

China's Developmental Peace and Western Liberal Peace:
Implications for Sustainable Peace and Development in Mozambique

Joanna Seraphim

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Supervisor: Jesper Willaing Zeuthen

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Contents

1. Introduction	2
1.1. Objective and research questions	4
2. Methodology.....	5
2.1. Theoretical Framework	5
2.2. Research Design and Methodology	6
2.3. Limitations	8
3. Theoretical framework	8
3.1. Historical roots of liberal peace	8
3.1.1. Ideological underpinnings of liberal peace	10
3.2. Historical roots of developmental peace	12
3.2.1. Ideological underpinnings of developmental peace.....	13
3.3. Contrasting perspectives on liberal and developmental peace.....	15
3.4. „Seeing like a State”, James Scott.....	16
3.5. Participatory development.....	18
4. Analysis	21
4.1. Liberal peace engagements in Mozambique	21
4.1.1. Democratization.....	22
4.1.2. Disarmament.....	26
4.1.3. Foreign aid	27
4.2. Historical overview of Sino-Mozambican relations.....	28
4.3. China’s engagements in Mozambique	30
4.3.1. Investments in the infrastructure.....	31
4.3.2. Agriculture	34
4.3.3. Timber industry.....	38
5. Conclusion	41
Bibliography	44

1. Introduction

Mozambique, located in southeastern Africa, is a country of a turbulent history. It is endowed with abundant natural resources, including gas, oil, minerals, precious metals, fertile agricultural lands, and vast forests. Nonetheless, despite this abundance, Mozambique continues to struggle, as it remains one of the world's poorest countries, with a large part of its population living below poverty line (Pavenne & Sheldon, 2023).

The country has faced a multitude of challenges, including protracted violent conflicts, political instability, and economic underdevelopment. Soon after gaining independence from Portuguese colonial rule in 1975, it has been torn by a prolonged civil war that lasted from 1977 to 1992. The sides involved were the Marxist Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) government and the anti-communist Renamo (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) rebels, backed by the former Rhodesia, and South African apartheid regime. The war ended with the signing of the Rome General Peace Accords under the UN supervision in 1992, and Mozambique has since experienced notable improvements in various aspects of its development. However, despite the progress made, the country continues to face several obstacles. Despite the establishment of a multi-party democratic system, Frelimo has maintained its leading position, securing victory in all seven presidential and parliamentary elections (Weimer & Carrilho, 2017). Due to these circumstances, the tensions between Frelimo and Renamo resurfaced in 2013, leading to a renewed period of hostility that persisted until the ratification of the new peace agreement in 2019. In addition, the emergence of an Islamist insurgency in the northern province of Cabo Delgado in 2017, by a group referred to as Al Sunnah wa Jama'ah (ASWJ), al Shabaab, and several other names (Strategic Comments, 2023), has led to an ongoing wave of humanitarian and security crises (Vandome & Vines, 2021).

Although Mozambique's economy experienced one of the fastest rates of growth from 2000 to 2015 in Sub-Saharan Africa, poverty reduction, job creation, and human capital accumulation have remained limited. The wealth generated during this period was mostly concentrated in a few sectors, while the majority of the population remained excluded. The country's ability to achieve fast, inclusive, and sustainable growth is significantly hampered by its low human capital index of 0.36 (World Bank, 2023). Furthermore, the uneven distribution

of basic education and healthcare services in Mozambique creates spatial inequalities and makes the population more susceptible to shocks. The lack of mechanisms to protect the most vulnerable exacerbates the situation, leaving those who are already marginalized or disadvantaged even more exposed to the negative effects of shocks such as natural disasters, economic downturns, and political instability (Ibidem). The combination of these factors creates a situation of fragility, instability, and violence, with limited safeguards in place to mitigate the risks and protect those who are most vulnerable. As of 2018, according to the latest assessment of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Mozambique was ranked 180th out of 189 in the Human Development Index with more than 62.9% of the country's population living on less than US\$2 a day (UNDP, 2018).

Traditionally, Mozambique has been a recipient of liberal peacebuilding donors' aid. Liberal peace refers to a framework in peacebuilding that centers around promoting liberal democratic values and neoliberal market-oriented economic policies, and it aims to create institutions and governance systems aligned with these principles. It is a value-based approach that advocates for the promotion of liberal peacebuilding as a universal framework (Schrodt, 2004). Its first key initiative in Mozambique was the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) in 1992, to oversee the implementation of the Rome General Peace Accords ending the civil war. Following, the liberal peacebuilding efforts involved supporting Mozambique's transition to democracy, disarmament, promotion of human rights, and good governance, which included among others assistance in the establishment of an independent judiciary, free press, and civil society organizations (Vines, 2021).

As a result, in the 1990s and 2000s, Mozambique was often praised as a "miracle" by international organizations, financial institutions, and media due to its economic growth, primary commodity exports, and low inflation. However, this image has been confronted with the reality of worsening poverty, inequality, and social crisis, leading to violent riots in 2008 and 2010 triggered by rising costs of basic goods and services. Despite these signs of crisis, Mozambique continued to be praised by international financial think tanks and media as a model reformer, attracting foreign investment, until the country's vulnerabilities were further exposed by the recent recurrence of armed conflict, natural disasters, and the COVID-19 pandemic (Castel-Branco & Greco, 2022). The acknowledgment of Mozambique's difficulties, regardless of the received aid, has resulted in a more cautious appraisal of the country's

developmental trajectory and has led to a shift towards more comprehensive approaches to development among the advocates of the liberal peace approach.

In addition to the liberal peacebuilding efforts, Mozambique has also been a recipient of Chinese developmental peace activities. Developmental peace is a principle deriving from China's domestic development trajectory, which states that economic development is a primary means to achieve sustainable peace. Therefore, it focuses on economic cooperation and developmental assistance to the recipient countries. (He, 2014).

Throughout the Mozambican civil war, China has been involved in providing military and political support to Frelimo. This involvement stemmed from China's shared ideological affinity with Frelimo and its strategic geopolitical interests in the region. With the end of the civil war the focus of the bilateral relations between the two countries shifted from the ideological dimension to primarily economic cooperation. In the beginning of the 2000s that China's economic engagement with Mozambique significantly increased, with Chinese investments targeting infrastructure, agriculture, and mining sectors. The primary objective of these investments was to foster economic growth and poverty reduction with economic development as a strategy to advance stability and peace in the country (Miyamoto, 2018).

Both approaches have made significant contributions to Mozambique's peacebuilding; however, both have also faced significant challenges. While liberal peace has faced criticism for its focus on formal institutions while disregarding local dynamics and traditions, the Chinese approach to peacebuilding through developmental projects has been criticized for its lack of transparency, environmental degradation, and unsustainability of the industries related to natural resources extraction.

1.1. Objective and research questions

The topic of this thesis emerged from a curiosity surrounding the reasons why Mozambique, a country long hailed as a "success story" of liberal peacebuilding, is facing persistent challenges in achieving long-lasting peace and development, despite the extensive support received from the Western peacebuilding donors and the considerable influx of Chinese assistance and investment in recent time.

Additionally, I was interested to see how distinct approaches rooted in diverse ideological foundations, contexts, and interests navigate their respective efforts in peacebuilding and development, and how these efforts correspond with the needs of the local people. This resulted in the decision to examine the liberal peace (value-based) and developmental peace (non-value-based) approaches in the context of Mozambique.

The thesis is guided by the following research question: *Why has peacebuilding in Mozambique failed despite the implementation of both liberal and developmental peacebuilding approaches?*

Three following questions are helping to structure the analysis:

- *What are the key characteristics of the Western value-based and China's non-value-based approaches to peacebuilding in Mozambique?*
- *How do these characteristics influence the outcomes and effectiveness of these efforts?*
- *Do these characteristics align with the local context and the needs of people?*
- *Do they contradict or align with each other?*

The analysis is structured based on the major areas of engagement of each approach, beginning with a description of the specific context and followed by subsequent interpretation in the text.

2. Methodology

2.1. Theoretical Framework

For the analysis of this thesis, I have employed liberal peace and developmental peace frameworks. In addition to examining these frameworks, I have chosen theories that help me provide insights into the extent to which peacebuilding efforts can adapt to local contexts and address the needs of the local population, leading to effective outcomes. For this purpose, the framework presented in James Scott's book "Seeing Like a State" and the framework of participatory development have been incorporated.

Employing the theoretical perspectives of liberal peace and developmental peace serves the purpose of deepening the understanding and assessment of their respective, value-based, and non-value-based frameworks guiding the peacebuilding and development initiatives in

Mozambique. This allows for an analysis of diverse approaches and strategies employed within each framework.

Given the persistent challenges in establishing sustainable peace in Mozambique, there was a demand to adopt some perspective that would help to identify the potential limitations of the above-mentioned frameworks. To serve this purpose, certain concepts from James Scott's work "Seeing Like a State" were incorporated into the analysis, offering insights into the deficiencies of social engineering and top-down approaches to governance and development.

Finally, in order to provide insights into how these limitations could have been mitigated, the framework of participatory development was adopted, emphasizing a more inclusive and people-centered perspective on how development can be approached.

2.2. Research Design and Methodology

I have chosen a research design that involves first discussing the liberal approach to peacebuilding and its limitations in achieving long lasting peace in Mozambique. Subsequently, I explore China's developmental approach to peacebuilding. Given the relatively limited theoretical discourse on developmental peace compared to liberal peace, my focus is on studying major Chinese activities in Mozambique, which have been presented as contributing to local development and, by implication, to developmental peacebuilding.

The study is based on qualitative data and relies on both primary and secondary sources. It draws upon a variety of academic literature, reports, a few press releases, and other relevant publications, which present diverse arguments and viewpoints on the subject. I strived to mainly choose peer-reviewed literature.

The data was collected through a literature review, which focused on its relevance to the topic, was approached using the document analysis method to examine the key characteristics of the value-based liberal peace and non-value-based developmental peace approach to peacebuilding and development in Mozambique and their impact on effectiveness and sustainability of these efforts.

The differentiation between value-based and non-value-based approaches is important in specifying the scope of the study since it is necessary to distinguish between Western donor

assistance under the liberal peace approach, the assistance provided by individual Western countries, China's developmental assistance, and China's investments.

