

**Master's thesis**

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# **Danish Development Assistance in Times of Refugee Influxes: A Discourse Analysis**

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**By**  
**Emma Margon Prip (20212155) &**  
**Maj Wiben Ebbekær (20211493)**

Supervisor: Danny Raymond  
No. of characters: 177.866

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**AALBORG  
UNIVERSITY**

## **Abstract**

For decades, Danish Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been characterized by a primary focus on poverty reduction in developing countries. However, since the turn of the century, academic debate surrounds the question of whether this is still the case. This is due to expanding use of the Danish ODA. E.g., an increasing amount of the Danish ODA is funding the reception of refugees in Denmark. Looking back over the 21st century, this proves to be particularly the case in times of significant refugee influx in Denmark. Thus, the academic debate concerns whether this broader use of the Danish ODA signifies how the handling of refugees is increasingly taking priority over the focus on poverty reduction.

Accepting the stance in the literature, that there has been a shift in priorities of Danish ODA towards handling refugees, this thesis sets out to uncover how these new prioritizations are framed in Danish political discourses. With a focus on the three periods within the 21st century where Denmark has received the most refugees, the aim is to investigate the discursive tools that are employed by Danish politicians when they frame this use of the Danish ODA. The three periods of investigation are; The onset of the War on Terror, the European Refugee Crisis, and the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine. Because Denmark has a tendency to spend more of its ODA on refugee reception during such larger refugee influxes, speeches from these exact periods are significant in revealing how Danish politicians are presenting both the crises itself and the incoming refugees, and how that might be a part of framing the need to use the Danish ODA in a particular manner.

In order to look at these political discourses, speeches from each of the periods are analyzed through Laclau and Mouffe's method of discourse analysis. This method allows for a focus on the framing and argumentation employed by the politicians when presenting how Danish ODA should be used. Accordingly, through Laclau and Mouffe's theory of identities, the analysis investigates the framing of the specific identities of the incoming refugees, and whether the framing changes throughout the century. This allows for a comparison of how different groups of refugees are perceived. This is combined with the theory of securitization as described by Wæver and Buzan et al.. This theory allows for an investigation into whether the crises that result in the larger refugee streams invoke a perceived necessity to protect Denmark.

The analysis indicates that, while poverty reduction is still a focus for Danish ODA, in our periods of analysis, this focus is pushed aside by matters perceived as more important. While the specific object that is perceived as more important differs between the periods, the periods share a discursive tendency to employ securitization moves to allow the ODA's focus to shift to these matters. A general tendency is that the speeches from all three periods touch upon the threat that incoming refugees are perceived to pose, or not pose, to the Danish welfare society and whether the crisis that is threatening the refugees can also be perceived as threatening Denmark. This second kind of threat is both perceived as physical and ideological. This is due to the crisis being a potential threat to the physical safety of Denmark, and due to the aggressor of the crisis being represented as spreading ideologies opposing Danish values. The securitization moves are, thus, highly connected to the notion of protecting Denmark and Danish identity.

The utilization of securitization moves aims to emphasize the necessity of allocating an adequate budget, coming from the ODA, to handle the perceived threat. Such an approach could potentially raise concerns of non-compliance with the official guidelines of ODA, which prohibit the spending of these funds for self-interested security purposes. Thus, while this thesis focuses on unveiling the discourses that frame the prioritization of securing Denmark through the ODA, we encourage future research to investigate whether this use of ODA indeed violates the agreement against employing ODA for self-protection.

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## **List of abbreviations**

<b>Abbreviations</b>	<b>Meaning</b>
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
Danida	Danish International Development Assistance
EU	The European Union
ICC	The International Criminal Court
IPA	Interpretive Policy Analysis
GNI	Gross National Income
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
ODA	Official Development Assistance
UN	The United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
US	The United States of America

## **Chapter 1: Introduction**

Within the social sciences, discourses are considered an important tool in understanding the social world. Therefore, we are interested in looking into how discursive tools shape political discourses on Danish Official Development Assistance (ODA) in times when there have been large refugee influxes in Denmark.

The current debate on Danish ODA discusses whether it has seen a change since the turn of the millennium. On the one hand, Stokke (2019), Jakobsen (2019), Delputte et al. (2016), Brunbech & Olesen (2013), Elgström & Delputte (2016), Olesen & Pedersen (2010), Lawler (2007), and Lancaster (2007) maintain that the Danish ODA is largely the same as before. This entails a focus on poverty reduction. On the other hand, Kjær (2022), Kjær et al. (2022), Engberg-Pedersen & Fejerskov (2018; 2021), Odén (2011), Browning (2007), and Selbervik & Nygaard (2006) argue that the political focus has changed to deterring refugees. However, this debate does not provide much insight into the political discourses that frame Danish ODA in times of large refugee influxes in Denmark.

The debate stems from a schism in Danish ODA history. Since the 1970s, Denmark has been internationally recognized as a benevolent donor of ODA, as it is one of only five nations that give the agreed-upon 0.7 percent of GNI to ODA (OECD, n.d.). Danish ODA increased during the latter end of the last century, and in 1992, Denmark donated 1.024 percent of its GNI to ODA, which was the first time that it reached over 1 percent (Houlind, 2019). However, since the turn of the century, Danish ODA has been declining. In 2022, it reached its lowest point in 40 years at 0.7 percent (Heldgaard, 2023). Additionally, while ODA in the 20th century was concerned with reducing poverty and increasing living standards in the Global South (Stokke, 2019), the new century brought about a shift towards a broader use of the Danish ODA. There has e.g. been a larger amount of Danish ODA spent on receiving and handling refugees and migrants within Danish borders during times of crisis. The simultaneous decrease of the Danish ODA in general and its change of focus means that Denmark donates a significantly lower amount of ODA to traditional ODA goals of poverty reduction. Instead, Danish ODA is spent on handling refugees in times of larger refugee influx. Regardless of this, however, Denmark is still among the countries donating the highest amount of ODA compared to its GNI (OECD, n.d.). It is these adjustments that lead some authors to argue that the political underpinnings of Danish ODA have changed, while other

authors argue that the high Danish ODA proves that Denmark remains as benevolent and poverty oriented as always.

According to OECD (n.d.), ODA is defined as “*government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries*” (OECD, n.d.). While this is the main aim of ODA, a country is allowed to fund its own reception and initial integration of refugees. Denmark can therefore also - in accordance with OECD regulation - decide to do so. However, as the UN’s first sustainable development goal, which Denmark has ratified, is to end poverty in all its forms everywhere by 2030 (UN, n.d.), the decision to spend a smaller amount on poverty reduction can seem paradoxical.

As the start of the century represented a break with previous tendencies of increasing Danish ODA and instead cutting it down, this is the ideal period to initiate our investigation. Within the 21st century, Denmark has seen three periods with large refugee influxes. Each is the result of a larger international crisis. These are the onset of the War on Terror, the European Refugee Crisis<sup>1</sup>, and the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. It would seem natural that a substantial international crisis has an impact on how ODA is prioritized. This, combined with the Danish tendency to spend more of the ODA on refugee reception during such larger refugee influxes, means that speeches from these exact periods are significant in revealing how Danish politicians argue for this specific use of ODA. Accordingly, this thesis sets out to understand the shift in the political priorities concerning Danish ODA. This is done through the following research questions:

## **1.1 Research question**

*How do Danish politicians employ discursive tools to frame the utilization of Danish development assistance in periods of significant refugee influx to Denmark during the 21st century?*

This, we will further elaborate through the sub-questions:

- *How have these discourses changed throughout this century?*
- *Do different groups of refugees impact the use of discursive tools differently?*

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<sup>1</sup> We will be referring to this period in time as the European Refugee Crisis as this was also how the UNHCR labeled the large refugee and migrant influx to Europe (Spindler, 2015). We are however aware that it was not only refugees who sought towards Europe in 2015 and 2016 but also migrants.

To uncover the reasoning used when discussing these prioritizations, we perform three separate discourse analyses on political speeches from three distinct periods within the 21st century. These analyses are conducted through the use of Laclau & Mouffe's (1985) method of discourse analysis as described by Jørgensen & Phillips (2002). As ascribed by this method, the analyses focus on the language and argumentations of the speeches rather than the physical effects they had. This method of analysis requires an understanding of the context in which a speech is given and, accordingly, the thesis will dive into the historical and social contexts of the respective periods. The analysis will search for indicators of described identities and their social belongingness, as described by Jørgensen & Phillips (2002), as this will help us investigate how refugees arriving in Denmark are perceived. Due to our focus on periods of international crisis, this theory is combined with the theory of securitization as described by Wæver (1996) and Buzan et al. (1998). These theories provide an additional aspect of how discourses can reflect tensions between opposing identities in periods where safety is a general concern.

In order to fully reflect on how this thesis finds its relevance in existing academic studies, we will initially present an overview of the current debate on the perceived adjustments in the use of Danish ODA.

## **Chapter 2: Literature review: The academic debate concerning Danish ODA**

In the following, we will present two competing streams in the academic debate concerning the prioritization of Danish ODA. One argues that the prioritization of Danish ODA has fundamentally remained unchanged since the last century. The other argues that Danish ODA and the political approach to it have significantly changed within this century. The aim of the following literature review is to show how Danish ODA has previously been investigated, in order to uncover how our research can contribute to the existing academic field.

The review is based on academic articles found through the online search engines Google Scholar, Jstor, and Aalborg University's own library with the search phrases 'development aid discourse', 'ODA', 'official development assistance', 'Danish development assistance', 'discourses on Danish development aid', 'refugees and Danish development assistance', 'Dansk udviklingsbistand'<sup>2</sup>, 'Udvikling i Dansk udviklingsbistand'<sup>3</sup>, 'flygtninge og dansk udviklingsbistand'<sup>4</sup> and 'Diskurser om dansk udviklingsbistand'<sup>5</sup>. We set the temporal scope to articles published throughout the 21st century to ensure that there are both newer articles with contemporary relevance that have the ability to present longer perspectives and articles written during the respective periods that can provide a view of the debate presented *while* the debated phenomena were taking place.

The articles are selected for inclusion if they mention *both* ODA and refugees. Articles concerning refugees exclusively, despite depicting the general Danish political view of this topic, do not reveal much about how the subject is intertwined with ODA. On the other hand, we made the discovery that articles concerning ODA often mention its relevance in refugee handling, revealing an academic interconnectivity between the two subjects. Often, Danish ODA is discussed in political and news articles rather than in academic literature. To ensure an academic standpoint, however, we include exclusively peer-reviewed academic articles. While this might exclude certain literature, the aim is to secure a certain degree of professionalism from the piece, and that the material is relatively free of personal biases that would be present in e.g. pieces from political parties. This process led us to the 15 articles included in the review: Kjær (2022), Kjær et al. (2022), Engberg-Pedersen & Fejerskov

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<sup>2</sup> Translates in English to "Danish development assistance"

<sup>3</sup> Translates in English to "Development in Danish development assistance"

<sup>4</sup> Translates in English to "Refugees and Danish development assistance"

<sup>5</sup> Translates in English to "Discourses concerning Danish development assistance"

(2018; 2021), Stokke (2019), Jakobsen (2019), Delputte et al. (2016), Elgström & Delputte (2016), Brunbech & Olesen (2013), Odén (2011), Olesen & Pedersen (2010), Lawler (2007), Lancaster (2007), Browning (2007), and Selbervik & Nygaard (2006).

Worth noting, is that neither of these 15 articles are published within the timeframe of our chosen period covering the onset of the War on Terror. While we had hoped to include articles spanning back to the early 2000s to ensure views that are current for this period, it proved impossible for us to find such articles within our search frame. This could be understood in two ways: Firstly, academic pieces can take several years to finish and publish, so even if the piece was initiated within our research period, it would not be published until later. Secondly, it could also reveal a lack of academic focus on the subject until the mid-2000s, which might reflect how the field of ODA contained rather few controversies until the early/mid-2000s.

## **2.1 Danish development assistance**

Throughout our literature review, we have identified two competing streams that represent each side of a debate concerning prioritizations of Danish ODA within the 21st century. We have divided the 15 articles into these two streams.

The first stream is characterized by the view that Danish ODA maintains an altruistic outlook with a continued focus on poverty reduction. This stream is represented by Stokke (2019), Jakobsen (2019), Delputte et al. (2016), Brunbech & Olesen (2013), Elgström & Delputte (2016), Olesen & Pedersen (2010), Lawler (2007), and Lancaster (2007). The second stream, however, argues that Danish ODA's focus on poverty reduction has diminished since the start of the century and that it has largely been replaced by a focus on deterring migration to Denmark. This stream is represented by Kjær (2022), Kjær et al. (2022), Engberg-Pedersen & Fejerskov (2018; 2021), Odén (2011), Browning (2007), and Selbervik & Nygaard (2006). This thesis conforms with this second stream, as our research reflects the increasing use of Danish ODA for refugee reception which we set out to understand. This will be elaborated upon in chapter 4.3.

Despite having chosen this academic departure, to fully understand the academic field that our thesis takes place within, it is necessary to represent both sides of the debate. This is to

fully present the debate in which we aim to participate with this thesis and acknowledge that objective truths might not exist. Thus, the aim of presenting both streams is to showcase this discrepancy in academic opinions on whether ODA is prioritized as originally intended by DAC. In the following, we will present the arguments of the streams in turn.

Stokke (2019), Jakobsen (2019), Delputte et al. (2016), Brunbech & Olesen (2013), Elgström & Delputte (2016), Olesen & Pedersen (2010), Lawler (2007) and Lancaster (2007) emphasizes the positive in the fact that, even though Danish ODA has lowered since its beginning, it has never descended under 0.7 percent of Denmark's GNI as pledged to the UN. Stokke (2019), Jakobsen (2019), and Elgström & Delputte (2016), furthermore, point to a fact of continued focus on poverty reduction as a primary aim for Denmark's ODA, which they argue means that there has been none to very few changes in the Danish development policy over the past 20 years. Thus, they present Denmark to be an altruistic frontrunner when it comes to development assistance in the world.

Both Stokke (2019), Elgström & Delputte (2016), Olesen & Pedersen (2010), and Lancaster (2007), however, also argues that despite this broad altruistic and humanitarian goal of the Danish development assistance, there is strong support for funding projects that might also benefit Danish interests e.g. business deals and immigration control. Having such a broad selection of articles making these statements shows how the understanding of a consequently altruistic approach yet with a growing focus on Danish interests as well, has been the case since the years around the shift of the century. However, Olesen & Pedersen (2010) also argue that since the start 2000's it was no longer popular to use a development discourse of altruism despite this continuous focus on selfless poverty reduction, which might explain a potential lack of discourse from that angle.

Lawler (2007) describes how the Danish political discourses during the start of the 2000s increasingly introduced strong negative culturally framed and restrictive views of immigrants and, subsequently, a cut in ODA. This places Lawler (2007) somehow between our two streams. He withstands exceptionalism in the high level of international solidarity and Danish ODA, yet indicates that its combination with an increasingly hostile immigration policy and national discourse on this subject could be perceived as Denmark attempting to legitimize its restrictive immigration policy by still showing international solidarity through other measures. If this was the case, it would provide a different, and more insecure, moral

fundament for this perception of Danish international exceptionalism, he argues. So while Lawler (2007) argues the true Danish views of the nexus of immigration and ODA are unclear, he urges a continued and enhanced consideration of the topic and what it might reveal about the Danish society.

While the above-mentioned academics generally sustain a view of Danish ODA as altruistic and exceptional, Kjær (2022), Kjær et al. (2022), Engberg-Pedersen & Fejerskov (2018; 2021), Odén (2011), Browning (2007), and Selbervik & Nygaard (2006) present a contending stream in the view on Danish ODA. Kjær (2022), Kjær et al. (2022), and Engberg-Pedersen and Fejerskov (2018; 2021) particularly focus on the fact that e.g. African countries have been receiving a declining amount of ODA within the past 30 years and that poverty reduction, in general, has become less central for Danish ODA. In 2006, Selbervik and Nygaard argued that, despite Denmark donating a high ODA compared to other countries, their goals seemed to be less focused on altruistic goals alone and that Danish political ODA discourse was not afraid to admit that they wanted something in return for their donations. Furthermore, they point to a discourse around the Danish elections in 2001 on directing money from ODA to Danish welfare. Kjær et al. (2022) and Browning (2007) agree with this notion and point to a decreased solidarity with the Global South. Browning (2007) shows how Denmark has clearly signaled this both through the action of a decreasing ODA since 2001 and an increasingly blatant negative towards immigrants in Danish society. In accordance with this, Kjær et al. (2022) point out how the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2022, does present development cooperation as a tool to handle some of the issues that Denmark faces i.e. immigration. Odén (2011), likewise, emphasizes how Denmark spends an increased amount of ODA to support Danish national security purposes. Particularly, in the sense of using ODA to deter migrants and using it as a lever for forcing countries to accept their rejected asylum seekers back. He also emphasizes how the Danish use of ODA on refugees in Denmark decreased by 21 million US dollars between 2005 and 2008.

Engberg-Pedersen & Fejerskov (2018; 2021) argue that the Danish ODA has changed so dramatically since the 1990s that it is hardly recognizable. They argue how the second-most recent paper on Danish development policy, ‘The World 2030’ from January 2017, reflects a shift in Danish priorities with an enhanced focus on preventing refugees and other immigrants from coming to Denmark and that this clearly reflects how it was made in the wake of the 2015 European Refugee Crisis. Furthermore, ‘The World 2030’, presents an

enhanced focus on Danish development assistance being an investment in places where Danish industrial interests can be reached, rather than an act of charity, which they argue underlines the shift in the Danish view on prioritizations of ODA. Kjær (2022) highlights how the word ‘poverty’ appears only 25 times in ‘The World 2030’ as opposed to 59 in Denmark’s development strategy from 2000, and that the concept of poverty has also been broadened in its use. She, furthermore, points out how the most recent paper on Danish development policy, ‘The World We Share’ from 2021 follows the line from 2017 of tightly connecting ODA with irregular migration. This is used to emphasize, what Kjær (2022) perceives as, the negative development in Danish political discourses on ODA.

Both Engberg-Pedersen & Fejerskov (2018, 2021), Kjær et al. (2022), and Kjær (2022), subsequently, argue that Danish ODA has moved from relying on humanitarian values to a focus on short-term Danish non-development interests e.g. refugee handling. Both Browning (2007) and Selbervik & Nygaard (2006) describe Denmark as being less exceptional today than previously when it comes to ODA, whereas Kjær et al. (2022) particularly focus on how fast Denmark has fallen behind compared to the other Nordic countries which Denmark usually compares itself to. Kjær et al. (2022) also present OECD DAC’s 2021 recommendations for Denmark, which focus on the need for Denmark to assure the integrity of its ODA, address the incoherence between its migrations policies and its declared development goals, and clarify how its donated ODA supports poverty Kjær et al. (2022) use this to argue that even OECD DAC seems critical of the Danish use of ODA and the discourse that surrounds it.

Our review indicates that both streams agree that while Danish ODA has been continuously adjusted since the 1990s, the amount still remains relatively high compared to most other countries. For context, in 2021, the average spending on ODA was 0.33 percent of GNI (OECD, n.d.), while Denmark has not donated less than 0.7 percent of its GNI since the 1970s (Paldam, 1997). The streams, furthermore, agree that there exists an overall consensus between the Danish political parties when it comes to the amount of ODA that Denmark should donate. Thus, the two streams agree that there has been a change in the economy of the Danish ODA; they do however have different approaches to how this reflects political decisions regarding ODA and how these are investigated.

## **2.2 Our place in the literature**

While the first stream does not focus much on discourses, the second stream sustains how the Danish ODA linguistics has been marked by a negative discourse within the 21st century. This has been happening increasingly, and has been accompanied by a significant change in Danish ODA, the second stream argues. However, this focus on discourses has not been the main object of these articles, and generally, rather few articles investigate the discourses that frame political acts concerning ODA. Furthermore, we have not been able to find academic articles specifically investigating the use of ODA on large-scale refugee reception. We aim to fill this gap in the literature by uncovering which discourses that Danish politicians use to frame the Danish ODA, as it will add to the understanding of how the reception of refugees, and the need to use ODA on this reception, are being framed. Because our focus also relies on the discursive framing of the use of ODA, our thesis conforms with the second stream and acknowledges the increasing use of ODA on refugee reception. This is because the thesis sets out to investigate the discursive tools that Danish politicians utilize when framing the use of Danish ODA on refugee reception, and whether there has been a change in these, as we see a lack of this in the current literature.

## **Chapter 3: Theoretical and methodological considerations**

In this section, we will present the theoretical and methodological foundation for our thesis. Generally, the thesis takes the outset in the social constructionist, also called social constructivist, approach to the social world. This approach aims at understanding the basis of human knowledge, the nature of reality, and how humans make sense of and share their experiences through language (Slater, 2017). Our focus on how governmental discourse interconnects ODA and refugees warrants this exact understanding of a social world where language is the main tool for sharing and creating reality. As our investigation aims to uncover how the political discourses of our chosen periods create a social reality representing Denmark, we will be making use of both methods and theories that seek to explain how discourses work. Thus, we will be making use of ‘securitization’ by Wæver (1996) and Buzan et al. (1998) and ‘discourse theory’ by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) as our theoretical foundation. These notions will be utilized in discourse analysis as described by Laclau & Mouffe (1985). Here, the discourse analysis will allow us to analyze how notions of security, identity, and power interact in creating this social reality and which consequences this has for political discourses about Danish ODA.

### **3.1 Social constructionism**

Following Jørgensen & Phillips (2002), this thesis takes its outset in the understanding that social constructionism has roots in post-structuralist theory through its understanding of the importance of linguistics in forming the social world.

Social constructionism perceives knowledge as a socially constructed phenomenon brought into existence through historical social interactions and particularly through linguistic measures (Slater, 2017). The social world is, thus, very much understood through the use of language. Language is the mechanism that individuals and groups can use to share their reality and, subsequently, create meaning for the phenomena around them. It is used to make these phenomena tangible and to create a common conception of them. How we utilize our language, i.e. the discourses we use, and the perceptions it relies on, are often so ingrained in our consciousness that we do not consider them as anything other than natural (Slater, 2017). Because our discursive uses are invisible to us, we would never challenge them either. In the same manner, our assumptions about social reality often become perceived as natural and objective to us. All discourse reveals information about a social world that is taken for

granted by the disseminator. Social constructivism, thus, maintains that social reality cannot be distinguished from a person's perception of it. All persons experience the world subjectively, and each of our social experiences keeps altering this subjectivity. Because it is the product of such dynamic measures, reality can never be stable and neither can our knowledge of it (Slater, 2017). Society around us is a product of our interaction with it. Generally, a social constructionist reality: “*(..) recognizes that people actively perceive their own ideas about what is in the world and then treat those ideas as if they were some form of objective reality.*” (Slater, 2017: p. 1627)

Understanding the world as constructed by the very discourses which we investigate in this thesis, allows us to acknowledge the importance of these discourses in forming the reality that Danish ODA is distributed and prioritized in. This methodological foundation, thus, allows us the understanding that, while we exclusively look at linguistics, these linguistics can shape what Danish ODA is being used upon and why.

In order to further understand how this world is shaped through political discourses, we will employ the theoretical understandings of Wæver (1996) and Buzan et al.'s (1998) notion of securitization.

### **3.2 Securitization**

Following the social constructionist understanding that language can create social reality, Wæver (1996) and Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde (1998) define securitization as speech acts that politicians can employ to create the reality that a certain object is a threat to the politician's society. This act is utilized in order for the politician to emphasize that this issue must have utmost priority, which justifies employing extraordinary measures on protecting this society against the threat. Wæver (1996) describes the security discourse as: “*characterized by dramatizing an issue as having absolute priority. Something is presented as an existential threat: if we do not tackle this, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here, or not be free to deal with future challenges in our own way). And by labelling this a security issue, the actor has claimed the right to deal with it by extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules of the game.*” (Wæver, 1996: p. 106). Thus, the theory allows us to investigate whether, and how, the discourses that we analyze make use of such speech acts to

create a reality where ODA must be spent on e.g. refugee reception for the sake of the Danish nation state.

Such a threat, Wæver (1996) argues, can be many things and, likewise, the ‘security’ that must be ensured against this threat, does not possess a universal meaning either. Rather, Wæver (1996) emphasizes how security must always be understood in relation to its referent object - the very notion that must be protected. This referent object is most often the nation state, and the threat must, thus, be understood as something that is a hazard to the survival of this entity. As there is often little to no distinction between a nation, a group of people united by common culture and beliefs, and a state, the physical entity the group inhabits, the security of the nation equals the security of the state. According to Buzan et al. (1998), this also means that security threats in the political sector are defined as anything that threatens either the state’s sovereignty, its ideology, or both. So security discourses are always employed as a tool to secure the state’s safety and security (Wæver, 1996; Buzan et al., 1998).

Because there is no universal meaning of security, Wæver (1996) argues that more and wider areas are continuously securitized. For instance, he mentions how some people might perceive climate change as a significant threat to security while others would think of immigrants and refugees as a factor that threatens national security. Thus, at the individual level, security can relate to anything that a person worries about. In the same manner, at the state level, anything that might be perceived as a threat to the nation state becomes a state responsibility to tackle. This is because the number one responsibility of the state, in this regard, is to protect itself from external issues that might cause harm to the state (Wæver, 1996).

Extending this notion to the social sphere, Buzan et al. (1998) describe how security concerns arise as connected to collective identities i.e. groups of people sharing specific characteristics. These identities could, for instance, rely on a shared religion or nation, and do not necessarily have to represent a state. Here, these identities become the referent object. Buzan et al. (1998) state that, since there are no clearly defined boundaries as to who or what can be a referent object, it can be difficult to assess which threats are existential to the respective referent object and, thus, warrants securitization moves. Essentially, this expression of securitization concerns a collective We. While a collective identity, the We, always will change gradually over time, it can be perceived as an existential threat if an external factor attempts to force the

collective identity to change at a pace that the group is not comfortable with. This might cause the collective identity to feel like it is no longer the Us that it defines itself by. In this manner, migrants and refugees can pose a perceived threat and become a security issue if the collective We are rather close-minded in terms of how the collective identity is composed and maintained. Here, the way in which the collective We retain its identity through e.g. ensuring ethnic and language homogeneity, is its way to ensure the survival of the We (Buzan et al., 1998).

With these examples of security threats, it becomes evident that security is not only a matter of the narrower definition of security as military action and a state's sovereignty. Security entails everything people worry about. Wæver (1996) suggests that security should be thought of as a practice and as a specific way of framing an issue. When something is framed as an existential threat to the nation through a security discourse it is done to justify an action that is not standard procedure to secure a nation's security. When a framing of security is used, it allows for a state representative to use any means necessary and possible to stop the threat to the state. The word 'security' does however not necessarily have to be spoken for a discourse to be a security discourse. It might as well be unspoken but lie implicit in the rest of the speech act. The important thing when analyzing security discourses is to detect whether a particular sociopolitical logic that is characteristic of security is a part of the discourse (Wæver, 1996; Buzan et al., 1998).

According to Buzan et al. (1998), securitization is studied through discourse and political constellations. Here it is important to focus on when a rhetorical or semiotic structure has gained so much weight that it makes an audience accept or at least tolerate violations of common practices and rules. It is not securitization when a person addresses something as an existential threat, that is a securitizing move. For it to be securitization an actor must succeed in not following common rules, which would otherwise need to oblige. Securitization cannot only be imposed, there needs to be some sort of consent. Therefore, the securitizing actor needs to argue their case to some extent. This does not mean that the actor needs to convince everybody with their securitization moves, they just need to gain enough resonance to be able to convince an audience that extraordinary measures are needed (Buzan et al., 1998).

Conversely, once a subject is no longer considered a threat to the referent object, it will go through the process of de-securitization. This is described as a process where: "*a political*

*community downgrades or ceases to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and reduces or stops calling for exceptional measures to deal with the threat”* (Wæver and Buzan as cited in Snetkov, 2017: p. 261).

This theory aids us in understanding the political processes of securitization and de-securitization. It is used to question why politicians frame something as a security issue, and what the implications of introducing security discourses might be. Within this thesis, it allows us to investigate how different collective identities of the refugees arriving in Denmark are framed through discourses and whether they are presented as posing a threat to Danish security.

### **3.3 Laclau and Mouffe as a theory**

#### 3.3.1 Understanding the social world

Jørgensen & Phillips (2002) describes Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) discourse theory as taking a more direct outset in poststructuralist ideas of discourses constructing the social world when compared to other approaches investigating discourses. However, as these authors, and us, view social constructionism as a branch of poststructuralism they can still fundamentally be considered as social constructionists. Accordingly, Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) discourse theory follows a social constructionist understanding of the social world and, thus, their theoretical foundation relies on the notion that discourse constructs the social world of both individuals and social phenomena. Our discourses, or ways of talking about certain phenomena, can never neutrally reflect this social world though, as it is always created by our preconceptions of the social and existing social structures. In return, once a discourse has been communicated, it will contribute to the creation and alteration of the social world. Furthermore, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) state that no discourse can ever be completely stabilized, and that meaning, therefore, can never be neither fixed nor objective. Thus, they explain how different discourses will offer competing versions of the meaning of a given notion, all in an attempt to fix the meaning in their own way and achieve hegemony: To attain dominance by fixing a specific perspective. This, they call *discursive struggle*. As with all discourse, this struggle is also a fundamental part of both reproducing and changing social reality as the dominating discourse will then have the power to affect it (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). However, it is emphasized by Laclau & Mouffe (1985) that, at the political level, a

discourse that differs from the dominating one, most likely shares certain understandings and notions with it. This is because even political opponents relate to each other and deal with the same issues and, subsequently, work with the same general concepts while attempting to achieve dominance in other terms instead (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Thus, the data that we analyze are likely to share many understandings at a general level despite covering a span of 20 years and representing different governments.

### 3.3.2 Defining discourse

*“A discourse is understood as the fixation of meaning within a particular domain.”* (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: p. 26). Such defines Laclau & Mouffe's (1985) discourse within their discourse theory. They introduce certain terminology to explain this. The most important to understand in our context are *signs*, *moments*, and *elements*, and these will be explained in the following.

As we exclusively analyze linguistic acts, a sign must be understood as any word. The two can be understood as synonyms. In a specific discourse, here a speech or interview, all signs are moments. A moment describes the state when a certain word has been fixed with a certain meaning within that particular discourse. This meaning is determined by the sign's relation to the other signs by excluding other possible meanings of the sign. As explained above, different discourses present meanings of these signs through the discursive struggle, so a moment can only be defined as such within one specific discourse by excluding other potential meanings from other competing discourses. Accordingly, a particular discourse establishes a temporary halt to variations in the meaning of the particular signs. The other meanings that a sign might have, or previously had, but are excluded in a particular discourse are called the *field of discursivity*. If we take a discourse on development assistance, this field of discursivity, thus, both includes understandings that are no longer relevant in the given discourse or even notions that do not belong to the field of development assistance at all. In this context, the notion of elements becomes relevant. An element is a sign whose meaning has not been fixed, and that can have varying potential meanings which is also called being polysemic (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Another way to define discourse could then be: “*a discourse attempts to transform elements into moments by reducing their polysemy to a fully fixed meaning.*” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: p. 28) However, the act of fixing a certain meaning to a sign can never be fully realized, as all the other possible meanings of the sign,

the entities of the field of discursivity, threaten to overtake the meaning. Thus, moments are always potential elements in the discursive struggle (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002).

### 3.3.3 Identities and power

Just as the structure of the social world, in general, is never stable nor objective, neither is the meaning of a society and the individuals who inhabit it (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Individuals occupy certain societal positions defined by particular discourses. These positions all have certain social expectations attached to them; again formulated by discourse. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) present the example of a ‘doctor’ and a ‘patient’ as two separate social positions which have strong expectations of how to act attached to them. The ‘doctor’ must say what is wrong with the patient and the patient must accept their diagnosis and take their prescribed medicine as the ‘doctor’ position is consumed with a strong authority over this exact situation (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).

Accordingly, all identities are created through discourse; by a disseminator attaching, or attempting to attach, certain meanings and traits to certain identities. This is both the case for individual and collective identities as Laclau & Mouffe (1985) place little focus on the difference between e.g. one specific ‘doctor’ or ‘doctors’ as a collectively understood identity. They explain that if a person identifies with a certain identity, they can also end up verbalizing it as a totality, a fixed and objective truth. In political speeches, an example of this could be a ‘country’. This entity signifies a collective identity of ‘a people’ belonging to this particular ‘country’. Here, both the existence of the ‘country’ and the identification of who is ‘its people’ is regarded as an objective truth. However, this belongingness is purely discursively created by defining which characteristics ‘the people’ might possess in order to belong to the ‘country’ which has also been made up discursively. This perceived totality of the identity of a ‘country’ is what enables national policies to exist and provides politicians a context in which they can present their meaning (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).

Between these collective identities exist an inherent power division, understood in the Foucauldian sense as who has the power to produce the social. Accordingly, those holding the power get to create the societal knowledge of how we think, act, and create society. This group can e.g. determine which characteristics are needed to belong within a ‘country’ through both linguistic and political processes. This power then also controls how we relate

to other groups or individuals. However, as with everything else in discourse theory, knowledge and identities can change. While we are dependent on living in *some* system of power, we are not dependent on any specific of such systems, and such systems of power are likewise an inherent part of the struggle (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).

### **3.4 How the theories complement each other**

Jørgensen & Phillips (2002) emphasize the value of combining discourse analytical perspectives with non-discourse analytical elements. This allows the researcher to access different forms of knowledge on the subject, which will provide a broader understanding and, subsequently, more in-depth analysis. When doing so, however, it is important to have the philosophical, theoretical, and methodological framework of each perspective in mind to assure their ability to work together (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).

