Encampment and the Emergence of Conflict

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A Comparative Study of Buduram and Lukole

"A distance large enough to prevent the poisonous effluvia of social decomposition from reaching places inhabited by their native inhabitants is the main criterion by which the location [sic] of their permanently temporary camps are selected. Out of that place, refugees are an obstacle and a trouble; inside that place, they are forgotten. In keeping them there and barring all leakage, in making the separation final and irreversible, 'compassion by some and hatred by others' cooperate in producing the same effect of taking distance and holding at a distance."

– Zygmunt Bauman, *Wasted Lives: Modernity and its Outcasts*

Abstract

Large refugee camps have been predominantly unsuccessful, especially in terms of the impact on refugees, host-States, and refugee-host relations. Most of the past discourse examines and evaluates the issues of refugee encampment from the myopic view of the humanitarian aide regime and political actors, excluding the refugees' own perspective. This limited understanding of encamped refugees hinders both the ability and motivation to make informed, responsible and humane decisions in refugee practice. This paper utilizes a causal model derived from conflict theory as an operational tool to explore, how the structure and process of encampment shape the relations between refugees, UNHCR, and the host-States of Ghana and Tanzania and in light of this, whether encampment contributes to conflict. The comparative cross-cultural case study of Buduburam Refugee Camp and Lukole Refugee Camp analyzes the various perspectives involved in refugee encampment, such as the reasoning behind UNHCR's methods, the host-States perception of refugees, and the refugees' own experiences as encamped individuals. The most critical factor contributing to the emergence of conflict between actors in this study is the present ontology of refugees as 'helpless victims' and the resulting deprivation of power. The outcome of this study contributes to further understanding of the effects of encampment and segregation on refugees.

Acknowledgements

There have been some personal trials and tribulations in the writing of this thesis, and although at moments it was a lonesome and frustrating process, I am so grateful for the people along the way, who helped me in one way or another.

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In addition, I thank Simon Turner, who not only provided me with inspiration and a 'point of comparison', but also lent me his copy of Malkki's book, which was yellowed, well-worn and filled with his notes from Lukole, symbolically connecting me to his research there.

Last but not least, my heartfelt thanks to my whole kollegium family, for being my 'home' so that I could work. I especially want to thank my dear Carmen, Angelina, and Claudio, who never let me starve or lose hope, listened to me, laughed with me, and helped me every step of the way, I wouldn't have been able to finish without you.

And to my family, who although are far away, are always with me. Without you, I could not travel the world and pursue all my goals and aspirations. I carry you wherever I go in my heart, and I am so blessed to have you in my life.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my mom, who is the most resilient, warm-hearted and awe-inspiring person I know. I am grateful to have experienced and inherited (lucky for me!) your exuberance for life, insatiable curiosity, love of cooking, passion for helping, adventurous and childlike spirit. You have made me who I am in many more ways than you can imagine, I love you.

Foreword

My interest in migration and refugees is quite a long-standing and personal one. As the child of two immigrant parents from South Korea, life was not easy, growing up in the intensely, racially-stratified American environment. The hardships of facing a lifetime of membership in the 'out-group' of society, confusion over identity, and constant cultural conflicts between myself and my family/Asian culture, and myself and my 'own' American/White culture had evolved into a great deal of curiosity about the effects of immigration, and what it means to be displaced. The terminology and concepts in this study are aspects of 'real life' for me, having experienced varying levels of them since as far back as I can remember: discrimination, prejudice, cultural conflict, clash of values, segregation (within the sub-culture of immigrant society), and being a foreigner; whether it's in Denmark, or in my home country.

About 10 years ago, my curiosity was activated when I began researching the effects of cultural clashes on second-generation Asian-Americans in cross-cultural psychology studies. Several years later, I worked as an English and civics instructor for Hispanic migrant workers in southern California, and taught art to all ages of girls' at an after-school empowerment program for disadvantaged youth (who also all happened to come from immigrant families).

The question in this study is a culmination of my work and observations over the last three years since I started development studies at Aalborg University and began focusing from the very first semester on a self-directed specialization in migration and refugee studies. During my internship I worked with refugees and IDPs from Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Guinea, and it was then I started wondering how protracted displacement affects people, and the impossibility of building a life, home, and family in such chaos.

Upon returning to West Africa this January to work on a project with Liberian refugees in Buduburam, I noticed the difference of refugee life in a camp; especially a camp that has almost become a village after 21 years. Spending time talking to refugees who had lived there for 17 years, or with 10-year old children who had been born in the camp and had never been outside (not even to take a small trip to the capital, only an hour's tro-tro ride away), made me feel deeply conflicted about UNHCR and the nature of refugee protection.

None of it makes any sense to me...the irrational and indefinite containment of people, amounting to wasted lives, dependency, poverty, isolation and an uncertain future.

My overwhelming impression was that protracted encampment made it so refugees could <u>never</u> go home. Furthermore, they couldn't find or establish a new one, and this was a feeling that I deeply understood.

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1. Introduction

I was taken aback when I first arrived in Côte d'Ivoire in 2009 to work with refugee women with the Danish Refugee Council. Today images from CNN, BBC and movies like "Blood Diamond" propagate our understanding of refugees as peacefully living in sprawling tent-cities after escaping violent conflicts in far away lands. The distinct mental picture that comes to

Dadaab Refugee Camp, Northern Kenya

mind from the word 'refugee', highlights the troublesome nature of its present ontology: poverty stricken Africans living in miles and miles of tents in the middle of 'nowhere', sprawling over a barren, arid desert. We take for granted that refugees live in *camps*, even though the emergence of this practice for dealing with refugees is quite recent (Smith 2004: 1482). In the literature and in the media, the refugee camp label has become so entrenched, that we don't question it anymore[1]. Experiencing the alternative in Côte d'Ivoire, where refugees are dispersed in villages and hosted by local communities in the western part of the country, I realized that there were other options.

As early as 1988, Jean-Pierre Hocké, then United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), acknowledged the disaster of encampment in a speech to the United Nations Administrative Committee on Coordination, by using the term 'warehousing'[2] in the refugee context for the first time (UNHCR 1988, para 2). In spite of this, the 'warehousing model', or "the practice of keeping refugees in protracted situations of restricted mobility, enforced idleness, and dependency – their lives on indefinite hold – in violation of their basic rights under the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention", (Smith 2004: 38) has become both the most conventional *and* contested method in refugee practice.

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[1] Case in point, I recently found an NGO online called 'Tents for Refugees', which collects used tents from music festivals to donate to refugees in camps. Apparently refugees have become synonymous with 'living in tents'.

[2] "Fundamentally, it is in all our interests to move refugees out of the dehumanizing conditions of rural refugee camps where so many of the world's 12 million refugees are situated. Far too many of them are virtually 'warehoused' in a state of near-total dependence." (UNHCR 1988, para 2).

Since the early 80's, numerous literature has debated the appropriateness, effectiveness and ethics of encampment (Harrell-Bond 1986; Black 1998; Crisp & Jacobsen 1998; Verdirame 1999; Bakewell 2002; Crisp 2003; Smith 2004). UNHCR's own policy and research unit acknowledge that the negative "consequences of having so many human beings in a static state include wasted lives, squandered resources and increased threats to security" (UNHCR 2004: 2). And "refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo…their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile…[and are] often unable to break free from enforced reliance on external assistance (UNHCR 2004: 1).

The mounting critique is voiced by diverse groups, such as researchers and policy makers, governments and NGOs, refugee associations, and international organizations. Verdirame further states that "human rights cannot be respected in refugee camps…[because they] represent a *legal anomaly*, and that they are in practice – albeit certainly not in theory – beyond the scope of national law and subjected to an informal legal system established by the agencies that run them" (Verdirame 1999: 55, *italic* added).

1.1 West Africa: 'Brothers in Distress'

I learned in the field that Côte d'Ivoire was a special case, and an example that is *positively* conspicuous in Africa in terms of encampment. When 70,000 Liberian refugees entered Côte d'Ivoire in 1989, domestic security could have been perceived as compromised. However, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the president at that time, did not consider the influx as a 'carrier' of conflict and welcomed them as 'brothers in distress' (Kuhlman 2002). Because the refugees came from the area along the Liberian-Ivorian border and were from the same ethnic groups[3] as the Ivorians, Houphouët-Boigny "encouraged local people to take them up in their midst," rather than containing them in camps (Kuhlman 2002: 11). Spontaneous local settlement became the norm in Côte d'Ivoire in the designated area along the Liberian border, called the *Zone d'Accueil des Réfugiés* (ZAR)[4] (Kuhlman 2002: 11). Unfortunately, most refugee-hosting countries in Africa no longer see it this way.

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[3] The groups included: "the Gio in the area of Danané where the borders of Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Guinea meet; the Krahn in the area of Guiglo further south; and the Kru plus related groups" (Kuhlman 2002: 11).
[4] I was working in this area, administratively divided as the four *départements* of Danané, Toulepleu, Guiglo and Tabou (Kuhlman 2002: 11).

In January, I was back in West Africa as a part of a project team for Save the Children Youth Denmark. Our main objective was to identify a partner to work with on a collaborative project benefiting children and youth in Buduburam Refugee Camp. Juxtaposing my initial impressions while working with community-based Liberian refugees in Côte d'Ivoire against my observations and experiences with the thousands of encamped Liberian refugees in Ghana, it was impossible not to notice a stark contrast.

As a part of due diligence in our partner identification exercise, we spent two weeks gathering as much information as we could about the context of the camp, and meeting with various relevant actors: Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) in the camp, Ghanaian camp administration, and UNHCR. At first Buduburam seemed more like a peaceful village than a refugee camp. It had a definite order, and was well organized with straight lines, plots and 'neighborhoods', and the houses were more permanent than tents. There was a bustling life, with markets, churches, and schools. Despite 20 years of warehousing in Ghana, the Liberians seemed well adjusted to life in the camp. But very soon we realized that this appearance was deceiving.

Unexpectedly, we began to observe many conflicts: between refugees and UNHCR; between refugees and the Ghanaian camp administration; and between refugees and the local population. They ranged from small disagreements and misunderstandings, to power struggles, and even to overt discrimination, xenophobia and violence. In the course of our work, we were exposed to very different perceptions of the conflicts that arose, depending on whom we spoke with. The sheer polarity of perspectives was puzzling and made any possibility of resolutions or compromise improbable. UNHCR told us stories of the refugees deliberately disturbing the camp, causing uprisings, and spreading false rumors about mass resettlement to America, or repatriation allowances of $1000. Refugees told us that Ghanaians were taking advantage of refugees in the camp by forging the refugees' names and documents and then bribing UNHCR into selling them the refugees' resettlement visas to the US, thereby taking their 'place' during resettlement. The Ghanaian administration officials told us that 'rebel' Liberian Refugee Welfare Council was plotting violent protest demonstrations and trying to take over the camp. During a meeting concerning the approval of our project, the Buduburam

camp director actually brought in his recently damaged tire, trying to convince us that refugees had deliberately punctured his tire in order to cause an accident[5], and so on[6].

To me, Buduburam was, (as Turner writes of refugee camps in his book, *Politics of Innocence*), "chaotic and unstructured while on the other hand…extremely ordered and bureaucratized", and a space that was "full of paradoxes" (Turner 2010: 43). The camp environment was calm in some ways, but riddled with dramatic stories, rumors and suspicion. It was very challenging trying to figure out whom to trust and what was the 'real' situation, and we felt constantly pushed and pulled by competing groups with what seemed like incompatible goals and agendas. Not having seen as much confusion between refugees and the local population (or UNHCR) in Côte d'Ivoire, I wondered if encampment itself could be a factor in creating the 'chaos' of this fractured, socio-political, insecure and bureaucratic environment.

1.2 Research Problem Formulation

In the case of Buduburam, it is evident that differing perceptions of refugees, UNHCR, and the host-State all play a significant role in creating conflict. The question is whether or not the structure and process of encampment contribute to the conflicts. Investigating various aspects of the encampment experience is critical to building a comprehensive body of research that has any chance of influencing refugee practice and policy. Most of the past discourse examines and evaluates the issues of refugee encampment from the myopic view of the humanitarian aide regime and political actors. This perspective unfortunately continues to draw focus and attention to the role of powerful transnational and national actors.

In this process, individuality and humanity is minimized while reinforcing a simplified caricature or role (i.e. a workable conceptualization) of refugees as passive, helpless, and dependent victims. Consequently, we have a limited understanding of the perspectives of the refugees. And according to Jaji, the intricate array of gendered, socio-economic and political relations

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[5] I recently found news report in the Ghanaian Chronicle about this, and there is a picture of the punctured tire.

[6] Even our last day before flying back home, we got an urgent call from UNHCR while riding in a tro-tro from Accra to Buduburam Refugee Camp. One of the agency officers suddenly 'strongly' advised us not to work with Children Better Way (CBW), an active refugee-run, community-based organization (CBO), with whom we were on our way to sign a partnership contract with. UNHCR reiterated that there had been repeated issues with this CBO and that in their opinion, CBW was not reliable and a risky choice for channeling our funds. They then suggested for a *second* time that week, that we develop the youth health project with them, and of course channel the funds through UNHCR, who would then choose the 'appropriate' implementing partners. While we were in a panic about how to proceed, the camp director called when we were about 10 minutes away from the entrance, to let us know there had just been a 'major' security issue, a violent attack on him and two journalists, so for our own safety we were not allowed to enter the camp to have our last meeting with the CBO. Later, we found that this incident had been greatly exaggerated.

stemming from displacement is conveniently overlooked, which has probable severe consequences (Jaji 2009). Accordingly, this ignorance hinders both the ability and motivation to make informed and responsible decisions[7].

Turner notes that what is often missing in refugee discourse, is a colorful, detailed picture of the refugees themselves (Turner 2004). Seminal ethnographic work in Tanzanian refugee camps by Malkki (1995a) and Turner (2010), have started to bring back the focus to the 'who' instead of only the 'what' we are dealing with. With this in mind, the crucial next step for research in this area is to continue to investigate the subjective roles and experiences of the key actors involved. And in this process increase the 'voice' of refugees, which can further open the dialogue into new strategies in the lines of gender-researcher Batliwala:

> Clearly, we need to build a new language in which to frame our vision and strategies for social transformation at the local, national, or global level. I for one intend to do so…by listening to poor women and their movements, listening to their values, principles, articulations, and actions, and by trying to hear how they frame their search for justice. From this, I suspect, will emerge not only a new discourse, but also new concepts and strategies that have not yet entered our political or philosophical imaginations (Batliwala 2007: 564).

In the course of this study, the research aims to emphasize the perspective of encamped refugees, and demonstrate in a different way, what I see is an inherent contradiction between the structure of encampment and refugee welfare.

1.2.1 Research Question

How does the structure and process of encampment shape the relationships between refugees, UNHCR, and the host-States of Ghana and Tanzania? Considering this, does encampment contribute to the emergence of conflict in the cases of Buduburam and Lukole?

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[7] "I was further disappointed at the colonialism evident in Geneva [UNHCR headquarters]…[and] representatives of African countries who have been co-opted by the life-style of the West, I find it more and more difficult to believe that decisions concerning refugees can be made in palaces and Mercedes" (Harrell-Bond 1986: xvii).

1.3 Key Concept: 'Dividing Practices' to Separate and Control

Foucault (1982) summarized in *The Subject and Power*, the techniques of separation and control are 'dividing practices' and demonstrate how concepts such as apartheid, segregation, asylum and refuge can be correlated with ethnic cleansing, prison and ghetto.

Figure 1 Actions, Structures and Institutions of Forced Isolation and Separation (Richmond 1994: 207, Fig. 12.1)

Apartheid   **Ethnic Cleansing**   **Asylum**

Reservation   Segregation

Partition   Isolation

Prison   Hospital

Ghetto   Outcast

Deport Exile

Refuge

The comparison may appear provoking or even a stretch at first, However further consideration reveals that all of the terms in the triangle in Figure 1 are closely linked, and involve the forced isolation of people. Using a sociological perspective, certain groups of people, by virtue of conceived differences or by being associated with the 'other', are considered to create conflict[8] with the dominant group in society. As a result, distancing is utilized as a strategy to mitigate that conflict (Richmond 1994). Structures like apartheid, asylum, segregation, prisons, and even hospitals[9] historically served very similar purposes as means of isolating the 'troublemakers' and restoring social order through the process of social control and classification. In apartheid, belonging to the 'wrong' racial group required you to completely separate from another part of society.

Asylum has a dual ontology as a sanctuary *for protecting* those who are persecuted, as well as it's opposite, a confining place to keep people who disturb societal peace such as the insane asylum, which *protects society from* the mentally ill (Richmond 1994: 207). The dual-nature of

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[8] Conflict theory in sociology originated out of Karl Marx's literature on struggles between classes, and thus has the basic premise that class-based conflict is inherently part of social interaction (Andersen & Taylor 2007). Other facets of conflict are explained in Chapter 3.
[9] Foucault specifically mentions his book, *The Birth of the Clinic* the social and spatial isolation of 'patients' from the healthy.

this concept is conspicuously applicable to refugee policy when one considers how 'asylum' seekers wait for years, isolated from general society in detention centers across Western Europe. From my perspective, this 'dividing practice' is in order to protect and control both sides (i.e. refugees and the general public from each other) a distinct feature also of encampment by simultaneously casting refugees as both 'victims' and 'malcontents'. Host countries appeal to UNHCR and the international community for funding to help them 'save' and 'protect' the refugees, while at the same in their own countries use political manipulation and the media to paint "imagery of 'refugees as bullets' piercing the integrity and socio-ethnic fabric" of the country, as in Tanzania, where this rhetoric has fully saturated the public, as well as institutional, opinion (Chaulia 2003: 162).