Western donor assistance is characterized by a large number of actors involved. Some states, besides participating in the liberal peacebuilding efforts, may be pursuing their own national agendas, while others may engage in Mozambique through private organizations and companies. Their actions may not be aligned with the country's developmental needs and may lack a value-based approach. Hence, in this thesis, I introduce the distinction between the Western donors and the value-based liberal agenda. This distinction also helps to draw a line between the liberal peace and the more recent attempts based on hybridity and adaptive peacebuilding approaches.

China's engagement in Mozambique encompasses a combination of loans, grants, technical assistance, and investment resulting significant difficulty to distinguish between what is meant as China's development assistance and what in fact is FDI. The involvement of Chinese state-owned enterprises adds complexity to the situation, as it becomes challenging to discern whether the investments are driven by a commercial interest or if they also carry a developmental aspect. Moreover, this complexity is further exacerbated by the fact that the main strategy of developmental peace is centered around economic cooperation and economic development. Given these circumstances, all these aspects are collectively addressed as a part of a non-value-based approach, which captures the interwoven nature of China's engagement.

In addition to the overall document analysis approach, the study employs descriptive and exploratory approaches to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the subject. By using the descriptive approach, the analysis aims to provide a detailed portrayal of the events and processes related to developmental and liberal peacebuilding in Mozambique. It aims to provide a depiction of China's engagement, including investments, agricultural cooperation, and timber extraction activities. For the liberal peace, it gives an account of the democratization process, disarmament efforts, and the role of foreign aid.

The exploratory approach allows for a deeper exploration of the underlying factors that have influenced the outcomes of both the approaches in Mozambique, such as e. g. the unequal relations within China's "win-win" approach, or the influence of historical, and social factors on liberal peace's democratization process. Through such exploration, the analysis seeks to identify patterns that may have shaped the outcomes of the peacebuilding efforts.

2.3. Limitations

Despite China's active engagement in several sectors in Mozambique, there is a notable lack of systematized studies about the effects of China's engagements in the country. Moreover, due to the rather limited quantity of data and the usage of different methodologies in existing studies have posed challenges in conducting a comprehensive evaluation of the effects of China's developmental peace on areas such as socio-economic development.

Furthermore, China engages with Mozambique through various actors, including private companies, state-owned companies, Chinese banks, and government assistance, present challenges in distinguishing between official development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI). The blend of loans, grants, and investments employment by China makes it challenging to categorize their economic investment clearly. Additionally, the significant participation of Chinese state-owned enterprises further complicates the assessment, as it becomes difficult to determine whether the investments primarily serve commercial purposes or possess a developmental aspect. The complexities of the nature and impact of China's engagement pose limitations when comparing it to the more defined and structured approach of liberal peace. Additionally, they require a broad scope of a research.

Moreover, there is also a limited amount of literature that thoroughly explains the reasons behind the failure of the liberal peace approach in Mozambique, particularly in the light of the recent resurgence of conflict 2013-2019 and the Islamist resurgence in Cabo Delgado. There is space for future research of the relationship between the liberal peace approach and these issues.

At last, as the research uses mostly secondary sources, it is subjected to potential biases that can affect the objectivity and reliability of the arguments, as well as may contribute to adopting perspectives influenced by the views and interpretations of other authors.

3. Theoretical framework

3.1. Historical roots of liberal peace

The concept of peacebuilding emerged more than three decades ago when John Galtung in his pioneering work “Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding” introduced it as an approach to address the structural, direct, and cultural causes of violence (Galtung, 1976). The United Nations (UN) adopted this concept, and it has since evolved to encompass a comprehensive range of processes and activities aimed at transforming conflicts and establishing long-lasting peace. The concept was embraced in the 1992 report written for the UN with the recommendations for strengthening the peace efforts in the post-Cold War world, titled “An Agenda for Peace” by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, which emphasized the institutional structures for peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). As a field of practice peacebuilding emerged with the end of the Cold War when the United Nations launched its first extensive peacebuilding mission, assisting the Namibia in peace negotiations after over two decades of civil war. It has been a time of experimentation and a range of tools and approaches for peacebuilding have been developed, such as conflict resolution, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction, and democratization (Paris, 2012).

The United Nations plays a central role in peacekeeping due to its global membership and extensive scope of peacekeeping operations. These operations involve tasks such as mediation, humanitarian aid, organizing local elections, training local actors, and establishing refugee camps. While these actions bring meaningful improvements to affected communities, instances of malpractice, misconduct, and failure to establish lasting peace have also been observed (Maus, 2020). UN peace operations have evolved over time, adapting to the changing global political and security environment, and drawing from the past experiences of their missions. Overall, throughout the history the missions diverged from large international interventions, to community-based, locally led initiatives.

The traditional approach of the UN peacekeeping missions, referred to as the liberal peace approach, focuses on establishing democratic and neoliberal institutions as the foremost objectives of peacebuilding in the post-conflict contexts. Moreover, democratization and liberalization were seen as the primary means to prevent conflict and promote stability. The idea of democratization as a tool for achieving peace and stability derives from the Democratic Peace Theory, which posits that armed conflicts between democracies are less probable. Democratic political institutions are supposed to provide equal representation, foster transparency, and accountability, thereby helping to prevent the resurgence of violence (Doyle, 2011). The neoliberal economic institutions aim to encourage the economic growth, investment, and job creation (He, 2021). Moreover, human rights and the rule of law are

integral components of the liberal peace approach. They provide a framework to ensure that governments uphold the rights of all citizens and offer equal access to justice. By incorporating human rights and the rule of law into its approach, liberal peacebuilding aims to establish democratic and neoliberal institutions grounded in principles of equality in justice (Bellamy & Williams, 2011).

Over time, the concept of liberal peace has undergone various changes. Within this framework, it is distinguished between three models: conservative, orthodox, and emancipatory. The conservative model represents the most authoritarian method of liberal peacebuilding, which employs state-led, top-down strategies characterized by coercion and hegemony to achieve peace and is often implemented through military interventions and political conditions. The orthodox model of liberal peace aims at governance through consensual negotiation, state building, and liberal institutions, while also paying more attention to local ownership. It aims for balance and multilateralism, envisioning peace as state led and institutional, engaging international organizations and NGOs in its pursuit for democracy, the rule of law, and human rights building. The last model, emancipatory, represents a more critical approach that emphasizes local ownership and consent, allowing for a bottom-up, emancipatory approach and increased focus on social equity and meeting the needs of the people (Richmond & Franks, 2009). The later discussed ONUMOZ peace mission in Mozambique presents the characteristics of the orthodox model.

To conclude, the historical roots of liberal peace can be traced back to the emergence of peacebuilding as a concept proposed by Galtung and subsequently adopted by the UN. Liberal peacebuilding interventions aim to transform post-conflict societies into liberal democracies through the establishment of democratic political and neoliberal economic institutions. While the liberal peace approach has long been dominant in the UN's peacebuilding, recent years have witnessed the emergence of alternative, more comprehensive approaches e. g. the hybrid approach, reflecting a changing landscape of peacebuilding practices (Anam, 2018).

3.1.1. Ideological underpinnings of liberal peace

The ideological foundations of the liberal peace agenda are grounded in the principles of democracy promotion, the establishment of market democracy, and the pursuit of universal

ambitions. According to these values, the goal of liberal peace is to establish a democratic liberal state that is based on the rule of law, human rights, and free globalized markets (Schrodt, 2004).

Liberal peace aims for a market democracy as the desired outcome of its transition, which is a political system characterized by democratic governance and free-market capitalism. Moreover, liberal peace promotes neoliberal development, which emphasizes free trade and global economic integration (Salehi, 2023). The underlying ideology behind this approach is the belief that economic growth and development can be achieved through market-oriented policies that promote private investment and entrepreneurship.

The difference between democratic peace and liberal peace lies in the broader goals of liberal peace. While democratic peace aims to promote democracy as the main means to prevent conflict, based on Doyle's democratic peace theory claiming that democracies do not go to wars with other democracies, liberal peace extends this aim and seeks to establish a comprehensive liberal order, that includes not only democratic governance and the rule of law, but also the protection of free markets and human rights. Furthermore, liberal peace also places a greater emphasis on the role of economic development as a means of peacebuilding (Schrodt 2004).

The universal ambitions of liberal peace are reflected in its focus to transfer the above-mentioned liberal values unchanged onto the recipient countries, with an aim to create a global political and economic order based on those values. This idea is based on the assumption that there is a universal standard of good governance and justice that transcends national boundaries. According to this idea of universalism, all nations and societies should adopt liberal values and institutions as the underlying framework for their political, economic, and social systems. These ideological foundations and principles make liberal peace a value-based approach (Richmond & Franks, 2009).

To sum up, the ideological underpinnings of liberal peace are based on a belief that economic development, democratic governance, and human rights are all interconnected and crucial for effective peacebuilding. Through the establishment of relevant for these concepts institutions, liberal peace aims to prevent conflict and promote development. In the context of governance, liberal peace emphasizes the importance of good governance as a norm based on values. The changes to the governance in the post-conflict states are executed in a rather radical

manner, since these changes involve abandonment of non-liberal and non-democratic systems that may have been in place before (He, 2014).

3.2. Historical roots of developmental peace

The era of Mao Zedong laid the foundation for China's later focus in its foreign policy on international peace and development. In 1949, the Communist Party of China (CCP) established the People's Republic of China (PRC). The CCP, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, launched a series of campaigns and reforms with the aim of modernizing China and enhancing the living conditions of its people. Some of these included the land reform, collectivization, and the Great Leap Forward, which aimed to accelerate the industrialization of the country. However, these initiatives, combined with the devastating effects of the decade-long Cultural Revolution, resulted in significant economic and social disruption, such as famine and political oppression, and severely hindered China's development process. During the 1960s and 1970s, China was among the world's poorest nations (Lieberthal, 2023).

China's focus in its foreign policy on international peace and development can be traced back to Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms in the late 1970s. Deng was a firm believer that China's development and modernization depended on a peaceful international environment and friendly relations with other countries. Consequently, China embarked on a more active foreign policy approach and sought to initiate stronger ties with the international community. This pursuit resulted in the 1982 "peaceful development" concept put forward by Deng, which emphasized China's commitment to the values of peaceful coexistence, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and peaceful resolution of disputes. This concept has been further incorporated into China's official foreign policy guidelines and became a foremost principle for China's engagement with the global community, opening the door to its increasing engagement in international peace and development efforts, participation in UN peacekeeping missions, aid provision, and investments (Zhang & Feng, 2019).