In light of this, we have chosen to combine discursive theoretical elements with the theory of securitization. Both Wæver (1996), Buzan et al. (1998), and Laclau & Mouffe (1985) set out with a constructionist epistemological approach to social reality which allows for this combination. Furthermore, securitization is an act of discursive practices that allows for the use of Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) methodological approach to investigate how the phenomena must be understood in speeches. When utilizing Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) methodological approach, it necessitates the use of their theoretical understanding as well, as they are "*a complete package*" (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: p. 5) where one aid in understanding the other. Furthermore, when seeking to understand political discourses concerning a nation's handling of those that are not perceived as belonging to it, as refugees or those receiving ODA in our case, it seems prudent to include a theory that is specifically concerned with this. Accordingly, combining Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) concept of collective identities with securitization theory (Wæver, 1996; Buzan et al., 1998) understanding of the collective identity of a We, allows us to investigate how discourses frame tensions between discursively created groups of people. Thus, combining the theories will provide us with a broader toolbox to understand the discursive elements we will encounter, allowing for more in-depth conclusions.

### **3.5 Laclau and Mouffe as a method**

As the aim of our thesis is to uncover the political discourses concerning Danish development assistance adopted by the Danish government, we will be analyzing our data through Laclau & Mouffe's (1985) method of discourse analysis as presented by Jørgensen & Phillips (2002). This method should be understood as directly connected with their above-mentioned theoretical approach to discourse, and it will allow us to investigate both discursive theatics and, accordingly, world- and political understandings that can be read into these theatics. Due to performing the same analysis on focal points from three different periods, with approximately 20 years between the first and the last source, it is also possible for us to comment on how the discourses differ between the periods. Accordingly, discourse analysis is very much concerned with mapping general and overarching discursive patterns of a certain social domain and moments (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). This is done by investigating patterns both in the separate speeches and across them in order to uncover what these patterns tell us about social reality at the given time.

#### 3.5.1 Nodal points, floating signifiers, and chains of equivalence

When analyzing a discourse, the very first thing to do is to identify the *nodal points*. Jørgensen & Phillips (2002) explain how "*A nodal point is a privileged sign around which the other signs are ordered; the other signs acquire their meaning from their relationship to the nodal point.*" (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: p. 26). Thus, the nodal point must be understood as a key signifier which in itself does not necessarily represent a deep specified meaning but which reveals key theatics within the discourse. The nodal point is then granted deeper meaning when placed in relation to other articulations in the discourse and in return gives context to these. If all discourses are in a struggle for meaning, it is, thus, the job of the nodal point to arrest this flow of potential meanings and instead fixate the discourse on a specific cause. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) present the example of 'liberal democracy' as the nodal point in a text. Here, they explain how it "*(..) becomes liberal democracy through its combination with other carriers of meaning such as 'free elections' and 'freedom of speech'.*" (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: p. 50) Accordingly, the meaning of any sign, nodal point or not, must always be understood in relation to other signs in the discourse that it relates to. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) call this relation between a nodal point and its connected signs and articulations a *chain of equivalence*. Forming this chain is the next step

to the analysis, as it will reveal the speaker's position towards a certain topic and uncover how they, the speaker, are framing the discourse around it. This can both be done with linguistic spaces as 'liberal democracy' and social spaces where people interact and can include both linguistic and nonlinguistic signs and elements (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Accordingly, when investigating identities, just as with other meanings, the first step is to determine the nodal point that defines the identity of interests. This could be signs as 'Danish' or 'refugee'. From there, it is possible to uncover which signs the identity might be equated with and which it is contrasted from. This will depict how the disseminator of the discourse frames the respective individual and intends for the audience to perceive them.

Laclau & Mouffe (1985) agrees with the notion that all knowledge about society is constructed by our own preconceived ideas concerning this society. Thus, one fixed and objective truth cannot exist, and in the same sense, neither can one absolute discourse. This is what opens up for the discursive struggle about definitions. While all discourse takes part in this struggle, Laclau & Mouffe (1985) define certain signifiers that are particularly open to being ascribed with different meanings across different discourses. These signs can possess different, or even opposing, meanings depending on which discourse they are used in. While there of course can be overlap between the meaning of a sign between different groups and discourses it is not a given. Laclau & Mouffe (1985) calls these signs that are, particularly contested *floating signifiers*. These signifiers have no universally fixed meaning and the speaker will attach their own meaning and agenda to them. In our context, it might be possible to see how politicians might use this to discursively steer their listeners' perception to align with their political agenda. When there is no preconceived idea of what a sign particularly means, this attachment of meaning is up to the speaker (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).

Nodal points must be understood as floating signifiers that have been crystallized within a certain discourse. A floating signifier, thus, refers to the state that the moment has while it is a part of the struggle between different discourses, while nodal points are used to define the meaning that it is attributed within a specific discourse. 'The body' is presented as an example: In medicine it is a nodal point around which biological or medicinal moments can be centered, but it can also be seen as a floating signifier in the struggle between this medical discourse and alternative treatment discourses which will exclude the medicinal moments and include other healing moments instead. Thus, when having identified the nodal points of a

discourse it is possible to compare this to how the same moment is defined in another discourse, in order to understand the struggle of meaning that these specific (now) floating signifiers are taking place in. By comparing discourses it is both possible to define which signs are a part of this struggle and which can be seen as relatively stable (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).

### 3.5.2 Sedimented discourse

Certain practices and discourses can also attain a meaning that seems so natural to a society that none other seems plausible because their original occurrence or meanings before have been forgotten. These discourses are called objective or sedimented. A *sedimented discourse* is the result of historical discursive struggles and is as fluid as all other discourse. Accordingly, a discourse that is currently sedimented has the ability to change, just like discourse that might have been sedimented 100 years ago no longer seems natural to us. Jørgensen & Phillips (2002) present the example of ‘children’. We have a very set of understandings and exceptions to children that are so conventionalized that we see them as natural. However, only a few hundred years ago, children were much more regarded as ‘small adults’ and had an entirely different set of expectations attached to them. While it might today seem horrendous to make children participate in the workforce like they used to, back then this understanding of their abilities was the sedimented one. Objectivity hides this historical and political process and, by doing this, it hides alternative outcomes of the earlier discursive struggle that manifested in the meaning that we know today (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Distinguishing meanings that are presented as objective, or sedimented, will aid in understanding the society that a given discourse is created within.

### 3.5.3 Discourse analysis in practice

Wæver (2001) argues for the use of Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) discourse analysis on public and political texts. Particularly he focuses on how it can be useful when investigating foreign policy. As ODA decisions can be understood as belonging to the arena of foreign policy, his take on what to keep in mind when performing a discourse analysis is particularly helpful. He emphasizes the importance of not attempting to uncover some hidden meaning or the politician’s *true* personal opinion on a topic but rather to focus on the level of understanding which words are used when individuals relate to each other. In doing this, the researcher

uncovers not a personal political level, but rather the political arena itself. Uncovering the discourses of this arena means uncovering the policy moves that politicians can actually make within the arena. When a politician is presenting a policy, it must stick to the discourse that he or she has earlier presented, so as to ensure that they can argue their case and can argue how it sticks with the vision that a state has for itself. This is not to say that every political act will fit the same narrow discursively created pattern, but the structures of the reality that the discourse has created put pressure on policies to turn out in a somehow fitting line of action (Wæver, 2001). This also underlines the strong interconnections between how ODA might be presented in our data and how that reflects the social world in which the speeches are given in. This practical understanding of what discourse analysis can be used for interacts well together with Jørgensen & Phillips's (2002) practical understanding of the method. They emphasize that the aim of discourse analysis is not to uncover a universal reality, but rather to investigate how discourses are a part of creating a reality that appears objective and natural and how different discourses might attempt to do that in different ways. This means that the entire social field is available for analysis through this approach. However, our thesis will focus on linguistic fields and specifically how Danish governmental discourses frame spending of ODA. All social phenomena, from identities to physical objects, are analyzed through these same above-mentioned concepts (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).

## **Chapter 4: Contextual background**

As previously stated, historical and social realities shape discourses. Thus, to comprehend Danish political discourses regarding ODA, it is essential to consider the historical and social context that has influenced these discourses both in a national and global context. Signs gather their meaning from the context in which a discourse is created, and in the same sense, our data must be understood through the context in which it is originally presented (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Thus, this section provides an outline of relevant social realities that have shaped Danish political discourses regarding ODA.

According to Stokke (2019), Denmark has aligned itself with the United Nations (UN) system since Denmark's early years of donating ODA, while Brunbech & Olesen (2013) argue that Denmark's high ODA serves to maintain the country's international image as a moral great power and retain policy influence. They emphasize the importance of understanding the international contexts that shape Danish ODA. Kjær (2022) and Lancaster (2007) also highlight the significance of understanding domestic factors as institutions, interests, and ideologies that can affect the social world which discourses are made within. Accordingly, this section will present the international contexts that have shaped both Danish ODA and Denmark's relation to refugees within the 21st century, and the domestic contexts that the data is presented within. As our data for the analyses span from 2001 to 2022, the following historical contextual pieces primarily focus on events from the late 1980s to the present day. The context from pre-2000 is crucial to understand, as it lays the groundwork for the preconceptions upon which subsequent decisions and discourses were made.

### **4.1 Historical background concerning ODA**

Laclau and Mouffe (1985) state how political discourse is always shaped by the discourses and decisions that precede it because these have shaped the social field that the new discourse must fit within. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the history of how Danish ODA has been used and the political field in which the speeches are given. Thus, this section presents the mechanisms on which Danish ODA is built and the political lens through which it must be understood. It provides an introduction to the international institutions that preceded ODA agreements, a general understanding of what ODA is and what it can be used for, and a short outline of how Danish ODA has been prioritized since ODA agreements were formed and what shaped these prioritizations.

#### 4.1.1 The institutional drivers of international development assistance

In the wake of the Second World War, many of the world's large multinational alliances aimed at increasing international cooperation were founded. In 1945, the UN was formed which was done to secure international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations, and to promote human rights and better living standards across the globe (United Nations, n.d.). The beginning of the concept of development assistance can be traced to the UN's *Expanded Program of Technical Assistance* (EPTA) in 1949, which focused on promoting social and economic development in countries devastated by the war (Nielsen, 2012). The North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) was founded in 1949, with the purpose to enhance the cooperation of its member states. This, was with the intention to secure peace in Europe and, thereby, the freedom of Europeans, which at the time of NATO's formation faced a substantial threat from the Soviet Union (NATO, 2022). In 1957, the European Economic Community (ECC, now known as the EU) was established. Its political goals were aimed at reducing political tensions in Europe after the Second World War, and to prevent another war from breaking out in Europe (Gabel, 2023).

In the 1960s, there was an extraordinary upsurge of institutions working with development assistance, these institutions have further laid the foundation of the world's current aid system. (OECD, 2006). The Development Assistance Committee (DAC, formerly Development Assistance Group (DAG)) was established in January 1960. DAC was established so that the developed countries had a forum where they could consult each other on their assistance and aid to the developing countries. Denmark joined DAC in 1963. In 1969, the DAC countries decided to adopt the Official Development Assistance (ODA). The purpose of ODA is that the DAC countries donate government aid to developing countries, in order to promote economic development and welfare here. Every three years, DAC updates its list of countries that are eligible to receive ODA. The list is based on a country's income per capita, where recipient countries are chosen if they have a significantly low per capita income. The funds can be donated for a broad array of projects and aims of development, but it also has certain boundaries. E.g., donations of military equipment or services, anti-terrorism activities, general peacekeeping missions, and missions promoting a donor country's security interests cannot be covered by ODA. However, it is possible to count on the cost of e.g., using the armed forces of the donor country to deliver humanitarian aid or if developmental activities happen within peacekeeping efforts. Likewise, support for refugees

and internally displaced people staying in recipient countries, and support for a refugee's first year in a donor country can be counted as ODA (OECD, n.d.)

These uses of ODA can be understood as extensions of the values of the previously mentioned multinational organizations. E.g. It is possible to see traces of the UN's Declaration of Human Rights reflected in several current development goals such as access to clean water or equal access to schools for all genders. When the ODA was adopted, it was at the same time recommended that the DAC countries should spend at least 0.7 percent of their GNI on ODA (OECD, 2006). However, the average spending on ODA across the DAC countries was 0.33 percent in 2021 (OECD, n.d.).

## **4.2 Background concerning international refugee streams**

As the analysis looks at periods each represented by a large influx of refugees in Denmark, it is important to understand what made these people flee their home countries and how Denmark received them. Thus, the following will outline the different crises that created these streams of refugees and explain shortly how international and Danish society reacted to them.

### 4.2.1 9/11 and the War on Terror

The end of the Cold War, and the subsequent collapse of many communist regimes, at the end of the 20th century led to a spread of liberal democracy and free market capitalism in many former communist countries and developing countries. Proxy wars had been fought in developing countries between the Soviet Union and the West, with the aim of spreading ideologies (Rasmussen, 2014). This had now ended in the favor of Western democracy and international peace and prosperity seemed secured. It was believed that liberal democracy's victory marked the end of humanity's sociocultural evolution and that this form of government represented the final form of human government. This was conceptualized through Fukuyama's (1992) notion of the End of History. The understanding was that the struggle for ideological supremacy had ended and instead, a period of global cooperation and peace was at hand.

However, this peace was challenged on September 11, 2001, when the US experienced the largest terror attack in its history. Four airplanes were hijacked, two of which hit the World Trade Centers, one hit the Pentagon, and one crashed. The US and its allies considered this a war declaration by Osama bin Laden and his organization, al-Qaeda. In response to the attack, US President Bush declared a ‘War on Terror’ (Fenger-Grøndahl & Skytt, 2021). The UN Security Council described the attack as a threat to international peace and referenced Article 51 of the UN Charter, which grants a nation the right to individual or collective self-defense. NATO reacted to the attack by invoking Article 5, which declares that any attack on a member state is an attack on all member states (Schmidt, 2021). The attack also affected Denmark, as the country aligned itself with the US on foreign and security policy matters and Denmark’s foreign policy, thus, gained a much larger focus on terror and security (Rasmussen, 2014).

As a reaction to the 9/11 attack, the US invaded Afghanistan in October 2001. This is recognized as this was the first step in the War on Terror and has the aid of fighting al-Qaeda. However, this initial aim was extended to also overthrow the Taliban government due to their perceived protection of al-Qaeda. Denmark, which declared solidarity with the US after the 9/11 attacks, sent its first soldiers to Afghanistan in 2002 to support the war effort (Schmidt, 2021).

In March 2003, despite the UN’s lack of support, American soldiers invaded Iraq. It was believed that Iraq’s leader, Saddam Hussein, had ties to al-Qaeda and, simultaneously, posed a threat to global security by developing an Iraqi arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. In 2003, by a slim majority in the Danish parliament, it was decided that Denmark would also contribute troops to the war in Iraq (Fenger-Grøndal & Danielsen, 2019).

These wars drove hundreds of thousands of Afghan and Iraqi citizens to flee, out of which 19,527 arrived in Denmark between 2000 and 2004. These people arrived in the wake of larger refugee influxes from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Denmark during the 1990s (Bendixen, 2021). In response to all these asylum seekers arriving in Denmark, the Danish government initiated a ‘Battle of values’ campaign, which emphasized the importance of refugees contributing to the Danish welfare state through increased expectations and low monetary aid to encourage work (Jönsson, 2019).

#### 4.2.2 The European Refugee Crisis

In 2015, Europe received more than 1.3 million asylum seekers, which was the highest number of asylum seekers the region had received since the 1980s. While these people arrived from many different places and for different reasons, about half of them could be traced to three countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, with Syria as the country producing the most asylum seekers at 378,000 (Pew Research Center, 2016). The crises in Iraq and Afghanistan can be understood as extensions of the abovementioned War on Terror, and the Civil Wars that each country witnessed. In Afghanistan, the refugee surge was caused by an upsurge in the conflict between the Taliban and the government (HRW, n.d.). Simultaneously, Iraq witnessed a civil war between Islamic State, previously known as the Iraqi fraction of al-Qaeda, and official Iraqi and international forces (van Veen et al., 2021). Both of these crises saw many civilian casualties and pushed many to flee. Islamic State also invaded Syria in 2014, and since then the organization has been engaging in violent conflict with the Syrian regime and other opposition groups (Johannesen & Arrouas, 2020). This, combined with the Syrian Civil War that had been going on since 2011 due to civil uprisings against the oppressive regime (Havmand & Fenger-Grøndahl, 2020), led to more than 100,000 civilian deaths and caused many more to flee (HRW, 2016). Another significant part of the asylum seekers coming to Europe in 2015 had origins in Eritrea. Here, there was no physical ongoing battle, but the oppressive regime that abused its citizens drove large quantities of them to flee (Amnesty International, 2015).

As these large surges in asylum seekers from the respective countries coincided, it caused pressure on European borders like none other the region had ever witnessed. This meant that the European countries faced difficulties in handling all the incoming asylum seekers, and the period ended up being denominated as a ‘European refugee crisis’ by the UNHCR and media alike (Spindler, 2015).

A big part of Europe’s common migration and asylum policy is based on the Dublin Convention which dictates that an asylum seeker must seek asylum in the first country where the person’s fingerprints were first registered. This is to prevent “asylum-shopping” so that an asylum seeker cannot both seek asylum in country B if their asylum application was rejected in country A (Folketinget, 2023A). However, the European asylum system got challenged when a record-high number of asylum seekers arrived in Europe in 2015. Especially Greece

and Italy, which were typically the first countries of arrival due to their placement in close proximity to Turkey and North Africa, were challenged as they were not able to get fingerprints from all the asylum seekers who arrived in their countries. This meant that the asylum seekers were able to move further north in Europe, which led to a sort of panic in the EU which did not know how to handle the asylum seekers (Folketinget, 2023B). In trying to avoid more refugees arriving, several of the EU countries closed their borders, and the EU tried to protect its outer borders by building e.g fences on the ground and by extending the mandate of Frontex which is a part of controlling the EU's outer borders at sea (Lønstrup, 2023; Mosskov & Lynard, 2015; Pedersen, 2021). Another reaction to the refugee crisis was that Europe experienced a political turn towards the right wing and parties that advocated for stricter immigration laws (Olsen, 2015). Several of the EU's member countries' populations were discontent with how the EU handled the refugee crisis, which resulted in a lack of confidence in the EU. The discontent with the refugee handling also spread to discontent in the way the EU handled the economy which resulted in an even bigger lack of confidence in the union (Connor, 2018). In 2016, the EU made a deal with Turkey; Turkey would prevent refugees from crossing their borders into Europe in return for economic compensation. This led to a decrease in the number of migrants and refugees arriving in Europe (Nedergaard, 2023).

#### 4.2.3 The War in Ukraine

Since Ukraine obtained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the country has been torn between having closer relations with Europe or with Russia. In November 2013 the EU and Ukraine failed to make an association and trade agreement. Instead, Viktor Janukovitj, Ukraine's president at the time, made an economic deal with Russia. However, the closer relations with Russia resulted in massive demonstrations over the following three months. In February 2014 at least 87 civilians and one policeman were killed in street fights. After this incident Janukovitj fled to Russia and parties from the opposition claimed power and appointed a temporary government and president (faktalink, n.d.).

On the 16<sup>th</sup> of March 2014, a referendum arranged by Russia was held in Crimea. The referendum was arranged as many pro-Russian citizens on the Crimean Peninsula expressed their concern with the political development in Ukraine, and they demanded more independence from Kyiv. Here the Crimean voters should decide whether they want to be a

part of Russia or stay a part of Ukraine. With an election turnout of 80 percent, whereof 96.77 percent of the voters voted to become part of Russia. The results were, however, questioned by international election observers as a big part of the ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea had decided to boycott the election beforehand. On the 18<sup>th</sup> of March, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a treaty officially annexing Crimea to the Russian Federation. However, this move led to sanctions from Europe and the US, and the UN has never accepted Crimea as a part of Russia (faktalink, n.d.).

The relationship between Russia and Ukraine has been tense since, reaching new highs when Russia invaded Ukraine on the 24<sup>th</sup> of February 2022 (Kallestrup & Eller, 2022). Here, Russia attacked several places in Ukraine at once, and since this day, battles between the Russian and the Ukrainian army have been fought over most of Ukraine (BBC News, 2023). However, Russia does not consider itself the aggressor. Rather, the country perceives the invasion of Ukraine as a mere act of self-defense. This is due to Russia seeing the need to protect the two, officially Ukrainian, separatist regions of Lugansk and Donetsk. Additionally, Russia believes that NATO's expansion towards the east is a threat to Russian security. There have been talks of Ukraine joining NATO since the end of the Cold War, and in 2008, NATO made the promise that Ukraine would eventually become a member state. This has, however, not happened yet (Lynggaard, 2022; Staun, 2022). On the 28th of February 2022, Ukraine applied for EU membership, and on the 23rd of June 2022 Ukraine was given candidate-country status (Det Europæiske Råd, 2023), also showing the Ukrainian inclination towards Europe.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has resulted in that by January 2023 7.9 million Ukrainians had left Ukraine, while 5.9 million Ukrainians were internally displaced (Palle, 2023). Western countries strongly condemn this invasion, with the EU, the US, the United Kingdom, and Canada have imposed a range of sanctions on Russia (Det Europæiske Råd, n.d. A). The Western countries have shown immense support for Ukraine through donations of military equipment and humanitarian aid, with the EU alone donating 67 billion euros to Ukraine (Det Europæiske Råd, n.d. B). Furthermore, the International Criminal Court (ICC) expressed its contempt for the invasion when it, in March 2023, issued an arrest warrant for Putin, accusing him of being responsible for war crimes committed in Ukraine, including the displacement of Ukrainian children. The Russian government, however, denies any wrongdoing (Bugge, 2023).

## **4.3 Danish development assistance**

The following section provides insight into relevant social realities shaping Danish ODA discourses in our chosen periods. Through a short presentation of political choices made concerning ODA and its policies, the political arena of the periods is laid out. As explained previously, understanding this arena will aid in understanding which discursive and political moves politicians can actually make, as they are automatically limited by the arena in which they move (Wæver, 2001). Furthermore, all three periods happen to either start with or include an election of a new government. Therefore, a short account of the issues that the winning party campaigned on, allows an understanding of the issues that were important to the Danish population at the given time.

### 4.3.1 From foreign aid to domestic welfare

During the 1960s and early 1970s, Denmark was under international criticism for its low contribution to ODA. The pressure on Denmark to increase its aid even came from the OECD DAC chairperson. This resulted in a significant increase in Danish ODA until 1978 when Denmark reached the agreed-upon 0.7 percent of GNI. Until 1992, Danish ODA stayed at that minimum level of 0.7 percent, while it was raised to just above 1 percent in 1992 and stayed at around 1 percent throughout the 1990s (Paldam, 1997). This focus on development work was enhanced by the appointment of Denmark's very first Minister of Development, Helle Degn, in 1993 (Globalnyt, n.d.). Furthermore, in 1992, Denmark vowed that by 2002 the country would have created a separate fund exclusively for environmental support for post-communist and development countries in addition to the broader ODA (Engberg-Pedersen & Fejerskov, 2021). In these years, Danish ODA was characterized by poverty reduction through rural development and equality-enhancing projects. This is while withholding a stance of non-interference in the political processes of the recipient countries and that real sustainable development must be created from within rather than by outsiders. This followed the official UN line of aid to developing countries (Stokke, 2019), and ensured both international prestige and a Danish presence in developing countries to enable the upkeep of Danish interests (Kjær, 2022).

At the end of the 1990s, discussions emerged both internationally and domestically about the effectiveness of ODA. Several of the projects that Denmark had been donating a large

amount of money had failed (Paldam, 1997) and, as a result, domestic political discussions about the value of a high ODA contributed to a decline in the support of a high ODA among the Danish population (Kjær, 2022). This coincided with an enhanced focus on security after 9/11, and these two themes became important in the 2001 election. Another focus was Danish domestic immigration policies as presented by the Liberal Party. They argued that Denmark had received too many refugees during the 1990s and that these were too hard to integrate, hard to get into the labor market, and were performing too many crimes. In 1998, Denmark enacted its first law on integration, reflecting the increased focus on this topic, and this focus was furthered in the Liberal Party's election campaign (Jønsson, 2019). They combined this with promising to cut the Danish ODA and instead spend the money on welfare in Denmark, which led to a win (danmarkshistorien.dk, 2015). By forming agreements with other political parties that were critics of both ODA and refugees, the Conservative Party and the Danish People's Party, they were able to make decisions without the support of more ODA-friendly politicians, which led to the promised sizable cut in development assistance and a repeal of the additional environment fund. This meant that, from 2001-2004, Denmark cut its ODA from 1.03 percent of its GNI to 0.85 percent (Ritzau, 2006), and during the same period Danida's administrative resources were cut by 25 percent. Furthermore, there was also a shift in focus toward security concerns and military intervention in regard to ODA. Now, ODA was being aimed at fragile countries such as Afghanistan, which was seen as a security threat after 9/11, and Somalia where piracy was a threat to Danish shipping companies (Engberg-Pedersen & Fejerskov, 2021).

#### 4.3.2 ODA and the European refugee crisis

Generally, ODA received little attention between the early 2000s and the 2015 election (Kjær, 2022). In this election, the Liberal Party campaigned, and won, on a platform of reducing Danish ODA to prioritize Danish health care and implementing stricter policies on immigrants and refugees (Kjær, 2022; Sørensen, 2017). The Liberal Party was able to form a single-party government with the support of the Conservative People's Party, the Liberal Alliance, and the Danish People's Party (Sørensen, 2017). The Danish People's Party, which are known to advocate for stricter migration policies, became the second biggest party in the 2015 election (Folketinget, 2015). The level of Danish ODA had been steadily decreasing since the early 2000s and was reduced to 0.7 percent following the 2015 election (Engberg-Pedersen & Fejerskov, 2021). This focus on domestic issues and the government's

subsequent ODA plans reflected how Denmark had been affected by the 2015 refugee crisis. In 2015, more than 21,000 persons applied for asylum in Denmark, Syrians constituted the nationality with the most asylum seekers in Denmark with 8,604 asylum applicants (Danmarks Statistik, 2016). This large influx of asylum seekers was accompanied by pictures of asylum seekers walking on Danish highways in the Danish media and implementations of strict immigration policies which were presented as necessary to prevent economic immigrants from falsely claiming refugee status. As a result, the amount of money set aside for refugee reception increased significantly. There was a political interest in spending as much of the ODA funds on the reception rather than finding the money elsewhere (Engberg-Pedersen & Fejerskov, 2021). Accordingly, approximately 2.7 billion Danish Kroner was used on expenses related to the reception of refugees in 2015 (Frandsen, 2016). With a budget of 17.7 billion Danish Kroner, these costs made up 15.25 percent of the total Danish ODA budget in 2015 (Damkjær, 2016). Furthermore, as a reaction to the large refugee influx, Danish politicians found new aspects of refugee handling to include in the ODA funds such as repatriation of refugees that had stayed in Denmark for many years, language education, and operation of the Refugee Appeals Board. However, this eagerness to use ODA funds to cover the new refugee-related expenses bordered on breaking the OECD's rules of what ODA can be used for, and drew strong criticisms from Danish civil society organizations and OECD officials (Baumann, 2016). This extended use of ODA was combined with a development plan that placed a great emphasis on reducing immigration to Denmark and framed the development of poor countries as a means to prevent migration. It also introduced a move towards investment rather than charity, meaning that Denmark would aim its donations to countries where Danish interests could benefit in a sort of tradeoff for development assistance. This represented another move away from only donating to fragile, poor countries (Engberg-Pedersen & Fejerskov, 2021).

#### 4.3.3 The welcoming of Ukrainian refugees

In 2021, Denmark released 'The World we Share' which is the latest Danish development paper. It shows a continued focus on human rights, limiting migration, and the importance of supporting Danish interests through ODA. The paper also has a great focus on fighting climate change and on helping developing countries adapt to the green transition (Udenrigsministeriet, 2021). In the paper on Danish Foreign and Security policy from January 2022, it was also presented that the Danish ODA should be spent in countries near

those producing the most refugees, denominated near areas, in order to support their reception of refugees. The idea to spend more of the ODA in nearby areas was to prevent too many refugees and migrants from seeking towards Europe (Udenrigsministeriet, 2022 B).

Due to the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Ukrainian refugees arriving in Denmark, the Danish government decided to allocate 2 billion Danish Kroner from the ODA so that they could use it for the reception of the Ukrainian refugees (Folketinget, 2022). Furthermore, since February 2022, the Danish government has donated 6.2 billion Danish Kroner in military support to Ukraine, an additional 1.4 billion Danish Kroner in civilian support (Udenrigsministeriet, 2023), and private donations have exceeded all former donations made by the Danish public (Jørgensen, 2023). In February 2023, Denmark had given approximately 34.000 Ukrainian refugees temporary residence permits under a special refugee law made for Ukrainian refugees. This law e.g. promises Ukrainian refugees asylum, except in very specific cases, it promises them a speedy case processing time, and it allows them to start working and studying right away (Ritzau, 2023).

The war in Ukraine also led to a referendum in Denmark where it should be decided if Denmark should abolish their EU defense opt-out. The majority of the Danish population voted for the abolishment of the defense opt-out (Lønstrup & Jensen, 2022). On the first of November, a general election was held in Denmark. The three most important topics for the Danish voters were in 2022 healthcare, climate, and economy, meaning that this was the first time since 2015 that immigration policy was not among the three most important topics in an election campaign (Larsen & Hansen, 2022; Holstein, 2019; Holstein & Skjoldan, 2015). At this election, the Social Democratic party, led by Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, campaigned with the promise to get Denmark and the Danish population through the uncertain times, here referring to the war in Ukraine and global inflation (Statsministeriet, 2022). The election resulted in the Social Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, and the Moderates forming a government with Frederiksen as Prime Minister.

## **Chapter 5: Analysis:**

### **5.1 Our selection of data**

In order to investigate the political framing of the use of Danish ODA in times of large refugee influxes, we will perform discourse analyses on data from our three chosen periods. Here, one speech will be the main data entry for each period, and its claims will be backed by arguments from other speeches or interviews with other politicians from that period to ensure a significant representation of the government. All data are from Prime Ministers, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, or Development Ministers to ensure their authority on the subject and that they speak on behalf of the government that they represent. In the interviews, we will only be analyzing the answers given by the government representative. While we realize that the interviewer is steering the conversation, we do assume that the answers that are given still express the opinions of the politician and the respective government.

When searching for our chosen data, we looked through databases such as [dansketaler.dk](#), the Danish Parliament's webpage, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs webpage, and the Prime Minister's Office's archives for speeches and summaries. Furthermore, we used Google search to find relevant interviews. Within these databases, we performed a word search for notions as 'dansk udviklingsbistand'<sup>6</sup>, 'flygtninge'<sup>7</sup>, 'indvandrere'<sup>8</sup> 'udviklingsbistand til flygtninge'<sup>9</sup>, 'dansk udviklingsminister'<sup>10</sup>, 'prioritering af dansk udviklingsbistand'<sup>11</sup>, and alike. By reviewing all speeches, political documents, summaries, and interviews that contained one or more of our relevant search words, we selected seven speeches and interviews: Three for our first period, and two for the following two periods. Here, all data entries have been selected as particularly relevant due to their presented interconnection of ODA, refugees, and often a third phenomenon that reflects what is significant in the global society during the period. Data concerning development assistance in general comprises various interconnected discourses, which are also disseminated on different levels in government. The government could be speaking at either a global, national, or even local level. Since our thesis is concerned with the Danish governmental discourse *within* Denmark,

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<sup>6</sup> Translates to 'Danish development assistance'

<sup>7</sup> Translates to 'refugees'

<sup>8</sup> Translates to 'inmigrants'

<sup>9</sup> Translates to 'development assistance for refugees'

<sup>10</sup> Translates to 'Danish Development Minister'

<sup>11</sup> Translates to prioritization of 'Danish development assistance'

we have chosen to focus on sources that are aimed at the Danish national level. Accordingly, all our data is in Danish, and we will translate the quotes used in the analysis in-text while offering the quote in its original language in the footnotes. This is done with reader-friendliness in mind, assuming that it is more convenient to not change between two languages while reading the analysis.

## **5.2 Analytical design**

As prescribed by Jørgensen & Phillips (2002), the initial step in our analysis will be to identify the nodal points of each speech, as these must be understood as key signifiers indicating the thematic(s) within the discourse. These will be ascribed further meaning by identifying the chain of equivalence to the respective nodal points, and by examining the signs of sedimented discourse which will reveal preconceived ideas about the social reality that each piece of data is performed within (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). This will aid us in looking for indicators of securitization (Wæver, 1996; Buzan et al., 1998), identities, and power relations (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002), that will provide a further understanding of the social reality that the politicians are attempting to create through their discourses.

The analysis is divided into three sections. Initially, the data from each period will be analyzed individually, whereafter the respective analyses will be summarized together. This will both allow us to understand the perceptions of social realities regarding refugees and ODA in the respective periods, and to investigate certain generalizations and discursive struggles when comparing the different periods.

## **5.3 The Danish Government as a producer of discourse**

As all our data represents the Danish government of the time, despite it being different governments that the data represent, they must all be seen as the creators of the same collective identity that is Us, as described by both Laclau & Mouffe (1985) and Buzan, et al. (1998). Persons within this collective identity are the ones that are understood as belonging to the group of the Danish people - connected by their inherent perceived relation to the discursively created notion of the country Denmark. Here, the government must both be understood as a power-holding entity in relation to the Danish people through its ability to create social understandings through political discourses and when considering that they represent Denmark as a collective identity against outsiders. Because the government is

always in this position of power, they have the ability to create the social reality that the discourses and spending of Danish ODA are based on.