Thus, asylum and encampment are proverbial leaves on the same tree. By reflecting on the dual-ontology of these concepts and structural similarity incorporating 'dividing practices' and control, this study explores the key concept of encampment in light of its elemental qualities.

2. General Context of Refugee Migration

In order to understand the specifics contexts of refugee encampment in Ghana and Tanzania, it is beneficial to present some background on the greater context of protracted refugee situations worldwide and the significance of refugee hosting in sub-Saharan Africa. In a majority of cases of refugees living in host or first asylum States, returning or permanent repatriation is not a timely possibility. Conflicts tend to ebb and flow with continuous cross-border activity. Outbreaks of violence subside to a temporary period of stability, which in turn result in spontaneous repatriation, only to be followed by a reoccurrence of violence and displacement. As a result, most refugees cannot live securely in their home country for an indefinite period of time and the border zones are inherently zones of conflict (Jacobsen 2001).

Realizations at the end of World War I brought upon the need to document and acknowledge the shared collective responsibility for refugees by States and the international community. This culminated in the adoption of treaties such as the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol (Hurwitz 2009: 9). In the period post-World War II, UNHCR was *temporarily* created to provide international protection and assist refugees in finding permanent and sustainable solutions (Hurwitz 2009). Today after 60 years, UNHCR continues

to request increased funding and support despite the fact that it has been unable to achieve its original mandate, and contributed to more than 5.5 million refugees (more than half in the world today) persisting in protracted or extended exile situations (Loescher 2011).

More than 60% of today's refugees are trapped in the world's poorest and most volatile regions in protracted situations, characterized by long exile periods spanning from five years to decades for some groups (UNHCR 2006a). Furthermore, 80% of refugees reside in the developing world (UNHCR 2009). In 2005 there were 5.5 million refugees in 33[10] protracted refugee situations in 26 countries worldwide[11] (UNHCR 2006a). Unfortunately in protracted situations, refugees flee from neighboring countries only to live encamped at the border in dangerous and squalid conditions (Jacobsen 2001), most remaining within their region of origin with average time period of 20 years in exile (UNHCR 2009). Major refugee-generating regions hosted between 76-91% of refugees from the same region, and 83% (8.7 million of the 10.4 million total) remain in the region of origin (Figure 2) (UNCHR 2009).

Figure 2. Major Source Countries of Refugees, End-2009 (UNHCR 2009: 24, Map II)

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
[10] Newer figures in UNHCR's Statistical Yearbook from 2009 have different numbers, 25 protracted refugee situations in approximately 21 countries worldwide (UNHCR 2009: 22). However, I could not use the updated data, as there was no further information as to how this new calculation was made, or a breakdown of the statistics. Consequently, I deferred to the older statistics.

[11] "However, the numbers are actually much greater than this. The UNHCR total does not include many long-term displaced persons in urban settings around the world or smaller residual displaced populations who remain in exile after others have returned home. Nor does it include the millions of Palestinian refugees throughout the Middle East under the mandate of the U.N. Relief and Works Administration or the 1.8 million Iraqi refugees in the region adjoining Iraq who now find themselves in a protracted refugee situation. Nor do these statistics include the 27.1 million internally displaced persons worldwide, the majority of whom are also in extended and chronic exile." (Loescher 2011: 1).

Sub-Saharan Africa had the largest number of protracted situations at 17, with approximately 2 million refugees, the largest groups being hosted in Guinea, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia (UNHCR 2006a). Estimates as high as 98% of sub-Saharan African refugees are in protracted situations (Kamara 2009 *FMR33*). Therefore, the extended length of time in exile is a key characteristic of the refugee experience in Africa, making it a critical region for this study.

Originally UNHCR envisioned three 'durable solutions' for refugees: 1) voluntary repatriation with change in conditions in the source country, 2) permanent local integration in the first asylum country, or 3) resettlement to another country. Nevertheless, warehousing has become the *de facto* fourth and 'all-too-durable' solution (Smith 2004: 38; Hovil 2007).

> Instead of hoping refugees will become integrated by means of camps, today's refugees are kept in camps, just surviving on assistance provided by international donors – assistance which is described as 'care and maintenance'. This international aid is completely undependable, erratic and inadequate." (Harrell-Bond 2000: 5).

3.5 million refugees are contained in camps in Africa and Asia (Stevens 2006) or as Smith claims, on a global level, of the "nearly 12 million refugees, more than 7 million have languished in refugee camps or segregated settlements in situations lasting ten years or more" (Smith 2004: 38). In contrast, UNHCR's statistics claim only 30%, or 2.3 millions refugees were residing in camps worldwide as of 2009 (Figure 3), with refugees in urban areas outnumbering encamped refugees for the first time in 2007. However, this does not take into account the *unknown* settlement

Figure 3. Distribution of Refugees by Type of Location*, End-2009 (UNHCR 2009: 46, Fig. V.2)

figure of 2.2 million refugees, which is 21% of the total (UNHCR 2009). Although there is a wide gap between these conflicting figures (between 30-58% of refugees are in camps), presenting them both is crucial to giving an idea of the magnitude and prevalence of encampment.

2.1 The Evolution of Refugee Settlement

Originally the 1951 Convention[12] envisioned the successful local integration of refugees in host-States, or countries of first asylum, emphasizing the role of citizenship as a key factor in finding durable solutions. Article 34 of the Convention specifically asks host-States to integrate refugees: "The contracting states shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings."

In the 1960-80s, many African countries took in a large number of refugees, working with UNHCR by supplying land and facilitating self-reliance efforts. UNHCR still favored "non-operational, spontaneous settlement" over formal encampment in Africa as late as 1976 (Smith 2004: 1482). However in the last 20 years, the tide has greatly changed, both host countries and the international community see local integration as problematic, and refugees find themselves geographically confined, pressured to repatriate, and discouraged from initiating in self-reliant activities (Crisp 2004).

Despite the well-documented moral and human rights concerns, encampment is now used as the predominant method for 'protecting' refugees in Africa, while also providing 'security' for host States. There is substantial evidence that UNHCR, as a part of the bureaucratic, refugee protection industry, actively supports this policy (Harrell-Bond 1986; Harrell-Bond 2000), "over the past decades, powerful bureaucratic and institutional interests have developed in keeping refugees in camps and dependent on relief" (Harrell-Bond 2000: 11). And host-States "prefer the encampment of refugees for several related reasons: 1) they offer visibility which helps with claims for burden sharing; 2) they offer mechanisms for containment and control which help mitigate any perceived security threat in the short term; and 3) they reduce the risk that refugee populations will melt into the host population, failing to repatriate when conditions change in the home country" (Kaiser 2006: 598).

Tanzania is a perfect illustration of this progression, as first President Jules Nyerere's inspiring and generous 'Open Door' policy garnered international praise and UNHCR's highest honor, the Nansen Refugee Award in 1983, recognizing the country's extraordinary and dedicated

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[12] The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137.

service to refugees (Chaulia 2003: 147). At the 1979 Arusha Conference Nyerere expressed his support of both integration and eventual voluntary repatriation of refugees as being beneficial for the whole of Africa:

> It is impossible to deal with these refugees as if all that is required is temporary relief from distress. They must as quickly as possible be given a means of producing or earning their own livelihood. The only practical way of proceeding is to work as if they are likely to be permanent inhabitants of their host State. Investment to meet their needs will never be wasted in the growing African economies even if these refugees should all in the future return to the place from whence they came. (Nyerere in Smith, 2004: 1482).

However after years of hosting refugees, the intensifying wars between 1993 and 2000 in the volatile Great Lakes region generated an explosion of 1,500,000 refugees into Tanzania (Chaulia 2003: 148), causing a "clear evolution…from an 'Open Door' policy to a policy with heavy restrictions and the absence of local integration as a durable solution" (Morel 2009: 107). Tanzania had, in all honesty, hosted more refugees than any other country on the African continent by the end of 2000[13] and thus the 'host fatigue' fueled a conviction that refugees were a burden and trouble to society, which was clearly conveyed at all levels of government and policies, resulting in their containment in the north-westernmost regions of Tanzania closest to where they originated from.

Morel concludes in her research that Tanzania is not responsible for this evolution[14], but the international community itself for the "*lack of international refugee burden-sharing, as evidenced by the lack of an international legal framework for durable solutions for refugees*" (Morel 2009: 107, *italic* added). Jacob Stevens sums up the current dismal state of affairs, clearly stating that UNHCR's original directive was to protect refugee interests (specifically their full political and economic rights) in the asylum or host country, while preparing them for the hope of voluntary repatriation in the future:

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[13] Which totaled 543,000 in December 2000, or about 1/6th of all African refugees, and 1/26th of all refugees worldwide (Chaulia 2003: 147-148).

[14] This evolution is mentioned as a part of the context of Tanzania's refugee-hosting scenario, and some reasons for the shift will be presented but not further analyzed as it is outside the scope of the problem formulation for this study.

As a brutal testament to its contemporary failure, at least 3.5 million of those refugees currently struggle for survival in sprawling camps in Africa and Asia. Fleeing from genocide, imperial aggression and civil war, only to be herded into camps or sent back to the country they were escaping, these asylum-seekers and returnees are part of a seemingly endless human tragedy. If it was originally a guarantor of refugee rights, UNHCR has since mutated into a patron of these prisons of the stateless: a network of huge camps that can never meet any plausible 'humanitarian' standard, and yet somehow justify international funding for the agency (Stevens 2006: 53).

On a final note, even in the present new encampment continues. Due to the current raging conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, as of April 2011 there are now 7,200 new Ivorian refugees in Ghana[15] and the Ghanaian government has opened two new camps near the border in Ampain and Kassap to accommodate them (UNHCR 2011c).

3. Methodological Approach

In order to clarify the research strategy and scope, this chapter outlines the methodological approach, incorporating the reasoning and justification for the research perspective, design, and applied method, and acknowledges the relevance and limitations of this study. The subsequent chapter synthesizes relevant theories and working concepts to create a framework for the analysis, and identifies the relationship between ideas, concepts, theories and actual encampment policy. Then, chapter five introduces the context of displacement in Ghana and Tanzania. Chapter six explores the relationship between refugee encampment and conflict in order to answer the research question. The last two chapters, seven and eight, respectively conclude and summarize the answer to the research question, and then recommend avenues for future research.

3.1 Aim of the Research

The main objective of this study is to explore how encampment contributes to conflict in interactions between refugees, UNHCR, and the host-States of Ghana and Tanzania. Large

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[15] Ironically, a majority of Ivorian refugees from the current conflict, 135,000, are actually hosted now in Liberia, a country whose lack of stability and infrastructure cannot even sustain repatriation of its own citizens from Ghana. This shows the effect of instability in the West African region, plagued with protracted civil wars, interconnected cycles of crises, outbreaks of violence and destabilization, and mass displacement within and between countries, creating what the Danish Refugee Council calls a "cluster of fragile states" (DRC 2009: 3).

camps have been predominantly unsuccessful, especially in terms of the impact on refugees, host-States, and refugee-host relations (Harrell-Bond 2000). Furthermore, much of the mounting literature on refugee-host relations focuses on livelihood constraints resulting from the camp model (Porter et al. 2008). Intensifying global conflicts and the pending dire position of millions of encamped refugees waiting in a purgatory for 'redemption' to be granted by the International Refugee Regime (IRR), renders the timing and focus of this study as critical and highly relevant.

By introducing a distinctive methodological perspective within interdisciplinary research at the cross-section where refugee studies (as a sub-category of development studies) and sociology meet, I hope to stimulate new discourse and further challenge accepted assumptions about the status quo of encampment, provoking action and policy changes that eventually funnel back to actual practice at the grassroots level. Given that "sociological insights have served…by uncovering morally shocking conditions or by clearing away collective illusions or by showing that socially desirable results could be obtained in a more humane fashion[16]" (Berger 1963: 7), I can only hope that the results of this study inspire new research into how refugee flows in Africa can be handled in a 'more humane fashion'.

Starting with various empirical qualitative and quantitative data sources (i.e. observations in the field and relevant literature), the research strategy uses a primarily *iterative* inductive process[17] in answering the research question (de Vaus 2001; Bryman 2004). By iterative I mean the research is "weaving back and forth between data and theory" (Bryman 2004: 10). Observations from empirical data are not applied to create a new theory *per se*, but to develop a new *understanding* of the relationship between encampment and conflict in the cases of Buduburam and Lukole, by using conflict theory and the concept of segregation. Within this process, the theoretical and conceptual framework is applied to guide, organize and interpret the empirical findings (de Vaus 2001: 6; Bryman 2004: 8-10) in order to explore *how* and *why* encampment could be related to conflict.

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[16] He further quips in his book, "people who like to avoid shocking discoveries, who prefer to believe that society is just what we were taught in Sunday School, who like the safety of rules and the maxims of what Alfred Scheutz has called the 'world-taken-for-granted,' should stay away from sociology" (Berger 1963: 24).

[17] Just like in the case of this study, Bryman notes that qualitative research in the social sciences principally utilizes an inductive approach concerning the relationship between theory and data, emphasizing the generation of theories (Bryman 2004: 20).

> If the issue of settlement policy is put in this context, the immediate policy question becomes less one of what is best for the refugees and more one of what is in the interest of the security of both refugee and host populations. In turn, to avoid there being a trade-off between security (in camps) and refugee well-being (in the absence of camps), those opposing encampment would need to *demonstrate that camps do not* necessarily enhance the security situation *or reduce conflict between refugees and locals*. (Black 1998: 6, *italic* added)

The outcome of this study contributes to further understanding of the effects of encampment and segregation on refugees, and as a part of this, introduces a new way of explaining the relationship between conflict and encampment along the lines of Black's recommendation.

3.2 Epistemological and Ontological Considerations

Epistemology fundamentally questions what should be regarded as valid knowledge in a discipline, and as Bryman notes (contrary to the norms of the natural science and positivism), the epistemological stance of interpretivism is more suitable to be able to *understand*, instead of simply *explain* human behavior (Bryman 2004: 13). The epistemological approach of interpretivism assists to ascertain the *subjective meanings* of, and better *understand* social actions, such as encampment and conflict behavior because the 'object' of study in this case is the interactions between refugees, host-States and UNHCR. These objects are fundamentally distinctive from those in natural sciences. Moreover, interpretivism, in the *hermeneutic-phenomenological* tradition, means that this study tries to grasp meanings through the perspective of Liberian and Burundian refugees[18], by focusing on the world and reality as it is lived and shaped through their preconceived notions (Bryman 2004: 13-14). This is achieved by analyzing the various perspectives involved in refugee encampment, such as the reasoning behind UNHCR's methods, the host-States perception of refugees, and the refugees' experiences themselves as encamped individuals. By using this approach, the study examines and questions the 'common-sense' knowledge that perpetuates the use of encampment.

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[18] And from the perspective of other actors involved, like the Ghanaian and Tanzanian government and nationals, and UNHCR.

The interpretivist epistemology is also heavily influenced by *symbolic interactionism* (Bryman 2004: 14), one of the fundamental sociological frameworks along with conflict theory employed in this study, emphasizing the analysis of social interactions and the subjective meanings that people attach to them, and considers "immediate social interaction to be the place where 'society' exists" (Andersen & Taylor 2006: 22).

It is important to also indicate that as the interpretative method formulates the primary data into a social scientific frame, there is already a double interpretation that has happened: I have interpreted other researchers' and objects' interpretations. Furthermore, in this study the research strategy requires a third level of interpretation, as I then re-interpret my interpretations when applying the theoretical and conceptual framework (Bryman 2004: 15).

The ontological orientation in qualitative research is also commonly constructionism instead of objectivism, because classifications of social entities or ideas about social reality do not have embedded, innate qualities, but meanings that are continuously constructed and re-constructed through social interaction (Bryman 2004: 17-18). For instance, 'refugee' is not a static and objective entity independent of interpretations of people who are displaced, the host-States or UNHCR[19]. Drawing upon insights from symbolic interactionism, this study acknowledges that refugee policy and encampment utilizes constantly evolving and socially constructed ideas of refugees, conflict, and protection. This is because "people behave based on what they *believe,* not just what is objectively true...[and social order is] constantly negotiated and created through interpretations people give to their behavior" (Andersen & Taylor 2006: 22).

The idea of what constitutes a refugee has changed in the minds of refugees themselves and other actors who must deal with refugees. For example in 1969, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) revised the refugee definition by adding the dimension of persecution from imperialistic 'foreign domination'. Tanzania whole-heartedly welcomed this new breed of refugee, 'the freedom fighter', who had a more exalted status than other refugees (Chaulia 2003). This diverges greatly from the present ontology of refugees construed by UNHCR as

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[19] Although there is a clear legal framework in place that defines who is, and who is not a refugee, the application of this varies.

helpless victims, or by the host-States as troublemakers, criminals, and threats to security. Furthermore, the application of the framework in determining 'refugee status' has fluctuated over time, depending on the time period or political context, as evidenced by Jackson's (1999) book, *The Refugee Concept in Group Situations*, where he examines the varied and challenging nature of applying the legal principles in refugee contexts worldwide, spanning from 1921 to 1985.