Following the Deng Xiaoping era, China carried on with his political legacy and continued to prioritize development as a means to solve all problems in the country during the Jiang Zemin era. During the Hu Jintao era, a concept of "scientific development" was introduced, which emphasized the critical importance of development for China (Wang, 2018). The political legacy of prioritizing development continued with Xi Jinping, who emphasized

China's role as a global power and advocated for a more proactive approach to international affairs. In his vision of the "Chinese dream", Xi Jinping prioritizes economic development as the fundamental task for an economically thriving, politically stable, and prosperous China. Moreover, due to the limited progress of political reform, successful development is one of the tools for consolidating and maintaining the legitimacy of the CCP (Ibidem).

According to Feng Zhang, Xi Jinping and the CCP utilize three frames of reference to guide China toward the role of a global leader. The first frame, known as "national rejuvenation," centers on the restoration of China's wealth and power. The second and third frames, "global community" and "Chinese contribution," respectively, are aimed at fostering common interests and promoting China's role in global governance. These frames shape China's approach to domestic and international affairs, reflecting its aspirations for national development and its vision for its global role. They provide a framework for understanding China's perspective on its place in the world and its approach to global governance. While the "global community" frame is presumed to foster mutually beneficial cooperation in order to facilitate China's international engagement, the "Chinese contribution" frame stresses China's role in maintaining international peace and stimulating development, raising among many Western scholars the question of whether that "contribution" is carrying the potential to transform into the propagation of Chinese-style global governance. Furthermore, in the 19th Party Congress Report, Xi designated China three global roles, namely the ones of a "builder of world peace", "preserver of international order", and lastly "contributor of global development" (Zhang, 2019). These assumed roles impact the intensity with which China engages in peacekeeping operations and highlights the importance China attaches to international peace and stability. Xi's emphasis on China's global responsibilities goes beyond Deng's developmental peace concept, as it also emphasizes China's active involvement in maintaining international order and promoting global development. As a result, China has increased its participation in UN peacekeeping missions, and despite the absence of an official agenda to promote "developmental peace", China's increasing international economic activities and aid, have led to the norm gradually exerting more influence globally (He, 2017).

3.2.1. Ideological underpinnings of developmental peace

The ideological underpinnings of China's developmental peace are founded on the belief that economic development, with "Chinese" characteristics, can contribute to global peace.

Prioritizing development is a fundamental principle of China's approach to maintaining internal stability, and this principle is extended to China's foreign policy as well (Wang, 2014). The term "developmental peace" was introduced by a Chinese scholar, He Yin, who identified two main pillars within this approach: the first focuses on economic development led by a strong central government, based on China's own experience of transitioning from an underdeveloped to a developed state, and the second involves developmental assistance without political conditions attached (He, 2014). By these means, China aims to achieve a mutually beneficial relationship between itself as the donor and the recipient country and offers its assistance in addressing underdevelopment issues through non-coercive methods. Moreover, China argues that its intentions are peaceful, and it advocates for a world order that respects state sovereignty and non-interference of internal affairs of other countries. Unlike liberal peace, China does not embrace liberal democracy as a precondition for development, instead it stresses that economic growth is the key to alleviate people from poverty. This focus on economic development as the primary means to achieve peace without imposing a specific value system makes developmental peace a non-value-based approach (Ibidem).

Developmental peace draws upon the concept of *tianxia*, meaning "all under heaven". This ancient concept influences present Chinese international relations theory, in which international order is envisioned as an "inclusive and harmonious order where nothing is left out" (Wong, 2021, p. 535). According to Zhao, *tianxia* differs from Western international relations theories by prioritizing inclusivity and harmony rather than sameness and universality. This approach aims to construct a world order where all nations are included, regardless of their political system. Overall, unlike liberal peace, which seeks to establish sameness through shared recognition of liberal ideologies, developmental peace acknowledges and tolerates differences in government types (Wong, 2021).

The principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries is central to China's developmental peace approach. This principle has been incorporated into the "Ten Principles" of the Bandung Conference in 1955 and further enshrined in the Chinese Constitution in 1982 (Zheng, 2016). China's dedication to state sovereignty is grounded in its historical experience of external interference in its internal affairs. Therefore, any attempts to impose Western-style, liberal democracy or to conduct any humanitarian intervention initiatives by the West are seen by China as a violation of country's sovereignty. However, in recent years, some domestic analysts have raised questions about whether China's non-interference policy serves its national interest. They argued that the policy has limited China's

ability to protect its interests in various regions due to its passive approach and lack of power-projection capabilities. On the other hand, domestic defenders of the non-interference policy argue that it is necessary to protect China's own sovereignty from foreign powers. Moreover, they claim that non-interference reinforces China's anti-imperialist stance, which is supported by many developing countries (Ibidem). Despite its domestic defense, this approach has faced criticism in the West from those who argue that China's emphasis on non-interference in the internal affairs of other states allows it to overlook human rights violations perpetrated against minority groups in Xinjiang, Tibet, or pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong (Chaziza & Goldman, 2014).

To conclude, China's developmental peace is based on a few key assumptions. Firstly, China believes that economic growth can contribute to global peace, therefore, it prioritizes economic development as a means of peacebuilding. The developmental assistance to other countries is flexible and offered without imposing any political conditions, and it aims to be implemented with non-coercive methods and in respect of state sovereignty. The developmental approach seeks to establish a mutually beneficial, "win-win" situation with the recipient country, with the emphasis on economic cooperation. In terms of governance, developmental peace gives a central role to a strong government and underplays the role of civil society. It prioritizes effective governance and supports any types of governance rules and practices (He, 2014).

3.3. [Contrasting perspectives on liberal and developmental peace](#)

Liberal peace and developmental peace differ not only in their origins and preconditions for aid, but also in their priorities, roles of the government and governance models, and transformation approaches (He, 2021). These divergences show how these approaches touch upon different aspects of peacebuilding and development, and therefore address diverse needs of developing countries.

Developmental peace approach has faced criticism from the West revolving around various topics. Some have argued that China's focus on large infrastructure projects and resource extraction may prioritize short-term economic benefits at the expense of long-term sustainable development (Mariani, 2022). Furthermore, another subject that provoked a discussion is China's adherence to non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries

and lack of addressing human right issues, with some authors arguing that this stance allows China to overlook human rights violations perpetrated against minority groups in Xinjiang or pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong (Chaziza & Goldman, 2014).

In contrast, several Chinese scholars have criticized the liberal peace approach for its more coercive character and the imposition of Western ideas on other nations. According to Zhang Guihong, for instance, the liberal peace agenda reflects a Western-centric perspective on peacebuilding, which disregards the distinct cultural and historical background of non-Western societies (Zhang, 2011). Similarly, Cheng Xiaohu argued that the liberal peace agenda is driven by Western political and economic interests, which limits its effectiveness in promoting peace and stability. According to Cheng, the neoliberal economic policies and democratic governance is so often advocated by the liberal peace as the only remedy for the post-conflict reconstruction, regardless of whether they are suitable for the particular context. (Cheng, 2011).

However, Kwok Chung Wong asserts that developmental peace is should not be seen as an opposition to the idea of liberal peace, but rather a complementary approach. Wong argues that both approaches can be useful in different contexts, and they do not necessarily contradict each other (Wong, 2021). This perspective highlights the potential of exploring points of complementarity between these two approaches, rather than viewing them solely as mutually exclusive.

3.4. „Seeing like a State”, James Scott

The central assumption of James Scott's book "Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed" is that states have a specific way of perceiving and simplifying the world, involving creation of standardized and uniform systems, in order to govern more effectively. Scott argues that this perspective became prominent in the early 20th century, influenced by the belief in scientific and technological progress as a means to create a better world. However, this focus on centralized planning and rational schemes overlooked the importance of local knowledge and practice. According to Scott, this neglect of local knowledge had negative consequences on development because it failed to recognize the complexities and specific needs of different communities (King, 2015).

One of the themes that James Scott touches upon is why so many state-led societal change initiatives of the past century have failed to result in the intended outcomes. The inquiry arises from an observation that while the causes of violent conflicts between different ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups are often relatively comprehensible, it is much more difficult to explain, why so many attempts to improve the conditions of people's lives have resulted in failures. James Scott proposes to answer this question through the following aspects.

Firstly, such attempts are often characterized by the simplification and categorization of the society by the state, which involves establishing a more efficient, structured, and bureaucratized system of governance, such as urban planning, land reforms, or population count. This can be used for both beneficial and oppressive purposes. Some of the beneficial outcomes include improving the provision of services, such as medical assistance, education, or infrastructure development. On the other hand, it can enhance issues such as marginalization and displacement of specific groups, especially those who do not fit into the official classifications. Exclusion of such groups of people, and the suppression of cultural and ecological variety due to simplification of society can have harmful and unsustainable effects in the long run. Among them there are the loss of traditional practices, loss of traditional knowledge, and environmental degradation. The emphasis on efficiency and bureaucratization might lead to an inflexible system, unable to cope with unexpected situations or changing circumstances. Moreover, its top-down characteristics and simplification of the complex realities frequently result in unintended consequences.

Secondly, such initiatives are often based on the high modernism theory, which is founded on the idea that science and technology possess the capability to solve all societal issues. Therefore, high modernism proposes social engineering solutions supported by scientific understanding of these issues. However, this theory frequently overlooks the potential negative consequences of extensive employment technical solutions. It prioritizes efficiency and productivity, while not paying as much attention to cultural and environmental issues.

Thirdly, there is a strong and oppressive regime involved, that has the capability to implement the high modernist initiatives. Conflicts, poor economic conditions, or independence movements have frequently contributed to the formation of such despotic regimes, which, in order to dissent and maintain control resorted to authoritarian measures, resulting among others in the violations of human rights and civil liberties. Such regimes are

prone to reject previous systems of governance, which can lead to loss of the institutional knowledge and expertise.

Finally, the civil society, weakened by often underlying conflicts and poor economic conditions, is susceptible to the rule of the despotic regimes, with no capacity to resist their high modernist, top-down social engineering initiatives. Under such circumstances, many citizens may feel compelled to accept the high modernist initiatives, even if they may ultimately harm their interests. Moreover, a vulnerable civil society may lack the means to hold the government accountable and therefore prevent it from abusing its power, further exacerbating the situation (Scott, 1999).

