knowledge consistent with 'managed interdependence', while the reforms portray features of 'incremental growth' due to the nature of addition of tasks without many changes to the bureau.

5.0 Conclusion

As this thesis explores whether reform experiences in the Economic and Social Council can provide valuable suggestions for solving the gridlock of reform of the United Nations Security Council, it can be concluded that while the two organisations have different focus areas and processes of reform, there are certain aspects that can be considered. Firstly, the emphasis on consensus and more effective institutions is common to both ECOSOC and the UNSC reform discussions. This suggests that fostering a sense of consensual knowledge and agreement among member states is crucial in both cases. Similarly, in ECOSOC, the need for comprehensive and effective reforms that tackle multiple aspects of the council's functioning is evident. However, the analysis reveals that challenges related to power dynamics and voting structure are more evident in the case of the UNSC where the right to veto plays a prominent role.

Additionally, it can be concluded that the analysis reveals several key findings. Firstly, in relation to the reform of the UNSC, China, Russia, and the United States of America emphasise the importance of considering the opinions of member states and securing their support for any reform proposal. However, it can be argued that China and Russia may use this argument to slow down the reform process and maintain the status quo. Furthermore, it can be concluded that the analysis indicates the reform process in UNSC faces challenges due to differing perspectives, power dynamics, and a lack of consensus on the nature of reform. On the other hand, the reform of ECOSOC has focussed on strengthening ECOSOC with support from all member states. While there is a great focus on the representation of states and voting structures in the UNSC reform discussion, these aspects were not visible in the discussion of ECOSOC reform. It can, therefore, be concluded that although the two organisations share similarities, the reform processes and experiences of ECOSOC analysed in this thesis do not tie in with the difficulties the UNSC experiences. The preservation of power and self-interest may be driving the resistance to change in the UNSC. From Haas' three models of change in IOs, it is evident that incremental growth and managed interdependence are observed in the evolution of ECOSOC, while the UNSC has experienced turbulent non-growth patterns.

It should also be concluded that since the data is from 2005-2006 and 2015-2016, new positions, processes and reforms can have emerged. In relation to the question of reform of the UNSC and whether the gridlock issue can be solved by learning from other organisations, more comparable studies of other IOs are needed to fully understand and shed light on the issue.

6.0 Reference list

- Bacchi, C. & Goodwin, S. (2016). *Poststructural Policy Analysis: A Guide to Practice*. Palgrave Pivot, New York. Retrieved from https://doi-org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/10.1057/978-1-137-52546-8_1.
- Bourantonis, D. (2005). *The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform*. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203335390>
- Bremmer, I. (2015, 5 January). These Are the Top 10 Geopolitical Risks of 2015. Time. Retrieved from <https://time.com/3652421/geopolitical-risks-2015-ian-bremmer-eurasia-group/>.
- Bryman, A. (2016). *Social research methods* (5. edition.). Oxford University Press.
- Buchanan, A. & Keohane, R. O. (2006). The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions. *Ethics & International Affairs* 2(4), 405-437.
- Cambridge Dictionary. (n.d.). Effectiveness. Retrieved from Cambridge Dictionary <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/effectiveness>
- Christiansen, T., Jørgensen, K. E., & Wiener, A. (2001). *The social construction of Europe*. SAGE. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446221105>
- Donnelly, J. (2013). Realism. In Burchill, S., Linklater, A., Donnelly, J., Nardin, T., Paterson, M., Reus-Smit, C., ... & Sajed, A. (Eds.) *Theories of International Relations*, 5th. ed. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dunne, T and Schmidt, B. C. (2017). Realism. In Baylis, J., Smith, P., and Owens, P. (Eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 7th ed., (pp. 101-115). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dunne, T. (2017). Liberalism. In Baylis, J., Smith, P., and Owens, P. (Eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 7th ed., (pp. 116 128). Oxford: Oxford University Press

- Economic and Social Council (1992). Rules and Procedures of the Economic Council, E/5715/Rev.2. Retrieved from <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/148091>.
- Fassbender, B. (2020). Key Documents on the Reform of the UN Security Council 1991-2019. Leiden; Boston: Brill Nijhoff.
- Fasulo, L. (2004). ECOSOC. In Fasulo, L. (Ed.), *An Insider's Guide to the UN*, (pp. 153-157). Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300133516-021>
- Fynsk, C. (2001). Linguistic Turn. In Smelser, N. J. & Baltes, P. B. (Eds.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*. Retrieved April 4, 2023, from <https://doi.org/10.1016/B0-08-043076-7/00074-7>
- G20 (n.d.). About G20. Retrieved from <https://www.g20.org/en/about-g20/>
- Haas, E. B. (1990). *When Knowledge is Power - Three Models of Change in International Organizations*. University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, California.
- Ikenberry, G. J. (2018). Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive. *Ethics & International Affairs*, (32)1, 17-29. Doi:10.1017/S0892679418000072.
- Knight, W. A. (2001). The Future of the UN Security Council: Questions of Legitimacy and Representation in Multilateral Governance. In Cooper, A. F., English, J. & Thakur, R. C. (Eds.), *Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a New Diplomacy?* (pp. 19–37). Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press.
- Lamont, C. (2015). *Research Methods in International Relations*. Sage: London.
- Langmore, J. & Thakur, R. (2016). The Elected but Neglected Security Council Members. *The Washington Quarterly*, (39)2, 99-114. DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2016.1204412
- Lenz, T. & Viola, L. A. (2017). Legitimacy and institutional change in international organisations: a cognitive approach. *Review of International Studies* (43)5, 939–961. doi:10.1017/S0260210517000201