3.3 Interpretivism and Causality

The multivariate convolution of human behavior within social systems produces highly indeterminate outcomes and thus theories in social sciences are probabilistic instead of deterministic (Richmond 1994: 15), as "the *complexity* of human social behavior and the *subjective*, *meaningful* and *voluntaristic* components…mean that it will never be possible to arrive at causal statements of the type 'If *X*, and *A* and *B*, then *Y* will always follow'" (de Vaus 2001: 5). Therefore, this study operates on the premise that encampment contributes to conflict in two specific cases, Buduburam and Lukole. In the analysis, I utilize factors from a causal model derived from conflict theory as an operational tool to understand how the structure and process of encampment in these specific cases, is related to conflict. It is important to note: *this causal framework is not applied with the purpose of generating generalizable conclusions about causality*.

Causality in this case is not straightforward as human social behavior is a not a linear process. Since causal variables in social sciences are impossible to isolate, stringent hypothesis testing is problematic. In the general case of encampment, distinct causal connections are blurred by the interrelated nature of all the factors. To illustrate this, I visually map the complexity of the possible factors related to protracted refugee encampment and conflict (see Appendix I).

Keeping in mind that variables in social systems like these cases are interactive, "in the sense that the consequence of event A may be different in the presence of variable B than…in variable C" (Richmond 1994: 15), the resulting experiences for encamped refugees in Ghana and Tanzania are very context specific. Moreover the variables in encampment are generally multiplicative and "not additive, meaning that the combination of circumstances will generate consequences that are more than the sum of the parts" (Richmond 1994: 15). As a result the

interaction of all the variables in encampment, and the history and culture of both the refugee population and the host population, create unique circumstances that occur in each case.

3.4 Research Design: Comparative Design

The 'credibility' of the outcome of qualitative research cannot be properly evaluated by simply reviewing the method applied, because "how the data is collected is irrelevant to the *logic* of the design" (de Vaus 2001: 9). More than a work plan or a method, research design is the framework, idea, and logical structure[20] behind the inquiry (de Vaus 2001: 9). Observations from two particular cases, Buduburam Refugee Camp and Lukole Refugee Camp are compared inductively to investigate how and why the structure of encampment contributes to the emergence of conflict. By conducting a micro-level analysis of these specific camps side-by-side, this study examines the *same* factors or perceptions created by interactions between refugees, the host-State and UNHCR in both cases. Through this comparison, the contributing factors are considered in relation to the emergence of conflict, because social phenomena can be better understood "when they are compared in relation to two or more meaningfully contrasting cases or situations" (Bryman 2004: 53).

The main 'object' of this study, and the holistic unit of analysis is segregated populations. Yin distinguishes between units as a whole, and ones that are comprised of numerous levels or components, categorizing the difference as 'holistic' or 'embedded' (de Vaus 2001: 220). Since embedded units or elements are levels that are a part of the larger or holistic unit, encamped refugees are the embedded units of analysis, and a smaller part of the larger group of segregated populations. Due to the comparative design, the two embedded units of analysis are Liberian refugees in Buduburam, and Hutu Burundian refugees in Lukole, which are considered as whole and compared, instead of investigating all embedded units or levels within these groups, which would more applicable to an in-depth case study.

Because the empirical data used in this study is from two different camps, in two different countries (Ghana and Tanzania) within the African continent, the sub-design method is cross-cultural research. Cross-cultural research is useful for examining specific "issues or phenomena

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[20] Research design specifically "deals with a *logical* problem and not a *logistical* problem" (Yin, in de Vaus, 2001, p. 9).

in two or more countries…[which in this case are encampment and conflict, by] comparing their manifestations in different socio-cultural settings [i.e. Ghana verses Tanzania]…to seek explanations for similarities or differences or to gain a greater awareness and a deeper understanding" (Hantrais in Bryman, 2004: 53).

Given that the comparative design in this case utilizes a qualitative research strategy, it takes on the form of a multiple-case study, when the number of cases examined is more than one (Bryman 2004). The selection of cases is quite important in multiple-case studies, and in this investigation, the two cases were chosen because of specific criteria. Whereas Buduburam is smaller, with more freedom of movement, and located close to the urban center of Ghana, Lukole in Tanzania is a larger, more protracted, isolated and restrictive, providing a more judicious comparison as it represents the most extreme type of encampment. The polarity of the cases effectively compares the factor of encampment regardless of how restrictively it is applied. If the outcomes have similarities, it implies that the segregation and containment process involved in encampment could have intrinsic symbolic or social repercussions that are external to functional considerations. The last key advantage of using a multiple-case approach is that it enhances the inductive process (Bryman 2004). Using two cases this study strengthens the applicability of utilizing a specific conflict theory in analyzing encampment, contributing to the development of new concepts, applications and emerging theories in the future.

3.4.1 Reliability, Validity and *Trustworthiness*

Although reliability and validity (internal and external) are prominent evaluation criteria for social research, some researchers argue that the "grounding of these ideas in quantitative research renders them inapplicable to or inappropriate for qualitative research" (Bryman 2004: 30). Therefore a more suitable assessment framework is used for this study called *trustworthiness*, proposed Lincoln and Guba, which features alternative terminology and methods for evaluating how good a qualitative study is (Bryman 2004: 30). Each aspect of this new criterion has a parallel in the previous criteria, clarified in Figure 4. The information and content in the table on validity and reliability have been summarized (Bryman 2004: 28-30). There is a direct relationship with similar tendencies for assessing research design, between the original criteria and the parallel terms.

Evaluation Criteria for Research   *Trustworthiness*

Internal Validity
Level of confidence that the research design and results sustain the causal conclusions

Validity
Measures the integrity of applied method, whether it fits the research question and findings

External Validity
Or generalization, is concerned with if the findings can be generalized beyond the specific context of the current research

Credibility
Believability of the findings, research has incorporated multiple accounts for social reality

Transferability
Whether findings can hold beyond the unique contextual situation under study, or even under the same context at another time

Reliability
Measures the stability and consistency of results (a key issue in quantitative research)

Dependability
Consistency that the findings are likely to apply at other times, such as using peer auditors to monitor each step of the process

Since this comparative design is structured as a multiple-case study, it has analogous weaknesses to a qualitative case study when dealing with 'trustworthiness'. However, the implication here is that the applicability of measuring the research design even with these new criteria "depends a large part on how far the researcher feels that these are appropriate" (Bryman 2004: 50) for evaluating this type of research.

Since 'dependability', in the sense of external reliability, assesses whether or not the findings would be consistent *each time*, it is not a relevant or useful measure for this study. The type of consistency involved in replication is not a realistic criterion, as I am unable to replicate my field observations[21] or Turner's observations in Lukole. Furthermore, the possibility of replication is immaterial because in this qualitative study it would not contribute to better executed research. However, *inter-observer consistency*, the second aspect of dependability relating to internal reliability, is a pertinent criterion for assessing this study. It considers whether similar observations would be reached if there were multiple observers in a study (Bryman 2004: 273). The decision to use a cross-cultural, multiple-case strategy in this study

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[21] It is "impossible to 'freeze' a social setting and the circumstances of an initial study to make it replicable" (Bryman 2004: 273).

directly accounts for inter-observer consistency and reduces reliability vulnerabilities such as *observer error* and *observer bias*. Comparing empirical data from two different geographical regions, camps, contexts, timeframes, and researchers, increases the coherence of the results and strengthens dependability.

Since it is unlikely there are "absolute truths about the social world that…[are] the job of the social scientist to reveal" (Bryman 2004: 274), evaluating 'credibility' in qualitative research encompasses two main questions: 1) if there is a "good match between researchers' observations and the theoretical ideas they develop" (Bryman 2004: 273) and 2) if the researcher acknowledged that there can be "multiple accounts of social reality", and used a strategy to validate the findings (Bryman 2004: 274). The 'believability' of outcomes is enhanced in this study by the cross-cultural, multiple-case approach that specifically incorporates 'multiple accounts of social reality'. This is achieved by analyzing the various perspectives involved in refugee encampment, such as the reasoning behind UNHCR's methods, the host-States perception of refugees, and the refugees' experiences themselves as encamped individuals. This approach is also useful for theory building, as it fosters high congruence levels between theories, concepts and observations.

3.4.2 Scope and Delimitation

There are many issues to consider when undertaking comparative and cross-cultural research. When the existing data (e.g. survey data) is used for secondary analysis, it is difficult to ensure that they are adequately comparable (i.e. in terms of data collection categories and methods, or any other factors that could undermine comparability), or that the samples (e.g. refugee groups) are equivalent (Bryman 2004). Another weakness of cross-cultural and multiple-case study is that similarities or differences observed between encampment refugees in Ghana and Tanzania could be due to the distinguishing features or factors of the analyzed cases themselves (Bryman 2004). In this study, the similarities of the effects of encampment could also be due to other factors of the refugee and host-State populations, such as poverty, refugee status, or culture. Consequently the results of this study are considered with caution, as the observations, explanations and understanding are context specific to these two cases. The main objective is to contribute to understanding how the structure of encampment affects

interactions between refugees and other parties involved. The outcome of this analysis cannot be generalized in order to make broad statements about encampment itself.

This study is delimited to refugees, in protracted situations, in two camps in Africa. These delimitations serve to increase the feasibility, focus, and quality of the research. When we are discussing issues of conflict and security, sub-Saharan Africa is a remarkable and pertinent case for study, being the region with the most episodes of instability since 1955 (Goldstone et al. 2010). Constraining the research population to protracted and encamped refugees is crucial to controlling and examining the correlated variables (with encampment) that could influence the emergence of conflict. Utilizing a narrower focus in this cross-cultural by restricting the geographic area to two countries in Africa, and the demographic to two specific homogenous refugee populations (Liberians and Hutu Burundians), in two camps, establishes a similar context. This delimitation controls for wider variations due to other factors such as broad culture and context by limiting the comparability factors (e.g., Palestinian refugees and religion, refugees from Myanmar and human rights abuses).

However, in reality the problem of encampment in protracted situations is surely not geographically limited to countries in Africa. In fact, according to the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI), more than half of the total most protracted and largest warehoused refugee populations are in other regions (refer to Appendix II and III for a global breakdown of warehoused refugee populations) (USCRI 2009).

Additionally, when you are talking about factors of conflict, it would be amiss to not mention that the scope leaves out the largest and more significant group of the displaced, internally displaced persons (IDPs). According to a report issued in March 2011 by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), out of the 27.5 million IDPs around the world at the end of 2010, Africa had the largest amount at 11.1 million or 40% of IDPs (IDMC 2011). At twice the number than refugees (approximately 13 million worldwide) IDPs are often in refugee-like situations, but do not quality for the same rights or international protection because they fall under their own government's jurisdiction (IDMC 2011). Similar to refugees, many IDPs face discrimination and rights violations, subjecting them to violence, arbitrary arrest, and forced relocation, and barring access to adequate housing, employment, education and health care

(IDMC 2011). Many countries in Africa have large IDP populations, and in West Africa, IDPs comprise the largest displaced group, however a majority live in host communities instead of camps (DRC 2009). Moreover, Ghana and Tanzania both do not have IDP populations. As result, although many IDPs are also encamped, this displaced group is outside of the scope of this study due to the lack of incidence in the case study areas.

It is also important to note that confining the scope of the research is not only to enhance the results of the study, but also happens involuntarily. There were numerous constraints or weaknesses of this study that occurred outside of my control. First, the study cannot claim to be a comprehensive analysis incorporating data from all refugee camps or organized settlements in Africa. Limitations in time (data collection timeframe of 3 months) and availability of source data should be considered. Observations in the field were also completed in limited time intervals due to funding restrictions: six months in Côte d'Ivoire (2009), and two weeks in Ghana at Buduburam Refugee Camp (2011). More time spent in both data collection and in the field would have increased the quality and wide-ranging applicability of the findings, as well as increase the internal and external validity[22] by having a larger base of cases and empirical data.

Under these circumstances and limitations, this thesis focuses solely on exploring the relationship between refugee encampment and the emergence of conflict. Due to the complex nature of displacement, the relevant research avenues are numerous and beyond the scope of this research design. For instance, it would be too time-consuming to present and describe all the key variables relevant to refugee policy and practice, or to define a comprehensive list of working concepts in refugee studies. Although background knowledge of the IRR – its history and how key actors (e.g. UNHCR, host states, industrialized nations) are involved – and a synthesis of refugee policy and current practice is helpful to fully understand the context of this research, they could not be incorporated into this study. Lastly, on the basis of this study's findings, implications of the problematic nature of refugee encampment is discussed but cannot serve to answer the broader question of distinguishing between what has been done in refugee practice, versus what needs or should to be done. Furthermore, generation of

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[22] Especially if time and funding could have allowed me to expand my scope to encamped, protracted refugees in other geographical locations.

concrete recommendations or ideas for alternative methods within refugee practice is also outside the capacity of this study.

3.5 Research Methods: Participant Observation, Micro-Ethnography

Participant observation involves the immersion of the researcher in a social setting for a period of time, listening, asking questions and observing behavior (Bryman 2004: 292). My stay in Buduburam consisted of participant observation over a period of two weeks. Consequently this study has a smaller scope and limited timeframe, which is more similar to what Bryman calls a *micro-ethnography* (Bryman 2004: 293). In reality, the principal purpose for my stay at Buduburam was to collect information and ideas to design a project, and complete a funding application for Save the Children Youth Denmark. In my capacity as a projects coordinator for two volunteer groups starting partnership projects in Africa, my main objective was to get a sense of the situation for refugees in Buduburam, assess the needs of the camp, and find a organization in the camp to sign a partnership with. It was within this investigation process and timeframe that I had incorporate the needs my research, so both time and scope were limited. Relying on various qualitative approaches to data collection, the primary methods used were interviewing, meetings, informal focus groups discussions and informal conversations, which was the most appropriate way to collect reliable data in the context that I was in. During the process of data collection, active participation was limited, and a covert role was utilized in both the closed setting of Buduburam Refugee Camp and in the open/public setting in Accra (Bryman 2004: 295).

The structure of data collection was dependant on who I was interacting with, for example, my meetings with UNHCR and camp administration were structured and semi-structured, while my meetings and interviews with community groups, or individual inhabitants were mostly unstructured. The focus groups we had were with children, as we wanted to incorporate their participation in generating ideas for projects, and were semi-structured. Therefore in terms of my relationship to Buduburam and its inhabitants, my main role was "observer-as-participant" because I did not engage and participate in the daily lives of the people at Buduburam (Bryman 2004: 301).

In conversations, I took on the active role of learner and asked refugees about their daily activities and life in the camp, what they saw as issues in the camp, their perception of UNHCR and living in Ghana, and about their plans for the future. I also informally surveyed Ghanaians around Accra, such as hotel staff, tro-tro drivers, and waiters. During meetings with the Ghanaians that worked in the camp, the Ghanaian staff at UNHCR and various agencies involved with our project, I asked a multitude of questions, trying to get a sense of their perspectives and experiences working with Liberian refugees in Buduburam. In addition, I was flexible and allowed the conversations to go the individual and group led them, to gain a deeper sense of their perspective and to hopefully prevent the possibility of people trying to tailor their responses to my expectations.

3.5.1 Research Method Strategy: Triangulation

Considering the short timeframe of micro-ethnography, I used the multi-method approach of triangulation to enhance credibility in this study (Bryman 2004: 275). The multiple qualitative research methods for data collection included: participant observation, semi-structured interviews, informal conversations, focus groups, and the collection and qualitative analysis of texts and documents. The data generated from fieldwork were consistently cross-checked with secondary sources, resulting in greater confidence in findings.

A large amount of data used in this study were secondary sources, compiled from books, academic journals, magazines, newspapers, the Internet, and internal UNHCR documents. The data for the comparison case study was based off of Simon Turner's detailed ethnographic research of camp life for Hutu Burundian refugees in Lukole Camp in Tanzania, conducted in 1997-1998.

Generation of primary sources of data included first-hand data from fieldwork in Ghana. This was comprised of field notes and observations from qualitative interviews, meetings, focus groups, informal conversations, and as visual materials (photographs). The field notes were mostly jotted and mental notes, that were either brief or detailed depending on the available time during or after meetings. Some meetings were recorded on a digital recorder (meetings UNHCR, CBOs in the camp, and with the camp director). Afterwards, when compiling the data, the notes and recordings were supplemented with additional notations based on memories.

Before the interviews and focus groups, a list of relevant questions was prepared. For the meetings with UNHCR, interview guides were prepared and provided to participants in advance. Focus group questions and activities (with the children) were prepared in advance. All efforts were made to ensure that the field notes accurately and comprehensively represented the meetings and interviews, and detailed photographs were taken of the camp to also facilitate memory. The depth and quality of information, knowledge and experiences obtained from the field were an invaluable source of data that provided a much greater understanding of the contextual situation in Buduburam.

3.6 Role of the Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

Theoretical and conceptual frameworks have various embedded assumptions that influence the reasoning and development of research and analysis. Encampment is explored as a social context is this study. Social 'location,' (i.e. one's situation and position in society) has a *profound* effect, and is an important factor in determining possibilities or limitations in life (Andersen & Taylor 2006). For encamped refugees, the situation of being 'a refugee' determines the present and future course of their lives, limiting their possibilities in many ways (e.g. emotionally, socially, intellectually, economically, etc.)[23].

A sociological perspective is useful for examining the effects of: social patterns and change (e.g. displacement and conflict), structures and institutions (e.g. encampment and IRR), and social interactions. It can also be used to challenge 'common-sense' assumptions and reveal the 'obscured' practices of what Foucault calls 'political violence'[24], which in this case would question the 'humanitarian-ness' of encampment to 'protect' refugees.

This study utilizes the theoretical basis of conflict theory in relation with concepts of stratification of society, social order, socialization, and asymmetrical power to 'frame' the inquiry.