Moreover, in “Seeing Like a State”, James Scott underlines the importance of local knowledge, practices, and institutions in shaping the success or failure of state-led initiatives. He argues that state led initiatives often fail to take into account the complexities of local contexts and are imposed without sufficient consideration for the preferences and needs of local communities (King, 2015).

As described above, James Scott’s theory of state-led societal change initiatives and their failures, is based on the notion that state-led initiatives often prioritize efficiency, productivity, and simplification of society over cultural, environmental, and social diversity, resulting in exclusion and marginalization of certain social groups. This theory is particularly relevant to the topic of this thesis as it can provide insights into why certain state-led initiatives in Mozambique have faced challenges in establishing lasting peace. More specifically, applying Scott’s thought can be useful to examine whether developmental and liberal peace approaches have addressed the cultural and environmental issues, or if their focus has been primarily on efficiency and productivity in peacebuilding efforts. Additionally, the theory helps to explore the impact of state-led initiatives on the Mozambican civil society, including their effects on cultural and environmental diversity, traditional practices, and the potential exclusion or marginalization of specific social groups.

3.5. Participatory development

This part provides an introduction to several key concepts associated with participatory development and explores Amartya Sen’s perspective on this approach.

The concept of participatory development was created to provide a voice for those meant to benefit from developmental projects. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) describes participatory development as “a process by which people take an active and influential hand in shaping decisions that affect their lives” (OECD, 1993, p. 11). Furthermore, according to the World Bank, participation within the context of participatory development is “a process by which people—especially disadvantaged people—can exercise influence over policy formulation, design alternatives, investment choices, management, and monitoring of development interventions in their communities” (Bhatnagar & Williams 1992, p. 7).

The main difference between participatory development and the traditional donor-led approaches to development lies in participatory development’s focus on a bottom-up approach in its interventions, as opposed to the top-down strategies employed in traditional approaches. The top-down approach, where policies are formulated and implemented by governments, tends to put people in a passive position, which contributes to reinforcing existing disparities and leaving the persisting problems unresolved, whereas the bottom-up approach intends to empower the marginalized and socially excluded (Dorman, 2002). While popular participation and the bottom-up approach may require time-consuming efforts, they offer numerous benefits. These advantages encompass the integration of local knowledge into projects, which increases the likelihood that the objectives and results align with perceived needs. Additionally, participatory approaches enhance accountability among the officials and contractors involved in the development process. Moreover, participation enables empowerment, facilitating the acquisition of new knowledge and skills among the communities involved, resulting in community-based organizations gaining a greater sense of ownership and responsibility for the project (OECD, 1993).

In his influential in shaping the participatory development discourse book, “Development as Freedom”, Amartya Sen underlines the importance of participatory development approach in promoting human development and freedom. He argues that the concept of development should be viewed in terms of actual liberties that people can experience, such as social opportunities or economic facilities, rather than just economic indicators like GDP growth or average annual income. In such perspective, human freedom is the primary objective and means of development, and the economic indicators are just a tool to attain it. Human freedom comprises of the processes and opportunities of freedom – the processes allow individuals to make choices and act on them, the opportunities refer to

possibilities that individuals have to achieve what they desire. Thus, human freedom is not only defined by the lack of coercion or political oppression, but also the presence of conditions that allow people to lead satisfying and self-determined lives (Sen, 2000).

According to Sen, in contrast to human freedom, there exist what he terms “unfreedoms”, which encompass issues such as poverty, hunger, poor economic opportunities, and deprivation of political freedoms. Unfreedom arises as a consequence of inadequate processes and limited opportunities. Inadequate processes refer to situations where people are hindered from exercising their rights, thus their freedom to make decisions and take actions is limited. Limited opportunities relate to situations where people lack the necessary resources or means to attain what they desire. In essence, the absence of freedom can be understood as the incapacity of people to achieve the fundamental capabilities necessary for living fulfilling and autonomous lives. Overall, Sen stresses the importance of participation in the development process, as it enables people to have a say in decisions that affect their lives, exercise their agency, and contribute to creating initiatives that they are more likely to take ownership of, leading to more sustainable outcomes (Ibidem).

Furthermore, Sen’s perspective on participatory development emphasizes the interconnectedness of poverty with various aspects of people’s well-being. Poverty is not solely about lacking income and material resources; it is a complex condition that encompasses the inability to access and participate in social, economic, and political spheres of life. People living in poverty are often deprived of the agency to make decisions about one’s own life – the opportunities to voice their concerns and shape decisions that affect them are often limited. Sen refers to this as “capability deprivation”, which signifies the restriction on individual’s ability of the people to accomplish things they consider valuable and achieve their goals. The “capability deprivation” leads to a limited range of achievable “functionings” (what a person can be or do), which include essential dimensions of human life, such as being healthy, educated, employed etc. In sum it up, poverty not only affects people’s fundamental needs, but also hampers their opportunities to fully realize their potential and actively participate in society (Terjesen, 2004).

Another important concept to Sen’s framework is democracy. He asserts that democracy plays a vital role in his overall approach, as it underscores the importance of freedom of choice and individual capabilities. In his view, democracy goes beyond mere electoral processes. It provides the citizens with a platform to participate in decision-making

processes that impact their lives, fostering human development and agency. Additionally, Sen highlights the crucial role of institutions in guaranteeing the efficient functioning of democracy by preventing the misuse of power and safeguarding citizens' rights (Sen, 2000).

The concept of participatory development is utilized in this study to enhance the analysis of China's developmental peace and Western liberal peace approach, both of which frequently employ top-down strategies, where policies are formulated and executed by the governments, without much consideration and participation of local communities. This approach tends to exclude and marginalize different groups of people, which, according to the principles of participatory development, can hinder the achievement of development outcomes. Moreover, the concept of poverty as capability deprivation can provide valuable insights into both approaches' efforts to address the underlying causes of poverty and social exclusion, e. g. the liberal peace approach often prioritizes state and institution building while overlooking the everyday challenges faced by the people. Moreover, the concept of democracy as a tool of promoting human development in Sen's understanding can help to discuss the shortcomings of Chinese and Western liberal actions and interventions in Mozambique, with the former lacking any democratic processes, and the latter often tending to impose western style democracy while disregarding local contexts and cultural practices. Overall, considering these aspects in the analysis can to a certain degree help to explain why developmental peace and liberal peace failed to produce lasting and sustainable peace in Mozambique so far.

4. Analysis

4.1. Liberal peace engagements in Mozambique

The involvement of liberal peace in Mozambique dates back to the United Nations Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) in 1992, which aimed to oversee the implementation of the Rome General Peace Accords (GPA) marking the end of the 14-year-long civil war between Frelimo and Renamo. Mozambique emerged as one of the first countries to undergo a process of liberal peacebuilding, where democratization and electoral politics played a central role in the peacebuilding framework (Manning, 2002). Furthermore, it has been considered one of the most extensive and successful peacekeeping missions ever conducted by the UN (Pereira,

2019). To show the scale of this operation, by 1993, the estimated cost of the mission was approximately US \$331 million, equivalent to one million dollars per day (Synge, 1997).

The UN was entrusted with executing the key provisions of the GPA due to the recognition of the importance of impartiality in this process. These key provisions included direct monitoring of the ceasefire, disarmament, and transitioning from a one-party state to a multi-party democracy. In relation to the democratic transition, ONUMOZ was also tasked with observation of the electoral processes to ensure their transparency. Moreover, GPA demanded for a process of liberalization that involved introducing a free-market economy, the rule of law, and commitment to human rights. As part of this process, assistance was provided in the establishment of an independent judiciary, civil society organizations, and free press (Vines, 2021). Alongside overseeing the disarmament, democratic transition, and liberalization, ONUMOZ launched a humanitarian program aimed at resettling and repatriating war-displaced people and refugees. By mid-1994, the majority of internally displaced people had been successfully resettled, and a large number of refugees had returned to the country (Peacekeeping UN).

Mozambique's transition to peace and democracy was viewed as a success of a liberal peacebuilding and was hailed as an exemplary model for other African countries to follow for several years (Morozzo della Rocca, 1994). According to Sambo, this perceived success was attributed to three main developments – the country experienced a prolonged period of peace for two decades (1992-2012); concurrently with the implementation of the structural adjustment programs, it experienced rapid growth and became one of the fastest growing economies in Africa; it successfully conducted multiple presidential and local elections, which were considered fairly credible by international observers (Sambo, 2023). However, already the implementation of many of the General Peace Accords' provisions encountered various obstacles and difficulties along the way.

4.1.1. Democratization

In 1994, Mozambique conducted its first democratic, multiparty elections, overseen by approximately 2300 civilian international observers, among them 900 from the UN. Both the parliamentary and presidential elections were won by the ruling party, Frelimo. The elections were deemed credible by the international observers, although several irregularities have been

reported (Sambo, 2023). Consequently, ONUMOZ, having successfully accomplished its objectives, concluded its mission. After all of the residual tasks were completed, the remaining operations were ultimately liquidated in 1995 (Peacekeeping UN).

However, the 1994 elections highlighted the existence of underlying problems with the management of the electoral process, contrary to the official narrative. Although witnessing a high level of voter participation and high competition, Renamo initially refused to accept the results, questioning their legitimacy, until faced with a significant pressure from the international community (Bussotti, 2021). This refusal to accept the results by one of the parties exposed the potential fragility of the newly established democratic institutions and raised concerns about the accountability of future elections and the effectiveness of existing mechanisms to handle electoral disputes.

Since then, Frelimo has maintained a continuous grip on power in the country, winning in all elections. This extended period of control over the state has enabled the party to exert a substantial control over state institutions. Consequently, the issue of the lack of transparency has become a central concern in Mozambique's current political landscape, as no entity possesses the ability to ensure the transparency in future elections – the allegedly independent institutions in Mozambique, including the National Elections Commission and the judiciary, are effectively controlled by Frelimo (Ibidem). This control by Frelimo over key state institutions raises doubt about the impartiality of the elections. Moreover, the campaign activities of Frelimo are funded by the use of public resources, further contributing to the unfair electoral advantage over Renamo (Freedomhouse, 2016). The latest elections of 2019, in which Frelimo secured its victory with the 73 percent of the votes, were accompanied by outbreaks of violence, including targeted attacks on opposition members and supporters, and resulting in several deaths. Opposition parties and civil society organizations criticized the election as fraudulent, lacking freedom, fairness, and transparency, considering it the most problematic since the implementation of multiparty democracy in 1994 (Freedomhouse, 2022). As apparent, the lack of transparency and limited evidence of a legal process in electoral management have resulted in recurring political tensions and conflicts (Bussotti, 2021).