#### **5.4 The onset of the War on Terror**

For this period, the main data of analysis is the Minister of Foreign Affairs Per Stig Møller's speech to the Council for International Development Cooperation in 2003 (Appendix A1). To support his claims, arguments from Anders Fogh Rasmussen's speeches during his first election campaign for Prime Minister are included (Appendix A2; A3), and also one speech from 2004 which is from Fogh Rasmussen's time as Prime Minister (Appendix A4). As this election campaign ended with his win, the speeches can be said to represent the same government that Møller represents despite Fogh Rasmussen not being Prime Minister yet. Furthermore, we have chosen these speeches because they were given less than two weeks after 9/11, and therefore represent how Danish political discourses reacted to this. These statements explain certain notions that are found as implicit in Møller's speech and, as they are made by the future leader of the government, give authority to Møller's claims.

Møller begins his speech by outlining his intentions with it: To explain the Danish government's '*re-prioritizations*' (Appendix A1) and '*redistribution*' (Appendix A1) of Danish ODA. His discourse is aimed at legitimizing the government's new approach to ODA and counter criticism that the cuts and new priorities happen at the expense of fighting poverty. Within this discourse, we have identified two significant nodal points, in line with Jørgensen & Phillips' (2002) direction of this being the first step to discourse analysis. We will first investigate them, their chains of equivalence, and our subsequent understandings separately and then present how they interact in revealing why Danish ODA was prioritized as it was.

The two nodal points of Møller's speech are the two aspects that he argues that Danish ODA should particularly be used for; poverty reduction and combating terror.

##### 5.4.1 Poverty reduction

Møller both begins and finishes his speech by mentioning the importance of reducing poverty through ODA. He does not explain much about what it entails though and simply connects

this nodal point in a chain of equivalence with signs such as '*HIV*', '*aids*', and '*Africa*' (Appendix A1). This lack of deeper explanation reveals how he considers the discourse surrounding poverty reduction sedimented. In Jørgensen & Phillips' (2002) words, it has gained an objective meaning. This objective understanding of what poverty reduction is, is based on the projects that the Danish ODA supported in the latter 20th century. This included supporting rural development through e.g. agriculture, supplying medicine, and focusing on gender equality, particularly on the African continent (See chapter 5.4.2). This is reflected in the speech when Møller emphasizes that approximately 60 percent of the Danish ODA will be used on programs in Africa. Here, Møller does not feel a need to justify which programs in Africa Denmark will support, as it is objectively ingrained that Danish ODA supports poverty reduction. However, Fogh Rasmussen provides a deeper understanding of why African poverty reduction must be prioritized in this particular situation. While he does mention the importance of "*lifting the African continent out of its current misery.*"<sup>12</sup> (Appendix A4) due to the continent's hardships of e.g. AIDS, military conflicts, and oppressive regimes, he expresses how reducing poverty is also an important step in ensuring that people will not flee these areas. He emphasizes that: "*Refugees must be aided as close to their home as possible. Here, we can help the best, and here we can help the most.*"<sup>13</sup> (Appendix A4). Through this, he argues that people should be aided in their home areas rather than becoming refugees in e.g. Denmark. This implies that he sees the Danish focus on poverty reduction as a deterrence mechanism. Thus, reducing poverty in Africa can also be seen as a means to enhance Danish interests of not receiving refugees in Denmark. A reason for this can be seen in his statements that: "*the new refugees challenge the integration*"<sup>14</sup> (Appendix A4) and "*So far, the integration has failed.*"<sup>15</sup> (Appendix A4). These quotes can be understood as an extension of Fogh Rasmussen's promises during his 2001 election campaign. Here, he focused on the hardships of integrating the many refugees that Denmark had already received in the 1990s and why their assimilation into Danish society must be prioritized (See chapter 4.3.1). His speech from 2004, thus, shows how the integration of the refugees arriving during the first years of the 2000s must be prioritized just the same.

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<sup>12</sup> Appendix A4 - Translated from Danish: "*løfte det afrikanske kontinent ud af den nuværende elendighed*"

<sup>13</sup> Appendix A4 - Translated from Danish: "*Flygtninge skal hjælpes så tæt som muligt på deres hjem. Her kan vi hjælpe bedst, og her kan vi hjælpe flest.*"

<sup>14</sup> Appendix A4 - Translated from Danish: "*de nye flygtninge udfordrer integrationen*"

<sup>15</sup> Appendix A4 - Translated from Danish: "*Hidtil er integrationen slået fejl.*"

Because of this objective reality of connecting ODA to poverty reduction in Africa, Møller's speech has the aim of legitimizing spending the money elsewhere. His discourse, thus, challenges the existing social reality that poverty reduction on the African continent is the sole most important project for Danish ODA. This conflicting stance is the place that Møller's discourse takes in the discursive struggle. He wants to introduce "*focus and efficiency*" (Appendix A1) in Denmark's distribution of ODA in order to achieve "*as much poverty reduction as possible for the money.*"<sup>16</sup> (Appendix A1) Through this moment, he seeks to establish that re-prioritization and efficiency are essential for effective poverty-oriented aid. This discourse must be understood as Møller attempting to frame the significant reduction in Danish ODA as a positive development because it allows for more focused interventions. Both Møller and Fogh Rasmussen emphasize that Denmark, even after the cuts, is one of the countries donating the highest amount of ODA in the world, which is also backed by several academics (See chapter 2.1). This has been the case since 1978 (See chapter 4.2.1), and these discourses on Danish ODA must, thus, be understood as contributing to an existing sedimented discourse painting Denmark as a benevolent donor of ODA. Additionally, Møller argues that "*There is no redistribution away from Africa*"<sup>17</sup> (Appendix A1). As shown above, he equals poverty reduction with aid to Africa, so through this quote, he essentially states that no money is removed from projects aimed at poverty reduction, in an attempt to sustain this poverty-oriented understanding of Danish ODA. However, Møller explains that three African countries will lose their Danish ODA altogether. He is, thus, contradicting himself in defending the cuts in Danish ODA. Nonetheless, saving money by implementing a more focused approach to poverty reduction, he claims, frees up the funds to spend on another and, currently perceived as a more crucial, factor: '*Terror*' (Appendix A1).

#### 5.4.2 Terror and securitization

Because of '*terror*' being expressed by both Møller (Appendix A1) and Fogh Rasmussen (Appendix A2; A3) as a new focus for discourses concerning Danish ODA, there is not a sedimented discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) around it. Accordingly, Møller spends more effort arguing for its importance compared to poverty reduction which, as shown above,

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<sup>16</sup> Appendix A1 - Translated from Danish: "*så meget fattigdoms-bekæmpelse som muligt for pengene.*"

<sup>17</sup> Appendix A1 - Translated from Danish: "*Der er altså ikke nogen omfordeling væk fra Afrika*"

grants little explanation in his social reality. This also emphasizes how he perceives the subject of terror as an important part of his discourse.

Terror must be understood as a floating signifier (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002), in the sense that there exist many different terror organizations and that people who are perceived as terrorists by some may be perceived as freedom fighters by others. This is also enhanced by Fogh Rasmussen, who mentions previous Irish and German terrorists (Appendix A2). So besides participating in the discursive struggle by linking Danish ODA with combating terror, this government, as presented by both Møller and Fogh Rasmussen, also attempts to change the discourse of *who* the Danish population thinks about when talking about terrorists. Being in a position of power to produce the social (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002), Møller gets to define exactly what terror must be understood as in this government's discourse. He does this by ascribing social context to terror through a chain of equivalence with signs like '*extremism*', '*radicalization*', and the collective identity of '*the Arabic world*' (Appendix A1). This shows how his discourse is affected by the 9/11 attacks on the US and Denmark's subsequent engagement in the US-led War on Terror in particular in Iraq and Afghanistan (See chapter 4.2.1). While this attack is never specifically mentioned in Møller's speech, the contextual knowledge of that time makes it clear that no listener would be in doubt about that. This is emphasized by Fogh Rasmussen being less discrete in his portrayal of who the terrorists that this government's discourses are about, are. His chain of equivalence extends the notion to include '*suicide pilots*' and '*hijacking passenger flights*' (Appendix A2) as was the means used for 9/11. Møller's speech should, thus, be understood as him attempting to create a natural understanding (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) that terror equals 9/11 and Arab people attacking the Western world. Because he needs to expressively connect it with signs such as '*radicalism*' and '*Arabic world*' (Appendix A1), we can see that this discourse has not been sedimented, but his lack of mentioning e.g. 9/11 shows that it might be on its way to be perceived as objective reality.

Because the Danish government here is in a position of power to produce the social knowledge on terror, Møller gets to also produce an understanding of terror performed by the '*the Arabic world*' (Appendix A1) as a threat to Danish security. This is backed by Fogh Rasmussen stating: "*When suicide pilots can cause this much death and destruction by hijacking passenger flight, what won't happen if they someday send missiles to large city malls? What won't happen if they use biological or chemical weapons against our*

*countries?"*<sup>18</sup> (Appendix A2). He emphasizes this potential threat to Denmark and its people, and the terror-linked chains of equivalence must, thus, be understood as the government employing securitization moves (Wæver, 1996) to justify this choice of prioritization of Danish ODA. Here, Møller explains the necessity of using the extraordinary tool of spending ODA funds to defend Denmark against terrorism. He states: "*But terrorism is, unfortunately, in a very dynamic and dangerous development. And in the perspective of 10-15 years, which foreign policy must always include, development aid can play a decisive role towards the future threats*"<sup>19</sup> (Appendix A1). Here, he employs securitization moves by posing terrorism as a threat that is growing larger. Through this, he emphasizes the social reality that, from now on, the Danish people must consider "*development politics as an integrated part of foreign- and security politics*"<sup>20</sup> (Appendix A1) which includes using Danish ODA "*in the fight of terrorisms root causes.*"<sup>21</sup> (Appendix A1) Møller's speech is a discourse act mainly aimed at proving how this fight against terrorism must have priority, which justifies cutting in poverty reduction aid. This discourse act of presenting a notion to have utmost priority to ensure political legitimacy to handle it fast is a common securitization move (Wæver, 1996). While the root causes of terrorism that ODA must fight are not explicitly mentioned, Møller emphasizes that they can be fought by supporting "*human rights, democracy, and good governance*"<sup>22</sup> (Appendix A1), which implies that poor governance and breaches of human rights are also connected to terror. Fogh Rasmussen furthers this by exclaiming that Denmark should only donate ODA to countries that follow democratic principles and values: "*And we wish to remove the ODA from regimes exercising terror and oppression. However, we want to raise the ODA to poor countries, who are trying to develop democracy*"<sup>23</sup> (Appendix A2). This marks a defining break with Denmark's previous UN-aligned ODA policy of not interfering with the political ideologies of a recipient country (See chapter 4.2.1). By this, both Møller and Fogh Rasmussen reveal their government's position of power to announce a naturalization (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) of democracy as the 'correct' governance

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<sup>18</sup> Appendix A2 - Translated from Danish: "Når selvmordspiloter kan forårsage så megen død og ødelæggelse ved at kapre passagerfly, hvad kan der så ikke ske, hvis de en dag sender missiler mod store bycentre? Hvad kan der ikke ske, hvis de anvender biologiske eller kemiske våben mod vore lande?"

<sup>19</sup> Appendix A1 - Translated from Danish: "Men terrorismen er desværre inde i en meget dynamisk og farlig udvikling. Og i det 10-15 årige perspektiv, som udenrigspolitikken altid skal inddrage, kan bistanden spille en afgørende rolle for det fremtidige trusselsbillede."

<sup>20</sup> Appendix A1 - Translated from Danish: "udviklingspolitikken som en integreret del af udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitikken"

<sup>21</sup> Appendix A1 - Translated from Danish: "i bekæmpelsen af terrorismens grundlæggende årsager"

<sup>22</sup> Appendix A1 - Translated from Danish: "menneskerettigheder, demokrati og god regeringsførelse"

<sup>23</sup> Appendix A2 - Translated from Danish: "Og vi ønsker at fjerne bistanden fra regimer, der udøver terror og undertrykkelse. Til gengæld vil vi øge bistanden til fattige lande, der prøver at udvikle demokrati"

ideology. This discursive focus on the fight against bad governance is, furthermore, enhanced by Fogh Rasmussen's including '*rogue states*' (Appendix A2) in his chain of equivalence (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) with terror and focusing on regimes in the above statement. This emphasizes the reality that, to the Danish government, fighting terrorism includes fighting both the Taliban government and Saddam Hussein's government in Iraq, as these were believed to allow for international terrorism. Thus, the discourse aims at establishing that combating terror means combating states ruling according to Islamic beliefs. This religious focus is underlined by terror being put in a chain of equivalence (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) with '*religious fundamentalism*' and '*fanaticism*' (Appendix A2; A3). He furthers this ideological focus by stating that "*When the terrorists crashed the hijacked planes towards New York and Washington, it was not just a cold and cynical attack on innocent people. It was an attack on democracy. It was an attack on all of us living in free and open societies.*"<sup>24</sup> (Appendix A3) Terrorism, thus, adds up to a fundamental threat to the democratic state of Denmark. To further emphasize this threat to Danish ideologies, Fogh Rasmussen compares the threat of terrorism to the previous communist threat, highlighting it as a new threat to liberal democracy right when peace had finally been achieved. This is emphasized by his statements that "*After the fall of the Berlin Wall we all hoped that the world would now be a more peaceful place to live. The communist threat was gone. But after September 11th, 2001, we woke up to a new and terrible enemy, international terrorism.*"<sup>25</sup> (Appendix A2) and "*No, history is not over. There is still much for idealistic liberal powers to do.*"<sup>26</sup> (Appendix 2) Here, he expresses the, then, commonly accepted belief that liberal democracy had won, as prescribed by the theory of the End of History (See chapter 4.3.1), but that terrorism and the ideologies that foster it, disrupt this international peace. By drawing these parallels to the communist threat during the Cold War, he argues that the threat of terrorism merits the same extraordinary measures of international engagement as was necessary when peace was threatened during the Cold War. This fits with Buzan et al. (1998) statement that, in politics, security is often defined as a threat to the state's ideology and, thus, this focus on ideology from Møller and Fogh Rasmussen is thus another securitization move of the Danish government.

<sup>24</sup> Appendix A3 - Translated from Danish: "*Da terroristerne smadrede de kaprede fly mod New York og Washington, var det ikke blot et koldt og kynisk angreb på uskyldige mennesker. Det var et angreb på demokratiet. Det var et angreb på alle os, der lever i frie og åbne samfund.*"

<sup>25</sup> Appendix A2 - Translated from Danish: "*Efter Berlinskurens fald håbede vi alle, at verden nu ville blive fredeligere at leve i. Den kommunistiske trussel var væk. Men den 11. september 2001 vågnede vi op til en ny og frygtelig fjende, den internationale terrorisme.*"

<sup>26</sup> Appendix A2 - Translated from Danish: "*Nej, historien er ikke slut. Der er stadig masser at gøre for idealistiske liberale kræfter.*"

### 5.4.3 Us versus Them

Both of these nodal points infers an ingrained Us versus Them discourse. This is done by creating distinct collective identities (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) that are presented as opposing. Here, the Us represents the Danish people. This collective identity is presented as a naturalized totality consisting of those that Møller believes to be belonging to Denmark. To invoke this identity, he uses the word ‘we’ 34 times in his speech where he is speaking in a Danish context (Appendix A1).

In the context of poverty reduction, this Us is placed in contrast with a Them consisting of those receiving Danish ODA. This group, Fogh Rasmussen describes as “*the poorest of the world*”<sup>27</sup> (Appendix A2), but also as the group whom Denmark should aid as to ensure that they do not become refugees in Denmark, as described above. While a collective identity always changes over time, particularly when it accepts new members, if it happens at a speed that the original members are not comfortable with, attempting to change or expand what the identity details can be perceived as an existential threat to the collective identity (Buzan et al., 1998). This seems to have happened with the large influx of refugees in Denmark during the 1990s and early 2000s, which is portrayed by Fogh Rasmussen’s strong focus on the hardships of integrating immigrants into Denmark during his election campaign and later speeches (See chapter 4.3.1). Refugees are expected to fit in with the preconceived idea of what the Danish collective identity entails, which for Fogh Rasmussen is described as they need to contribute to the Danish welfare state. This is expressed in his statements that “*So we send a crystal clear signal to everyone: If you want to work and contribute to Danish society, then you are welcome. But you cannot just come to Denmark to collect welfare benefits.*”<sup>28</sup> (Appendix A3) This quote is an expression of his ‘Battle of Values’, which started during his election campaign (See chapter 4.3.1) and reflects the perceived struggle to implement his specific ideas and ideologies among the immigrants in Denmark. This reveals that many of the refugees already residing in Denmark are not perceived as included in the Danish collective identity because they are not perceived as contributing to Danish society. Accordingly, the Danish government has no wish to welcome more people in Denmark who

<sup>27</sup> Appendix A2 - Translated from Danish: “*klodens fattigste*”

<sup>28</sup> Appendix A3 - Translated from Danish: “*Så sender vi et krystalklart signal til alle: Hvis I vil arbejde og yde et bidrag til det danske samfund, så er I velkomne. Men I kan ikke bare komme til Danmark for at hæve bistandshjælp.*”

cannot be considered as part of the collective identity, and it utilizes securitization moves to express this.

Another Them is also presented in Møller's speech. The above collective identity (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) of 'poor potential refugees' is, as shown, not a part of the Danish people, but neither are they a part of the collective identity created by the discourse on terror. As described, Møller includes the collective identity of '*the Arabic world*' (Appendix A1) in his chain of equivalence with terror and, as such, his discourse creates the collective identity of the Arabic world by attaching it to perceived dangerous ideologies and terrorism (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Through a discourse focusing on securitization moves (Buzan et al., 1998), he places Them, the Arabic world, and terrorists, in stark contrast with Us, the Danish people. Because this collective identity is connected with religion and ideology, as described above, the threat that this group poses is also connected to the existential foundation of the Danish collective identity. Both Møller and Fogh Rasmussen focus not only on the present threat of terrorism but also on the threat that this poses to future Denmark. It is, thus, not only a threat to the Us currently alive, but also to the future collective identity of Us. Thus, he expresses an existential fear of this perceived threat to social reality as We know it. By claiming that these terrorists with dangerous ideologies and violent tendencies are threatening the survival of social and future reality as We know it, they also connect the Danish collective identity with democratic ideologies, just like the terrorists are closely connected to their ideologies. This is, thus, a matter of protecting the Danish nation state as it is.

Møller's linking of terror to the entire Arabic world is an expression of Jørgensen & Phillips' (2002) argument that discourses often create a blur between individual and collective identities. However, here Fogh Rasmussen focuses on emphasizing that this War on Terror must not be perceived as a war on Muslims or on the Arabic world in general, but simply a war on terrorism. He, thus, attempts to correct a potential naturalization of Arab people equaling terrorism. This is to distinguish between the people from Afghanistan and Iraq who supported the 9/11 attacks, and e.g. refugees from these areas that arrived in Denmark. So this last mentioned group of people belongs more within the collective identity of 'poor potential refugees' as described in the first Them. However, it could be argued that these entire groups of people are presented as existential threats to Denmark, where it is either due to fear of an attack or because they pose a threat to what it means to be part of Danish collective identity.

#### 5.4.4 Intermediate conclusion

By the start of the 2000s, political Danish discourses concerning ODA included a sedimented discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) of Denmark as donating a high amount to ODA, and as the primary aim of this ODA to be aimed at poverty reduction on the African continent. Møllers attempts to maintain these naturalizations despite cutting in the Danish ODA and arguing for a shift away from Africa being the sole focus of Danish ODA. Rather, he argues, the money must now also be spent on halting the emerging threat of international terrorism.

The nodal points of Møller's speech are, thus, '*poverty reduction*' and '*combating terror*'. The chains of equivalence and further explanations granted by Fogh Rasmussen reveal that the discursive aim of the contemporary government is to argue how ODA must be used to protect Denmark. By supporting poverty reduction on the African continent, the number of people feeling forced to flee to e.g. Denmark is minimized. This is in line with the contemporary Danish political interests after having received large influxes of refugees for many years and having had perceived issues with these people assimilating to the Danish collective identity. Migrants can, thus, be considered as presented as an existential threat to this Danish collective identity. While Møller does not mention refugees at all and Fogh Rasmussen only does it to a smaller extent, the identity of refugees must be considered a part of the collective identity of the migrants that the government presents as a threat to Denmark. However, this threat is surpassed by the government's discourse of constructing a social reality based on the fear of terror. Møller and Fogh Rasmussen employ securitizing moves such as creating a discourse of Us versus Them, where the collective identity of Us, the Danish People, must be protected from the collective identity of the Them, the terrorists, with the ultimate goal to safeguard both Our physical safety and ideological integrity. Møller associates the Arabic world with terror in a chain of equivalence, painting a social reality where radicalism in the Arabic world leads to the threat of terrorism in Denmark. This perceived reality justifies spending Danish ODA on combating terrorism rather than only reducing poverty.

Consequently, these discourses serve as securitizing moves altogether, and as historical knowledge of the ODA indeed being cut and Denmark engaging in the War on Terror confirms that both policies were implemented, it is indeed a successful securitization.

## **5.5 The European Refugee Crisis**

For this section, the primary data of analysis is the opening speech of the Danish parliament given by Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen in 2015 (Appendix B1). The speech will be supported by an interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kristian Jensen (Appendix B2). The general purpose of an opening speech at the Danish parliament is to give a State of the Union and connect new policy proposals from the government to the current situation in Denmark (Klujeff, 2011). Accordingly, Løkke Rasmussen focuses on what he perceives as characterizing Denmark, the greatness of the country, and subjects that are prominent in contemporary Danish social reality, e.g., refugee reception. He starts out by emphasizing that Denmark is one of the best countries in the world, but that there also are certain issues that the government needs to correct to improve and maintain this greatness. Following Jørgensen & Phillips' (2002) model for a discourse analysis, the following will present the important nodal points of the speech and their respective chains of equivalence. Løkke Rasmussen's speech holds two prominent collective identities: - '*Denmark*' and '*refugees*'. These two identities must also be understood as the two nodal points: '*Denmark*', which must aid refugees and developing countries and, simultaneously, ensure its own society. And the '*refugees*' who threaten the ability of Denmark to sustain its society as they know it. Accordingly, an overall aim of Løkke Rasmussen's discourse is to emphasize the complex dichotomy between Denmark's responsibility towards refugees and migrants and its responsibility to maintain its own welfare society. The speech suggests that there is a trade-off between the two: the more refugees and migrants Denmark takes in, the less sustainable its society becomes.

### 5.5.1 Collective identities

In line with Jørgensen & Phillips' (2002) argument about national identity, Løkke Rasmussen (Appendix B1) presents the greatness of Denmark as a fixed and objective truth that has been fostered through generations in Denmark. He portrays the nodal point '*Denmark*' in a positive manner, by connecting it in a chain of equivalence (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) with signs such as '*harmony*', '*prosperity*', '*freedom*', '*welfare*', '*equality*', and '*collective responsibility*' (Appendix B1). Along with the use of these positive connotations about Denmark, Løkke Rasmussen states that Denmark is one of the best countries in the world. This is, thus, the most important social reality (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) that Løkke

Rasmussen aims to assert. This superiority is presented as an objective fact that We, the Danish people, can all agree to. As Prime Minister, Løkke Rasmussen is in a powerful position where he can produce the social, both through linguistic and political processes (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). This means that he can characterize which key features apply to the collective identity of Denmark, which he has chosen to be largely positive.

He does, however, also proclaim that, despite being one of the best countries in the world, there are things in Denmark that can, and must, be improved. This speech act of not only praising Denmark must be seen in the context in which the speech is given. As a newly elected Prime Minister, the opening speech is an opportunity to present new policy proposals. Such proposals must include factors to change and improve Denmark. In this particular context, there is a large focus on which extraneous factors that need to be prevented or changed in order for Denmark to keep on being one of the greatest countries in the world. So overall it is still a very positive description of Denmark, its citizens, and its culture that the audience is left with, which indicates that Denmark is very much something worthy of protection.

Another nodal point in Løkke Rasmussen's speech is '*refugees*'. According to Jørgensen & Phillips (2002), nodal points must be understood as floating signifiers, which are signifiers with no universally attached meaning but which are instead ascribed meaning when they become moments in a discourse. Contrary to this common understanding of nodal points, however, the term '*refugee*' does have a universal meaning. It is defined by the 1951 Refugee Convention as "*someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.*" (UNHCR, n.d.: p. 3). What is not universally defined, though, is how the reception of refugees influences the recipient country, and it is this meaning that Løkke Rasmussen is defining in his speech through the nodal point '*refugees*'. Due to his power position, Løkke Rasmussen is also able to control how a collective identity, in this case, '*Denmark*', relates to other groups or individuals (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).

Initially, Løkke Rasmussen acknowledges that refugees flee under tough circumstances and that Denmark has a responsibility to help them indicating sympathy and willingness to help the refugees. However, he does not have any more positive words for the refugees and

instead, connects ‘refugees’ in a chain of equivalence (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) with ‘too many’, ‘failed integration’, and ‘discouraging’ (Appendix B1). He furthers this negative perception of the collective identity of ‘refugees’ by stating that “*we need to be honest about the fact that the new refugees challenge the integration. Regardless of if one believes there are too many or too few refugees coming to the country – the government thinks that there are coming too many*”<sup>29</sup> (Appendix B1) and “*So far, the integration has failed.*”<sup>30</sup> (Appendix B1). By connecting ‘too many refugees’, who at this time mainly came from Africa and the Middle East (See Chapter 4.2.2), with a failed integration, he implies that the collective Danish We are threatened by the collective identity of the refugees and their culture which they bring to Denmark. As specified by Buzan et al. (1998), a collective We will always change over time, but if feeling forced to change too fast by an external threat, the group will no longer recognize itself. When a collective identity feels threatened in this manner, it is a natural reaction that power holders in the collective adopt a discourse on securitization to deter the perceived threat (Buzan et al., 1998). This is also the case in the speech by Løkke Rasmussen. The securitization discourse in the speech might be more subtle but is non the less still present. We will unfold this in the following section.

### 5.5.2 Danish welfare, securitization, and ODA

Despite stating that Denmark is one of the best countries in the world, Løkke Rasmussen also emphasizes how his government has “*to get Denmark back on the right track again.*”<sup>31</sup> (Appendix B1). This implies that something needs to be changed in Denmark. Throughout the speech, he clarifies how one of the major things that need to be changed is the number of refugees and immigrants arriving in Denmark. As the structure of the social world is never stable nor objective (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) Løkke Rasmussen can, due to his power position, contribute to a change in the public perception of the refugees arriving in Denmark.

While emphasizing that “*there is a difference between being a refugee and being an economic migrant*”<sup>32</sup> (Appendix B1), Løkke Rasmussen uses the words ‘refugee’, ‘foreigner’, and ‘immigrant’ interchangeably in several places in the speech (Appendix B1). This follows

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<sup>29</sup> Appendix B1 - translated from Danish: “*skal vi være ærlige om, at de nye flygtninge udfordrer integrationen. Uanset om man mener, der kommer for mange eller for få flygtninge til landet – regeringen mener, at der kommer for mange*”

<sup>30</sup> Appendix B1 - translated from Danish: “*Hidtil er integrationen slæt fejl.*”

<sup>31</sup> Appendix B1 - translated from Danish: “*at få Danmark på sikker kurs igen.*”

<sup>32</sup> Appendix B1 - translated from Danish: “*der er forskel på at være flygtning og økonomisk migrant.*”

Jørgensen & Phillips' (2002) notion, that collective and individual identities are often hard to divide. In this speech, it has the effect that these different categories of non-Danish people are presented as one collective identity that is a burden to Denmark because many of them are not employed. According to Løkke Rasmussen, Denmark cannot economically function properly if too many people rely on social services. e.g. by highlighting that, after a year in Denmark, only one in ten refugees are either working or taking an education. This reveals the sedimented perception (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) that if a person is able to work and chooses not to, they are a burden on society. This does also mean that refugees receiving social services are a threat to the Danish welfare system, as it can only handle a certain amount benefiting from social services. In raising the concern that most refugees are unemployed after a year in Denmark, Løkke Rasmussen adopts a security discourse (Buzan et al., 1998). He emphasizes that "*I support a country that is open to those who can and will. Where the main way to Denmark is education and work - not asylum and family reunification*"<sup>33</sup> (Appendix B1). This is a clear expression that he aims to protect Denmark and the Danish welfare system by keeping refugees away. Thus, the securitization move emphasizes the social reality that it is necessary to prevent too many refugees and migrants from coming to Denmark, as they will put a burden on the system rather than contribute to it. This perceived need to protect Denmark is not only linguistically put forward. It is also exemplified by stricter immigration and integration laws. Løkke Rasmussen and his government have already introduced a stricter immigration policy, to make it less attractive for refugees and immigrants to come to Denmark. At the same time, the government plans on making it more difficult to obtain permanent residence in Denmark (Appendix B1). The policies, thus, also serve as securitization moves (Wæver, 1996), as they make it harder for the people considered to be a threat to arrive and stay, in Denmark. Should a refugee, however, obtain asylum in Denmark, they have to get a job as quickly as possible, and at the same time, they must learn Danish (Appendix B1). Løkke Rasmussen emphasizes repeatedly that it is important to shield Danish values and culture, which showcases this perceived threat from non-Danish people. This creates the connotation that refugees are only welcome if they are willing to adopt the Danish collective We's way of living, in this way they will pose less of a threat to the collective We of Denmark (Buzan et al., 1998).

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<sup>33</sup>Appendix B1 - translated from Danish: "Jeg går ind for et land, som er åbent for dem, der kan og vil. Hvor hovedvejen til Danmark er uddannelse og arbejde – ikke asyl og familiesammenføring."

This is also emphasized by Løkke Rasmussen's statements that "*Denmark has a responsibility of helping people who are fleeing their country. But we do also have the responsibility of keeping our country together.*"<sup>34</sup> (Appendix B1), and "*I am proud of Denmark. A country that takes responsibility for the world. Helps people in need. And protects the values which bind us together.*"<sup>35</sup> (Appendix B1) Here, he portrays Denmark as a country with its ethos in the right place, as Denmark helps people in need and donates a respectable amount of ODA. However, he also emphasizes the need to focus on spending ODA where it serves Danish interests and promotes the values important to Denmark. Thus, Denmark is presented as a benevolent actor, who is helping people in need while also promoting its own values. But there is also a general understating in the speech that Denmark has first priority, even before improving the living standards in developing countries.

To get Denmark back on the perceived right track, Løkke Rasmussen will cut some funds from the Danish ODA "*The government has chosen to spend less money on the ODA, but we will still live up to the UN's goal for ODA.*"<sup>36</sup> (Appendix B1). This policy of reducing ODA can also be seen in an interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kristian Jensen (Appendix B2). He describes his most important task as finding savings in development assistance. Jensen says, "*It would have been much easier if I could take money from something that doesn't work. We have used money where it has been beneficial. But we must prioritize so that we use the money where it does the best*"<sup>37</sup> (Appendix B2). Jensen does not explicitly clarify where the money will do best, but him talking about cutting the budget implies that the money being cut from the ODA will do the best in Denmark. This creates an understanding that it is okay to use money that was previously earmarked for developing countries and is now used in Denmark. The reduction in the ODA is justified by both Løkke Rasmussen and Jensen emphasizing the fact that Denmark is still living up to the UN's ambition that the DAC countries give 0.7 percent of their GNI to ODA. They are attempting to sedate a discourse where it is okay for Denmark to cut the Danish ODA as long as they still donate a minimum of 0.7 percent of the Danish GNI. Part of the discourse also entails that Denmark's

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<sup>34</sup> Appendix B1 - translated from Danish: "*Danmark har et ansvar for at hjælpe mennesker på flugt. Men vi har også et ansvar for, at vores land hænger sammen.*"

<sup>35</sup> Appendix B1 - translated from Danish: "*Jeg er stolt af Danmark. Et land, der tager ansvar i verden. Hjælper mennesker i nød. Og værner om de værdier, der binder os sammen.*"

<sup>36</sup> Appendix B1 - translated from Danish: "*Regeringen har valgt at bruge færre penge på udviklingsbistand – men stadig leve op til FN's målsætning.*"

<sup>37</sup> Appendix B2 - translated from Danish: "*Det havde været meget nemmere, hvis jeg kunne tage penge fra noget, der ikke virker. Vi har brugt penge, hvor de har gjort gavn. Men vi er nødt til at prioritere, så vi bruger pengene, hvor de gør mest gavn*"

international reputation as one of the most giving and solidary countries will not suffer because of the cutbacks. That Denmark's international reputation will not suffer is an important aspect of the collective identity which Løkke Rasmussen created by declaring Denmark one of the greatest countries in the world.

While Løkke Rasmussen primarily focuses on ideological security rather than physical security, he also emphasizes the importance of Denmark participating in the fight against ISIS which is leading a '*terror war*' (Appendix B1) against Us. This indicates a danger towards '*Denmark*' and the rest of the West, as implied by the word Us. It calls for additional action when there is an imminent threat to a state's safety and security. Løkke Rasmussen adopts a security discourse, which is usually the first step when a state feels threatened (Wæver, 1996), with the hope of gaining support from the rest of the Danish parliament to take more action against ISIS. Implying that if We fight ISIS the threat against our state will disappear. Jensen elaborates in his interview that Denmark is e.g., fighting ISIS through The Arabic Initiative by helping with F16 flights and by gathering troops. The Arabic Initiative is funded by the Danish ODA. This connection between the ODA and military actions against ISIS gives the impression that the Danish government can spend the ODA on its own security.

Considering the rules and guidelines concerning the use of ODA (See chapter 4.1.1.), one could be tempted to say that there is a clear-cut understanding of what ODA is and means. However, the purpose and thereby meaning of ODA are challenged by both Løkke Rasmussen and Jensen who both express that it is acceptable to use the ODA to fight ISIS, that the ODA shall help prevent migration (Appendix B1; Appendix B2) and that the ODA shall serve Danish interests and values. By challenging the definition of ODA, ODA ends up being a moment in the field of discursivity (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) where Løkke Rasmussen tries to sediment a discourse wherein it is acceptable for ODA to serve Danish interests and security.