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[23] Most of all, warehousing refugees aggravates their near total disempowerment…[they] become spectators to their own lives rather than active participants in decision-making. Authoritarian military conditions, camp confinement…complete reliance on international assistance can generate pathological dependency, [and] low self-esteem… (Smith 2004: 42).

[24] "It seems to me, that the real political task in a society such as ours is to criticize the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticize them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them" (Foucault & Chomsky 2006: 41).

Before this study, encampment as a structure and process had not been clearly defined according to its elemental aspects. In order to specify and operationalize the concept of encampment, it is *deconstructed* and then redefined by applying the concepts of role and spatial segregation. This process resulted in a more explicit definition and application of a new terminology, *extreme residential spatial segregation*, which both exposes its underlying characteristics, and its similarities to other analogous structures. Because this contributes to a deeper understanding of encampment, it reduces the ambiguity that is commonly found in social science discourse, resulting in an analytical approach that is more precise.

4. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

It is impossible to summarize here the numerous theories within refugee studies, or sociological theories on conflict, as various researchers and practitioners adopt diverse theoretical frameworks dependant on their epistemological assumptions or value premises. Considering the critical importance of the theoretical and conceptual framework for the inductive process of this study, the components were carefully chosen based on their pragmatic applicability and functionality to direct and organize the analysis (e.g. operationalizing multi-dimensional terminology such as conflict, segregation, and encampment). Also considered was their interpretive power to define, examine and 'translate' the empirical data in order to answer the research problem.

4.1 Theoretical Basis for the Analysis: Conflict Theory

This chapter summarizes key concepts within and relevant to conflict theory including its relationship to underlying factors (such as power, social order, and stratification of society), and the role of *incompatible goals* as a root to conflict.

There are numerous definitions and ways for perceiving conflict based on the theoretical orientation, from a simple struggle for status (Park & Burgess 1921), to interaction of groups who believe they have incompatible objectives (Kreisberg 1982). However, in order to first establish the context of the concept, the fundament is presented. Although all the underlying concepts of conflict are not directly applied in the analysis, each layer is deconstructed because appreciating the nature of power and its relationship to the dialectic of control is *essential* to understanding the 'mechanism' of conflict.

Conflict theory within sociology is derived from Marx's ideas concerning a fragmented society, and highlights the functions of power, and use of that power (coercion) to create social order (Andersen & Taylor 2006). Marx believed that this economic organization of society (e.g. bourgeoisie who own the means of production, and the proletariat who sell their labor) had the most important impact on people's lives, and that economic forces fundamentally shaped society (Andersen & Taylor 2006). Status differentiation of groups and individuals is overtly present in the social system, and social order is not maintained by a consensus of participants, but through domination from those in power who have the greatest material and symbolic resources (Richmond 1994; Andersen & Taylor 2006). Material resources are means of production, property, energy, raw materials, and goods and services derived through productive action. Symbolic resources have to do with the capacity to communicate, and are linked with information, intelligence, knowledge, art, technology and science (Giddens 1984). In addition to social class differences, ethnic, racial, religious and tribal differences can also be major sources of conflict between states.

Societies are generally organized via social stratification, "a relatively fixed, hierarchical arrangement in society by which groups have different access to resources, power, and perceived social worth" (Andersen & Taylor 2006: 212). "This asymmetrical distribution gives rise to 'structures of domination' embedded in political, economic, and social institutions that can be oppressive" (Richmond 1994: 7) which is used by the controlling group to actively maintain their position. Power is used at the expense of weaker groups, who are bound to their status in society through social control, and the resulting "exploitation can be physical or psychological. It implies the manipulation of others through ideological indoctrination as well as material deprivation." (Richmond 1994: 7). And since power is root of all social relationships and interaction, resentment and hostility become continual elements present in society. Although this asymmetrical distribution of power and resources is not always the cause of conflict, it is a common associative factor, as groups and individuals struggle for control over resources, and advance their interests (Richmond 1994; Andersen & Taylor 2006). Although individuals and groups are subordinate to societal structure in the conflict theory perspective, power struggles between conflicting groups can also be the source for social change.

4.1.1 Power and Socialization

Ingrained within the realms of domination and social control is the concept of power. However, due to its complexity and applicability to all disciplines, and social contexts, there are numerous methods for approaching, perceiving and examining the notion of power (with varying degrees of commonalities and discrepancies), which makes it problematic to address. Guiding this investigation from a conflict perspective, the critical dimensions are: 1) the operationalization of power [*what are its components?*], and 2) the utilization of power [*how is it applied?*] in an asymmetrical society.

Both Hegel and Foucault and many others[25], divide the structure of power into several types. Foucault's 'power over', corresponding with Hegel's types of power, *Macht* and *Gewalt*[26], is the ability to have control over others, and is most relevant to the conflict perspective because it emphasizes the context and dynamics of domination, which is both externally exerted and internalized (Rowlands 1995).

On the mechanisms of power, Foucault states, "the term 'power' designates relationships between partners" and "the domination of the means of constraint, of inequality, and the action of men upon other men" (Foucault 1982: 786-787). The established hegemony is maintained and reinforced by complex systems in greater society, externally through social institutions and interaction, as well as internally through everyday practices and shared beliefs (e.g. cultural norms) (Andersen & Taylor 2006). Berger noted the dual nature of this relationship, that while people live in society, society also lives within people (Berger 1963). Charles Cooley and George Mead, theorists of the Chicago School in sociology, were specifically concerned with this interdependence between the individual and society (Andersen & Taylor 2006). Consequently, individuals and groups develop through their interactions with others, and through the process of *socialization*, are shaped to 'fit' within society and its expectations (Andersen & Taylor 2006).

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[25] Other theorists and researchers, such as Rowlands (1995), and Kabeer (1999) who applied it to gender and empowerment, based on earlier theories by Hegel, Foucault, Weber, and etc.

[26] "*Macht* is primarily the power held by persons in virtue of an institutional position (of power) that enables them to influence and control people, things and events…[and] *Gewalt* is the power to force (rather than influence) people to do what one wants. It is often, but not always, equivalent to 'violence' (*Gewalttätigkeit*, literally ' *Gewalt*-activity'). More than *Macht*, it suggests the application of force or power…but *Gewalt* also means legitimate power, and then refers to the specific organs of state-power and to the power wielded by officials of these organs" (Inwood 1992: 106).

4.1.2 Structuration and the Dialectic of Control

Giddens suggests that society does not determine people's behavior in a mechanical way; his less rigid and more dynamic view of the interconnected relationship between structures and actors is called 'structuration' (Giddens 1984). Although social control mechanisms constrain the actors within them, the relationship between them is more complex involving inter-subjective meanings, so actors also have the ability to transform the structures by perceiving and acting on them in new ways (Giddens 1984).

Therefore the intrinsic dialectical nature of the uneven power structure has its counter-force in Foucault's 'power to', or Hegel's *Kraft*[27], which is the ability to do what you want, and having the capacity to resist 'power over' exercised by others (Rowlands 1995). This dimension of power is relevant to the counter-movement against domination by the subjugated class, which in turn creates conflict. It is this perspective on resistance that corresponds to Giddens' 'dialectic of control' (Giddens 1984: 16) or the capacity of individuals or a group to garner material and symbolic resources to 'resist' and 'act otherwise' to alter the course of events (Giddens 1984). Thus power relations are not simply top-down but are always two-ways between actors, and this capacity sustains the possibility of conflict.

An important observation that Richmond makes based on the dialectic of control is that although dominant parties often try to suppress these resistance movements with the use of force, the subjugated parties can also use force in defense and retaliation, thus fueling more conflict. Furthermore, the escalation to violence cannot be equated to power, as violence is simply instrumental in this case, and in fact could be an indication of the weakness or fragility of power and legitimate authority (Richmond 1994). Now that the underlying root of conflict has been identified, the specific contributing factors for conflict behavior are clarified in the next section.

4.1.3 Factors of Conflict Behavior

There are three different approaches for evaluating a conflict situation: 1) examine the origin of the conflict, 2) consider the conflict actions, and 3) focus on the conflict dynamics (Bartos &

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[27] "Kraft ('force, energy, vigour, strength', etc.), when applied to a person, means his individual physical, intellectual or moral power to effect things" (Inwood 1992: 106).

Wehr 2002). Once you can identify the probable causes of conflict, then it is easier to understand and explain why a conflict exists. In an asymmetrical system, it can be assumed that groups in their struggle for status or resources have 'incompatible goals' and/or hostility, which escalate into a distinctive behavior, called *conflict behavior* (Bartos & Wehr 2002). Thus, according to this framework a conflict situation occurs when "actors use conflict behavior against each other to attain incompatible goals and/or to express their hostility" (Bartos & Wehr 2002: 13). In order to deconstruct the dynamics of conflict, the framework developed by Bartos and Wehr (2002) is very useful for isolating and then analyzing the various aspects of conflict. This is the first study to apply this conflict model to refugee studies and encampment.

4.1.3.1 Incompatible Goals

When groups are horizontally and vertically differentiated, the different roles they play in a system or society can lead to 'incompatible roles', which in turn contribute to the development of incompatible goals. Vertical role differentiation is different roles within a power hierarchy, while horizontal role differentiation can be explained as task specialization, where people play different and specialized roles (that are not hierarchical). Aside from incompatible roles, groups can also have incompatible goals due to contested resources and incompatible values (Bartos & Wehr 2002: 29).

Contested resources have to do with power, wealth, and prestige, and often are disproportionately distributed between groups due to several factors. Relative deprivation, which is a perceived unjust resource allocation in comparison to what you had before, or what other groups have, or when instituted by a 'illegitimate' power, can cultivate a sense of injustice (Bartos & Wehr 2002: 29-35). In addition, two other relevant factors are, absolute deprivation, when a group is objectively (completely) deprived of necessary resources to live, and a belligerent culture, defined as "a disposition toward coercive action" (Bartos & Wehr 2002: 36). When the sense of injustice is combined with the last two factors, the 'resources' in question can become contested, and one group disputes the way the resources have been allocated (Bartos & Wehr 2002). Of course the role of asymmetrical resource allocation leading to conflict between dominant and subordinate groups has been presented extensively in a previous section, from its roots in Marxism to current interpretations by Richmond (1994) and Giddens (1984). However, the pivotal role of incompatible values has not yet been addressed.

Each society creates – and is created by – a social structure with common shared cultural values, which are the "standards of rightness and goodness that hold a culture and society together" (Bartos & Wehr 2002: 41). When *physically* separated, interaction between groups decreases. Separation also creates an *ethnocentric* unified group identity, where groups create identities that justify their imagined superiority over other groups. In the context of a larger group like the nation-state, this is known as nationalism (Bartos & Wehr 2002: 43-44). Moreover separated groups tend to progress in diverse directions, leading to different cultures, which in turn contribute to the development of incompatible values (Bartos & Wehr 2002: 41). To sum up, incompatible roles, contested resources and incompatible values are all possible contributing factors for goal incompatibility and conflict behavior, and are organized in Figure 5. To further elaborate on the divisive nature of two of the factors presented, horizontal and vertical differentiation and separation, its conceptual relationship to role and spatial segregation is explicated in the next section.

Relative Deprivation

Illegitimate Power

Sense of Injustice

Absolute Deprivation

Belligerent Culture

Contested Resources

Horizontal and Vertical Differentiation

Incompatibility of Roles

Separation

Incompatibility of Values

Figure 5. Causal Model for Incompatible Goals (Adapted from Bartos & Wehr 2002: 48, Fig. 3.2)

4.2 Conceptual Context of Separation

As mentioned previously, forms of social differentiation (categorization) and various methods of separating of groups is an integral part of maintaining social order and socialization of individuals in an asymmetrical society. Allport emphasized the 'normalcy' of social categorization, "the human mind must think with the aid of categories…once formed, categories are the basis for normal prejudgment. We cannot possibly avoid this process." (Allport 1979: 20) This is a reality that all individuals and groups face, and depending on the

context, we all participate and belong as a part of some 'in-groups', while we are excluded (or exclude ourselves) from other 'out-groups' (Andersen & Taylor 2006).

Since I was unable to find comprehensive theoretical or conceptual literature concerning separation or segregation, I combined various sources to develop a compilation of key working concepts that I find relevant to encampment. Foucault's theory on 'dividing practices' is useful as a foundation to establish the context of segregation and encampment. After presenting the various definitions for segregation, I adapt and expand upon segregation 'theory' (inductively based on the empirical data I compiled on refugee encampment), in order to develop a new category of segregation. I label this category of segregation "extreme residential spatial segregation", and define its properties and relation to encampment at the end of this chapter.

4.2.1 Dividing Practices

As mentioned before, separation methods are inevitable in most social settings, and based on socially constructed criteria. Foucault critiques this fact as part of "objectification which transform human beings into subjects" where they are categorized by what he calls "dividing practices" (Foucault 1982: 777). Like socialization, these dividing practices are the manifestation of disciplinary power, and are the *modus operandi* of domination fostering the spatial and social exclusion of certain individuals. "The subject is either divided inside himself or divided from others. This process objectivizes him. Examples are the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, the criminals and the 'good boys'" (Foucault 1982: 778).

Rabinow further interprets Foucault's dividing practices as a "process of social objectification and categorization, [where] human beings are given both a social and a personal identity... [using] modes of manipulation...and the practice of exclusion – usually in a spatial sense, but always in a social one" (Rabinow 1984: 8). Through dividing practices humans are divided and classified according to criteria such as class, race, ethnicity, religion, and gender. According to neo-Marx theorists, the dominant class exploits these divisive practices to maintain power and social order (Richmond 1994).

Weber, in writings about class and status, remarked on the strategic use of physical separation in that the dominant class "was sustained through preserving social distance and a measure of

exclusiveness" (Richmond 1994: 5) and that status groups were unequivocally "linked to 'race', language, religion, nationality, and cultural differences [in that]…Social 'closure' arises as a result of defining membership in terms of ascriptive criteria" (Richmond 1994: 5). Racism, prejudice and discrimination are tools in the 'structures of dominance' and are some of the most pernicious and enduring fundamental bases for conflict in society (Allport 1979). The categorization, as well as social and spatial division, becomes 'real' and is reinforced through the process of internalization, influencing how people interact and perceive themselves and others. Thus a person's place (classification), and how they are perceived in society, becomes actively incorporated into his/her self-image (Richmond 1994).

4.2.2 Separation Through Segregation

The fundamental principle of separation as a means of social control has a long history and has been extensively used in many contexts and situations to reduce tension and conflict (Richmond 1994). Examples vary from benign applications (e.g. special classes for disabled children), to mid-range applications such as political separations (e.g. agreed-upon border movements in Europe), to the most detrimental (e.g. extermination camps in wartime). Some groups are even separated and exiled within their own country of origin (e.g. aborigines in Australia and indigenous peoples in Canada and US living on reservations).

Considering that the diverse modes for separation, this paper focuses on the concept of segregation as the key underlying structure in encampment of refugees. Segregation is multi-dimensional concept that is hard to define in absolute terms. It refers to territoriality, racial/ethnic/economic/political (etc.) separateness, spatially or ideologically and can be used to protect certain groups from others (Albert 2003: 59). Segregation is "a process of clustering wherein individuals and groups are sifted and sorted out in space based on their sharing certain traits or activities in common" and "almost always involves… discrimination by one group against another…with actions and practices by members of the dominant group that limit the opportunities of a less powerful group" (Adeboye 2003: 304).

Schelling describes that "some segregation results from the practices of organizations; some is deliberately organized; and some results from the interplay of individual choices that discriminate…[and it can be] "reciprocal or one-sided" (Schelling 1971: 143). Segregation can

be organized (i.e. institutionalized) or unorganized (i.e. voluntary), but a primary mechanism in the practice of separation is always a system of inequality and exclusion of one group by another group, and "the group that is of lesser social status will be referred to as the *segregated* group" (Clark et al. 2004: 495). Thus, segregation is commonly involuntary, resulting from legal actions or other norms that force one group to be excluded and separated from the others. Involuntary segregation can be either "*de jure* (created by laws that prohibit certain people from interacting with others or place limits on such interactions) or *de facto* (created by unwritten norms that result in segregation in a way that resembles if it was legally required)" (Kornblum 2008: 305).

Segregation can be manifested in two forms: 1) role (social) segregation, the separation of groups by norms/rules that specify behavior, and 2) spatial (physical) segregation, the separation of groups into differing spatial spheres (Jackman 1994: 128). Role segregation dictates behaviors such as: tasks in economic/social life (e.g. occupation), interpersonal behaviors for interactions, and physical markers (e.g. dress codes) (Jackman 1994: 129). This can also be classified as 'activity' segregation referring the localization of certain activities (e.g. social, relational, and economic) (Boal 1976). Spatial and residential segregation is the most common and is developed through role segregation (Jackman 1994: 131).

4.2.3 Extreme Residential Spatial Segregation and Encampment

The most extreme version with the largest physical distance of spatial segregation is residential segregation, where groups are allocated to differing, distinct residential areas (Jackman 1994: 133). Examples of this type of segregation are numerous, such as segregation of blacks in America, apartheid, and encampment of Jews (and other 'undesirables') in Germany during World War II (WWII). The last two examples both incorporate the restriction of movement and forced containment, making them most similar to refugee encampment. Encampment is the most severe and prohibitive version of segregation and thus can be termed *extreme residential spatial segregation*. A working definition for 'camp' relevant to this study is a designated area of confinement, containment, or even imprisonment of a segregated group, which falls under this category of segregation.