While one of the aims the ONUMOZ intervention was to prevent future conflicts by establishing a liberal democratic system with fair elections, in line with the principles of liberal peace, the hasty implementation of the reforms led to a number of unintended consequences and challenges. The failure to ensure fair elections in Mozambique can be attributed to various

factors. To begin with, the rapid pace of the country's democratization process, imposed by liberal peacebuilding actors and driven by their timeline and agenda, may have hindered the establishment of robust democratic institutions. This rapid transition was preceded by decades of Mozambican dependency on the colonial rule and later the authoritarian rule of Frelimo, which hampered the foundation of a solid base for strong democratic institutions. By failing to effectively address the deep-rooted political, social, and institutional issues, the transition resulted in democratic institutions not adequately established, leaving gaps in transparency, accountability, and inclusivity of the government. Citing De Tollenaere, "The donors were able to influence the establishment of democratic rules, but much less the practice of the democratic play" (De Tollenaere, 2006, p. 28). It can be argued that by adopting a more gradual, context-specific approach and incorporating participatory development principles into the process, the establishment of robust and inclusive democratic institutions could have been better achieved, rather than relying on a one-size-fits-all approach and pre-determined timelines.

Apart from the weak institutions, Mozambican society, as a whole, has not been adequately included in the democratic process. Women, in particular, have consistently been excluded from decision-making, despite their contributions within Mozambican institutions (Bussotti, 2021). Also, compared to other African economically disadvantaged countries, Mozambique experiences relatively low literacy levels, limited education, and restricted access to media. People with such backgrounds are unable to fully participate in the social life and critically assess government's performance, which limits their capability to exercise their democratic rights (Manning & Malbrough, 2013). These issues showcase what Amartya Sen refers to as the "unfreedoms" – the deprivation of the basic capabilities and agency in shaping one's own life in social, political, but also private dimensions. Without addressing these "unfreedoms", equal participation in the democratic process can remain constrained. This demonstrates the limitations of liberal peace strategy, which did not emphasize empowerment of the civil society and their participation in the transition, putting them in a passive position.

Furthermore, the limited alignment of people's social aspirations with the new political system, particularly in rural areas, has posed challenges, as the state has struggled to effectively represent the entire population, lacking the capacity to address the diverse needs and concerns of its citizens (Harrison, 1996). The exclusion of the civil society, and other political actors from the political processes has resulted in a political system dominated by just two parties, with Frelimo's current trajectory indicating a concerning trend towards the potential dominance of a single political party. This can be partly attributed to the fact that Frelimo has a long history

of authoritarian practices. As a liberation movement it used such practices to effectively fight the colonial rule. After gaining independence and during the civil war the authoritarian rule persisted. As such, Frelimo's legacy may have ingrained certain undemocratic practices and norms within both the government and society (Sambo, 2023). Now, three decades after the GPA, it becomes evident that the adoption of democracy by Frelimo has been motivated more by pragmatic factors, such as exhaustion by the war and the convenience of a peace transition, rather than a sincere dedication to democratic principles (de Brito, 2014).

In addition to the aforementioned factors, another challenge to fair elections in Mozambique, is the concentration of political power in the hands of an elite group, comprised of Makonde. This concentration of power has resulted in the marginalization of other ethnic groups such as the Kimwane and Makhuwa and their political participation, perpetuating social divisions and reinforcing a system that favors a selected group at the expense of broader societal representation (Bussotti, 2021). This effectively hinders the establishment of an inclusive and equitable system, that distributes the resources in a fair manner and does not limit the opportunities for social mobility.

In his work, James Scott highlights three key processes that historically contributed to the emergence of large-scale, top-down social engineering projects. These processes include destabilization of civil society by shocks (e. g. violent conflicts), which in turn causes vulnerability within the society allowing for political groups to seize authoritarian control over the state. These groups then promote high modernist initiatives aimed at transforming society according to their vision (Adas, 2000). These similarities between historical patterns for the emergence of social engineering projects and the process of top-down democratization in Mozambique suggest a possible presence of comparable challenges that arise from such initiatives. While the ONUMOZ initiative in Mozambique at its core aimed to prevent the establishment of an authoritarian state, the high modernist character of the implementation of the initiative resulted in a top-down approach that hindered genuine participation of the local communities in the process. Consequently, the power in the country remained in the hands of elites, who exploited the new structures for their personal benefit and gradually transitioned towards an increasingly authoritarian form of governance, showing that top-down democratization alone does not guarantee equal distribution of power and resources. Another issue with the top-down democratization in creation of the sustainable peace and development, continuing to use James Scotts perspective, it its standardized and uniform character, that ignores the local knowledge and practice. To give an example, the exclusion of traditional

authorities in Mozambique from power by Frelimo, according to some authors, was among the factors that fueled the civil war. This exclusion motivated people from rural areas, who relied on such traditional structures in their daily lives, to join Renamo (Abrahams & Nilsson 1995). However, this issue has not been addressed by the liberal peacebuilders, despite its potential to contribute a more inclusive and contextually relevant approach to peacebuilding.

4.1.2. Disarmament

One of the responsibilities undertaken by ONUMOZ, in addition to monitoring the ceasefire and democratic transition, was disarmament. This process largely failed, since Renamo did not fully engage in the process of disbanding and decommissioning its military forces, which was one of the factors contributing to the reemergence of an armed conflict in 2013, which lasted six years. While I did not focus as much on the issue of disarmament as I did on other aspects, as it can be argued that the recent outbreak of violence can primarily be attributed to the failures related to the process of democratization and liberalization, which did not provide equal opportunities for all citizens and political parties to participate and benefit from the state structures, it is still important to touch upon this topic.

The failure of ONUMOZ in achieving successful disarmament in Mozambique can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, its mandate regarding disarmament was weak, lacking clear guidelines on the objectives and criteria for success. Additionally, the distinction between disarmament and demobilization was not adequately defined, leaving the process to various interpretations, confusion, and insufficient attention to the disarmament. Furthermore, the UN did not provide sufficient political and financial resources to ensure a proper implementation of the decommissioning. During the peace process, ONUMOZ placed a higher priority on assisting Renamo in its transition from a military organization to a political party, and the reintegration of the former soldiers into society. Much less attention was given to the process of disarmament (Vines, 1998). Moreover, according to GPA, Renamo's leader, Afonso Dhlakama was allowed to keep a personal guard. This provision allowed for an interpretation that a complete demobilization of the army was not necessary (Bussotti, 2021). This decision revealed a state-centric and top-down approach that ignored the potential risks linked to incomplete demobilization, neglecting the standpoint of the local populations on this issue.

4.1.3. Foreign aid

Foreign aid, along with its attached conditionality, serves as the major tool of liberal peace to encourage reforms and desired behaviors in the recipient countries. As such, aid from liberal peace donors played a crucial role in Mozambique's shift from war to peace, not only by providing necessary resources, support, and expertise, but also by prompting change that was deemed necessary based on the liberal peace values. Specifically, in the case of ONUMOZ, aid conditionality played a crucial role in driving the shift towards a multi-party liberal democracy, the transformation of Renamo into a political party, and the establishment of democratic elections.

However, the flow of funding did not stop with the conclusion of ONUMOZ. Donors continued to play a major role offering financial aid, training, and technical assistance to support the electoral processes. Consequently, Mozambique became highly reliant on foreign aid, initially ranking among the most aid-dependent countries globally in 1992. At that time, aid constituted 58.4% of the country's Gross National Income (GNI) (Data World Bank). Over the years the dependency has decreased, with aid accounting for 18.6% of the GNI in 2020 (Ibidem). However, this figure still indicates a high level of dependency. The results of this extensive financial support from the donors in the country's development have been varied, inspiring both criticism and praise (Manning & Malbrough, 2013).

As mentioned above, the influx of the international aid was intended to prompt democratization and all related to it processes in Mozambique. Nevertheless, it also had an unintended outcome, which was of a great importance for the future trajectory of the country and the prevalence of conflict. It contributed to Frelimo's elite transformation into a patrimonial political class. This transformation resulted in a widespread corruption among the highest levels of government, with Frelimo extending its influence through the patronage networks. These networks actively compete to control and exploit state resources for personal gain, undermining the public trust in the government. This dynamic played a significant role in Renamo's decision to resort to armed violence in 2013, as they hoped to negotiate a new agreement with Frelimo that would allow them to also benefit from the future profits generated by coal and gas reserves and gain more representation (Vines, 2021). This situation showcases that applying predefined objectives, in this case dictating liberal peace principles using the aid conditionality in a top-down manner, can overlook the complexity of local settings, and lead to unintended consequences, such as patrimonialism and corruption, which have a direct impact

on the effectiveness of the developmental efforts and peacebuilding. In this case, the emergence of these unintended outcomes can be attributed to the broader perspective drawn from James Scott and described above. In this perspective the democratization efforts of liberal peace in Mozambique can be seen as a social engineering project, which relied on predetermined and rigid frameworks, neglecting the inclusion of local perspectives. Consequently, it ended up serving the interest of the ruling class rather than the needs of the people.

Corruption remains a major problem at all levels of Mozambican society. The susceptibility of the judiciary to external pressures presents a great obstacle to the effective implementation and enforcement of anticorruption measures. Consequently, corruption undermines the efficiency of foreign aid, limiting its impact on the society (Freedomhouse, 2016). With the growing recognition among the donors of the Mozambican government's misuses on power and monopoly, they have started redirecting their focus from emphasis on democracy to emphasis on good governance, and from central towards increased focus on local level (Manning & Malbrough, 2013). However, this shifting focus did not yet seem to bring visible outcomes in the quality of democratic institutions, considering the outcome of the latest 2019 elections.