### 5.5.3 Intermediate conclusion

During the mid-2010s, Danish political discourses concerning ODA includes a sedimented discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) of Denmark donating a high amount of ODA. This allows for Løkke Rasmussen to present the idea that it is acceptable to make budget cuts for the ODA and to allocate some of the funds to other purposes than what is traditionally

prioritized. These budget cuts would allow for Denmark to use the money on Danish welfare instead. In the speech by Løkke Rasmussen, two nodal points were detected which helped to frame the alternation of the ODA, namely '*Denmark*' and '*refugees*'.

Through a chain of equivalence, Løkke Rasmussen only connects positive signs to '*Denmark*'. He declares it to be one of the best countries in the world and implies, with this, that it must be protected from the many refugees arriving and threatening what it means to belong to the Danish collective identity. Accordingly, the collective identity of '*refugees*' is portrayed as posing a threat to the collective We of '*Denmark*'. This is based on the hardship of integrating them into Danish society due to their perceived lack of work ethics and the foreign language and culture that they bring along. Løkke Rasmussen adopts a security discourse, through which he attempts to justify the additional immigration laws that his government is introducing. The security discourse, thus, focuses on protecting Denmark, its values, and its collective We. This shows that the security discourse in 2015 is mainly about securing the collective We and not as much physical safety of Denmark as a state. However, discourses of physical safety are also present through Løkke Rasmussen emphasizing how Denmark is engaging in the fight against ISIS.

Accordingly, these discourses serve as securitizing moves altogether. The aims of these moves are to ensure that Denmark will not suffer too much from the many refugees arriving there. As historical knowledge confirms that the Danish ODA was indeed cut to support Danish welfare and reception of refugees, it can be perceived as a successful securitization.

## **5.6 The Russian invasion of Ukraine**

For this section, the primary data of analysis is a speech by Minister of Development Flemming Møller Mortensen (Appendix C1). The speech was given at an event at the Danish Foreign Policy Society in April 2022, which served as a platform to address the EU's common asylum policies. With his speech, Mortensen aims to address how to protect Denmark and Europe against Russia whilst helping Ukrainian refugees.

The speech by Mortensen is supported by a speech held by Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen (Appendix C1) at an event marking the Danish liberation from the Nazis after the Second World War. In her speech, she addresses the importance of showing solidarity with the

Ukrainians and the war they are facing by comparing their struggles to the Danish struggles during the Second World War.

In accordance with Jørgensen and Phillips's (2002) prescription of a discourse analysis, we have identified a single prominent nodal point within the speech, which is '*war of aggression*'. We will first investigate this nodal point and its chain of equivalence to understand how the nodal point is portrayed. Afterward, we will unfold the collective identities '*Denmark*', '*Ukraine*', and '*Europe*', as these collective identities along with the nodal point will help us grasp the political discourses on Danish ODA, and how the ODA is prioritized.

### 5.6.1 Securitization

In Mortensen's speech, there is a single nodal point, which is '*war of aggression*' (Appendix C1). As this is a floating signifier (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002), in the sense that there are several wars and attacks happening at any given time, Mortensen connects it in a chain of equivalence (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) with signs as '*war in Europe*' and, '*the brave fight of the Ukrainians*' and the collective identities of both '*Ukraine*' and '*Russia*' (Appendix C1), to infer that he is talking about the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. He, furthermore, connects it with the signs '*unprovoked*', '*crisis*', '*invasion*', and '*terrible humanitarian catastrophe*' (Appendix C1). Here, Mortensen paints a picture of a dangerous war, created by the Russians. Connecting '*Russia*', the invading party in the war, with this chain of negatively loaded signs, infers the stance that the country is acting wrongly with their current actions. He is presenting the country, and Putin specifically, as a threat to not only Ukraine but also to Denmark and Europe in general. This is e.g. done by stating that "*the Ukrainians' brave fight, to a great extent, is also our fight.*"<sup>38</sup> (Appendix C1). Here, Mortensen aims at creating a social reality where, despite not having been under direct attack, Denmark is under threat from the war. Both he and Frederiksen (Appendix C2) emphasize a mutual dependency between Ukraine and Denmark. Ukraine is in need of the military equipment that Denmark, along with other EU countries, provides in order to win the war. Simultaneously, it is implied that if Russia wins the war, it could be fatal to the safety of Denmark and Europe. Thus, Ukraine winning the war is also in the personal interests of

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<sup>38</sup> Appendix C1 - translated from Danish: "*ukrainernes modige kamp i høj grad også er vores kamp.*"

Denmark. Turning this war in Ukraine into a threat to Denmark is a securitization move (Wæver, 1996), as it discursively creates an external threat that Denmark must protect itself from. Because of this threat to Denmark, Mortensen claims, the country must enhance its defenses and increase its military defense budget. To justify this increased spending, he emphasizes, with both his first and last sentence of the speech, that this invasion marks “*very extraordinary times.*”<sup>39</sup> (Appendix C1). Presenting a security issue as an extraordinary situation is a securitization move (Buzan et al. 1998) that is often employed by politicians to justify extraordinary protective measures against a perceived threat. This is also exemplified by Mortensen claiming the need to use additional funds on the Danish military. This, he argues, is so that Denmark can protect itself against threats like this ‘*war of aggression*’ (Appendix C1). He furthers this by stating that “*Everyone in Europe needs to take more responsibility for their own safety. And Denmark needs to do so as well.*”<sup>40</sup> (Appendix C1). All these discursive tools, Mortensen employs to underline how security from Russia must take absolute priority, which Wæver (1996) also defines as a securitizing move.

It seems uncommon that it is Mortensen as the Development Minister who is addressing military spending, as normally it would be addressed by the Minister of Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs, or Prime Minister rather than the Development Minister. However, when addressed by Mortensen, it implies an existing sedimented Danish political discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) that links ODA with national and global security. This is supported by his statement that “*Our own comfort and security are also - we must not forget - the premise for us to pursue the development policy that we do.*”<sup>41</sup> (Appendix C1). Thus, he presents it as a commonly understood naturalized phenomenon that Denmark *cannot* contribute to global development if it is not safe. This justifies ensuring Danish safety as a link in the Danish development work. Furthermore, should Russia win, Mortensen implies great consequences for the countries receiving Danish ODA as well. Accordingly, Danish development work, just like the defense expenses as shown above, must fit this social reality of a perceived Russian threat. While emphasizing that Denmark must continue contributing to the development of developing countries, Mortensen also argues that “*We must ascertain that we use the development cooperation to fight influences from forces that do not share our*

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<sup>39</sup> Appendix C1 - translated from Danish: “*meget særlige tider.*”

<sup>40</sup> Appendix C1 - translated from Danish: “*Alle i Europa skal tage et større ansvar for egen sikkerhed. Og Danmark skal være med.*”

<sup>41</sup> Appendix C1 - translated from Danish: “*Vores egen tryghed og sikkerhed er også – det må vi ikke glemme – premissen for, at vi kan føre den udviklingspolitik, som vi gør.*”

*democratic values and views on human rights*”<sup>42</sup> (Appendix C1). He argues that Danish ODA should be used to protect Danish values and ideologies. In this regard, he claims that simultaneous with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia is also spreading misinformation about the West through its presence in Africa and that the African continent witnesses “*a battle of values between democracies and autocracies with Russia as our direct opponent*” (Appendix C1). Thus, the ODA that Denmark donates must be used as a tool in promoting the ideologies that Denmark supports in order to keep Denmark safe. Mortensen is constructing a social reality wherein it can potentially be dangerous for both Denmark and the West if democracy continues being reduced around the world. This approach that Russia threatens the survival of Danish values and ideologies is another securitization move (Buzan et al., 1998), and it infers that social reality as we know it is under attack by Russia’s actions elsewhere in the world. Here, Mortensen argues that “*geopolitics are back.*”<sup>43</sup> (Appendix C1). This is a reference to the international state during the Cold War, where the Soviet Union and the West e.g. partook in proxy wars on the African continent over which ideology should dominate the world (See chapter 4.2.1), which is what he infers is also happening now. He emphasizes that it is crucial that we win this battle, in order to uphold the global social reality as we know it. By referring to this war, which has been finished for decades, he speaks into an old sedimented discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) of Russia, or the Soviet Union, as our natural enemy in this context due to our different ideologies. This discourse reinforces the enemy picture of Russia. This is enhanced by Frederiksen connecting the Russian invasion with the Second World War. She states that “*Can you believe that our generation must again be confronted with this.*”<sup>44</sup> (Appendix C2) Through this quote, she connects the Danish generations and ties them together in one Danish identity. Through her speech, she infers that this Danish identity is under threat from the external forces of Russia. In comparing the suffering during the Second World War, the government refers to a social reality that is by many connected to fear. Thus, simply by referring to it, it can create additional fear of an alike situation. This, thus, adds a notion of an existential fear of another large-scale war, which would not only pose a threat to the current Danish society but also the future Danish society. The securitization move (Buzan et al., 1998) of adding this fear of the future of not only Danish ideologies but also Danish physical safety, is, thus, the main argument for prioritizing Danish military budgets.

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<sup>42</sup> Appendix C1 - translated from Danish: "Vi skal stå ved, at vi også bruger udviklingssamarbejdet til at bekæmpe påvirkning fra kraefter, som ikke deler vores demokratiske værdier og syn på menneskerettigheder."

<sup>43</sup> Appendix C1 - translated from Danish: "geopolitikken er tilbage."

<sup>44</sup> Appendix C2 - translated from Danish: "Tænk, at vores generation igen skal konfronteres med det."

### 5.6.2 Collective identities

Mortensen outlines several collective identities (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) throughout his speech. The most prominent ones are '*Denmark*', '*Ukraine*', and '*Europe*'. Despite being separate collective identities, they are also discursively interconnected into a common collective identity.

Mortensen defines Denmark, and thereby the Danish collective identity (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002), as a safe and democratic nation where citizens have a lot of possibilities and where human rights are respected. Adding to this Frederiksen describes Denmark as having been a free country since the end of the Second World War. Mortensen mentions that Denmark is one of the few countries that gives at least 0.7 percent of its GNI to ODA, that Denmark has done this for more than 40 years, and that Denmark will continue to do so (Appendix C1). Here, Mortensen is speaking into an existing sedimented discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) of Denmark as a charitable and helpful country (See chapter 2.1). Simultaneously, he is creating the social reality that Denmark is one of the few developed countries that is meeting its international responsibilities in this regard. He does not, however, mention that the Danish ODA is at a historical low, at a time when the Danish economy is continuing to grow (Danmarks Statistik, 2023). If Mortensen had mentioned this, it could potentially have created another social reality, where Denmark is still a helpful country but Denmark might not have seemed as altruistic if the budget cuts and Denmark's good economy was mentioned. In her speech, Frederiksen is speaking into the same sedimented discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) of Denmark being benevolent, which supports the government's attempt at establishing this general social reality of Denmark being a helpful international frontrunner. She states that "*Denmark will take care of you.*"<sup>45</sup> (Appendix C2), when referring to the Ukrainian refugees. It is, however, not only highlighted how Denmark, as the state, will help the Ukrainian refugees. Frederiksen, furthermore, thanks the Danish people for their hospitality and their helpfulness towards the Ukrainian refugees. This gives the indication that this is a characteristic that Frederiksen believes and appreciates that the Danish population possesses.

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<sup>45</sup> Appendix C2 - translated from Danish: "*Danmark passer på jer.*"

Both Mortensen and Frederiksen's speeches hold a sedimented discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002), of it being naturalized that Denmark is responsible for aiding Ukraine, as Denmark, in contradiction to Ukraine, has the surplus energy at the moment. This is exemplified by Mortensen's argument that "*Because Denmark is safer [than Ukraine right now], and the Danes have more and better possibilities*"<sup>46</sup> (Appendix C1) and Frederiksen who says "*The Nazi troops surrendered. Denmark was free once again. [...] Denmark was again a real country. "A free country."*"<sup>47</sup> (Appendix C2) The notion of a real country as one that is not occupied creates the understanding that Ukraine is not fully a real country right now. They need the help to be so once again, and from the speeches by Mortensen and Frederiksen, it must be understood that Denmark will give Ukraine the help they need. To understand how Denmark and Ukraine are part of the same collective identity (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002), there is a need to understand how the Ukrainian collective identity is defined, which is outlined below.

When defining the Ukrainian collective identity (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002), Mortensen describes an independent and brave European nation consisting of a people that take responsibility for their own security and safety. This notion of a brave Ukrainian collective identity (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) is also emphasized by Frederiksen. She presents Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his people as being in pain, but furthers that this pain is what will add to their brave fight. By describing the Ukrainians as brave, it is underlined that the current situation in which they find themselves is not a product of their own doing. Therefore they are brave when they choose to fight against an enemy who is stronger than them, in order to fight for what they believe in - freedom and democracy, which is also presenting the Danish ideology of a good nation (Buzan et al., 1998). Furthermore, Mortensen portrays the Ukrainians as victims of a war which has led to millions of Ukrainians becoming refugees. They have fled a humanitarian catastrophe where many have been killed and even more have been wounded. By describing the direness of the situation which the Ukrainians are fleeing from, he aims to foster sympathy for the Ukrainian refugees. This is a manner of portraying the Ukrainian refugees as deserving of Denmark's aid, warranting part of the Danish ODA to be spent on their reception.

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<sup>46</sup> Appendix C1 - translated from Danish: "*For Danmark er tryggere, og danskernes muligheder flere og bedre, i en demokratisk verden.*"

<sup>47</sup> Appendix C2 - translated from Danish: "*De nazistiske tropper overgav sig. Danmark var efter frit. [...] Danmark var igen et rigtigt land. Et frit land.*"

Mortensen further explains this need for Denmark to offer its aid to Ukraine with the reasoning that we are the near area and neighbors of Ukraine. This is a de-securitization move (Snetkov, 2017), as Mortensen is trying to reformulate the longstanding discourse of refugees as being dangerous to Denmark and its values. This de-securitization move is also backed by Frederiksen who in her speech proclaims that the Ukrainian refugees “*shall know that you are welcome. Denmark will take care of you.*”<sup>48</sup> (Appendix C2). Both Mortensen and Frederiksen indicate that Ukraine is something worthy of protection, due to their identity as victims who are fighting bravely to get back their country and freedom which are rightfully theirs. And they are worthy of protection because they live a life that is like the Danish way of living, where they take their kids to school, go to work, go grocery shopping, go to football matches, and visit their friends. Therefore, it must be understood that the Ukrainian refugees do not pose a threat to the collective We in Denmark (Buzan et al., 1998), as their similar way of living will not force the Danish We to change too fast.

Even though Denmark and Ukraine are described as two separate collective identities, they are also combined in another collective identity: ‘*Europe*’. Mortensen does this in several ways. The most prominent examples are that he is referring to the common European history of the Second World War and when he says “*Nobody must doubt that the Ukrainians brave fight to a large extent is also our fight.*”<sup>49</sup> (Appendix C1). By describing the common denominators of Denmark and Ukraine in a European context Mortensen is trying to create a collective identity of Europe as a unit, who are facing a common threat. The common threat is posed by Russia which is responsible for “*a Europe which is changing dramatically.*”<sup>50</sup> (Appendix C1). Europe as a collective identity must fight Russia to secure, that the European We, which is built on democracy and freedom, does not have to change. Mortensen is producing a social reality where the attack on Ukraine does not only have consequences for Ukraine but that the attack influences the entire European continent. Frederiksen helps sediment this discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) by saying “*Putin thought he could divide Europe. But his brutal conduct has led to the opposite. The bond between us is stronger than ever before.*”<sup>51</sup> (Appendix C2).

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<sup>48</sup> Appendix C2 - translated from Danish: “*skal vide, at I er velkomne. Danmark passer på jer.*”

<sup>49</sup> Appendix C1 - translated from Danish: “*Ingen må være i tvivl om, at ukrainernes modige kamp i høj grad også er vores kamp.*”

<sup>50</sup> Appendix C1 - translated from Danish: “*et Europa, der er under stærk forandring.*”

<sup>51</sup> Appendix C2 - translated from Danish: “*Putin troede, at han kunne splitte Europa. Men hans brutale fremfærd har ført til det modsatte. Båndene mellem os er stærkere end nogensinde før.*”

The creation of the collective identities (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) of '*Denmark*', '*Ukraine*', and '*Europe*' are essential for the securitization moves (Wæver, 1996; Buzan et al., 1998)) employed by Mortensen and Frederiksen to succeed. The Danes need to understand that the attack on Ukraine is also an attack on Europe and Denmark, as this will allow for the Danish government to use extraordinary means in order to keep Denmark safe. Mortensen and Frederiksen create the notion that if extraordinary measures are not used, it can have consequences for Danish freedom and democracy. This is in line with Buzan et al. (1998), that security does not only have to relate to a state, but that it can also be other things such as nations, or in this case a union and continent. As Ukraine is a part of the same continent as Denmark, and a candidate for membership of the EU, the country is, thus, included in both the *We* of the continent, and seems to be treated almost as a member of the EU-*We* as well. This is visible in the immense amount of military equipment and economic aid that the EU countries offer to Ukraine.

### 5.6.3 Intermediate conclusion

In 2022, the Danish political discourses concerning ODA includes a sedimented discourse of Denmark being a charitable and helpful country that is living up to its international responsibilities concerning ODA. Starting out with this discourse of praising Danish reliability, allows Mortensen and Frederiksen to approach the conversation on how Denmark should spend its ODA. Both argue that the security of Denmark and its democratic values needs to be of a higher prioritization when choosing where to spend the Danish ODA. This is because Denmark is facing a new threat, both towards its value system and its physical safety, in Russia. Here, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is presented as an immediate threat to Denmark as well. This is both due to the fact that a win for Russia could allow for the spread of Russian warfare and ideologies, and because the collective identity of Europeans, which Denmark and Ukraine shares, means that an attack on Ukraine is perceived as an attack on us. Because of these two aspects, it is crucial for Denmark that Ukraine wins the war. This is expressed through the nodal point '*war of aggression*', which is marking the unimaginable situation which Europe is facing and that something extraordinary needs to be done. It is emphasized by Mortensen that the security of Denmark is also important for the Danish development work, and he is here making the connection between Danish security and ODA. Accordingly, both Mortensen and Frederiksen employ several securitization moves

throughout their speeches, which reflects the attempt to create a social reality wherein there is also a threat towards Denmark.

### **5.7 Correlation of the analyses**

While there are certain differences in the governmental discourses of each period, they overall touch upon the same subjects. In the following, these general discursive tools will be presented.

Generally, the speeches represent a political framing of it being necessary to re-prioritize and re-distribute Danish ODA to ensure money towards the subject that the government sees as the most important at a given time. This is particularly evident both during the onset of the War on Terror and the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, where the respective politicians use this framing to explain why less money will be given to traditional ODA goals of poverty reduction in developing countries. While the specific subject that the ODA has then been prioritized to go to is different in the two instances, the reasoning for the prioritization shares the common notion of being for the protection of Denmark. While Løkke Rasmussen in 2015 does not use the same kind of framing, he also argues for ODA being used as a means of protecting Denmark. Overall, there are two different kinds of security discussed in the speeches: Ideological security and physical security.

Fogh Rasmussen (Appendix A2; A3) argues that a prominent aim of Denmark's continued ODA to the African continent is to ensure that the people living in poverty there will not become refugees in Denmark. This wish to keep these people out of Denmark, is due to them posing a perceived threat to Danish society due to the hardship of integrating them. Here, he argues that refugees in Denmark have a hard time conforming to the values that he deems Danish, namely contributing to the Danish welfare state through working. This notion is repeated by Løkke Rasmussen (Appendix B1) during the European Refugee Crisis. He emphasizes how foreigners who are not working or studying are a burden to Danish society and a threat to its functioning of it. Thus, refugees in both these periods are presented as posing a threat to Danish ideologies and ideas of how to run a society. This reflects how discourse concerning refugees is relatively stable here. This notion is also expressed when Fogh Rasmussen (Appendix A4) and Løkke Rasmussen (Appendix B1) use the exact same words to describe that integration of these people is failing. These are all clear signs of the

government utilizing securitization moves to deter these refugees. Accordingly, their entire collective identity, the Them, is presented as a threat to the Danish understanding of the countries and its citizen's collective identity, the Us. The Danish collective identity is, by Løkke Rasmussen, connotated with collective responsibility and prosperity. He even announces it as one of the best countries, and thus people, in the world. The presentation creates a notion of a Danish collective identity that is worth preserving as it is. Thus, these securitization moves are employed to ensure that no foreigners will change this We.

However, this view on refugees is rather different during the arrival of Ukrainian refugees in Denmark due to the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. Here, the refugees are not perceived as a threat to Denmark. Rather, the thing that is threatening Ukraine is also presented as threatening Denmark. There is no discourse about using ODA to keep refugees out of Denmark as during the War on Terror and the European Refugee Crisis. Instead, both Mortensen (Appendix C1) and Frederiksen (Appendix C2) argue for the importance of using a part of the Danish ODA on welcoming these refugees into Denmark. During the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, there is a massive focus on the Danish responsibility and willingness to welcome the Ukrainian refugees. Mortensen and Frederiksen emphasizing this need to welcome Ukrainian refugees are de-securitization moves that attempt to reframe the sedimented discourse visible in the other periods of refugees as a danger to Danish identity. These moves are employed due to the collective identity of Ukrainians being perceived as closer to the Danish identity than to the collective identity of the previous refugees. This is because the refugees arriving during the Russian invasion are Europeans rather than from Africa or the Middle East. This can be seen in both Mortensen's and Frederiksen's explanation that it is Denmark's responsibility to aid them because they live in our near area and they, before becoming refugees, had lives similar to a Danish every day. Accordingly, they do not pose a threat to what it means to belong to the Danish collective identity or challenge Danish ideologies. Ukrainians and Danes are, furthermore, described as belonging together within another collective identity: Europeans. This emphasizes the similarity between the two groups, and how they are not a threat to Danish identity.

Rather, during the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, what is perceived as a threat to Denmark, is the same thing that is threatening Ukraine: Russia. Here, the threat is twofold. Firstly, Russia poses a threat to Danish ideologies. Not in the same way that refugees during the War on Terror and the European Refugee Crisis are presented to do, but in a more

large-scale manner. Mortensen emphasizes how the war with Russia reaches beyond the borders of Ukraine. It is also fought through Russia and the West aiding different actors on the African continent, and is perceived as a battle of the spread of ideologies in these countries. Here, the Western, and Danish, ideology of democracy is opposed to what Mortensen denotes as the Russian autocracy. This reference to a battle of ideologies fought on the African continent, leads the thoughts to the proxy wars, performed in similar fashion, during the Cold War. Accordingly, Mortensen creates a social reality where Danish ODA is an important tool in fighting this spread of a perceived wrong ideology in other countries. Despite it being towards different entities, this presentation on a threat to Danish ideologies is a securitization move in line with the securitization moves employed to keep out refugees during the previous refugee influxes.

However, the threat from Russia is not only ideological, and it is not only happening in Africa. It is also a matter of the physical safety of Denmark and Europe, and Mortensen employs additional securitization moves when he attempts to frame the physical threat to Ukraine as a similarly physical threat to Denmark. For this securitization move, the creation of the collective identity of Europeans is an important tool. Danes must accept the social reality that an attack on Ukraine is also an attack on Denmark, in order to also accept that the Danish government employs extraordinary security measures. Both Mortensen and Frederiksen argue that it can have stark consequences for Danish safety and freedom if the Russians are allowed to further their attack. Accordingly, Mortensen argues for an increase in the Danish military budget. The discourse employed by Mortensen here shares several tendencies with the discourse employed by both Møller (Appendix A1) and Fogh during the onset of the War on Terror. In both of these periods, the government is taking on a rather expressive security discourse. During the onset of the War on Terror, the Danish government presented Arabic terrorism as a threat to both Denmark and Europe. This terrorism was argued to be founded in religious beliefs and was perceived as a threat to Danish ideologies of e.g. democracy and human rights. This is the same threat that Mortensen argues that the Russian, perceived autocratic, government presently poses to Denmark. Thus, both of the Danish governments utilize securitization moves by arguing for ideological threats to Denmark's values. These ideologies are presented as existential threats to the Danish collective identity, and both Møller and Fogh Rasmussen take on a discourse of focusing on the future threats to the Danish people that the enemy poses. Here, Fogh Rasmussen is particularly concrete in verbalizing a threat of terror attacks in Denmark. While Mortensen is

also emphasizing the physical threat to Denmark that Russia poses, he is much less direct in explaining what kind of attack Denmark can expect. However, in both periods, the government takes on the discourse that there is a threat happening in a foreign place, whether it be the US or Ukraine, that will spread to Denmark if Denmark does not use its ODA to stop it. While Løkke Rasmussen also mentions the fight against terror and assumes a security discourse in emphasizing the importance of fighting it, his main focus is the threat to the Danish values from receiving too many refugees in Denmark. Likewise, the speeches during the onset of the War on Terror and the recent Russian invasion hold a focus on the aggressor of this threat and their international reach. However, this is only seen in a very limited manner during the European Refugee Crisis. Here, even the name of the crisis, as denominated by the media and the UN, implies that contrary to our other periods, the perceived crisis is not what drives people to flee, but the fact that they are arriving in Our country. This can e.g. be seen in the lack of mentioning e.g. the Syrian Civil War, despite this being a prominent reason for many of these refugees becoming displaced. This implies that Løkke Rasmussen does not see this war as a threat to Denmark. So, generally, this period sees less focus on physical safety compared to the other two periods.

The discourses from all of our chosen periods include two overarching examples of sedimented discourses (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Firstly, it is presented as naturalized that refugees should be helped in the near areas of their home countries. And secondly, all politicians treat it as an objective fact, that Denmark is a benevolent donor country that lives up to its international responsibilities in relation to its ODA. Furthermore, all speeches contain securitization moves. It is possible to see a development in how this is employed in the political discourses, as each period seems to have its own particular subject to protect itself from. During the onset of the War on Terror, while refugees are presented as a potential threat to Danish values, the securitization movement has a more expressive focus on protecting Denmark from the physical threats of terror. These two factors change place in the hierarchy during the European Refugee Crisis. Here, the political discourse is primarily concerned with securing the Danish collective identity by preventing too many refugees from coming to Denmark, while mentioning the threat of terror as a minor detail. Lastly, the political discourse during the Russian invasion of Ukraine is completely void of the perceived threat of refugees. Rather, it focuses on the physical and ideological aspects of securitization. This is expressed through the perceived need to both secure Danish values such as freedom

and democracy in the world in general and to focus on aiding Ukraine in winning the war, as Russia is also posing a threat to Denmark.

## **Chapter 6: Reflection**

In this section, we will briefly present some of the theoretical and methodological reflections we have made after conducting our analysis. We will describe the alternative methods we could have utilized. We will also discuss the strengths of our theoretical and methodological choices and how they could have been further enhanced.

### **6.1 Interpretive Policy Analysis**

The analysis might have benefitted from following the method of interpretive policy analysis (IPA). Like Laulau and Mouffe's (1985) discourse theory and method, IPA enhances language as the key to understanding the social world (Yanow, 2011). However, it differs from Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) discourse analysis in including not only the disseminator but also the audience.

Thus, performing an IPA would have allowed for the inclusion of perspectives from the audiences of our speeches. This could e.g., be opposition parties, civil society, or political voters. Yanow (2011) describes an interpretative approach to a policy analysis as focusing "*on the meanings of policies, on the values, feelings, or beliefs they express, and on the processes by which those meanings are communicated to and “read” by various audiences.*" (Yanow, 2011: p.11) When conducting an IPA, the researcher must identify the different discourses on a political subject, and then detect whether these discourses are conflicting. By detecting how the discourses are conflicting, it is also possible to make new suggestions to discourses and e.g., law proposals, and in that way come closer to an agreement that is more in line with both politicians' and audiences' points of view. By including the different perspectives, and not just the perspectives of the politicians, the IPA seeks to emphasize the meaningfulness of human action and how these actions affect policymaking (Yanow, 2011).

However, the decision to not include this method was based on, that our interest and field of investigation is about how Danish politicians create a discourse of how the Danish ODA is spent. The need to understand det audiences' perception and understanding of the Danish politicians' discourses are therefore not relevant to our thesis. Rather, we are investigating the discourses employed by the Danish politicians as these, at the end of the day, have the final say in how the ODA is distributed. Here, it makes more sense to only include the discourse analysis by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) whose method gives us some great tools to unfold a

discourse and its meaning. By combining the discourse analysis with our contextual section, we do also get an understanding of under which circumstances the discourses are created.

## **6.2 Critical Discourse Analysis**

When we decided to investigate relevant Danish politicians' discourses on Danish ODA, we had to decide whether we wanted to make use of Fairclough's (2010) critical discourse analysis (CDA) or Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) discourse analysis. Fairclough's (2010) method could have been good to use, as there is a great focus on investigating how discourses change over time. With this method, the researcher detects former discourses to investigate an already established meaning on a given subject. Fairclough (2010) believes that it is possible to change the social and cultural world by combining elements from different discourses and thereby create a new and concrete language use and discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). The understanding of former discourses is, however, also given through Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) notion of sedimented discourses.

The decision to go with Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) discourse analysis was based on their perception of how the social world is constructed. Fairclough (2010) believes that discourses are just one of the things which are making up the social world and insists that there are other aspects that contribute to the creation of the social world. Whereas Laclau and Mouffe (1985) think of language and discourses as the creator of the social world. To them, meaning can never be permanently fixed. Instead, discourses are in a constant struggle to try to fix their own meaning and achieve hegemony (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). We believe that Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) approach to discourses as constituting for social phenomena fits our thesis well. It has been especially helpful in understanding how different identities are created. These identities have been crucial in the insight of how security has been applied in the different speeches. We think that it has worked well to employ both of the theories from Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and the theory of securitization as they have the same constructionist approach, where language is at the center of the construction of the social world. Where Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) approach has given us some great analytical tools to detect patterns in the discourses, the theory of securitization has allowed us to get a deeper and better understanding of how security is portrayed in the analyzed speeches.

## **Chapter 7: Conclusion**

The aim of this thesis has been to uncover the discursive tools that relevant Danish politicians employ, when they discuss the prioritization of Danish ODA in periods of significant refugee influx in Denmark. In order to investigate this, we have performed discourse analyses of political speeches concerning Danish ODA given during the three largest refugee influxes in Denmark within this century. While the different periods, naturally, concern certain different events, there are two prominent discursive tools that are employed during each period: The question of collective identities and their belongingness, and the question of the security of the Danish state.

Our analyses reveal a discursive tendency to argue for the interconnectedness of development and security, explaining the perceived relevance of discussing security threats in speeches concerning ODA and vice versa. This fact seems relatively stable in the discursive struggle of ODA. Generally, the speeches also reflect the framing of a re-prioritization of ODA, rather than a cut from other projects, when describing the need to spend the money on refugee reception and ensuring security. This framing, combined with a repeated emphasis on Denmark being one of the countries donating the highest amount of ODA compared to its size, diverts the attention away from ODA being spent less on traditional ODA goals of poverty reduction and on the fact the Danish ODA has dramatically decreased since the turn of the century.

While the speeches given during the onset of the War on Terror and during the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine have a large focus on the aggressor of these crises, the speech given during the European Refugee Crisis does not pay this much attention and only briefly mentions e.g. the Syrian Civil War which caused the displacement of a lot of the people reaching Europe during the European Refugee Crisis. This reflects how the crisis itself is not seen as a threat to Denmark. Instead, it is the substantial surge of refugees it created that is deemed problematic. Generally, the speeches during the European Refugee Crisis are characterized by less focus on physical safety compared to the preceding and succeeding periods. This is evident through the increased employment of securitization discourses, which prioritize physical safety during the onset of the War on Terror and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Here, the discourse is particularly aimed at presenting the threats happening overseas as threats to Danish society if they are not stopped. Particularly during the War on

Terror, it is expressed that this will happen through the Danish ODA, yet without an explanation of why these exact funds must go to it or how they play a part in stopping the threat. During the War on Terror and the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, there is also a focus on ideological safety which is another feature of securitization. During the War on Terror, there is a focus on religious violence, while the speeches from the recent Russian invasion focus on the danger of the Russian state system. Thus, both periods have a focus on protecting Danish ideologies and values, also as they are presented in the global system because a threat to this belief system is perceived as an existential threat to Danish identity and world understanding itself. In addition to this, we see an enhanced focus on the protection of Danish values and ideologies within Denmark during the period of the European Refugee Crisis. The same kind of ideological securitization, aimed against the refugees coming to Denmark, is also visible during the onset of the War on Terror. During both these crises, non-European refugees arrive in Denmark, and they are not perceived as a part of the Danish, or extended to European, collective identity. Rather, their entire collective identity is presented as a threat to the Danish identity due to a perceived incompatibility. It is argued that these refugees are too hard to integrate and have no wish to contribute to a society founded on Danish values. Thus, refugees in both these periods are presented as posing a threat to Danish ideologies and ideas of how to run a society, underlining the government's employment of securitization moves to deter these refugees. Conversely, Ukrainian refugees are presented as belonging to Denmark and being a part of the collective identity of Europeans together with Danish people. This is a de-securitization move of the previously established social reality and sedimented discourse, where refugees are presented as threats. Thus, the discourse concerning refugees could be understood as relatively stable until fairly recently, when the Danish government takes a new stance in this discursive struggle by framing these exact refugees as safe rather than a threat. This proves that the perceived collective identity of the incoming refugees has a major impact on how they are discursively presented. It is commonplace to spend ODA on receiving refugees, which the respective analyses also reveal. However, the different discourses concerning the different refugees-groups reveal a hierarchy, where some are worth aiding through ODA because they are in danger, and others are aided through the ODA, in order to keep them from becoming a danger to Denmark.