There are various degrees of severity, restriction and violence in different kinds of camps, ranging from least punitive (displacement, resettlement, refugee, detention and internment camps), to the most malicious (labor, concentration, and extermination camps in Nazi Germany during WWII). The conceptual source of each of these terms is unambiguous and self-explanatory, yet it's a paradoxical mix of graphic notions: displacing, settling again, taking refuge, detaining, interning, concentrating, and exterminating. But not that herein lies the varying *reasons* and *objectives* for encampment of certain groups depending on the context. Other embedded elements in encampment besides containment are: the supreme authority of the institutional structure; and the insecure factors of unknown duration of confinement, and future life outcomes.

As far as defining what is considered a refugee camp or settlement, Richard Black asserts that there are various elements that comprise a standardized view: "the most obvious example… are, effectively, tented cities…[but] a wider definition…to describe both 'small, open settlements where the refugee communities have been able to maintain a village atmosphere' and 'larger, more crowded camps' where they are 'more dependent on assistance'" (Black 1998: 2).

Some researchers have associated encampment with imprisonment. Kaiser sums up a widely held perspective that refugee camps are "prison-like places where rights to freedom of movement – and related access to education, employment, meaningful family life and livelihoods – are denied refugees via this mechanism of control and containment" (Kaiser 2006: 604). While others have even related encampment with modern-day slavery, "[Nazi] concentration camps resembled slavery…they, too, had a closed authority system. The guards exerted minute control over the inmates. They had the power of life and death" (Guterman 1975: 189). Furthermore, "Like the first generation of slaves, the inmates of the camps under-went a series of shocks and traumas…their arrest at night, their chronic hunger, the constant threat of death, which, when it came, was unpredictable, and the ever-present brutalities and tortures" (Guterman 1975: 189).

To conclude, the connection between encampment and conflict is established via two principal factors of incompatible goals: 1) role segregation, which creates vertical and horizontal

differentiation, and 2) spatial segregation, which actualizes the physical separation between groups. The next section specifies the context – including the history, setting and organization of camps in both Ghana and Tanzania – in order to provide the basis for examining the actors and conditions involved.

5. Comparative Contexts: Refugee Flows into Ghana and Tanzania

As of my visit in January this year, Buduburam has approximately 11,000 registered refugees remaining (UNHCR 2010) and approximately an additional 5,000-9,000 unregistered refugees according to both UNHCR staff, the camp director, and refugees living in the camp. After 20 years in exile, the future of Liberian refugees in Ghana is still uncertain. However, when contrasted to many other hosting contexts in Sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana's refugee situation is the somewhat limited in time and scope, considering the small-scale nature and duration of these flows. Unlike Ghana, Tanzania is quite an experienced host, duly earning its right to join the ranks of 'fatigued host countries' as the largest refugee-hosting country in Africa between

Figure 6. Major Refugee Hosting Countries, End-2007 (UNHCR 2007: 8, Fig. 3)

Country	Refugees
Pakistan*	2,033,100
Syrian Arab Rep.**	1,503,800
Islamic Rep. of Iran	963,500
Germany	578,900
Jordan**	500,300
United Rep. of Tanzania	435,600
China	301,100
United Kingdom***	299,700
Chad	294,000
United States***	281,200

*   Includes Afghans in a refugee-like situation.
**   Government estimate.
*** UNHCR estimate based on 10 years of individual recognition of asylum-seekers. Figure excludes resettled refugees.

1997 and 2007 (Figure 6) (UNHCR 2009: 22). Having hosted displaced populations from 12 countries[28] since its 1961 independence (Chaulia 2003: 147) Tanzania is considered a regional pioneer in effective refugee settlement and one of the most important refugee hosting States (Morel 2009), making it a logical point for comparison. In the 32-year span between 1961 and 1993, Tanzania hosted approximately 400,000 refugees dispersed over 20 settlements nationwide (Chaulia 2003: 148). This is particularly the case in the two countries chosen for this comparative case study. Although Ghana and Tanzania are signatories to all three principal refugee rights treaties – the 1951 Convention, 1967 Protocol, and the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention (UNHCR 2006a: 205-208) – they both primarily use encampment and have domestic laws in place to control the freedom of movement and economic activities of refugees. However the severities of the application of these restrictions

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[28] These countries are (not in chronological order): Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, South Africa, Somalia, Sudan, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Zambia and Malawi.

in the two countries differ and are a crucial discussion point in subsequent sections as to whether the existence of the constraint or the severity matters more. The next section introduces and compares the historical context of the refugee 'landscape' in both Ghana and Tanzania.

5.1 Liberian Refugees in Ghana

When I was in Buduburam, there were definite signs of 'host fatigue' and implementation of another UNHCR's exit-strategy phase concerning the Liberian refugees who have been coming to Ghana for more than two decades. With the initial arrival of Liberian refugees fleeing the civil war that erupted in Nimba Country on Christmas Eve in 1989, the Ghanaian government called upon UNHCR for assistance as they were unprepared and unaccustomed to handling large groups of refugees (Dick 2002b). Quickly the National Reception Committee was constituted, comprising the Ghanaian Ministry of Mobilization and Social Welfare and other NGOs, as well as the ad hoc Committee on Refugees. The Committee then decided to use abandoned church land available in the Gomoa District, about 40 km east of Accra, in order to establish Buduburam Refugee Camp in 1990 (refer to Appendix IV for a UNHCR map of Ghana and the location of the camp)(Dick 2002a; Porter et al. 2008; Hardgrove 2009).

By the end of September 1990, there were already 7,000[29] Liberians settled in Buduburam who received *prima facie*[30] refugee status and a flood of relief aid from Ghanaian churches, NGOs and UNHCR (Dick 2002a). This number increased to over 25,000 in the mid-1990s as the conflict continued, and the devastating conclusion of the first phase of the Liberian Civil War, was seven years of violence, an estimated 200,000 war casualties, approximately 1.4 million internally displaced persons and 700,000 refugees that fled, out of a pre-war population of 2.8 million. Thus by the election in 1997, Liberia (which is one of the smallest West African states) was ranked sixth globally in terms of refugee producing numbers (Dick 2002a).

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[29] Over the course of Liberia's 14-year period of political unrest and civil war, numerous waves of refugees made their way to Ghana, with a majority settling in Buduburam, although a few groups went to Accra and other towns, or to a much smaller camp near the Ivorian border (Dick 2006a; Dick 2006b).

[30] UNHCR's *Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees* says in paragraph 44 that "while refugee status must normally be determined on an individual basis, situations have also arisen in which entire groups have been under circumstances indicating that members of the group could be considered individually as refugees. In such situations, the need to provide assistance is extremely urgent and it may not be possible for purely practical reasons to carry out an individual determination of refugee status for each member of the group. Recourse has therefore been had to the so-called 'group determination' of refugee status, whereby each member of the group is regarded *prima facie* (i.e. in the absence of evidence to the contrary) as a refugee" (UNHCR 1992: 9).

After this phase of the civil war, UNHCR Ghana shifted from a focus on care and maintenance to 'voluntary' repatriation through significantly reducing material assistance except to most vulnerable groups, and 3,597 Liberian refugees were assisted to repatriate (Dick 2002b). Despite the fact that by June 2000 UNHCR terminated all assistance, including food support through the World Food Program (WFP), to Liberian refugees in the West Africa region to force them to repatriate, a majority stayed in Buduburam (UNHCR/WFP 2006: 11). Of the over 20,000 refugees that stayed in Ghana, most feared that the conditions and leadership of new government did not change the situation or eradicate the ethnic and tribal conflicts (UNHCR/WFP 2006: 11).

Renewed fighting in Liberia in 2001 produced another much larger wave of refugees in Buduburam, straining the existing resources and infrastructure in the camp, which was originally designed to host only 5,000 refugees (UNHCR/WFP 2006: 11), until UNHCR re-established its program there in July 2002. Most of the refugees were young men, who fled forced enlistment into the rebel armies in Liberia, and Liberian refugees fleeing outbreaks of conflict in neighboring Côte d'Ivoire. By 2003, UNHCR registered 42,000 refugees living in Buduburam, although according to the Welfare Council of Buduburam Camp, 12,000-13,000 unregistered refugees were also present in the camp (UNHCR/WFP 2006: 11-12). All Liberian refugees who arrived after October 2003 do not have refugee cards and are not recognized by the Ghanaian government, and thus do not receive any direct assistance from UNHCR or the WFP (UNHCR/WFP 2006: 12).

However UNHCR did not continue care and maintenance programs in the camp, still targeting only vulnerable groups, and by 2004 the WFP resumed food assistance in Buduburam, but for only up to 10,000 new arrivals and vulnerable groups. Thus in 2005, Porter et al. noted that the recent arrivals had not received basic humanitarian support and had to somehow 'fend for themselves' (Porter et al. 2005: 236). From 2004-2006, UNHCR started 'promoting' voluntary repatriation again, facilitating several large-scale repatriations to Liberia of 3,500 in July 2006; 7,000 in June 2007, and 8,825 in 2008; and 985 in November 2010 (UNHCR 2010).

5.2 Burundian Refugees in Tanzania

A majority of refugees in Tanzania have come from Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Nonetheless over time, the largest and most significant group of refugees came from Burundi (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2010), making them a pertinent comparison group for this study.

The first significant wave of 160,000 Burundian refugees occurred in 1972, following a conflict that escalated when a Hutu organization attacked Tutsis with the declared intent of genocide, the Tutsi-dominated government responded with a violent large-scale retaliation (Milner 2009) and the situation progressively deteriorated with indiscriminate murders on both sides but the estimated combined cross-genocide is between 50,000 to 100,000 (Jackson 1999: 166)[31]. This conflict produced one of Africa's most protracted refugee situations at 36 years, with most of the approximately 200,000 Burundians settled in three designated areas in western Tanzania: Ulyankulu in Tabora Region and in Katumba and Mishamo in Rukwa Region; also known as the 'Old Settlements' (refer to the area map in Appendix V) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2010). Initially, UNHCR and the international community provided financial assistance and built core infrastructure in these villages, and each family was allocated between five and up to ten hectares of land for cultivation, which resulted in the self-sufficiency of the refugees by 1985[32] (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2010).

However, when the second large wave of 340,000 Burundian refugees fleeing ethnic conflict arrived in 1993 after the assassination of President Ndadaye, (Turner 2001; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2010), the tide had changed in Tanzania due to many reasons, including some negative experiences with generosity towards certain refugee groups such the Rwandans[33], the shift from African socialism to economic liberalization leading to scarcity of resources, and continued proliferation of conflicts in the region with massive influxes of

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[31] Although Turner writes, between 80,000 and 200,000 Hutus were massacred by the Tutsi government (Turner 2010).

[32] This group is distinct from the subsequent groups of Burundi refugees settled in camps along northwest Tanzania (Thomson 2009). In fact in 2009, the Tanzanian government with help of UNHCR took an unprecedented action by naturalizing 155,100 Burundian refugees who had lived in the 'Old Settlements' since 1972 and then supported repatriation for more than 30,000 refugees to Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Consequently the refugee population in Tanzania dropped suddenly by more than 200,000 to a total of 118,700 (-63%) in 2009, plummeting its global host country ranking from 7th in 2008 to 21st, with overall figures decreasing by 83% since 2002, when it was hosting nearly 700,000 refugees (UNHCR 2009: 22).

[33] Chaulia notes that Tanzania was one of the first African states to extend citizenship to refugee groups (Chaulia 2003), and in the case of Rwanda had granted citizenship, education and work to refugees, which was all abandoned in 1994 when they repatriated, making the government of Tanzania feel that their generosity was not respected or appreciated (LHRC 2006: 81).

refugees (Chaulia 2003). The 1994 genocide in Rwanda alone brought in 600,000 refugees into Tanzania (Turner 2010).

Greater Lukole refugee camp, comprised of two adjacent camps (Lukole A and Lukole B) in the Ngara district of the Kagera region in western Tanzania, was one of the sites established in 1994 in response to the new influx of Burundian refugees (Turner 2001). It started with only 8,000 refugees, but as the situation worsened in Burundi, the number grew steadily (the

UNHCR maps in Figure 7 show the evolution of the camp) (Turner 2010). In the end of 1996 when the Tanzanian government issued an ultimatum requiring 500,000 Rwandan refugees to repatriate within a month (Chaulia 2003: 161), and all the Burundian refugees who had been encamped with Rwandans were congregated together into Lukole, which was now two

Figure 7. Development of Lukole A: 1994 -1995 (Turner 2010: 12, Fig. 1.1 & 1.2)

consolidated camps, A and B. Burundi refugees from another camp in Kitali, about 70 km from Lukole, were moved to Lumasi, a camp right next to Lukole that was now vacant from the Rwandan repatriation, which was renamed Lukole B (Turner 2010:13-14). Furthermore, despite warnings from humanitarian organizations that the camp's population density was now producing a health hazard, Tanzanian officials rounded up nearly 100,000 refugees in a camp that held less than 20,000 some months before (Turner 2010: 13), which were now oriented for 'care and maintenance' instead of self-sufficiency (Chaulia 2003; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2010). Because the camps were only for housing and not agriculture, most of the camps in Ngara district had nearly 100,000 refugees (Turner 2001:75).

The context has been introduced in these analogous cases of national groups (Liberian and Burundian) facing prolonged ethnic civil war and exile in neighboring countries that are relatively peaceful but use organized encampment to manage refugee flows. The key differences are the size of the camp (with Lukole being between 2-4 times the size of

Buduburam depending on the time period), the restrictive environment, and experience level of the host-State, which create some differences in the analysis of various factors.

## 6. Encampment, Goals and the Emergence of Conflict

As mentioned in the theoretical framework, conflict is intrinsic to social interaction as different groups or individuals tend to have diverse perspectives, goals and interests. These goals may or may not be compatible, and can contribute to compromise or conflict between groups (Bartos & Wehr 2002). As shown previously in this paper, conflicts are incredibly complex and confusing, so applying a micro-analytical approach can be helpful to identify just a specific aspect of the conflict. This study investigates the notion that encampment contributes to conflict and thus the principal aim of the analysis is to investigate if encampment plays a role in creating goal incompatibility, an antecedent to conflict. As encamped refugees in Ghana and Tanzania are the main unit of analysis in this study, the perspective will be from their point of view as the central group involved in the conflict.

But how do we evaluate refugees' goals, or interests? Jacobsen summarizes refugees' immediate goals after displacement as involving: physical safety (from violence), minimizing economic and food insecurity, finding a settlement area, and locating family who are lost (Jacobsen 2002: 99). They must pursue livelihoods in one of two domains, either contained in official refugee areas (i.e. camps and settlements) or informal sector, which impacts their choice of goals. Then, if the displacement is protracted or goals are achieved (or not), new goals become priorities as the situation evolves (Jacobsen 2002: 100). While this gives a synopsis of generalized refugee goals, it does not provide a dynamic picture of how refugees' goals are affected by the structure of encampment or by interactions with locals in host-State or UNHCR (who may have opposing goals causing conflict). From the analysis it will be clear that the main goals of the refugees in Lukole and Buduburam were to create some sort of meaning in their new 'home'. This largely amounted to a desire for self-reliance and ability to take care of one-self and family. We will see how this was strongly impeded, though in different ways, by the 'encampment situation' in the two camps. In Lukole the bureaucratic logic that permeated the camp led to a general feeling of disempowerment and even moral decay among the refugees that went against their desire for independence.

6.1 'Conflict Mapping'

In order to systematically organize and evaluate these factors, theoretical tools can act as a roadmap to isolate essential elements and expose the connections that assist in answering the research question. Subsequently, the subjective experience of encampment is *deconstructed* and then analyzed against each possible causal component of goal incompatibility (contested resources, incompatible roles and incompatible values) by using the technique called 'conflict mapping' (Bartos & Wehr 2002).

Referring back to the theoretical framework, a causal model was presented according to the various factors involved in the development of incompatible goals (Figure 7) leading to conflict. In the process of reformulating Bartos & Wehr's conflict theory in relation to encampment, I adapted the conflict map to incorporate the conceptual framework of role and spatial segregation as a part of the contributing factors for incompatible goals. The connection between encampment and conflict is established via two principal factors of incompatible goals: 1) role segregation, which creates vertical and horizontal differentiation, and 2) spatial segregation, which actualizes the physical separation between groups. This relationship is added into the new model (Figure 8).

Figure 8. *Adapted Causal Model*: Incorporating Role and Spatial Segregation as a Factor in Incompatible Goals (*Author's own figure*)

Investigating the factors through conflict mapping enhances the investigative process by specifying the context, identifying the parties involved, and revealing the dynamics (Bartos & Wehr 2002). The now combined theoretical and conceptual framework is applied to compare two cases in Ghana and Tanzania to question if each of the operational factors in the model

contributes to incompatible goals between refugees, the host-State, and UNHCR. However, the resulting analysis cannot of course explain all relevant aspects in encampment, but attempts to describe the possible 'roots' of the conflict. It is important to note that in order to analyze multi-dimensional contexts such as encampment using this process, often I had to rely on my insights and instincts from observations and sometimes reach beyond available facts or data. Thus the same data could have been interpreted and mapped in various ways. The next section identifies the parties involved.

6.2 Key Actors in the International Refugee Regime

According the *Statute of the Office of the UNHCR* (1950) the most important actors in the IRR are clearly identified as:

> *The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*, acting under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assume the function of providing international protection, under the auspices of the United Nations, to refugees who fall within the scope of the present Statute and of seeking permanent solution for the problem of refugees by assisting Governments and, subject to the approval of the Governments concerned, private organisations to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, or their assimilation within new national communities (UNCHR in Dick, 2002a).