4.2. Historical overview of Sino-Mozambican relations

The relations between China and Mozambique can be traced back to the pre-independence period, during which China provided support to Frelimo, including military aid and guerilla training. However, diplomatic relations between the two countries were established following Mozambique's independence in 1975. Despite the Mozambican civil war that lasted from 1978 to 1992, the two countries maintained the relationship, and China continued to provide support to Frelimo. After the civil war came to an end in 1992 with signing of the Rome General Peace Accords, Mozambique went through a period of economic liberalization and started seeking foreign investment to help revive its economy. Given China's growing economic power and investment interest in Africa, the focus of the mutual relations between the countries switched from the ideological dimension towards mainly economic cooperation (Jansson & Kiala, 2009). The areas of Chinese investments included particularly construction, extractive, and agricultural sectors, and have been facilitated by the support of Chinese institutions backed by the CCP. The engagement in large public projects funded by the Chinese government allowed these companies to gain a strong position and establish themselves in Mozambique (Cezne &

Wethal, 2022). Consequently, as of today it is estimated that about 30% of Mozambique road construction projects is executed by Chinese companies, while approximately 70% of China's foreign direct investment in Mozambique is directed towards natural resources such as gas and oil (Garcia, 2020). Furthermore, China is actively involved in arms exports to Mozambique, providing over 90% of its arms between 2000 and 2018 (Hendrix, 2020).

Another milestone in strengthening the political and economic ties between Mozambique and China resulted from the former Chinese President's Hu Jintao visit to Mozambique in 2007. As a consequence, the number of Mozambican goods receiving tax exemptions when exported to China increased from 190 to 442 (Tembe & Xu, 2013). Additionally, a Sino-African zero tariff agreement was announced after the FOCAC 2006 Summit, exempting 466 African export products from Chinese import duties. However, these agreements are thought to have had little effect on Mozambican exports due to low manufacturing and supply capacity in Africa (Jansson & Kiala, 2009).

Since the establishment of bilateral Sino-Mozambican relations in 1975, the two countries have signed several key bilateral agreements. One of the earliest agreements, the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement (ETCA), was signed in 1984, and established a framework for economic cooperation, enabling the provision of financial assistance and technical cooperation. In 2001, the Trade Agreement and Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment were signed, aimed at encouraging trade and investment between the two countries through reduction of the barriers and tariffs, as well as ensuring legal protection and fair treatment for the investors. The Agreement on Human Resource Development, Agriculture, and Environmental protection was signed in 2002, which involved China agreeing to provide technical assistance and training to Mozambican personnel in these specified fields. This involved the sending of Chinese experts and technicians to work alongside Mozambican personnel, with the aim of facilitating knowledge transfer. In 2010, China wrote off Mozambique's debt to China, which amounted to over \$1 billion at the time. In 2015, both the countries signed a Military Cooperation Agreement to strengthen military cooperation to combat terrorism in Mozambique (China-embassy, 2023).

In 2018, Mozambique officially joined the One Belt One Road Initiative following President Nyusi's official trip to China. During Nyusi's meeting with Xi Jinping, the Chinese President expressed a willingness to support Mozambique's economic and social progress and to share governance and development experience with the country. However, it's important to

note that China had already been investing in various infrastructure projects in Mozambique prior to its formal participation in the One Belt One Road Initiative. Moreover, Xi offered further assistance in accelerating Mozambique's industrialization and agricultural modernization. The specific actions agreed upon have been outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Mozambique on Jointly Promoting the Construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. Lastly, the Cooperation Plan between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Mozambique on Jointly Promoting the Construction of the Belt and Road has been signed in 2019 (Ibidem).

4.3. China's engagements in Mozambique

China's peacebuilding and development initiatives in Mozambique are executed through various channels, such as direct financial assistance, debt relief, and investment in crucial fields, including infrastructure development, agriculture, healthcare, and education. However, since China's economic investments in Africa typically involve a combination of loans, grants, investment, and technical assistance it makes it difficult to differentiate between Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). This overlap is further complicated by the significant involvement of Chinese state-owned enterprises in these investments, making it difficult to determine whether the investments are purely commercial or have a developmental component. Moreover, since state-owned enterprises are controlled by the Chinese government, their investments are frequently linked with China's strategic interests and often entail requirements such as using Chinese companies for project construction and management. This creates a perception that these investments are not solely focused on development but also serve to advance China's economic goals. Consequently, distinguishing between China's ODA and FDI in Africa can be challenging, given the blurred line between them (Garcia, 2020). For the above-mentioned reasons and the fact, that among the aims of developmental peace, the objective to promote economic development through investments and facilitating trade and investment flows is included, this study will consider both ODA and FDI in the analysis of developmental peace approach in Mozambique.

4.3.1. Investments in the infrastructure

Chinese financing institutions and companies have heavily invested in the construction sector across Africa, especially over the past decade. As a part of this larger trend, China has been one of the Mozambique's most significant investors in infrastructure since the end of 2000s. The Mozambican government has welcomed the Chinese construction initiatives due to the country's urgent need for infrastructure development, particularly in the aftermath of the destructive 1977 – 1992 civil war, which left the country with severely damaged physical assets. China's construction projects are often framed as developmental initiatives, since infrastructure is considered crucial for the development of other economic sectors and industries (Wethal, 2017).

China's role as one of the major infrastructure development actors has resulted in the financing and construction of several large-scale projects. The projects encompass various sectors, including transportation, urban development, and energy, ranging from railways, roads, and bridges, through governmental buildings, stadiums, and conference centers, to engagement in natural gas infrastructure construction (Alden & Chichava & Roque, 2014). Some of the most significant projects financed and completed in recent years include the Maputo-Katembe Bridge, Nacala Corridor Railway, Beira fishing port, which aim to boost country's economic growth and improve the transportation connectivity within Mozambique and beyond its borders (Globaltimes, 2020). Projects such as the Zimpeto National Stadium and the expansion of the Maputo International Airport are expected to enhance Mozambique's image as a destination for tourism and business (China-Lusophone Brief, 2022).

While the lack of infrastructure investment from the side of traditional liberal peace donors has made China's delivery of the so much-needed infrastructure greatly appreciated by the recipients (Grimm, 2014), examining the implementation of the Chinese-led projects and their integration into the Mozambican economy is essential for understanding whether the projects are able to create a long-term impact on the development (Wethal, 2017). Considering these aspects is also helpful in discussing the extent to which the projects align with the objectives of developmental peace, especially in the areas of enhancing socio-economic development and stability.

Beside the acknowledgement of the benefits arising from China's investments in Mozambique, there have also been voices of criticism regarding China's heavy emphasis on infrastructure development as a means of promoting the overall development. In their study

about Chinese mega-projects and their impact on the work relations, Cezne and Wethal found that while Chinese infrastructure projects were based on the notion of development, and presented as opportunities for job creation, skills transfer, and economic growth in Mozambique, there have been issues in the labor relations between the Chinese and Mozambican parts, including complaints and protests about working conditions, inadequate wages, and ambiguous job prospects for the Mozambican side. The capacity building was often restrained by ongoing communication problems between the workers. Moreover, the interactions between Mozambican and Chinese workers highlighted socio-spatial disparities, such as separate housing complexes for Chinese employees and their limited engagement with local community. Mozambican workers reported instances of discrimination and racism from Chinese colleagues in the workplace, which challenges the horizontal nature of China-Africa relations (Cezane & Wethal, 2022). Overall, while acknowledging the significant contribution of both investments and developmental assistance in addressing Mozambique's lack of basic infrastructure, some scholars have raised concerns whether the implemented projects serve the interests of national and foreign commercial entities rather than those of the local community, due to the weak connections between these projects and the socio-economic context of Mozambique (Ibidem).

Furthermore, Wethal in her study examining the correlation between China's construction projects and Mozambique's economic development states that there is a significant lack of capacities in the domestic construction sector, which can be attributed partly to the dominance of Chinese companies in outcompeting other firms and overtaking the construction processes with the result of becoming key beneficiaries of the infrastructure boom. As a consequence, they have emerged as the primary beneficiaries of the ongoing infrastructure boom. Wethal argues that the prevailing narrative about the development, influenced by dominant powers, has diminished the understanding of the economic development to merely GDP growth. Despite being framed as development initiatives, the primary objective of the construction projects is to foster trade integration (Wethal, 2017). Moreover, drawing from the experience of the past infrastructure boom of the 1960s and 1970s within the context of the liberal peace approach, it becomes apparent that prioritizing physical assets over human capital and neglecting simultaneous investment in local capacity building can render newly constructed infrastructure ineffective. Evidence of this could be seen in the sub-Saharan Africa region, where one-third of the roads built during the 1970s by the Western donors and the World Bank were no longer in use by the mid-1990s (Zawdie & Murray, 2013).

The central assumption of developmental peace approach is the notion that since underdevelopment is often the underlying cause of conflicts, an economic approach to peacebuilding can result in long-lasting peace. While China's involvement in Mozambique's infrastructure development addresses some of the country's infrastructure needs, there are concerns about labor relations, socio-economic disparities, and the focus on trade integration rather than on holistic development. These factors raise questions about the extent to which China's initiatives align with the central assumption of the developmental peace approach and its objective of achieving long-lasting peace through economic development.

To discuss it further, China's investments in infrastructure projects tend to lean towards large-scale initiatives that are often linked to exploration of the natural resources in recipient countries. In Mozambique, projects such as the Nacala Corridor Railway and the Port of Nacala primarily serve the purpose of transporting and exporting coal and other commodities (Telesur, 2018). While these projects have improved the overall transportation and trade capabilities, their direct impact on the more underdeveloped and rural parts of the country may be limited. This focus on export-oriented activities and resource extraction deepens the disparities in infrastructure development between urban and rural areas.

The latest World Bank Economic Update for Mozambique emphasizes the importance of addressing the increasing gap in infrastructure development to achieve more inclusive and sustainable growth, since the rural-urban disparities can lead to unequal economic opportunities and hinder the overall development of the country. The report identifies that unequal access to basic infrastructure concerns especially the central and northern regions, including the conflict-affected Cabo Delgado province (World Bank, 2020). Furthermore, according to a study by Cezane and Wethal, there is an increasing consensus that the conflict in Cabo Delgado is rooted in the lack of integration of the large infrastructure projects into the local economies, which results in lack of job opportunities creation for the local community, thus, resulting in marginalization of the local population (Cezane & Wethal, 2022). Parallely, Bussotti argues that the conflict reflects the disparities in socio-economic conditions between the southern and northern regions and different ethnic groups (Bussotti, 2021). This corresponds with the allocation of the infrastructure investment and, more broadly, the urban-rural divisions.