As shown in our literature review, currently little literature exists concerning how political discourses on Danish ODA frame its use. Thus, this thesis adds a discursive layer to the

ongoing debate on whether Danish ODA primarily prioritizes the same goals of poverty reduction as it did in the previous century. Through the analysis, it is confirmed that while poverty reduction is still a theme for discourses on ODA, it to some extent, particularly in the speeches given concerning the Russian invasion of Ukraine, is pushed aside for other subjects. Rather, we conclude that speeches concerning ODA in this century have a much larger focus on Danish security. This is rather interesting to note when considering that the official ODA regulations do not allow spending ODA on missions promoting personal security interests. An investigation into whether the Danish ODA is indeed being used on these matters could, therefore, be highly relevant and interesting, as is it in the Danish discursive spirit to promote the view of Denmark as a benevolent donator of ODA and a morally good country.

## **Chapter 8: Perspectivation**

As shown in the paper, ODA regulations state that it is not allowed to use the funds for ensuring one's own safety interests. However, as emphasized throughout this thesis, Danish ODA, and discourses regarding it cannot be understood separately from the global context in which it is given. Here, it might be argued that safety and threats cannot be defined in the same manner as it was when the agreement on ODA was originally written. Since the end of the Second World War, most armed conflicts have taken the shape of civil wars rather than wars between several different nations (Burcharth, 2017). Apart from causing massive civil casualties, these crises are a major factor in the fact that currently and throughout this century, more people have been displaced than in any other period since the Second World War. E.g., in 2022, more than 100 million people globally were either refugees, displaced, or internally displaced. The record high number is caused by long-running conflicts in countries like Syria and Venezuela, the war in Ukraine, and climate changes, which have e.g., cause the worst drought ever in the horn of Africa (UNHCR, 2022; Dansk Flygtningehjælp, n.d.; Top & Christiansen, 2023).

The above-mentioned factors represent a kind of threat that was not present when Denmark first started giving ODA. Because of this, discourses and perceptions concerning what a threat is has also changed and might no longer reflect the situation that the ODA regulations were built upon. While the ODA regulations highly concern physical safety and military intervention within foreign countries, our analyses display how contemporary uses of ODA for security measures are much more aimed at the protection of Danish ideologies and ways of living. This is done by spending ODA on receiving refugees in Denmark and by strengthening developing countries to a degree where their citizens do not see a need to flee. Here, security is no longer about the safety and stability of the entire global society as was the focus after the Second World War. Rather, as shown in our analysis, there is a discursive trend toward framing the need for protecting one's own country's identity. Thus, it might be discussed whether this use of ODA is against the original framing of the ODA regulations.

The relative stability in the global system since the Cold War seems to have led to a confidence in the peace of the system and perhaps even a feeling that the protection of the international Unions that were created after the Second World War is losing their relevance. This can e.g. be seen in Great Britain's choice to retract from the EU in 2016 because they

felt that the Union made more demands than what it offered of goods. This was partly a reaction to the European Refugee Crisis, where one in three voters claimed that the most important reason for leaving the EU was to reclaim control over immigration to the country (Ashcroft, 2016). As the EU was founded to prevent war in Europe after the Second World War (Gabel, 2023), leaving the union could be understood as Great Britain no longer perceiving this as a necessary cause. The British voters' perceptions are also echoed in Løkke Rasmussen's speech from 2015, where he emphasizes that the EU is not to dictate the number of refugees that Denmark takes in.

However, it could seem that the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marks the beginning of a shift away from these tendencies. Since the invasion both Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova have applied for membership in the EU (Thomsen, 2022) while Sweden and Finland applied for membership in NATO (Udenrigsministeriet, 2022 A). Likewise, our analysis shows how the speeches from 2022 have an increased focus on the EU as a collective unity. This signifies how the Russian invasion has sparked this perceived necessity of standing together with other nations to ensure the safety and security of one's nation. In Denmark, this can e.g. be seen in the Danish population's choices when voting about the country's opt-out from the EU: In 2015, the Danish people voted to keep the country's Justice and Home Affairs opt-out status (Marsden, 2015) and thereby chose not to work closer together with the EU. In 2022, however, the Danish public decided that they wanted to get rid of the defense opt-out, and are moving, thus, closer to collaborating with the EU (Mørk, 2022). This tendency of wanting a stronger EU and NATO can also be seen as a reaction to Russia's increasing influence in Africa. In several countries in Africa, Russia and the Russian paramilitary organization, the Wagner Group, present an alternative to the Western countries, who have previously dominated development projects and peacekeeping missions on the African continent. The West is losing important alliances to Russia, which makes it more difficult for the West to work in Africa, and this can potentially influence the world order as it is known today (Larsen & Jacobsen, 2023). Likewise, China has expanded its influence on the African continent within the last two decades. China has done this by helping with new infrastructure, and by also giving aid that comes with no strings attached, which is a contrast to aid from the Western countries, where aid often comes with demands of anti-corruption, human rights, and equality (Soljhell, 2022). The West can, therefore, no longer assume that its measures have priority in developing countries. This is whilst the Russian attack on Ukraine has dramatically changed the world's, and especially the West's, security policy which is also reflected in

Mortensen's (Appendix C1) focus on military security (Den sikkerhedspolitiske analysegruppe, 2022). This is enhanced when Mortensen emphasizes that geopolitics are back in focus, and, accordingly, brings back discourses reminiscent of the Cold War era e.g. by enhancing Europe, and the West through our common ideologies, as one collected unity. Now that there again are talks about geopolitics, also in relation to the use of ODA, it will be interesting to follow how the future discourses concerning, and uses of, ODA will reflect this. Will the new geopolitical order influence the discourses and the use of ODA? Will the main objective of ODA still be poverty reduction and development, or will it be more important for the donor countries to build alliances in the developing countries in order to prevent Russia and China from becoming more influential in these countries?

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## **Appendix A**

### **A1: Per Stig Møllers tale ved møde i Rådet for internationalt udviklingssamarbejde 2003**

Velkommen til rådsmøde. Før jeg kommer ind på dagens emne – regeringens bud på de kommende års udviklingspolitiske prioriteter – vil jeg gerne sige Rådet en stor tak for det bidrag, der allerede er ydet til debatten. Jeg tænker især på sidste rådskonference i maj, hvor Globale Offentlige Goder var på dagsordenen, og hvor Rådet udviste imponerende appetit på også at kaste sig i lag med nye emner. Jeg håber, at der også i dag kan tænkes nyt og stort, så der fortsat kan bidrages til dansk bistand af høj kvalitet.

I dag skal det handle om de bud på nye prioriteter i udviklingsbistanden for de kommende år, som jeg i juni præsenterede med ”En verden til forskel”.

Vores indsats for Afrika er blevet kommenteret flittigt de seneste dage. Det er blevet sagt, at omprioriteringerne i udviklingsbistanden er sket på bekostning af kampen mod aids og fattigdom.

Jeg vil gerne tage fat i disse to spørgsmål i dag: fattigdomsorienteringen og omprioriteringen af bistanden. Lad mig starte med fakta.

Det er korrekt, at bistandsniveauet til Afrika er faldet lidt målt i absolutte tal. Det er sket, fordi regeringen i 2002 reducerede den samlede bistand med 1,5 mia. kr. Det lovede vi at gøre i regeringsprogrammet, og det løfte blev holdt. På trods af at det samtidig blev besluttet at udfase bistanden til Eritrea, Malawi og Zimbabwe, holdt regeringen fast i det mangeårige princip om, at cirka 60 pct. af den bilaterale bistand skal gå til Afrika. Det er tilfældet i det forslag til finanslov, som regeringen lagde frem i august måned og vil også være det i de kommende år. Der er altså ikke nogen omfordeling væk fra Afrika.

Fattigdomsorienteringen står derfor fortsat som det helt centrale hensyn i udviklingspolitikken. Samtidig er der nye udfordringer. Terror i både rige og fattige lande har mindet os om, at en ny udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitisk situation har indfundet sig. Det må også udviklingssamarbejdet tage bestik af. Derfor har vi omprioriteret bistanden. Nøgleordene er fokus og effektivitet.

Øget fokus i bistanden indebærer en koncentration af den danske indsats i et mindre antal programsamarbejdslande og sektorprogrammer. Kun sådan opnår vi størst mulig gennemslagskraft. Sigtet er, at få så meget fattigdoms-bekämpelse som muligt for pengene. Derfor koncentrerer vi os nu om eksisterende aktiviteter og lader spørgsmålet om landevalg ligge for en tid.

Regeringen har nøje overvejet, hvordan bistanden kan bruges bedre. Og der er sket meget. Det ville derfor være godt, hvis det også fik en plads i debatten.

Udviklingsbistanden skal medvirke til at bekæmpe grundlaget for radikalisering og ekstremisme. Konfliktforebyggelse og konsolidering af fred er højt på dagsordenen både bilateralt og multilateralt. Og sandt at sige er stadige konflikter og krige direkte til skade for udviklingen af de fattige lande og forbedringen af de fattiges levevilkår. Se blot på Afrika i den forbindelse! I den sammenhæng er ikke mindst FN's rolle afgørende, både under og efter konflikter. Samarbejdet om Afghanistan og udviklingsindsatsen i de palæstinensiske selvstyreområder er gode eksempler. Begge steder er nøden stor pga. konflikterne. Disse indsatser understøtter samtidig Danmarks kandidatur til FN's Sikkerhedsråd i 2005-06 og indgår dermed i vores samlede udenrigspolitik.

Regeringen har afsat 100 mio. kr. årligt til den danske indsats i den arabiske verden. Initiativet indebærer en styrket dialog med de enkelte lande i regionen. Denne dialog går fra sikkerhed over god regeringsførelse, pluralisme og informationsadgang til økonomisk udvikling og kulturelt samarbejde. Gennem projekter, der relaterer sig hertil, vil der blive arbejdet målrettet på at sikre en bedre gensidig forståelse. Også her er det vigtigt at se udviklingspolitikken som en integreret del af udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitikken.

Når det gælder bekämpelse af terrorisme, tror jeg, der er behov for lidt opklaring. Sidste måned holdt vi en konference om udviklingsbistandens rolle i bekämpelse af terrorisme. Debatten viste, at der ikke findes nemme svar, men at bistanden kan indgå som et af instrumenterne i bekämpelsen af terrorismens grundlæggende årsager. Der skal vi fra dansk side være parat til at gå de nødvendige nye veje.

Desværre druknede budskabet lidt, fordi kluge hoveder mente at belære os om, at bistanden

ikke kan bruges på kort sigt. Det har jeg nu selv sagt mange gange. Men terrorismen er desværre inde i en meget dynamisk og farlig udvikling. Og i det 10-15 årlige perspektiv, som udenrigspolitikken altid skal inddrage, kan bistanden spille en afgørende rolle for det fremtidige trusselsbilledet.

Derfor styrkes menneskerettigheder, demokrati og god regeringsførelse som indsatsområde. Effektiv udryddelse af fattigdom kræver, at landene selv fører en ansvarlig politik. Et centralt element i denne indsats er den nye handlingsplan til bekæmpelse af korruption, der blev præsenteret i sommer.

På det multilaterale område nedprioriteres samarbejdet med organisationer og programmer, der ikke har tilstrækkelig gennemslagskraft på landeniveau. Til gengæld afsættes ekstra midler til arbejdet med sundhed og befolkningspolitik. Særlig prioritet giver vi til organisationer med hiv/aids højt på dagsordenen. Omproriteringen indebærer derfor ikke færre, men flere midler til hiv/aids.

Den bilaterale bistand fokuseres yderligere ved at styrke samarbejdet med de samarbejdslande, der har vist vilje til at tage ansvaret for egen udvikling. Det vil kunne bringe nye penge i spil. Over de næste fem år iværksættes ni nye sektorprogrammer indenfor sundhed (herunder hiv/aids), vand og sanitet samt uddannelse.

Iværksættelsen af disse nye sektorprogrammer er konkret udtryk for, at regeringen er parat til at sætte handling bag ordene om at opfylde 2015-målene, der netop vedrører de områder, der nu satses på med de nye sektorprogrammer. Også derfor er jeg glad for, at Rådet har valgt i dag at fokusere på 2015-målene.

Stærkere involvering af den private sektor er et vigtigt mål for regeringen. Idéen er at fremme en erhvervsudvikling, der sætter partnerlandene i stand til selv at finansiere mere fattigdomsbekæmpelse fremover. Som noget nyt i forlængelse af Johannesburg afsættes 100 mio. kr. til fremme af offentligt-private partnerskaber, der kombinerer statsligt og privat initiativ i udviklingslandene. Samtidig har regeringen klart forpligtet sig til at sikre, at dansk bistand fremover tilpasses de fattige landes fattigdomsstrategier. Etableringen af ”World Diabetes Fund” i samarbejde med Novo Nordisk viser en af de lovende veje frem på dette område.

Øget effektivitet i udviklingssamarbejdet skal sikre, at vi får mere bistand for pengene. Her har regeringen gennemført en decentralisering af administrationen af bistanden til programsamarbejdslandene fra 1. september i år, så det daglige samarbejde med partnerlandene sker ude i landene – direkte med vore partnere. Det sikrer, at vi kan gennemføre bistanden med den nødvendige fleksibilitet og i højere grad basere os på partnerens nationale strategi. Donorkoordination og EU-udbud af bistandsleverancer fra 2004 peger i samme retning. Mål- og resultatstyring af bistanden forstærkes, så det sikres, at bistanden er relevant, tidssvarende og effektiv. Gevinsterne kan i stedet anvendes til andre, prioriterede indsatser.

Tidligere fik Rådet udleveret den rullende femårsplan inden offentliggørelsen. Det sker ikke længere. Til gengæld har vi debatten i dag på et tidspunkt, hvor der endnu er lejlighed til at sætte præg på finansloven.

Udviklingspolitikken må hele tiden forholde sig til en Verden i forandring. Omrioriteringen sker ikke på bekostning af, men er tværtimod til fordel for fattigdomsorienteringen af dansk bistand. Det er mit håb, at en bred dialog – baseret på fakta – om, hvordan vi bedst indretter bistanden kan fortsætte.

En langsigtet, effektiv og fleksibel indsats fra dansk side kan gøre en forskel. En verden til forskel. Jeg ser for min del frem til et fortsat tæt samarbejde med Rådet herom. Tak.

URL til artiklen:

<https://dansketaler.dk/tale/tale-ved-moede-i-raadet-for-internationalt-udviklingssamarbejde/>

## **A2: Anders Fogh Rasmussens første tale ved Venstres landsmøde 2001**

Efter Berlinmurens fald håbede vi alle, at verden nu ville blive fredeligere at leve i. Den kommunistiske trussel var væk. Men den 11. september 2001 vågnede vi op til en ny og frygtelig fjende, den internationale terrorisme.

Vi står over for en ny og krævende udfordring. Vi skal tænke i nye baner for at beskytte os selv mod terrorister og slyngelstater. Når selvmordspiloter kan forårsage så megen død og ødelæggelse ved at kapre passagerfly, hvad kan der så ikke ske, hvis de en dag sender missiler mod store bycentre? Hvad kan der ikke ske, hvis de anvender biologiske eller kemiske våben mod vore lande?

Der er brug for at udvikle et forsvar mod terrorister og slyngelstater, hvad enten de bruger flykapringer, missiler eller biologiske og kemiske våben. Og det er nødvendigt, at så mange af verdens demokratiske lande som muligt arbejder sammen om dette forsvar.

Kampen mod terrorismen bliver langvarig og ressourcekrævende. I kraft af sin enorme styrke vil USA skulle trække det store læs. Men det er vigtigt, at USA ikke står alene.

Vi kan hjælpe amerikanerne på flere måder. Men én af vejene til at aflaste USA er, at vi europæere i højere grad selv bliver i stand til at klare regionale konflikter som dem på Balkan. Når amerikanerne har hænderne fyldt med bekæmpelsen af terror, er det forståeligt, hvis de en dag kommer og siger: Nu må EU overtage opgaven med at sikre freden på Balkan.

Derfor er det er nødvendigt, at vi sætter fuld fart på at opbygge den fælles europæiske forsvarsopolitik. Det er på høje tid, at der bliver opstillet et europæisk udrykningshold, som kan klare at skabe fred og sikre fred i Europa. Selvfølgelig i samarbejde og forståelse med amerikanerne. Men her er et område, hvor vi helt kontant kan aflaste USA, så amerikanerne kan koncentrere flere kræfter om den nye terror-fjende.

Efter alt at dømme er der brug for udenlandske tropper i Bosnien, Kosovo og Makedonien i lang tid fremover. Derfor må vi forudse, at opgaven en dag overgår til at være en EU-ledet

operation.

Hvis det sker, kan Danmark ikke længere deltage. Det kan vi ikke på grund af den danske undtagelse fra EU's forsvarssamarbejde. Det vil altså sige, at Danmark er afskåret fra at deltage i en fredsbevarende mission – alene fordi ledelsen af den flytter fra NATO til EU.

Danmark må altså stå uden for fællesskabet om at bevare freden på Balkan. Og det vil i den grad være skadeligt for Danmarks anseelse og indflydelse. Danmarks aktive militære engagement på Balkan har i de senere år givet os en international position og indflydelse, som langt overstiger vor størrelse. Hvis vi må melde os ud af fællesskabet på grund af undtagelsen, vil vi miste indflydelse – også i NATO.

Derfor må Danmark af med sin undtagelse. Danmark bør være fuldt og helt med i EU's forsvarssamarbejde. Det har Venstre ment hele tiden.

Jeg siger det ikke, fordi forsvars-undtagelsen forhindrer os i at være med i samarbejdet om bekämpelse af terrorisme. For det gør den ikke.

Men i de kommende år må vi hjælpe med at aflaste amerikanerne, hvor vi kan. Og én af vejene er at opbygge et militært udrykningshold i EU. Og det bør Danmark selvfølgelig være med i. Derfor skal forsvars-undtagelsen væk. Ligesom de andre undtagelser, i øvrigt.

I dag vil jeg ikke give mig ind i en diskussion om, hvornår vi så skal holde en folkeafstemning om at fjerne ét eller flere af forbeholdene. Hvis jeg gjorde det, ville jeg straks blive beskyldt for at udnytte den forfærdelige terroraktion i den hjemlige EU-politik. Jeg ønsker ikke at give EU-modstanderne så let spil.

Lad os hellere diskutere indholdet. Kan det virkelig være rigtigt, at Danmark skal være afskåret fra at deltage i fredsbevarende militære actioner, blot fordi det er EU, som leder dem? Kan det virkelig være rigtigt, at Danmark skal sætte sig uden for fællesskabet om at klare fredsopgaver i Europa?

Nej. Venstre siger: Danmark skal være fuldt og helt med.

Jeg har lagt mærke til, at vores politiske modstandere nu bruger terror-tragedien til at overfalde Venstre, fordi vi har foreslået en beskeden besparelse på u-landsbistanden. Helt præcist har vi foreslået at fryse bistanden fast på 1999-niveau i en periode. Det giver en besparelse, som vi vil bruge til at fjerne ventelister på sygehusene.

Selv med denne besparelse vil Danmark fortsat være det land i verden, der giver den største bistand pr. indbygger.

Vi ønsker en kritisk gennemgang af u-landsbistanden for at sikre større effektivitet. Og vi ønsker at fjerne bistanden fra regimer, der udøver terror og undertrykkelse. Til gengæld vil vi øge bistanden til fattige lande, der prøver at udvikle demokrati og markedsøkonomi.

Nu bliver vi så nærmest beskyldt for at give næring til terrorisme, fordi vi vil spare på u-landsbistanden. Det er naturligvis rent vrøvl. U-landsbistand kan ikke forhindre terrorisme. Ville det give mindre terrorisme at give u-landspenge til Taliban-styret i Afghanistan? Eller til Saddam Hussein i Irak? Eller Mugabe i Zimbabwe?

Nej, selvfølgelig ikke. Det er helt andre mekanismer, der skal til.

Naturligvis skal vi forebygge ekstremisme i verden ved at sikre en bedre økonomisk og social udvikling i Den Tredje Verden. Det sker ikke ved u-landshjælp, men ved at give de fattige lande fri adgang til verdensmarkedet.

I øvrigt er det forkert at sætte lighedstegn mellem terrorisme og fattigdom. Så enkelt er det ikke. De arabiske lande har nogle af verdens største olieindtægter. Alligevel er det i høj grad her, at fanatisme og religiøs fundamentalisme trives.

Fundamentalisterne efterlyser ikke flere penge eller flere af Vestens goder. Tværtimod så

hader de Vesten, fordi de mener, at rigdom og velstand og den vestlige levevis gør skade på menneskets sjæl.

Og hvis det var så enkelt, at penge kunne forhindre fundamentalisme, så kunne de arabiske herskere lade oliepengene komme den brede befolkning til gode.

De 19 terrorister på flyene var hverken fattige eller forhastede stakler, men derimod højt uddannede middelklasse-borgere.

bin Laden er heller ikke ligefrem fattig.

I Tyskland var der terrorister i halvfjerdsene – ikke på grund af fattigdom, men på grund af politisk fanatisme. I Nordirland er der terrorister – ikke på grund af fattigdom, men på grund af religiøs fanatisme.

Det er alt for overfladisk at sætte lighedstegn mellem fattigdom og terrorisme.

Og man er blåøjet, hvis man tror, at mere u-landsbistand giver færre terrorister.

Det er helt andre effektive redskaber, der er brug for.

Naturligvis skal Danmark som ét af verdens rigeste lande give en ordentlig u-landsbistand.

Det ønsker Venstre også.

Men det rækker ikke til at skabe en selvbærende vækst og velstand i udviklingslandene. Der skal meget mere grundlæggende forandringer til.

Verden står over for nye og krævende udfordringer i det nye århundrede.

Alt for mange mennesker sulter. Omkring en femtedel af verdens befolkning får ikke mad nok.

Alt for mange mennesker lever i fattigdom. I dag lever omkring halvdelen af verdens befolkning for mindre end 2 dollars om dagen.

Alt for mange mennesker er ramt af dødelige sygdomme og epidemier. Hundreder af millioner rammes hvert år af malaria. Millioner dør af AIDS. I en række u-lande er de dødelige sygdomme ved at true vækst og udvikling.

Vi skal have skaffet mad til de sultende. Vi skal forbedre levevilkårene for klodens fattigste.  
Vi skal bekæmpe sygdomme og epidemier.

Vejen til bedre vilkår for de fattigste er vækst og velstand i u-landene. Vækst og velstand, som vi skal forene med en bedre beskyttelse af miljøet.

Det er en gigantisk udfordring. Men vi kan løse den. Udgangspunktet er stærkt nok. Kloden råder over så store ressourcer, at der er rigeligt til alle. Sult og fattigdom skyldes menneskets dårskab. Problemerne er skabt af mennesker. Problemerne kan og skal også løses af mennesker.

Men det kræver en ny tankegang. Det kræver et markant opgør med de kræfter og systemer, som undertrykker menneskers frihed. Og det kræver et opgør med de mørkemænd, som prædiker dommedagsprofetier om verdens undergang. Vi løser ikke fremtidens udfordringer med bekymringer og sortsyn. Vi løser kun fremtidens udfordringer med lyssyn, optimisme og handling.

Der er lysende eksempler på, at det betaler sig at vælge den rigtige vej.

For 40 år siden var det asiatiske land, Sydkorea, lige så fattigt som det afrikanske land, Ghana. Sydkorea valgte det åbne samfund, markedsøkonomi, frihandel. Ghana valgte det lukkede samfund, planøkonomi, protektionisme. Sydkorea er i dag et ganske velstående land. Ghana sakker agterud.

Eller se på Nordkorea. Nordkoreas befolkning lever under et strengt kommunistisk diktatur. Et diktatur præget af lukkethed og undertrykkelse. Nordkorea er i dag et fattigt land, truet af sult og økonomisk sammenbrud.

De asiatiske lande, som valgte åbenhed, har klaret sig bedre end de lande i Asien og Afrika, som eksperimenterede med planøkonomi og selvforsyning. Hundredvis af millioner af asiater i de åbne lande har forladt fattigdommen i løbet af en generation.

Recepten er altså klar nok: Frihed og åbenhed skaber fremgang og velstand. Undertrykkelse og lukkethed skaber tilbagegang og fattigdom. Hvor svært kan det være?

Lad os tage fat på de store udfordringer. Med målbevidsthed og beslutsomhed. Det er en stor opgave. For effektive løsninger kræver, at alle verdens lande står sammen om opgaven. Men vi kan godt, hvis viljen er til stede.

Vi har en god mulighed i forbindelse med et stort verdens topmøde, som skal finde sted i Johannesburg, Sydafrika, i efteråret 2002. Det er i samme periode, at Danmark har formandskabet i EU. Denne position bør Danmark benytte til at sætte sig i spidsen for at udarbejde en ”Global Pact”. Vi skal sigte på en aftale mellem alle verdens lande om en forstærket indsats for at bekæmpe sult og fattigdom, sygdom og forurening.

Lad os sigte på en Global Pact, som indeholder fem hovedpunkter:

For det første bør den indeholde en forpligtelse til at nedbryde alle toldmure og afvikle alle handelshindringer i hele verden. I den forbindelse bør vi også indgå en global aftale om en gensidig afvikling af subsidier til landbrug over hele kloden. Den mest effektive hjælp til u-landene er at give dem en fuldstændig fri adgang til verdensmarkedet.

For det andet bør vi indgå internationale aftaler om beskyttelsen af miljøet. Vi skal sætte ind mod drivhuseffekten med fastsættelse af nogle globale mål, som alle forpligter sig til at

arbejde efter. Men vi skal samtidig sikre, at det sker på en måde, så vi får mest mulig miljø for pengene. Aftalerne skal sikre, at økonomisk vækst i u-landene kan gå hånd i hånd med beskyttelse af miljøet.

For det tredje bør vi indgå internationale aftaler om en forstærket indsats mod dødelige sygdomme og epidemier.

For det fjerde er det vigtigt, at vi skærper kravene til demokrati og menneskerettigheder i u-landene. De rige lande skal forpligte sig til at leve op til FN's målsætning om at yde 0,7 pct. af bruttonationalproduktet i udviklingsbistand. Samtidig bør der indgås en aftale om afskrivning af u-landenes gæld. Men til gengæld bør vi stille krav til u-landene om sunde økonomiske reformer.

For det femte bør den globale pagt indeholde en aftale om international informationsfrihed på tværs af alle landegrænser. Ethvert land, der ønsker at modtage bistand, skal indvillige i at give dets borgere fri adgang til internettet og fri adgang til nyheder og informationer uden barrierer, unødige hindringer eller censur fra regeringens side.

Det er fem liberale bud på indholdet i en sådan global pagt. Den globale pagt skal bestå i, at de rige lande vedkender sig deres økonomiske ansvar for at hjælpe de fattige lande i gang med en selvbærende udvikling. Men samtidig skal udviklingslandene forpligte sig til at indføre samfundsmodeller, der bygger på frihed, demokrati og respekt for menneskerettigheder.

I alt for mange år har der hersket en u-landssocialisme, som har undertrykt friheden og fastholdt de fattige i deres fattigdom. Nu er tiden kommet til at stille krav til u-landene. Krav om politiske og økonomiske reformer.

For godt og vel ti år siden påstod en klog mand, at historien var slut. De vestlige demokratier havde endegyldigt sejret over ondskabens imperium. Efter 1989 og Murens fald var fremtiden liberal. Tidsånden var med os. Det var ”historiens dom”.

En besnærende tanke. Men også farlig. Hvis vi tror, at liberalismen har vundet, hvis vi tror, at kampen for menneskets frihedsrettigheder er vundet én gang for alle, ja, så frister det til at hvile på laurbærrene. Og så risikerer vi, at ufriheden, undertrykkelsen og socialismen kommer krybende tilbage.

Det er i øvrigt ravruskende forkert, at verden pludselig er blevet liberal. Det er den ikke. Verden er stadig præget af ufrihed og undertrykkelse. Store dele af Afrika, Asien og Mellemøsten kender ikke til liberalt demokrati.

Verdens største land, Kina, er stadig et kommunistisk diktatur. En række arabiske lande lider under nogle af de hårdeste diktaturer i verden – med undertrykkelse af kvinder, demokratiforkæmpere og anderledes tænkende.

På Cuba er der stadig samba-socialisme. Den er bestemt ikke charmerende – uanset hvad udenrigsminister Lykketoft en gang har sagt.

Det afrikanske kontinent er plaget af krig, diktatur og sygdom. Som det eneste sted i verden er befolkningen i Afrika blevet fattigere i de senere år.

Nej, historien er ikke slut. Der er stadig masser at gøre for idealistiske liberale kræfter.

Frihed og demokrati er goder, som hver ny generation selv må slås for.

Man har sagt, at det 20. århundrede var socialismens århundrede. Det var i hvert fald et århundrede præget af ufred, handelskrige og totalitære stater.

Vi kan kun gøre det 21. århundrede til liberalismens århundrede, hvis vi giver folk mulighed for at forme deres eget liv i frihed, fred og velstand.

Den liberale bevægelse har meget at gøre, før verden er fri af terror, undertrykkelse, nød og

ufred. Historien er ikke slut. Den fortsætter. Nu er det op til os at forme den.

Lad os gøre det 21. århundrede til frihedens århundrede!

URL til artiklen: <https://dansketaler.dk/tale/landsmoedetale-af-venstres-formand-2/>

### **A3: Anders Fogh Rasmussens tale ved Venstres landsmøde 2001, 2**

Den 11. september 2001 om eftermiddagen sad vi lamslæde og stirrede bestyrtet på de direkte TV-billeder fra New York og Washington. Vi var direkte vidner til vanvittige selvmordspiloters bestialske angreb på tusinder af uskyldige mennesker. Vi sad dér – afmægtige tilskuere med følelser, der vekslede mellem vantro og vrede, rædsel og raseri, sorg og smerte.

For evigt har de forfærdende scener prentet sig i vore sind.

Det er forfærdende billeder. Men vi kan aldrig – og vi må aldrig – glemme dem. Det er billeder af ofrene for skruppelløse barbarers grænseløse ondskab.

Disse rystende billeder skal minde os om, at menneskeheden stadig fosterer menneskeligt afskum, som er parat til at gennemføre omfattende, meningsløse og morderiske angreb på deres medmennesker.

De skal minde os om, at civilisationen til enhver tid kan blive truet af kolde og kyniske menneskemonstre, som er parate til at dræbe og lemlestede uskyldige i gigantisk omfang for at nå deres mål.

De skal minde os om, at der på denne klode findes mennesker med et så afstumpet og afskyeligt menneskesyn, at de er parate til at gøre uskyldige mennesker til redskaber og ofre for deres eget had.

De skal minde os om, at frihed og fred ikke er nogen selvfølge.

De skal minde os om, at de frie, demokratiske samfund skal stå sammen og bekæmpe ondskaben, undertrykkelsen, fanatismen.

Den 11. september var en dag, hvor den brutale virkelighed overgik selv de værste fantasier. Det gjorde ondt på os alle. Det gjorde ondt at se dette angreb på hjertet af den nation, som hele den frie verden skylder så meget.

USA er udpeget som fjende af alverdens terrorgrupper og tyranner. Det er ikke tilfældigt. For USA repræsenterer alt det, som religiøse fanatikere og herskesyge diktatorer frygter og foragter. Det amerikanske samfund er bygget på idéerne om personlig frihed og religiøs tolerance. Frihedsgudinden står i New Yorks havn som det stolte vartegn for en nation, der har realiseret drømmen om at give mennesker frihed til og mulighed for at skabe sig en bedre tilværelse. Derfor drømmer millioner af mennesker over hele kloden om at komme til USA, mulighedernes land.

I hele den vestlige verden har vi bygget vores samfund op på det samme værdisæt som det amerikanske. Vi bygger vores samfund på respekten for personlig frihed, demokrati og

menneskerettigheder. Det er de principper og værdier, som har gjort det muligt at løfte vor del af civilisationen fra fattigdom til velstand.

Jeg siger ikke, at Vestens demokratier er ufejlbare. Men de er dog enestående med hensyn til at give mennesker muligheder for at skabe sig et bedre liv.

Og det er disse værdier, det er den personlige frihed og respekten for menneskelivets ukrænkelighed, som vi mere end nogensinde nu skal värne og forsøre.

Da terroristerne smadrede de kaprede fly mod New York og Washington, var det ikke blot et koldt og kynisk angreb på uskyldige mennesker. Det var et angreb på demokratiet. Det var et angreb på alle os, der lever i frie og åbne samfund.

Vi må stå sammen om at forsvere friheden og demokratiet.

Aldrig må vi bøje os for terrorister, der spreder død og ødelæggelse. Aldrig må vi bøje os for tyranner, som vil true den personlige frihed. Aldrig må vi overgive os til de kræfter, som vil indhylle os i et middelalderligt mørke.

Vi skal kompromisløst bekæmpe terrorismen, rykke den op med rode, udslette den fra Jordens overflade. Den kamp mod det onde skal USA ikke stå ene om.

I tidens løb har det amerikanske folk bragt enorme ofre i kampen for frihed og fred. De hjalp os i 1. Verdenskrig. De befriede os fra nazismen under den 2. Verdenskrig. De beskyttede os mod den kommunistiske trussel under Den Kolde Krig.

Nu er det tid, at vi viser solidaritet med vores amerikanske venner og allierede.

Ethvert land har ret til selvforsvar. Terrorangrebet var en krigserklæring mod USA. Selvfølgelig har USA ret til at slå igen. Ikke som hævn, men som selvforsvar over for en brutal og skruppelløs fjende.