This incorporates the camp administration, which is usually UNHCR and NGOs (which includes private and religious organizations), plus the host-States, with UNHCR having the role of supervising, coordinating and funding[34] the various sub-contracted NGOs, called 'implementing partners', to provide direct assistance to refugees (Dick 2002a). Notably, refugees themselves are not identified as a key 'actor' in the regime, but only as the 'subject' of the intervention, or as a 'problem' to be solved.

In Buduburam, UNHCR had been partnering with four government partners: the Ghana Refugee Board (GRB), the National Disaster Management Organization (NADMO), the Ghana Health Service, and the Ghana Education service. They also partnered with five national NGOs,

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[34] UNHCR is also responsible for annual efforts to raise funds for its programs and is consequently accountable to donors.

and 2 inter-governmental partners (UN Volunteers and International Organization for Migration). The implementing partners implemented 85% of UNHCR's operations (UNHCR 2010). The camp director is part of the Ghanaian government agency NADMO, and at the time I was there was also the *de facto* head of the GRB. The appointment of the new director and board of GRB had been very delayed due to a new election, and thus in early January was not functional. I was told by UNHCR that all funds for Buduburam are channeled through them and then distributed to the partners.

In Lukole, Turner writes then he was there in 1997-1998, UNCHR and the other relief agencies were in charge of camp governance, and all funds are channeled through UNHCR. However, the other relief agencies ('implementing partners') were in charge of the daily operations, such as registration, food distribution, health, education, building roads etc. The Tanzanian government was mainly responsible for controlling and security, monitoring who went in and out of the camp (Turner 2010: 45).

6.3 Assymetrical Power: The Relationship Between Refugees and UNHCR

The following analysis demonstrates how the severe deprivation of power is the most important outcome of the process of role and spatial segregation that defines encampment. The transformation from self-reliance to near total dependency on UNHCR is so vast that the distinction between relative and absolute deprivation becomes irrelevant. This loss of power is closely related to the spatial segregation into the physical structure of the refugee camp, as well as the labeling and objectification that signifies the process of role segregation. The segregation not only confines the refugee to a defined physical space, but also to a narrow category defining the refugee as a helpless victim that needs protection and care. At the center of this two-fold process is the UNHCR, whose efficient care distribution depends on the notion of refugee-as-victim as a bureaucratic imperative.

6.3.1 'Dividing Practices': Role and Spatial Segregation

UNHCR's camp administration in both Ghana and Tanzania can be seen as manifestation of Foucault's disciplinary power, which controls and regulates, 'training' the administered to be refugees. The techniques of control "separates, analyzes, differentiates, carries its procedures

of decomposition"(Rabinow 1984: 188) through issuing refugee identification cards; visits and tours by government, UNHCR officials and experts; issuances of official reports, notices and announcements; demonstrating the domination and control of the 'authority'. The camps then produce 'refugees' through these 'dividing practices' as an *object of intervention*, excluding them socially and spatially from others ("the healthy") who do not have the 'refugee problem' ("the sick").

Regarding the institutionalization of separation, in *The Birth of the Clinic*, "Foucault demonstrates how the body was increasingly treated as a thing during the nineteenth century, and how this objectification was paralleled and complemented by the dividing practices instituted in the clinic's spatial, temporal, and social compartmentalization's" (Rabinow 1984: 8). As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, the underlying connotations of hospitals (clinics), and refugee camps have much in common, as both are institutions of forced isolation and separation of individuals that have a specific classification or even label: 'patients' and 'refugees'. The dual nature of isolation is social and spatial, where individuals with certain characteristics are physically excluded from mainstream society. Furthermore, just like in the case of UNHCR the classifications such as 'asylum seekers', 'refugees', 'prisoners' etc. facilitate methods of institutional administration of this exclusion (Wong 1989) and "bureaucratic interests and procedures are themselves crucial determinants in the definition of labels like refugee" (Zetter 1991: 41).

The 'dividing practices' classification mechanism incorporates both social and spatial exclusion mentioned by Rabinow (1984), instituting role and spatial segregation in encampment. In the encamped refugee context, spatial segregation is simply one facet of the more critical role segregation[35], as the behaviors and activities of refugees (whether it be economic, social, political, etc.) are limited to the physicality of the camp and structural boundaries of refugee status. The prohibitive institutionalized aspects of encampment, such as the restriction of physical movement/containment predisposing inequality of groups, is present in other forms

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[35] Thus these two types of segregation are intertwined in practice and in effects.

of 'extreme residential spatial segregation' like apartheid[36], literally meaning 'apartness', or 'aparthood,' the separation of people (Richmond 1994).

An integral component of the apartheid system was control of 'internal migration' (Richmond 1994: 208). Black citizens were severely restricted in their travel (needing special official permission to go to white areas), employment choices, associations (interracial marriage was illegal) and place of residence (Andersen & Taylor 2006). Furthermore, it completely divided the very *lives* of people into separate *inequitable spatial spheres*, "whites were allocated large central areas, and blacks displaced to distant urban periphery townships" (Spinks 2001:16)[37]. The consequences of less desirable spatial placement is even more critical in the case of encampment, as camps are 'purpose-built sites' usually in isolated, rural areas near the border, in close proximity to ongoing armed conflict[38] (Jacobsen 2001).

In Buduburam, security is not problem in this sense because the camp is not located on the border with Liberia (as they don't share a border), and refugees fleeing Liberia are safely sheltered from ongoing involvement or participation in the civil conflict. There are two critical uncharacteristic features of Buduburam that make it an exception, 1) it is located in a central region of Ghana, in Gomoa District, right near the capital and adjacent to Ghanaian villages, and 2) inhabitants in Buduburam have no restrictions on movement, and can leave and enter the camp as they please[39] (Dick 2002b). Since Buduburam is not physically isolated like other rural camps and is the most urban area in Gomoa District, it is bustling with activity and has a town-like atmosphere.

Lukole, the other extreme, is the classic example of a refugee camp in a conflict zone, isolated from the central part of Tanzania, located far in the Ngara district in a border zone from which

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[36] In South Africa, the Nationalist party came to power in 1948 on platform of apartheid, a legally enforced system of complete social, economic and political segregation and discrimination of people by race (Dvorin 1951), which preserved the already existing system of white supremacy. All South Africans were officially registered and classified, and then assigned to specific urban areas that were separated by buffer zones, designed to minimize any cross-racial interaction (Spinks 2001).

[37] Two main processes of segregation emphasize how profound this is: "One is organized action – legal or illegal, coercive or merely exclusionary, subtle or flagrant, open or covert, kindly or malicious, moralistic or pragmatic. The other is the process, largely but not entirely economic, by which the poor get separated from the rich, the less educated from the more educated, the unskilled from the skilled...in where they work and live and eat and play, in whom they know and whom they date and whom they go to school with" (Schelling 1971: 144).

[38] UNHCR advises that camps be built at least 50km from the border for security, however they are often still in the conflict zones even when complying with this regulation (Jacobsen 2001).

[39] Mobility is not an issue, the entrance to the camp has a guard and gate but everyone just walks around it, there is no checkpoint. Inhabitants are constantly going in an out of the camp, which is located on a very large main highway. In fact, the whole group of staff from CBW took a tro-tro to downtown Accra to meet some of our team from Denmark in May.

the refugees fled violent conflict. Only 60-70 kilometers to Ngara, literally right across the border is the Muyinga province in Burundi, where in 1995 there were massacres, and the Palipehutu started guerilla wars causing mass displacement (Turner 2001: 74). Since the camp was in a very secluded area, unlike Buduburam, issue of security was used to justify various containment measures implemented to highly control and restrict physical – *and all other types of* – mobility (Turner 2010: 44). Upon 'registration', refugees required special permission from the camp commandant to leave a zone of 4 km around the camp (Turner 2001: 77).

6.3.2 Socialization: Becoming the 'The Refugee'

The *socialization* process of encampment always starts with a compilation of refugees, *en masse*, into a selected and contained location, which is set apart and designated especially for them. In this case, Liberian refugees in Buduburam, and Burundian refugees into Lukole. Malkki (1995a) appropriately calls this grouping an "immense collectivity" considering the grouping is 20,000 or even 100,000 people, in the cases of Buduburam and Lukole, respectively. The grouping based solely on refugee status systematically homogenizes and excludes the refugees, subjecting them to 'objectification', transforming them into subjects "*the* refugee(s)".

UNHCR also uses role and spatial segregation in encampment process to 'depoliticise' and 'dehistoricise' refugees to conform them to the 'pure' refugee label (Malkki 1996), or to be what Turner explains as "innocent victims without a past and without political subjectivities" (Turner 2010: 3). Likewise, "in this way, the label is formed and reformed as part of a social compact between the state and its citizens so that we are all incorporated in the political project of making labels in convenient images, while keeping the refugees and other dispossessed people at a distance" (Zetter 2007: 190).

Moreover, the objectification process is applied *abruptly*, and drastically after displacement. As Burundian refugees settled in Lukole, Turner observed that "a striking feature to any refugee camp is the sense that its inhabitants have experienced a radical change in their lives, a 'catastrophic event'…these changes have all occurred very abruptly, with the choice of packing a few possessions and leaving one's home often being taken within only days or even hours" (Turner 2010: 5).

The 'abrupt' socialization process to become 'a refugee' is a mode of social control and manifestation of power, so that UNHCR can establish an orderly system to manage the 'refugee problem'. Normally in the socialization process (Figure 9), each ring of socialization represents a layer of social controls[40], or *agents of socialization*. Starting from the individual, they range from the subtlest systems of pressure, to the most overt (Andersen & Taylor 2006: 84). In the case of sudden displacement and then encampment, the socialization process is *truncated and transformed*, as the first four levels have been instantly dominated by the last two, institutions and coercion, as the most influental layers in refugees' lives. This jarring transformation and loss of Foucault's 'power to', makes the transformation a despairing process. Theresa, a woman interviewed by Hardgrove describes her beginning experience as 'a refugee' at Buduburam, "Being a refugee, we have never seen refugees before and we did not experience it before. And is a very hard thing to describe to be a refugee…You just abruptly be a refugee. You use to provide your own food and your own support for your children education and you cannot turn around to do anything…It is very dark…The problem is there—you cannot solve it" (Hardgrove 2009: 489).

Figure 9. Socialization as Social Control (Andersen & Taylor 2006: 84, Fig. 4.1)

Coercion: punishment, imprisonment, violence
Institutions: law, religion, economy, education, state
Language: cultural symbols
Peers
Family
Self

6.3.3 The 'Helpless' Refugee Role

Refugee role and spatial segregation is comprehensively social and 'activity'-based, dictating both activities and behavior, infusing the label with meaning and assigning a specific role to individuals who accept (voluntarily or forcibly) assistance. The spatial and temporal compartmentalization of encampment reinforces and clarifies the expectations of the 'helpless' refugee role, and the process of internalization actively incorporates this into the refugee's self-image. As a result, refugees are clearly cognizant of what is expected of them and play the role, as one Ugandan explained to Harrell-Bond:

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[40] Generally social control permeates every level of social interactions in our lives, and the process of socialization is profoundly significant and perpetuates itself. Thus the main product of socialization becomes society itself (Andersen & Taylor 2006).

…Our people believe that to be a refugee is to be taken care of by UNHCR. But [self-settled] people on the border, they don't think they are refugees. After crossing the Ugandan/Sudan border, they believe that *since they are still self-supporting, they are not refugees*. When they see you pack to come to the settlement, they say 'so you have accepted to be a refugees'. They use the 's' on the word Refugee' even if you are a single person, without knowing the connotation, even when they are actually refugees in the Sudan! (Harrell-Bond 1986: 6, *italic* added).

Furthermore encampment inherently perpetuated role segregation of refugees as 'victims' by attracting the already disadvantaged. For example, the demographic composition of refugees will vary between camped and self-settled refugees based on the factor of receiving humanitarian assistance, especially targeted aid (Werker 2007: 473). Refugees, who are less able to provide for themselves outside the camp, and desperately need the aid, are more likely to have to live in the camps, such as children, adolescents, women and the elderly (Crisp 2003: 121).

Zetter, who has been researching the adverse effects and evolution of the refugee label for 20 years, feels this is a significant problem, "our concern is fundamental – [it's the] processes by which refugees are socialized with certain identities [,] and the structural impacts (control, regulation, opportunities) of these identities" (Zetter 1991: 41) while Hovil surmises that:

The most striking contrast between those refugees living in settlements and those who are self-settled is not the difference in relative standards of living, but …response…to their predicament. The feeling of powerlessness pervading the interviews with settlement refugees stands in direct contrast to those who had opted out of the refugee assistance structures and were taking responsibility for their lives...By no means are their circumstances easy…because they are not recognised by the refugee assistance structures…However, the fact remains that their ability to move freely has a positive impact on their lives, allowing them to utilize fully the resources around them and make choices based on where they exist" (Hovil 2002:22).

In Lukole, Burundian refugees were subjected to an extraordinary number of official rules and regulations. They had rules about size, how and where to build their houses. They were told what to eat, and how much. They were not allowed to leave the camp, work, barter their food rations or be involved in politics (Turner 2010: 43). Because of this, Burundian refugees had very little decision-making power to make any choices about their lives, because it had already been determined for them. Their only role according to UNHCR was to be 'good' refugees, 'behave', stay alive and healthy and do as little as possible, waiting patiently until the time has come that they could be returned to 'normal' life (Turner 2010: 43).

In contrast, Liberian refugees are not legally restricted from traveling, working, bartering and trade, pursuing an education or even applying for asylum in Ghana (Dick 2002a). However in reality, their activity and social roles also ended up being greatly limited, like those of refugees in Lukole. They faced strict crackdowns by the Ghanaian government or police whenever they tried to gather and protest. Bureaucratic processes blocked their naturalization applications or work permits as well (Dick 2002b: Porter et al. 2008). And, nearly all the refugees I spoke with recounted stories of frustration regarding discrimination from Ghanaians, which limited them on a daily basis from bartering, traveling or building social networks outside the camp. They would always be perceived as those camp refugees.

Surprisingly, despite the differences 'official' restrictive levels in role and spatial segregation, the end result remained the same – *both* refugee populations were marginalized into their roles as 'helpless victims'.

6.3.4 UNHCR: The *Locus* of Power

Malkki found that in her research with Burundian refugees in Tanzania, that in order to 'more conveniently' administer its services, UNHCR had inadvertently created the camp as a *locus* of power:

> The spatial concentration and ordering of people that it enabled, as well as the administrative and bureaucratic processes it facilitated within its boundaries, had far-reaching consequences. The segregation of nationalities; the orderly organization of repatriation or third-country resettlement; medical and hygienic programs and

quarantining; "perpetual screening" and the accumulation of documentation on the inhabitants of the camps; the control of movement and black-marketing; law enforcement and public discipline; and schooling and rehabilitation were some of the operations that the spatial concentration and ordering of people enabled or facilitated. (Malkki 1995b: 498).

Turner describes the manifestation of UNHCR control and power in Lukole, "how the camp made up a *bureaucratic dream*[41] of efficiency and straight lines, and how the population was counted, measured, fed, nursed and generally kept in good health" (Turner 2010: 61, *italic* added). But the flip side of all this efficiency and control is an institutionalized structure that is an 'assembly line' to meet collective basic needs but has no room for individual human beings.

In the case of both Liberian and Burundian refugees in this study, the structure and process of encampment leads to relative and absolute deprivation, where there is a significant loss of resources such as wealth, power, and prestige in comparison to what they had before displacement. However of these three, the most critical loss is power. Although wealth and prestige are also important, the lack of individual power affects both. When encamped, refugees lose almost complete power (including control and decision-making ability) over their own lives and enter a situation of complete dependency. This deprivation of power that arises from refugee encampment is due to UNHCR's usurping of the refugees' power in order to 'care' for refugees in a system of patronage and control. Harrell-Bond (1986) is one of the first to analyze the 'refugees as a burden' paradigm, and the external imposition of dependency by the humanitarian aid regime onto the assumed to be 'helpless' refugees at the expense of their dignity.

In Buduburam, my interviews with several refugees revealed the progression of individual power deprivation from independent to helpless through the process of encampment. After displacement, most refugees lost job or livelihood opportunities, perhaps a home, family members, and possessions but encampment made them lose themselves. Exactly as Hardgrove

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[41] Given that I was in Buduburam during the UNHCR down-cycle and process of 'camp closure', I saw less the 'dream' and more a bureaucratic nightmare. After 'managing' the camp for nearly two decades, the series of failures with finding 'durable solutions', fostering 'self-reliance' or implementing forced 'voluntary' repatriation of Liberians, led to what I could sense felt like an atmosphere of panic at UNHCR office in Accra, and a feeling of confusion in the camp.

had found, "most recounted stories of previous independence, self-sufficiency…" (Hardgrove 2009: 489) of when they had a life in Liberia, taking care of themselves and their families. Becoming 'a refugee' was signified with a loss of self-reliance and independence that they had their former lives. Many adult refugees I spoke with emphasized that the two key issues that led to their feelings of helplessness and disempowerment were not being to provide consistently for themselves or their families, and the uncertainty and lack of control over their future.

6.3.4.1 From Human to 'Caseload'

An example of the ultimate objectification and subjugation of the refugees to the refugee role, role segregation in encampment also established both vertical and horizontal differentiation of groups within and outside of the camp. And as a result, as Foucault (1982) says the refugee is then "divided inside…[or] "from others". In both Buduburam and Lukole, after UNHCR's first division and objectification, of the powerless 'refugee' label, refugees were further divided by intricate categories based on 'vulnerability', creating an efficient bureaucracy that operationalizes the 'governing' and 'caring' for refugees.