The emphasis on the large-scale infrastructure development by Chinese institutions comes with some issues, including often poor labor relations, and a focus on trade integration

rather than sustainable development. It is characterized by a top-down approach, limited local participation and capacity building, which results in limited consideration of the needs of the local communities, and often in limited benefits and positive effects of the newly constructed infrastructure on the overall social development in the affected areas. However, the Mozambican government has also faced criticism for its shortcomings. One major concern is the redistribution of wealth generated from hydrocarbon revenues to local communities. Another area of criticism is the generation of employment opportunities in coal-producing areas and the negotiation of favorable terms with the investors (Power & other, 2016). Likewise, according to World Bank's Economic Update Mozambique should focus on establishing linkages between the gas sector and other sectors of the economy through policies and investments. This would facilitate leveraging the growing gas industry to diversify the economy and create more employment opportunities. The report emphasizes that establishing these linkages is important to ensure the sustainability of the gas sector in the long term and without them, the country may not be able to fully take advantage of the potential benefits of the gas industry (World Bank, 2020). The presented shortcomings of the Mozambican government raise questions about the alignment between China's emphasis on large-scale infrastructure development and the means to achieving development without introducing changes to local governments, as advocated by China's developmental peace approach. Moreover, looking from the perspective of James Scott these projects are an example of centralize planning and do not take into account the local contexts and needs, such as the need of improving the local infrastructure to decrease the rural-urban divisions. Given their large scale, the projects focus on efficiency and productivity in the goods transportation, and their impact on the cultural and environmental issues was not taken into account.

4.3.2. Agriculture

Chinese agricultural assistance in Africa has a long history, starting in the late 1950s and continuing to play a crucial role in Chinese contemporary aid to the continent. China's engagement in the agricultural sector in Mozambique encompasses various areas such as agricultural infrastructure development, commercial farming, agribusiness, technology transfer, agricultural cooperation, and research. The collaboration between the two countries takes place through two main channels. The first channel revolves around the establishment of two centers – the Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre (ATDC) and the Umbeluzi

Agricultural Research and Technology Transfer Center (CITTAU) (2011) (Amanor & Chichava, 2016). Both centers were established to test the compatibility of Chinese seed varieties to the local environment, and to conduct research to improve indigenous seeds varieties (Xu, 2016). Moreover, CITTAU conducts training programs for Mozambican agricultural professionals and farmers to facilitate the transfer of technology. The second channel entails agribusiness and contract farming agreements between the Chinese and Mozambican sides, with the main companies involved including Wanbao Development Agriculture Limited (WAADL), China-Africa Cotton Mozambique (CACM), and Lianhe Africa Agriculture Development Company. Their aim is to supply the farmers with machinery, seeds, and fertilizers. They recover the expenses incurred in supporting the farmers by deducting the cost of the services from the payment made to the farmers for their grain. Among those three companies, WAADL is recognized as China's largest agribusiness company in Africa (Amanor & Chichava, 2016). While the emphasis of these companies is on establishing contract farming relationships, the transfer of land to these companies has led to local discontent, with the Xai-Xai Rice Project funded by WAADL being the most notable illustration of these situations (Chichava, 2014). This chapter will introduce the Xai-Xai Rice Project, and the Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre as being the staple examples of Sino-Mozambican cooperation in the field of agriculture.

The Xai-Xai Rice Project, officially known as Regadio do Baixo Limpopo (RBL), is one of the most significant, large-scale agriculture infrastructure and commercial farming projects in Mozambique and the whole of Africa, that has been funded and implemented by Chinese state-owned companies. After the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) proposed to enhance the agricultural sector in Africa, the initiative was introduced and gained recognition as the Chinese-Mozambican "friendship" farm (Chichava, 2015). The aim of the project is to facilitate the transfer of agricultural technology from Chinese contractors to Mozambican farmers, aiming to enhance their productivity levels. The project has generated extensive discussions and debates. Through agribusiness and contract farming Chinese companies have a relatively large scope to acquire land in the country, which, as seen on the example of Xai-Xai Rice Farms has triggered instances of social unrest (Amanor & Chichava, 2016). The study conducted by Ponguane, Mussumbuluco and Mucavele highlights the shortcomings in the Mozambican government's attempts to transform their agricultural sector and provide economic benefits to rural families through rice cultivation, listing up land displacement as one of the limitations (Ponguane & Mussumbuluco & Mucavele, 2021).

According to estimates by local NGOs, around 80,000 people have experienced land displacement as a direct result of the project. As the project extends its reach into new regions, it is anticipated that the number of affected people will continue to rise (Anesi & Fama, 2021). Furthermore, the local communities have not been consulted regarding the displacement, nor have they received adequate compensation. The lack of support and disregards for the well-being of these affected communities can be attributed, according to the findings of the civil society organization *Forúm das Organizações Não Governamentais de Gaza (FONGA)*, to local politicians and bureaucrats exploiting their positions for personal gain (Chichava, 2015). Through agribusiness and contract farming Chinese companies have a relatively large scope to acquire land in the country, which, as seen on the example of Xai-Xai Rice Farms has triggered instances of social unrest (Amanor & Chichava, 2016). While the technology transfer program has successfully increased rice productivity in the region, there are challenges related to the successful transfer of technology, since the Chinese technicians oversee all main production processes, and the local farmers are left with secondary tasks (Ponguane & Mussumbuluco & Mucavele, 2021). Moreover, the produced rice is intended for export and sale instead of being made available for local consumption, and therefore does not meet the needs of the local population. The problems in ensuring fair distribution of benefits to the local people further undermine their agency (Chichava, 2015) To conclude, Ganho argues that the Xai-Xai Rice Project represents an intensive, large-scale mechanized agriculture model, that marginalizes small-scale producers (Ganho, 2022).

The ATDC in Mozambique aims to foster agricultural development in the country through agricultural and technical assistance. They were first introduced at the 2006 and 2009 Forum of China-Africa Cooperation. The project consists of two main components: capacity building and technology transfer. The first component focuses on enhancing staff capacity and organizational functions, while the second component seeks to identify, demonstrate, and pilot new technologies (TechnoServe, 2023). According to an UNDP report it has successfully contributed to tackling food insecurity and poverty alleviation in the region by identifying crop varieties suitable for cultivation in the local environments and introducing innovative agricultural technologies (UNDP, 2018). In general, the transfer of technology through the ATDC has proven beneficial in improving the overall output of the agricultural sector in the region, however it has also faced some limitations. The Mozambican government and Chinese companies focus on large-scale agriculture and have a limited interest in integrating contract farming with the already existing infrastructure of the state's agricultural services, which

contributes to these infrastructures being less developed. Moreover, this contributes to a greater opportunity for foreign investors and donors to play a significant role in supporting, but also influencing the agricultural services, e. g. the presence of the ATDC has facilitated the increased penetration of Chinese technologies and seeds into the markets of Mozambique (Amanor & Chichava, 2016). Another potential limitation arises from the contrasting farming cultures of Mozambican smallholder farmers and the Chinese intensive cultivation methods. The challenge of independently adopting and sustaining the Chinese techniques can consequently curtail the potential impact of technology transfer. Furthermore, the sustainability of the project reminds a point of concern, since it appears that the ATDC's do not have the ability to achieve financial independence, which means that they may continue to rely on external financial support to sustain their operations (Jiang, Harding, Anseeuw & Alden, 2016).

In the case of Sino-Mozambican agricultural cooperation, it appears that China to a large extent adheres to its developmental peace objectives. Nevertheless, it is of course subject to debate and interpretation. On one hand, the aim of achieving development through economic development is partially realized, since the presented projects contribute to the overall development of the agricultural sector; however, it is important to acknowledge that the benefits of this development are not equally distributed among all the parties involved and affected. What is notable is the shared emphasis on large-scale agricultural infrastructure by both the Chinese and Mozambican parties. While China aims to produce development through these top-down initiatives, the outcomes are not entirely in line with the intended goals. To better understand the shortcomings, it can be useful to look at the issue through the perspectives of James Scott and participatory development. Through the lens of James Scott, the Xai-Xai Rice Project demonstrates the state's focus on efficiency and productivity, as reflected in prioritizing large-scale and highly mechanized agriculture. The displacement of local communities without adequate consultation or compensation demonstrates how the state, by implementing top-down initiatives, simplifies the society without considering the complexities and needs of the affected local communities. Also, the project's focus on large-scale technical solutions overlooks the potential negative consequences for the small-scale farmers. These issues undermine the agency of the local people, which in turn leads to their marginalization, and exclusion, hindering the overall developmental process, and undermining developmental peace's assumption, that the economic growth led by a strong state is the key to alleviate people from poverty. Furthermore, the Xai-Xai project lacks participation of the local people in the decision-making processes. From the perspective of developmental peace, WAADLs failure to

consider needs and preferences of the local farmers can be one of the underlying causes of unsatisfying effects of the project. Also, the ATCD project overlooks the importance of local contexts, and as a result, while contributing to the improvement of agricultural productivity, it faces limitations in integration in the existing infrastructure, which can threaten further gains. It also failed to take into account the cultural differences between Mozambican farmers and Chinese agricultural methods.

4.3.3. Timber industry

The timber industry is one of the most important sectors in Mozambique's economy, generating significant income and employment opportunities. Mozambique's forests span over roughly 35 million hectares and are home to a diverse range of species that hold considerable commercial value (The World Bank, 2018). China's growing demand for timber has led to over 90% of Mozambique's timber exports being sent to China in 2020 (Tugendhat & Chichava, 2021), is putting pressure on sustainable forest management. In 2007, in order to promote local processing of roundwood and increase employment, Mozambique imposed a prohibition of the exportation of high-quality timber in the form of logs. Nevertheless, the impact of this prohibition is uncertain since there are hardly any Mozambican-owned firms involved, while the Chinese companies continue to dominate the timber trade by exporting it to the Chinese market. Moreover, the Chinese market demands logs over sawn timber, which has led to an increased amount of illegal timber-extraction activities, decreasing the Mozambican government's control over logging activities and their revenue (Ekman & Wenbin & Langa, 2013). Following the 2007 prohibition of high-quality log exports, the Mozambique Ministry of Land, Environment and Rural Development (MITADER) imposed a total prohibition on the export of unprocessed logs due to the continuing revenue losses (Macqueen & Falcão, 2017). However, it is believed that Mozambique is the largest supplier of illegal roundwood to China in the entire African continent (Tugendhat & Chichava, 2021). In 2018, Imede Falume, the Deputy Director of the National Forestry Directorate stated unofficially during the Committee on Forestry meeting held by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN that "It (logging) is dominated by Chinese people who go to the bush and convince the poorest people to cut the logs" (Reuters, 2018). The impact of China's logging activities in Mozambique is a complex issue that raises significant environmental, social, and economic concerns.