Vi skal indstille os på, at kampen mod den internationale terrorisme bliver lang og svær og hård. Det er vigtigt at opstille en stærk international koalition mod terrorisme. En koalition, som går på tværs af de sædvanlige skillelinjer. På de rygende ruiner af World Trade Centre vil vi forhåbentlig se en verdensomspændende koalition, som omfatter både de vestlige demokratier, Rusland, Kina og en række moderate muslimske lande. De moderate muslimske ledere er lige så truet af terrorister som de vestlige demokratier er.

I NATO har vi givet håndslag på solidaritet med USA. Vi betragter angrebet på USA som et angreb på hele alliance. Regeringen har valgt en klar linie på det punkt. Det vil jeg gerne rose den for.

Det betyder, at vi i givet fald er parate til at støtte USA i en militær aktion mod terroristerne. Det er også i vor egen interesse. Næste gang kan det være os i Europa, som er mål for vanvittige terrorister.

Det er næppe sandsynligt, at Danmark kan yde det helt store bidrag til en øjeblikkelig militær aktion mod de skyldige bag terroraktionen. Men hvis vi bliver spurgt, er det klart Venstres opfattelse, at Danmark skal bidrage med det, vi nu kan.

Og når det gælder den mere langsigtede indsats mod terrorisme, kan vi i Danmark gøre en stor indsats. Først og fremmest kan vi stramme lovgivning og kontrol, så Danmark ikke bliver hjemsted eller arnested for terrorister eller deres hjælpere. Og vi kan indgå et tættere samarbejde med politi og efterretningsvæsen i andre lande.

Regeringens initiativer går i den samme retning. Og det vil jeg gerne bakke op.

For én ting måstå fuldstændig klart: Danmark skal ikke seje under et usselt bekvemmelighedsflag. Terrorismus er en krig mod civilisationen. Terrorismus kan ramme alle – også os. Derfor må vi stå skulder ved skulder. Og Danmark må løfte sin del af opgaven.

Det har krænket mig stærkt at se palæstinensere danse af glæde over drabene på tusinder af amerikanere. At danse af glæde over et gigantisk tab af menneskeliv er udtryk for et afskyeligt og afstumpet menneskesyn. Et menneskesyn, som ethvert anstændigt menneske må tage den allerstørkeste afstand fra.

Og det er stærkt foruroligende, at vi også har set fanatiske unge i Danmark give åbent udtryk for glæde over drabene på tusinder af uskyldige mennesker i USA.

Vi har set dem køre rundt i gaderne med jubelråb.

Vi har set jubelscener på gymnasier med mange muslimske elever.

Forhåbentlig er det kun nogle få i et fanatisk mindretal. Men det er udansk. Og det er udtryk for en uhyggelig mangel på respekt for mennesker, frihed og demokrati. I Danmark er der frihed til at tænke, tale og tro, som man vil. Men vi er nødt til at slå fast med syvtommersom, at det danske samfund hviler på nogle helt fundationale principper om frihed og respekt for menneskeliv.

Nogle af de unge fundamentalister har samlet sig i en organisation, der hedder, "Hizb-ut-Tahrir". Hizb-ut-Tahrir forsvarer selvmordsbomber. Organisationen arbejder for, at der skal etableres en islamisk stat. Ifølge Hizb-ut-Tahrir er Vesten, og dermed også Danmark, kun ude på at undergrave og ødelægge islam. Kampen mellem islam og Vesten er evig. Og det er ikke tilladt nogen muslim at være neutral eller tilskuer til den kamp.

Sådanne grupper har vi altså i Danmark i dag. De er grupper af unge, som åbent foragter vort demokrati og de værdier, vort samfund bygger på. Der er endnu kun få. Men de er der. Og de er ved at blive flere.

Forrige fredag var der én af imamerne, som ved fredagsbønnen i København truede USA og den vestlige verden med gengældelse, hvis Afghanistan bliver utsat for angreb. Hadet til vesten stikker altså dybere end de indoktrinerede unge med flag i bilruderne i Vollsmose.

I Afghanistan sidder der otte vesteuropæiske nødhjælpsarbejdere indespærret. De er anklaget for at missionere om det kristne budskab. De risikerer dødsstraf. Det sker samtidig med, at imamer i København uanfægtet kan opildne til jihad mod den vestlige verden. Det hænger ikke sammen.

Jeg vil sige ligeud til de fanatiske udlændinge: Hvis I hader Danmark, hvis I hader den vestlige kultur, hvis I hader de vestlige frihedsideal, så rejs til et andet land. Så rejs til et andet land, som bedre lever op til jeres forestillinger. I har jeres fulde frihed til at forlade Danmark.

Jeg siger også dette af hensyn til de mange indvandrere, som hver dag arbejder hårdt for at skabe en tilværelse i Danmark. Jeg har ved flere lejligheder haft møder med repræsentanter for indvanderne. Senest som æresgæst, da pakistanerne i Danmark fejrede deres nationaldag. Det var en meget positiv oplevelse. Langt de fleste indvandrere har et stærkt ønske om at blive integreret i det danske samfund. Og de tager også afstand fra vold og terror.

Men deres dagligdag og hele tilværelse bliver forpestet og smadret af de fanatiske og fundamentalistiske grupper. For de skaber konfrontation, de pisker en hadefuld stemning op. Og det rammer alle indvandrere. For på den måde bliver der skabt modsætninger og spændinger mellem danskere og indvandrere. Og det er til skade for hele det danske samfund.

Der er brug for en politik, som kan skabe et bedre forhold mellem udlændinge og danskere. Det kræver en ny udlændingepolitik, som er i overensstemmelse med det brede flertal i den danske befolkning.

Flere og flere danskere er dybt og ægte bekymrede over den slappe politik, som bliver ført. Flere og flere spørger sig selv: Hvad er det, der er ved at ske med det danske samfund?

Hver 8. nyfødt i Danmark har en mor med udenlandsk baggrund. I visse kommuner er mere end hver tredje nyfødt barn af en udenlandsk mor.

I et stigende antal skoler og institutioner er danske børn i mindretal.

Mindre end halvdelen af indvanderne er i arbejde. Flere og flere er på bistand.

Næsten halvdelen af de personer, der bliver anholdt og fængslet for virkelig grove forbrydelser i København, er udlændinge.

To ud af tre anmeldte voldtægter i København bliver begået af udlændinge.

Der er stadig flere eksempler på, at store grupper af unge indvandrere fejt lokker politiet i baghold og angriber betjentene.

Der er bykvarterer i Danmark, hvor politiet nu kun kan patruljere med omfattende forstærkning.

Det her er kendsgerninger. Kendsgerninger, som skal åbent frem. Kendsgerninger, som bekymrer flere og flere. Kendsgerninger, som vi har en pligt til at forholde os til.

Der er brug for en ny politik. Der er brug for en fast og fair udlændingepolitik. En mere håndfast politik, hvor vi konsekvent siger nej til asylfup, kriminalitet og misbrug af offentlige ydelser. Men også en fair politik, hvor vi rækker hånden frem til dem, der vil arbejde og yde et positivt bidrag til det danske samfund.

Jeg vil godt sige tingene ligeud: Der kommer i øjeblikket for mange udlændinge til Danmark. Der kommer for mange, som giver problemer. Til gengæld kommer der nok for få af dem, som Danmark har brug for – dem der vil arbejde og yde et bidrag til det danske samfund.

Vi er nødt til at stramme flygtningepolitikken. Der kommer så mange flygtninge til Danmark, at mange kommuner efterhånden ikke kan skaffe boliger til dem alle. Selvfølgelig skal vi give et fristed til reelle flygtninge, så længe de er på flugt. Men meningen må være, at de vender tilbage til deres hjemland, så snart situationen tillader det.

Vi vil stramme reglerne om asyl, så vi stopper asylfup og sikrer, at kun reelle flygtninge kommer ind i landet.

De første syv år skal udlændinge kun have en midlertidig opholdstilladelse. Tallene viser, at omkring 40 % af flygtningene jævnligt tager på ferie i det land, de er flygtet fra. Dér må vi sige stop. Vi må sige: Hvis man kan rejse på ferie i hjemlandet, er faren for forfølgelse vist ikke ret stor. Og så er tiden måske inde til at rejse ud af Danmark og søge hjem. Sagerne skal tages op og opholdstilladelserne inddrages, hvis opholdsgrundlaget ikke er til stede.

Desværre er det et stort og et voksende problem, at så mange indvandrere står uden arbejde. Hvis indvanderne var lige så meget i arbejde som danskerne, så skulle 50.000 flere indvandrere være i arbejde. Det er de ikke. De er arbejdsløse på bistandshjælp eller andre overførsler fra det offentlige.

Det kan ikke fortsætte. Det er dårligt for indvanderne selv, som mister selvværd og selvrespekt. Og det er dårligt for Danmark, som går glip af en nødvendig arbejdskraft.

Vi skal have fat i de arbejdsløse unge og have dem i arbejde. Der er gode kommuner, som har vist vejen. De siger simpelt hen: Nej, I kan ikke få bistandshjælp, men I kan få et arbejde. Det er sådan, det skal være. Det er afgørende, at de unge forstår, at arbejde er vigtigt – ikke mindst for deres selvværd.

Vi viser indvandrere den største respekt ved også at stille krav. Vi skal ikke spinde mennesker ind i et net af tilskud og overførsler og kontrol og bureaucrati. Vi skal gøre op med den umyndiggørende forsørgermentalitet. Vi skal give bedre muligheder for, at den enkelte kan få et arbejde og en uddannelse, og at det kan betale sig at gøre en indsats.

I stedet for alle mulige besværlige regler, så burde der være én meget enkel regel. Hvis man kan skaffe sig arbejde og bolig og forsørge sig og sine, så skal det være muligt at komme til Danmark. De første syv år er der ikke fuld adgang til f.eks. bistandshjælp. Men når man så har boet, arbejdet og betalt skat i Danmark i syv år, så kan man få de samme rettigheder som alle andre.

Det er en respektfuld måde at komme til et nyt land på. Så sender vi et krystalklart signal til alle: Hvis I vil arbejde og yde et bidrag til det danske samfund, så er I velkomne. Men I kan ikke bare komme til Danmark for at hæve bistandshjælp. Danmark kan og skal ikke være bistandskontor for hele verden.

Det er en sådan fast og fair udlændingepolitik, der er brug for. Et meget bredt flertal i befolkningen ønsker en opstramning. Bekymringen over den slappe udlændingepolitik rækker langt ud over, hvad folk stemmer på ved valgene.

Tiden er ikke til at grave grøfter. Opgaven er derimod at skabe et bredt flertal i Folketinget for de helt nødvendige stramninger.

Befolkningens chance for at få en ny udlændingepolitik er at stemme en borgerlig-liberal regering til magten. En ny regering vil lægge sine forslag frem til fri forhandling i Folketinget. Alle partier vil blive indbudt til forhandlinger.

Jeg så gerne, at vi kunne skabe grundlag for en bred aftale om de nødvendige stramninger. Jeg så gerne, at såvel Socialdemokratiet som Dansk Folkeparti kunne indgå i en sådan aftale.

Jeg opfordrer såvel Socialdemokratiet som Dansk Folkeparti til at lægge partitaktiske hensyn til side. Der er i befolkningen et stærkt ønske om, at et meget bredt flertal på Christiansborg kan enes om en langsigtet udlændingepolitik. En politik, som kan skabe tryghed i befolkningen.

Det er tid til forandring. Der er brug for en ny udlændingepolitik. En ny politik, som er i overensstemmelse med ønskerne hos et bredt flertal i den danske befolkning. Der er brug for en fast og fair udlændingepolitik. Nej til dem, der vil snyde, nasse, bedrage og begå

kriminalitet. Ja til dem, der vil arbejde og bidrage positivt til det danske samfund. Det skal være slut med slapheden.

Samtidig må jeg sige til alle danskere: Nu er det tid at besinde sig på de værdier, vort folkestyre bygger på. Frihed, demokrati, fred er ingen selvfølge. Hver ny generation skal kæmpe for at sikre disse værdier.

Det var skræmmende at høre om jubelscenerne på nogle københavnske gymnasier med mange muslimske elever. En dansk pige kom i skole og mødte synet af jublende muslimer, der fejrede terroren. Hun græd.

Hendes mor forklarede til avisen: ”En gruppe muslimske elever samlede sig fra morgenstunden i forhallen. De jublede og klappede, mens de råbte ”Allah er stor” og ”Det er Allahs vilje”. Min datter kom grædende hjem og sagde, at hun ikke ville tilbage igen”.

Her er jeg nødt til at sige: Det nytter ikke med slaphed. Der er nogle, som mener, at vi i tolerancens navn skal vise forståelse for de unge fanatikeres reaktion.

Lad mig sige det klart og tydeligt: Vi skal aldeles ikke vise forståelse. Vi skal gå lodret imod. For deres holdning er undergravende for demokratiet, den personlige frihed, hele det humane menneskesyn, som vort samfund bygger på. At vise forståelse for anti-demokratiske holdninger er lalle-glad tolerance.

Det er gymnasiets opgave, det er lærernes forpligtelse at værne mod hadet og meningsløsheden. Det rækker ikke at sætte sig i en rundkreds og synge ”Kringsatt av Fiender”. Her er det tid at sætte foden hårdt ned og forlange respekt for demokratiet og de fundamentale værdier, vort samfund bygger på.

Når skolerne møder anti-demokratiske holdninger, må lærerne sige klart fra og gå hårdt op imod det. Og lad os sige det meget klart: Danske skoler skal ikke være rammen om jubelfest, når terror og vold slår mennesker ihjel.

I det hele taget er der brug for at minde om det gamle ord, ”frisind”. Frisind er den holdning, at hvert enkelt menneske anerkender det andet menneskes ret til frit at tænke, tale og tro og til frit at vælge sin livsform.

Men frisind betyder ikke, at den enkelte skal acceptere alle livsværdier og livsmønstre som ligeværdige. Hvis alle holdninger bliver opfattet som lige gyldige, bliver de også lige gyldige.

Frisind er ikke lalle-glad tolerance.

Frisind er det modsatte af holdningsløshed.

Der er brug for frisind i det danske samfund.

I Danmark har vi et folkestyre, som bygger på en vidstrakt frihed og en grundlæggende respekt for det enkelte menneske og for minoriteter. Der er frihed til at tænke, tale og tro. Der er frihed til at tænke om seksuelle minoriteter, hvad man vil. Men det er helt uacceptabelt at kaste sten mod homoseksuelle i en fredelig parade, som det skete på Nørrebro.

Der er frihed til selv at vælge livsform i familien. Men det danske samfund bygger på ligestilling mellem kvinder og mænd. Vi vil ikke acceptere undertrykkelse af kvinders rettigheder.

I Danmark er der religionsfrihed. Enhver kan læse de hellige skrifter, man vil. Men i et sandt folkestyre gælder det: Religiøse love kan aldrig komme til atstå over Danmarks Grundlov eller Folketingets love.

I Danmark kan enhver have den tro, man vil. Men i et sandt folkestyre gælder det: Religion og politik skal ikke blandes sammen.

I Danmark har enhver lov at have sin mening om USA og give udtryk for den. Men vi kan og vil ikke acceptere vold eller opfordring til vold som politisk middel.

Det er frisind. Retten til at tænke, tale og tro. Men samtidig respekt for de grundlæggende frihedsrettigheder, som vort folkestyre bygger på. Dette er helt afgørende byggesten i det danske folkestyre. Dem har vi alle en pligt til at værne om.

Jeg vil slutte med en kraftig opfordring til alle i det danske samfund. En opfordring til, at alle nu holder balancen.

Den afskyelige terroraktion har sat følelsene stærkt i kog. Det er forståeligt. Det er svært at finde ord, som stærkt nok kan fordømme denne grufulde handling.

Men det er ikke – og det må ikke blive – en kamp med kristne mod muslimer.

Det er en kamp mod terror, fanatisme og undertrykkelse, hvor den end findes på kloden.

Og i Danmark må det ikke gå sådan, at alle udlændinge bliver mistænkeliggjort. Fanatiske fundamentalister, kriminelle og asylsnydere må ikke få lov at ødelægge tilværelsen for de mange udlændinge, som gerne vil tilpasse sig det danske samfund.

Netop derfor må vi gøre op med slapheden, blødsødenheden, tossegodheden og den lalle-glade tolerance.

Venstre vil være garant for en fast og fair udlændingepolitik.

Venstre er et liberalt parti. Det betyder, at vi sætter mennesket i centrum. Vi vil sikre mere frihed og flere valgmuligheder for det enkelte menneske. Det skal kunne betale sig at arbejde og i det hele taget at gøre en indsats.

For os er det mennesket, der betyder noget – ikke hudfarve eller religion.

Nogle – ganske mange måske – vil kritisere mig for det, jeg har sagt her.

Det må jeg leve med – og det gør jeg gerne.

Alt for længe har der i dette land eksisteret en kreds af mennesker, som mente, at de havde patent på sandheden, patent på medmenneskelighed, patent på human livsopfattelse, og at alle, som gav udtryk for andre synspunkter end deres kunne beordres til tavshed og skammekrog.

Resultatet har været ulykkeligt.

Resultatet har været, at der i årtier er ført en fejslagen flygtninge- og indvandrerpolitik.

Resultatet har været en stigende frustration hos mange danskere. Det meget, meget store flertal af danskere vender sig bastant imod enhver form for racisme. Men de føler en ægte bekymring over udviklingen i det danske samfund.

Og resultatet er, at der er grund til at frygte, at der bliver gravet stadig dybere grøfter mellem befolkningsgrupper i Danmark. Det er det modsatte, der er brug for.

Det er integration, der er nøgleordet – ikke adskillelse og udskillelse.

Kampen mod terroren er ikke en kamp mod muslimer eller Islam.

Det er en kamp mod terrorisme, hverken mere eller mindre.

Og det er en kamp, den vestlige verden næppe kan vinde uden hjælp og støtte fra det store flertal af muslimer, der ønsker frihed, der ønsker tryghed, der ønsker velstand, der ønsker demokrati, der ønsker menneskerettigheder. Det store flertal af muslimer, der drømmer om det, vi drømmer om, og fordømmer det, vi fordømmer.

Dem rækker vi vores hånd. Dem beder vi om støtte. Og sammen vil vi kunne vinde krigen mod terrorisme. Den kan blive lang. Den kan kræve ofre. Men den skal kæmpes – for civilisation og menneskelighed.

**URL til artiklen:** <https://dansketaler.dk/tale/landsmedetale-af-venstres-formand/>

#### **A4: Anders Fogh Rasmussens tale ved Folketingets åbning, 2004**

Det går godt i Danmark.

Vi har en solid økonomi. Én af de stærkeste i Europa. Vi har et rekordstort overskud på betalingsbalancen. Overskuddet på de offentlige finanser er blandt de største i Europa. Den offentlige gæld er nedbragt med over 17 mia. kr. siden 2001. Og renten er meget lav.

Solide overskud. Nedbringelse af gæld. Samtidig med, at skatterne er blevet sat ned.

Vi indførte et skattestop fra regeringens første dag. Og det har vi overholdt. Der har nu været skattestop i 1043 dage. Ja, vi er endda gået videre. I år har vi givet skattelettelser for næsten 10 mia. kr.

Skattestop og skattelettelser. Og det har vi præsteret samtidig med, at der er gennemført forbedringer af velfærden. Siden 2001 er det offentlige forbrug vokset med 13 mia. kr. Penge der især er brugt på øget velfærd. Og der er også blevet flere medarbejdere til at yde velfærd. I dag er der 14.000 flere ansatte i den offentlige sektor end for tre år siden.

Ledigheden er begyndt at falde. Beskæftigelsen er stigende og vil næste år være højere end nogensinde før.

Regeringens politik med skattenedsættelser og Forårspakke virker. Vi er på rette spor.

Det går godt. Og det kommer til at gå endnu bedre, hvis vi fastholder regeringens kurs.

Forventningerne til fremtiden er lyse. Flere og flere virksomheder ser positivt på de økonomiske udsigter og beskæftigelsen. Og danskernes tillid til den økonomiske udvikling er i top.

Optimismen blomstrer i Danmark.

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Det danske samfund står stærkere end nogensinde til at møde fremtidens udfordringer. Og udfordringer er der nok af. Men netop, når det går godt, skal vi tage fat på at sikre det danske samfund, så de kommende generationer kan opleve fortsat fremskridt, tryghed og velfærd.

Den nok største udfordring er den, man med et lidt fremmedgørende ord kalder globalisering.

Vi oplever i disse år, at en del af vor produktion og vore arbejdspladser flytter til lande østpå, hvor lønningerne er betydeligt lavere end her.

Men vi kan ikke og vi skal ikke konkurrere på lønnen med lande som Kina og Polen – eller opstille kunstige barrierer. Det vil kun gøre os fattigere.

Vi skal i stedet skabe nye job ved at konkurrere på dygtighed. Så de arbejdspladser, vi mister til lavlønslandene, bliver erstattet af gode, vellønnede job.

Når andre er billigere, skal vi være bedre.

Vi skal blive bedre til at oprette nye arbejdspladser. Vi skal gøre Danmark til et førende iværksættersamfund. Vi skal forske og få ny viden og nye idéer. Og vi skal omsætte den ny viden og de nye idéer til vækst og arbejdspladser.

Men vi skal også bevare trygheden for den enkelte. I gamle dage var tryghed på arbejdsmarkedet forbundet med fast job og lange opsigelsesvarsler. I vore dage handler tryghed på arbejdsmarkedet også om viden, kvalifikationer og evnen til at omstille sig til nye tider.

I dag er det ikke nok at tage en uddannelse, og så tro man kan leve af den resten af livet. Vi skal løbende dygtiggøre os. Vi skal kunne matche nye krav og omstille os til nye job, når gamle forsvinder.

Viljen til forandring er vejen til tryghed.

Derfor skal der være bedre muligheder for at kunne få relevant omskoling og efteruddannelse. For faglærte såvel som ufaglærte. For dem med de lange uddannelser og for

dem uden. For dem, der arbejder med de nyeste teknologier, og for dem, der arbejder indenfor traditionelle håndværk. Det gælder alle.

Og det er et fælles ansvar. For det offentlige. For virksomhederne. Og for medarbejderne.

Regeringen har derfor sammen med arbejdsmarkedets parter iværksat et fælles projekt om, hvordan vi kan skabe et markant løft af voksen- og efteruddannelserne.

Det er mit håb, at alle Folketingets partier vil bakke op om denne langsigtede plan og om den lovgivning, der skal følge op på arbejdet. Morgendagens udfordringer kræver, at vi forbedrer hele vores uddannelsessystem. Regeringen har allerede gennemført en række afgørende reformer af folkeskolen, gymnasier, erhvervsskoler og universiteter for at højne det faglige niveau.

Men vi mener, at der er meget mere at gøre. Bl.a. i folkeskolen. Det duer ikke, at visse skoler stadig bruger forældede bøger og undervisningsmaterialer. Det er jo helt håbløst, hvis det er rigtigt, at der er folkeskoler, som stadig bruger atlas med det gamle Sovjetunionens grænser. Det kan vi simpelthen ikke byde den generation, der om nogle år skal tage livtag med globaliseringens udfordringer.

Folkeskolen skal have et løft. Over de næste 4 år vil vi tilføre i alt knap 2,3 mia. kr. Til flere timer. Til lærebøger. Til modernisering af lokaler. Til computere. Til efteruddannelse af lærere.

Men penge gør det ikke alene. For vi har i forvejen verdens dyreste folkeskole. Det afgørende er undervisningen. Det afgørende er, at alle elever kommer ud af skolen med gode faglige færdigheder.

Vi skal sikre, at vore børn og unge lærer noget, de kan bruge. Derfor har vi indført bindende mål for, hvad eleverne skal kunne på bestemte klassetrin i folkeskolen. Og vi vil give skolerne bedre mulighed for at teste, om målene bliver nået. For at styrke kendskabet til centrale dele af dansk litteratur vil der nu blive udsendt en fortægnelse over forfatterskaber, som eleverne skal have stiftet bekendtskab med i skolen.

Der bliver udsendt nye læreplaner for gymnasiet. Vi vil foreslå styrket faglighed i lærer- og pædagoguddannelserne. Og vi vil fremlægge forslag om, at de enkelte uddannelsesinstitutioner skal offentliggøre deres mål og resultater, bl.a. hvor mange, der fuldfører uddannelsen, og hvor mange der finder beskæftigelse efter endt uddannelse.

Vi skal med andre ord tro på, at det gør en forskel, at vores børn lærer noget. At det ikke er ligegyldigt, hvad de lærer.

Og nej, det er ikke tilbage til fortiden. Det er investering i fremtiden.

Vi er gode til at få idéer i Danmark. Men vi er mindre gode til at omsætte idéerne til vækst og beskæftigelse.

Vejen fra forskning til forretning skal være kortere, nemmere og hurtigere.

Derfor skal en ny lov give universiteter og forskningscentre mulighed for at oprette selskaber. Selskaber, som med forskernes resultater i hånden professionelt kan starte en ny produktion sammen med private.

Regeringen vil fremlægge forslag om etablering af idéværksteder, hvor studerende og forskere kan afprøve og udvikle nye produkt- og forretningsidéer. Væksthuse, som skal støtte udviklingen fra opfindelser til arbejdspladser.

Vi vil danne en iværksætterfond, som kan skaffe risikovillig kapital til start af nye virksomheder. Vi etablerer en særlig, gunstig låneordning for iværksættere. Vi arbejder sammen med pensionsinstitutterne om at skaffe flere midler til investering i nye virksomheder.

Og vi har nedsat Tænketanken for fremtidens vækst, som skal komme med bud på, hvad Danmark skal leve af i fremtiden.

Danmark skal være en teknologisk højdespringer. Derfor etablerer regeringen en særlig højteknologifond. Vi vil målrette fondens midler til ambitiøs forskning og udvikling på områder, hvor der er chance for at skabe varige arbejdspladser med fremtid i.

Målet er i første omgang at bygge fonden op til 16 mia. kr. Vi vil herudover på næste års finanslov afsætte næsten 10 mia. kr. til forskning. Og vi vil optage 500 flere studerende på forskeruddannelsen om året, så vi får uddannet en ny generation af unge dygtige forskere.

Men regeringen vil videre end det. Vi har en vision om Danmark som et førende videnssamfund. Vi vil øge indsatsen med forskning og udvikling markant. Og vi vil forbedre uddannelserne yderligere. Til foråret vil regeringen præsentere en flerårs-plan for Danmark som førende vækst-, viden- og iværksættersamfund.

Vi sætter det mål, at det offentlige og de private virksomheder tilsammen øger indsatsen med forskning og udvikling, så vi i 2010 når op på et beløb svarende til mere end 3 procent af landets samlede produktion, bruttonationalproduktet. Det vil bringe Danmark blandt de absolut førende lande i Europa, når det gælder forskning og udvikling.

Det er en stor udfordring. Men en udfordring, som vi kan klare. Vi har styr på økonomien. Og vi har før vist, at vi magter at omstille os.

Jeg forstår godt, hvis mange mennesker er bekymrede over al den debat om udflytning af job til Østeuropa og Asien. Men vi kan forvandle globaliseringen fra en trussel til en chance. Hvis vi bærer os klogt ad. Hvis vi dygtiggør os. Hvis vi tager fat nu. Og det skal vi.

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Siden regeringsskiftet i november 2001 har regeringen gradvist fornyet og udviklet det danske velfærdssamfund. En forandring, som er gået hånd i hånd med tryghed. Nu fortsætter regeringen sit arbejde med at forny, udvikle og skabe vækst og velfærd i det danske samfund.

Vi tager udgangspunkt i det enkelte menneske – ikke i systemet. Vi er ikke bundet af særlige hensyn til organisationer eller bevægelser. Vi tager i stedet fordomsfrit fat om tingene og forsøger at skabe de bedste rammer for befolkningen.

- Vi har aftalt en kommunalreform, som giver den enkelte borger mere kvalitet for pengene. Vi styrker det lokale demokrati gennem stærke, bæredygtige kommuner. Vi styrker

kommunerne ved at give dem flere opgaver.

Det er den største og vigtigste reform af den offentlige sektor i mange år. En reform der skal sikre fortsatte forbedringer af den offentlige service. For de syge. For de handicappede og de svage grupper. For de ledige. Og for alle andre.

Reformen påvirker mange tusinde medarbejdere. Til alle jer vil jeg gerne understrege og gentage: Alle medarbejdere følger med opgaverne over i den nye struktur. Vi har brug for jeres kompetencer og motivation til at løse de mange vigtige opgaver. Regeringen lægger afgørende vægt på tryghed for de ansatte.

I hele landet er der netop nu en rivende udvikling i gang. Danmarkskortet skifter dagligt udseende. Mange kommuner har besluttet at slå sig sammen. Andre er på vej til det. Vi ser en optimisme og en vilje til forandring og til at tænke nyt over hele landet. Det er en bølge af forandring, som viser, at kommunalreformen er den rigtige løsning på det rigtige tidspunkt. Det lover godt for fremtiden.

Jeg er glad for den aftale, vi har indgået. Den er bred i sit indhold. Den har bred opbakning blandt landets kommunalpolitikere. Men desværre er der partier i Folketinget, som har valgt at holde sig udenfor aftalen. Partier der normalt gerne vil opfattes som ansvarlige og reformvenlige.

Politikerne i kommunerne har viljen og modet til forandring. De fortjener bred opbakning fra Folketinget. Jeg håber derfor, at der vil være bred tilslutning til de konkrete lovforslag, som vi lægger frem. Regeringen giver alle endnu en chance for at vise, at de godt vil være med.

· Vi vil fortsætte med at forny og forbedre vores sygehuse. Behandlingen af sygdomme på danske sygehuse skal være i verdensklasse. Og ventetiderne skal væk eller være de kortest mulige.

Vi har tilført sygehusene over 3 mia. kr. ekstra fra 2002 til 2005. Og det virker. Der opereres nu hvert år 70.000 flere på vores sygehuse, end da regeringen trådte til. Der er ansat flere læger og sygeplejersker. Og ventetiderne er faldet markant.

Vi har givet alle borgere – uanset pengepung – ret til at vælge at blive behandlet på et privat eller udenlandsk sygehus, hvis ventetiden på de offentlige sygehuse er lang. Det har hjulpet over 37.000 patienter til at komme hurtigere i behandling for deres sygdom. 37.000 danskere, der har fået forbedret deres liv. 37.000 danskere, der har haft glæde af denne regerings opgør med fortidens ideologiske blokeringer.

Næste skridt er at gøre kvaliteten i behandlingen endnu bedre. Med kommunalreformen skaber vi 5 stærke sundhedsregioner, som bliver gearet til at levere den højeste kvalitet. Ved at samle behandlinger. Ved bedre at udnytte mulighederne for at behandle specielle sygdomme. Og ved en bedre anvendelse af det personale, der er til rådighed.

Vi er nødt til at forbedre behandlingen af kræft. Der er allerede taget en række initiativer. Men vi ønsker at højne kvaliteten af kræftbehandling yderligere. Vi vil derfor hurtigt følge op på anbefalingerne fra Sundhedsstyrelsens kræftstyregruppe. Og regeringen vil fremlægge en ny kræfthandlingsplan. Sigtet er at bringe kræftbehandlingen på de danske sygehuse op på det højeste internationale niveau.

- Vi skal fortsat forbedre omsorgen for vore ældre. Derfor foreslår regeringen en særlig og ekstra indsats til gavn for de ældre, medicinske patienter.

Vi har indført frit valg af hjemmehjælp og ældreboliger. Kommunerne får hvert år tilført 1/2 mia. kr. ekstra til ældreplejen. Der bygges flere ældreboliger. Og mere end 170.000 ældre får nu en særlig ældreydelse. Og heraf får 150.000 ældre det fulde beløb.

Næste skridt er bedre vilkår for de mange ældre patienter, som er indlagt på vore sygehuse. Vi har fokuseret meget på ventetider og komplikerede sygdomme. Og det har givet positivt resultat. Nu sætter vi stærkere fokus på de mange ældre, medicinske patienter med mere almindelige sygdomme såsom sukkersyge og lungesygdomme. På finanslovforslaget for 2005 har regeringen afsat i alt 210 mio. kr. til en særlig indsats for ældre medicinske patienter.

- Vi vil forstærke indsatsen for at få indvanderne i arbejde og uddannelse og i det hele taget integreret bedre i det danske samfund. Derfor vil regeringen forebygge ghettodannelse i byerne. Og flere indvandrere skal ind i erhvervsuddannelserne.

Vi har strammet udlændingepolitikken. Og det virker. Antallet af opholdstilladelser er ikke længere over 17.000 om året. Antallet er nu mere end halveret til ca. 7.000.

Før valget lovede vi en fast og fair udlændingepolitik. Det har vi opfyldt. Og den holder vi fast ved.

Også 24 års reglen. Den regel, som siger, at man som udgangspunkt skal være mindst 24 år for at kunne få familiesammenføring her i landet. Den regel er nødvendig. For at beskytte de unge piger mod de ulykkelige tvangsægteskaber og arrangerede ægteskaber. For at sikre en ordentlig integration.

Der er partier, som vil afskaffe 24 års reglen. Med henvisning til, at den strider mod internationale konventioner og menneskerettigheder. Regeringen må kraftigt afvise den kritik. 24 års reglen strider ikke mod nogen konvention. Vi fører en stram udlændingepolitik, ja. Men den lever helt op til vores internationale forpligtelser. Der er ikke noget at komme efter.

Kritikken mod 24 års reglen dækker reelt over, at der er oppositionspartier, som vil lempe udlændingepolitikken. Der er partier, som siger: ”Det er ligegyldigt, om der kommer 4.000 eller 10.000 udlændinge til Danmark ved familiesammenføring.”