> In order better to govern the camp and deliver services, the camp population was
> divided into several sub-groups depending on their degree of 'vulnerability,' in other
> words how needy they were evaluated to be. In a preliminary registration and
> demography report based on a registration exercise conducted February 28 – March 5,
> 1997, two pages are devoted to 'vulnerability'…twenty categories of vulnerability are
> identified from relatively common groups such as 'EA - Elderly Adult', 'SP - Single
> Parent' and 'UAM - Unaccompanied Minor' to more complex categories such as 'SP/MD
> – Single Parent/Mentally Disabled' and 'FF/UAM - Foster Family Unaccompanied
> Minor'. The latter categories are termed 'double vulnerables' in the report, and defined
> as 'individuals with more than one type of vulnerability' (Turner 2010: 47).

In Buduburam similar classifications have been implemented since at different times, various resources have been made available (i.e. food, healthcare) to only groups of refugees identified as the most vulnerable. Moreover, in both Buduburam and Lukole the refugees are subjected to objectification by the term 'caseload' depending on *when* they arrived. In Buduburam, to

determine what benefits they are eligible for, the protracted – first wave of conflict – refugees were called 'old caseload' and the newer refugees arriving in the early 2000s, were 'new caseload', and did not receive any assistance from UNHCR (Dick 2002b: 6). In Lukole, 'original caseload' referred to the first influx, while the term 'caseload' was also generally used to denote the whole refugee population at any given time (Turner 2001). Turner defines 'caseload' as "one of the bureaucratic terms used in UNHCR discourse…[and] Bauman describes how the use of impersonal concepts makes it easier for the bureaucrats involved to make unpopular decisions…it is easier to cut down the food ration for a caseload than it is for women, men and children" (Turner 2001: 70).

6.3.4.2 UNHCR: an Illegitimate Power?

Lukole, as Turner said, was a 'bureaucratic dream'. In contrast, in Buduburam I saw less the 'dream' and more a bureaucratic nightmare. It is important to point out that things were quite different at Buduburam because it was immersed in the impossible UNHCR 'exit' process of camp closure. After 'managing' the camp for nearly two decades, the series of failures with finding 'durable solutions', fostering self-reliance and implementing forced 'voluntary' repatriation of Liberians, led to what I could sense felt like an atmosphere of panic at UNHCR office in Accra, and a feeling of confusion in the camp. The dream of control and order had crumbled.

Most of the refugees I spoke to in Buduburam were quite confused when I asked them what UNHCR did for them in the camp. I usually got a long and diverse list of what they used to but didn't do anymore. As we were walking, Patrick, one of the young guys in our group said, "UNHCR used to give us food every week from that the building", pointing to a run-down vacant building a couple minutes walk from the entrance to the camp with a faded sign that said "WFP". I asked when they stopped, and he said that is was mostly stopped by early 2000s when they were trying to get large groups to repatriate, and then for a while was restarted for a couple years just for selected groups. I was so surprised that it had been quite awhile considering that most refugees I met had no stable source of income. During their field research, Porter et al. found that in 2005:

> …Of the [38,000] refugees currently resident in Buduburam, [an estimated] just over 10 per cent are employed in the camp formal/service sector, and informal economic activities, such as petty trading, and communications (space-to-space) inside and outside the camp, and an estimated 20 per cent personally receive remittances from abroad. This leaves the majority (around 60 per cent) with no regular source of income, though many are assisted at least occasionally through the remittances received by others within their family or social network. (Porter et al. 2008: 237).

As far as I could see, livelihood opportunities had not increased much since 2005. When I met with one CBO in Buduburam, Pan African Center for Peace, two of the women running the projects had been professionals in Liberia. Kebeh was a trained social worker, and Alva was a teacher who was now the principal in one of the schools run by a catholic church in the camp. They were trying very hard to utilize their skills to make a living, however in the confines of being 'a refugee' it was impossible, as they could not get approval for a Ghanaian work permit. Kebeh did get a part-time job working as a counselor for other for other refugees in the camp through the Ghanaian Social Welfare office, however Alva, could not teach or be part of a Ghanaian school because she could not speak Twi[42].

Although they technically had jobs, they were 'refugee jobs' and paid so little, that it was not enough to live on and they had to supplement their salary by doing many other types of activities. Alva called her job as a principal "volunteer work". Porter et al. observed the same in 2005, a only very few well-qualified camp inhabitants like nurses and teachers could get work but the opportunities were limited and even those with qualifications (like a health assistance certificate) or teacher (like Alva) were unable to obtain work (Porter et al. 2008: 237). After 20 years at Buduburam, this inability to integrate locally or become economically independent and self-reliant seemed to be resulting from the structure and process of encampment.

The power that UNHCR had usurped from refugees and the ability to control was connected with dependency and UNHCR as the patron providing for all needs. This made me wonder what happened to the power structure once UNHCR no longer 'cared' for the refugees. A factor

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[42] Although English is technically the official language of Ghana, Twi is the most widely spoken of the 'government-sponsored languages'.

contributing to conflict was the sense of illegitimate power. In Buduburam, although there was confusion and conflict, it was difficult to ascertain if the refugees still considered UNHCR to be a legitimate power in the camp.

When I first met Abraham Browne, the director of Children Better Way (CBW), the community-based organization (CBO) that we are partnering with in Buduburam, he indicated that as a refugee living in the camp for more than 10 years, he was quite critical of UNHCR and the use of encampment, as well as the hopeless protracted situation that Buduburam had become. However, strangely enough, he is still living in the camp. In fact many of the inhabitants of Buduburam complained quite a lot, strongly voicing how UNHCR was not keeping promises to refugees in the camp[43], but a large number have preferred to continue living in Buduburam instead of returning to Liberia, which was technically no longer in crisis. This demonstrates how pervasive dependency can be, as it seemed in general the refugees didn't question the authority of UNHCR, as they were quite accustomed to structure and its rules and control.

6.3.5 Cracks in the Locus of Control

In the internal report I received from UNHCR in January, it was clear to see evidence of the issues that have been unfolding in Buduburam for quite some time according to refugees I spoke to. This annual review report corroborated the issues between UNHCR and refugees that I caught a small glimpse of when I was in the camp. The first operational challenge listed in the report was:

> Some Liberian refugees continue to instigate rumours and actions aimed at a resumption of a large-scale resettlement to third countries. They utilized the media to further spread erroneous information to the general public. These actions sought to manipulate vulnerable refugees…(UNHCR 2010)

The report continued and explained how the 'troublemakers' were threatening the most vulnerable in the camp. This was the flip side to the 'innocent' and 'helpless' refugee role. This is what Turner calls 'the troubled nature of innocence'. In Lukole, when the role that was

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[43] I heard many stories and rumors of promised agreements of resettlement to the US, or promised sums of money ($1000) for repatriation, that were broken by UNHCR.

imposed by the camp and UNHCR didn't fit, the framing of refugees became polarized, and refugees were divided into 'victims' and 'troublemakers' (Turner 2010: 3-4). This problem with the refugee role is apparent in both Buduburam and Lukole. In Buduburam, there have been constant protests and skirmishes between refugees, Ghanaian police and camp administration. The protests have often been rebellions targeted at UNHCR and its policies in the camp, and for rettlement. In Lukole there were similar problems:

> It was my clear impression that most ground staff were generally committed to helping the refugees, but due to the bureaucratic imperative to count and control, a tug of war would often take place between relief staff and refugees. Relief staff would spend most of their time making rules and systems for ensuring that the refugees did not break them, while refugees would spend their time trying to bend the rules which they found unfair. This may seem paradoxical and it certainly frustrated many on both sides. (Turner 2010: 47-48)

The role incompatibility in extreme polarization of refugee labels from 'helpless' and 'vulnerable' to 'troublemaker' and 'criminal' has detrimental consequences for how refugees are perceived and treated. In this transformation, the discourse surrounding 'the refugee' regenerates and problematizes him/her as an object of fear, and "at worst, the refugee is criminalized or politicized as a threat to order" (Whitaker 1998: 414), with "the need for *surveillance*, *control*, *detention*, and *deportation*" (Whitaker 1998: 415). Ghana has been very actively deporting refugees who protest. The UNHCR report indicated that in April 2008, 16 Liberians registered refugees who were protesting in the camp were arrested and deported (UNHCR 2010), which is a clear violation of *non-refoulement*.

The structure of encampment enforces another deprivation of power by altering social relations between gender, age groups, and class/status. Turner points out that from the point of view of refugees in Lukole the camp had become a place of 'moral decay' that was compared to a constructed ideal of the old life in Burundi (Turner 2010). The first manifestation of this moral decay was in terms of gender roles, where men in Lukole were seen as having lost a large part of their traditional role as patriarch. The fact that UNCHR caters for all the refugees' needs especially in terms of food and clothes meant that the usual

breadwinners, men, were stripped of the possibility to provide for their family. The loss of this role had significant consequences for the men's sense of masculinity and power.

A common expression men used in Lukole was "UNCHR is a better husband", to indicate how women had lost respect for their husbands (Turner 2010: 67). Again we see how the structure of encampment transfers power from the individual (man) to UNHCR. This pits the Burundian men in the camp against UNHCR in a losing power struggle for the role of provider. In addition, UNHCR's equal treatment of all the refugees irrespective of gender, age or social status conflicted with traditional Burundian customs:

> The everyday governmental practices of the UNCHR, such as the distribution of food and clothes, were seen as a direct threat to social and moral order, as men became like women and women like men. So when the men fought back, they were not just fighting micropowers and bureaucratic practices…they were fighting what they perceived to be an agent: the UNHCR. (Turner 2010: 69)

The role segregation in encampment that creates 'the refugee' also strips men of their power and status in the community. Given that the refugees have such little decision-making power in daily camp life, this dual loss of power and status further humiliating and a threat to masculinity, which also affected family life. In the eyes of the refugees the threat to Burundian customs was evident in many aspects of camp life (Turner 2010).

6.3.6 Incompatible Goals Between Refugees and UNHCR

The two critical contributors to conflict between UNHCR and refugees are contested resources (power) and incompatibility of roles. From the analysis above, we now understand how role and spatial segregation in encampment shape the relationship between the refugees and UNCHR in a way that deprives the refugees of any sense of self-sufficiency and power over their lives. While the refugee's deprivation also pertains to wealth, it is clearly the loss of power that is the most crucial. This also leads to role incompatibility, which is evident in both cases between the refugees and UNHCR, stemming from the process of role segregation within the structure of encampment. The refugees are not intrinsically helpless, they rather *become*

more or less helpless in the process of the encampment. Major influence on the lives of the refugees is inadvertently usurped by UNHCR in order to 'care' for, what seen as clients in a system of patronage and control. In the abrupt process of becoming a refugee the subject behind the label is severely challenged in the truncated, but powerful socialization to 'refugeehood'. In this light we can see how the power to control the refugees' actions and lives is the contested resource in the relationship between the refugees and UNHCR. Both parties pursue to control the lives of the encamped refugees, but for different reasons. The overall goal of the refugees in this context was enough space for self-reliance, where they could take care of themselves and their family. The goal of UNCHR was to 'manage' the refugees as 'objects of intervention' in order to keep them alive and healthy. In the context of the camps these two goals were incompatible, creating a conflict symbolized by the 'dividing practices' utilized by UNCHR.

6.4 Conflicting Values: Misinterpretations Between Refugees and Host-States

When analyzing the interactions between refugees and locals in the host-States, incompatible roles and contested resources addressed before do not seem to be a primary contributor to conflict. Incompatible values due to spatial and role segregation seem to be the key factor in contributing to conflict, suspicion and discrimination in interactions between refugees and locals, with the issues more prevalent in Ghana between the Liberian refugees and Ghanaians.

In the beginning when Liberian refugees first came to Ghana, the local population was very hospitable, generous and kind. There had always been good relations between Liberians and Ghanaians (Porter et al. 2008: 242). But in the recent years the relationship has deteriorated greatly. Even UNHCR has acknowledged how serious the problem has become. In the annual review report mentioned earlier, the second operational challenge listed was "to correct wrong perceptions of Ghanaians about camp inhabitants" through planned paid media campaigns (UNHCR 2010).

Malkki writes that it is logical that one the first 'therapies' commonly imposed on refugees is a *spatial* one, as the camp is "a technology of power entailing the management of space and movement – for 'peoples out of place'" (Malkki 1992: 34). Because the concept of culture itself

is territorialized and "our concepts of space have always fundamentally rested on…images of break, rupture, and disjunction. The recognition of cultures, societies, nations, all in the plural, is unproblematic exactly because there appears an unquestionable division, an intrinsic discontinuity, *between* cultures, *between* societies…"(Gupta in Malkki, 1992: 28).

People that are separated from each other tend to develop different values and cultures, which can lead to incompatible values. In the case of Buduburam and Lukole, the spatial segregation adds a new dimension to the separation between the refugees and the locals in the host-State. Because spatial separation is structural, it has profound effects. It is the same process that builds nationalities, and can explain why people have different ideas about how to behave, what to eat, and what language to speak. In this way, it is integrated with personal and group identity, defining who you are and where you belong, and therefore "those segregated in this way see the world around them in 'we/they' terms. They try to defend themselves against 'external attacks'" (Albert 2003: 60). The perceived (or actual) threat of 'attacks' can be physical, cultural, religious or ideological, and have to do with conflicting needs and values (Jackman 1994; Albert 2003).

In Lukole, because the camp was so isolated and restricted, the refugees did not have a lot of interaction with local Tanzanians. However, some of the relief workers in the camp were Tanzanian, and the interaction was quite different than with the European relief workers (Turner 2010: 46). Turner points out that it was usually the lower-level Tanzanian workers that disgruntled refugees:

> At meetings refugees would complain that the Tanzanian distributors treated them
> with contempt and misused their power, often cheating the refugees of their fair share.
> This being one of the few direct points of contact between the governing institutions
> and the refugee population, it was here that their general sense of powerlessness
> surfaced (Turner 2010: 46).

In Buduburam, this sense of incompatible values was very clear between the Liberians and the Ghanaian locals and administration. Both sides seemed on constant guard to the possibility of attacks. In discussions with Liberians, I asked them what do you think of Ghanaians? They

almost invariably answered in stereotypes. One older woman said, "Ghanaians are mean and not open." Another said, "They are very rigid and discriminate…they will not sell you something for a fair price at the market when you don't speak Twi." Another woman told me that Ghanaians are racist, and they will charge a Liberian 100 pesewas for a bag of water, when they'd even charge an 'obruni' (*like me, as she pointed*) the regular price of 5 pesewas. Ghanaians also freely conveyed very negative stereotypes of Liberians. In fact, to me the comments seemed worse, because there was an underlying hierarchy: Ghanaians were the locals, and Liberians were foreigners. I heard a range of comments: "Liberians are troublemakers, they are lazy, and don't respect us." "Liberians are not Christian, they don't have good values…Liberian women are loose." There seem to be a lot of misunderstandings, and Ghanaians particularly consistently mentioned that Liberians did not have the same traditional Christian values, questioning their morality. There was also a sense that Ghanaians felt that Liberians were not grateful for the fact that they were staying in Ghana:

> One Liberian man described an incident when he was getting off a bus one day and a man heard his accent and started insulting him about Liberians eating government money and being stupid people. Others on the bus stopped the Ghanaian when he began to physically attack the man. (Porter et al. 2008: 244).

Ghanaians also perceive Liberian youth in particular as disrespectful to authority, deviant, and violent hoodlums, "A growing problem at the camp is restless youths that have no interest in attending school…area of the camp, known as 'The Gap', is particularly notorious. The Ghanaian police routinely visit the area to curtail any illegal activity" (Dick 2002b: 21). Many Ghanaians felt that Liberian refugees were criminals and that the camp was a hotbed of illegal and criminal behavior (Porter et al. 2008).

One critical incompatibility in Ghana is with language. Although Ghanaians speak English, most in the Accra area speak Twi. Liberians, because there are so many ethnic languages with none that are dominant, speak English to each other. Abraham told me that was a surprise when he came many years ago. Ava told me that the Ghanaians specifically do not like to speak English with other Africans. Segregation already leads to a blockage in the communication and interaction between groups, but adding a different language exacerbates the problem. "Such

blockages tend to increase mutual suspicion, distrust and hostility" (Clark et al. 2004: 497). This problem with language is something the Liberians faced everyday, at the market, in finding work, or even just riding the tro-tro around town.

Segregation also creates a distorted sense of social reality (Clark et al. 2004: 497) and can manifest ethnocentrism, as Turner observed in Lukole. The Burundian refugees had general feeling of being superior to the Tanzanians, so "seeing fellow Africans having so much influence on their lives, and earning so much more for the same work, made them resentful towards African relief workers" (Turner 2010: 46).

Ghanaian government officials also perpetuated the suspicion and hostility, such as the camp director at Buduburam. I found newspaper article in the Ghanaian Chronicle that recounts the same story about how the refugees are trying to kill him. One of the headlines in the article read: "War Declared on Ghanaian Officials" (Homeku 2011).

It is clear from the interactions and differing perceptions presented, that there are incompatible values between refugees and locals in the host-State in these cases, which contribute to conflict. In both Lukole and Buduburam, it appears that the spatial segregation in encampment is a factor in feeding the suspicion, hostility, and the 'we-they' feelings. When considering the all factors leading to incompatible goals, incompatible values are the most significant factor in explaining the emergence of conflict between refugees and host-States.