China's logging activities in Mozambique, which take place predominantly in the Cabo Delgado and Zambezia provinces are distinguished by a tension between economic development and environmental conservation. While the timber industry is a vital contributor to the country's economy and China's demand for timber has led to significant income and employment opportunities, which goes in line with the assumptions of developmental peace, it is important to note the challenges that come with it. Firstly, China's demand for timber has put significant pressure on sustainable forest management, resulting in increased illegal logging and decreased government control over extraction activities and revenue. This disruption can be attributed to weak law enforcement and corruption (Hui, 2016). Another factor that fuels the situation is the lack of cooperation between the government and local people.

The search for the most precious roundwood, prohibited for extraction in 2007, has led to Chinese logging companies hiring illegally local scouts, able to identify the much-coveted roundwood, who are however often paid very little for their job, creating an unequal power dynamic between the Chinese employers and the local people who are to some extent dependent on them for their livelihoods (Nielsen & Bunkenborg, 2020). Moreover, China's illegal logging activities in Cabo Delgado contradict the developmental peace "win-win situation" and "mutual benefit" assumption on both the society and state level. As mentioned above, on the society level China's presence in the region doesn't give equal opportunities to Mozambicans and Chinese, whether it be in the official or illegal employment places. In their extensive ethnographic research, Morten Nielsen and Mikkel Bunkenborg shed light on the treatment of local workers in the timber extraction industry by Chinese companies and workers. They found that a significant power imbalance existed between Chinese and Mozambican workers, with many Chinese workers viewing themselves as masters and Mozambican as servants, who therefore lack ownership and control over the processes that affect their lives (Ibidem). On the state level, China's logging activities contributed to Mozambican government's decreased control over its timber resources and a significant revenue loss. As China benefits more from the revenue flight inside its own borders, Mozambique struggles to control illegal logging activities and to protect the environment (Hui, 2016).

In addition to the social and economic impacts of Chinese timber extraction in Mozambique, the practice has also led to significant environmental consequences. Deforestation and soil erosion have been identified as two major issues environmental issues that have arisen as a result of the excessive logging activities. These have led to the growing

loss of traditional livelihoods and displacement of local communities, as well as posing a threat to the long-term sustainability of the region's ecosystems (Macqueen & Falcão, 2017).

Overall, the case of China's timber extraction activities in Mozambique seems contradictory to the principal developmental peace assumption, that sustainable domestic peace and development can be achieved solely through economic development, denying the liberal peace's assumption of the importance of institution building. Under the guiding assumptions of developmental peace, China highlights African ownership, nonintervention and sovereignty in post-conflict reconstruction and development in its policy towards African countries. Moreover, China emphasizes the importance of peace through development as the most significant precondition for sustainable peace in African countries (Wang, 2018). However, in the given situation China's belief that developmental peace can be achieved without making changes to local governments, does not seem to bring intended outcomes. The local government's inefficiency in protecting its own resources leads to environmental degradation and revenue flight, which in turn contributes to an increase in social problems instead of development. Introducing change to local governments seems to be a necessary step to deal with the corruption and improving the law enforcement, which in turn would help to return the control over the situation to the government. Furthermore, the domination of the Chinese companies in the industry raises concerns regarding the degree to which their operations contribute to the development of Mozambique's economy and society. The focus on meeting China's demand for timber, rather than developing domestic markets reflects a narrow focus on economic growth that may not align with the broader objectives of developmental peace. Therefore, China's logging activities in Mozambique present a clear example of how the developmental peace's assumption of a "win-win situation" does not always hold true in practice, and China's actions contribute rather to the problem than the solution.

Moreover, looking from the perspective of James Scott, perceiving forests merely as a source of timber simplifies them and neglects their broader socio-cultural significance and their ecological importance. This narrow perspective can bring devastating consequences, particularly in the context of Mozambique's challenges related to climate change. In the social dimension, deforestation does not only disrupt traditional livelihoods, reducing income opportunities for local communities, but also exacerbates the urban-rural division. People from the areas affected by deforestation activities may be compelled to seek employment in cities, contributing to unemployment issues. These socio-economic challenges can foster social

discontent, which in turn can fuel conflicts and is a major threat to peacebuilding and developmental efforts.

The unequal power dynamics between Chinese employers and local employees is one of the examples of how state in Mozambique focuses on economic development priorities, which, in this case, benefits the elites at the expense of marginalized groups. These inequalities have disrupted the stability and functioning of social life in the regions particularly threatened by logging activities, as the excessive natural resource extraction radically reshaped the traditional practices. Moreover, the lack of cooperation between the government and local population has contributed to the exploitation of these individuals by Chinese logging companies. This highlights a need for a more equal participation and engagement of all stakeholders in the development process, as underlined in the principles of participatory development. By failing to involve local communities in decision-making processes and exploiting their labor and knowledge, the Chinese logging companies are perpetuating a pattern of development that favors external actors over local ones. Overall, the relationship between economic development, state power, and local, in this context often marginalized, communities is characterized by a high complexity. It cannot be solved by merely addressing economic development alone; rather, as suggested by participatory development framework, it requires a comprehensive approach that takes into account the perspectives and voices of all stakeholders, as well as a broader participation of the affected communities, to ensure that the benefits of economic development are shared equitably and sustainably.

5. Conclusion

Both liberal peace and developmental peace have made significant contributions to Mozambique's landscape in recent years. While liberal peace initiatives focused on the socio-political dimensions, developmental peace primarily addressed socio-economic aspects. In my analysis, I attempted to identify the key characteristics of these approaches and their consequences for peacebuilding, and the following findings emerged.

Firstly, both approaches reveal a top-down character that, in different ways, disregards the local contexts and the specific needs of the local population. In the case of liberal peace, the assumed universal character and conditionality of its approach overlooked the local

complexities and the unique historical and socio-political context of Mozambique, resulting in failure to acknowledge and adapt to the local conditions effectively. The top-down approach to democratization and foreign aid neglected to adequately consider how entrenched was the power of Frelimo in Mozambique and underestimated its authoritarian origin and its implications. As a result, the systemic change that occurred was superficial, without fundamentally altering the dynamics between Frelimo, Renamo, and society at large. By focusing on the political aspects of the transition and establishing democratic structures without really addressing the conditions for democratic participation, only a limited group of people was able to benefit from the transition and improve their socio-economic conditions, ultimately leading Frelimo's transformation into a patrimonial political class and to a widespread corruption. This situation is exacerbating inequalities among different groups, which are often a source of conflict, and consequently fails to effectively address this crucial aspect of development and peacebuilding.

In the case of developmental peace, the emphasis of its top-down approach is placed on large-scale projects in infrastructure and agriculture funded by China. These investments predominantly revolve around natural resource extraction industries and urban areas and prioritize the perceived benefits of the government, elites, and the Chinese parties involved, rather than considering investments that could elevate the lives of the overall populations. This challenges assumptions of developmental peace, which suggest that development alone can lead to sustainable effects without interfering in local governments, as it does not take into account that a weak and corrupt government may not have the capacity or willingness to represent and protect the interests of the whole society. It also raises questions about the assumption that China's presence in Mozambique is resulting in a mutually beneficial "win-win" situation for both countries.

Both liberal peace and developmental peace manifest elements of the high modernist ideology, although in different ways. While both approaches share the belief that they have the ability to shape and engineer the society, they do so in varying dimensions. Liberal peace does so in the-value based dimension, proposing the supremacy and universality of its liberal democratic values and institutions. During its mission to Mozambique and afterwards it applied its predetermined vision of democracy to peacebuilding. Developmental peace, on the other hand, operates through its non-value-based approach and it believes in bringing about change by promoting economic growth and technological progress. Overall, it can be argued that both liberal peace and developmental peace engage with Mozambique from a position of superiority

– in the first case, ideological superiority, in the other, economic and technical. This is displayed by the fact that interventions and investments, such as the analyzed ONUMOZ mission and Chinese investments, are loosely connected to true needs of the local populations and rather replicate some predetermined “formula for success” without considering whether the formula aligns with the needs of the people.

Both cases are characterized by a need for greater societal engagement and participation, within local communities and at the governmental level. An engagement of the society from the grassroot level would give a greater opportunity to combat issues such as clientism and corruption within the Mozambican government and enhance a more transparent and accountable governance system. Enhancing the participation in the context of China’s investments would facilitate for people to have more freedom and voice in addressing various issues, including displacement, fairness in job relations between Mozambican and Chinese workers, and improved knowledge transfer in the areas of China’s investments and cooperation. In the case of the liberal peace, advocating for greater inclusion of the people in the decision-making processes can lead to a political system and allocation of foreign aid that prioritize the needs of the general population rather than being concentrated on the elites.

Liberal peace and developmental peace are two distinct approaches to peacebuilding with different priorities and frameworks that function in parallel in Mozambique. This allows for potential interaction and complementarity between the two approaches, but also entails the possibility of mutual exclusion in specific aspects. While both of them are targeting different dimensions of peacebuilding and can be beneficial in different contexts, which would render them complementary, the study identified specific instances where they exhibited contradictory behavior. Firstly, China’s approach of providing aid without conditions attached has the potential to diminish the influence of the liberal peace in shaping the outcomes through conditional aid. While liberal peacebuilding actors have already observed Frelimo’s inclination towards one-party rule, aid conditionality is one of the means by which they can attempt to mitigate this trend, which was the reason behind the recent reemergence of the conflict between Frelimo and Renamo. Moreover, China’s investments, which rely on a strong role of the government in the decision-making process and assign limited importance to civil society, contradict the necessity for greater public participation required to counter Frelimo’s shift towards authoritarian measures. At last, China’s role as the primary source of arms transfer to Mozambique strongly contradicts the disarmament efforts of the liberal peace approach, perpetuating the presence of weapons in the country.

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