Jeg vil gerne slå fast: Regeringen er lodret uenig i det synspunkt. Det er ikke ligegyldigt, hvor mange indvandrere, der kommer til Danmark. Vi er nødt til at holde benhårdt fast i en stram udlændingepolitik. Kun på den måde får vi mulighed for at sikre uddannelse og arbejde til de indvandrere, som allerede er her.

Desværre arbejder kun 4 ud af 10 udlændinge og efterkommere. Det er én af de laveste andele i hele Europa. Resten er på kontanthjælp eller dagpenge.

Det er for svært at få fodfæste på arbejdsmarkedet for nyankomne, som mangler uddannelse og danskkundskaber. Bl.a. stiller vi høje teoretiske krav til dem, som vil påbegynde en praktisk uddannelse – krav, som især rammer udlændinge og efterkommere. Det er som en trappestige, hvor de nederste trin mangler. Vi må gøre en kraftanstregelse for at skabe flere praktiske indgange til flere uddannelser. Vi skal give mulighed for, at man kan få lov at vise, hvad man dur til i praksis, før man går i gang med en uddannelse. Én måde at gøre det på er

ved en såkaldt trainee-ordning, som DS Håndværk og Industri og Dansk Metal er ved at indføre. Sådanne initiativer hilser regeringen velkommen og opfordrer andre til at følge det gode eksempel. Vi vil nu efterse alle offentlige ansættelsesområder for at skabe tilsvarende muligheder dér. Især de unge skal have et bedre tilbud end kontanthjælp. Vi skal tilbyde dem trainee-job, forpraktik, fælordininger og lignende i stedet for kontanthjælp. Det skal slet ikke være muligt at få kontanthjælp, hvis der er gode muligheder for at få sådanne uddannelsespladser. Uddannelse er bedre end kontanthjælp. Vi gør de unge en tjeneste ved at forlange, at de tager sig noget til, der er fremtid i. Og det gælder naturligvis alle unge.

Desværre oplever vi også en anden kilde til dårlig integration. Der er visse åndelige ledere, imamer og muftier, som bekæmper integrationen med deres kvindeundertrykkende udtalelser, deres lovreligiøse krav til den opvoksende generation og deres forstokkede forkynELSE.

Jeg ved, at de færreste muslimer i dette land deler disse imamers og muftiers middelalderlige livssyn. Men det bekymrer mig, at de fanatiske religiøse ledere er med til at skabe skel og konfrontation i Danmark.

Jeg vil gerne have en positiv dialog med de grupper af indvandrere, som respekterer de værdier, det danske samfund bygger på. Som ønsker integration, uddannelse og arbejde. Jeg vil derfor tage initiativ til at samle repræsentanter for disse grupper af indvandrere til et møde på Marienborg her i efteråret. På dette møde vil vi drøfte med repræsentanter for indvanderne, hvordan vi kan forbedre mulighederne for arbejde, uddannelse og integration i det hele taget.

\* \* \*

Regeringen vil fremlægge en række yderligere initiativer:

- Vi vil give børnefamilierne bedre muligheder for at tilrettelægge arbejdsliv og familieliv. Derfor vil vi foreslå en pasningsgaranti for børn, når de fylder 1/2 år. Det kan ikke være rigtigt, at der stadig her i år 2004 er kommuner, som ikke kan tilbyde et ordentligt pasningstilbud. Derfor er vi nødt til at lovgive, så vi får de sidste kommuner med. Det giver familierne større tryghed. Og det giver forældre et reelt frit valg, om de vil bruge hele barselsorloven med det samme eller vende helt eller delvist tilbage til deres job. Desuden

foreslår vi mere frit valg af børnepasning.

- Vi vil styrke indsatsen for de svageste grupper. Derfor foreslår vi en særlig indsats for at hjælpe socialt utsatte til at få et job. Vi vil give målrettede tilbud om hjælp til blandt andet hjemløse og tidligere misbrugere.
- Og vi vil udbygge tilbuddene for de alt for mange mennesker, som i dag har et meget stort alkoholproblem. Den enkelte misbruger skal kunne komme hurtigt i behandling, når vedkommende er indstillet på det. Sigtet er en behandlingsgaranti for alkoholmisbrugere.
- Vi vil forbedre tryghed og retssikkerhed gennem en fortsat håndfast retsopolitik. Derfor foreslår regeringen at udvide politiets muligheder for at anvende DNA-registeret i forbindelse med efterforskning af forbrydelser. DNA-profiler er vor tids moderne fingeraftryk. De giver større chance for hurtigere at finde de skyldige og frikende de uskyldige.
- Vi vil have en skrappere kurs over for spirituskørsel. Spirituskørsel er hensynsløs adfærd. Alkohol er skyld i cirka hver fjerde dræbte og cirka hver sjette kvæstede i trafikken. Vi vil derfor skærpe straffene for spirituskørsel – ved højere bøder og skærpede regler for fængselsstraffe, frakendelse af kørekort og konfiskation af bilen.
- Vi vil føre en fremsynet miljøpolitik. Derfor foreslår regeringen flere naturprojekter, som vil gavne mennesker, dyr og planter. Vi vil forbedre vandløb og ådale som levesteder for truede arter. Vi vil genskabe tidligere søer. Vi vil beskytte højmoser. Vi vil skabe nye grønne områder tæt på byerne, hvor mange mennesker kan få gavn af skov- og naturområder. Og vi vil fremme brugen af mere miljøvenligt brændstof. Derfor vil regeringen sænke afgiften på svovlfri benzin og diesel.

\* \* \*

Efter udvidelsen med 10 nye lande er EU i dag den afgørende ramme om samarbejdet mellem Europas lande. Det er i EU, at de afgørende beslutninger bliver taget om Europas fremtid. Her skal Danmark være med – fuldt og helt.

Vi skal bruge kræfterne på at gøre Danmarks indflydelse i det nye EU så stor som mulig. I

stedet for de evindelige skænderier for og imod EU. Vi skal selv komme med forslag og udspil. Vi skal ikke nøjes med defensivt og bag ud skuende at trække 10 eller 20 procent fra det, andre har foreslået. Vi skal skabe allianceer med andre partnere om at fremme forslag og synspunkter, der kan føre EU og Europa i den retning, som vi gerne vil.

Den linie har regeringen fulgt fra første dag. Og det har virket. Under det danske EU-formandskab fik vi udvidelsen i hus. Vores forslag om en samlet og aktiv EU-politik over for de nye naboer er også blevet vedtaget. Og vi er i forreste linie, når det gælder om at reformere og styrke europæisk økonomi, så Europa fremover kan skabe job og sikre borgernes velfærd.

Den linie agter vi at fortsætte. Senest har vi spillet ud med et forslag om at fordoble EU's indsats inden for forskning og udvikling. Vi vil skabe et indre marked for forskning, udvikling og uddannelse, så EU kan blive en førende vidensøkonomi i verden. Og vi har fremlagt konkrete ideer til et styrket og mere effektivt samarbejde om at beskytte borgerne mod virkninger af terrorangreb og naturkatastrofer.

Med den ny traktat får EU den nødvendige ramme for at udvikle samarbejdet. Vi får en bedre traktat. Den er nødvendig for, at det udvidede EU kan fungere effektivt. Og den er mere demokratisk. Den nye traktat giver en klar beskrivelse af arbejdsdelingen i EU, større indflydelse til de nationale parlamenter, mere åbenhed og en styrkelse af borgernes rettigheder i forhold til EU. Som bekendt skal vi have en folkeafstemning om den nye traktat. Regeringen lægger vægt på, at der bliver god tid til en grundig oplysning og debat før folkeafstemningen. Og der er rimelig god tid. Den nye traktat skal først træde i kraft den 1. november 2006.

Første skridt bliver et forsøg på at indgå en national aftale om traktaten. Regeringen har indbudt de interesserede partier til forhandlinger om en sådan aftale. Formålet er at skabe det bredest mulige grundlag for en offensiv dansk politik i EU fremover.

\* \* \*

Danmark har udsigt til at blive medlem af FN's sikkerhedsråd de kommende to år. Valget af Danmark vil være en stor anerkendelse af Danmarks internationale profil og

sikkerhedspolitiske engagement. Det er et stort ansvar. Og det er en enestående mulighed for at få indflydelse.

Regeringen lægger afgørende vægt på fortsat at udvikle den internationale retsorden gennem FN. Vi ønsker at styrke FN og FN's sikkerhedsråd.

International terrorisme og masseødelæggelsesvåben er nogle af de største trusler mod borgernes sikkerhed. Derfor er det vigtigt, at alle lande deltager i at bekæmpe terrorisme. Det vil Danmark arbejde for i Sikkerhedsrådet. Derfor arbejder vi også for at få formandsposten for FN's anti-terror komité.

Arbejdet i Sikkerhedsrådet vil blive præget af de mange konflikter i Afrika og Mellemøsten.

Afrika må ikke blive det tabte kontinent. Verdens rige lande må stå sammen om at løfte det afrikanske kontinent ud af den nuværende elendighed. Vi må hjælpe Afrika, så forfald og fortvivlelse bliver afløst af fremskridt og forhåbning.

Der er brug for en bred indsats. Løse militære konflikter. Håndtere flygtninge-problemer. Sikre demokrati og god regeringsførelse. Skabe bedre handelsvilkår. Stimulere økonomisk udvikling. Bekæmpe AIDS.

Regeringen vil i løbet af de kommende måneder fremlægge en samlet Afrika-politik som ramme for en mere sammenhængende og målrettet dansk indsats. AIDS er den største enkeltstående trussel mod befolkningen i Afrika. Kampen mod AIDS er det område, hvor en ekstra indsats for alvor vil nyte. Derfor har regeringen foreslået en ekstraordinær bevilling til bekæmpelse af hiv/aids i 2005.

Vi vil forstærke indsatsen for at hjælpe verdens fattige lande med bedre miljø og sundhed. Derfor foreslår regeringen, at vi i ulandsbistanden lægger mere vægt på miljø, rent vand, bedre sanitet og bekæmpelse af smitsomme sygdomme.

Intet sted er nøden større end blandt de millioner af flygtninge, der henslæber en håbløs tilværelse på det afrikanske kontinent. Regeringens holdning er klar: Flygtninge skal hjælpes så tæt som muligt på deres hjem. Her kan vi hjælpe bedst, og her kan vi hjælpe flest.

Regeringen vil derfor styrke indsatsen for at hjælpe flygtningene der, hvor de er.

Mellemøsten forbliver det centrale arnested for terror og ufred. Det må vi forholde os til. Derfor har regeringen lanceret et arabisk initiativ med det formål at fremme modernisering og demokratisering i den arabiske verden. Derfor støtter regeringen, at der bliver etableret en levedygtig og selvstændig palæstinensisk stat. Og derfor fortsætter vi vores indsats i Irak.

Mange spørger sig selv:

Hvorfor deltager vi så aktivt i bekæmpelsen af terrorisme? Hvad skal danske soldater i Afghanistan? Og hvorfor er Danmark stadig i Irak?

Jeg forstår på sin vis godt de spørgsmål. Det ville jo umiddelbart være nemmere, at vi holdt os væk. Blev hjemme. Og passede vor egen have.

Men det ville være den forkerte vej. Tag ikke fejl. Situationen i fjerne lande påvirker også vort liv i Europa. Demokrati i Irak vil vise de arabiske folk, at der er en anden vej end undertrykkelse, terror og tyranni. Demokrati i Irak vil derfor bidrage til mere sikkerhed i Europa. Fred i Irak vil bidrage til tryghed i Europa.

Hvis den frie verden giver op i Irak nu, vil det give ekstremister og terrorister frit løb. Og de vil ikke stoppe ved Iraks grænser. Derfor skal vi hjælpe det irakiske folk med at bygge et frit og fredeligt og moderne Irak. Derfor skal vi hjælpe den irakiske regering med at skabe mere ro og sikkerhed. Derfor skal vi sammen med FN sikre og beskytte processen frem mod demokratiske valg i Irak.

Og derfor er jeg glad for, at der i Folketinget er bred opbakning til at forlænge den danske styrkes indsats i Irak.

\* \* \*

Vi vil fortsætte med at forny og modernisere rigsfællesskabet. Indflydelse, medansvar, samarbejde – det er nøgleord i et moderne fællesskab. Det er også holdningen bag regeringens ønske om at forny rigsfællesskabet med Færøerne og Grønland: Et

samarbejdende rigsfællesskab i pagt med tiden.

Indflydelse og samarbejde er sigtet med regeringens forslag om en udenrigspolitisk fuldmagt til Færøerne og Grønland. Den vil give landsstyrerne mulighed for en selvstændig udenrigspolitisk optræden på rigets vegne i egne anliggender.

Den færøske lagmand og jeg er enige om at søge gennemført en lovgivning, som vil give de færøske myndigheder mulighed for at overtage ansvaret for en lang række nye områder.

Det drejer sig om områder af stor betydning for den enkelte borgersom f.eks. retsvæsen, kriminalforsorg, familieret og udlændingeområdet. Grænsen bliver alene sat af de rammer, som grundloven og rigsfællesskabet giver.

Beslutningen om tempo og omfang for overtagelserne vil ligge på Færøerne. Og et grundlæggende princip vil være, at overtagelser af nye ansvarsområder går hånd i hånd med det økonomiske ansvar.

Regeringen og Grønlands Hjemmestyre har nedsat en parlamentarisk kommission. Den skal komme med forslag til, hvordan de grønlandske myndigheder kan overtage ansvaret for flere områder. Også her er der nu lagt et spor til fornyelse af forholdet mellem Grønland og Danmark. Inden for rammerne af grundlov og rigsfællesskab.

\* \* \*

Vi går nu ind i den fjerde folketingsamling, siden regeringen trådte til med nye mål for det danske samfund.

De løfter, som vi gav før valget i 2001, er gennemført. Og mere til.

Nu tager vi atter fat på et nyt, travlt folketingsår.

Vi har en god politisk tradition i Danmark. Vi kan være uenige. Nogle gange endda fløjtende uenige. Men vi søger i reglen at tage hensyn til modparten. Og vi tilstræber brede politiske forlig.

Det glæder mig, at det er lykkedes at skabe brede politiske aftaler mellem regeringen og partierne i Folketinget. Siden valget i november 2001 er omkring 80 procent af lovene vedtaget med et bredt flertal her i Folketinget.

Og det er ikke bare små-love. Der står brede flertal bag en række store reformer: Folkeskolereform, gymnasieresform, universitetsreform, flerårsaftale for erhvervsskolerne, forsvarsforlig, aftale om ”Flere i arbejde”, aftaler om Nordsøen og om energi. Blot for at nævne nogle af de større aftaler.

Selvfølgelig er det ikke et mål i sig selv, at der står brede flertal bag lovene. Det vigtigste er selvsagt, at vi gennemfører det, som er rigtigt og nødvendigt. Men det er en klar fordel, hvis vi samtidig kan skabe politisk bredde bag betydende reformer.

Det vil regeringen også lægge op til i den kommende folketingsamling.

Vi inviterer alle Folketingets partier til et bredt samarbejde.

Må jeg opfordre til, at vi indleder Folketingets arbejde med at udbringe et leve for Danmark.

Danmark leve!

**URL til artiklen:** <https://dansketaler.dk/tale/anders-fogh-rasmussens-aabningstale-2004/>

## **Appendix B**

### **B1: Lars Løkke Rasmussens tale ved Folketingets åbning, 2015**

Danmark er et dejligt land. Et af de bedste i verden. Det kan vi danskere hurtigt blive enige om.

Gennem generationer har vi skabt en helt særlig plet på kloden. Med frihed. Velstand. Harmoni.

Vi er stolte af, hvem vi er. Det har vi grund til.

Men vi skal også være ærlige om, at vi ikke har løst alle problemer.

Der er ting, vi kan gøre bedre. Der er ting, vi skal gøre bedre. Selv i et af verdens bedste lande.

Vi har bygget vores samfund på ligeværd. På tillid til hinanden. På respekt for den enkelte.

Det er det, der gør Danmark til Danmark. Til et samfund, der hænger sammen. Til det land, vi holder af.

Men når væksten koncentrerer sig i de større byer. Så kan Danmark blive delt i to.

Så risikerer vi et Danmark, der ikke hænger sammen geografisk.

Når børn vokser op i parallelsamfund, hvor ligeværd og frihed bliver tilsidesat.

Så risikerer vi et Danmark, der ikke hænger sammen værdimæssigt.

Når gevinsten ved at arbejde er for lille, og for mange bliver forsørget af det offentlige.

Så risikerer vi et Danmark, der ikke hænger sammen økonomisk.

Og når der ikke skabes nok private arbejdspladser, så hænger økonomien heller ikke sammen. For pengene til velfærd kan kun komme ét sted fra:

Vores virksomheder.

Danmark er et lille land i en stor verden. Vi er afhængige af det, der sker uden for vores grænser. Men vi skal selv bestemme, hvad vi er for et land.

Jeg ønsker et Danmark, der hænger sammen. Geografisk. Værdimæssigt. Økonomisk. Og menneskeligt.

\* \* \*

Danmark og Europa står i en ekstraordinær situation.

Vores grænser er under et dobbelt pres

Dels fra migranter, som søger væk fra fattigdom.

Dels fra mennesker på flugt fra krig og ødelæggelse.

Ofte under vilkår, der er så barske, at vi dårligt kan rumme dem.

Familier i synkefærdige både. Mennesker stuvet sammen i lastbiler. Børn og voksne prisgivet kyniske menneskesmuglere.

Det er dybt ulykkeligt.

Danmark har et ansvar for at hjælpe mennesker på flugt.

Men vi har også et ansvar for, at vores land hænger sammen.

Vi må tale åbent om, at der er forskel på at være flygtning og økonomisk migrant. Vi kan aldrig magte en folkevandring, der er båret af ønsket om et bedre liv. Hvor forstændigt det ønske end er.

Vi må holde hjertet varmt og hovedet koldt.

Der er ingen nemme løsninger. Men jeg mener, at vi har realistiske muligheder, hvis vi ser verden, som den er.

For det første er det klart, at Europa skal få styr på tilstrømningen. Det nytter ikke at lade Europas grænser stå åbne og kun tale om at fordele de mennesker, der kommer ind.

Vi må tage fat om problemets rod. Og Danmark gør vores del.

Regeringen afsætter 750 millioner kroner til blandt andet bistand i nærområder. Når vi hjælper i flygtningelejre tæt på hjemlandet. Så kan vi hjælpe flere. Og færre bliver drevet ud på en farefuld rejse mod Europa.

For det andet skal EU ikke bestemme, hvor mange asylansøgere Danmark tager imod.

Vi står og vil fortsat stå uden for EU's fælles asyl- og udlændingepolitik. Også efter folkeafstemningen den 3. december.

For det tredje fører regeringen en stram udlændingepolitik.

Vi har allerede indført en ny integrationsydelse. Den gør det mindre attraktivt at komme til Danmark. Vi vil stramme kravene til familiesammenføring. Og skærpe reglerne for at få permanent ophold.

Alt det gør vi, fordi vi synes, det er rimeligt. Og fordi de vilkår, der er i Danmark, har betydning for, hvor mange der søger asyl. Den erkendelse er efterhånden ved at brede sig.

Og jeg er overbevist om, at antallet har betydning for, om integrationen kan lykkes. Det synspunkt deler jeg også med stadig flere.

For det fjerde skal vi være ærlige om, at de nye flygtninge udfordrer integrationen.

Uanset om man mener, der kommer for mange eller for få flygtninge til landet – regeringen mener, at der kommer for mange – så er der flygtninge i Danmark. Og der kommer flygtninge til Danmark.

Hidtil er integrationen slæt fejl.

Efter et år i Danmark er kun én ud af ti flygtninge i arbejde eller uddannelse. Det er nedslående.

Efter fire år er det kun en tredjedel. Det er trist.

Og af alle indvandrere fra ikke-vestlige lande er ikke engang halvdelen i arbejde. Selvom mange har været her i 10, 20 eller 30 år. Det er dybt bekymrende.

Det skal vi gøre bedre. Meget bedre.

Jeg glæder mig over alle de gode viljer, der er sat fri de seneste uger. I virksomhederne. I foreningslivet. Hos de tusindvis af danskere, der har meldt sig som frivillige.

Nu skal vi gibe de gode viljer. Vi skal ud over flotte ord, varme følelser og de mange likes på Facebook. Vi skal forpligte hinanden til handling. Også længere frem.

Omkring årsskiftet vil regeringen fremlægge et nyt integrationsprogram. Målet er, at flygtninge, der har fået asyl, skal ud på en virksomhed så hurtigt som muligt. Og at de skal lære dansk samtidig. Vi skal skære ned på papirarbejdet og bruge kræfterne på at få integrationen til at virke.

Danmark skal hænge sammen økonomisk, socialt og kulturelt.

\* \* \*

Det store pres på Europas grænser har rod i komplikerede konflikter og ringe levevilkår. Verden er rykket tættere på. Og Danmark skal fortsat engagere os dér, hvor vi kan gøre størst forskel.

Vi er heldigvis ikke alene. Vi samarbejder med andre lande. Vi er en del af EU's indsats.

Derfor behøver vi heller ikke at være alle vegne. Vi skal fokusere vores udviklingsbistand, hvor det tjener vores interesser. Hvor vi fremmer de værdier, vi tror på. Og hvor vi bekæmper årsager til fattigdom og migration.

Både EU og Danmark skal stille krav om, at de lande, som migranterne kommer fra, tager deres egne statsborgere retur, når ikke de kan få lovligt ophold her.

Danmark deltager i den internationale indsats mod terrorbevægelsen ISIL i Irak. Vi ser ikke passivt til, når ISIL brutalt forgriber sig på lokalbefolkningen og fører terrorkrig mod os.

De danske piloter, mekanikere og det øvrige personale har løst deres opgave fremragende. Nu får de en tiltrængt pause herhjemme.

Men når vi sender flyene ud igen, er regeringen åben for at se på et bredere mandat for den danske indsats. Jeg håber, at Folketinget er parat til at bakke op. Så vi kan være med dér, hvor vi gør størst nytte. Også med vores kampfly.

Terror er et onde, vi skal blive ved med at bekæmpe. Målet er fred og fremgang. Så familier ikke bliver tvunget på flugt. Men kan leve i deres eget land.

Jeg er stolt af Danmark. Et land, der tager ansvar i verden. Hjælper mennesker i nød. Og værner om de værdier, der binder os sammen.

\* \* \*

Min regering har fået den opgave og dermed det ansvar at lede Danmark. Og enhver regering får ansvaret for at lede landet derfra, hvor det står.

Derfor har vi lavet et kasseeftersyn af den offentlige økonomi. Og resultatet er klart. Før valget blev der tegnet ét billede. Nu er billedet desværre et andet. Der er færre penge, end vi håbede og troede. Der er færre penge til ny politik.

Økonomien var kørt til budgetlovens yderste grænse. Kasseeftersynet viste, at man var kommet for langt ud.

Der bør være en sikkerhedsmargin. Det var der ikke før. Det er der nu.

Som ny regering er det vores opgave at få Danmark på sikker kurs igen.

Det betyder, at vi har 5 milliarder kroner mindre til næste år. Vi skal prioritere skarpt. Det er helt nødvendigt.

Regeringen har valgt at bruge færre penge på udviklingsbistand – men stadig leve op til FN's målsætning. At bruge færre penge på forskning – men stadig leve op til EU's målsætning. At effektivisere uddannelserne – men stadig ligge i top blandt de lande, der investerer mest i uddannelse.

Hvorfor gør vi det?

Fordi vi vil indfri de løfter, vi gik til valg på.

Flere penge til sundhed. Et stærkt politi. Muligheder for vækst i hele Danmark. En BoligJobordning.

Det lovede vi før valget. Det gennemfører vi efter valget.

Pengene skal stemme. Danmark skal hænge sammen økonomisk.

\* \* \*

Dansk økonomi er stille og roligt på vej frem efter krisen.

Men det går ikke lige godt alle steder i landet. Fremgangen har bedst fat i Hovedstaden og store dele af Østjylland.

Før flyttede de unge fra København, når de stiftede familie. Nu bliver mange boende.

I Trekantsområdet og Århus er der job at få. I mindre byer lukker virksomheden.

Familier flytter. Butikker lukker ned.

Jeg synes, det er trist, hvis Danmark bliver delt op i udvikling og afvikling.

Ikke alene trist for de dele af landet, hvor fremgangen er svær at få øje på. Men trist for hele Danmark. Jeg er overbevist om, at vi har brug for hinanden.

Vi hverken kan eller skal bremse de steder, hvor det går fremad. Men vi skal og kan give hele Danmark muligheder for også at udvikle sig.

Det er ikke enkelt. Virkeligheden er kompliceret.

Vi skal gøre mange forskellige ting.

Statslige arbejdspladser. Vi har besluttet at gennemføre den største samlede udflytning nogensinde.

Vi flytter omkring 3.900 statslige arbejdspladser.

Det handler om rimelighed. Staten tjener hele landet. Derfor skal staten være til stede i hele landet.

Og det handler om at skabe aktivitet dér, hvor der er brug for det. I alt 38 byer får nye statslige arbejdspladser.

Og mon ikke synet på regeringens beslutning afhænger af, hvor man ser den fra?

Jeg er fuldt ud opmærksom på, at det kan give problemer, når vi flytter tusindvis af job.

Det berører mange medarbejdere og deres familier. Og der venter et praktisk arbejde. At etablere arbejdspladserne nye steder. At sikre normal drift.

Men jeg er også fuldt opmærksom på, at udflytningen betyder meget for de steder, som får nye arbejdspladser.

I torsdags fik jeg en mail fra Brigitte fra Næstved. Hun skriver: "Af hjertet tak!!!! Det betyder uendeligt meget for vores by."

Det er Udlændingestyrelsen, der flytter til Næstved med 375 job.

For mig er det en bunden opgave at få fordelt de statslige arbejdspladser mere ligeligt ud over landet.

Private arbejdspladser. Regeringen vil også forbedre de private virksomheders vilkår for at skabe job og vækst i hele Danmark.

Vi lever af at producere. Levere service. Vi står stærkt inden for blandt andet medicinalindustri. Og den grønne sektor. Vi er energieffektive. Opfindsomme. Og kreative. De styrker skal vi bygge videre på. Med realismen i behold.

Vi skal ikke stille skrappere krav til vores egne virksomheder, end tyskerne eller svenskerne stiller til deres. Derfor gør vi op med overimplementering af EU-regler.

Vi tager hul på at forbedre vilkårene for generationsskifte. Vi vil fjerne reklameafgiften. Vi vil fjerne NOx-afgiften.

Vi vil gøre hverdagen lettere for virksomhederne. Derfor må erhvervsrettet lovgivning som hovedregel kun træde i kraft to gange om året – den 1. januar og den 1. juli.

Og vi vil gøre noget særligt for de mange virksomheder, der beskæftiger sig med fødevarer.

Danmarks landbrug, mejerier, slagterier – hele den danske fødevaresektor – producerer nogle af verdens sikreste fødevarer. De er førende på eksportmarkederne. De skaber titusindvis af arbejdspladser over hele landet.

Danmark har brug for en endnu stærkere fødevaresektor.

Det kan ikke være rigtigt, at dansk landbrug skal have lavere udbytte eller ringere kvalitet i kornet end vores naboer, fordi der ikke må gødes tilstrækkeligt.

Dansk landbrug skal være et konkurrencedygtigt erhverv.

Det bliver sigtelinjen i den landbrugs- og fødevarepakke, som vi vil offentliggøre inden jul.

En friere planlov. Det er også en vigtig del af regeringens strategi for vækst i hele Danmark.

I dag er der mange eksempler på, at planloven står i vejen for udvikling.

Flere byer kan ikke udvide, fordi de ligger, hvor de ligger. Ved kysten. Det gør rigtig mange danske byer.

Forladte bygninger står tomme. De skal have nyt liv. Også når de er placeret i landzone.

Og det er da ulogisk, at loven spænder ben for mennesker, der gerne vil bo i en landsby. Når nu affolkning af landsbyerne er et bredt anerkendt problem.

I Mariagerfjord Kommune ønskede nogle borgere for to år siden at købe grunde og bygge nyt i udkanten af landsbyen Rold.

Det er ikke muligt efter de gældende regler. For der er tale om ”byudvikling i det åbne land.” Og det betragtes som ”i strid med statslige interesser.”

Som jeg ser det, er det loven, der er i strid med borgernes, landsbyens, kommunens og Danmarks interesser.

Vi vil give kommunerne mere frihed.

Det er et stort ønske i mange kommuner.

Samtidig skal det være slut med uforståelige regler. Haveejere langs kysten skal da ikke spørge om lov til at sætte et højbed eller et gyngestativ op. Og hvorfor er der nogen, der ikke må bygge et skur til en havkajak?

Jeg har det princip, at love skal være til at forstå. Alt andet er manglende respekt for borgerne.

Regeringen fremlægger om kort tid et forslag til en friere og rimeligere planlov. Så kommuner, virksomheder og borgere får bedre mulighed for at skabe den udvikling og vækst, som er så tiltrængt uden for de store byer.

Jeg ønsker et Danmark, hvor vi selv vælger, hvordan vi vil leve vores liv. Mange mennesker er glade for at bo med højt til himlen, frisk luft i lungerne og et tæt naboskab. Det skal vi give friheden til.

Jeg vil et Danmark, der hænger sammen geografisk.

\* \* \*

Uden arbejdspladser. Ingen velstand.

Uden velstand. Ingen velfærd.

Uden velfærd hænger Danmark ikke sammen socialt.

Vi har et fællesskab, der hjælper dem, der har brug for det. Og en af grundpillerne i vores velfærdsamfund er retten til fri og lige sundhed.

Vi har et godt sundhedsvæsen. Men vi skal gøre det endnu bedre.

Når man ser på et Danmarks kort, så er chancerne for god og hurtig behandling større i nogle dele af landet end i andre. De forskelle skal vi til livs.

Alle Danmarks fem regioner må vise, at de kan levere høj kvalitet til borgerne. Den behandling, du får, skal ikke afhænge af, hvor i landet du bor.

Og den skal heller ikke afhænge af din pengepung.

Hvis du er syg, er det afgørende, at du hurtigt får at vide, hvad du fejler. Så du kan blive behandlet. Og forhåbentligt blive rask igen. Det skal være en ret for alle – uanset indtægt.

I dag har danskerne en udredningsret på 30 dage. Men i praksis holder den langt fra for alle patienter.

Hvad gør man så? Jo, hvis man har råd, kan man søge hjælp på et privathospital.

Hvis man har råd. Den ulighed i sundheden vil jeg ikke acceptere. Vi skal ikke have et A-hold og et B-hold.

Derfor vil vi give alle danskere, uanset om de lider af en fysisk eller en psykisk sygdom, den ret, at hvis det offentlige ikke kan udrede inden for 30 dage efter henvisning til sygehus, så kan du gå et andet sted hen – uden at dankortet skal frem.

Og når du har fået at vide, hvad du fejler og skal behandles, så bruger vi samme princip: Hvis ventetiden på de offentlige sygehuse er mere end 30 dage, så giver vi ret til privat behandling.

Det vigtige er mennesket. Ikke systemet. Det vigtige er den kvalitet, vi får. Ikke hvor lægen er ansat.

En god og tryg sundhed har særlig betydning for én gruppe af borgere: De ældre.

I sidste måned talte jeg med Olaf Sørensen på 83 år. Han blev hofteopereret i maj og lå på intensiv i 40 dage på grund af komplikationer. Det svækker et menneske.

Men da jeg mødte Olaf, var han ved godt mod. På kun otte dage havde han lært at rejse sig fra kørestolen og gå uden at holde i gelænderet.

Olaf og jeg mødtes på Aalborg Rehabiliteringscenter. Her gør personalet en kæmpe indsats for at hjælpe mennesker til at hjælpe sig selv.

Og ifølge Aalborg Kommune er rehabilitering ikke kun godt for den enkelte. Det er også en god forretning. Borgeren har brug for langt mindre hjælp fra kommunen, når han eller hun er hjemme igen.

Det eksempel skal vi tage med os, når vi skal løse problemerne på de medicinske afdelinger. Unødvendige indlæggelser. For mange genindlæggelser. Patienter, der ikke kommer hjem, selvom de er færdigbehandlede.

Ældre mennesker, der må ligge på en hospitalsgang. Det er uværdigt.

Det ønsker ingen af os for vores forældre eller bedsteforældre.

Regeringen vil nedbringe antallet af unødvendige indlæggelser af ældre medicinske patienter.

Vi vil give flere penge til kvalitet og forebyggelse i almen praksis og kommuner. Så færre bliver indlagt.

Det kommer oveni den milliard kroner ekstra til sundhed, som vi allerede har aftalt med regionerne. Penge, som skal gå til stigende udgifter til sygehusmedicin. Nye behandlingsformer. Og flere ældre og kroniske patienter.

Vi giver et massivt løft til sundhed og ældre allerede til næste år. For at være helt præcis et løft på 2,4 milliarder kroner.

Det er, hvad vi lovede før valget.

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Danmark er et trygt land. Og der er én gruppe mennesker, som har særlig betydning for vores tryghed.

Jeg bliver varm om hjertet, når danske betjente beroliger rådvilde familier. Bruger ord før fysisk magt. Og får smilet frem hos børn, der har oplevet ting, de burde være forsøknet for.

Jeg vil gerne takke politiet.

I handler med ordentlighed og respekt, når I tager imod flygtninge og migranter ved Danmarks grænser. Og jeg er taknemmelig for den professionelle indsats, I ydede under og efter terrorangrebet i København.

Alle ved, at politiet er presset. Et bredt flertal i Folketinget har sikret en ekstra bevilling i år. Og vi har afsat midler til at fjerne den store pukkel af overarbejde.

I efteråret skal vi indgå en politisk aftale om politiets økonomi i de kommende år. Regeringen ønsker et stærkt og synligt politi i hele landet. De skal have de redskaber og ressourcer, de har brug for.