- Merriam Webster. (n.d.). Efficiency. Retrieved from <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/efficiency>
- Nadin, P. (2016). UN Security Council Reform. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687254>
- Nature. (2020, 25 November). UNESCO must reform to stay relevant — and reconnect people through science. *The international journal of science* 587, 521-522. <https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-020-03311-3>.
- Ossewaarde, R., Nijhof, A., & Heyse, L. (2008). Dynamics of NGO legitimacy: How organising betrays core missions of INGOs. *Public Administration and Development*, (28), 42-53. Retrieved from <https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/doi/abs/10.1002/pad.472>
- Park, S. (2017). International organisations in world politics. In Baylis, J., Smith, P., and Owens, P. (Eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 7th ed., (pp. 316-330). Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Scholte, J. A. (2011). Towards legitimacy in global governance. *Review of International Political Economy* (18)1, 110-120. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2011.545215>
- Seaman, K. (2014). *UN-TIED Nations; the United Nations, Peacekeeping and Global Governance*. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- Security Council Report (2020, 16 December). UN Security Council Working Methods: The Veto. Retrieved from <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php>
- Slaughter, A. M. (2005). Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform. *The American Journal of International Law*, 99(3), 619–631. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1602294>

UNESCO. (n.d. a). Member States. Retrieved 6 April 2023 from

<https://en.unesco.org/countries>

UNESCO. (n.d. b). UNESCO in Brief. Retrieved from <https://www.unesco.org/en/brief>

United Nations (n.d. b). History of the United Nations. Retrieved from

<https://www.un.org/en/about-us/history-of-the-un>

United Nations Economic and Social Council (2005, 15 September). The role of ECOSOC in

the implementation of the United Nations Development Agenda, including the

implementation of the decisions made by the 2005 World Summit in the areas of

social and economic development. Retrieved from

<https://www.un.org/ecosoc/en/content/2005-he-mr-munir-akram-pakistan>

United Nations Economic and Social Council (n.d. a). About Us. Retrieved from

<https://www.un.org/ecosoc/en/content/about-us>

United Nations Economic and Social Council (n.d. b) FAQ. Retrieved from

<https://www.un.org/ecosoc/en/FAQ>

United Nations General Assembly. (2005). 2005 World Summit Outcome. Retrieved from

https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf.

United Nations General Assembly. (2006, 20 November). A/RES/61/16. Retrieved from

<https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/587000?ln=en>

United Nations General Assembly. (2015, 30 October). A/70/PV.43. Retrieved from

<https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/816848?ln=en>

United Nations General Assembly. (2016, 7 November). A/71/PV.42. Retrieved from

<https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/857341?ln=en>

United Nations Peacekeeping. (n.d.). How we are funded. Retrieved from

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded>

- United Nations, Office for ECOSOC Support and Coordination. (n.d.). Reform Background. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/esa/coordination/reform_background.htm
- United Nations. (n.d. a). About Us. Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/en/about-us>
- United Nations. (n.d. c). Main Bodies. Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/main-bodies>
- United Nations. (n.d. d). UN Charter (full text). Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text>
- United Nations. (n.d. e). UN System. Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-system>
- Walt, S. M. (2015, April 7). The U.N. Security Council. What's Up With That? Foreign Policy. Retrieved from <https://foreignpolicy.com>
- Weiss, T. G. (2010). ECOSOC IS Dead, Long Live ECOSOC. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Global Policy and Development. Retrieved from https://library.fes.de/TouchPoint/singleHit.do?methodToCall=showHit&curPos=1&identifier=2_SOLR_SERVER_26438117
- Weiss, T. G. (2011). A Pipe Dream? Reforming the United Nations. *Harvard International Review* (33)1, 48-53.
- Weiss, T. G. (2012). ECOSOC and the MDGs: what can be done? In Wilkinson, R., & Hulme, D. (Eds.), *The millennium development goals and beyond : Global development after 2015*. (pp. 117-128). Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203104798-16>
- Winther, B. Z. (2020). A Review of the Academic Debate About United Nations Security Council Reform. *The Chinese journal of global governance* (6)1, 71–101.
- Winther, B. Z. (2022). *UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM: new approaches to understanding and unlocking the gridlock*. Aalborg Universitetsforlag.

Ph.d.-serien for Det Humanistiske og Samfundsvidenskabelige fakultet, Aalborg

Universitet <https://doi.org/10.54337/aau510591888>

7.0 List of Appendices

Appendix A – 8 April 2015, China, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Sam Kutesa

Appendix B – 14 April 2015, Russian Federation, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Sam Kutesa

Appendix C – 16 April 2015, United States of America, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Sam Kutesa

Appendix D – A/71/PV.42

Appendix E – A/RES/60/1

Appendix F – Breakfast meeting of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Bureau at the Head of State and Government Level

Appendix G – A/RES/61/16

Appendix H – United Nations System Chart