6.5 Cultural Factors Contributing to the Emergence of Conflict

We have so far considered the more important factors in terms of the structure and process of encampment that contribute to the emergence of incompatible goals and conflict. There is one last one that we consider although it does not directly result from the process of encampment and is impossible to measure or separate from the other factors. However, for this study, 'belligerent culture' is possibly an important contributing factor for conflict. The perspective of looking at culture and its relationship to conflict reinforces the fact that refugees are not a generic collective, void of a past nor future. Accordingly, it is quite pertinent to examine the possibility that a 'belligerent culture' can contribute to creating incompatible goals, especially considering the historical background of both Liberia and Burundi.

Both nations have a historical record of belligerency and 'war-like' behavior. It is difficult to say how much of this behavior can be explained by a belligerent national 'personality' or nature, or by the circumstances that people were exposed to. Bartos and Wehr state, "studies suggest that groups that have been subjugated for a long period of time develop a culture that equips them to deal with oppression" (Bartos & Wehr 2002: 59). Both refugee populations have been subjected to extended periods of oppression, the indigenous Liberian majority by the Americos, and the Hutus by the minority Tutsi-led government in Burundi; as well as recurring patterns of belligerence, perpetuated by multiple outbreaks of civil struggle and violence. These resulting circumstances can suggest that belligerent manifestations possibly reflect a characteristics and value of the culture.

The bizarre and unique history of Liberia could be a source for building a belligerent culture. Founded in 1847[44] as the solution to America's socially and morally disgraceful problem of slavery, Liberia was created as the first republic in Africa[45] (Dick 2002a). Post-Civil War newly freed slaves were sent to the quasi-American colony and got off to a bad start, by relegating indigenous Liberians to second-class status (Dick 2002b). The first settlers (i.e. forced migrants) arrived, a "beleaguered huddle of unwanted blacks who left America where their race conflicted with their freedom to find refuge in Africa where their freedom conflicted with their security" (Sanneh in Dick, 2002a: 11); and had no idea what they were getting into. For the next century and a half, this 1% minority *quasi*-imperial elite, ex-slave class and their descendants, the Americo-Liberians, struggled to maintain control and power, ruling and governing Liberia until the first military coup in 1980 (Dick 2002a).

By manipulating customs and traditions of what they considered were 'tribal people' (i.e. uncivilized), the Americos were able to gain and reinforce control, limiting their access to economic and political power with blatant discriminatory practices (Dick 2002a). Liberia was organized as two separate societies, with Liberia's tiny elite community reinforced by closely intertwined family networks of power and extreme and extravagant wealth, while the majority was poor, uneducated and marginalized (Dick 2002a). One of the days in the camp, over a bowl of Liberian peanut soup, Abraham told me a lot about the dire conditions for the majority of

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[44] The US government forcibly seized the land from coastal chiefs in the area and created a colony (Dick 2002a).
[45] Although the history of the area that is now Liberia predates American involvement, as trade routes and commerce with Europeans were well-established and existed for 200 years prior (Dick 2002a).

the population before the first overthrow of the Americo rule, marginalization led to exclusion from any social, economic, political and educational development or progress, he estimated that the literacy level of indigenous Liberians had been around 5-10%.

The incredible imbalance of power and resources would inevitably unravel the Americo hegemony, which had by the time of the coup disintegrated, and had been maintained by brute force (Dick 2002b). Unfortunately the military rule started by Samuel Doe, the indigenous, uneducated sergeant responsible for the coup, was characterized by fear, brutality and greed. Under Americo rule 'tribalism' or ethnic conflict between Liberia's sixteen ethnic groups had never become such a violent and destructive force as it did in the civil war, which rapidly disintegrated into a blood bath (Dick 2002a). The collapse of the government did not bring new opportunities or equality for the suppressed majority, but persistence of conflict and insecurity. This resulted in a complete demolition of social, economic and political structures, a protracted civil war, and a steady decline that Liberia is still struggling to rebuild today (Dick 2002a). Having spent time in Liberia in 2009, especially in Nimba County – the geographical nexus of the conflict – the overall defeated and miserable feeling of the area is *tangible*. The buildings, roads, and economy[46] are not the only things that have been destroyed, but talking to refugees dispersed around the county there is a lack of hope for the future. In conversations with both IDPs in Liberia and refugees in Buduburam, I got the sense that this history as the 'underdog' has a profound affect, and that they were all in an intense struggle with life, pushing and pulling economically and socially[47], as much as they could to get by.

Turner considers the history of the Burundian Hutus in Lukole and how it affects their adjustment to, and perception of, their new life in the camp. The history of Burundi is also severely marked by violent conflict since the time of its independence in 1962. Although the ethnic identities of 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' were consolidated during colonialism, they had not been particularly politicized until after the end of colonialism. After several years of shifting leadership, Colonel Micombero took power through a coup d'état in late 1966 establishing a

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[46] Liberia currently has a staggering 85% unemployment rate (DRC 2009).
[47] Liberians are not afraid to ask for anything that will get them ahead. In Liberia, I met a driver for DRC in the Nimba office who within five minutes of finding out I was American, began recounting his sob story, and asked me quite a number of times, very insistently, if my parents would sponsor and host him for immigrating to the US. We also noticed this frequently on my Save the Children Youth team when working with our partner CBO in Buduburam. Although we have explained many times how the funding application and cycle works, they continuously ask for numerous other kinds of funds that we are not allowed to provide according to our donor agreements with Dansk Ungdoms Fællesråd.

post-colonial government (Turner 2010). Claiming that the ethnic categories 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' were created by the former colonial powers as a strategy for subjugating and rule, the new government stated that any mention of ethnic diversity or categories would be a threat to national unity[48]. This position thoroughly concealed the fact that the government was comprised mainly of Tutsis, a minority group in Burundi (Turner 2010).

The Tutsi elite succeeded for the most part in aligning this 'anti-ethnic' sentiment with a modernization agenda by connecting independence with the shedding of 'colonial mentality', of which the notion of ethnicity was closely linked. Furthermore, the Tutsi's feared that liberal democracy and pluralism would open the door for struggle along ethnic lines resulting in an erosion of their minority rights (Turner 2010). Because government had the ideology 'the Hutu' construction was inherently ethnic (and supporting majority rule) opposing national unity, it justified keeping Hutu leaders out of central administration. This resulted in one-party patrimonial rule by the Tutsi minority elite.

As time went on, increasing paranoia developed in the Tutsi government as they failed to deliver on the modernization and development agenda. As a result, the Tutsi government purged both the administration and army of Hutus in 1969, and harassment of successful Hutu traders began at the local level. Over time, resentment built up among the Hutu elite as they faced reduced opportunities for social advancement (Turner 2010). On April 29 in 1972, between 300-500 armed Hutu insurgents launched a well-coordinated attack on government installations and military posts in two southern provinces, Rumonge and Nyanza-Lac. After these attacks they continued to kill Tutsi civilians indiscriminately in the area, resulting in a massacre of 2,000 to 3,000 people. The victims were mostly Tutsis, but also included Hutus who refused to join the revolution. Immediately the national army repressed the insurgency, and it evolved from "brutal counter-attacks by the army to systematic slaughter of all Hutu above a certain level of education" (Turner 2010: 31). The magnitude of the government's retaliation and number of deaths greatly is disputed as previously mentioned, estimated as 50,000 to 250,000 depending on the source (Malkki 1995a; Jackson 1999; Turner 2010).

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[48] Moreover, following the Tutsi persecution in 1959 as a part of the Hutu revolution in Rwanda, the Tutsi elite was very vigilant about stopping any ethnically based social movements.

Turner explains how this historical event stands out in the minds of the Hutu refugees, who perceived the events in 1972 as an eye-opening experience. This is because previously Hutus had not perceived these struggles as an ethnic conflict, and some even "collaborated with the army in rounding up fellow Hutu, and were afterwards told to dig their own graves" (Turner 2010: 32). So in the eyes of the Hutu refugees in Lukole, this event was a turning point where they were no longer naive 'innocent victims' that were 'blind to reality'.

On the other hand, this 'loss of innocence' was also partially constructed by a political campaign initiated by Hutu party, Palipehutu, and its founder, Remy Gahutu. After 1972 Gahutu went to camps in Tanzania and Rwanda and 'educated' Hutu Burundian refugees on the 'correct' history of Burundi, specifically the clash between the Tutsis and Hutus. In the late 80s this campaign continued in Burundi. In Gahutu's account it was the story of how the Tutsi minority stole the country from the naive Hutus, by tricking them into a false sense of community through the proliferation of Micombero's non-ethnicist ideology. Although the Palipehutu never came into power in Burundi, and were 'replaced' in 1992 by the more moderate Frodebu, the awareness they created of Hutu oppression by the Tutsi remained. When violence broke out again in 1993, the Hutu were ready to go on the offensive[49] and went on pre-emptive strike, massacring an estimated 30,000 Tutsi civilians, an ultimate 'loss of innocence' (Turner 2010: 1-2, 39).

The Hutu refugees that Turner eventually meets in Lukole in 1997-98 had fled from this last incident mentioned in the progression of violence. Because of this, it could be argued that the Hutu refugees in the camp had been greatly affected by oppression and hostility, contributing to a 'belligerent culture'. Turner acknowledges this connection when he says that it is a question of "…how they come to terms with their violent past and how they relate this to their everyday experience of the exceptional space of the camp" (Turner 2010: 2).

It is important to consider past culture and experiences of both refugee groups as a contributing factor to how they interact with UNHCR and the host-States. This past will affect how they perceive and respond to the structure and process of encampment.

[49] Turner writes that the Hutus were determined not to be 'killed like animals' like before (Turner 2010: 1).

7. Conclusion

This study examined how the structure and process of encampment shaped the relationships between refugees, UNHCR, and the host-States of Ghana and Tanzania, and asked whether encampment contributes to the emergence of conflict in the cases of Buduburam and Lukole. Besides the concepts of 'dividing practices', segregation and separation, a theoretical framework from conflict theory revolving around the notion of incompatible goals has been applied to the analysis. This was primarily in order to try and highlight some of the aspects of encampment that shaped the relationships between the camp actors and in their relationship to conflict.

One of the major findings of the analysis was the significance of the asymmetrical relationship between UNCHR and the refugees in Buduburam and Lukole. By utilizing the theoretical framework it was demonstrated how this relationship was shaped by the structure of spatial segregation and process of role segregation that the camps imposed on the refugees. This led to a near absolute deprivation of power for the refugees, who were left with little if any sense of self-sufficiency and agency over their lives. This loss of power is the most crucial for understanding the UNHCR-refugee relationship in camps, as it constituted the main contested resource: the power over the refugees' actions and lives. This contestation also related to role incompatibility, which is evident in both cases between the refugees and UNHCR, stemming from the process of role segregation within the structure of encampment. The refugees' were cast as helpless victims, which was a consequence of UNCHR's bureaucratic need for structure, control and efficiency, rather than a deterministic result of being a refugee. Thus, the role of 'helpless' victim did not fit well with the refugee's diverse backgrounds and need to be an independent human being. Although this exploration and model cannot make definitive statements about outcomes, it did appear that segregation and loss of power in encampment did have a negative affect on relations between refugees and UNHCR. Furthermore the contestation of the power and the incompatibility of roles are derived from the incompatibility between UNCHR's goal of keeping a perceived mass of helpless victimized refugees alive and the refugees own desire for self-reliance. This result suggests that the structure and process of encampment did contribute to incompatible goals between refugees and UNHCR, which could lead to conflict.

In regards to the relationship between refugees and host-States, in both Lukole and Buduburam, it appears that the spatial segregation in encampment is a factor in feeding the suspicion, hostility, and the 'we-they' feelings. This was more serious in Buduburam because they seemed to interact more with locals. This along with the protracted camp situation at Buduburam made local integration more problematic, and prevented refugees from establishing a sustainable livelihood. In this case the encampment in many aspects works against UNHCR's efforts to protect refugees and facilitate sustainable solutions. The data also suggests that the longer the refugees live in camp is also a negative factor in terms of their ability to become independent, and their relations with both UNHCR and host states.

Lastly the potential influence of a 'belligerent culture' in relation to contested resources and conflict was presented and considered, but in the cases at hand it is not really possible to discern the exact significance of this or if it contributed to conflict. However in light of the limited roles that are placed on refugees, I felt that historical context of both the Liberians and the Hutu Burundians were pertinent to consider.

Figure 10. Factors Map: Refugee Encampment and Incompatible Goals

Relative Deprivation:
Refugees don't have same power, prestige or wealth as before

Feelings of Injustice

Illegitimate Power: UNHCR

Absolute Deprivation:
Refugees don't have any power in encampment complete dependence

Contested Resources

Encampment of Refugees:
Segregation
Discrimination
Containment

Incompatible Goals

Incompatibility of Roles: refugees and UNHCR

Role Segregation:
Refugees cannot work or do livelihood activities, labeled as helpless victims or troublemakers

Incompatibility of Values: Between refugees and locals

Spatial Segregation:
Refugees contained in camps

Jeannie Morgan. Master Thesis. June 30, 2011. Development and International Relations.

8. Suggestions for Future Research

Now that it was shown that interactions in the refugee encampment system were interpreted in diverse ways between various groups, such as refugees, locals, and UNHCR, further analysis at this micro-level could be beneficial. Perhaps another perspective for future research could explore 'the opposite' of encampment and segregation, the local integration of refugees in host states by utilizing intergroup contact theory.

Intergroup contact theory is invaluable as a counterpoint to the previously presented conflict theories, which stress the inevitability of conflict, by highlighting the critical role of social interaction in *reducing* conflict and hostility. It is developed out of Gordon Allport's proposed 'contact hypothesis', which delineated key 'positive factors' in the reduction of prejudice between divergent groups. Prejudice is an unfortunate byproduct of conflict created by refugee encampment. Relating prejudice to solidarity, it could be associated with the presence of very low solidarity, by low levels of interaction, similarity (perceived), and liking. Expanding on (with some similarities) the factors presented for creating a high level of solidarity, contact between groups should be on *equal status*, in order to pursue *common goals*, via *cooperative interaction*, and sanctioned by *institutional support* (law, authorities or customs) (Allport 1979).

Using intergroup contact theory, a field study could investigate a refugee local integration program according to the factors of developing 'positive' intergroup contact: 1) equal status in this case could be *situational*, even if the groups initially differed in status; 2) *active* effort towards mutual goals are most effective; 3) cooperation should be an *interdependent* effort; and 4) support from authorities or social institutions should be *explicit* (Dovidio et al. 2005).

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Wong, D. (1989) "The Semantics of Migration." Sojourn 4(2): 275-285.

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10. Appendices

Appendix I: Complex Causal Factors: Displacement, Encampment and Conflict

Source: Author's own figure.

Protracted Refugee Timeline = Average 15 Years in Encampment

Conflict & Displacement

Cross-Border Refugee Movement

Tensions/Conflict At the Border

Further Straining of Resource Shortage

Security Issues

Tensions/Conflict Between Refugees and Host Country

Protection Needs for Refugees

Humanitarian Crisis (UNHCR and IRR Involvement)

Encampment and Segregation of Refugees

Discouragement of Local Integration and Self-Reliant Activities

Restriction of Movement, and Livelihood Activities of Refugees

Host Country and Donor Fatigue

Refugee Dependency

Withdrawal of UNHCR Support

Deterioration of Camp Conditions

Coerced "Voluntary Repatriation"

Appendix II: Major Protracted Refugee Situations (As of January 1, 2005)

*Source*: UNHCR The State of the World's Refugees 2006, Figure 5.1, page 107 (UNHCR 2006a).

Country of Asylum	Origin	end-2004
Algeria	Western Sahara	165,000
Armenia	Azerbaijan	235,000
Burundi	Dem. Rep. of Congo	48,000
Cameroon	Chad	39,000
China	Viet Nam	299,000
Congo	Dem. Rep. of Congo	59,000
Côte d'Ivoire	Liberia	70,000
Dem. Rep. of Congo	Angola	98,000
Dem. Rep. of Congo	Sudan	45,000
Egypt	Occupied Palestinian Territory	70,000
Ethiopia	Sudan	90,000
Guinea	Liberia	127,000
India	China	94,000
India	Sri Lanka	57,000
Islamic Rep. of Iran	Afghanistan	953,000
Islamic Rep. of Iran	Iraq	93,000
Kenya	Somalia	154,000
Kenya	Sudan	68,000
Nepal	Bhutan	105,000
Pakistan	Afghanistan*	960,000
Rwanda	Dem. Rep. of Congo	45,000
Saudi Arabia	Occupied Palestinian Territory	240,000
Serbia and Montenegro	Bosnia and Herzegovina	95,000
Serbia and Montenegro	Croatia	180,000
Sudan	Eritrea	111,000
Thailand	Myanmar	121,000
Uganda	Sudan	215,000
United Rep. of Tanzania	Burundi	444,000
United Rep. of Tanzania	Dem. Rep. of Congo	153,000
Uzbekistan	Tajikistan	39,000
Yemen	Somalia	64,000
Zambia	Angola	89,000
Zambia	Dem. Rep. of Congo	66,000

Note: This table refers to refugee situations where the number of refugees of a certain origin within a particular country of asylum has been 25,000 or more for at least five consecutive years. Industrialized countries are not included. Data does not include Palestinian refugees under the mandate of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

* UNHCR estimate.

Appendix III: Map of Warehoused Refugee Populations (As of December 31, 2008)

Source: World Refugee Survey 2009.

Appendix IV: UNHCR Map of Ghana Including Camp Locations (As of June 2005)

Source: UNHCR Website (UNHCR 2005).

Appendix V: UNHCR Map of Tanzania 'Old Settlements' Refugee Area

Source: Supplementary Appeal for Comprehensive Solutions for Burundian Refugees in Tanzania's Old Settlements (UNHCR 2008).