Vi vil også sikre, at politiet kan samarbejde effektivt med kolleger i andre lande.

Det er derfor, at danskerne den 3. december skal stemme om at omdanne retsforbeholdet til en tilvalgsordning.

Med en tilvalgsordning kan Danmark selv bestemme, hvilke dele af EU's retssamarbejde vi ønsker at deltagte i.

Det betyder mere – ikke mindre – selvbestemmelse for Danmark.

Med en tilvalgsordning skaber vi sikkerhed for, at Danmark kan forblive et fuldt og helt medlem af det europæiske politisamarbejde Europol.

Det er afgørende for at fange og straffe menneskehandlere, narkohandlere, tyvebander og andre kriminelle, der opererer over grænserne.

Politisamarbejdet beviser sit værd i den helt aktuelle situation med mange flygtninge og migranter.

Europol sikrer efterretninger om presset på Danmarks og Europas grænser. De gør en indsats for at bekæmpe menneskesmuglere. De er et vigtigt led i bestræbelserne for at få styr på tilstrømningen.

Et ja den 3. december er et ja til, at Danmark kan forblive i det europæiske politisamarbejde.

Et ja den 3. december er ikke en glidebane for dansk deltagelse i EU's samarbejde om asyl og indvandring.

Det fremgår krystalklart af den brede Europol-aftale, at dansk udlændingepolitik fortsat skal fastlægges i Danmark. Det gælder også efter et ja til tilvalgsordningen.

Derfor vil jeg opfordre alle partier til, at vi i efterårets debat diskuterer det, som afstemningen den 3. december handler om. Og ikke det, den ikke handler om.

Den handler ikke om fælles udlændinge- eller asylpolitik. Her står Danmark udenfor. Det skal vi fortsat gøre. Vi bestemmer selv vores udlændingepolitik.

Det burde være enkelt nok. Ja-partierne bag Europol-aftalen har givet hinanden gensidig votoret på den del.

Alligevel virker det som om, nogen forsøger at tegne et fejlagtigt billede af, at vi er på vej ned ad en glidebane. Det er vi ikke.

For at mane enhver tvivl i jorden, vil jeg i dag understrege: Hvis et flertal i Folketinget på noget tidspunkt måtte ønske, at Danmark skal deltage i den fælles europæiske asylpolitik. Så er min holdning helt klar: Vi hæver ikke vores veto uden at spørge danskerne ved en ny folkeafstemning. Det vil jeg gerne garantere her i dag.

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I rigsfællesskabet har vi en solid tradition for at diskutere problemer åbent og finde løsninger sammen. Jeg glæder mig til samarbejdet med det nye landsstyre på Færøerne og med landsstyret i Grønland.

Færøerne og Grønland ønsker at arbejde med egne forfatninger. Det har regeringen forståelse for. Vi drøfter gerne spørgsmål med landsstyrerne, som opstår i forbindelse med forfatningsarbejdet for at sikre, at nye forfatninger kan rummes inden for rigsfællesskabet.

Der er forskel på Færøernes og Grønlands økonomiske situation. Men begge lande står over for store økonomiske udfordringer på lidt længere sigt. Danmark træder gerne til med rådgivning og administrativ bistand, hvis Færøerne eller Grønland ønsker det.

Vi skal nedbryde de hindringer, der er for borgernes og virksomhedernes mobilitet mellem Danmark, Færøerne og Grønland. Så styrker vi rigsfællesskabet. Det er en vigtig sag, som vi arbejder sammen om.

Sagen om servicekontrakten på Thulebasen betyder meget for både Grønland og Danmark. Og regeringen prioriterer den højt. Vi arbejder på, at Thulebasen i størst muligt omfang skal komme Grønland til gode. Og vi arbejder tæt sammen med landstyret om sagen.

Jeg ønsker også et tæt samarbejde i rigsfællesskabet og i Norden om udviklingen i Arktis – og om vores fælles arbejde i blandt andet Arktisk Råd. Der er stor international fokus på de nye muligheder og udfordringer i Arktis.

\* \* \*

Danmark er mulighedernes land. Det skal det også være for de næste generationer.

Og hovedvejen til gode muligheder går gennem gode uddannelser til alle unge.

Vi har sammen med et bredt flertal vedtaget en god folkeskolereform. En reform, hvor alle børn skal blive så dygtige, som de overhovedet kan.

Vi har sammen skabt en reform af erhvervsuddannelserne. En reform, som skal genskabe prestigen ved at blive faglært. Dem har vi brug for.

Og det er regeringens ambition, at vi til næste år styrker gymnasierne med en reform, der hæver det faglige niveau. Og målretter gymnasierne til det, som er deres formål: En solid forberedelse til videre uddannelse.

Men det er ikke nok, at vi ser på ungdomsuddannelserne én for én.

Vi skal også se på dem under ét.

I dag er der alt for mange unge, som falder fra eller vælger forkert. Nogle bliver slået tilbage til start. Andre fortsætter med en uddannelse, som de måske hverken kan eller vil bruge.

Vi skal tage fat på omveje og blindgyder i uddannelserne.

Jeg synes også, det er på tide, at vi får et stærkere fokus på de unge, der falder helt igennem. Dem, der aldrig får en ungdomsuddannelse.

Det er fantastisk at se lyset i øjnene på en dreng, der har haft nederlag på nederlag. For så pludselig at opdage, at også han kan stå på tæer og række op og gøre en succes.

Det er trist, at mange unge ikke får den mulighed.

I dag er der ikke god nok undervisning til dem, der har brug for et fagligt løft og en bedre forberedelse.

Det kan fx være en dreng, der har taget 10. klasse på en efterskole. Og derefter går på produktionsskole for at lave noget praktisk og blive klogere på, hvad han vil.

Men langt fra alle forløb er gode nok. Der er eksempler på forberedende undervisning, som knap nok rykker de unge. Det er for dårligt.

Derfor vil regeringen nedsætte en ekspertgruppe, der skal samle erfaringer, og se på, hvordan vi kan forbedre vejen fra folkeskole til den rigtige ungdomsuddannelse. Både for de fagligt svage. Og for alle de andre, der går en omvej til den uddannelse, der passer til dem.

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Vi skal have råd til at investere i sundhed. Vi skal investere i uddannelse. Det kan kun lade sig gøre, hvis vores land hænger sammen økonomisk.

Derfor er det et problem, når mange lever af kontanthjælp eller dagpenge.

Det bekymrer mig, at mange ikke har et job. Jeg tror på, at man får et bedre liv ved at have noget at stå op til om morgen. Vores land skal også hænge sammen menneskeligt.

Jeg har sat den retning: Flere skal forsørge sig selv. Færre skal forsøges af det offentlige.

Jeg synes, det er rimeligt, at man får noget ekstra for at yde en indsats.

Tag et par på kontanthjælp. De er over 30 år. De har tre børn. Hvis den ene får et arbejde til godt 220.000 kroner om året, så giver det kun cirka 1.400 kroner ekstra til familien hver måned.

Måske er der dem, der overvejer, om det er det værd?

Den bekymring kan jeg få.

Regeringen vil indføre et kontanthjælpsloft. Vi vil sætte en klar grænse for, hvor meget en kontanthjælpsmodtager kan modtage i offentlige ydelser.

Vi sikrer, at kontanthjælpsmodtagere vil have en væsentlig indkomstfremgang ved at tage et fuldtidsjob.

Vi vil også udbrede den nye integrationsydelse til alle, der kun har opholdt sig i Danmark i en kortere årrække.

Det er første fase i regeringens jobreform.

Når vi sparer på pengene til dem, der ikke arbejder. Så frigør vi penge til at sætte skatten ned. Især for dem, der tjener mindst. Det er rimeligt.

Det skal kunne betale sig at arbejde. Også for mennesker med små indkomster.

Derudover har regeringen en ambition om at sænke skatten på den sidst tjente krone.

Det bliver retningen i anden fase af vores jobreform.

Men inden vi når dertil, skal vi drøfte dagpenge.

Uden dagpengereformen og de andre reformer, vi gennemførte eller tog initiativ til, sidst vi var i regering, ville de offentlige kasser mangle 47 milliarder kroner om året.

Jeg mener, at dagpengereformen fra 2010 er grundlæggende rigtig.

Men det betyder ikke, at systemet er perfekt.

Dagpengekommissionen præsenterer sine anbefalinger den 19. oktober. Med det afsæt vil vi indlede forhandlinger med Folketingets partier.

Jeg ønsker en aftale, som respekterer den ramme, den tidligere regering har sat. Det er min ambition, at vi kan samles om en løsning med bred opbakning. Så der kan komme ro om reglerne.

Og med den del på plads vil vi i det nye år indkalde arbejdsmarkedets parter til trepartdrøftelser.

Hvordan kan der skabes flere private job? Hvordan kan vores unge få en praktikplads? Og hvordan får virksomhederne de medarbejdere, de har brug for? Det er noget af det, vi skal drøfte.

I Danmark har vi haft en tradition for, at lønmodtagerne, arbejdsgiverne og politikerne sammen laver treparts aftaler om væsentlige samfundsspørgsmål.

Det er en god tradition. Den vil vi genskabe.

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Vores evne til at tage ansvar sammen. Vores tillid til hinanden. Vores harmoniske samfund.

Det er det Danmark, vi er stolte af. Og som vi skal værne om.

Jeg ønsker et Danmark, der hænger sammen geografisk. Hvor den enkelte har friheden til at bo og arbejde i hele landet.

Jeg vil et samfund med et stærkt sundhedsvæsen for alle. Uanset hvor du bor, og hvor mange penge du har.

Jeg går ind for et land, som er åbent for dem, der kan og vil. Hvor hovedvejen til Danmark er uddannelse og arbejde – ikke asyl og familiesammenføring. Og hvor vi er realistiske om, hvor mange udlændinge vi magter at integrere.

Jeg stræber efter et Danmark, hvor vi belønner dem, der går på arbejde og yder deres del. Og hvor virksomhederne har frihed til at skabe fremgang og job.

I dag – den 6. oktober – har vi været regering i 100 dage.

Jeg glæder mig over, at vi både før sommerferien og så sent som i går har indgået gode aftaler med alle Folketingets partier, på nær et enkelt. Vi har taget de første skridt.

I dag har jeg annonceret de næste skridt, som vi vil tage i det nye folketingsår.

Men først og fremmest har vi sat en retning for Danmark mange år frem. En retning for et friere, rigere og rimeligere samfund.

Jeg glæder mig til samarbejdet med jer her i Folketinget. Og med mange andre engagerede danskere. Arbejdsmarkedets parter. De frivillige. Alle, der vil tage ansvar.

Lad os indlede det nye folketingsår med at udbringe et leve for vores land.

DANMARK LEVE.

Hurra! Hurra! Hurra!

Artiklen er udskrevet fra Danske Taler: <https://dansketales.dk>

URL til artiklen:  
<https://dansketaler.dk/tale/statsminister-lars-loekke-rasmussens-tale-ved-folketingets-abning-2015/>

## B2: ‘Kristian Jensen: Min største opgave er ulandsbesparelserne’, Altinget, 2015

En flygtningekrise uden sidestykke siden Anden Verdenskrig. Krig i Mellemøsten. Og en konflikt mellem Ukraine og Rusland, der fortsætter.

Der er nok at tage fat på for næstformanden i Venstre, Kristian Jensen, der for kun ca. halvanden måned siden også kunne sætte sig på posten som udenrigsminister. Alligevel ser han regeringens bebudede besparelse af udviklingsbistanden som sin største opgave i år.

Regeringens målsætning er at sænke bistanden fra de nuværende ca. 0,87 procent til 0,7 procent af BNI, som vil være det laveste niveau siden 1978.

”Det havde været meget nemmere, hvis jeg kunne tage penge fra noget, der ikke virker. Vi har brugt penge, hvor de har gjort gavn. Men vi er nødt til at prioritere, så vi bruger pengene, hvor de gør mest gavn,” siger Kristian Jensen.

Vi vil stadig være en udenrigspolitisk storspiller med en fantastisk 'standing' hos andre lande og i FN-systemet.

Kristian Jensen (V) om kommende besparelser på ulandsbistanden, Udenrigsminister Omprioriteringen, som Kristian Jensen selv kalder det, vil ifølge ham betyde ”over to milliarder kroner” mindre på bistandsrammen, der blandt andet skal bruges på sundhed og ældre i Danmark i stedet.

”Det er både rimeligt, fair og tilstrækkeligt, at Danmark bidrager med 0,7 procent i traditionel udviklingsbistand. Men for at prioritere skarpere vil vi bruge en større andel af bistanden i Afrika, hvor de største udfordringer ligger,” siger han.

Hele verden skal i slutningen af september under et stort anlagt FN-topmøde – med Mogens Lykketoft i formandsstolen – forhandle afløseren for de såkaldte Millennium Development Goals fra 2000 på plads. De i alt 17 nye såkaldte bæredygtigheds mål, hvoraf udryddelse af fattigdom er et af dem, skal sætte rammerne frem mod 2030 for, hvor verden ifølge FN bør bevæge sig hen.

Hvilket indtryk tror du, det efterlader, at Danmark sænker sin udviklingsbistand med næsten 20 procent lige før topmødet?

”Vi vil stadig være en udenrigspolitisk storspiller med en fantastisk 'standing' hos andre lande og i FN-systemet. Og vi kan med rank ryg og stolthed i stemmen sige, at vi lever op til FN's målsætning på 0,7 procent,” siger han og fortsætter:

”Folk vil stadig anerkende vores bidrag. I gennemsnit giver den udviklede del af verden 0,23 procent i bistand. Derfor er der stadig masser af luft for andre til at løfte,” slår han fast.

Den tidligere regering har afsat ca. 17,7 mia. kr. til udviklingsbistand i 2015. Hvis bistanden allerede i år var sænket til 0,7 procent, ville man have 14,24 mia. kr. tilbage. Det svarer til en besparelse på 19,5 procent.

Aldrig under 0,7

Kristian Jensen lover, at det danske udviklingsbidrag ikke vil nå under 0,7 procent.

I finansloven er der hvert år et skøn for næste års danske vækst, som regeringen skal bruge til at sørge for, at der bliver tilført nok ekstra penge til ulandsbistanden for at leve op til målsætningen. Det slår ministeren fast:

”Det er vores løfte, at vi overholder FN's målsætning på 0,7 procent.”

Men de ekstra penge kunne bruges på eksempelvis ældre eller sundhed i Danmark. Hvordan har du det med det?

”Hvis vandet stiger, stiger alle både i havnen. Det er det samme her. Jeg ser det ikke som et problem,” siger han.

Det, jeg forsørger at spørge om, er, hvor vigtigt det er for jer at ligge over FN's anbefalede minimumsniveau ...

”Det afgørende er, at vi opfylder FN's minimumsniveau for udviklingsbistand på 0,7 procent,” siger Kristian Jensen.

Friholder nødhjælp

Mens det står uklart, hvordan og hvor regeringen vil spare på udviklingsbistanden, tegner der sig efterhånden et tydeligere billede af, hvilke pejlemærker udenrigsministeren vil sigte efter på udviklingsområdet.

Ud over at Venstre gentagene gange har peget på, at der skal en større andel af bistanden til Afrika, har regeringen lovet at prioritere støtten til nærområder til især Syrien, hvor millioner er på flugt fra den over fire år gamle borgerkrig.

Og direkte adspurgt betyder det ifølge Kristian Jensen, at man vil friholde nødhjælpsområdet for besparelser. Det skal være med til at holde migrationsstrømmene på afstand.

”Nødhjælpen skal sikre, at vi giver hjælpen i nærområderne. Hvis vi hjælper en flygtning tæt på sit land, er der også høj sandsynlighed for, at hans familie vender tilbage. Omvendt er det svært at vende tilbage, hvis man har boet langt borte,” lyder det.

Men hvis I vil forebygge de store migrationsstrømme, vil en prioritering af nødhjælpen på et budget, der bliver mindre, give mindre til normale og mere langsigtede udviklings- og fattigdomsprojekter. Hvordan ser du på dilemmaet mellem de to prioriteringer?

”Nødhjælp handler om at hjælpe, når beslutningen om at flygte er taget. Vi har brug for at have nødhjælp, lejre, arbejdsmuligheder og mad, så man har en tålelig tilværelse,” siger Kristian Jensen og fortsætter:

”Men vi skal også diskutere, hvorfor folk vælger at flygte. Det gør man ofte på grund af krig samt i mangel af personlig frihed, et ordentlig retssystem og udviklingsmuligheder. Hvis jeg stod som 20-årig i Mali og kiggede op mod Europa, så ville jeg også være fristet til at tage den lange rejse,” siger han.

Derfor handler det ifølge udenrigsministeren om at bidrage til at skabe et håb for at bygge en fremtid i de lande, folk er i. Og det lover ministeren, at Danmark – men også EU – kommer til at lave en indsats for.

#### Mere til erhvervslivet

Tidligere handels- og udviklingsminister Mogens Jensen havde stort fokus på at sikre større samspil mellem udviklings- og handelsområdet. Det skulle skabes job fra Hanoi til Herning, var begründelsen.

Men sidste år blev 128 mio. kr. fjernet fra erhvervsredskaberne på udviklingsbistanden, der blandt andet skulle hjælpe danske virksomheder i gang i udviklingslandene. Det skete, for at SR-regeringen kunne lande en finansaftale for 2015 med SF og Enhedslisten, fordi man måtte finde besparelser for 2,5 mia. kr. til at finansiere en stor stigning i antallet af asylansøgere, der kom til Danmark.

Det var ikke sket, hvis Venstre kunne have bremset det, slår udenrigsministeren fast. Han vil i stedet bruge en større andel af bistanden til at hjælpe erhvervslivet.

Kristian Jensen er parat til at bruge nogle af de penge, der var taget af udviklingsbistanden og afsat til asylområdet, til at hjælpe primært små og mellemstore virksomheder.

”Den private sektor er en afgørende forudsætning for udvikling. Bistandsmodtagere siger, at de gerne vil have vores bistand. Men de allerhelst vil have vores investeringer, fordi det både medfører en økonomisk, men også en teknologisk overførelse,” siger han.

Hvis det skal lykkedes at nå de kommende 17 bæredygtigheds mål udelukkende med traditionel bistand, vil verden ifølge ministeren skulle give fire procent af deres BNI til udviklingsbistand – i dag gives der i gennemsnit 0,23 procent.

”Uden at få blandt andet kapitalfonde og pensionskasser til at bidrage er det helt håbløst. Derfor skal vi diskutere, hvad de efterspørger for at investere. Og de efterspørger først og fremmest, at der er sikkerhed, et velfungerende retssystem og en åben, transparent markedsøkonomi,” siger han.

#### Kompromisser uundgåelige

Dansk Folkeparti og Liberal Alliance, der sammen Konservative forventes at lave finanslov med Venstre, har allerede meldt ud, at de deler målsætning med Venstre i forhold til udviklingsbistanden.

Men før regeringen overhovedet kan komme igennem med sine ønsker om at sænke udviklingsbistanden til 0,7 procent af BNI, skal De Konservative være med på ideen.

”Som mindretalsregering må vi forhandle. Hvis nogen partier mener, at vi skal fjerne vores andre initiativer for at bruge det på udviklingsbistand, må vi jo se, hvad der kan skabes et flertal for,” siger ministeren.

#### Hvordan vil du have det, hvis I ikke når ned på 0,7 procent?

”Snævert set som minister vil det lette min hverdag, hvis vi landede et andet sted, der var højere end 0,7 procent. Men jeg har ført valgkamp og blevet valgt på at mene, at det er både rimeligt og fair med 0,7 procent,” siger han.

#### Vil det ikke være et løftebrud, hvis det ikke lykkes?

”Vi er den smalleste regering i over 30 år. Det, vi lægger frem, er vores politik. Vi kommer til at lave et finanslovsudspil, der afspejler Venstres politik. Men vi kommer til at lave indrømmelse og kompromisser med alle de partier, der vil lave finanslov med os,” siger Kristian Jensen.

#### Mange ubekendte

#### Vil I skære på bidragene til de danske udviklings- og nødhjælpsorganisationer?

”Når vi friholder det humanitære arbejde, er vi nødt til at skære andre steder. Hvordan og hvorledes det kommer til at ske, vender vi tilbage til,” siger Kristian Jensen, der også udtrykker behov for at kigge på graden af støtte til de multilaterale organisationer.

Dansk Folkeparti vil gerne have Det Arabiske Initiativ lukket. Hvordan ser du fremtiden for det Arabiske initiativ?

”Det Arabiske Initiativ er meget væsentligt i forhold til, at lave en langsigtet civilsamfundsopbygning, så landene fortsat bevæger sig mod demokrati og holder sig ude af problemer og konflikter, siger han og fortsætter:

”Det Arabiske Initiativ har været med til at bekæmpe Isil på flere områder. Ud over blandt andet hjælp med F16-fly og troppeopbygning, bekæmper vi Isil med midler til at understøtte civilsamfundet. Jeg ser Det Arabiske Initiativ som led i den komplette pakke af sikkerhedspolitiske instrumenter, som vi bruger til at bekæmpe Isil.”

Så I afviser at lukke Det Arabiske Initiativ?

”Ja.”

Men kan I afvise, at der kommer besparelser?

”Ud over det humanitære kan jeg hverken be- eller afkraefte noget,” siger Kristian Jensen

I vil prioritere Afrika. Men den største modtager af dansk udviklingsbistand er Afghanistan, som ligger uden for Afrika. Hvad kommer der til at ske med Afghanistan?

”Jeg vil overhovedet ikke tale niveauer, men vi har særlig historisk forpligtelse over for Afghanistan. Derudover har vi et bredt forlig om vores indsats i Afghanistan. Og vi har som hovedregel på Christiansborg, at det man ikke vil fastholde, skal man opsigte inden et valg. Det har vi ikke gjort,” lyder det.

URL til artiklen:

<https://www.altinget.dk/udvikling/artikel/kristian-jensen-min-stoerste-opgave-er-ulandsbesparelserne>

## Appendix C

### **C1: Flemming Møller Mortensens tale ved det Udenrigspolitiske Selskab, 2022**

Tak til Det Udenrigspolitiske Selskab for igen i år, at stå for konkurrence og arrangement.

I år må dog siges at være et særligt år. Et meget særligt år.

Putins uprovokerede angrebskrig har bragt Europa i en situation, som vi ikke har set i samme skala siden afslutningen på 2. Verdenskrig.

Vi står med det, der ellers længe har været helt utænkeligt: en krig i Europa. En invasion af et frit og selvstændigt land.

Og vi står med en forfærdelig humanitær katastrofe. Mange er dræbt. Flere er blevet sårede.

Og indtil videre er over fire millioner mennesker flygtet ud af Ukraine. Dertil er næsten syv millioner er på flugt internt i Ukraine.

Samlet svarer det til hele Sveriges befolkning.

Vi står med et Europa, der er under stærk forandring.

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Ingen må være i tvivl om, at ukrainernes modige kamp i høj grad også er vores kamp.

For Danmark er tryggere, og danskernes muligheder flere og bedre, i en demokratisk verden.

Hvor menneskerettighederne, folkeretten og hele det fundamentale sæt af internationale spilleregler bliver respekteret og overholdt, og hvor man bliver stillet til ansvar for sine handlinger.

Og ukrainerne viser os, at også vi fremover selv må tage større ansvar for vores egen tryghed og sikkerhed. Og om nødvendigt kæmpe for den.

Vores egen tryghed og sikkerhed er også – det må vi ikke glemme – præmissen for, at vi kan føre den udviklingspolitik, som vi gør.

Det er derfor, at vi hvert år kan give ca. 17. mia. kroner i den samlede udviklingsbistand, blandet andet til flygtningemodtagelse og migrationsindsatser.

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Derfor har regeringen også allerede handlet.

Regeringen og partierne bag det Nationale Kompromis er enige om et markant, historisk løft af vores forsvar.

En generel reserve på 3,5 mia. kr. afsættes årligt i 2022 og 2023 til blandt andet forhøjet beredskab, aktuelle økonomiske ubalancer i forsvaret, styrket diplomati og humanitær indsats, så vi kan håndtere den aktuelle krise.

Og inden udgangen af 2033 skal Danmarks udgifter til forsvar og sikkerhed være løftet varigt til 2% af BNP.

Ved at styrke det danske forsvar styrker vi også NATO-alliancen. Og der er heldigvis en lang række allierede, der i disse dage tager lignende skridt, så vi sammen kan varetage vores fælles sikkerhed.

Og så skal vi af med forsvarsforbeholdet. Alle i Europa skal tage et større ansvar for egen sikkerhed. Og Danmark skal være med.

Tiden kalder på sammenhold – ikke forbehold. Samarbejde, ikke enegang.

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Tak til alle jer studerende, der har skrevet og indsendt artikler.

I har skrevet om flygtninge og migration. Det gjorde nogle af jer før de forfærdelige begivenheder i Ukraine.

Desværre har de mange flygtninge fra Putins angrebskrig kun gjort temaet endnu mere aktuelt.

Vi har i regeringen længe talt om, at flygtninge skal hjælpes bedre i deres nærområder. Det er en af hovedprioriteterne i den udviklingspolitiske strategi, som otte af Folketingets partier står bag.

Nu har vi fået syn for sagen. Pludselig er vi selv nærområde. Nu er det os, der skal hjælpe vores naboer. Det forpligter.

Det bliver en enorm opgave. Det bliver en svær opgave. Men jeg er sikker på, at vi vil løfte den.

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Men vi skal også fortsat hjælpe med at løfte verden. Der er brug for det.

Demokratiske værdier har længe været på retur. Fattigdom, flugt og fundamentalisme vokser igen.

Og verdens uligheder er jo ikke blevet mindre af, at Rusland har invaderet Ukraine. Tværtimod.

Vi ser stigende fødevarepriser som følge af krigen i Ukraine.

Samtidig ser vi, hvordan der også på det afrikanske kontinent foregår en værdikamp mellem demokratier og autokratier med Rusland som vores direkte modstander.

I Mali spreder russerne misinformation om Vesten. Og de påvirker sikkerhedssituationen med deres lejesoldater.

Hvad enten vi kan lide det eller ej, må det være tydeligt for enhver, at geopolitikken er tilbage.

Det har også betydning for den måde, vi bruger udviklingssamarbejdet på.

Vi skal stå ved, at vi også bruger udviklingssamarbejdet til at bekæmpe påvirkning fra kræfter, som ikke deler vores demokratiske værdier og syn på menneskerettigheder.

Vi må gå på to ben.

Vi vinder nemlig ikke den globale værdikamp med militærmagt alene. Der er også meget brug for det, som udviklingssamarbejdet kan

Nemlig skabe civil udvikling. Højne uddannelsesniveauet.

Give piger og kvinder samme uddannelses- og jobmuligheder som drenge og mænd.

Fremme demokrati, menneskerettigheder og de kræfter, der står på de samme værdier som os.

Kun på den måde får vi skabt samfund, som mennesker kan og vil leve i – og ikke migrere fra.

Det bliver netop mit arbejde som udviklingsminister de kommende år at finde den balance.

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Så selvfølgelig skal Danmark fortsat have et stærkt udviklingssamarbejde.

Vi skal fortsat bidrage til at skabe fremtidsudsigter og bæredygtige liv for verdens fattige.

Vi skal bruge udviklingssamarbejdet til at vise vejen som grøn frontløber gennem klima-, natur- og miljøindsatser.

Og vi skal forebygge fattigdom og ulighed, skrøbelighed, konflikt og vold, som leder til tvungen fordrivelse og irregulær migration.

Danmark er et af de meget få lande, der lever op til FN's målsætning om at give mindst 0,7 pct. af BNI i udviklingsbistand.

Det har vi gjort i mere end 40 år, og det bliver vi ved med.

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Jeg vil gerne endnu engang sige mange tak for jeres artikler.

De bidrager til at løse netop den grundlæggende udfordring, som vi i Europa skal blive bedre til at håndtere.

Det er opløftende og inspirerende at se jeres store udenrigspolitiske engagement og lyst til at debattere.

Der er brug for det – vi lever i meget særlige tider.

Tak for ordet.

URL til artiklen:

<https://um.dk/om-os/ministrene/tidligere-ministres-taler-og-artikler/flemming-moeller-mortensens-taler-og-artikler/tale-ved-arrangement-hos-det-udenrigspolitiske-selskab>

## C2: Statsminister Mette Frederiksens tale til arrangementet “Et lys i mørket”, 2022

Kære danskere. Kære ukrainere.

I aften for 77 år siden kom den nyhed, som alle danskere havde ventet med længsel: De nazistiske tropper overgav sig. Danmark var atter frit.

Forestil jer Rådhuspladsen. Lige her, hvor vi er nu. En smuk aften i maj.

Her samledes mennesker i tusindvis. Dengang i 1945.

Folk dansede. Kravlede rundt på sporvogne. Kastede sig i hinandens arme.

Med grin og gråd. Kys og kram.

Der blev viftet med dannebrog. Danmark var igen et rigtigt land. Et frit land.

Præcis 77 år efter den bedste aften i moderne Danmarkshistorie står vi her igen. Tusindvis af mennesker samlet på Rådhuspladsen.

Tak! Til alle jer, der er mødt frem.

\* \* \*

I aften vifter I med ukrainske flag.

For denne gang er krigen tilbage i Europa. Brutal. Umenneskelig. Ubærlig.

Krig i Europa. Tænk, at vores generation igen skal konfronteres med det.

I al sin gru. Så minder det os om, at frihed forpligter.

At demokrati ikke kommer af sig selv.

Og at vi europæere har et skæbnefællesskab.

På ruinerne af Anden Verdenskrig rejste vi de institutioner, som gjorde, at Europa vandt freden. FN. NATO. Og EU.

Putin troede, at han kunne splitte Europa. Men hans brutale fremfærd har ført til det modsatte. Båndene mellem os er stærkere end nogensinde før.

Og lad mig gøre det helt klart:

Ukraine tilhører ingen andre end Ukraine.

\* \* \*

For to uger siden rejste jeg til Ukraine.

Jeg glemmer det aldrig. Så meget ødelæggelse. Så meget smerte og sorg. Boliger, der aldrig igen bliver til at bo i. Sønderskudte hjem. Hele bydele smadret af Putins krigsmaskine.

Men det værste var beretningerne om forbrydelser mod mennesker.

Grusomme voldtægter. Brutale mord.

Kvinder. Mænd. Unge. Gamle. Små børn.

Det vil jeg aldrig glemme. Det vil vi aldrig glemme. Det må verden aldrig glemme.

Vi bliver nødt til at love hinanden. At de ansvarlige bliver stillet til regnskab.

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Midt i mørket er også et lys. For på trods af smerten kæmper I ufortrødent videre mod Putins overmagt.

Vi har netop hørt den ukrainske nationalsang. ”Vi giver krop og sjæl for vores frihed.” Sådan synger I.

Som folk kan I ikke synge noget andet. Opgiver I jeres frihed, så har I intet. Intet!

Når friheden er under angreb, er det ikke nok, at vi fortæller hinanden om vigtigheden af den. Vi skal også være klar til at forsvare friheden.

Derfor sender vi våben og militært udstyr. Og vi bliver ved med at gøre det.

Derfor har vi vedtaget sanktioner. Og vil blive ved med at gøre det.

Derfor hjælper vi med humanitær bistand. Og kære Danmark, skal vi ikke blive ved med også.

Vil Danmark være med til at genopbygge Ukraine? Det spørgsmål stillede Zelenskyy mig i Kyiv.

Mit svar og Danmarks svar er selvfølgelig: Ja! De første danske gravemaskiner er allerede på vej.

Ukraine kan regne med Danmark og danskerne.

\* \* \*

Dengang i 1945 – i aften for 77 år siden – betød befrielsen, at de, der var flygtet fra Danmark, kunne vende hjem til Danmark igen.

I de følgende dage og uger kom de hjem – de tusindvis af jøder, som var sejlet over Øresund til sikkerhed i Sverige.

Langt de fleste danske jøder overlevede krigen. Danske jøders skæbne er et lys i det nazistiske folkemords mørke.

Hundredvis af danske familier hjalp deres jødiske medmennesker med husly og mad. Skjulte de forfulgte. Organiserede flugten til Sverige.

I aften vil jeg gerne rette en særlig tak til alle i Danmark, som hjælper de ukrainske flygtninge. Jeg er dybt taknemmelig over den store gæstfrihed, I viser. Tak for den.

Og en helt særlig hilsen til jer ukrainere, som er flygtet til Danmark.

Vi ved, at I for kort tid siden levede et helt almindeligt liv derhjemme. Som os. Fulgte ungerne i skole. Gik på arbejde. Købte ind. Tog til fodbold. Besøgte venner.

Nu har I behov for at være her. Genfinde så normal en hverdag som muligt.

I skal vide, at I er velkomne.

Danmark passer på jer.

\* \* \*

Om aftenen den 4. maj sætter vi lys i vinduerne for at fejre, at Danmark blev frit. Det har vi gjort i 76 år.

Men i aften – den 4. maj 2022 – der tænder vi lys for Ukraine.

Lysene er vores vartegn for, at håbet og freden vil sejre. For vores modstand mod uret og krig, som Vesten samles om.

Kære danskere. Kære ukrainere.

Jeg er bearet over, at præsident Zelenskyy i aften vil tale til det danske folk.

Det er Zelenskyy, der lige nu viser os, hvordan nationalt sammenhold og modstandskraft ser ud i vores tid.

Han bærer ukrainernes smerte i sig. Og den giver ham styrke. Kampgejst. Mod.

Kære alle. Tag rigtig godt imod Ukraines fantastiske præsident Zelenskyy, der vil tale til os lige om lidt.

URL til artiklen:

<https://www.stm.dk/statsministeren/taler/statsminister-mette-frederiksens-tale-til-arangan-gementet-et-lys-i-moerket/>